Agency - Ahearn 2001 - Language and Agency

Language and Agency Author(s): Laura M. Ahearn Source: Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 30 (2001), pp.
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Annu. Rev. Anthropol.2001. 30:109-37 Copyright? 2001 by AnnualReviews. All rightsreserved
AND AGENCY LANGUAGE LauraM. Ahearn

New Brunswick,New Jersey 08901; e-mail: ahearn@rci.rutgers.edu Rutgers University,
Key Words practice, grammar, dialogic,gender,literacy * Abstract Thisreviewdescribes andcritiques someof themanyways agencyhas been conceptualized in the academyoverthe pastfew decades,focusingin particular on practicetheoristssuchas Giddens,Bourdieu, de Certeau, For Sahlins,andOrtner. scholars interested in agency,it demonstrates the importance of lookingclosely at language andarguesthatthe issues surrounding linguisticformandagencyarerelevant to anthropologists withwidelydivergent research agendas. Linguistic anthropologists havemadesignificant contributions to theunderstanding of agencyas it emergesin dissomeof themostpromising research course,andthefinalsectionsof thisessaydescribe in the studyof languageandgender,literacypractices,andthe dialogicconstruction of meaningandagency.
WHY AGENCY NOW?

The term agency, variouslydefined,has become ubiquitouswithin anthropology and other disciplines. This essay describes and critiquessome of the many ways agency has been conceptualizedin the academyover the past few decades. While I propose a skeletal definition for the term, my purpose is not to dictate how scholars should define agency, or even to insist that they should use the term at all. Rather,my purpose is to survey the scholarshipon agency and to suggest how importantit is for scholars interestedin agency to look closely at language and linguistic form. I arguethat the issues surrounding language and agency are relevantto anthropologists with widely divergentresearchagendasbecause most anthropologists-whether archaeological,biological, cultural,or linguistic-are concerned,in one formor another,with whatpeople say anddo. Linguisticanthroto the understanding of agency as it pologists have made significantcontributions emerges in discourse,and in the final sections of this essay, I describesome of the most promisingresearchin the study of language and gender,literacypractices, and the dialogic constructionof meaningand agency. Before turningto definitionalissues, it is worthwhileto reflectfor a momenton our own intellectualpracticeand ask ourselves why so many scholarsin so many fields are currentlyinterestedin the concept of agency. Messer-Davidowposes this questiondirectly,asking, "Whyagency now?" (1995, p. 23). While there are undoubtedly many answersto this question,one is thatthereis a clear connection
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AHEARN thatforeground betweentheemergenceof interestin approaches practiceon the one hand,andthe social movementsof the 1960s and 1970s on the other(Ortner1984, p. 160). In addition,the social upheavalsin centraland easternEuropein the late moreclearlytheirideas about 1980s andearly 1990s led manyscholarsto articulate humanagency and social structures(Sztompka 1991). As a result of witnessing or participatingin actions aimed at transformingsociety, then, many academics the very havebegunto investigatehow practicescan eitherreproduceor transform that shape them. I believe it is no coincidence thatthe recent agentive1 structures turn, an outgrowthof the trends Ortneridentifiedin 1984, follows on the heels not only of the social movementsof the past few decades but also of postmodern and poststructuralist critiqueswithin the academy that have called into question impersonalmasternarrativesthat leave no room for tensions, contradictions,or oppositional actions on the part of individuals and collectivities. It is because political and theoretical questions about agency are so central to contemporary debates that the concept arouses so much interest-and why it is therefore so crucialto define clearly.
DEFINITIONAL STARTING POINTS

In most scholarly endeavors,defining terms is half the battle. This is especially true for a word like language, which is so commonplacethat researchersoften mistakenlyassumeits meaningis self-evident(Williams1977, pp. 21-44). Precise definitionsare equally essential for words such as agency thathave takenon new meanings on entering academic discourse. As a startingpoint for this review, I to languagethat discuss languageas a formof social action,which is the approach a and then take, present provisionaldefinitionof many linguistic anthropologists agency.
Language as Social Action

Whereasmost linguists follow de Saussure(1986) and Chomsky(1965, 1986) in set apartfromeverydayinteractions studyinglanguageas a set of formalstructures and rather than "competence"ratherthan "performance"), "parole," ("langue" most linguistic anthropologists regardlanguage as a form of social action, a culturalresource,anda set of sociocultural practices(Schieffelin 1990, p. 16). People do things with words (Austin 1962, Searle 1969, cf. Butler 1997). Brenneis & Macaulay(1996), Duranti(1997), and Hanks (1996) presentpersuasiveand thoconrough explicationsof this approachto language.Linguistic anthropologists embeddedin networks siderlanguage,whetherspokenorwritten,to be inextricably of socioculturalrelations.When scholarstreat language, culture, and society as mutuallyconstituted,one of theirmainresponsibilitiesthenbecomes to studyhow writers Whileother formforagency. in thechoiceof anadjectival is no unanimity 'There I prefer useagential oragentic, agentive.
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discourseboth shapes and is shapedby socioculturalfactorsand power dynamics (Urban 1991). There are no neutral words, Bakhtin (1981, p. 293) reminds us: "All words have the 'taste' of a profession,a genre, a tendency,a party,a particular work, a particular person, a generation,an age group,the day and hour.Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life...." Unequal power relationscan result in-and be the result of-symbolic violence (symbolic power,symbolic domination),which, Bourdieu(1991, p. 170) dialect or style maintains,occurs when individualsmistakenlyconsidera standard of speakingto be truly superiorto the way they themselves speak, ratherthan an differenceaffordedsocial significance.Languageandpoweraretherefore arbitrary commonly intertwined. Note that in this view, language is not defined as a conduit that merely convehicle carryingonly veys information(Reddy 1979), and it is not a transparent how linguistic referentialmeaning (Goodwin 1990, p. 4). In orderto understand language,we haveto set asidethis vehicularmetaphoranthropologists approach view languageas a vehicle that unless, thatis, we say thatlinguisticanthropologists people themselves are continuallyin the process of buildingtogether.According emerto this approachto language,meaningsare co-constructedby participants, social interactions. Scholars have various from proposed strategies gent particular how this works. Early work in the ethnographyof communifor understanding cation encouragedresearchersto look for patternsin actual speech (Gumperz& Hymes 1964, Bauman & Sherzer 1989). Scholars groundedin fields as diverse as ethnomethodology,sociolinguistics, the sociology of language, linguistic anthropology,and conversationanalysis have contributedto an understandingof how meanings emerge in conversationsby focusing on the microprocesses of linguistic interactions(Garfinkel1967; Goffman 1974, 1981; Ochs et al 1996; Sacks 1992). The appropriate unit of analysis for many scholars who treat lanas is social action not the sentence, the individual,or even the conversaguage tion but ratherspeech acts (Austin 1962, Searle 1969), speech events (Jakobson 1960, Hymes 1972), participantstructures(Philips 1972), participationframeworks (Goffman 1981), participant frameworksand situatedactivities (Goodwin or of communities 1990), practice(Eckert& McConnell-Ginet1992). Withinthese are as coconstructed,social reality is also constructed.In the contexts, meanings advocated here, then, languagedoes not merely reflect an alreadyexistapproach social it also reality; ing helps to create that reality (Gumperz& Levinson 1996, Hill & Mannheim 1992, Lucy 1992, Sapir 1949, Spender 1980, Whorf 1956, Williams 1977). Withsuch a dialogic, coconstructed view of languageas a form of social action, the face fluid, often ambigulinguistic anthropologists challenge of interpreting ous linguistic data with importantsocioculturalimplications.How can this task best be accomplished?Both text and context must be taken into consideration, and they must be understoodto be intrinsicallyinterwoven(Duranti& Goodwin 1992). We must acknowledgethe inevitabilityof a certaindegree of interpretive while also recognizingthatindeterminacy is not limitless (Derrida indeterminacy
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AHEARN 1972). Elsewhere I have argued that we should espouse what I call a practice theory of meaning constraint(Ahearn 1998, 2001). According to this perspective, we must shift our focus away from searchingfor definitive interpretations and insteadconcentrateon looking for constraintson the kinds of meaningsthat might emerge from an event such as a song performanceor a text such as a love letter.Meanings might be infinite in number,but they are very tightly bounded. As Eco (1990, p. 42) notes, "If it is very difficult to decide whethera given inis a good one, it is, however, always possible to decide whether it terpretation is a bad one." Appadurai(1991, p. 472) takes a similar view of language, callof intering for a new "theoryof reception"that incorporatesan understanding textualityand situatedness.In advocatinga practice theory ratherthan a theory of reception,however,I emphasize how individuals,including scholars, actively constructand constrain-rather than passively receive-interpretations that are both socially mediated and intertextuallysituatedwithin a bounded universe of discourse. Fromthe foregoing discussion of language,it shouldbe clear that as linguistic anthropologists increasinglytreatlanguageas a form of social action, the task of a of agency becomes ever developing theoreticallysophisticatedunderstanding more urgent.We turnthereforeto the challenge of definingthe concept.
A Provisional Definition of Agency

Jean and John Comaroffhave called agency "thatabstraction greatlyunderspecified, often misused, much fetishized these days by social scientists"(1997, p. 37; cited in Ortner2001, p. 1). While this assessment may be a bit harsh, it is true that scholars often fail to recognize that the particularways in which they conceive of agency have implicationsfor the understanding of personhood,causality, action, and intention.Agency thereforedeserves "deeperconsiderationand more extensive theoreticalelaboration" (Dobres & Robb 2000, p. 3). Let me propose,then, a provisionaldefinitionof the concept:Agency refersto the socioculturallymediatedcapacityto act. Accordingto this bare bones definition,all action is socioculturallymediated, both in its productionand in its interpretation. Although this definitionprovides us with a startingpoint, it leaves many details unspecified. The following are some questions to ponder-questions thatmay be answeredin differentways by different scholars. Must all agency be human?Can nonhumanprimates (Small 1993), machines (Pickering 1995), technologies (Dobres 2000), spirits (Keane 1997, pp. 64-66), or signs (Colapietro 1989, pp. 95-97; Peirce 1955) exercise assumptions agency?Mustagencybe individual,leadingto chargesof unwarranted regardingWesternatomic individualism(Ortner1996)? Or can agency also be supraindividual-the property,perhaps, of families, faculties, or labor unions? Conversely,can agency be subindividual-the propertyof "dividuals"(Daniel 1984, p. 42; Marriott1976; McElhinny1998, p. 181), as when someone feels tor withinherselfor himself?Whatdoes it meanto be an agentof someoneelse? Must
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agency be conscious, intentional,or effective? What does it mean for an act to be conscious, intentional,or effective? We might begin to answer some of these questions by considering, as Karp (1986) does, what distinguishes an "actor"from an "agent."In Karp'sview, an or rule-oriented, actorrefersto a personwhose actionis rule-governed whereasan agentrefersto a personengaged in the exercise of powerin the sense of the ability the world(Karp1986, p. 137). Actorand to bringabouteffects andto (re)constitute agent shouldbe consideredtwo differentaspectsof the same person,accordingto Karp,or two differentperspectiveson the actions of any given individual.Ortner (2001) proposes differentiatingamong various types of agency, such as "agency of power"and "agencyof intention,"though she is careful to note that any such distinction is purely heuristic because types of agency are often inseparablein et al (1993), advocatea nonindividualistic practice.Some scholars,suchas Wertsch notion of agency. Drawing on Vygotsky (1978, 1987) and paraphrasing Bateson (1972), they arguethat agency "extendsbeyond the skin"because it is frequently a propertyof groupsandinvolves "mediational means"such as languageandtools (Wertschet al 1993, p. 352). It is especially important for anthropologists to ask themselveshow conceptions of agency may differ from society to society, and how these conceptions might be relatedto notions of personhoodand causality(Jackson& Karp 1990, Skinner et al 1998). Pickeringsuggests that "withindifferentcultureshumanbeings and the materialworldmightexhibitcapacitiesfor actionquitedifferentfromthose we customarilyattributeto them" (1995, p. 245). Desjarlaispresents an illustration of this within the United States itself in his study of a homeless shelterin Boston, in which he argues that the forms of agency he observed emerged out of a specific socioculturalcontext. Agency was not ontologicallypriorto thatcontext but arose from the social, political, and culturaldynamicsof a specific place and time (Desjarlais 1997, p. 204). In my own work, I have maintainedthat it is important to ask how people themselves conceive of their own actions and whether they attribute responsibilityfor events to individuals,to fate, to deities, or to other animate or inanimateforces. In the case of Junigau,Nepal, people's conceptionsof their own and others' actions are changing rapidly,demonstratingthe need for to ask not only what agency meansfor themselvesas theorists,but anthropologists what it means for the people with whom they work, andhow those meaningsmay shift over time (Ahearn2000b, 2001).
IN DEFININGAGENCY PROBLEMS
Several uses of agency that are common in the literatureare, in my opinion, of questionableuse to anthropologists(though perhapsnot to scholars in other disciplines). In the following overview,which drawsfrom severalfields but does not purportto be a full delineation of the debates within any given discipline, examplesarediscussedin which agency is definedtoo simplistically,too narrowly, or too opaquely.
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Agency as Free Will

One of the most common tendencies in discussions of agency is the treatment of it as a synonym for free will. This is especially evident in what philosophers call action theory. Within action theory, philosophersattemptto distinguish an "action"from an "event."Davidson (1980[1971], p. 43) begins his famous essay, "Agency,"with the following question: "Whatevents in the life of a person reveal agency; what are his deeds and his doings in contrastto mere happeningsin his history;what is the markthat distinguisheshis actions?"Twenty years later, Segal (1991, p. 3) echoes Davidson as he explains philosophical action theory: "Hittinga ball is an action, falling down a flight of stairsis not. A theoryof action seeks, among other things, to explain the distinctions we make." In attempting to explain humanagency, action theoristsand otherphilosophersgenerallyargue that agency requiressome sort of concomitantmental state, such as "intention" (Davidson 1980[1971], p. 46), "presenceof the self" (Segal 1991, p. 113), a "rational point of view" and a "domainof intentionalcontrol"(Rovane 1998, p. 85), or "motivation, responsibility,and expectationsof recognitionor reward"(Mann 1994, p. 14). The main weakness in treatingagency as a synonym for free will is that such an approachignores or only gives lip service to the social natureof agency and the pervasiveinfluenceof cultureon humanintentions,beliefs, and actions. Even Taylor(1985, pp. 1-44), a philosopherwhose writingson languageandagency are extremelythought provoking,locates agency inside the mentalprocesses of particularindividualswhen he connects agency with "second-order desires,""strong evaluation,"and "a vocabularyof worth."Similarly, Ludwig Wittgenstein,the famous philosopherof language to whom linguistic anthropologists increasingly look forinspiration, fails to theorizeadequately the sociocultural nature of language and action. While Wittgenstein(1958) recognizes the degree to which language and social forms are intertwined,he leaves the details of this interrelationship unGiddens notes this in work (1979, 50) explained. p. shortcoming Wittgenstein's on languageand action, stating,"Wittgensteinian philosophyhas not led towards sort of with social with concern any change, power relations,or with conflict in strands in the of Other action have operatedat an even further society. philosophy distance from such issues, focusing attentionalmost exclusively upon the nature of reasonsor intentionsin humanactivity." Tracesof this tendencyto equateagency with socially unfetteredfree will can be found in many otherdisciplines, includinganthropology, psychology, political science, and history. Sometimes scholars contend that only certain individuals "haveagency,"while othershavelittleornone. Some historians, forexample,locate agency solely in the power of individual"GreatMen."A recentdebate surrounds the publicationof comparativepolitical scientist Daniel J. Goldhagen's (1996) book, which arguesthat ordinaryGermansplayed an active, agentive role in the Holocaust. Moses (1998) states, "Havingraised the question of the perpetrators' choice, Goldhagenmust convince the readerthat they were not 'just following orders,'thatis, thatthese actorspossessed agency"(p. 205). Accordingto Moses,
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however, Goldhagen'simplicit methodologicalunderpinningsare contradictory. On one handhe espouses rationalchoice models2to stress thatordinaryGermans had "agency,"which he equateswith free will, and yet on the otherhandhe relies on behaviorismto accountfor the prevalenceof antisemitismin Germansociety (Moses 1998, p. 209). Some scholars,especially those studyingcolonialismandpostcolonialism,have been moving away from approachesthat treatagency as a synonym for free will as exercisedby completely autonomousindividuals(e.g., Cooper 1994, Cooper& Stoler 1997, Pieters2000, Pomper1996, Scott 1988, Sewell 1992). HistorianLalu (2000, pp. 50-51) offers an observationthat applies equally well to historians, and all other scholarsinterestedin agency: "[T]he philosophers,anthropologists, question of agency, it seems, may be posed in ways other than in terms of the autonomoussubjector authorialsubject.... [We] may have to think of the ways in which agency is constitutedby the norms,practices,institutions,anddiscourses through which it is made available."Such a linguistically and socioculturally mediatedconceptionof agency is discussed furtherbelow.
Equating Agency with Resistance

Anothermisguidedapproach to agency is to considerit a synonymfor resistance. This approach is characteristic of the workof some anthropologists, manyscholars in subalternstudies, and feminist theorists in a numberof fields. Feminism has always addressedissues of agency, if only implicitly (Mann 1994, p. 14), but recently the term has been cropping up with increasing frequency (Andermahr 1997, Davies 1991, Dissanayake 1996, Gardiner1995, Goddard2000, Kumar 1994, McNay 2000). Fraser(1992, pp. 16-17) explainsthatagency has become a problemin recentfeminist theorybecause of two equally important goals. On the one hand, feminists have sought to establish the seriousness of their struggleby the pervasivenessand systematicityof male dominance.This has demonstrating led to the developmentof theoriesthatemphasizethe constraining powerof gender structures andnorms,while downplayingthe resistingcapacitiesof individualsand groups.On the otherhand,feministshave also soughtto inspirewomen's activism by rediscoveringlost or socially invisible traditionsof resistancein the past and present. In some scholars' work (both feminist and nonfeminist), instead of a balancebetween these two countervailing tendencies,thereis an overemphasison resistance(Abu-Lughod1990). Accordingto many feminist theorists,in orderto demonstrate statusquo (e.g., Goddard agency,a personmust resist the patriarchal theimpulsebehindequatingagency 2000, p. 3). While one cancertainlyunderstand with resistance,agency should not be reducedto it. Oppositionalagency is only one of many forms of agency. Many scholars interestedin other forms of social and economic oppression also equate agency with actions that resist domination(Pruyn 1999; Scott 1985, 2SeeBurs (1994)fora critique of rational choicemodelsof agency.
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AHEARN 1990). As useful as manyof these studiesare,I taketo heartAbu-Lughod's(1990) andsecondOrtner's of resistance" cautionagainstthe "romance (1995) conclusion thatthereis no such thing as pureresistance;motivationsare always complex and (Ahearn2000a, Gamburd2000, Jeffery & Jeffery 1996, Jeffery & contradictory Basu 1998). I findMacLeod'sworkvery helpful in conceptualizingboth women's and men's agency. She notes that women, "even as subordinateplayers, always play an active partthat goes beyond the dichotomy of victimization/acceptance, a dichotomythat flattensout a complex and ambiguousagency in which women accept, accommodate,ignore, resist, or protest-sometimes all at the same time" (MacLeod 1992, p. 534). Such a nuanced understandingof the multiplicity of motivationsbehind all human actions should be at the core of our definition of agency.
The Absenceof Agency?

to agency thatpresentschallengesto scholarsis thatof Foucault Anotherapproach (1977, 1978). On one level, Foucaultcan be read as statingthat omnipresentimpersonaldiscoursesso thoroughlypervadesociety thatno roomis left for anything that might be regardedas agency, oppositional or otherwise. In The History of Sexuality,VolumeI, for example,Foucault(1978, pp. 93, 95) writes, butbecauseit comes notbecauseit embraceseverything, Poweris everywhere; insofaras it is permanent, from everywhere.And "Power," repetitious,inert, is simply the over-alleffect thatemerges from all these and self-reproducing, mobilities, the concatenationthat rests on each of them and seeks in turnto arresttheir movement ... thereis no power that is exercised withouta series of aims and objectives.But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individualsubject... There have been numerouscritiquesof Foucault'sdefinitionof power, many of them focusing on the problematicimplicationsit has for humanagency (Bartky 1995, Hoy 1986). Even thoughFoucaultstatesthat"[w]herethereis power,there is resistance,"he continueson to say, "andyet, or ratherconsequently,this resistance is never in a position of exteriorityin relation to power" (Foucault 1978, p. 95). The problem is that in History of Sexuality, Volume I, Foucault never explains how power is enforced or personified,and the processes of resistance remainsimilarlyopaque.Nor, despite the centralityof Foucault'swork to scholars of colonialism, does he examine colonial politics in any detail in that volume (Stoler 1995). Many scholars agree with Said (1983, p. 246), who argues that "[t]hedisturbingcircularityof Foucault'stheoryof power is a form of theoretical overtotalization...." Others,however,have maintainedthatFoucault'sdefinitionof power does not eliminatethe possibility for agency,howeverdefined.O'Hara(1992, p. 66), drawing largely on Foucault's later work, argues that Foucaultproposes a model of mobility,andconflict."Accordingto Halperin agency thatis "amatterof plurality, (1995, pp. 16-17), Foucault'snotion of power is not a substancebut a relation,a
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dynamic situation;it producesnot only constraintson, but also possibilities for, action. Nevertheless, even if Foucault'sformulationsdo leave room for agency, human his focus is more on pervasivediscoursesthanon the actions of particular beings.
THEORY PRACTICE
of Louis Bonaparte": ConsiderMarx'sfamouswordsin "TheEighteenthBrumaire Men make theirown history,but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it undercircumstanceschosen by themselves,but undercircumfrom the past. The traditionof stances directly found, given and transmitted all the dead generationsweighs like a nightmareon the brain of the living (Marx 1978[1852], p. 595). How can we reconcile the fact that, as Marx noted almost a century and a half ago, individualsappearto create society even as they are createdby it? Berger& statements in theirfamous Luckmann turnthisquestionintoa trilogyof paradoxical book, TheSocial Construction product.Societyis an ofReality:"Societyis a human objectivereality.Man is a social product"(1966, p. 61; emphasisin the original). these seemingly contradictory The most promising approachfor understanding statementsis practice theory,which Ortner(1989, p. 11; 1984, 1996) defines as "a theory of the relationshipbetween the structuresof society and culture on the one hand and the nature of human action on the other."The emphasis in practicetheory is on the social influences on agency; humanactions are central, but they are never considered in isolation from the social structuresthat shape them.
StructurationTheory
Giddens is perhapsthe central figure in the debate about agency and structure and is considered one of the founders of practice theory (Giddens 1979, 1984, Archer1988, Burs & Dietz 1994, Karp1986). Explicitly drawingon the insights of ethnomethodologistssuch as Garfinkeland interactionistsociologists such as and bring social Goffman,Giddens attemptsto breathelife into social structures structures into contactwith humanactions (Giddens 1979, p. 57, 68, 83; Bryant& Jary 1991, Sewell 1992). Unlike scholars who treat agency as a synonym for free will or resistance,Giddensconsistentlylinks agency to structure throughhis discussionof rules andresources.Centralto Giddens'theoryof structuration is the that are actions both and understanding people's shaped(in constraining enabling ways) by the very social structuresthat those actions then serve to reinforce or reconfigure.Given this recursiveloop consisting of actions influencedby social structures and social structures(re)createdby actions, the question of how social can occur is crucial and is takenup below in the context of otherpractice change theorists.
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Some sociologists prefer to use the term practice or praxis (drawingon and redefiningthe Marxistterm) in additionto, or insteadof, agency (Giddens 1979, p. 56; Sztompka 1994). Sztompka,for example, distinguishesthe two terms in the following manner:"Agency and praxis are two sides of the incessant social functioning;agency actualizes in praxis, and praxis reshapes agency, which actualizes itself in changed praxis"(Sztompka 1994, p. 276). Thus, agency can be consideredthe socioculturallymediatedcapacityto act, while praxis (or practice) can be consideredthe action itself.
Agencyand the Habitus

Aside from Giddens, the most influential theorist within practice theory is Bourdieu, a professor of sociology who has conducted ethnographicfieldwork in Algeria. Bourdieuborrowsand redefinesthe termhabitus,firstused in anthroof the body pology by MarcelMauss to refer to a habitualcondition,particularly (Farell 2000, p. 399). Bourdieu'sdefinitionrefers to a generativeprocess that that are conditioned by the "structuring produces practices and representations structures" fromwhich they emerge.These practicesandtheiroutcomes-whether intended or unintended-then reproduceor reconfigurethe habitus (Bourdieu 1977, p. 78). The recursivenatureof this process mirrorsthat found in Giddens' The habitusgeneratesan infinitebut boundednumberof theory of structuration. andperceptions,each one of which is imbuedwith the actions, thoughts, possible culturallyconstructedmeanings and values embodied by the habitus. These actions, thoughts,andperceptionsin turnthenrecreateand/orchallengethe culturally constructedmeaningsand values. With this analysis of agency, Bourdieumoves us far from the concept of free will. Although he defines the habitus as "an endless capacity to engenderproducts," Bourdieuemphasizes dispositions in orderto precludeany assumptionof absolutefree will on the partof actors,repeatedlypointingout how farremovedhis novelty. Whatprevents concept of the habitusis from a creationof unpredictable novel sociocultural the creationof unpredictably productsarethe (pre)dispositions the habitusembodies in its many forms and structures.Of the infinite thoughts, meanings, and practicesthat the habituscan produceat any given historicalmothatany will ever be thoughtor practiced ment,thereis only a minimalprobability because individualsare predisposedto think and act in a mannerthatreproduces the existing system of inequalities. As necessaryandhelpful as his remindersare of the constraintson individuals' actions and thoughts, Bourdieu, like Giddens, faces the dilemma of explaining how social reproduction becomes social transformation (Sewell 1992). Bourdieu tendenciesof the habitus,which, because it is sturdy emphasizesthe reproductive and well-rooted,located in the physical environmentscontainingactors,and embodied mentally and physically within the actors themselves, can be applied in new as well as familiarsituationsto reinforcethe statusquo. Despite the theoretical possibility of social transformation resulting from actions generatedby the little room for resistanceor social change. Bourdieu's framework leaves habitus,
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The microprocessesof resistancearetakenup in the Practice of EverydayLife, written by anothertheorist commonly associated with practice theory, historian Michel de Certeau.De Certeauencouragesother scholarsto attendto the actions of ordinarypeople, especially when they engage in "la perruque" (literally,"the wig"), a Frenchidiomatic expressionthatrefers to the work one does for oneself in the guise of work done for an employer (de Certeau1984, p. 25). De Certeau to describehow individualsuse strategiesand tactics uses the tropeof la perruque to carve out a semi-independent domainof practicewithin the constraintsplaced on them by the powerful. Althoughde Certeau,Bourdieu,and Giddensoffer us theorieswith significant explanatorypower in regardto the persistence of deeply embeddedrelations of inequality,they give insufficientattentionto the question of how any habitus or can produceactionsthatfundamentally structure changeit. In an attemptto understandmorefully how social changeoccurs,let us look at the workof otherpractice theoristsworkingwithin anthropology.
AnthropologicalContributionsto PracticeTheory
In his Historical Metaphorsand MythicalRealities, Sahlins sets for himself the task of understandinghow an attempt at social reproductioncan become social transformation (Sahlins 1981, Obeyesekere1992). Sahlins, unlike Bourdieu, attendsclosely to the processes of social transformation and emphasizes the imaccountof the transformation portanceof historyin his historicalandethnographic that Hawaiiansociety underwentin the wake of CaptainCook's arrivaland his subsequentmurder.Noting (perhapstoo perfunctorily)that such transformations can occur even without intercultural collisions, Sahlins neverthelessfocuses on how these cross-cultural contactsmay facilitateunprecedented change. When individualsbringtheirculturalunderstandings, as derivedfrom structural principles (what Bourdieuwould call theirhabitus),to bearon new situations,the dynamics of practice [what Sahlins calls "the structureof the conjuncture" (1981, p. 35)] can cause unintendedoutcomes. What starts as an attemptto reproducesocial structure may end in social transformation. By interweavinghistoryand structure in this manner,Sahlins not only highlights the importanceof agency and its often unintendedconsequences,he also emphasizesthe temporalityof agency and throwsinto questionthe concept of resistanceas conscious activity.Nevertheless, because Sahlins' work,like Bourdieu's,evinces tracesof its structuralist roots, the of social he are rather mechanistic, reproduction/transformation posits processes and his "permanent dialectic of structureand practice"(Sahlins 1981, p. 54) has little room in it for tensions inherentwithin social structure itself. this Ortner builds on the theories of both Sahlins (1989) very issue, Addressing and Bourdieuin High Religion: A Culturaland Political History of SherpaBuddhism.In her elucidationof the termspractice,structure, actor,andhistory,Ortner sets out the four cornerstoneson which her ethnography is built,therebysidestepping the dualistic,mechanisticformulationsof Bourdieuand Sahlins.Practicefor
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Ortner entailsthe recognitionof asymmetryanddominationin particular historical and culturalsettings, along with an awarenessof the culturalschemas and constraintswithin which individualsact. Departingfrom the claims of both Bourdieu and Sahlins,Ortneremphasizesthe existence of inherentstructural contradictions thatkeep a simple reproduction of the hegemonic social orderfrom being a foregone conclusion.As Williams(1977, p. 113) notes, "Therealityof any hegemony, in the extendedpolitical and culturalsense, is that,while by definitionit is always dominant,it is never either total or exclusive." Because of the tensions and contradictionsinherentin the habitus, actors are neitherfree agents nor completely socially determined products.Instead,Ortner(1989, p. 198) suggests thatthey are The centralquestionfor practicetheorists,then, is determin"loosely structured." how such actorsmanage at times to transformthe systems ing loosely structured thatproducethem. Suchloose structuring can occurlinguisticallyas well as socioculturally. Speakers of a given languageare constrainedto some degree by the grammatical structuresof theirparticular but are still of an infinite language, they capable producing numberof grammatically well-formedutteranceswithin those constraints.Moreover, languages,like cultures,change over time throughdrift and contactdespite theirsupposedlyself-reproducing structures (DeGraff1999, Lightfoot 1999, Sapir de Saussure It 1986). is thereforehelpful to look closely at language 1933[1949], (both its grammaticalstructuresand its patternsof use) in order to gain a more of how people reproduceand transformboth language thoroughunderstanding andculture.The following section describessome of the grammatical constraints, either universalacross all languages or particularto a smaller set of languages, that may predispose people to conceptualize agency and subjecthoodin certain ways.
GRAMMATICALAGENTS
Any discussionof agency andlanguagemustconsiderhow grammatical categories in differentlanguagesdistinguishamongtypes of subjects,for such categories,"to the extent thatthey are obligatoryand habitual,and relativelyinaccessible to the averagespeaker'sconsciousness, will form a privilegedlocation for transmitting and reproducing culturaland social categories"(Hill & Mannheim1992, p. 387). Althougheach languagehas its own set of linguisticresourcesthatcan be used to or deny agency,there are also some featuresthatcan be found exercise, attribute, in every language (Comrie 1981). Accordingto Dixon (1994, p. 6), for example, all languages work in terms of three basic relations-S, A, and O-defined as follows: verb (e.g., Sita went to Kathmandu); S-Subject of an intransitive A-Agent, or subject,of a transitiveverb (e.g., Parvati loves Shiva);and O-Object of a transitiveverb (e.g., Maya ate rice).
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Semantically,thereare variousroles the subjectof a sentencecan take, such as the following (cf. Duranti1994, pp. 122-123; Keenan 1984): Pabi readthe book. Shiva danced. Tika heardthe news. The stone brokethe window. Patient/Undergoer The old woman died. Agent Actor Perceiver Instrument These semanticroles can be treatedin variousways syntactically.Defining the linguisticsubjectin a way thatappliesto all languagesturnsout to be a challenging and controversialtopic over which linguists differ (Comrie 1981, pp. 98-101). In the majorityof languages,includingmost of the languagesof Europe,the subjects of transitiveandintransitive verbsaretreatedthe same way syntactically, while the of a transitive verb is treated This pattern is knownas accusativity object differently. of the world'slanguages,however,a (Dixon 1994, pp. 16-17).3 In abouta quarter verb andthe complementary patternobtainsin which the subjectof an intransitive object of a transitiveverb are treatedthe same way syntactically,while the subject of a transitive verbis treateddifferently. This pattern is knownas ergativity(Bittner & Hale 1996, Dixon 1994, Plank 1979). In ergativelanguages,there is usually a grammaticalmarkerthatdistinguishesAgents (of transitiveverbs) from Subjects (of intransitiveverbs) and Objects (of transitiveverbs). Consider the following examples in Samoan, taken from Duranti(1994, p. 122), in which the ergative markere is present only in (a), before the Agent of the transitiveverb, and not before the Subjectof the intransitive verb in (b): (a) 'uafa'atau e le tama le suka. TA4buy ERG ART boy ART sugar The boy has boughtthe sugar. (b) 'ua alu le tama 'i le maketi. TA go ART boy to ART market The boy has gone to the market. inwhich thesubjects of transitive andintransitive verbs aretreated thesameway 3Languages whilethe transitive arealso called"nominativesyntactically objectis treated differently accusative." in whichthe subjects of intransitive verbsandtheobjects of tranLanguages sitiveverbsaretreated the sameway syntactically arealsocalled"ergative-absolutive." I followDixon(1994)in shortening thesetermsto "accusativity" and"ergativity," respecto emphasize whichcase is beingtreated withaccusativity, Obtively,in order uniquely; in theaccusative caseandaretreated fromSubjects andAgents, jectsareplaced differently whereas withergativity, case andaretreated Agentsareplacedin theergative differently fromSubjects andObjects. 4The abbreviations usedin theinterlinear TArefers glosseshavethefollowing meanings: to a marker of verbtenseor aspect; ERGrefersto an ergative ARTrefersto an marker; article (Duranti 1994,pp. 177-78).
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AHEARN Some languageshave "split"grammatical systems in which speakersfollow an accusativepatternin some cases and an ergativepatternin othercases. In standard Nepali, for example, the ergativemarkerle is obligatorilyused with the Agents of transitiveverbs in the past tense only-not in the presentor futuretense. In the dialect of Nepali spokenin the village of Junigau,Nepal, however,people use the ergative markerle in nonobligatoryways in the present and futuretenses when they wantto place emphasison the Agent, as can be seen in the following example takenfrom a Junigauwoman'snarrative of marriage(Ahearn2001): (c) mai le pani man garchhu. I ERG too respectdo I, too, respect [my husband]. A related sort of split appearsin languages that have grammaticalsystems in which the subjectsof some intransitive verbs are categorizedwith transitivesubverbs are still consideredintransitive. jects, while the subjectsof otherintransitive In Guarani,for example, when "I"is used with more agentive intransitiveverbs, suchas "go"and"getup,"it is placedin the same(ergative)case as when "I"is used with the transitiveverb "bring" (Mithun1991, p. 511). "I"is placed in a different case in Guaraniwhen used with less agentiveintransitive verbs, such as "tobe"the same case thatis used for the directobject pronoun"me."In these languages, of agency are built rightinto theirsemanticand syntacticstructures. attributions Let me emphasize,however,thatin none of these cases is it possible to drawa simplisticconnectionbetweenthe presenceof ergativecase markingsand"more" or "less"agency.5Nevertheless,ergativelanguagespresentresearchers with a valuable tool they can use to explorenotionsof subjectivityandactionin othercultures. While languagesmayencode agencydifferentlyin theirgrammatical categories, there are some universalpatternsthat can be discerned regardingthe types of nouns most likely to appearin the Agent position. Drawing on linguistic data from Chinook and Dyirbal, both of which are split ergative systems that use an of case-marking for certaintypes of nounphrasesandan accusative ergativepattern for other of noun pattern types phrases,Silverstein(1976, pp. 116-122) proposes an animacyhierarchy thatpredictswhereon the spectrumof nounphrasesthe split between ergativityand accusativitywill occur. Dixon generalizes from Silverstein's animacy hierarchy,a revised version of which is shown in Figure 1, arguingthat in all languages, the items towardthe right of the spectrumare more likely to be in the Agent function,and the items to the left of the spectrumare more likely to be in the Objectposition. Dixon (1994, p. 84) summarizesthis important linguistic universalas follows: to talkof having or even"no" As 5Itis notuseful,in my opinion, "more," "less," agency. I hopeI havedemonstrated in thisessay,agencyis not a quantity thatcanbe measured. researchers should focuson delineating different kindsof agency, ordifferent Rather, ways in whichagency is socioculturally in particular mediated timesandplaces.
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St person pronouns 3d person pronouns Proper nouns Commonnouns Human Animate Inanimate
2ndperson pronouns
(basedon Dixon 1994,p. 85; Foley 1999,p. 210;revised Figure 1 Theanimacy hierarchy fromSilverstein1976,p. 122). Put very roughly,a speakerwill thinkin termsof doing things to otherpeople to a much greaterextent than in terms of things being done to him. In the speaker'sview of the world, as it impinges on him and as he describes it in language,he will be the quintessentialagent.6 In other words, from the universalgrammaticalprinciplesunderlyingall languages, we know that the most salient person in a linguistic interactionis the speaker,"I"(Foley 1999, p. 210). The second most salientpersonis the addressee, "you."Both "I"and "you"aremore salient, and thereforemore likely to be found in the Agent position, thanthe absentparticipants in the interaction,rankedin the following order:thirdpersonpronouns,propernouns, common nouns referringto humans,common nouns referringto animatenonhumans,and common nouns referringto inanimateobjects.While therehave been some challenges andrevisions to this model (cf. Dixon 1994, pp. 83-94), the implicationsof a possibly universal the attribution of linguisticagency areworthconsidering.Note tendencyregarding not social, definitions carefully,however,that we are talking about grammatical, of agency here. There are times when the grammaticaland social categories of context Agent will overlap,but this remainsto be determinedin each particular (cf. Duranti1994, p. 124). How can the grammatical details regardingAgent, Subject,and Objectin particularlanguagesbe relevantto scholarsinterestedin the social aspectsof agency? useof themasculine 6Dixon's demonstrates of howgrammatical generic yetanother example toattribute more oftentocertain kinds of subjects. See categories predispose speakers agency McConnell-Ginet of markedness (1979),Silverstein (1985),andWaugh (1982)foranalyses in theuseof masculine andfeminine pronouns.
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As DuBois (1987) notes, ergativityoriginatesin discourse itself, in other words, in naturallyoccurringconversations.Derbyshire(1987, p. 319), for example, reportsthatin manyAmazonianlanguages,when a nounphrasedescribinga highly is followed, ranked clause, the accusativepattern personis the subjectin a transitive whereaswhen a noun phrasedescribingthe higherrankedperson is the object (a more marked, or unexpected, occurrence),the ergative patternis followed. In English, LaFrance(1992) has shown thatwhen subjectsare askedto supplyplausible scenariosof events thatmight have precededand followed a set of sentences alternatingmale and female subjects and objects, they demonstratea linguistic bias against women that she calls "the disappearingagent effect." Her findings indicate that if a sentence is phrased such that a female is described as doing somethingor feeling something,especially with respectto a male, then she fades from causal view, but when she is on the receiving end of someone else's actions, then the subject or source of these events, ratherthan she herself, is highlighted (LaFrance1992, p. 341). Although these responses were elicited rather informedinthantakenfrom naturallyoccurringconversations, ethnographically these demonstrate how of this exactly linguistic usages vestigations phenomenon reflect,reinforce,and sometimesreconfigureagency and statushierarchiesin the society. Duranti'sFrom Grammarto Politics: Linguistic Anthropologyin a Western rich example of Samoan Village (1994) provides just such an ethnographically how attentionto linguistic forms can shed light on humanagency.7Durantimainrevealshow they attribute tains thatthe Samoans'use of ergativemarkers agency, individualsare more likely to use of or blame. Powerful in cases praise especially when they wantto accuse someone of a maliciousact, whereas the ergativemarker less powerful individualstry to resist such accusationsby suggesting alternative of praisingand blamlinguistic definitionsof events. Thus, Duranti's"grammar and how is demonstrates shapedby, the linguisticforms agency expressedin, ing" thata socially and linguisticallyembeddedspeakeruses.
AGENCY IN LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY

how grammatical seek to understand categories"loosely Linguisticanthropologists look and therefore structure" carefully at how speech both shapes and speakers reflectssocial andculturalrealities.Forthese reasons,they arewell situatedto contributeto the scholarshipon agency.Indeed,long before Giddensfirstpopularized the termagency,linguisticanthropologists (andsome scholarsin relatedfields such and sociolinguistics)were writingabout as discourseanalysis,ethnomethodology, language as a form of social action. For years, linguistic anthropologistshave examined specific speech events in order to illuminate how people think about their own and others' actions. By analyzing grammaticalmarkers,pronounuse, & Ochs(1990). 7See alsoDuranti
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turn taking, narrativestructures,dispute resolution, overlappingutterances,and other linguistic features, linguistic anthropologistshave looked to language for concreteexamples of effective (and ineffective) social action. In the sections that have taken to show how follow, I presentseveralpaths linguistic anthropologists culturein all its formsemergesfromeverydaylinguisticagencythatis itself shaped by socioculturalformations.There are several bodies of literaturenot dealt with here, for althoughthey make contributionsto the study of language and agency, they are summarizedwell elsewhere. The burgeoningarea of language ideology research, for example, is summed up in Kroskrity(2000) and Schieffelin et al (1998). Languagechange, creolization,and bilingualismare also not treatedhere (cf. DeGraff 1999, Lightfoot 1999, Romaine 1995). Nevertheless,while the following sections touch on only some of the many areas relevantto language and agency that have been explored by linguistic anthropologists,they illustratethe importantcontributionslinguistic anthropologyhas to make to social theory as a whole.
Languageand Gender
One of the areas within linguistic anthropologymost centrally concerned with questions of agency is the field of language and gender.The scholarshipin this area generally avoids relying on a definitionof agency as resistance, which can be found in much of the gender literaturein other fields, and instead draws on more nuancedunderstandings from within linguistics and sociology of language as social action. While many of the language and gender scholars do not use the term agency in their work, they explore the relationshipbetween linguistic practices and social structuresin ways that contributeto our understandingof the concept of agency. Dozens of articles demonstrating how gender as a social constructemerges from particularlinguistic interactionsare contained within a handful of indispensableanthologies (Bergvall et al 1996, Bucholtz et al 1994, 1999, Hall & Bucholtz 1995, Hall et al 1992, Livia & Hall 1997, Philips et al 1987, Roman et al 1994, Tannen 1993). The interestedreader can find within these volumes studiesthatdescribe,for example,how phone sex workersexercise ambiguous agency by using traditionally"powerless,"stereotypicallyfeminine speech to become economically independent(Hall 1995); how preschoolers'dispute resolution practices reflect and shape their developing gendered identities (Sheldon 1993); and how gay men produce coming-out narrativesfull of references to personal agency regardingthe learning of distinctively gay ways of talking(Leap 1999). In an insightfulessay thattracesthe intersectionsbetween practicetheory and feminist theory,McElhinny(1998) identifiesfour scholarsin the field of language and gender-Goodwin, Ochs, and the writing team of Eckert & McConnellGinet-who have made importantcontributionsto both theoreticalrealms, and she urges that they be added to the canon. Goodwin, deservedly well known for hermeticulouslyresearched book, He-Said-She-Said:Talkas Social Organization
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among Black Children,focuses on "situatedactivities"ratherthan on whole societies or particularindividuals because such a unit of analysis enables her to demonstratehow stereotypes about women's speech become untenable when moving from one activity to another (Goodwin 1990, p. 9). Goodwin discovered that the girls on Maple Street did indeed use talk for different purposes than boys did when interactingamong themselves, but when interactingwith boys, they frequentlytook on the boys' speech patterns,at times even outperforming them in verbal contests. She concludes, "This analysis has examined ways in which aspects of gender are manifested in speech activities, but more I have investigatedhow speech events can themselvesprovidefor soimportant, cial organization,shaping alignment and social identities of participantsto the (Goodwin 1990, p. 286; emphasisin the original).Goodwin's presentinteraction" work calls attention to the many different ways that agency can be exercised linguisticallyand to the importanceof looking closely at linguistic as well as socioculturalcontexts when attemptingto understandsocial dynamics and social change. Ochs' work treatinglanguagesocializationas a lifelong activity also provides us with important insight into the microprocessesof social change and continuity (Ochs 1988, 1992, 1996; McElhinny1998, p. 168). Because people areconstantly learningnew ways to speak and act for particularsocioculturalcontexts, a close examinationof this learningprocess in childrenand adultscan shed light on the (to which pracslippage between social reproductionand social transformation tice theorists such as Bourdieu and Giddens allude but fail to elucidate). Citing BourdieuandGiddens,Ochs notes, "Thisfocus on languagepracticesas resources for socializingsocial andcultural competencelinks languagesocializationresearch as outcomes thatportray social structures to post-structural sociologicalparadigms in the ." original).Ochs,oftenin of socialpractices.. (Ochs 1996,p. 408; emphasis collaboration with Schieffelin,looks closely at indexicality,honorificpronounuse, featuresto investigatehow linwordorder,case-markings,and othergrammatical encode and socialize information about society andculture(Ochs guistic practices & Schieffelin 1983, 1984, Schieffelin & Ochs 1986). In her researchon Kaluli children'slanguagesocialization,Schieffelin (1990, p. 239) concludes that, "The methodsused in this studyenable one to specify and interpret microethnographic the words, interactions,relationships,and contexts in which culturalmeanings are displayed to young children and reproducedby them.... This study shows how language is a resource for social theory."This latter statement,while true, do not merely provide social theorists is too modest. Linguistic anthropologists of linguistic data;they also contributeunique insights to the with the "resource" process of theorybuilding.In focusing on languageacquisitionand socialization, to ourunderstanding of the microprocessesof social Ochs & Schieffelincontribute reproduction,therebyhelping us identify the potential slippages between social and social transformation. reproduction of linguistic and Eckert& McConnell-Ginetalso advance our understanding social practicesin theirindividualandjoint researchon genderedsocial categories
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in a Detroit area high school (Eckert 1989, Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992, 1995; cf. McElhinny 1998, p. 171ff.). They write, "Languageis a primarytool people use in constitutingthemselves and others as 'kinds' of people in terms of which attributes,activities, and participationin social practice can be regulated" (Eckert& McConnell-Ginet1995, p. 470). Perhapstheir most significant contributionto practice theory is their emphasis on a "communityof practice" (cf. Lave & Wenger 1991), which they define as "an aggregate of people who come togetheraroundmutualengagementin an endeavor.Ways of doing things, ways of talking, beliefs, values, power relations-in short,practices-emerge in the course of this mutualendeavor"(Eckert& McConnell-Ginet1992, p. 464). The concept of communities of practice offers scholars a processual yet structural unit that can easily be viewed as both constitutiveof, and constitutedby, its participants.In placing linguistic and social practices within the contexts of communitiesof practice, Eckertand McConnell-Ginetcontributeto a more nuancedview of the varyingways in which agency is socioculturally constrained and enabled.
LiteracyPractices
Language,of course,can be writtenas well as spoken.Anotherfield of scholarship well situatedto make significantcontributions to our understanding of language and agency, therefore,is the study of literacypractices.Withinlinguistic anthropology and relateddisciplines in recent years therehas been a theoreticaldebate, summarized nicely by Besnier(1995), Collins (1995), andStreet(2001), regarding how literacy should be defined and studied.On one side of the issue are scholars like Goody & Watt(1963), who were earlyproponents of what Street(1984, 1993, model of literacy.Goody and othersupporters 2001) has called the "autonomous" of the autonomousmodel maintainthat the advent of literacy in a society will cause the same social and psychological effects, no matterwhich society is being studied. These scholars "conceptualiseliteracy in technical terms, treatingit as independentof social context, an autonomousvariablewhose consequences for society and cognition can be derived from its intrinsic character" (Street 1984, p. 5). Another proponent of the autonomous model, Ong (1982, pp. 14-15), asserts boldly that "without writing, human consciousness cannot achieve its fuller potentials, cannot produce other beautiful and powerful creations. In this sense, oralityneeds to produceand is destinedto producewriting."Ong, Goody, and others who espouse the autonomousmodel see a "GreatDivide" separating "oral"societies from "literate"ones-a gap similar to the one turn-of-theused to claim existed between "primitive" and "civilized" centuryanthropologists societies. On the opposing side of the issue are those scholars engaging in what Street such as Streethimself (1984, (2001, p.10) calls New LiteracyStudies.Researchers 1993,2001), Basso (1989[1974]), Baynham(1995), Besnier (1995), andFinnegan (1988) favor an "ideological"model for studyingliteracies, an approachthat has
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AHEARN benefitedfrom, and contributed to, practicetheory.Besnier (1995, p. 5) describes the goals of this approachas follows: "Ratherthan seeking an overarchingand context-freecharacterization of the cognitive and social consequencesof literacy, of the ideologicalmodel focus on the activities,events, andideological proponents constructsassociatedwith particular of literacy." manifestations This approach examinesthe specificramifications of the adventof literacyin each society, claiming thatthereare no universalattributes of literatesocieties and maintainingthat it is impossible for literacyskills to be acquiredneutrally.Most anthropologists agree with Baynham(1995, p. 71) thatit is important to understand literacyas a form of social practice(or agency), and to investigatethe way it interactswith ideologies and institutionsto shape and define the possibilities and life paths of individuals. My own work on Nepali love letters derives inspirationfrom the work of of various Barton,Besnier,Street,andotherswho haveexploredthe manifestations literaciesin their social contexts (Barton& Hall 2000, Barton& Hamilton 1998, Bartonet al 2000). In Junigau,Nepal, newly literateyoung women are applying their literacy skills in a novel form of courtship:love letters that echo the developmentdiscoursesandchangingnotions of agency thatcan be foundelsewherein the society (Ahearn2000b, 2001). This scholarshipis an exampleof whatBesnier studies"of literacy.He defines such studies as (1995, p. 9) calls "event-centered into the ethnographic investigations ways thatliteracyderivesits meaningfromthe broadercontext in which it is practiced,and the ways that aspects of the situation acquiremeaningfrom acts of readingand writing. Because culturalmeanings are often constitutedthroughliteracy practices as well as throughverbalinteractions, scholarsinterestedin the role of differenttypes of agency (oral and literate) in the reproductionand transformation of cultural can benefit from work the of researchers in this field. meanings
Dialogic Approaches
interestedin agency (includingsome mentionedin Manylinguisticanthropologists are a previoussections) taking dialogic approachfollowing Bakhtin(1981, 1984, a in few cases, the Soviet psychologist Vygotsky (1978, 1987, Holland 1993) and, et al 1998, Wertschet al 1993). In a statementthat summarizesthe approachto language and agency espoused by these scholars, Bakhtin (1984, p. 183) notes that"Languagelives only in the dialogic interaction of those who make use of it." Mannheim& Tedlock (1995, p. 4) explain that dialogue, which etymologically refers to talk (logos) that goes back and forth (dia), can involve any or all of the verbal exchange, a social field across which multiple following: straightforward voices and multipleculturallogics contend,or a text that is multivocaland egalitarianratherthanunivocaland authoritarian. In all cases, however,the traditional and action,in which actionis treatedas a reflection relationshipbetween structure of a priorstructure, is rejectedin favorof one in which structure emerges through situatedaction. Wordsor texts are socially situatedby, not createdby, individuals (Mannheim& Tedlock 1995, p. 5).
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Locatinglanguage,culture,andagency in the intersticesbetweenpeople, rather thanwithin individualsthemselves,requiresa differentway of thinkingaboutand studying linguistic and culturalinteractions.While it may appearthat a dialogic approach precludesthe possibility of studyingindividuals,in theiredited volume, TheDialogic Emergenceof Culture,Tedlock& Mannheim(1995) providenumerous examplesof how scholarscan studythe wordsand actionsof particular people while also situatingthose individualswithin socioculturalfields that are always fluidandin process.In Hill's contribution to the volume, for example,she drawson Bakhtin'snotionof heteroglossiato analyzehow the narrator Don Gabriel,a native Mexicano speaker,tells of his son's murder.The narrativecontains dysfluencies when he speaksin Spanishof profitmotivesfor the murder, butit remainselegantly fluentwhen he speaksin Mexicanoaboutthe loss of his son. "Thenarrative reveals a veritablekaleidoscopeof 'emotionalselves,' which areall art,distributed in fragments across the rhetoricalsystems of the narrative," writes Hill (1995, p. 139). of ongoAmong these selves is one thatpositionsitself squarelywithinthe "domain ing ideological resistanceto a capitalistideology,"an ideology indexedby the use of Spanish.By locatingmultiplesocially embeddedvoices amongandwithinindividualsin this narrative, Hill demonstrates the usefulnessfor linguisticandcultural alike of a dialogic approachto the study of languageand agency. anthropologists Anothercontribution to the Tedlock& Mannheimvolume, a reprintof a 1983 McDermott & paper by Tylbor(1995[1983]), looks at how one short classroom interactionamong several students and a teacherproduces an outcome not predictablefrom analysis of the words alone. Rosa, a first-grade studentwho cannot read, constantlycalls out for a turnat readingaloud-and yet on close examination, Rosa, her classmates, and the teacher all seem to be colluding throughthe use of subtle gestures and timing cues in ordernot to give Rosa a chance to read aloud (McDermott& Tylbor 1995[1983], p. 223). This collusional approachto understanding language and agency "refersto how membersof any social order mustconstantlyhelp each otherposit a particular stateof affairs,even when such a statewould be in no way at handwithouteveryoneso proceeding"(McDermott& Tylbor 1995[1983], p. 219). Just as meaningsand outcomes are coconstructed,so is agency. Basso (1996) explores the dynamics of "place-making" among the Western whose activities and historical Apache, storytelling dialogicallyproduce reproduce and moral wisdom. Basso claims knowledge Place-makingthroughstorytelling, is a of social traditions and a of (1996, p. 7), identities, way "doing way constructing humanhistory."Drawingon Bakhtin's(1981, p. 7) notion of chronotopes,which are places where time and space have fused to create culturallyand historically charged locations, Basso describes how historicaltales themselves have agency and shape the moral judgments that Apaches make about themselves and other people (Basso 1996, p. 62). The landscape itself also exercises agency in this process, as the historicallyandmorallysignificantplaces serveto remindApaches of the stories associated with them. Throughtelling stories associated with particular places, the WesternApache coconstructa spatial, temporal,and cultural
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world that then serves to shape their futureconduct. This is truly an instance of agency extending"beyondthe skin"(Bateson 1972, Wertschet al 1993). lanAnotherimportantwork that takes a dialogic approachto understanding and Evidencein Oral Responsibility guage andagencyis Hill & Irvine'santhology, Discourse (1993). Hill & Irvinewritethatthe connectionbetweenknowledgeand to anapproach thatemphasizesdialogicalityandthe agencyis of centralimportance social constructionof meaning.Interpreting events, establishingfacts, conveying as knowledge are all activitiesinvolving opinion, and constitutinginterpretations socially situatedparticipants,who are agents in the constructionof knowledge and agents when they act on what they have come to know, believe, suspect, or opine (Hill & Irvine 1993, p. 2). As one example of such activities, Besnier's contributionto this volume demonstrateshow residents on Nukulaelae Atoll in of reportedspeech in orderto Polynesia take advantageof the multifunctionality inject a greateror lesser amountof affect into an utterance,therebymanipulating the audience'sperceptionof the quotedindividual(Besnier 1993). Besnier argues thatthe meaningsof Nukulaelaeutterances-like those of everyoneelse-cannot be understoodwithout locating the speakersin temporallyspecific sociocultural fields of relationality.Linguistic agency is molded by these socioculturalfields, which it then proceedsto recreateor reconfigure.
CONCLUSION
this To conclude, let me reiteratetwo points I have attemptedto make throughout review.First,scholarswho choose to use the termagency shoulddefineit carefully. TheprovisionaldefinitionI offeredat the outsetof this essay-that agencyrefersto the socioculturallymediatedcapacityto act-leaves a greatdeal unspecified.For example, where is agency located?Must agency be human,individual,collective, intentional,or conscious?Some studiesof agencyreinforcereceivednotionsabout while othersdeny agency to individuals,attributing westernatomicindividualism, it insteadonly to discoursesor social forces. It is absolutelycrucialthat theorists considerthe assumptionsaboutpersonhood,desire, and intentionalitythat might unwittinglybe built into their analyses. No matterhow agency is defined-and it can be defined in any numberof ways-implications for social theory abound. Scholarsusing the term must define it clearly, both for themselves and for their to avoidtreatingagency as it is important in particular, readers.Foranthropologists a synonymfor free will or resistance.One fruitfuldirectionfor futureresearchmay be to begin to distinguishamongtypes of agency-oppositional agency,complicit agency, agency of power, agency of intention,etc.-while also recognizing that multiple types are exercised in any given action. By doing this, we might gain a of the "complexandambiguousagency"(MacLeod morethoroughunderstanding us. that surrounds 1992) always can how focusing on linguisticinteractions Second, I hope I have demonstrated and in the microfor scholars interested clues macro-processes provideimportant
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of agency.Because languageand cultureare so tightly interwoven,neithershould be studied in isolation from the other,especially when a researcherseeks to understanda concept as complex as agency. While practice theory offers several as mutuallyconstitutive,I mainpromisingavenuesthattreatagency and structure andpracticescan shed even more tainthatattendingclosely to linguistic structures becomes social light on practicetheorists'maindilemma:how social reproduction Because grammatical transformation. categorieswithin particular languagesconstructthe roles of Subject,Agent, and Object differently,researcherscan benefit from examining such categoriescarefully when listening to how people attribute responsibility,credit, or blame for an event. Three areas in which scholars are skillfully combining a close examinationof language with a concern for broader social issues are the fields of languageand gender,literacypractices,and dialogic approachesto language. Such nuanced treatmentsof language and action serve as excellent models for the developmentof a more sophisticatedunderstanding of agency. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many people read and commented on earlier drafts of this essay, including my wonderful in-house editor, Rick Black; my eloquent and loyal critic, Peter Laipson;andthe following generousandknowledgeablecolleagues:JohnAdams, Anne Blackburn,Marcia-AnneDobres, Michele Gamburd,Karl Heider, Louise Jennings,Alice Kasakoff,Ann Kingsolver,Bruce Mannheim,and Gail Wagner. I am grateful to Sherry Ortnerfor introducingme to practice theory, to Bruce Mannheim forpointingoutto me the connectionbetweenlanguageandagency,and to TomFrickefor helping me understand how agency worksin Nepal. I also benefited enormouslyfrom the lively discussions of the Agency ReadingGroupat the University of South Carolina and from the research assistance of Gail Davis, ChangyongLiao, andJenniferWhetstone.This reviewis a productof collective ratherthanindividualagency,butonly I am to blamefor anyweaknessesthatremain. Visit the Annual Reviewshome page at www.AnnualReviews.org LITERATURE CITED
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Language and Agency Author(s): Laura M. Ahearn Source: Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 30 (2001), pp.

Annu. Rev. Anthropol.2001. 30:109-37 Copyright? 2001 by AnnualReviews. All rightsreserved

AND AGENCY LANGUAGE LauraM. Ahearn

WHY AGENCY NOW?

DEFINITIONAL STARTING POINTS

Language as Social Action

A Provisional Definition of Agency

Agency as Free Will

Equating Agency with Resistance

The Absenceof Agency?

Agencyand the Habitus

AGENCY IN LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY

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