Kalt and Zupan Capture and Ideology in The Economic

American Economic Association
Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics Author(s): Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Jun., 1984), pp. 279-300 Published by: American Economic Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1804008 . Accessed: 12/10/2013 00:26
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Captureand Ideologyin the EconomicTheoryof Politics

ByJOSEPH P. KALT
AND MARK A. ZUPAN*
long allow theuse of Occam'srazorin positive theory of regulation The economic to models, theories ofpolitics that ago putpublicinterest apprehensions or well-founded been these rest. These theorieshave correctly to identify, difficult goalsareunusually than measure, wishings, rather viewedas normative the Notwithstanding and analyze. which ofrealworld They latter phenomena. approaches explanations that wefind problem, have been replacedby modelsof political confine acto a viewof political themselves with therestof torsas narrowly behavior thatare consistent exmaximizers egocentric (AnthonyDowns, 1957; plainandpredict microeconomics poorly. outcomes legislative of thedetermiand Gordon 1965; The tracking and dissecting James Buchanan Tullock, policy 1976). nantsof voting 1971; Sam Peltzman, GeorgeStigler, on coal strip-mining debatehas arisenover suggest of politics Recently, however, theory thattheeconomic of a publicinterest has been prematurely whether some version closed to a broader will have to be read- conception of regulation theory behavior. ofpolitical about actionsand mitted to our thinking arena. What is at issue results in thepolitical andIdeology inthe 1. Interests importance of thealtruistic, is theempirical of Politics Economics interested in actors goalsofrational publicly outand regulatory determining legislative Regulation Coal Strip-Mining Kau and Paul Rubin,1979; A. TheSetting: comes(James 1982). Kalt,1981;Peltzman, and signifi- The Surface thenature assesses andReclamaControl Thisstudy Mining in a interested of a cance of publicly objectives tion Act (SMCRA) was the product twice instance of economic Congress struggle. policymak- protracted political particular on coal strip-mining passed versions of SMCRA-in 1974 and ing:U.S. Senatevoting The existence of suchobjectives 1975-only to have themvetoedby Presiregulations. into no contradiction of the eco- dentFord.SMCRA was finally signed is, of course, 3, 1977. on August Carter (Kenneth law by President nomicview of humanbehavior of stripthe restoration 1974); and may The Act requires Arrow, 1972; GaryBecker, state.In addihistory minedland to its premining well be rootedin genetic-biological Mine an Abandoned Actestablished 1978).Gen- tion, (Becker, 1976; JackHirshleifer, the previously Fund and clarified pub- Reclamation individuals' altruistic, erally, however, to water and land rights property liclyinterested goals have been givenlittle indefinite coal. by strippable Thisreflects such in areasunderlain that attention. the judgment theuse ofenvironmental as to The Actreduces unimportant goals are so empirically mining. inputsand raisesthecostsof strip This tendsto raise the priceof coal and * Departments of Economics, HarvardUniversity, generates coal surface transfers income from MA 02138, and Massachusetts Cambridge, Institute of to underand coal consumers producers Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139,respectively. We of enand theconsumers producers thankHarold Demsetz, Paul Joskow, ground Allen Jacobs, losses The combined amenities. vironmental ThomasRomer, Richard Schmalensee, Harry Watson, and coal consumers apMarkWatson, and workshop at Harvard, of surface producers participants MIT, and theUniversity of Chicagoforhelpful comof $1.4 billion per pear to be on theorder ments andsuggestions. Peter Martin, Kevin Mohan, and 70/30, respecyear (split approximately Margaret Wallsprovided valuable research assistance. fora After accounting 1983). Kalt, tively; The support of theSloan Foundation and theEnergy smalldeadweight loss, the annualgainsof andEnvironmental at the Policy Center Kennedy School ofGovernment hasbeengreatly appreciated. users and undernoncoal environmental
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ground producers are in the rangeof $1.3 thatis, a dutyto a senseof "civic duty," billion (split roughly 90/10). of of thepublic.Pursuit servetheinterests While incidence analysis canproduce more such a dutyis a consumption that activity or lessprecise estimates ofparticular market yields of glow ofthewarm utility in theform participants' gainsor lossesfrom SMCRA, moral rectitude. this type of Classifying thereis clearly no reasonto expectthese argument as a "conin theutility function economic stakes to translate one-for-one into sumption from the (as distinguished motive" political clout(Mancur Olson,1971; Stigler, self-interested "investment motive"of in1971). Indeed,one of thetasksof theeco- creasing asserts Stigler one's own wealth), nomic theory of regulation and theresearch with theories ofpolitics: respect to economic below is to describe how economic stakes "The investment motive is richin empirical map into political influence. For our pur- implications, is motive and theconsumption poses,incidence analysis indicates thedirec- lesswell-endowed, so we should see howfar tion ofrelevant in SMCRA: parties' interests before we analysis we can carry theformer theregulation of theenvironmental (p. 104). damage add thelatter" attendant to strip should mining be expected may yet of thisassertion The sentiment to be opposed coal producers and bysurface ofrecent A number prove tobe supportable. coal consumers; coal producers investigations, underground that however, havesuggested and consumers of affected environmental policymakers' self-defined notionsof the amenities should SMCRA. support are dominant explanatory "publicinterest" votingbehavior factorsin congressional B. RelatedResearch 1979; Kau and Rubin; (EdwardMitchell, to haveattempted Kalt,1981).Thesestudies The tenor of economic ("capture") theo- explain on specific issues(for records voting riesofregulation, when appliedto a specific example, as functions of oil pricecontrols) case suchas SMCRA,might that the relevanteconomicinterest suggest variablesplus incidence of thelegislation summarizes not orientasomemeasure of the "ideological" but also thepolitics onlytheeconomics, of The latter is typically tionof congressmen. the issue: narrowly self-interested under- based on rating scalesprovided byideologigroundcoal producers and environmental cal watchdogorganizations such as the consumers captured policymakers at theex- Americans (ADA) or Action forDemocratic pense of narrowly self-interested coal con- the Americans Action for Constitutional sumers and surface coal producers. Thisline (ACA). The consistent are that ecofindings of reasoning, cannot be disproved. nomic interest however, variablesplay surprisingly Since every economic policydecisionpro- weakrolesin legislative the while outcomes, ducestransfers of wealth, it is always possi- hypothesis is quite of no ideological effect ble to infallibly relate outcomes to political easily rejected. distributional Thisapproach, infact, impacts. look Peltzman (1982) has takena critical leavesopenthequestion of whether thebeThe interests of conat these findings. havior and results we observe in thepolitical stituents of andtheideological "preferences" arena are the product of something more theirrepresentatives are plausibly interrethan the parochialpecuniary interests of from running with causation lated-perhaps affected parties. Theapparent theformer to thelatter. importhe most basic proposition Probably of be due to tanceof ideology may,therefore, economic, capturemodelsof regulation By exis economic interest variables. left-out the (sometimes assertion thatthe amining implicit) Senate across a broadsample voting interested is ableto "explain Peltzman altruistic, publicly away" goals of indi- ofissues, viduals aresuchinsignificant in polit- most of the importance of ideological factors ical processes that they areempirically with an extendedarray of unin- preferences and dispensable. constituent interest measures teresting (forexample, Stigler (1972) has notedthepossibility of altruistic The research motives in characteristics). demographic action. Thesemight taketheform of differs political these behind however, results, strategy
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in a fundamental way fromthe approach in theresearch taken itcritiques. Specifically, Peltzman examines a sample covering essentially theentire packageof votesoffered by senators to theirconstituents, rather than voting on a specific issue.Thequery remains whether conclusions reached at sucha high levelofbundling can safely be applied to the specific case.The economic theory ofregulation hasgenerally and applied beenputforth as an issue-specific theory (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976;Burton Abrams and Russell Settle, 1978).
ideology may giveindividuals the satisfaction of knowing thattheyhave concretely improved thelot of others. Second,evenif the ofideology pursuit hasnoeffect onothers, individualsmay derive satisfaction from "having donetheright thing" (Stigler's consumption motive).2 Do individuals really get from utility these sources? It is notourintentionhere to dispute tastes. We takethepresence of ideological tastes by intro'as given spection and observation. Following Becker (1974),wealso takethq pursuit ofsuchtastes to be rational-tobe responsive, thatis, to opportunity costs.This contrasts withthe unfortunate terminology which characterizes C. Possible Sources ofIdeological Voting altruistic-ideological behavior as "non-ecoIn thejargonof recent research, thepur- nomic" (Peltzman, 1982) and/or "irratioof politicalactors nal" (YoramBarzeland EugeneSilberberg, portedsocial objectives havebeentermed "ideology." Political ideol- 1973).Therationality ofideological behavior below. ogies are more or less consistent sets of is tested behavior based on pureideology normative statements as to bestor preferred Political either thepublicly interested statesof the world.Such statements are mayarisefrom ofconstituents or theindependent moralistic and altruistic in the sense that objectives of their interested objectives repreareheldas applicable toeveryone, they rather publicly thanmerely thestate- sentatives. to the actormaking ments. are Constituents:Voters' ideological goals Accordingly, political ideologies taken here to be statements about how mightinclude,for example,anticommutheir communism, Jeffersonian agrarianism, can bestserve government proponents' nism, of the publicinterest. Behav- Rawlsianegalitarianism, and so on.3 The conceptions ofsuchgoalsposesno problems for ior in accordwithsuchstatements has two presence of politics. Publicyinpossiblesources:1) the directappearance theeconomic theory in actors'preference are just another of altruism functions terested ideologues special capable of capturing the political and 2) a conve- interest (termed "pure" ideology); of statics subject to thecomparative wheninforma- process, nientsignalling mechanism as modeled costsand benefits tion onpolitical is otherwise decisions costly.' organizational by Peltzman (1976). We suspect, however, wouldconcludethat 1. PureIdeology in Voters and their Repre- thatmosteconomists ofideological is notan thepursuit ifit exists objectives Pureideology, at all,is sentatives. Atleaston thebasis phenomenon. themanifestation in thepolitical important of altruism in themarket observed sector, The returns from thefurtherance of of behavior sector. Is an ideology appearto comein at leasttwo this would appear to be well-founded. there forms. thesuccessful of an anyreasonto expect pureideological First, promotion in the actions to be relatively more common
have oftenbeen These two sourcesof ideology noted.Downs'exposition is particularly clear.Jerome Rothenberg (1965), BrunoFrey and Lawrence Lau (1968), and AlbertBreton (1974) provide systematic theoretical treatments of pureideology; and empirical oftheconcept implementation hasbeenpushed furthest by theliterature on the"paradoxof voting" (William Riker andPeter Ordeshook, 1968;Robert Tollison and Thomas Willett, 1975;andOrley Ashenfelter and StanleyKelley, 1975). in either mayalso recase,individuals 20f course, of, or even in the form of the esteem ceive returns 1976). (Becker, other individuals favors from, reciprocal in any embodied of "publicinterest" 'The notion of thepromotion neednotinclude ideology particular ideologies 1982).Indeed, efficiency (Tullock, economic aroundthe "equity"(i.e., center appear to typically side of the assignments) rightsand distributional dichotomy. economists' equity-efficiency
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political arena?Severalfactors suggest the "liturgical"... and [is]hardly at all like the choice among alternative investanswer be affirmative. may ments. [p. 18] First,altruistic ideological interests that depend uponactually improving thewelfare of others have clear collective good attributes. Theapparatus ofgovernment Third, evenwhen political provides participation is theclassicSamuelsonian (1954) means(i.e., motivated bythe prospect ofpecuniary gains, coercive for power) thefree-rider such gains are oftensubjectto substantial overcoming problems that can plaguea marketplace. In- public goods problems. Pecuniary political deed,thisapparatus maybe madecompara- gainscommonly mustbe shared withlarge tively fortherepresentative inexpensive al- numbers of congruent parties (forexample, to the extent truist it can be hijacked and all coal consumers or all environmental usedto require outsiders to finance theben- users).Whileprivate sector investments can efits to thealtruist's delivered targeted group. be accompanied byfree-rider problems, such in muchpolitical Second, thein- problems are virtually activity, theruleat thelegisdividual has no meaningful of in- lative level in U.S.-style prospect democracy (the In the case of large- Chrysler fluencing outcomes. and Lockheed cases notwithstandnumber majoritarian elections, forexample, ing).In contrast, at leastthat part ofideology theindividual is generally voter incapable of based on individuals' tastesfor the warm promoting his or her investment interests. glow of moralrectitude is a strict private This observation has led to therecognition good in boththepublicand private sectors. that altruistic-ideological cost (i.e., forgone preferences play Thus the opportunity central rolesin motivating theact ofvoting. pecuniary of ideology return) be exmight Nevertheless, it has typically been assumed pectedto be generally in thepolitical lower that,once the decisionto vote has been arenathanin themarketplace. Accordingly, made, we can explainthe ballot cast by therational in the actor sector political would reference to thevoter's economic interests. be expected to revealbehavior tiltedrelaAs Geoffrey Brennan and Buchanan (1982) tively moretoward obaltruistic-ideological have pointedout, however, this is a non jectives. if thedecision sequitur: to voteis based on Representatives: Institutional of attributes it doesnotfollow consumption motives, that the politicalsectormay allow pure ideothese motives aresetasideuponentering the logicalactionby representatives themselves. voting booth.Comparing the consumption Thisopportunity couldarisebecause, analochoices madein voting investment deci- goustothecaseofmanagement inthe with private sionsin themarketplace in origi- corporation, there (emphasis maybe someseparation nal): of "ownership" by constituents and "control"bypolicymakers. Anysuchslackin the ... we may presumethattheindividual can be expected principal-agent relationship caresas towhich outcome from emerges to resultin policymaker or independence the voting But thisdoes not process. Alchianand Harold "shirking"-asArmen us to presume that in permit hischoice Demsetz (1972)call it. the pollingbooth reflects or correofthespecific-issue Models legislative prooveroutspondswithhis preferences cess that have out of the economic grown comes.For the voteris not choosing ofregulation theory (Peltzman, 1976)seldom between outcomes....Whenthevoter shirking.4 By theopportunity leave room for policymaker pullsa particular lever, cost of doing so is not a particular policy forgone.... [pp.14-15] shirking in whichideological 4Notable exceptions andFrey ofRothenberg models aretheformal appears thechoiceof candidate... de[Thus]... is primarily ofthese models thefocus andLau,although on tastes for pends overwhelmingly motivated In a model success. electoral onpolicymakers' as such-and showing "preferences" to thoseconsidered similar attributes by institutional at all on theevaluation of outhardly slack in the Barro (1973)allows Robert andbelow, here comes.Voting behavior is thento be nonideological) and (albeit, relationship principal-agent officials. byelected maximization understood utility as "symbolic" or perhaps
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with endowing legislators goalssuchas vote elements of naturalmonopoly are present maxi- (Stigler,1971); and collusionto prevent maximization, rather thanown-utility behavior that Tiebout-type is officially mization, suchmodels preclude (1956) competition is not directly controlled by constituents. sanctioned. of the Finally, theseattributes of thestrength of theprin- market Thisconception conditions forlegislative seatscreate bond in the legislative process, conducive cipal-agent in OliverWilto "opportunism" the liamson's(1975) sense; and the rangeof however, doesnotseemtobe in linewith of thisbond thatcomesout of enforceable agreements of the contractual conception of institutions typeexamined Klein,Robert by Benjamin the property rights theory and and Demsetz;MichaelJensen (Alchian and Alchian be Crawford, (1978)thatmight WilliamMeckling, is notably 1976) and the bulk of struck to minimize opportunism evidence associated (see the sum- limited to theverbal agreement empirical (for example, promises"). 1982).Conditions that"I willkeepmycampaign mary by Louis De Alessi, invisible It mustbe stressed thatnoneof thisimunderwhichthe market system's in nar- plies thatshirking to encounter difficulty is costlessto legislative handis likely and con- representatives. to theposition of Analogous theseparation ofownership rowing vis-a-vis privatesectormanagers trolwouldappearto be especially prevalent shirking facesomeconshareholders, representatives in thelegislative context.5 booth,as well as the voting First,the "marketfor control"(Henry trol through from constituents pressure by significant morecontinuous Manne,1965)is characterized thepleasantto affect at the whohavesomeability indivisibilities thatimpair adjustment working day,fuconstit- ness of thepolicymaker's margin by constituents. The typical and other opportunities, uentis presented with choices ture employment all-or-nothing a smallnumber of largebundles of aspects between of thereturns to positions of policy over responsibility. issuesto be addressed by policymakers inlegislative Nevertheless, meetsonly stitutions theirtenure;and the market suchas theU.S. Senatewouldapinfrequently-every six yearsin thecase of pear to be archetypical Alchian-Demsetz ofpolit- organizations theU.S. Senate. Second, as "hirers" inwhich areimperfectly agents have poor policedby their ical representation, voter-owners "imperprincipals-where to be well-informed. As Olsonhas fectly" incentives to a nirvana world is defined relative are subjectto of zeropolicing collective decisions stressed, is result costs.The implied thataffect par- some amount classicfree-rider problems of own-welfare maximization in theacquisi- by representatives to invest ticipants' willingness at the expenseof their tionof information. thesefree-rider constituents-an Third, amount thatmaybe optiare exacerbated by the factthat mal for constituents problems giventhe real world is held under policing "ownership" by constituents coststhey face. attenuated titles.Politicalownerproperty policedrepAny shirking by imperfectly and, as residual resentatives around ship is nontransferable, canbe expected tocenter of correct claimants to thenetbenefits deci- those activities thathave low opportunity such costs (for example, sions, constituent-owners promoting in terms of reelection decisions cannot resulting gains prospects) easily capture offthe and/orpoor substitutes andDemsetz). thepolit- job. Paralleling Fourth, (seeAlchian of Becker's (1957) analysis ical market is apparently subject to lessthan privatemanagers' on-the-job consumption 1977). and Alchianand Reuben Kessel's (1962) perfect competition (JohnFerejohn, in examination The provision of representation services shirkof nonprofit institutions, on nonpecuniary the U.S. political takesplace under ingbylegislators mayfocus system conditions of effective to perquisites of office holding-although opduopoly;barriers are significant forpersonal gain are entry (Abramsand Settle); portunities pecuniary available. The perquisites of politicertainly from "factfinding" cal office junkets range that separation doesnotrequire 5Ideologicalshirking connections and postservice employment in the be more prevalent and control of ownership interest groupsto public It is sufficient withrent-seeking than in themarketplace. setting legislative slack. to use the there be some principal-agent and theability that notoriety, prestige,
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to imposeone's own powerof government The last of the"good" society. pet theories is almost uniquely of these emoluments and is what sector in thepolitical available consumption. ideological we havetermed in an shirking of reasons, For a number such as Senate votingmightbe activity component. to havean ideological expected Morris Fiorinaand RogerNoll (1978) have defates legislators' that for instance, noted, to constituents on theprovision pendheavily exam(for services" "facilitation ofso-called of levels at other intervention ple,supportive fromtheir as distinguished government), of floorvotes. This is compleprovision shirknonideological that mented bythefact bribes, taking (for example, votes ingon floor ormissing rollcallsin tobe informed, failing costly is comparatively ofoffice parties) favor whilea penalties, of institutional as a result or censure does notfaceexpulsion legislator (i.e.,ideolhisorher"conscience" for voting theindividto theextent Furthermore, ogy).6 takethefateon can rationally ual legislator pieceoflegislation ofanyparticular thefloor vote becomes valuethat legislator's as given, vote,thatis, less to any constituent-that of well-being on theeconomic has no impact outsince it does not affect constituents valueofthevote The only remaining comes.7 be itsconsumpwould then, to thelegislator, wouldbe willing tionvalue-no constituent the forit.Thisis,ofcourse, to payanything analogue to Brennanand legislative-floor (notedabove)of voting analysis Buchanan's itwould although behavior bycitizens, booth that theinvestto conclude be inappropriate ment valueof a votein a placeliketheU.S. nil as it is in theverySenateis typically voting booth. majoritarian large-number is the apparatus Lastly,the governmental broad foraffecting mechanism preeminent
creates, this The opportunities socialchange. low coststo if coupledwithcomparatively a self-selecwould imply shirking, ideological with individuals tion processthat attracts to demandsforideology intense relatively sector. thepolitical
Information. and Costly Ideology 2. Impure base policymakers that possible It is certainly theprewith on consultation decisions their than more nothing when ofan ideology cepts is being served.In a narrowself-interest on theconcorinformation worldin which and the interests constituent dancebetween is scarce, of policyproposals consequences inmayservetheir representatives political to thedesire (forexample, motives vestment ofan on thedictates byrelying getreelected) of their to theservice as a shortcut ideology goals (Downs; Buchananand constituents' plays the Tullock).In this view,ideology of the theory same role in the economic rules of politicalprocessthat managerial of theprofit-maxithumb playin thetheory thatthe apThe implication mizingfirm. are in of representatives parentideologies interests sugfactproxiesforconstituents' of ideolmeasures between collinearity gests has Thisimplication interests. ogyand those on of voting in studies support notreceived buthas beenborneoutin issues, individual on of voting (1982) examination Peltzman's by bundle ofissuesaddressed theaggregated results conflicting senators. Theseapparently of a thecontext belowwithin are analyzed democracy. Downsian viewofrepresentative deDowns'seminal lookat representative an important implication suggests mocracy on as a deviceforeconomizing of ideology if legislators are not perfectly information: policed on everyvote, the rationalconrepreto support couldbe expected stituent forpureideology whosedemands sentatives are intenserelativeto othermotivesfor of form in thepecuniary 6Note,also, thatshirking issue To be sure,as each specific maximization) shirking. of support (at theexpense bribes taking pretheconstituent arises between elections, show andwould interest to someconstituent's is service theconstituent's vote that below, fers representatives ofvoting analysis in the empirical up accordingly of conwithmeasures is uncorrelated unlessbribery ownideolonottheir on that issue, interests and bribery situation, In thelatter influence. stituent with1) an faced constituent But the gies. tobe (say,failing shirking ofnonideological forms other by bundleof issuesto be decided uncertain noise. up as white show should on issues) informed office, 2) their terms of over representatives a of parliain thecontext is also noted, point 7This andLau (p. 358). byFrey system, mentary deciof policy abouttheeffects uncertainty
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andhence costs policing and3) positive sions, to windup on neton can attempt shirking, or (in a pecuniary sidesofissues thewinning candisense) by supporting nonpecuniary Uponelecideologies. appropriate dateswith will engagein pure tion,such candidates on particularissues ideologicalshirking to be captured themselves than permit rather thatorganize interests by theissue-specific moat anyparticular themselves andpresent incidence approachto ment;an economic willbe inadeconomy political issue-specific however, slateofissues, Overthefull equate. fallinlinewith should voting representatives' ideoconstituents' oftheir indicators general interests-asPeltzlogicaland investment We now examinethese man (1982) finds. in thecontext of the implications Downsian issueofSMCRA. specific onSMCRA Voting II. Senate
A. Study Design
estimator: and has variance

(2) Vari=1/(ri + .5)+1/(ni
-
ri+ .5);
ANTISTRIP is based on the The variable in the thatserved of the100 senators voting from (1977-78);andis derived Congress 95th of 21 roll call votesin whichthe interests prounderground surfacecoal producers, and theconsumers coal consumers, ducers, amenitieswere clearly of environmental delineated.These votes deal with either MeaSMCRA or its vetoedpredecessors.8 suresthatwould have raisedthe costs of to be detrimental weretaken mining surface Selected mining-andconversely. to surface are implications votes and theireconomic (1982)sugPhelps and Charles notidentical; problems of aggregation thepossibility gests rein ANTISTRIP. In thiscase, however, votes whenindividual sultsare unaffected variables(see our are used as dependent earlier paper).
and their Influence B. Interests the causal is to untangle Our objective on strip-mining behind Senatevoting forces proof regulation theory The economic of theeffects We seekto separate controls. of constituents' and ideo- videsthebasis formeasures interests (economic constituents' theinterSpecifically, andinfluence. In addition, interests ideology. logical)and senators' thepolitihavein capturing that estsconstituents we wouldlike to be able to uncover gains or cal processare theirprospective which is ideology part,if any,of senators' The ability proposal. anypolicy and that lossesfrom shirking interested publicly purely have to capturethe political in for constituents stands which merely partof ideology to ability on their critically depends in- process constituent difficult to identify otherwise in inherent effects the free-rider overcome terests. decisions. Any group'sinfluence is ob- collective legislation on strip-mining Voting percapita onmembers' willdepend positively a "yea" or a "nay." To servedas either interof their AN- stakesand theconcentration a variable senators' positions, measure of on theheterogeneity to reflectthe ests; and negatively TISTRIP is constructed and groupsize. Where objectives frequency, fi, withwhichthe ith senator members' reflecting variables we employ data permit, A to strip mining. castsa voteunfavorable as well of groupeffectiveness, on r, determinants an anti-strip position voting senator in of groups'interests has fi= rl/n,.This as the magnitude out of n, opportunities is boundedby zero and unity. SMCRA. frequency of groups' first to themagnitude Turning Adjusting for ri= 0, ri= n,, and heterovariablesreflecting we introduce Gartand James Zweifel, interests, skedasticity (John underof surface coal producers, ofArnold thestakes theweighted technique logit 1967), and coal consumers, coal producers, ground in and TongLee (1965)is employed Zellner Thus oureconometric analysis. (1) ANTISTRIPi = ln[(ri + .5)/(ni
-
ri+ .5)];
Inc., Quarterly, Congressional from aretaken 8Votes (1973,1975,1977).A Almanac Quarterly Congressional in our1983paper. listis available descriptive
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lobplaguepolitical that environmental ameni- free-rider of affected problems consumers of ties. effectiveness bying."The organizational beis examined SURFRES the electric The variables powerindustry Coal Producers: ofSMCRA on coal theeffect and UNDERRES measure each state's low.Reflecting and prices, to be nega(in Btus) in 1977 of surface reserves CONSUME is expected and are tively toANTISTRIP. coal, respectively; related underground Environmental inConsumers: of statepersonal as fractions expressed Environmental twobroadtypes: into be classed may of interests importance cometo scale fortherelative sense;and usersin theliteral Re- environmental to states'economies. coal production protection for those for whom environmental are used to proxy measures serve-based cause. Empirical an ideological on represents value of SMCRA's impacts the present of the latteris in many western evidenceon the existence coal resources. Particularly by WilliamSchulzeet al. (1981). was in itsinfancy provided mining states where strip to pay, based on willingness that, figures inade- Theyfind in 1977,current production valueofan undeveloped impor- themost significant quatelycapturethe present-valued deindividuals' from is derived to states'economies. environment tanceof the industry thatan areais used therelative mandsfor namely of mostinterest, justknowing Results suchinofwhether independent and ideological variables, " properly," rolesof economic or evenplan to visitthe evervisit to production- dividuals are notaffected by switching These values are notably measures(see our area themselves. or employment-based They arise frompreearlier paper).9 altruistic-ideological. aboutwhatenvironmental opinions differences across scriptive There are significant stanwithself-defined mining uses are consistent on strip statesin SMCRA's impact and the public theregula- dards of ethicalpropriety costs. Thevariable MC measures theviewof include in thelong-run Thesestandards average interest. increase tion-induced psypurported for as an antidote in each state, as de- wilderness mining cost of surface theconcepcostsofurbanization; rivedby ICF, Inc. (1977). Becausesurface chological West as a peculiar were adverselyaffected tion of the American mininginterests lesson; the by SMCRA, MC as wellas SURFRES are culturaland natural history of of thepropriety question related to ANTI- quasi-religious to be negatively expected for resources ofenvironmental STRIP. The variableUNDERRES is ex- appropriating of rapid ends;thesocialdesirability on ANTI- human impact pectedto havea positive benthe appropriate and economic growth; STRIP. thereThevariable Coal Consumers: CONSUME eficiaries of publiclands.Moreover, thatpeople's of sultsof Schulzeet al. suggest theimportance is employed to represent in each state. Electric willingness to pay to upholdtheseprecepts coal consumption static properof has standardcomparative for78 percent accounts power generation is just U.S. coal demandand CONSUME is the ties-ideological environmentalism from economic ofstate coal another good. share electricity generated that interests I 1977.10 It is preferred to other measures To capturethe ideological a percapita constituents suchas totalcoal Btusconsumed havein SMCRA, we employ as state smallin variable utilities, if it is primarily electric ENVIROS. Thisis defined environmental the membership in thesixlargest and largein size,whoovercome number populaof voting-age (as a fraction groups between correlation the Interestingly, tion). Coal Coal Association, are from National 9Reserves of actual recreawith the ENVIROS and measures correlated Data 1978 (1979).Thesearehighly over 1978-87 tionaluse of theenvironment of new minedevelopment projections (forexample, Inc., Keystone Coal Industry huntingand fishing, reported in McGraw-Hill, budgets for parks
Manual(1977). Coal Data 1978.The correla'0CONSUME is from measure, CONSUME and an alternative tionbetween bewhoappeared "Of theover50 coal consumers per capita,is 0.72. Results totalcoal Btusconsumed on SMCRA,onlyone was hearings whenthealforecongressional unchanged beloware essentially reported nota utility. is utilized (see ourearlier ternative measure paper).
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visits and recreation, to parklands) is quite low.12If senators' voting has beencaptured byideological environmentalists, ENVIROS should have a positiveeffect on ANTIThe interests of actual nonmining consumers of the environment threatened by stripmining are represented by three
variables:HUNTFISH, SPLITRIGHTS, and UNRECLAIMED. The variable HUNTSTRIP.
FISH is defined as thenumber of hunting and fishing licenses as a percentage of state It is highly population. correlated with other measures of outdoorrecreational activity. tal organizations (HSURF, HUNDER, The analysis in Kalt (1983) indicates that HCONSUME, and HENVIROS).14 Data outdoor recreation is little threatened bystrip do notpermit similar measures forSPLITand HUNTFISH is consistently in- RIGHTS and UNRECLAIMED.15 Herfinmining; in theeconometric Since dahl indices significant analysis. are negatively related to group of interest results are invariant with respect size and positively related to theconcentrato theinclusion of HUNTFISH, thevariable tionofinterests within a group. Accordingly, is excluded here(see ourearlier paper).The HSURF and HCONSUME are expectedto variableSPLITRIGHTS captures the sup- have negativeeffects on ANTISTRIP, while and HUNDER and HENVIROS should have port of ranchers, farmers, lumberers, other noncoalbusiness interests forlegisla- positive impacts. tion that preserved their to preferential rights thelargeland areas underlaid by federally C. SenatorIdeology controlled coal.Theeconomic strippable valuesat stake aremeasured bytheagriculture/ The finalvariableto be introduced into timber revenue surface the examination yieldof thedisputed of ANTISTRIP voting is as a percentage ofstate acres, expressed per- some(arguably measure ofsenators' impure) sonal income.Similarly, UNRECLAIMED ownideologies. Following thelinesofprevimeasures the prospective value of already ous research, we relyon the independent butunrestored stripped acresto noncoal in- (but not disinterested) "pro-environment" terests whostoodto benefit from theAban- rating scale of the League of Conservation donedMine Reclamation Funds' subsidies. Voters (LCV). Thisrating scaleis based on The variables SPLITRIGHTS and UNRE27 not-surface-mining-related Senate votes CLAIMED shouldbe positively related to taken inthe95th anddeemed Congress tobe ANTISTRIP.13 ideologically revealing by the LCV.16The evenwhenscaledby state group's interests,
Group Influence: The magnitude of a
14The Keystone Coal Industry Manual provides state mine-by-mine data; HCONSUME is basedoncoal-fired electric generating capacity as reported inNational Coal Association, Steam Electric Plant Factors (1978),
fully forthatgroup's size,does notaccount ability to overcome thefree-rider problems associated with political lobbying. Thesesorts ofproblems havebeenincorporated intoempirical research on nonpolitical collective action, most notably in dealing with jointmaximization in oligopolistic markets. Available data permit us to addressthisissuein the politicalcontext. To reflect the likelihood that a group can surmount free-rider difficulties, weintroduce Herfindahl indices bystate forsurface coal producers, underground coal producers, coal consumers, and environmen-
12The groups are SierraClub, NationalAudubon Environmental Defense Society, of the Fund,Friends Earth,NationalWildlife and Wilderness Federation, Society (data provided by Resources forthe Future, Inc.,).The correlation between ENVIROS and total hunting andfishing licenses in a state (U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract, 1979) is 0.37. The correlation with state budgets forparks and recreation
visits to stateand federal forests and parklands (data from Charles Goeldner andKarenDicke,1981). 13Data forSPLITRIGHTS and UNRECLAIMED
(StatisticalAbstract, 1977) is -0.13; and is 0.003 with
HENVIROS is basedon thesixenvironmental groups mentioned in fn.12 above. '5The omission does not appearto be consequential; thememberships of SPLITRIGHTS and UNREandeasily self-identified. CLAIMED arerelatively small Ourearlier examined free-rider paper problems affecting these groups by introducing squared values of
SPLITRIGHTS
are fromICF, Inc. and the Surveyof Current Business.
cal Environmental Issues (1978) and are listed in our
ofinterest. and do notalter significant anyconclusions 16Votesarefrom LCV, How SenatorsVoted on Criti-
and UNRECLAIMED. Resultsare in-
earlier paper.
288
JUNE 1984
LCV notionof environmentalism conforms wellwith theaforementioned moralistic values of an undeveloped environment."7 Analogous to ANTISTRIP, the frequency of pro-environmental votesis transformed accordingto (1) and is denotedPROLCV. Reflecting theLCV's ownstance, PROLCV is expected to be positively related toANTI-
If maybe left-out variables. analysis, there with the (apparent) these are correlated that the hypothesis ideologies of senators, politics matters inspecific-issue pure ideology accepted.Consemay be inappropriately undera majorpartof the effort quently, III is aimedat uncovering takenin Section sucha correlation. At thisstage, it can only STRIP. The extremes of PROLCV are be noted appearing that eachoftheinterests occupiedby senators withreputations efforts as in the recordof SMCRA lobbying ideologues-for example, Kennedy (D-MA), and suggested by theory has beenidentified Culver (D-IA), Zorinsky (R-NE),and Hatch to theextent allowed by thedata: all voters (R-UT). Of course, this observation vanbegsthe at leasthave "homes"in theselected ofthepurity question ofideology. of ables and account is taken of thenature To the extent, if any, PROLCV reflects political To be sure, thegrouporganization. pure ideology, a movefrom a lowerto a in to their interests ingsof voters according higher PROLCV represents a movefrom a coal strip mining mostlikely do not correless to a moreintense demand forideologi- spond to the groupings ("constituencies") cal support of an undeveloped environment. thatoriginally got a senator elected-as a The variablePROLCV is built up from result discussed in Section ofthe"bundling" dichotomous,pro- or anti-environment I. But,thecapture do modelsof regulation choicesby senators. Holdingotherthings notsuggest variforleft-out thatthesearch constant, theopportunity including cost of ablesshould with these groupbegin original withrelatively shirking, senators moreinmodels are specific-isings.Insofar as these tense demands for ideological environ- sue models, thesearch forleft-out variables will choose the "pro" position shouldbe guidedby analysis mentalism of SMCRA's more willhavehigher impacts frequently surand,hence, and producers' on consumers' To theextent PROLCV reflects apparent ideology thatis in factproxying forconandLogrolling Lobbying D. Interstate in SMCRA, PROLCV stituents' interests shouldexhibit with significant not collinearity Two aspects of thelegislative process theother factors thatexplainANTISTRIP modelare worth included in our empirical voting.Of course,as in any econometric noting of senahere.First,the conception in ouranalysis embodied tors' choices voting their senators as casting portrays "captured" of SMCRA on ballots based the likely impact '7Joseph Sax (1980)provides thearchetypical stateon their betownstates' constituents-with ment ofideological environmentalism: moreatconstituents terorganized getting The preservationist is not an elitist whowantsto exclude others, notwithstanding popularopinionto the to ofvoters theability tention. Thisobscures contrary; he is a moralist whowants to convert them. lines. inadestate Data across apply pressure He is concerned aboutwhatother peopledo in the incorus to formally quaciesdo notpermit notbecause he is unaware parks ofthediversity oftaste in the society but becausehe viewscertain kindsof to the this Nevertheless, porate phenomenon. as calculated to undermine activity the attitudes he mustappeal extent thatcross-state lobbyers believes the parks can,andshould encourage. [p.14] in order to be effecto within-state impacts ... Engagement with nature provides an opportunity for is there the recedes. Moreover, tive, problem detachment from the submissiveness, conformity, and massbehavior that dogus in ourdaily lives;it offers a outno obvious reason why SMCRA-specific chanceto express distinctiveness and to explore our should cluster around deeperlongings. At the same time,the setting-by of-stateinterests of ideology measure PROLCV or anyother us to theawesomeness exposing ofthenatural in world thecontext of"ethical" recreation-moderates theurge non-SMCRA ofa senator's basedona bundle to prevail without thevitality that destroying gives rise a central becomes votes. this possibility Still, to it: to facewhatis wildin us and yetnotrevert to savagery. below. [p.42] objectofinvestigation
PROLCV values. plus.
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289
process tweenPROLCV and the included A secondaspectof thelegislative interest by our model is not coveredexplicitly variables used to explainANTISTRIP, the of thepaucity Thisin partreflects logrolling. interests being constituent SMCRA-specific would served anddatathat bytheory helpprovided mustbe unresenators by "buying" and direc- lated to theinterests of theextent allowmeasurement we have been able to and coalition-formingidentify. tionof anylogrolling of of thehistory Again,a reading issue of SMCRA-of the SMCRA provides on the specific help in identifying little which suchpotent of issues to choose from, hundreds left-out variables. Still,thisimtradehis plication senator issue(s)woulda logrolling object for empiria further suggests are there Note,however, SMCRA votefor? cal investigation. whylogrolling reasons a priori no apparent appearany moreor wouldmakeideology E. InitialResults to constituent relative any less important That in explaining SMCRA voting. the interests It is clear thatthe task of isolating to trade away determinants ofa senator on an ecooflegislative voting is,thewillingness or his own nomicissue such as SMCRA is extraordiinterests either his constituents' to the narily related shouldbe negatively we present ideology the cut, complex. As a first and the ".standard" of thoseinterests in strength has beenapplied political analysis that re- previousresearch. preferences, of his ideological intensity Table 1 comparesthe in the absenceof Furthermore, forby theeconomic Model argued spectively. Capture thatideology theory thehypothesis of regulation pureideology, (i.e., PROLCV is exwillincorrectly be accepted onlyif cluded)and a Capture-plus-Ideology matters Model hold: twoconditions that includesa variable(PROLCV) inthat arein interests 1) Thenon-SMCRA ideological tendedto accountforsenators' his preferences. votesagainst whena senator to a factserved Bothmodelslendsupport are multigroup interests SMCRA-specific 1976) constituents' seePeltzman, (for example, that capture relatedto the interests amended ofpolitics-perhaps systematically theory logroll- to includecapture through indirectly served (either were Noncoal by ideologues. on the beneficiaries voting bythesenator's of the environment, coal coningor directly) which PROLCV is constructed. sumers, and coal producers, issuesfrom underground 2) At the same time,for the senator surface coal prodlucers all appear to have up his con- appreciably buying SMCRA votesby giving influenced senators' votingon SMCRA- SMCRA; and interest interests on other issues, stituents' organizational groups' mustbe sys- capacities interests constituent pushed appearto have generally specific thatare senatorsin expecteddirections, related to theinterests tematically although or directly) served signifiby without statistical strong indirectly especially (either being his PROLCV voting. cance. from the WithPROLCV issuesranging of Table 1 is the The moststriking result from sharp oxideemissions of nitrogen in explanatory reregulation that increase power of phos- sults fromthe introduction and the elimination automobiles of PROLCV. to ex- Indeed, detergent of result thatled Kau phates in dishwashing it is thistype pansion of Redwood National Park and and Rubin, and Kalt (1981)to conclude that staffers forparking pure ideologywas at work in legislative congressional charging of thesetworequire- politics. satisfaction privileges, The foregoing discussion, however, Never- arguesthatsucha conclusion seemssomewhat implausible. ments is premature. question SectionIII proceeds we addressthisimportant witha dissection that theless, in Section III-for thecases of accounts fortheextent to which an extended empirically of ideology array both PROLCV and measures ofconstituent characteristics (including to theenviron- ENVIROS) can explain PROLCV. At this unrelated that arecompletely wecan only while thebehavment. notethat, stage, indicatesthat condition aboveto ior of selectedcoefficients forthesecond Finally, be- PROLCV is not completely to orthogonal collinearity introducing hold without
290
JUNE 1984
TABLE 1-THE DETERMINANTSOF ANTI-STRIP-MINING VOTING IN THE U.S. SENATEa
III. Separating Interests andIdeology
Explanatory Variable
PROLCV MC
Capture Model
-0.513 (-4.78)
Capture-plusIdeolo%,y Model
0.466 (10.05) [0.65] -0.375 (-3.47) [-0.22]
SURFRES
UNDERRES SPLITRIGHTS ENVIROS UNRECLAIMED CONSUME
-16.765
( -1.66) 12.512 (2.09) - 26.546 (-0.55) 83.375
-17.198
( -1.71) [-0.57] 14.132 (2.37) [0.73] 68.488 (1.40) [0.12] 0.501
(4.48)
0.019
(0.02)
(3.77) (-1.46)
- 0.350
Amongthemanyissuessenators voteon arecertain and ethical moral matters around HSURF 0.017 -0.294 whicheconomic-interest lobbying is infre(-1.24) (0.07) quent. Examples include suchissuesas child [0.00+] pornography, the neutron bomb, and capital HUNDER 0.305 0.150 punishment. WhilePeltzman (1982) rejects (1.10) (0.54) ideologyas an explanation for votingon [0.03] HENVIROS 1.935 -1.286 economic issues such as SMCRA, he sug( -1.14) (1.78) that on noneconomic gests voting socio-ethi[-0.07] cal questions is especially likely to be based -0.486 HCONSUME -0.261 on individuals' formoralrectipreferences (-2.42) (-1.29) [-0.08] that tude, is,pureideology. he finds Indeed, 1.414 Constant -0.154 evidence thatvoting on suchissuesreflects (-0.33) (2.86) own preferences senators' morethan does W2 0.45 0.74 " on voting pocketbook" issues. Following 27.47 Condition-Stat. 25.99 thisline of reasoning, we throw PROLCV aDependentvariableis ANTISTRIP; t-statistics are out of theanalysis of ANTISTRIP and rein parentheses. shown place it withmeasures of senators' social bBeta coefficients areshown in brackets. issueideology. Thesemeasures arebasedon senators' voting increased on, forexample, for trafficking in childpornograpenalties thesetofother explanatory factors, expanding theapplicability ofthedeath thevari- phy, able's statistical significance and thecondi- penalty, allowing theimmigration ofavowed tion statistics (David Belsleyet al., 1980) communists, and "giving away"thePanama indicate thereis insufficient Canal. (Subsequent collinearity to sections assess whether justifythe conclusionthat PROLCV is these measures reflect left-out interactually a proxy fortheconstituent merely interests ests and/or captureby ideologicalconidentified by thecapture theory. stituents.)
(-1.83)
[-0.13]
-0.440
(3.03) [0.22]
[0.00+] 0.015
Even if PROLCV's sources-indiscernible constituent interests or the elusive nofor the public tion of senatorial concerns interest-are unclear, its explanatory power is striking. In thefollowing we atanalysis, to pryopentheblackbox ofideology tempt of different We first from a number angles. of senators' own look fora purermeasure interested demandsfor altruistic, publicly behavior. after that Second, isolating portion which is mostclearly we examine the pure, relative importance of thepureand remaining,arguably interest-proxy, partsof ideolthe apparent inogy. We theninvestigate moreclosely. terest-proxy part of ideology Finally,to assay whether conideological is economically we subsumption rational, statics test. ject it to a revealing comparative
A. SMCRA Voting and Social Issue Ideology
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291
of ANTISTRIP. Table 3 vari- the explanation Two typesof social issue ideology whenan individual interest of results reshows is PROLCV First, ables are examined. covered issues on individ- voteon oneofthesocio-ethical voting placedby (dichotomous) are created by the SI Index replacesPROLCV. The ual issues.Second,twoindexes is how well votingon an finding to (1)) fromthe sampleof in- striking (according as content much as pocketbook with issue votes all includes sample The votes. dividual posiby senators' SMCRA can be explained thatcould be takenin the 95thCongress the sexeducation, penalty, on thedeath questions, tions socio-ethical as general identified bomb,the cedingof the Panama concerns.18 neutron by pocketbook uncontaminated of avowed comare the column Canal, the immigration The issues thusidentified case,thesocial was basedon and so on. In every in Table 2. Selection munists, headings impact positive has a strongly that is, therewas no issuevariable a priorijudgment; the ex" fishing." on ANTISTRIP.19 Furthermore, econometric powerof the Capture-plus-Ideolthe"SI (Social Issue) planatory One of theindexes, social when similar the ogyModelis remarkably with dealing is basedon 34 votes Index," be PROLCV. As might replaces in issuevoting Canal issues indicated 12 non-Panama whenindexes thisis mostevident Table 3. The secondindex,the "Panama expected, tilts results first ofthese are used.The thrust Canal Index,"is based on a sampleof 25 of PROLCV as theratification towardthe interpretation during taken votes procedural ideology. pure relatively PanamaCanal reflecting Carter's forPresident process ofthePanamaCanalwas Theceding Treaty. Part of B. IsolatingthePurest of thelegislative becausea reading selected SenatorIdeology it was probably indicates thatfirst, history concase in which recent themoststriking on theaggregate of voting In an analysis liberals; it" against "stonewalled servatives facedin the96th interest bundleof issuessenators economic no identifiable and second, that, (1982)demonstrates Peltzman Congress, by theissue. coalesced were groups of of thesocialissue at least on economicissues,measures content The ideological ADA rat(forexample, ideology liberal/conservativesenatorial cutsalongmodern votes choicesof party to expected ing scales and senators' lines. To provideconsistency stand in for a detailedlist of a valueof unity affiliation) are assigned senators signs, corthat plausibly characteristics (as defined constituent position theliberal whenvoting intereconomic underlying to their theADA) and a valueof respond by, forexample, we assume analysis, out thatpoliticians ests. In the following It turns zero otherwise. case in theparticular applies this finding and envi- that package liberalism consistently allow captureby be- of SMCRA. We further correlation together-the ronmentalism We thensplitmeaconstituents. scales ideological theLCV's andtheADA's rating tween into that part thatcan be ideology sured if ideology the apparent is 0.94.Accordingly, and characteristics by constituent explained as pureas in PROLCV is,in fact, embodied component. senator-specific in voting on socio- the remaining expressed the ideology whether objectis to examine the social issue measures Our primary ethicalmatters, power. has explanatory latter any ANthe on effects have positive strongly should PROLCV and the SI estimate We first reestimation overall TISTRIP. Moreover, of the typesof factors those found Index as functions sults shouldcloselyresemble by Kau and Rubin, and by suggested when usingPROLCV. when Peltzman(1982)-factor such as general results representative Table2 reports and eachsenator's characteristics constituent replacesPROLCV in social issue ideology
PARTY (Democrat = 1). Included constituAlmanac Quarterly '8Votes are from Congressional
paper. in ourearlier (1977,1978)andaredescribed
fortheSI Index(0.57) is the 19Thebetacoefficient in themodel. largest second
292
TABLE 2-IDEOLOGY,

SOCIAL POLICIES, AND SMCRAVOTING: REPRESENTATIvERESULTSa
JUNE 1984
IDEOLOGY MC SURFRES UNDERRES SPLITRIGHTS ENVIROS UNRECLAIMED CONSUME HSURF HUNDER HENVIROS HCONSUME Constant
A2
Communist Immigration
0.842 (5.92) -0.503 (-4.22) -21.157 (-2.07) 15.519 (3.43) -1.077 (-0.02) 41.602 (2.02) 0.014 (2.75) -0.223 (-0.88) -0.048 (- 0.19) 0.159 (0.53) 0.164 (0.13) -0.466 (-2.21) 0.343 (0.69) 0.54
Death Penalty
1.013 (7.19) -0.464 (-4.23) -15.152 (-1.46) 11.025 (1.77) -16.656 (-0.29) 61.048 (3.13) 0.022 (3.86) -0.301 (-1.14) -0.556 (-2.19) 0.435 (1.43) 1.370 (1.18) -0.138 (-0.64) -0.614 (-1.23) 0.66
SI Index
0.296 (9.62) -0.372 (-3.44) -16.204 (-1.61) 12.201 (2.04) 19.663 (0.41) 21.450 (1.09) 0.011 (2.10) -0.280 (-1.16) -0.380 (-1.60) 0.416 (1.50) 0.192 (0.17) -0.138 (-0.67) 0.730 (1.53) 0.71
Panama Canal Index

0.193 (8.93) -0.434 (-4.02) -16.845 (-1.67) 13.079 (2.17) 45.120 (0.93) 44.194 (2.29) 0.013 (2.46) -0.293 (-1.18) -0.428 (-1.77) 0.407 (1.39) 0.962 (0.87) -0.197 (-0.96) 0.111 (0.24) 0.67
PROLCVb
0.466 (10.05) -0.375 (-3.47) -17.198 (-1.71) 14.132 (2.37) 68.488 (1.40) 0.501 (0.02) 0.015 (3.03) -0.440 (-1.83) 0.017 (0.07) 0.150 (0.54) -1.286 (-1.14) -0.261 (-1.29) 1.414 (2.86) 0.74
bFrom Table1, Capture-plus-Ideology Model.
aSee fna, Table 1.
ent characteristics ENVIROS and HENVIROS consistof demographic The variables variables and measures intended to reflect areincluded to reflect constituents' (environideological interests. Moregenerally, constituents' independent ideological inter- mental) ests. By employing demographic ideology maybe reflected by a variables, constituent we are accepting themethodology of those measure ofthestate's suchas thepercentage whohavefound that senators' pureideologi- votegoingto McGovern (MCGOV) in the cal goalsplay no rolein legislative politics 1972 presidential election. The recognized (Peltzman, 1982)and that demographic vari- hopelessness of McGovern's candidacyat ables provide suitable proxies for con- election timeprobably on the made voting stituents' underlying economicinterests.20 basis of investment fruitmotives unusually less,and,by Stigler's (1972)argument, votes cast would uncommonly reflect ideological prothat demographics (1983)also argues 20Becker consumption motives.21 Thus, MCGOV is Howinterests. forconstituents' groupings videnatural
Theorem andthe Possibility Arrow's 1963General ever, andelectoral cycling, on coalitions, literature associated test(if that 1979,foran excellent as a senator his nextelectoral (see DennisMueller, approaches equilibria economet- senator in theimplicit with however, survey) suggest lessconfidence Thisis consistent, is notretiring!). and elsewhere) theinterpretation in thiswork of at leastthepartof theideology (embodied ricassumption characteriscan be mapped measures toconstituent characteristics is not related constituent which thatstates' shirking (see SectionIII, Part D, representatives. tics as ideological choicesof elected intotheir uniquely however, below). overuniqueness and existence, Suchconcerns of theADA in was president 21George McGovern we find as to why belowthat guidance do notprovide ofconstituent interests improves 1976-78. theexplanatory power
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293
AND 3-IDEOLOGY, SOCIALPOLICIES, TABLE ISSUEVOTESa SMCRA VOTING:SOCIAL Issue: Coefficient W2
Immigration Communist
Death Penalty
0.842
(5.92) 1.013 (7.19) (6.53) 1.177 (7.70) 0.893
(5.90)
0.54
0.66
modelsof PROLCV and The estimated paper)closely the SI Index(see our earlier reported ofcorrelation thepatterns resemble by Kau and Rubin, Kalt (1981), and down of ideology. to allow the breaking PROLCV and theSI Indexare Specifically, by constituent splitintothatpartpredicted and a interests and ideological) (economic The fitted component residualcomponent. part)of PROLCV theconstituent (denoted and the SI Index is obtainedboth with interleft-out PARTY included as a possible Corest proxy and withPARTY excluded. senator-specific the residual, respondingly, each model's of either consists component plus errors alone or theseerrors prediction If there is anysenathefitted PARTYeffect. tor ideologyat workin PROLCV or SI is the component senator-specific voting, this be isolated. that might purest part part and the senatorThe constituent of PROLCV and,alterspecific component as separate theSI Indexareentered natively, ofANTIin themodel variables explanatory the results, STRIP. Clearly, givenprevious measures part of the ideology constituent on ANTIshouldhave a significant effect is the however, STRIP. Of central interest, effect of the senator-specific part of the ideologymeasures.If senatorsare well issuesor if, when policedon stripmining and theydo so nonideologically shirking, this of constituent interests, independent related variable should notbe systematically The alternative to ANTISTRIP voting. hyhas variable that thesenator-specific pothesis a significantly positiveimpacton ANTIthe on twoconditions. STRIP depends First, variable mustbe isolating senators' pursuit interested of theirown altruistic, publicly environmental issues (PROgoalson general matters (theSI Index). LCV) orsocio-ethical
are PARTY, MCGOV, ENincluded 22Variables attainvotereducational VIROS, per capitaincome, by income generated personal ofstate thefraction ment, of distribution urban-rural age,the voter manufacturing, and a economy, of thestate therateof growth voters, here areinsensitive ofinterest Results dummy. southern examfor toinclude, thelistofvariables to lengthening andthe blue-colunionization, characteristics, ple,racial split. lar/white-collar
role hereis Peltzman(1982).22Theirpriinary
Resisters Draft Pardon

Sex Education NeutronBomb
0.902
0.57
0.64 0.54
School Desegregation Abortion ChildPornography Disability Pregnancy Discrimination Pregnancy

Cuba in Africa
(6.67)
0.945 0.591 0.623 1.209 1.319
0.62 0.53 0.44 0.56 0.61

0.62
(4.73) (3.52)
(6.07)
LoanstoCommunists Panama CanalTreaty
(7.11) 0.882 (5.54) (6.45)
0.888 1.185
0.55 0.65
(8.64)
Table 2; t-staspecification, aCapture-plus-ideology in parentheses. areshown tistics
ofPROLCV and intheexplanation included with it is correlated theSI Index.Arguably, but the characteristics; constituent left-out to our of MCGOV is irrelevant exactsource of senators' portion that ofisolating purpose whichis not relatedto some convoting interest. (economicor ideological) stituent is hand, of PARTY,on theother The source a matter ofconcern. charconstituent If the list of included senaPARTY reflects is complete, acteristics factors" (Peltz"non-economic tor-specific worldview man,1982) suchas a senator's at the timeof the (liberalor conservative) choice.In theabsenceof a affiliation party charthatour set of constituent guarantee ouranalyweperform is complete, acteristics as ideology party bothperspectives: sis from conand partyas proxyfor unidentified is interpretation The latter interests. stituent of by the inclusion less plausible rendered MCGOV.
294
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW TABLE 4-LCV IDEOLOGY ANDCONSTITUENT INTERESTS IN SMCRAVOTINGa Excluding Party& Error Partof PROLCV Party& Error Partof PROLCV Coefficient Beta Excluding ErrorPart of PROLCV Coefficient Beta
JUNE 1984
ErrorPart of PROLCV Coefficient Beta
Explanatory Variable Senator-Specific Partof PROLCV Party& Error

Error Only
Coefficient
Beta
0.442 (7.73)
-
0.45
-
0.401
0.30
Constituent Part of PROLCV MC SURFRES UNDERRES SPLITRIGHTS ENVIROS UNRECLAIMED CONSUME HSURF HUNDER HENVIROS HCONSUME Constant R2 aSee fn.a, Table 1.
(4.89) 0.615 (6.45) -0.422 (- 3.91) -25.826 (- 2.54) 18.634 (3.08) 66.982 (1.33) -8.770 (-0.37) 0.016 (3.15) -0.493 (-2.04) 0.009 (0.04) 0.373 (1.35) -0.630 (-0.54) -0.139 (-0.67) 1.706 (3.10) 0.57 0.48 -0.24 -0.86 0.96 0.12 -0.03 0.24 -0.15 0.00 + 0.08 -0.04 -0.04 0.527 (5.49) -0.370 (- 3.42) -18.427 (-1.80) 14.894 (2.46) 76.481 (1.52) -7.932 (-0.34) 0.015 (2.97) -0.455 (-1.89) 0.043 (0.18) 0.168 (0.60) -1.474 (-1.27) -0.225 (-1.08) 1.590 (2.89) 0.74 0.41 -0.21 -0.61 0.77 0.13 -0.03 0.22 -0.14 0.01 0.04 -0.08 -0.07 0.570 (8.83) -0.483 (-4.50) -24.446 (-2.42) 17.467 (2.91) 80.400 (1.62) 6.150 (0.30) 0.017 (3.49) -0.544 (- 2.26) - 0.115 (-0.48) 0.571 (2.05) -0.883 (-0.78) -0.032 (-0.16) 1.190 (2.42) 0.67 0.56 -0.28 -0.81 0.90 0.14 0.02 0.25 -0.16 -0.03 0.12 -0.05 -0.01 0.511 (7.78) -0.389 (- 3.57) -18.615 (-1.83) 14.860 (2.47) 75.804 (1.53) -2.794 (-0.14) 0.015 (3.06) -0.465 (-1.92) 0.009 (0.04) 0.223 (0.78) -1.379 (-1.21) -0.205 (-0.98) 1.454 (2.93) 0.74 0.50 -0.22 -0.62 0.77 0.13 -0.01 0.22 -0.14 0.00 + 0.05 -0.08 -0.06
-
musthave pursuedthese ANTISTRIP voting. Second,senators In fact, in every case, issueof its inclusion appreciably voting on thespecific improves goalsin their the explanatory powerof themodel.23 policy. Further, it coal strip mining ANTISTRIP seemsnoteworthy estimated Table 4 reports thatthese conclusions are weaker and splitting of not obviously whenlooking modelsunderthe fitting at the case senator-specific theanalogous PROLCV. Table5 reports partof social issue voting. the conAs anticipated, for SI ideology. The results of Tables 4 and 5 may,of stituent partsof bothPROLCV and theSI course,be due to the exclusion of some on influence positive Indexhave a strongly oftheinterpretaANTISTRIP. Independent that the senatoror interest 23In everycase, the hypothesis tion of PARTY (i.e., ideology on themodel's explanaspecific variable has no effect also has torypoweris rejected measure proxy), thesenator-specific confiat above the99 percent effect on dencelevel. a highly and positive significant
VOL. 74 NO. 3
AND IDEOLOGY OF POLITICS KALTANDZUPAN:CAPTURE

ISSUE IDEOLOGY AND CONSTITUENTINTERESTSIN SMCRA VOTINGa
295
TABLE 5-SOCIAL
Excluding Party & Error Part ofIndex Coefficient Beta
& Error Party Part ofIndex Coefficient Beta
Excluding Part Error ofIndex Coefficient Beta
Error Part ofIndex Coefficient Beta
Senator-Specific Part ofIndex

Party& Efror
-
ErrorOnly
(7.86)
-
0.288
0.44 -
Constant
0.452 (5.55) MC -0.432 (-4.00) SURFRES -20.969 (-2.08) 15.148 UNDERRES (2.53) SPLITRIGHTS 16.589 (0.34) ENVIROS 18.950 (0.86) UNRECLAIMED 0.016 (3.10) CONSUME -0.355 (-1.48) HSURF -0.186 (-0.78) HUNDER 0.457 (1.64) HENVIROS -0.105 (- 0.09) HCONSUME -0.178 (-0.86) (2.31) 0.54
1.227
Constituent Part ofIndex
(4.93) 0.393 (6.20) -0.389 (- 3.58) -17.593 (-1.74) 12.984 (2.17) 31.148 (0.64) 14.273 (0.71) 0.012 (2.27) -0.315 (-1.31) -0.354 (-1.49) 0.507 (1.80) -0.290 (-0.26) -0.063 (-0.30) (1.87) 0.72
0.916
0.233
0.29
0.38 -0.25 -0.70 0.78 0.03 0.06 0.24 -0.11 -0.04 0.10 -0.01 -0.05
-
0.326 (3.94) -0.369 (- 3.40) -16.575 (-1.64) 12.433 (2.07) 22.087 (0.45) 17.641 (0.80) 0.011 (2.08) -0.282 (-1.17) -0.369 (-1.54) 0.426 (1.53) 0.066 (0.06) -0.121 (-0.58) (1.55) 0.71
0.823
0.27 -0.21 -0.55 0.64 0.04 0.06 0.16 -0.09 -0.09 0.09 0.01 -0.04
-
0.501 (8.44) -0.473 (-4.41) -20.761 (-2.06) 14.765 (2.47) 40.386 (0.83) 19.517 (0.97) 0.016 (3.23) -0.413 (-1.72) -0.270 (-1.14) 0.665 (2.38) -0.744 (-0.66) -0.020 (-0.10) (2.09) 0.65
1.022
0.52 -0.27 -0.69 0.76 0.07 0.06 0.24 -0.12 -0.06 0.14 -0.04 -0.01
-
0.41 -0.22 -0.58 0.67 0.05 0.05 0.18 -0.10 -0.08 0.11 -0.02 -0.02
aSee fn.a, Table1.
the sexeducation, issues, con- eralenvironmental SMCRA-specific as-of-yet-unidentified etc.Pendpornography, child bomb, even an out-of- neutron stituent interest-perhaps Tables sucha variable, for search or a non-SMCRAinterest ingfurther state interest, probaideology that suggest 4 and 5 further Tables4 and by logrolling. served indirectly of from analyses notbe excluded that sucha reduce thelikelihood blyshould 5, however, politics. That is, if such a variable particular-issue variableexists. it wouldhaveto be relatively wereto exist, Constituent C. TheRoleofLeft-Out to not only states' identified orthogonal Characteristics but also to the interests, SMCRA-specific usedin theexinterest variables constituent a that has assumed The preceding analysis of PROLCV and the SI Index. planation is ideology apparent itwould havetobe simultaneouslylargepartof senators' Moreover, (economic with causalconstituent correlated to sense)related and causally (in thecapture left out of thebasic interests regulation, gen- or ideological) voting on coal strip-mining
296
JUNE1984
of SMCRA, generalenvironmental issues, of ANTIexplanation capture-plus-ideology suggest however, matters, such and socio-ethical I, however, in Section STRIP. As noted varidifferent thattherolesplayedby theindividual twovery for couldarise correlations across itmaybe happen- ables in thissetwillnotbe identical On theonehand, reasons. size,signs, of their is ideology cases in terms thethree stance:whatlooks like senator if the variConsequently, eco- and significance. of left-out constituent the reflection partof thatactually ables thatmakeup theconstituent interests nomicor ideological causalrolesin SMCRA playdirect ideology On effects on SMCRA voting. have direct willbe highpower explanatory their hand,PROLCV and theSI Index voting, theother the to enter unre- er if theyare not constrained ideology, puresenator maybe entirely comhavein the ANTISTRIP modelin thesamelinear constituents latedto theinterests of theyhave in the explanation tobroad binations issueofSMCRA,butrelated specific via Senate elec- PROLCV or the SI Index. On the other characteristics constituent in may ofideology part theconstituent in putting the hand, tions and voters'interests in theparticuideology factbe puresenator intooffice-ala Downs. ideologies "right" from lar case of SMCRA and the routeof incausation of inferring The problem by the set of generalconstituent fluence In thecase at difficult. correlation is notably may thus be the indirect byfocusing characteristics this problem we approach hand, these implications: Downsianroute.If so, constraining there are different on whether with characteristics to enter the ANTISTRIP that arecorrelated thevariables 1) when directly modelin the same way theyenterthe exare operating of ideology measures should measures of the ideology on ANTISTRIP, as opposed to 2) when planation power. indi- notaffect operate explanatory and they their is imperfect policing charconstituent of their on thetypes when thegeneral Results impact through rectly to enter the theideologies acteristics are constrained elected senators (and, hence, constituent senators). byshirking manifested ANTISTRIP modelas thefitted in implications con- parts ofPROLCV andtheSI Indexarewhat One suchdifference in Tables4 and 5. Table 6 comcharacteristics is reported cernsthewaytheconstituent powerof the conand perhaps pares the explanatory ideology, (i.e., demographics, in that obtained with characteristics strained PARTY) thatexplainPROLCV and theSI paper case (see ourearlier ofANTISTRIP. theunconstrained theexplanation Indexenter that,of Table 6 indicates mayplay a forfullresults). The same set of characteristics the general when R2 is higher The the course, of in all voting. role three types causal are not concharacteristics content constituent in theeconomic differences obvious
TABLE 6-IDEOLOGY AND THE PATH OF GENERAL CONSTITUENT IN ANTiSTRIP VOTING CHARACTERISTICS
Characteristics LCV Ideology;Constituent Model ?artyas Ideology:

R2
Characteristics SI Ideology:Constituent Unconstrained 0.79 0.73 0.79 0.74

Constrainedb
Unconstrained 0.78 0.73 0.79 0.73
Constraineda 0.77 0.74 0.77 0.74
F-Testc Proxy: Partyas Interest

R2
W2
84%
14%
0.75 0.71 0.76 0.72
W2 F-Testc
89%
21%
aFrom Table 4. bFromTable 5. increased Lower values signify may be rejected. at whichequalityof thetwo regressions cThe level of significance of equality. in rejection confidence
VOL. 74 NO. 3
KALTANDZUPAN:CAPTUREAND IDEOLOGY OF POLITICS
297
should In theSI Indexcase, theadjusted to monitoring. The cost of shirking strained. are also be inversely thecharacteristics relatedto the security, when R2 alsoimproves In the somehow withwhicha senator measured, only slightly. unconstrained-although holdshisor her in office to remain intending the adjustedR2 PROLCV case, however, related to such is plausibly characteristics seat.Thissecurity when constituent falls actually of last vicmargin tests factors as the senator's In eachcase,classical areunconstrained. power (a major anduncon- tory,tenure,committee oftheconstrained oftheequality and personal services), of facilitation that source confidence little provide models strained involve obviously Theserelationships wealth. canbe rejected. equality forexamthat substantial characteristics simultaneity-tenure, constituent Thegeneral but theyget security, senators have been supposedto be directly ple, affords might their constituents. by serving appearto be oper- tenure SMCRA voting affecting of a fullsimultaneous The development the pure ideology through atingindirectly the beyond is considerably ofshirking That is, model senators. of electedand shirking one comNevertheless, scopeof thisstudy. PROLCV and theSI Indexdo notappearto that is clearly eco- ponent unidentified in for otherwise of thecostof shirking be standing have determined might that interests can be examinedorideological nomic exogenously nextelectoral in their on thepar- the proximity voting of a senator's senators captured con- test (RobertBarro,1973). In a worldin ticular issueof SMCRA. The suggested bundleof whichvotershave positivediscountrates overall clusion is thata senator's a senator that and/ormemories thatdecay, can, preferences theconstituent reflects votes day.Theinterests in a sense,run down his or her security on election expressed were and build it back up inter- capital in midterm those when ofthose sameconstituents, Ideoapproaches. by thepro- againas thenextelection reshufflied estsare subsequently be directly therefore, should, logicalshirking decision on of a particular effects spective in a senator's to thetimeremaining do notfully con- related however, theSenatefloor, Thecapture term. on that decision. trol thesenator ofthis hypothesis. one test Table7 reports of elecmayworkwell as a theory theory wereup forre33 senators of issue- In our sample, but not so wellas a theory tions, shirkin 1978.Ifpresent, ideological election politics. specific (ceteris ing shouldhavebeen less prevalent thanin the andIdeological paribus)amongthesesenators Policing D. Electoral the strip-mining sampleas a wholeduring Shirking we lookfor this, of 1977.To examine voting of the Capturein the predictions rolesof PROLCV and the errors If theevident Model of ANTISTRIP. On reflect plus-Ideology largely SI Indexin SMCRA voting outcome, vote,the expected own ideological they any particular preferences, senators' by thesignof thesenaissue-specific yea or nay,is given do so because of imperfect to which tor'spredicted ANTISTRIP value.The abthe extent Accordingly, policing. the inter- solutemagnitude of thisvalue suggests ofthepublic notions senators' shirking outto be placedin theexpected shouldbe confidence est entertheirvotingbehavior is inferred whenan actual relatedto the opportunity come.An error systematically from on a votediffers theexpected of this outcome The investigation costsof shirking. An error as running is interpreted sourceof comparative outcome. cost is a promising whenitssignis a senator's ideology importance, against staticstestsfor the presence, LCV in representativeoppositeto the signof the senator's of ideology and rationality the opportunity rating. In general terms, politics. Twelve errorsare made in predicting with shouldvarydirectly cost of shirking in 1977.Of these, approxiincentives to police (i.e., the SMCRA voting constituents' madeby the33 perwere 50 percent and consumers' stakes); mately surplus producers' centof thesenators whowereup forreelecwithorganization-inforand varyinversely of the 6 up-for-reelection impediments tion. Moreover, mation costsand institutional
298

TABLE 7-THE EFFECT OF ELECTORAL POLICING ON IDEOLOGICAL VOTING
JUNE 1984
Senator's Electoral Status Up for Reelection NotUp for Reelection Total
Incorrect Predictions in1977a Percent Number ofTotal 6 6 12 50 50
ofwhich:
Voted Against LCV Ideology Percent Number ofCol. 1 5 3 8 83.3 50
aPredictions basedon Table 1, Capture-plus-Ideology Model."Incorrect" signifies ofpredicted sign ANTISTRIPdiffered from ofactual in 1977. sign ANTISTRIPvoting
senators predicted 5 werevoting incorrectly, againsttheir ideologies; and the remaining senator voting with hisideology wasretiring. Of the6 not-up-for-reelection errors, only3 wererepresented by senators voting against theirideologies. The probability that this pattemwas generated by chance is very low.24 Thus,it appears thattheproximity of the nextelection inhibits ideological shirking:senators shirk lessas thepolicemen approach.
suggest thatthe discretionary consumption afforded policymakers by institutional slack is taken, to a substantial degree, in theform of rationalaltruistic-ideological promotion of self-defined notions of thepublicinterest. At leastin thecase offederal coal strip-mining policy, thisideological shirking appears to have significantly affected the courseof publicpolicy. If theconcept ofideological shirking does proveto be significant, its usefulness will of modelsthat dependon thedevelopment IV. Summary andConclusions canpredict theconditions (for example, types of issues, institutional settings, economic Theevidence thus far suggests theneedfor contexts) under which ideological shirking is in theeconomic somebroadening of likely theory to be an important Of phenomenon. Thistheory politics. has effectively precluded course, it stillmaybe thatthephenomenon from itslistof determining factors anything does notevenexist. Theremayyetbe conother theparochial, than self-inter- stituent narrowly from interests this andprevimissing ested objectives of policymakers' constit- ous analyses willexplain that awayideology's uents.This reflects the factthateconomic, importance in specific-issue politics.The of regulation capture models are largely in- searchfor theseinterests shouldcontinue. stitution-free. Our analysis has attempted to Fornow, itappears theeconomic that theory bring certain aspectsof theproperty rights ofregulation willhavetokeepthedooropen of institutions-policing theory costs,op- to ideological behavior. bear on the portunism, appropriability-to legislative process. wehaveasked Specifically, REFERENCES whether slackin control oflegislators is empirically important enough to warrant incorBurton A. and Settle, RussellF., "The intopositive models of politics. At Abrams, poration Economic Theory of Regulation and Pubthelevelof specific-issue the policymaking, lic Financing of Presidential Elections," answer appearsto be yes. Our results also Journal of Political Economy, April1978, 86, 245-57.
Armen andKessel,Reuben, "CompetiAlchian,
24Bearing in mindthesmallsample, a Chi-squared test indicates that thehypothesis that thecontingencies in Table7 were generated bychance can be rejected at abovethe99 percent confidence level.
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American Economic Association

Captureand Ideologyin the EconomicTheoryof Politics

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

KALTANDZUPAN:CAPTUREAND IDEOLOGY OF POLITICS

THE AMERICANECONOMIC REVIEW

KALTAND ZUPAN: CAPTURE AND IDEOLOGY OF POLITICS

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

estimator: and has variance

THE AMERICANECONOMIC REVIEW

(StatisticalAbstract, 1977) is -0.13; and is 0.003 with

are fromICF, Inc. and the Surveyof Current Business.

cal Environmental Issues (1978) and are listed in our

and UNRECLAIMED. Resultsare in-

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

KALTANDZUPAN: CAPTUREAND IDEOLOGY OF POLITICS

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

TABLE 1-THE DETERMINANTSOF ANTI-STRIP-MINING VOTING IN THE U.S. SENATEa

III. Separating Interests andIdeology

KALTAND ZUPAN: CAPTUREAND IDEOLOGY OFPOLITICS

paper. in ourearlier (1977,1978)andaredescribed

fortheSI Index(0.57) is the 19Thebetacoefficient in themodel. largest second

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

Panama Canal Index

bFrom Table1, Capture-plus-Ideology Model.

aSee fna, Table 1.

KALTAND ZUPAN: CAPTURE AND IDEOLOGY OF POLITICS

AND 3-IDEOLOGY, SOCIALPOLICIES, TABLE ISSUEVOTESa SMCRA VOTING:SOCIAL Issue: Coefficient W2

role hereis Peltzman(1982).22Theirpriinary

Resisters Draft Pardon

School Desegregation Abortion ChildPornography Disability Pregnancy Discrimination Pregnancy

0.945 0.591 0.623 1.209 1.319

0.62 0.53 0.44 0.56 0.61

LoanstoCommunists Panama CanalTreaty

(7.11) 0.882 (5.54) (6.45)

Table 2; t-staspecification, aCapture-plus-ideology in parentheses. areshown tistics

ErrorPart of PROLCV Coefficient Beta

Explanatory Variable Senator-Specific Partof PROLCV Party& Error

AND IDEOLOGY OF POLITICS KALTANDZUPAN:CAPTURE

Excluding Party & Error Part ofIndex Coefficient Beta

& Error Party Part ofIndex Coefficient Beta

Excluding Part Error ofIndex Coefficient Beta

Error Part ofIndex Coefficient Beta

Senator-Specific Part ofIndex

Constituent Part ofIndex

aSee fn.a, Table1.

THE AMERICANECONOMIC REVIEW

Characteristics LCV Ideology;Constituent Model ?artyas Ideology:

Characteristics SI Ideology:Constituent Unconstrained 0.79 0.73 0.79 0.74

Unconstrained 0.78 0.73 0.79 0.73

Constraineda 0.77 0.74 0.77 0.74

F-Testc Proxy: Partyas Interest

0.75 0.71 0.76 0.72

KALTANDZUPAN:CAPTUREAND IDEOLOGY OF POLITICS

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

Senator's Electoral Status Up for Reelection NotUp for Reelection Total

Incorrect Predictions in1977a Percent Number ofTotal 6 6 12 50 50

Voted Against LCV Ideology Percent Number ofCol. 1 5 3 8 83.3 50

KALTAND ZUPAN: CAPTURE AND IDEOLOGY OF POLITICS

BeModelofGovernment a Mathematical 1968,28, 355-80. December

of Colorado, Boulder:GSBA, University 1981. in Economics and Biology," and Conflict

tember 1976,14, 817-26.

Journalof Economics,August 1983, 98,