El Banco Filipino vs.

Palanca Facts: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco EspanolFilipino. His debt amounted to P218, 294.10. The parties to this mortgage at that time estimated the value of the property in question at P292,558, which was about P75,000 in excess of the indebtedness. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died without returning again to the Philippines.The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a nonresident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered.The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. Palanca appealed the judgment of the CFI due to its denial. Issue: WON due process of law was observed? Held: As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding;

(3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary. It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a non-resident, to take measures that in some way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition, and if he fails to do this, and fails to get notice by the ordinary publications which have usually been required in such cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide the consequences. The failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; As publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly

Lim vs. Court of Appeals Facts: On Dec. 7, 1992, Bistro Pigale, Inc. filed before the trial court a petition for mandamus and prohibition against Mayor Lim of Manila because the policemen under his instructions inspected and investigated its license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff. This resulted to the stoppage of work in Bistros night club (New Bangkok Club) and restaurant (Exotic Garden Restaurant) operations. Mayor Lim also refused to accept its application for a business license as well as the work permit applications of the staff members for the year 1993. Acting on Bistros application for injunctive relief, the trial court issued a TRO on Dec. 29, 1992 ordering Lim and/or his agents to refrain from inspecting or interfering in Bistros operations. However, despite the trial courts order, Lim still issued a closure order and sent policemen to carry this out. Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order and to dismiss the case contending that the power of the mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments as well as its staff members is inherent in the statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and licenses as expressly provided in Sec. 11 (I), Art. II of the revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Sec. 455 par. 3 (iv) of the LGC of 1991. The trial court denied Lims motion. Lim filed with CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against Bistro and Judge Reyes claiming that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction in favor of Bistro. CA sustained the trial court orders and denied Lims motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, Manila City Ordinance No. 7783 took effect. Lim ordered the WPD command to permanently close down Bistros operation. Hence; this petition for review on certiorari filed before the SC. Issue: Whether or not CA erred in upholding the trial courts order. Held: NO. Sec. 11 (I), Art. II of the Revised Chapter of Manila and Sec. 455 (3) (iv) of the LGC clearly provides that power of the Mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke is expressly premised on the violation of permits and licenses. The law refers to the

violation of the conditions on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse the issuance of such is premised on the non-compliance with the pre-requisites. The mayor must observe due process in the exercise of such power, which means that he shall give the applicant or the licensee the duty to be heard. Even though the mayor has the power to investigate private commercial establishments for the violations, still, he has no power to order a police raid in the guise of inspection or investigation. Lim has no authority to close down Bistro without due process of law. In this instant case, Lims exercise of power violated Bistros property rights that are protected under the due process clause of the constitution.

Rural Bank of Buhi vs. CA Facts: Buhi Bank was a rural bank. Its books were examined by the Rural Banks' Division of the Central Bank. However, it refused to be examined. As a consequence, its financial assistance was suspended. Later, a general examination of the banks affairs and operations were again conducted. The rural banks division found out massive irregularities in the operations, giving out loans to unknown and fictitious borrowers, and sums amounting to millions past due to the Central Bank. There were also promissory notes rediscounted with the Central Bank for cash. As a result, the Buhi Bank became insolvent. The division chief, Odra, recommended that Buhi be placed under receivership. Thus, the Monetary Board adopted a Resolution # 583, placing the bank under receivership. Odra, the division chief, was made the receiver. Odra thus implemented the resolution, authorizing deputies to take control and possession of Buhis assets and liabilities. Del Rosario, the Buhi Bank Manager, filed an injunction against the receiver, arguing that the resolution violated the Rural Banks Act and constitutes gadalej. The bank claims that there was a violation of due process. They claim that the bank was not given the chance to deny and disprove the claim of insolvency or the other grounds and that it was hastily put under receivership. Later on, the Central Bank Monetary Board ordered the liquidation of the Bank. The judge ruled in favor of the Bank and issued a writ of execution. The CA however restrained the enforcement of execution, citing that the Judge did not follow the orders, and thus required the Bank to yield to the CB. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed RULING: AFFIRMATIVE. CLOSURE VALID. Under Sec 29 of the RA 265, on proceedings regarding insolvency, there is NO REQUIREMENT that a hearing be first conducted before a bank may be placed under receivership. The law explicitly provides that the Monetary Board can IMMEDIATELY forbid a banking institution from doing business and IMMEDIATELY appoint a receiver when: 1) there has been an examination by CB, b) a report to the CB, and c) prima facie

showing that the bank is insolvent. As to the claim that the RA 265 violates due process, the claim is untenable. The law could not have intended to disregard the constitutional requirement of due process when it conferred power to place rural banks under receivership. The closure and liquidation of the bank is considered an exercise of POLICE POWER. It maybe subject to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, etc. The appointment of a receiver may be made by the Monetary Board, WITHOUT NOTICE AND HEARING, but subject to the JUDICIAL INQUIRY, to insure protection of the banking institution. Due process does NOT necessarily require a PRIOR HEARING. A hearing or an OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD may be made SUBSEQUENT to the closure. One could just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would happen, resulting in panic and hysteria. In that way, fortunes will be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking industry. There is no question that the action of the MB may be subject to judicial review. Courts may interfere with the MBs exercise of discretion. Here, the RTC has jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of whether the MB acted in bad faith when it directed the dissolution of Buhi Bank.

Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc (NLU). NLU states that Toribios act is not valid. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood (NWB). That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the Court of Industrial Relations. Issue: Whether or not there has been a due process of law. Held: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. The motion for a new trial should be granted and sent to the CIR

Vertudes vs Bureau of Immigration Facts: Before us is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to review and set aside the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the decision of the Civil Service Commission(CSC) finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and dismissing her from government service. Private respondent Buenaflor complained of having been convinced by petitioner into paying the total amount of P79,000.00 in exchange for the processing of her visa, passport and other travel documents for Japan. Private respondent delivered to petitioner Security Bank (SB) Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the amounts of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively, and cash worth P29,000.00. However, no visa was delivered. Private respondent insisted that petitioner return her money, to no avail. Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and recommended her dismissal from the service. Petitioner filed a Motion to Re-open with the BI, wherein Commissioner Rodriguez issued an order, adopting the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz. Subsequently, the assailed order of dismissal was affirmed by then Department of Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas.Petitioner appealed to the CSC, raising the issues of lack of due process and lack of substantial evidence, which dismissed the petitioners appeal. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA, raising the issue: whether or not the BI and CSC violated petitioner's right to due process. the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was accorded due process Held: The petition is denied. She contends that she was denied of her right to a full hearing when she was not accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against her. The argument is unmeritorious. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of crossexamination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness butfailed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine . The right to crossexamination being a personal right, petitioner must be deemed to have waived this right by agreeing to submit the case for resolution and

Diosdado Guzman vs. National University Facts: Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University. The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The petitioners have failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.

Held: Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;

(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO REENROLL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

PHILCOMSAT vs. Alcuaz Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due toExecutive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing. Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasijudicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order ofrespondents is hereby SET ASIDE.

United States vs. Toribio Facts: The appellant, Turibio slaugh343tered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, his carabao, without the permit from the municipal treasure of Carmen, Bohol wherein it was slaughtered, which is in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. The said act of slaughtering the carabao took place after his application for a permit to slaughter his carabao was denied to him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes." The counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure, Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act because there is no slaughter house in the said municipality. However, according to the states the prohibition refers to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer. Counsel for appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which cannot be procured in the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or draft purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Issue: W/O Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Held: The SC Ruled against Turibio. Because it is a valid exercise of Police power. An examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest which it seeks to safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the particular provisions of the statute

under consideration were imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign police power which every State possesses for the general public welfare and which "reaches to every species of property within the commonwealth." The power we allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

Ynot vs. IAC Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 262-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from inter-provinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On Jan. 13, 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A for outright confiscation of carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The RTC of of Iloilo City ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. Ynot appealed the same to IAC in which the lower courts decision was upheld. Hence, this case for certiorari before the SC. Issue: Whether EO 626-A is Constitutional or not. Held: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 262-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given the right to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted

unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.