ON NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORIES: SOME BASICS

From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism

Kinds of ethical inquiries

Kinds of ethical inquiries

Non-philosophical inquiries

Philosophical inquiries

Descriptive ethics

Moralizing / Moral Training

Applied ethics

Normative ethics

Metaethics

Sociology Psychology

Anthropology

Philosophical inquiries the three branches of philosophical ethics ! ! Applied ethics: that branch of ethics that seeks to answer questions about specific actions/practices in virtue of some general normative moral principle(s). Normative ethics: that branch of ethics that studies systems of moral rightness and wrongness. It seeks to provide a system of principles and procedures for determining what (morally speaking) a person should do and should not do. Metaethics: that branch of ethics that seeks to answer specific questions about the nature of ethics.

On normative ethics: a closer look On the concept of a normative theory A theory T is a normative theory just in case T states the norm(s)i.e., how things ought/ought not be with respect to some issue (e.g., how a person should act, what should believe, etc.). In stating the norm(s), the theory will also tell us the truth-conditions for such normative sentences as Smith should do A, Jones ought not do A, A-ing is the wrong thing to do, Jane is supposed to do A, Bob is obligated to do A, A-ing is Sallys duty, etc. Every normative theory does so based upon an ultimate or fundamental criterion. The ultimate criterion of morality Every normative theory of morality is committed to ethical foundationalism, namely, the view that EF: There is exactly one ultimate criterion of moral conduct and it is upon and in relation to that criterion that we rank and organize any derivative moral principles.

So, according to (EF), there is an ultimate criterioncall this the first principle of morality (hereafter FPM)and that criterion serves as the foundation for the whole of the moral theory given that any moral principle other than FPM is (i) derived from FPM and (ii) is ranked and organized according to

the requirements of FPM. As we will see, every normative theory of morality will argue for a different FPM and it is a theorys particular version of FPM that distinguishes it from the others. To help us make sense of this, let us first consider the following. Every FPM will have the following form: CM: An action A is morally right iff there is some condition C such that A satisfies C.

The important query that we need to address is what condition C is exactly since we will see that it is C alone makes every normative theory of morality different. To figure out what C is according to each theory, we can begin by considering the following taxonomy of normative theories of morality. A taxonomy of normative theories of morality
Normative Theories of Morality Act-Centered Consequentialism / Teleological Utilitarianism Ethical Egoism Act Utilitarianism Rule Utilitarianism Ethical Egotism Deontology Agent-Centered Virtue Ethics

The Big Three: what makes them different? ! Consequentialist/teleological ethical theories: consequentialists tell us that it is the consequences of an action (i.e., what the world is like after S does act A) that makes the action morally permissible or not. As such, these types of theories tell us that condition C of FPM is nothing other than producing the right consequences. Deontological ethical theories: deontologists tell us that it is the agents intentions in doing an action (i.e., whether the reason S did act A was that it was Ss moral duty to A) that makes the action morally permissible or not. As such, these types of theories tell us that condition C of FPM is nothing other than being done for the right reasons. Virtue ethical theories: virtue ethicists tell us that it is the agents character traits and motives (i.e., whether the virtuous person would do act A) that makes the action morally permissible or not. As such, these types of theories tell us that condition C of FPM is nothing other than the agent having the right dispositions of character.

Consider the following passage by Richard Foley concerning these differences: Virtue ethics is ordinarily contrasted with both consequentialist ethics, which is closely associated with but not limited to utilitarianism, and deontological ethics, which is closely associated with but again not limited to Kantianism. In trying to say what makes an action or decision [morally] right, consequentialists focus on its consequences, actual or apparent, whereas proponents of deontological ethics instead emphasize the agents moral duties, which are typically captured in a set of rules. The proponents of virtue ethics, by contrast, emphasize neither consequences nor rules but rather moral

virtues, which are typically thought of as behavioral dispositions; an action is [morally] right insofar as it is [a] product of such virtues. But to talk of what each of these approaches emphasizes is to mark the distinctions among them in only a very loose way. Consequences, rules and virtues all play an important role in our moral lives, and thus, any approach to ethics, if it is to be at all plausible, must do justice to all three. So, consequentialists must be able to account for the importance of rules and virtues, just as deontologists must be able to account for the importance of consequences and virtues, and just as virtue theorists must be able to account for the importance of consequences and rules. What separates consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue theorists is their views about the theoretical foundations of ethics. They disagree on what is to be taken as fundamentalconsequences, rules, or virtues. Consequentialists insist that it is consequences that are to be taken as fundamental, and it is in terms of them that they try to give an account of moral rules and moral virtues. By contrast, deontologists and virtue theorists take duty and virtue to be fundamental, respectively, and then try to treat the other two notions as derivative. Keeping this in mind, lets ask, what is a virtue ethics? Suppose an ethicist says that a [morally] right action is a virtuous action, i.e., an action that is a product of moral virtues, and when we ask what a virtue is, the ethicist tells us that a virtue is a habit or disposition that tends to produce good consequences. This is not enough to make the view an instance of virtue ethics. On the contrary, consequentialists can and often do endorse this kind of view. In a genuine virtue-based ethics, virtue cannot be defined in terms of consequences, or for that matter in terms of rules, and the good cannot be defined independently of the virtues. For an approach to ethics to be virtue-based, it must treat virtue as the fundamental notion, not rules or consequences.1 Three requirements on normative theorizing A normative ethical theory T is true only if T is (i) normatively authoritative, (ii) normatively complete and (iii) normatively consistent. In other words, unless a normative ethical theory satisfies these three requirements, it cannot be true. These three requirements are to be understood as follows: ! ! ! Normatively authoritative: A moral theory T is normatively authoritative iff, whenever T entails that you should/should not do act A, then it is actually true that you should/should not do A. Normatively complete: A moral theory T is normatively complete iff, whenever it is actually true that you should/should not do act A, then T tells you that should/should not do A. Normatively consistent: A moral theory T is normatively consistent iff T does not say that you should do act A at some times and should not A at other times based on arbitrary grounds.2

The Epistemology of Sosa, Philosophical Issues 5: Truth and Rationality, ed. Enrique Villanueva (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press, 1994), 5-6. 2010, Richard G. Graziano. All rights reserved. This material may not be used, or duplicated in part or whole without express written permission by the author.
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