Está en la página 1de 3

THBT NATO has lost its relevance

A very good morning to the distinguished members of the house. As the second proposition speaker, I will be diving into the second substantive and rebutting some of the key flaws in the propositions case. [CASE DIVISION] Today as the second proposition will be showing you how the decisions that have been made by NATO has altered the political discourse among its member states for the better. [CASE PROPER] Europe's economic woes are forcing key NATO members (and especially the U.K.) to adopt draconian cuts in defense spending. NATO's European members already devote a much smaller percentage of GDP to defense than the United States does, and they are notoriously bad at translating even that modest amount into effective military power. The latest round of defense cuts means that Europe will be even less able to make a meaningful contribution to out-of-area missions in the future, and those are the only serious military missions NATO is likely to have. There have long been debates about the sustainability of the transatlantic alliance and accusations amongst allies of unequal contributions to burdensharing. But since countries on both sides of the Atlantic have begun introducing new and often major military spending cuts in response to the economic crisis, concerns about the future of transatlantic defense cooperation have become more pronounced. A growing number of senior officials are now publicly questioning the future of NATO. In June 2011, in the midst of NATOs operation in Libya, Robert Gates, then US Defense Secretary, stated that Europe faced the prospect of collective military irrelevance The largest budget cuts have been introduced in the smaller EU member states, with rates above 20 percent. Latvia notably reduced military spending by 21 percent in 2009. Lithuania cut 36 percent in 2010. The majority of middle-sized countries have implemented military spending cuts of 10 to 15

percent, on average. For example, the Czech Republic and Ireland reduced their defense budget by 10 percent in 2011 and 2010 respectively. Portugal cut 11 percent in 2010. Greek military spending dropped by 18 percent in 2010 and a further 19 percent in 2011. Romania introduced cuts of 13 percent in 2010. Larger EU countries like Germany and the United Kingdom have limited their cuts to about 8 percent to be introduced between 2011 and 2015. Some states, such as Finland and Denmark, have recorded steady military spending through the crisis, while Poland and Sweden have actually increased their defense budgets. For the last two decades, European countries have committed to project military force both in order to ensure their security, and to assist in crisis management abroad. This objective was notably endorsed once more in NATOs 2010 Strategic Concept. As a result, since the 1990s, Europeans have been reforming their armed forces from large immobile defensive militaries into deployable units which can be sustained in distant theatres. However, many states have been slow to introduce all the necessary military reforms and buy the equipment required for operations far away. And as they introduce new spending cuts, they further risk undermining their ability to conduct military operations The economic crisis risks exacerbating the modernization, participation and legitimacy gaps which exist in the transatlantic alliance. Even before the economic downturn there was a discrepancy between the speed at which the US and Europeans modernized their military capabilities and introduced new technologies leading many to suggest that NATO was already a multitier alliance. As a result of the current spending cuts, this gap is set to widen. The US will continue its frequent technological upgrades, but the larger European states will modernize their military platforms at a slower pace than originally planned. Furthermore, several of the smaller countries will completely suspend the modernization of some of their weapons. For many years, some European allies have only been able to afford modest contributions to NATO missions even though they supported the deployments politically. The Libya operation was the most recent illustration of this trend. As a result of the economic crisis, this participation imbalance risks becoming more pronounced. Several European countries have already started withdrawing their troops from multinational operations in order to save money. And as the armed forces of smaller European states

become increasingly insignificant, there will be growing pressure on the larger countries in particular France, Germany and the United Kingdom to compensate for the shortcomings. At a time when large NATO allies are also trying to scale back the size of their armed forces, such a trend risks further eroding the concept of NATO solidarity. It is also likely to weaken the ability of smaller countries to influence political decisions within the transatlantic alliance. Atlantic Alliance is beginning to resemble Oscar Wilde's Dorian Gray, appearing youthful and robust as it grows older -- but becoming ever more infirm. The Washington Treaty may remain in force, the various ministerial meetings may continue to issue earnest and upbeat communiques, and the bureaucracy may keep NATO's web page up and running-all these superficial routines will go on, provided the alliance isn't asked to actually do anything else. The danger is that NATO will be dead before anyone notices, and we will only discover the corpse in time to come .

También podría gustarte