Condor

In the wake of the September 11, terrorist attacks, the Department of Justice (DOJ) pressed the State
Department to reduce the number of visas the State Department issued "as a means to delay, disrupt and
discourage movement to the United States of individuals from countries with significant Muslim
populations."1 In a meeting shortly after 9-11, a high ranking DOJ official told a high ranking State
Department official, "You need to stop issuing visas to Arab males."

DOJ proposals included stopping the issuance of all visas,3 suspending visa issuance entirely to nationals of
selected "problem" countries, and requiring that the FBI and CIA "check each applicant from certain
countries before a visa is issued."4 The Justice Department pushed the State Department to slow down visa
issuance "until the FBI could get a better handle on the threat assessment and how to counteract the
threat."5 State acceded.

Effective November 14, 2001, State issued a blanket 20-day hold before any visa could be issued to males
ages 16-45 from 26 countries of the Middle East and North Africa, plus Bangladesh, Malaysia and
Indonesia.6 This program was discontinued in October 2002.7 It "yielded no useful anti-terrorist ,
information and led to no visa denials."8 C*

The twenty-day hold provided Justice with time to push development of the Visas Condor Program, ^T
iris'fituTe^n January 26, 2002.9 Although the precise criteria for Condor are classified, Condor mandated
additional screening by the FBI and other agencies for certain visa applicants from 26 predominantly
Muslim countries. 10

Consular officers processed applications from people fitting Condor criteria, sent a Security Advisory ^
Opinion (SAO) cable to main State who forwarded it to the FBI and other agencies for Condor screening.
Involved agencies agreed that the Condor name check would be completed within 30 days,12 so State
instructed consular officials to "proceed with visa issuance if they had received no objection from the
Department after 30 days."13

' Memorandum to the Secretary of State from Acting Assistant Secretary Consular Affairs, George
Lannon (October 12,2002).
2 Barry MFR at 5 (quoting Stuart Levy).
3 Lannon MFR at 5, 8 (describing how in meetings at the White House, a representative of the FBI said

"let's shut down visas").

4 OAG015-1096.
5 Barry MFR at 6.
6 Memorandum to the Secretary of State from Acting Assistant Secretary Consular Affairs, George

Lannon (October 12,2002).

7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Barry MFR at 6; Supplementary information provided by State Department after interview of Travis
Farris, Consular Affairs Consular Systems Division. RDOS03012218.
10 Memorandum to the Secretary of State from Acting Assistant Secretary Consular Affairs, George
Lannon (October 12, 2002)("Visas Condor - Present").
11 Action Memorandum to the Secretary of State from Acting Assistant Secretary of State Dianne Andruch
re: "Visas Condor" Nonimmigrant Visa Cases; RDOS03008599.

12 Memorandum to the Secretary of State from Acting Assistant Secretary of State Dianne Andruch re:
"Visas Condor" Nonimmigrant Visa Cases; RDOS03008599; Lannon MFR at 8.
13 Action Memorandum to the Secretary of State from Acting Assistant Secretary of State Dianne
Andruch re: "Visas Condor" Nonimmigrant Visa Cases; RDOS03008599.

1
11 Law Enforcement Privacy

By spring, 2002, it was clear something was seriously wrong with Condor name check processing at the
FBI. Condor name checks were not being returned to State or, in some instances, were returned to consular
officials three months after they were submitted.14 In April, the responsibility for processing Condor cables
was shifted within the FBI from the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) to the Foreign
, Terrorists Tracking Task Force (FTTTF).'5 According to records we reviewed, FTTTF inherited
"mountains" of unprocessed Condor cables, some dating back to January 2002.l6

At around this time, it was discovered that 240 visas had been issued to individuals subject to Condor
checks before the FBI had responded, and whose names registered an initial "hit" in the FBI's Condor
processing system. The State Department prudentially revoked the visas of all 240 individuals. 17 The FBI
later cleared all 240 individuals and withdrew its objections to their being issued visas.'8

In July 20Q2, the FBI acknowledged that it could not keep up and respond to Condor SAOs within the
agreed-upon.30 days.19 On July 20, 2002, State agreed to place an "indefinite hold" on Condor applications
until the FBI formally responded to the SAO.20

In September 20CI2, the CIA withdrew from its participation in the Condor program because it had found no
significant information on any Condor applicants, and was already placing all important anti-terrorism
information into the.TlPOFF terrorist watch list, then maintained by the State Department for use in the
visa clearance process.21

By January 2003, the State Department had conducted over 125,000 Condor name checks,22 and employed
25 employees on this task,23 However, as with the 20-day hold provision, by January 2003, the Visas
, Condor Program had uncovered no terrorists,24 and led to the denial of not one visa.25

Conclusion

After September 11, 2001, the Justice Department drove policymaking in an effort to restrict the issuance
of visas to citizens of predominantly Muslim countries. The Justice Department drove the development of
a series of policies, the effect of which was to delay the issuance of visas to large numbers of citizens from
Muslim countries. These policies had.no discernible counterterrorism benefit.

14
Lannon MFR at 8.
15
GAO, Memorandum of phone conversation witrj.
10 Id.
17 Barry MFR at 6.
18 Barry MFR at 6.
19 Action Memorandum to the Secretary of State from Acting Assistant Secretary of State Dianne
Andruch re: "Visas Condor" Nonimmigrant Visa Cases, RDOS03008599; Barry MFR at 6.
20 Supplementary information provided by State Department after interview of Travis Farris, Consular
Affairs Consular Systems Division. RDOS03012218.
21 Action Memorandum to the Secretary of State from Acting Assistant Secretary of State Dianne Andruch
re: "Visas Condor" Nonimmigrant Visa Cases; RDOS03008599.
22 Testimony of Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, before the 9-11
Commission on January 26,2004.
23 Barry MFR at 6.
24 Testimony of Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, before the 9-11
Commission on January 26, 2004.
"5 Maura Harty MFR at 5 - 6. In addition, as of November 2003, there were 587 visa applicants whose
clearances remained in limbo with no definitive position taken by the FBI on their visa applications. Id.