WHAT IS DRIVING THE US, RUSSIA AND CHINA IN CENTRAL ASIAS NEW-GREAT GAME?

Jose Macedo

ABSTRACT: The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created an unexpected strategic vacuum in
Central Asia promptly followed by a fierce competition between great powers, also known as the New Great Game. The rich energy resources are usually considered the main reason of the renewed interest in the region and also as the principal motivation of the US, Russia and China in the New Great Game. However the role of energy resources is usually overstated. This paper will identify which other drivers beyond energy resources should be considered in order to have a broader and comprehensive understanding of the present scenario in Central Asia. Using the neorealist approach the paper will first analyse the significance of the Caspian oil and gas reserves to energy security enhancement, how they provoke competition between great powers and how pipeline politics translate it. Later, it will demonstrate that beyond its energy resources Central Asia also has an inherent importance resulting from its geographic situation. Finally, the paper will analyse how the US, Russia and China have been acting in Central Asias arena and identify their main drivers beyond energy resourc es. The paper will conclude by stating that the US, Russia and China struggle to attain, keep and enhance power and that energy resources are just a mean to this supreme objective. It will also conclude by asserting that although the great powers behave aggressively and self-interestedly they may find a minimum degree of cooperation to tackle common concerns such as a growing radical Islamism.

The author holds a Law Degree awarded by the Lusada University of Lisbon (2001) and a Post Graduate Degree in Commercial Law awarded by the Faculty of Law of the Portuguese Catholic University (2006). The author is a Lawyer member of the Portuguese Bar Association since 2004 and is currently undertaking an LLM Programme in Energy Law & Policy at the Centre for Energy, Petroleum & Mineral Law and Policy (CEPMLP) of the University of Dundee, Scotland. The author is currently in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development providing legal advisory in energy related projects. Email: josevmacedo@gmail.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 Table of Abbreviations... iii 1 2 3 4 5 Introduction........ 1 The Evolving Concept of Energy Security.... 2 The Caspians Region Contribution to Energy Security..... 3 Geostrategic Competition... 5 The Great Powers in Central Asia 7 5.1 United States.. 7 5.2 Russia. 10 5.3 China 11 .. 6 Conclusion...... 13 . BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ABBREVIATIONS

BTC

Baku -Tbilisi-Ceyhan

BTE

Baku -Tbilisi-Erzurum

CIS

Commonwealth of Independent States

FSU

Former Soviet Union

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OPEC

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

SCO

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

US

United States of America

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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1.

Introduction

In the 19th Century Central Asia was the stage of the Great Game which opposed the British Empire and the Russian Empire in a fight for regional dominance. Although both powers had economic interests in the region this competition was mainly driven by geopolitical concerns, where an expansionist Imperial Russian policy towards the South was fought by the English Empire in order to protect its sovereign interests in India. The states lying between these two great powers thus became the arena where such competition took place. The strategic vacuum created in the region by the collapse of the Soviet Union in the year of 1991 prompted the inevitable race between great powers to fulfill the existing gap, namely the US, Russia and China, transforming again Central Asia in a global arena where great powers compete among them for regional influence. This competition is designated by political analysts as the New Great Game, invoking the 19th century competition among the Russian and the English Empires; however, such comparison does not do justice to the complexity of the present geopolitical situation Central Asia where a whole new range of factors need to be considered to fully understand the regional dynamics.

It is widely accepted that one of the most important drivers in this competition is the fact that great powers want their piece of the regional rich energy resources. It is however the authors conviction that energy security concerns and the consequent race for energy sources are not able to offer per se a comprehensive analysis of the regional dynamics, and it cannot encompass other issues such as growing and dangerous radical Islamism.

This paper seeks to establish the reasons which drive the great powers (US, Russia and China) to engage in regional conflicts in the post-Cold War Central Asia, and in the Caspian region in particular. The paper will have a neorealist approach, assuming that states struggle among them to gain and keep power in a scenario characterized by fear

and distrust. The paper will also use the middle range theory of geopolitics to briefly assess the inherent geographical importance of Central Asia.

Firstly the paper will offer a brief background on how the concept of energy security has evolved and has become part of foreign relations policy, and how Central Asian natural resources can contribute to global energy security, with focus on the Caspian Sea region. An approach over the pipeline politics phenomenon will offer an example of commercial and political competition for such energy resources. Considering the importance of Central Asia that results from its geographic situation and goes beyond its energy resources, it will then be illustrated how great powers such as US, Russia and China have been fighting for influence in Central Asia, identifying their main concerns and how they interact with each other.

The paper will conclude by presenting the reasons which make Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region in particular a geopolitical hotspot and what is motivating great powers to engage in aggressive competition.

2.

The Evolving Concept of Energy Security

The concept of energy security as an international concern is not new and it goes back to the global disruptions of oil supplies in the 1970s which fashioned foreign policy making ever since; however energy security concerns gradually vanished as confidence in oil supplies was restored, and eventually ignored during the 1990s. 1 The advent of the 21st century has put energy security on the agenda again. Regional and social disorder perturbs the Middle East and global terrorism threatens the whole supply chain. Other conflicts regarding producing countries or regions, such as Nigeria and Venezuela, also contribute to apprehension towards security of supply.

In order to enhance the reliability of energy supply and its availability at reasonable price2 oil and gas consuming states try to diversify their supplying sources thus assuring

Andrews-Speed, Philip, Energy Security in East Asia: a European View, Presented at the Symposium on Pacific Energy Cooperation 2003, 12-13 February 2003, Tokyo 2 Two main features which are generally recognized as part of the energy security concept. 2

alternative and competing sources used both as a tool to prevent and minimize the impact of a potential oil disruption and to leverage their bargaining power. They will support the emergence of new producing regions as they may contribute to a higher and diversified supply of energy, to a higher competition among producing regions, which will eventually result in a global market less vulnerable to disruptions or to unreasonable prices.

Diversification of supply is thus the main tool a consuming country can use to secure the availability of the sufficient energy resources at an affordable price and in a sustainable manner. As it was very clearly stated in 17th June 1914 by Sir Winston Churchill when presenting a bill proposing that the British government invested in an oil company: On no one quality, on no one process, on no one country, on no one route, and on no one field must we be dependent. Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone.3. The Caspians Region Contribution to Energy Security

3.

Although concerns have been focused on the peaking of oil production, at the present time energy security is mainly threatened by global terrorism, regional conflicts and social turmoil. As Daniel Yergin clearly puts it the real risk to supplies over the next decade is not of geology but geopolitics4.

Doubts regarding the future of Iraq - which has the second largest world oil reserves after Saudi Arabia-, the growing insecurity in the Middle East and the need to bypass OPEC countries, have generated a renovated interest in new producing regions such as West Africa and the Caspian region.

At the end of 2008 the Caspian Sea presented 48 thousand million barrels of proven oil reserves (3,8% of world share) and 12,54 trillion cubic meters of natural gas (6,8% of world share). At the same date the Middle East presented 754,1 thousand million barrels

See, Ferrier, Ronald W., The history of the British Petroleum Company, Volume 1, The Developing Years, 19011932 p. 182 (1st Edition, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press) (1982) 4 See, Kalicki, Jan H. & Goldwyn, David L. Energy and Security, Towards a New Foreign Policy Strategy, p. 51 ( 1st Edition, United States, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press) (2005) 3

of proven oil reserves (an astonishing 59,9% of world share) and 75,91 trillion cubic meters of natural gas (equivalent to 41% of the world share). 5

Although the Caspian Sea reserves are modest in comparison with Persian Gulf region, it has sufficient oil reserves to significantly contribute to the diversification of energy supply, to reduce excessive power of major producing countries over the market and to also reduce the percentage of oil subject to disruption.

The fact that the Caspian Sea is landlocked poses however a significant economical and political challenge to those interested in developing its natural resources as these have to be transported by pipeline to the consuming markets, usually crossing more than one country before its final destination.

Considering the amount of the Caspian energy reserves, the expected revenues from its marketing and their effect in the development of regional economies, pipelines have transformed from simple transportation projects into ways of achieving political objectives. These projects usually combine commercial and political interests, and frequently the later seems to surpass the former.

The case of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) is a clear and the most known example of how politic considerations mingle with commercial interests in the so called pipeline politics or pipeline diplomacy. Soon after the fall of the Soviet Union, the likely magnitude of the increases in the production of oil in the Caspian region became obvious along with the need to build a new pipeline to transport the oil to Western markets. At the time three major options were proposed: (i) expanding the Russian network to the North through already existing pipelines and railroads; (ii) the Iranian solution, using newly built pipelines towards the South, and finally (iii) the US supported option of the BTC.

The Iranian solution was considered to be economically more attractive than the other two, it had however to be set aside due to the strong discouragement of private investment in Iran by the US, which in fact had already registered Iran in the President

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, full-report 2009, pages 6 and 22. 4

George Bushs axis of evil hit list (by then already subject to sanctions under the IranLibyan Sanctions Act ). The solution of expanding the Russian pipeline network and use the Novorossiysks port was also less expensive than the BTC pipeline project, but it was discarded even though due to US pressures willing to break Russian regional pipeline monopoly and reduce its political and economic influence in the region.

As a consequence of the several political dropping the Russian and Iranian solution, the BTC pipeline was built notwithstanding being the most expensive, and is therefore a clear example of the so called pipeline politics, i.e., the transformation of pipelines into means to achieve political objectives which tend to compete or outgrow economical considerations.

In fact, the US State under President William J. Clinton had already called the BTC project a cornerstone of its foreign policy and its construction was also supported by the Bush administration. As Mark Berniker clearly states The political allure of the BTC project for the United States is self-evident: the BTC pipeline could deny Iran a significant role as a Caspian energy exporter; reduce the dependence of Caucasus and Central Asian states on Russian pipelines; and bolster fledgling regional economies, especially those of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. 6.

4.

Geostrategic Competition

The discovery of significant oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea region converted it a center of reinforced interest and the arena where reignited disputes over access to the energy resources take place. Nevertheless regional competition was initially driven by the energy resources located in territory of former Soviet Union (FSU) countries, it is the authors conviction that the role of the energy resources race is often overstated and it is not sufficient to explain the regional rivalry between great powers as the US, Russia and China., and it usually prejudices a broader understanding which encompasses questions such as terrorism, Islamism and regional players ambitions.

See http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav061702a.shtml 5

As Julia Nanay accurately observed: New oil is being found in Mexico, Venezuela, West Africa and other places, but it isnt getting the same attention, because you dont have this huge strategic rivalries. There is no other place in the world where so many people and countries and companies are competing.7.

One should therefore try to understand what other issues beyond energy resources are leading to regional competition. For this purpose the paper will offer a brief geopolitical which can offer a broader understanding, in fact, geopolitical theory is now being revisited by states in order to better understand Central Asias current scenario 8.

Sir Halford Mackinder was one of the many scholars which affirmed the strategic value of the Heartland, approximately corresponding to Central Asia. In Mackinders view an efficient administration of the Heartland
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would offer the controlling state a decisive

influence in the global agenda: Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland controls the World-Island, who rules the World-Island commands the world10.

The Heartland concept was developed and presented to clarify the British Empire of the need to tackle the Russian expansionism towards the Persian coast, in a time Russia was strongly enhancing its rail-road system, which could allow the land power (represented by Russia) to be nearly as mobile as the sea power (represented by the British Empire) and thus gain a critical advantage in the World-Island.

Experience has confirmed the strategic importance of Central Asia, however the Heartland theory is grounded on early 20th Century facts and influenced by his own interpretation of history, and is thus flawed to explain the present scenario in Central Asia. However Mackinders ideas still influence actual politics. In fact they influenced Zbigniew Brzezinski - a prominent American political scientist, former National
7

Iseri, Emre, The US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty-First Century, in Geopolitics, 14: pag 26-46, 2009, published by Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 8 According with Igor Torbakov, the rivalry between the US and Russia for influence in Central Asia is prompting policy-makers to turn to century-old notions for guidance as they develop responses to geopolitical developments, see http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav020404a.shtml 9 The World-Island comprise and the interlinked continents of Europe, Asia and Africa, which was the largest, most populous, and richest of all possible land combinations. 10 Mackinder, Halford, Democratic Ideals and Reality (London, Constable and Company 1919).

Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter in his post-Cold War thesis of the Grand Chessboard. In his book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Zbigniew Brzezinski lays out what the US should do in order to preserve its superpower position. He asserted that to keep its hegemony the US should maintain a geopolitical pluralism in the post-Soviet space11, and thus tackle the Russian attempt to regain its influence near the former Soviet Union (FSU) countries. According with Zbigniew Brzezinski How the United States both manipulates and accommodates the principal geostrategic players on the Eurasian chessboard and how it manages Eurasia's key geopolitical pivots will be critical to the longevity and stability of America's global primacy and for that purpose considers that The most immediate task is to make certain that no state or combination of states gains the capacity to expel the United States from Eurasia or even to diminish significantly its decisive arbitrating role..

Both Mackinder and Brzezinski, as many other geopolitics scholars, have asserted Central Asias strategic importance and alerted to the possible global consequences of a regional dominance by a single state, and both US and Russian foreign policies are influenced by Brzezinskis Great Game, striving to gain regional dominance by undermining the others power.

5.

The Great Powers in Central Asia

5.1 United States The emergence of new independent states in Central Asia after the Soviet Unions fall in 1991 initially took the US by surprise 12. The Caspian region which was initially considered of marginal interest to the US soon became the stage of international competition, both for control over rich energy resources and for regional influence.

11 12

US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian Heartland, p. 34 Energy Security: the Caspian Sea, 7

The Caspian significant hydrocarbons reserves are at the centre of the competition between great powers. Although of undisputable importance, access to such regional energy resources is not the only reason that led to US intervention in the Caspian zone. In fact, the US need to control energy resources and transportation routes in Central Asia should be mainly understood as a mean to achieve and preserve regional and global dominance, and not as a final objective.

The US foreign policy towards the Caspian region is much influenced by Zbigniew Brzezinskis Gran Chessboard and hence oriented to protect its hegemony from any possible challenger. Vassilis Fouskas and Bulent Gokay, authors of The new American imperialism, describe the situation as follows: As the only superpower remaining after the dismantling of the soviet bloc, the United States is inserting itself into the strategic regions of Eurasia and anchoring US geopolitical influence in these areas to prevent all real and potential competition from challenging its global hegemony13.

The US intention to keep its global dominance is no secret and therefore its objective to underpin such global power through a strengthen influence in the Caspian Sea region should not come as a big surprise. This purpose had already been made clear in the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), based on a paper drafted by the former Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfwitz who defended that it should not be allowed for any nation to challenge US hegemony14. Although not specifically mentioned, the PNAC obviously refers to Russia and China, the most probable challengers of US power.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks also extended the strategic importance of Central Asia to the US who has to rely on local military bases to combat the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban. Following this purpose, the US has signed several basing agreements with regional states, such as Azerbaijan, to station military personnel and equipment.

13

See, Fouskas, Vassilis & Gokay, Bulent, The New American Imperialism: Bush's War on Terror and Blood for Oil, p. 29 (USA, Praeger Publishers) (2005) 14 See, Iseri, Emre, The US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty-First Century, in Geopolitics, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 26-46 (2009)

This presence however is not welcomed by US and China. In fact the US military presence in the Caspian region was initially accepted by Russia and China as a necessary evil to combat terrorism, nonetheless the uncertainty regarding the duration of such combat and the growing suspicion regarding US real objectives has raised strong criticisms in Moscow, Beijing and Tehran, who feel their regional influences and interests threatened by such growing presence in what they consider to be their backyard.

In fact, US military capabilities exhibitions in joint military exercises with regional states such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan15 have eventually led the SCO to request in 2005 the abandonment of all Central Asian bases16.

In addition to military training and cooperation, the US also leads a policy of promoting a greater autonomy of FSU countries, offering them financial incentives and putting forward new regional forums such as GUUAM (which includes Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Moldavia).

The promotion of democracy has also been a US quest in East Europe and Central Asia and resource to speeches against Russian tyranny are common. This of course undermines Russian authority and has already resulted in the implementation of democracy in Ukraine (with the so called Orange revolution) and in Georgia (the so called Rose Revolution). It should also be kept in mind the US efforts to eliminate the Russias influence by eliminating its pipeline monopoly by sponsoring competing projects like the BTC pipeline.

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The US has inclusively sponsored the creation of the so called Caspian Guard (an initiative of the United States Department of Defense) which said to have conceived to assist Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorism, nuclear proliferation and other threats to the Caspian region. Iran has already shown interest in creating a rapid reaction force in partnership with Russia (see article on http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/caspian-guard.htm). 16 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, by Andrew Scheineson, in Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/publication/10883/ 9

5.2 Russia

Regardless of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the majority of the ruling Russian elites and high military ranks still defend the concept of a Greater Russia with strong links to the FSU republics. In fact, already in 1993 a new Russian Military Doctrine proclaimed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) area a region of Russian vital interests and the Russian Federations new Foreign Policy Concept identified the former USSR as a region of Russian special responsibility.17.Moscows has already demonstrated that Russia is deeply committed in developing close commercial and political relations with the FSU countries, also called the near abroad. Washington has strongly and consistently opposed Russians interference in the FSU affairs on the grounds that such interference was a sign of an imperialism revival18, which is consistent with the US policy of promoting a geopolitical pluralism in order to avoid the emergence of any potential challenger to its regional and global power. In the Georgia war Russia took the opportunity to clearly and soundly affirm that it will not waive its interests in the near abroad thus answering to constant US attempts to undermine its influence in the region.

The decision of going to war against Georgia (a quasi proxy of the US and NATO in the Caspian Region) Russia demonstrated that was willing to play hardball when it comes to defend its geopolitical interests and alerted that the US would have to accept new rules of engagement in international affairs. Russia also made clear that the multiple pipeline system sponsored by the US - namely the BTC and BTE pipelines, which were allegedly targeted during the conflict - operates only under Russian terms and conditions. Russia is now more likely to continue its attempt to regain its influence in the near abroad through its stick and carrot policy but now with far less US resistance.
17

Nation, R. Craig, U.S. Interests in the New Eurasia, in Russian Security Strategy under Putin: U.S. and Russian Perspectives, published by the U.S Government, November 2007 18 It is worth mentioning that criticisms regarding Russian foreign policy towards the FSU states are usually grounded on an alleged imperialist revival, giving it a negative connotation. It should however be noted that stronger links between Russia and FSU states in specific areas, and their general proximity may be beneficial for both. It should not be assumed that relations of Russia with FSU are carried with disadvantages for the lasts. 10

In order to regain its influence in the Caspian Region, Russia also launched and participates in several new forums such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SOC). The SCO gathers Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and has been a very influential organization in the region. Although it was initially founded (1996) to resolve border disputes among state members it has expanded to counter terrorism activities, increase military cooperation and intelligence cooperation. The SCO has also shown to be a powerful counterweight to US influences and a useful diplomatic tool, able to simultaneously accommodate Russias and Chinas interests.

Russia also has to pay special attention to its near abroad as they may be critical in future evolutions regarding the radical Islamism threat. In fact, Russias territory adjacent to the Caspian region has a large Muslim population and part of it has been subject to some pressure by the militant Muslim front, a radical Islamite group initiated in Chechnya19. In order to secure Russian citizens from radical Islamism Russia will have to pay special attention to the Southern borders (more exposed to the Muslim world) and keep fighting home terrorism, and under this scenario Central Asia countries could serve Russian interests by buffering and curbing radical Islamism exportation. Although Putin is clearly a nationalist willing to reaffirm the rebirth of a Greater Russia recent economical crises, the overdependence on the returns from oil and gas and the reduction of exports to Western markets have highlighted Russian fragilities which may be in the way of its international objectives.

5.3 - China

Like other competitors, China has both commercial and strategic interests in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. Chinas initial concern regarding Central Asia was to improve the security of its Western border with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. This changed however. For a long time China did not have to rely on others to obtain oil as it was a self-sufficient nation but became a net oil importer in 1993 and
19

This raises extra concern to Moscow as the Muslim sector (with approximately 15 million people) is growing dramatically when compared to the shrinking Slavic community. 11

in 2003 surpassed Japan to become the world second largest oil consumer and third largest net importer. With an economy growing strongly and at a very fast pace (and also switching from coal to oil), China is probably the most interested competitor for the Caspian region hydrocarbons20. Its energy diplomacy, acting directly or through the SCO oil club, has been very successful in guaranteeing strong commercial and friendly links with growing energy suppliers such as Kazakhstan.

In fact China has been commercially very active in assuring long term supply contracts from FSU oil and gas producing countries and agreeing in new transit pipelines destined to transport energy resources into its borders. An example of this success is the new Turkmenistan-China pipeline opened in December 2009 by Chinas President, Hu Jintao. This pipeline will drastically increased Chinas access to the fuel and simultaneously provides the first major alternative to the Russian pipeline transport system, not even passing Ru ssian territory. The ambitious project runs 1,140 miles across three Central Asian nations to the Chinese border, linking Turkmenistan to the Chinese region of Xinjiang. Once inside China, it connects with a pipeline that can carry the fuel even farther east.21.

According to Alexander A. Cooley, this achievement was possible because China did not blend its energy investments with political goals such as support for democratic change or requests for access to military bases as it usually happens with the EU or US, which in its opinion served only to stiffen Russian opposition to European and American oil and gas ventures.22

These projects and investments have allowed China to increase its energy security, both by increasing the amount of oil available but also favoring alternative routes to the sea lane through Malacca Strait which is a potential area for terrorist attacks23.

20

Data offered by the US Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis in http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm 21 New Gas Pipeline from Central Asia feeds China. Article published in the Asia Pacific - The New York Times, in 14.12.2009. See http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/world/asia/15pipeline.html 22 Ibid 23 See, Liao, Xuanli, Central Asia and Chinas Energy Security, in China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 61-69 (2006) 12

From a strictly strategic and security point of view (i.e., beyond oil and gas) the main concern of China regarding the Caspian region is the US influence and radical Islamism. China is very much relying on Russia to keep of the US from its zones of influence as keeping the US out is an objective which both share.

One other concern regarding regional security is the growing concern of infiltration of radical Islamism influences into Chinas territory, namely on the regions bordering Central Asia, and also the containment of aggressive Uighur separatists which create regional restlessness. Fighting terrorism is thus also a common objective with Russia.

6.

Conclusion

The worlds major economies have been unable to cut their dependency on oil , and the new fast developing economies are also growing dependant on hydrocarbon. Under this scenario of increased need for oil the Caspian region can offer a modest but reasonable contribute to a more stable and reliable global energy market and thus to energy security. Considering the strategic value of oil and gas, consuming countries will try to send abroad their oil companies to gain access to those resources, and will use their political influences to achieve this goal. The so called pipeline diplomacy is the illustration of how states influence is used to gain access to energy resources in the Caspian and how it often overlaps with commercial considerations suggesting alternative and cheaper pipeline routing.

The geopolitical importance of the Caspian region does not accrue only from its rich energy resources though. In fact the US, which strongly promoted the development of oil production and the opening of oil pipeline corridors from the Caspian region to the West, does not have, beyond Russia, any single Caspian region producing country is its top ten oil suppliers. This is of course inconsistent with the amount of financial and diplomatic effort laid down by the US to promote projects as the BTC pipeline. On the contrary, the US has taken a policy mainly destined to avoid the emergence of a regional and potential global challenger, undermining in particular Russians attempts of re-establishing stronger links with the FSU republics and regaining its privileges it had before the fall of the USSR.

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On the other hand, Russia has been keen to show how far is willing to go to protect its vital interests and to affirm its zones of special responsibility. Although a less aggressive dialogue seem to be taking place between US president Obama and Russian president Medvedev it is very unlikely that Russia stops looking at the US as their main contender and vice versa.

China does not welcome the presence of US in general and repudiates in particular the democratic speeches and lectures on human rights. China therefore benefits from the Russian fight against US regional presence and both coordinate efforts in the SOC forum to achieve this common objective. It is yet to be seen what will be the result of the awaited Chinas emergence as new superpower in its r elations with Russia. The SCO forum and the subsistence of the US as common enemy may relieve the tension among them, but remains of Russian imperialism ideologies within Moscows elites may clash with Chinas policies and lead to conflict.

The US, Russia and China are dynamically engaged in the Caspian region where they compete to gain access to the rich energy sources. Oil and gas are not however the only motives which justify their presence and the way they conduct their operations in the so called New Great Game or in the Grand Chessboard. The US, Russia and China are mainly driven by their own goal to attain as much power as possible and eventually achieve regional hegemony. Access to energy resources is therefore only an intermediate objective which serves the core goal of achieving, keeping and enhancing power. Although fighting for power, the US, Russia and China may come to cooperate in areas where they have common interests such as the resolution of ethnic conflicts and the suppression of radical Islamism.

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