Centano v.

Villalon-Pornillos

Case No. 54 G.R. No. 113092 (September 1, 1994) Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No. 203

FACTS: In 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan. Martin Centeno, chairman of the group, approached Judge Angeles, President of Tikay, and the latter solicited P 1,500. However, this solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD and as a result, it was contended that Centeno violated P.D. 1564, which states Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional Office of the Department of Social services and Development. ISSUE: W/N the phrase charitable purposes in P.D. 1564 is meant to include religious purposes. HELD: No. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The 1987 Constitution treats the words charitable and religious separately and independently from each other. Since P.D. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a permit from DSWD, this means that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. The term charitable should be strictly construed to exclude solicitations for religious purposes. Moreover, since this is a criminal case, penal law must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 256 G.R. No. L-69344 (April 26, 1991) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 84

FACTS: Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1,283, 621.63 for taxes from the years 1955-1959. A reinvestigation of their debt was made and the amount was changed to P17,117.08. They applied for tax amnesty under P.D. 23, 213 and 370. Due to this, their debt even decreased to about P12,000. They paid such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of such. The Government contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 because of Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 which stated that amnesty is not allowed for those who had pending assessments with the BIR. Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was null because P.D. 213 did not contain any exemption wherein one should not be allowed to amnesty. ISSUE: W/N Respondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty. HELD: Yes, because Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 was null and void. If Revenue Regulation No. 8-72 provided an exception to the coverage of P.D. 213, then such provision is null and void for being contrary to the Presidential Decree. Revenue regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a Presidential Decree. Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Company
Case No. 3 G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85

FACTS: RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature. Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes. ISSUE: W/N insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its taxes. HELD: No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme Court looked into the definition of insulating oils under Materials Handbook by George J. Brady, 8 th Edition. The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law frowns on exemption from taxation; hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimi juris. Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary
Case No. 82 G.R. No. 108524 (November 10, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85

FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buying and selling copra. Prior to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91, copra was classified as a food product under Sec. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and therefore exempt from tax in all stages, including distribution. Under Sec. 103(a), the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of the land which the same is produced. Under Sec. 103(b), the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT in all stages. RMC 47-91 then reclassified copra as a non-food product. ISSUE: W/N copra is an agricultural food product which is exempt from VAT and thus not under the purview of RMC 47-91. HELD: No, it is not an agricultural food product, thus it is not exempt from VAT. The Commissioner of Internal Revenues interpretation is entitled to great respect because it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and implementation of tax laws. In fact, although copra is from coconut, and 80% of the coconut plant is edible, copra per se is not intended for human consumption.
Case No. 107 G.R. No 100970 (September 2, 1992) Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No. 202

FACTS: Carlie Surposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his beneficiaries. On October 18, 1988, Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound. After a written notice of claim by the beneficiaries to the insurance company, the latter denied the claim, saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy. The insurance company was found liable by the Insurance Commission to pay P15,000, and this decision was affirmed by the appellate court. Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using expressio unius exclusio alterius in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded therefrom. ISSUE: Did the CA make a mistake in using the said principle? HELD:

No. The fact remains that the death of Surposa was pure accident on the part of the victim. Furthermore, the personal accident insurance policy specifically enumerated only 10 circumstances where no liability attaches to the insurance company. Failure to include death through murder or assault meant it had not been intended to be exempt from liabilities resulting from such.
Case No. 83 G.R. No. 86020 (August 5, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 311, Footnote No. 131

FACTS: Norma Corporal was an employed public school teacher. During the course of her work, she had several pregnancies. On her 4th pregnancy, she suffered complete abortion. On her 5th pregnancy, she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a hilot. An hour later, she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. She underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards. Her husband, herein Petitioner, filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS. But said agency denied. The matter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed because the cause of his wifes death was non-work-related. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner could avail the compensation benefit. HELD: No. The determination of whether the prolapse of Normas uterus developed before or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her physiological structure and changes in the body. While as a rule that labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, there is also a rule that such liberal construction cannot be applied if the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code are clear. Manahan v. Employees Compensation Commission
Case No. 79 G.R. No. L-44899 (April 22, 1981) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124

FACTS: Nazario Manahan, Jr., died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a teacher in the Las Pinas Municipal High School. The claimant, the widow of the deceased, filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husband was due to his occupation. However, GSIS denied such claim. Claimant filed for a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his employment. Again she was denied by the GSIS. She then appealed her case to the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim. ISSUE: W/N the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits. HELD: Yes. The findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his employment, he was treated for Epigastric pain- and ulcer-like symptoms. This was supported by his medical records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernabe. Epigastric pain is a symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of Enteric Fever. Pursuant to the doctrine of Corales v. ECC, the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act shall be applied, thus the presumption of compensability should be in favor of the claimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of doubt, the case should be resolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberally construed to give relief to the worker and his dependents.

Lazo v. Employees Compensation Commission

Case No. 70 G.R. No. 78617 (June 18, 1990) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 123

FACTS: Petitioner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm. On June 18, 1986, the Petitioner rendered full duty. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the next day. On his way home, he met an accident and as a result, he sustained injuries. For injuries sustained, he claimed for disability benefits under P.D. 626 but was denied by the GSIS. ISSUE: W/N the denial of compensation under P.D. 626 was valid. HELD: No. In the case at bar, it can be seen that Petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not come on time. There is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route. While presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in general favor of the workingman still subsists. Vicente v. Employees Compensation Commission
Case No. 168 G.R. No. 85024 (January 23, 1991) Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 127

FACTS: Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. At the course of his employment, he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. So at the age of forty-five, he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to income benefits under the GSIS retirement program. The application was supported by a physicians certification that Petitioner was classified as under permanent total disability. The significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner could avail of the full income benefits. GSIS contended that Petitioner was only permanent partial disability. The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision. ISSUE: Whether Petitioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial disability. HELD: Petitioner was under permanent total disability. The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. The Court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of government workers, especially the humble rank and file. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries and requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor.
Case No. 285 G. R. No. 96422 (February 28, 1994) Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.205

FACTS: The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioners retirement benefits. Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. On December 1985, he applied for and obtained clearance, which covered the period from 1976 to 1985, from all money, property, and other accountabilities in preparation for his retirement. After the EDSA Revolution, he submitted his resignation and sought a

second clearance for the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. Respondent, who took over as Chairman, created an inventory/audit of all equipment acquired during the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the committee recommended Petitioners clearance from accountability and after another special audit, Respondent approved Petitioners application for retirement but added that . of the money value of benefits due would be withheld subject to the findings of the audit. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can authorize that half of Petitioners retirement benefits may be withheld. HELD: No. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension to the Auditor General and members of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act), the benefits granted shall not be subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes. Withholding Petitioners benefits is not allowed in this case. Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retirees well-being. Pahilan v. Tabalba, et al.
Case No. 96 G.R. No. 110170 (February 21, 1994) Chapter VIII, Page 342, Footnote No. 63

FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban, Camiguin. Respondent Tabalba was proclaimed Mayor. Petitioner Pahilan filed an election protest although the docket fees he paid were insufficient. The trial court dismissed the election protest for non-payment on time of the required fees for filing an initiatory pleading. Within the 5-day period to appeal, Petitioner filed a verified appeal brief. But the Clerk of Court said that his office did not receive any notice of appeal from Petitioner. Petitioners appeal was then dismissed for failure to appeal within the prescribed period. ISSUE: 1. W/N the verified appeal was validly dismissed. 2. W/N the trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner for non-payment on time of the required fees. HELD: 1. No. The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief. The filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of the notice of appeal. The RTC was sent copies by registered mail within the prescribed period, and is assumed to be received in the regular course of the mail, filed as of the date of mailing. 2. No. The docket fee was paid although insufficient. Statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc.
Case No. 78 G.R. No. L-23771 (August 4, 1988) Chapter IX, Page 355, Footnote No. 14

FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from respondent deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax rate of 5% as prescribed in Sec. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code, instead of the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Pending the case, RA 3843 was

passed, granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of light, heat, and power. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%. ISSUE: W/N RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the uniformity and equality of taxation clause of the Constitution. HELD: It is valid. Sec. 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal application. RA 3843 did not only fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts, but made it in lieu of any and all taxes, all laws to the contrary notwithstanding, thus leaving no room for doubt regarding the legislative intent. Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts. They do not constitute a part of the machinery of the general government. The Legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of a particular case. RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law. Gallardo v. Borromeo

Case No. 50 G.R. No. L-36007 (May 25, 1988)

FACTS: Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he (plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government job as a letter carrier. Upon appeal, the CA applying Sec. 7 of RA 6389, held that the landowners desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant. ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application to Sec. 7 of RA 6389. HELD: No. The applicable law when petitioner filed his complaint was RA 3844 which provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant should the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding. The newer law, R.A. 6389 eliminated this ground. In applying Art. 4 of the New Civil Code, RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect. Since Congress failed to express an intention to make said RA retroactive, it may not apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts. Balatbat v. Court of Appeals and Passion
Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-36378 (January 27, 1992) Chapter IX, Page 363, Footnote No. 73

FACTS: Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. Ana, Pampanga containing 18,490 square meters of land owned by Garcia. Garcia sold the land to private respondent Pasion and had declared it for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 126. Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant to Sec. 36(1) of RA 3844. However, petitioner maintains that the case should have been decided in light of Sec. 7 of RA 6389 since, in view of the appeal the respondent still does not have the vested right to acquire the land. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 7 of RA 6389 should be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Art. 4 of the Civil Code provides that there should be no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided by law. In order for a law to have a retroactive

effect it should have a provision stating its retroactivity, otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore the law is a rule established to guide our action with no binding effect until it is enacted, thus laws have no effect in past times but laws look forward in the future. Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, Hon. Andres, Jr. and Burgos
Case No. 99 G.R. No. 104215 (May 8, 1996) Chapter IX, Page 377, Footnote No. 140

FACTS: Private respondent was recruited to work in Saudi Arabia as a service contract driver. Months after, another contract was executed which changed his position into that of a helper/laborer. When private respondent returned to the Philippines, he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and the amount actually paid to him, plus his contractual bonus. Private respondent filed the complaint with the Labor Arbiter but E.O. No. 797 was passed, creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), vested with the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims between employers and employees abroad. The Labor Arbiter still proceeded with the case and rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent. ISSUE: W/N E.O. 797 should be given retroactive effect and thus divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. HELD: No. E.O. 797 is not a curative statute and is therefore not included in the exception to the rule on prospectivity. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessitated. Furthermore, the jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action; in this case, these were P.D. 1691 and 1391. Co v. CA
Case No. 65 G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.91

FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: CLOSED ACCOUNT. A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delivery of a rubber or bouncing check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. HELD: No. According to them, Que v. People should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 315

G.R. No. 91856 (October 5, 1990) Chapter IX, Page 372, Footnote No. 117

FACTS: Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence, being without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Art. 33 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: W/N a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action. HELD: Yes. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Diu v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 96 G.R. No. 115213 (December 19, 1995) Chapter X, Page 391, Footnote No. 28

FACTS: On several occasions, private respondent Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store all valued at P7,862.55. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands. Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman and the latter set the case for hearing, but private respondents failed to appear. When the parties met, they failed to reach an amicable settlement. Private respondents in their Answer, while admitting indebtedness, interposed two counterclaims: (1) for P6,227.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging to petitioners, and (2) another for P12,0000.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. ISSUE: W/N parties did not meet in presence of a Pangkat as required by law. HELD: Petition was granted without prejudice to the re-filing of the case by petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P.D. 1508, otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law". It must be noted that P.D. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the LGC of 1991. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial court before the effectivity of the LGC. Nevertheless, Sec. 4 and 6 of the former law have been substantially reproduced in Sec. 410(b) and 412 respectively, of the latter law. Briad Agro Development Corp. v. Hon. dela Serna, and dela Cruz, et al.
Case No. 39 G.R. No. 83225 (June 29, 1989) Chapter IX, Page 376, Footnote No. 136

FACTS: The case arose out of a complaint filed by Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services WFTU Local Chapter No. ROI-005 against respondent agricultural firm for alleged underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage, ECOLA, overtime pay, legal holiday pay, night shift differential pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. Respondent failed to submit controverting evidence despite due notice; Director Balbin thus ruled in favor of the employees and ordered respondent to pay P5,369,909.30. In its appeal to the NLRC, Briad Agro questioned the Regional Directors

authority to entertain the pecuniary claim of workers, which NLRC dismissed on the strength of E.O. 111 amending Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, which granted to Regional Directors jurisdiction over monetary claims. ISSUE: W/N the jurisdiction over money claims is exclusive to the Labor Arbiters, by force of Art. 217 of the Labor Code. HELD: The Court held that E.O. 111 has the character of a curative law to remedy a defect that attached to the provision subject of the amendment. This was clear from the proviso: The provisions of Art. 217 of this Code notwithstanding The intended effect was clearly to make the Secretary of Labor and the various Regional Directors have concurrent jurisdiction. E.O. 111 therefore has retroactive effect.