People v.

Purisima Facts: Petitioners: City Fiscal of Manila, Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and the Solicitor General Public Respondents: CFI of Manila-branches VII & XVIII, CFI of Samar Par. 3, PD#9 provides: It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as fan knife, spear, dagger, bolo, balisong, barong, kris, or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 5 to 10 years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct Petitioners-fiscals filed before the respective respondent courts several & separate informations for illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Par. 3 of PD#9. (For illustration, one of the similarly written infos. alleged: Thataccused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed weaponthe same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.) Respondent courts, upon motions to quash filed by the defense counsels, issued their respective orders quashing the informations on common ground that the said informations did not allege facts constituting an offense penalized under PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of the crime: that the carrying outside of the accuseds residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. They said that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.#1081 which seeks to attain the maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. They added that the non-inclusion of the aforementioned element of the offense leads to confusion as the same act punished as an offense under par. 3 of PD#9 is also the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance: Sec. 26, Act#1780: It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: x x x. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding P500, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 6 months, or both Ordinance#3820penalizes with a fine not more than P200 or imprisonment for not more than one month, or bothanyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weaponin any public place. Thus, the 26 petitions for review assailing the respective orders of the respondent courts. The petitions, having similar issues, were consolidated by the Supreme Court. The argument of the petitioners: 1. A perusal of par.3 of PD#9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy 2. The City Fiscal of Manila adds that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial; it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated ISSUE: W/N the informations filed are sufficient form and substance to constitute the offense penalized under PD#9 HELD: NO. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. This is especially in the case at bar where the acts being

punished are covered by 2 penal statutes and a city ordinance. The right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against him, otherwise such act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under any of the 3 punitive laws and thus expose the accused to oppression and harassment. The elements of the offense under par. 3, PD#9 are: 1) the carrying outside ones residence of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and 2) that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder. It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of Act#1780 and Ord#3820. Thus, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described under PD#9 is not a crime in itself. What makes the act criminal under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without such motivation, the act falls under the Act or the Ordinance. Consequently, the informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective and quashal is proper. The filing of the petitions were unnecessary because the petitioners could have availed itself of other remedies based on Rule 117, Sec.7. (Effect of sustaining the motion to quash); Rule 110, Sec.13 (Amendment of Info or complaint): 1. If the evidence so warranted, the People could have filed an amended info to include the second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondents. The SC has previously ruled that if the facts alleged in the info do not constitute an offense, the case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the info. 2. If the facts so justified, the petitioners could have filed a complaint either under Sec. 26 of Act#1780 or Manila city ordinance#3820, especially since the dismissal of the cases were made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash. Under Sec. 8, Rule 117, an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on extinguishment of criminal liability or double jeopardy. US V. HART FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under ActNo. 519 which punishes every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible meansof support. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by the comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the other Defendants had visible means of support, it was under the first part of the portion of law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that the phrase without visible means of support was in connection to the second part of the said portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense. ISSUE: How should the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act theeffect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous and incor rectpunctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant had, visible means of support and that the absence of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses, defendants are acquitted.

PEOPLE V. BUENVIAJE FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the violation of illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as adoctor. Defendant practices chiropractic although she has n ot secured acertificate to practice medicine. She treated and manipulated the head and body of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of doctor should be understood to re fer to doctor of medicine and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject. ISSUE: W/N chiropractic is included in the term practice of medicine under Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code. HELD: Act 3111 is constitutional as the title An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended) is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter of each section. Chiropractic is included in the practice of medicine. Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title, to prohibit duplicity in legislation by apprising legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of the law. SARCOS V. CASTILLO FACTS: Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged withmisconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent, the Provincial Governor ofSurigao del Sur. The act, constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in officeconsisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private individuals inthe cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and benefit, to the damageand prejudice of the public and of the government. And on the basis of suchadministrative complaint, Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension byRespondent pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185, otherwise known as theDecentralization Act of l967. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspensionunder the Decentralization Act of l967. HELD: The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on theProvincial Board. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations byvesting the power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over thepower of suspension. The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power ofpreventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor. OLIVA V. LAMADRID Facts: Plaintiff Laureano Oliva owns a parcel of land in Camarines Norte. He mortgaged the property tothe Rural Bank of Daet as security for the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the payment of hisobligation, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the property sold at public auction, to theBank, as the sole bidder, on February 4, 1961. The certificate of sale, issued by the sheriff stated that theproperty could be redeemed within two (2) years from and after the date of the sale, or until February 4,1963. No redemption having been made within said period, the corresponding deed of sale was executedin favor of the Bank, on February 27, 1963.Prior to May 31, 1963, plaintiff offered to repurchase the property but the offer was turned down. Heclaimed that, as holder of a free patent and a torrens title, he is entitled to redeem the property within five(5) years from the date of the auction sale , pursuant to Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Uponthe other hand, defendants alleged in their answer that the right of redemption

expired on February 4,1963, under the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 2670,which, they maintain, is controlling. Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141* Owners of lands covered by a homestead or free patent are entitled to redeem their property within five (5) years from the date of sale. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Republic Act No. 2670* The period of two (2) years granted for the redemption of property foreclosed refers to lands not covered by a Torrens Title, a homestead or free patent, or to owners of lands without torrens titles, who can showfive years or more of peaceful, continuous anduninterrupted possession thereof in theconcept of an owner, or of homesteads or free patent lands pending the issuance oftitles but already approved, or of landspending homestead or free patent titles. Issue: Whether the period of redemption is governed by Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 , as assertedby the plaintiff, or by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720 , as amended, as contended by the defendants Held: The plaintiff herein has the right to repurchase the property in question within five (5) years from the date ofthe conveyance or foreclosure sale or up to February 4, 1966, and that having exercised such right andtendered payment long before the date last mentioned, defendants herein are bound to reconvey saidproperty to him. Ratio: The legislative history of the bills which later became said Republic Act No. 2670, amending Republic ActNo. 720, shows that the original proposal was to give homesteaders or free patent holders a period of ten(10) years within which to redeem their property foreclosed by rural banks; that this proposal was eventuallyfound to be unwise, because its effect would have been to dissuade rural banks from granting loans to homesteaders or free patent holders which were sought to be liberalized said period of redemption being too long, from the viewpoint of said banks; and that, consequently, the proposal was given up, withthe specific intent and understanding tha homesteaders or holders of free patent would retain the right to redeem within five (5) years from the conveyance of their properties, as provided in the general law, that is to say the Public Land Act, or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Where the general law is the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the Republic Act, they should be unified, and should abide by the conditions of the times.