Introduction The connection between law and justice is a deep one.

We have "Hall s of Justice," "Justices of the Supreme Court," and "the administration of justi ce." We know that "justice" is one of the central concepts of legal theory, but it is also vague and ambiguous. This post provides an introductory roadmap to th e concept of justice. Subsequent entries in the Legal Theory Lexicon will cover more particular aspects of this topic such as "distributive justice." As always, this post is aimed at law students (especially first-year law students) with an interest in legal theory. A Typology of Justice What is justice? One way to app roach this question is via a typology--a scheme that divides the general and abs tract concept of justice into component parts: (1) distributive justice, (2) cor rective justice, (3) political justice, and (4) procedural justice. These may be deep and fundamental differences between different types of justice, or these c ategories may simply be heuristic devices. For now, let's lay that question to t he side and focus instead on a brief exposition of each of the four types of jus tice: Distributive Justice In 1971, John Rawls's book A Theory of Justice put di stributive justice at the center of philosophical discussion of justice. What is the subject of distributive justice? Even this question is controversial, but o ne formulation is: The subject matter of distributive justice is the distributio n of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.. The burdens of social coop eration include things like taxes and obligations to provide civic service (e.g. military service, jury service, and so forth). The benefits of social cooperati on might be seen as including the resources

that are produced by social cooperation, which might be represented by wealth an d income. Thus, questions that might be answered by a theory of distributive jus tice might include: --Should the system of taxation be progressive (with a heavi er burden on the wealthy than the poor)? --Should the government adopt an income s policy (such as a guaranteed annual income) that will provide a minimum level of resources to those who are least well off? --should the burden of military se rvice by distributed equally (in the form of mandatory service for all citizens) or should this burden be allocated by a volunteer army and market incentives? T his list just begins to scratch the surface. In the context of the law school cu rriculum, questions of distributive justice arise in a variety of course. In tor t law, distributive justice may be the basis for the theory that one of the purp oses of tort law is "risk spreading" or the just distribution of the costs of ac cidents. In contract law, questions of distributive justice may arise in cases i nvolving contracts of adhesions or contracts with terms that may exploit the uns ophisticated and economically disadvantaged. In a future post, I will say more a bout particular theories of distributive justice. For now, let me just mention t hree approaches. The first approach is found in Rawls's theory, justice as fairn ess, which includes two principles of distributive justice. The first principle guarantees to every citizen a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, su ch as freedom of conscience, the right to vote, and so froth. The second princip le (the "difference principle") requires that inequalities of income and wealth work to the advantage of the least well-off group in society. The second approac h is strict egalitarianism--which would not permit differences with respect to w hatever good is the subject of justice. Why not equality of wealth and income? T hat's one option for

egalitarians, but there are others such as equality of welfare or equality of re sources of equality of opportunity for these things. The third approach is liber tarianism--which holds that the distribution of wealth and resources is not itse lf a proper subject matter for justice. Rather, libertarians begin with the prem ise that each individual should have certain liberty rights (e.g. self-ownership , property rights, and contract rights) and that whatever distribution results f rom the exercise of these rights is a just distribution. Corrective Justice Aris totle defined "corrective" or "rectificatory" justice as "Justice in transaction s." That's a good place to start. With Aristotle we might divide transactions in to two categories, the voluntary and the involuntary. Justice in voluntary trans actions would include the topics encompassed by contract law. Justice in involun tary transactions would include both transactions that are involuntary due to fo rce (e.g. battery) and transactions that are involuntary due to fraud (e.g. frau d, misrepresentation, etc.). One of the great debates in contemporary legal theo ry concerns the status of corrective justice. This topic is especially hot in to rt theory and criminal law theory. For example, some tort theories believe that the purpose of tort law is captured by the idea of corrective justice. Such theo rists tend to believe that liability standards should be fault bases (e.g. inten tional tort or negligence as opposed to strict liability) and that the purposes of tort damages is to make the plaintiff whole (and to force the defendant to di sgorge wrongful gains) and notdeterrence. Other tort theorists, e.g. welfarists or utilitarians, believe that corrective justice institutions should be judged s olely by the consequences they produce. So a utilitarian might believe that the purpose of tort law is to produce optimum deterrence. Finally, some tort theoris ts believe that tort law serves the ends of distributive justice.

Political Justice Yet another topic of justice is political justice. In a sense, this might be seen as a subtopic of distributive justice--since political right s and responsibilities can be seen as encompassed within the general category of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. In relationship to the law scho ol curriculum, we might say that political justice is concerned with the foundat ional issues of constitutional theory. Who shall have the right to vote? What po wer shall be allocated to local communities as opposed to nationstates? What lim itations shall there be on the power of democratic majorities (e.g. individual r ights & judicial review)? The topic of political justice shades into another imp ortant idea--"political legitimacy." Are these two ideas essentially the same or are they different? One view is that it is possible to have a legitimate politi cal order that is nonetheless unjust (or vice versa). For example, some might sa y that the test of political legitimacy has to do with the origination of the po litical system. If a system has been accepted and endorsed by the people, this v iew contends, it is legitimate-even if the substance of the system (e.g. the all ocation of political rights) is unjust. On this view, a religious state might be legitimate but unjust. A quite different view is that political legitimacy depe nds on political justice. For example, Randy Barnett has argued that the test fo r constitutional legitimacy is whether the constitution provides adequate guaran tees of just outcomes (for Barnett, the protection of individual liberty). On th is view, popular endorsement of an unjust political system does not make that sy stem legitimate. Procedural Justice A final form of justice is "procedural justi ce." The very existence of this category is controversial. Some theorists argue that the only the outcomes of procedures count. But this is not the universal vi ew. Some theorists believe that procedures are important for reasons that are no t reducible to a concern with outcomes. One

helpful typology was provided by Rawls, who distinguished between perfect, imper fect, and pure procedural justice. --Perfect procedural justice assumes that we have an independent criterion for the correctness of outcomes. For example, a co rrect outcome in a criminal case would be "freeing the innocent and convicting t he guilty." We have perfect procedural justice if the procedure guarantees the c orrect outcome. In other words, perfect procedural justice requires 100% accurac y. --Imperfect procedural justice. Of course, in the actual world, most procedur es fall short of 100% accuracy. Moreover, the more accurate a procedure is, the more expensive it is likely to be. Imperfect procedural justice acknowledges the se facts and therefore conceives of procedural justice as a fair balance between the benefits of accuracy and the costs of procedure. --Pure procedural justice is based on the denial of the premise that we have an independent criterion for a correct outcome. We have a case of pure procedural justice if the procedure it self provides the criterion for judging the justice of the outcome. Rawls himsel f doubted there were many cases of pure procedural justice. He did see one case-a fair bet. With a fair gamble (e.g. a roll of unloaded dice), the outcome does n't matter. In the context of the law school curriculum, questions of procedural justice arise in connection with procedural dues process (in constitutional law , administrative law, and procedure) and especially in the courses in civil and criminal procedure. Justice and Moral Theory Thinking about each of these four t ypes of justice is connected with more general views about moral and political t heory. Each of the three important families of normative moral theory (consequen tialist, deontological, and aretaic) connects in interesting ways with thinking about justice:

Consequentialist Ideas About Justice There are many different forms of consequen tialism. In moral theory, the most familiar form is utilitarianism. In law, the emphasis lately have been on wheelbarrows. Most consequentialist theories do not see justice in any of its forms as truly distinctive. For example, for act util itarians the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on whether that action (as opposed to the alternatives) produces the most utility. Thus, the best distr ibution of resources is the one that maximizes utility, and the best system of t ort law is the one that utility. There are different ways of expressing this ide a. One expression maintains that consequentialists do not place any independent value on justice; another way of putting it is to say that for consequentialists , justice isthe production of good consequences. Deontological Ideas About Justi ce By way of contrast, deontological theories have a natural affinity for the id ea that justice serves as an independent criterion for the rightness and wrongne ss of actions. Thus, it is a characteristically deontological position to mainta in that unjust actions or institutions cannot be justified on the ground that th ey would produce good consequences. Thus, deontologists might say that it would be unjust and hence impermissible to punish an innocent persons--even if the net long-term effect of that action were to produce good consequences. Areataic Ide as About Justice From the view point of aretaic theory, justice is primarily a v irtue, an excellence of human character. One of the most difficult problems for virtue ethics has been the development of an adequate theory of the virtue of ju stice. One view is that justice is the disposition to take neither too much nor too little for one's self. Another view is that justice is the disposition to ac t in conformity with social and legal norms, tempered by equity. Yet a third vie w is that the virtue of justice is simply the disposition to act in accord with the right theory of what a just action is.

The Relationship Between Law and Justice What is the relationship between law an d justice? That question can be tackled from many different directions. One angl e of approach would be to ask whether there is some essential or necessary conne ction between legal validity and justice. The view that only just laws are legal ly valid is usually associated with natural law theory, whereas the view that th ere is no essential or necessary connection between law and justice is character istically associated with legal positivism. But whether one is a natural lawyer or a legal positivism, one could say that the laws should be just. Thus, theorie s of justice can be seen as guiding the science of legislation. Conclusion Conte mporary legal education is, in a sense, all about justice. Natural law, legal po sitivism, and legal realism all go beyond the black letter law and ask the quest ion, "What should the law be?" Law students quickly discover that their instruct ors are frequently more interested in questions like, "Is that a just rule?" tha n in questions like, "What is the rule?" As you continue your study of legal rul es, you can begin to ask questions like: "Does this rule address a question of d istributive, corrective, political, or procedural justice?" "Is the rule in the case (or statute or constitutional provision) just or unjust?" "What theory of j ustice underlies the reasoning of the court?" Debates over Law and Morality Prof essional Ethics and Law A persistent theme in recent literature on the conduct o f lawyers in their profession concerns a perceived marked decline in ethical sta ndards of behaviour. This has prompted calls for increasing ethical requirements both within and without the profession. It has also stimulated scholarly debate about the nature of professional ethics or responsibility and the role of ethic al

rules or codes of conduct. In my own country, New Zealand, the debate over profe ssional legal ethics has been stimulated through the public attention which nota ble instances of ethical transgression have received. Examples are found in such events as the Winebox Inquiry concerning the activities of business corporation s and their legal advisers seeking to minimise the corporations tax liability, un ethical conduct by lower Court judges and serious defalcations of clients money b y lawyers. Although, in these and other such instances, breaches of the law by t hose participating in the impugned behaviour have not in every case been establi shed, there has been little doubt regarding the presence of serious immoral or u nethical conduct. Perhaps even more serious have been the illegal and unethical transgressions committed by public of cials, who, though themselves not necessaril y lawyers, have been charged with important public legal functions. The most ser ious of these, in my country has been the misappropriation of public money for p rivate purposes by the Auditor-General during the tenure of his of ce. The chief o bligation of that public of ce is to ensure that state institutions, of cials and bo dies charged with public responsibilities are spending taxpayers funds strictly within their legal powers and purposes Legal Enforcement of Morality Professiona l ethics is not the only area where the fundamental question of the interrelatio n of law and the ethical dimension has expressed itself in public debate. The qu estion as to whether law should be used to enforce morality and, if so to what e xtent, has arisen in relation to issues which have been and are still debated. I n England there was a celebrated debate between a judge of the House of Lords, L ord Devlin, and perhaps the leading

English legal philosopher of this century, H L A Hart, over the question as to w hether homosexual acts by consenting adults in private ought to be prohibited by law. In more recent times debate has raged over the morality of abortion and wh ether or to what extent it ought to be legally proscribed. Immoral Law Another d ebate which also involved the late Oxford philosopher of law, H L A Hart, this t ime against a Harvard law professor, Lon Fuller, concerned the question as to wh ether speci c instances of formally enacted but grossly immoral (unjust) laws of t he Nazi regime during the Second World War were genuine law, though deserving of condemnation (Hart), or were they in fact not valid binding law at all owing to a speci c kind of inner moral failing (Fuller)? This debate was itself an off-sho ot from an older debate between legal positivists and natural law theorists. Nat ural lawyers within the tradition of Thomas Aquinas (Thomists) adhered to the ma xim, lex injusta non est lex (an unjust law is not law). Legal positivists such as Hart have maintained that the maxim commits a logical error in seeking to der ive an is (invalid or non-law) from an ought (law that ought to be just). It is not the purpose of this essay to explore in depth the above debates relating to ethi cs and the professions and those on law and morals. Rather, the aim is to provid e a uniquely Christian perspective on the relationship of law and the ethical di mension from which these debates can be approached. It is hoped that this perspe ctive can offer a sound principled basis upon which it may be possible to work t owards genuine solutions to the problems they pose. With respect to the relation ship of law and justice my essay in the rst volume of this Signposts series has a lready furnished some of the key elements of that perspective. They will be summ arised with minor elaboration before

proceeding to develop them in order to address the fundamental problem of the re lationship between law and the ethical or moral dimension. Law and Justice In th e reformational perspective human law and legal institutions arise out of concre te formative responses to a universal normative requirement of Gods ordering Word for the Creation. This normative requirement is but one of the diverse ways in which Gods Word-governed creation exists and functions. It is described as the ju ral manner or mode of Gods Creation. We should take care not to confuse this distin ct jural dimension of our experience with the idea of Gods Creation-governing Wor d as Gods law for the creation. The jural aspect is only one of the diverse ways in w hich Gods ordering Law (-Word) governs Creation. As a universal dimension of huma n experience the jural aspect is a normative dimension of the full array of huma n institutions, communities and relationships, of families, marriage bonds, frie ndships, business corporations, churches, voluntary organisations, etc. as well as of the legal institutions of the state. For example, it expresses itself in t he informal rules or norms that regulate disagreement and con ict within the famil y as well as in the formal public rules (law) of statute law and judicial case dec isions. The core meaning of this normative jural dimension is captured in the co ncept of retribution (or tribution) understood as a giving of what is justly due o r owing. We might say that the whole Creation including Gods human creatures prio r to the invasion of sin existed in an original state of tribution, that is, in a jural state of harmony and peace. The conditions of human life at present, and

extending back to the advent of sin into the world, has meant that the normative requirement for re-tribution, restoring relationships as far as humanly possibl e to a state of tribution, is now and until the renewing of all things a continu ing and inescapable call upon Gods image-bearers for an obedient response. Retrib ution then, in this re-formed interpretation extends well beyond a criminal or p enal reference. Moreover, in a biblical understanding, even the concept of crimi nal retribution must be open to a broader range of considerations than mere offe nder directed punishment but take account of restorative considerations in respe ct of the victim and the wider community. Hence this core re-tributive character of the jural dimension expresses itself in both civil (non-criminal) and crimin al laws of the state. However, as a dimension of all societal relations and inst itutions, retributive justice is a divine normative calling, a calling for its i mplementation (positivisation) in humanly posited norms of justice across the full range of human relationships, communities and institutions. The different types of laws (understood in their original juridical sense) obtain their typical cha racter from the concrete societal context in which they occur through human form ation. Within the family, for example, they have a relatively informal expressio n appropriate to the ethical character of the bonds that constitute that intimat e community. The jural dimension of this natural institution is to be normativel y expressed in a manner that is in keeping with the predominant norms of love, c are and nurture appropriate within that familial context. Similarly, the interna l rules of an economic institution such as a business

enterprise or a business contract, whilst often displaying a more formal charact er, are also avoured by the speci c (economic) character of those institutions. No one needs to have pointed out that the rules contained in statutes and in the de cisions of the state courts are laws. In fact it is only this type of law for wh ich the term law is commonly reserved when used in its primary juridical sense. It should be clearly understood, however, that from a biblicalreformational perspe ctive all kinds of rules formed within non-state human communities and instituti ons are just as much law as the rules of the state. This is because each one of those rule-spheres is a concrete expression of the jural dimension containing, i n a relatively better or worse fashion, positivisations of (re)tributive norms o f justice. The social-structural basis for the prominence given to state laws is to be found in the overriding normative role which that form of law plays in re lation to all of those other types of law and from the (normative) fact that it is the jural dimension which characterises the state institution in a way true o f no other human community. It is the states task to bind all non-state jural sph eres their internal laws to common, public norms of (tributive) justice. For exa mple, through the law of contract the state binds a jural institution (contract) within economic relationships (commercial transactions) to the procedural-jural requirements of fairness and equity in the public interest. In every state commun ity, however, the common law, coordinating non-state (private) jural spheres, is matched by laws which apply to all members (citizens) within the state communit y itself. This internal law of the state posits norms of justice to promote the general (public) interest in a formal (public) law. Criminal law is only one kin d of public law directed at behaviour that constitutes violations of human inter ests concerning the integrity of the person and

property. Criminal offences are actions which normally possess a serious moral q uality (e.g. murder, typically, the intentional killing by a person of another h uman being) and which call for a criminal form of re-tributive justice. But all kinds of laws directed towards the welfare of the general citizenry is law of th is public type which the state alone is competent to form in the public interest . Law, Justice and Ethics legal justice refers to a normative dimension or aspect, a jural mode or manner which we encounter in our temporal experience within the d iversity of created reality. Human law in this juridical sense is the concrete e xpression of this aspect functioning within families, friendships, economic orga nizations and other societal structures, including the state which is characteri zed by the leading role that the jural aspect plays in that societal institution . It may seem strange that in referring to the jural aspect as the normative bas is of legal justice no mention has been made of ethics or morality. The reason f or this is grounded in a requirement for an appropriately nuanced account of Gods ordering for Creation. The divine Word calls forth a rich diversity of distinct and irreducible normative responses. Although closely related to the jural, the ethical dimension is an irreducible normative mode of real experience that is d istinct from the jural dimension. Whereas the jural mode is characterized as a b alancing and harmonizing of a plurality of interests in a (re)tributive manner, that is, a giving of what is justly due and owing, the ethical dimension of crea ted reality calls forth a human ethical response of human love characterised

in its core sense of delity or troth and often expressed in the notion of care. In this view then, justice, as a normative jural concept, is not to be categorised as an ethical or moral value. This does not in any way diminish the importance of the ethical dimension (or the jural, for that matter) of uman experience. On the contrary, it allows us to explain the normative signi cance of the ethical or mor al aspect within the full range of human contexts and for creational reality as a whole. But, signi cantly for the subject of this essay, it allows us to explain the normative importance of the ethical aspect for the jural dimension (and vice versa). There are at least three key features of social reality which might lea d one mistakenly to think that justice as a distinctive jural idea or concept co uld be viewed as an ethical concept. Societal Universality of Justice First, jus tice as a normative demand on responsible human action is not con ned to legal con texts. But then we have seen that the jural aspect as that aspect which gives to law its characteristic normative quality is not con ned to what is commonly under stood as law or legal contexts. So the fact that questions of justice arise in such contexts does not at all imply the absence of the jural tributive dimension from which it might be concluded that we are now in the realm of the non-jural or et hical realm. Laws and rules are but the concrete formalisation or positivisation o f that jural normative dimension. Not every resolution of a justice issue, withi n the diversity of social contexts where they may arise, requires, or results in , law or rules in that form-al sense. Justice (the Jural) as a Prerequisite of L ove (the Ethical)

Secondly, it is also true that ful lment of the normative demands of morality or e thics presupposes compliance with the strict retributive requirements of justice though the reverse does not necessarily apply. That is to say, ful lment of the r equirements of justice does not satisfy the full demands of ethical love or care . A parent who does not treat each of his children fairly, for example, by undul y favouring one child over other siblings in attention and in the provision of m aterial sustenance, cannot be ful lling the normative requirement of caring love t hat above all characterises the family bond. This, however, does not show that f airness or justice is an ethical norm but that the normative requirement of just ice as a jural norm is a necessary basis for ethical behaviour. Hence ful lling th e strict requirements of (retributive) justice within a family context does not guarantee a loving or caring atmosphere within the family, though without satisfyi ng those jural requirements the latter could hardly exist. A parent, then, who o bserves his or her moral duties of justice within the family has not yet satis ed th e full extent of the ethical requirements of love and nurture. It is said that t he full requirements of morality are supererogatory or aspirational they require som ething over and above what is our duty, what is justly owing to another. Often, when we refer to moral duties, whatever may be the social context, we are still in the realm of the jural, of what is due and owing in justice to another. The o pposition of moral duty to legal duty often only indicates the difference between a jural normative requirement that has been formalised in law (positive legal duty ) however well or badly, and one that has not (moral duty). Moral here, in common usage merely has the meaning of unpositivised (jural) norm.

 The Ethical Element within Justice and Law There is a third feature of justice, a feature, perhaps more than any other, which might lead us to think that justic e is merely a subset of the ethical, that it is a moral value or norm. another rem arkable way in which the jural and ethical dimensions are connected which reveal s the wonderful coherence of creational experience. Up to this point in my discu ssion of the nature of justice, in both this and my earlier essay, I have relied on the central insight that justice refers to a distinctive normative mode of h uman existence (the jural) that stands along side a diversity of other aspects ( both normative and non-normative). It could be said that what I have shown is th at, however close the ethical and jural stand in relation to one other, the rela tion is an external one. Though conformity to ethical norms may assume conformit y to jural norms the two are distinct from one other. Acting justly does not ens ure one has also acted ethically in the sense of supererogatory demands of moral ity. Immoral behaviour such as lying may involve the in iction of perceptible harm in a jural sense that requires re-tributive restoration to the harm-sufferer; t hen again it may not. It is not all forms of dishonesty that demand a retributiv e response from the law, only those that involve, as well as a moral transgressi on, a disruption of the jural (tributive balance of interests), that is, jural har m. But now we must observe that within the internal normative demands of justice as a retributive manner of balancing interests, of giving what is owing, of res toring the harmony of interests where they have been disrupted, there is a

potentiality for ethically or morally deepening, for enhancing, a strict retribu tive concept of justice. Let me provide some illustrations from both private law and public law. Within the bonds of friendship, marriage and family, the moral norm of good faith, troth or delity plays a constitutive and a leading role. Fidelity is both a constituting element of such relationships and small-scale communitie s without which they could not exist. It also de nes them as relationships of a mo ral ethical type in a way that is not true of business relations or organisation s, or schools, churches, legal institutions, etc. Within the law, however, we al so nd reference to the concept of good faith. For example, within the context of insurance contracts there is a well established obligation on both insurer and i nsured of utmost good faith (uberrimae dei). What cannot be disputed is that good faith in this legal context does not have its full ethical meaning but is underst ood as a legal duty, the imposition of a jural norm within the common private la w of the state. Its function is not to constitute a typical ethical relationship of the intimate kind displayed in friendships, marriage and family but to ethic ally enhance a legal relation (insurance contract) within the economic sphere of commercial relations. This legal obligation aims, not to establish a con ding rel ationship of a intimate ethical type, but merely to safeguard the mutual interes ts of the parties to the contractual relationship which depends for its successf ul continuance, and for the performance of the mutual obligations and protection of mutual rights, upon a degree of good faith on both sides. It is possible in a range of different economic contexts to form contractual relations

without a general requirement of good faith. But within the history of Western l aw it has been found that ethically reinforcing legal relations in this way enha nces the legal protection of commercial interests and thereby advances the inter ests of commerce and the general welfare of society. The need for such ethical r einforcement within the jural sphere is often a response to a general lack of mo rality within commercial relations and provides a form of legal retributive just ice that is ethically opened up. But it should be understood that such moral enhan cement of law is not a substitute for ethical behaviour but rather addresses the jural effects, the harms in icted on others interests, the injustices that result from commercial immorality. The legal requirement of good faith has an ethical m eaning analogous to its fully ethical meaning. Good faith, as a legal duty, open s up the jural requirement of justice in a direction that points towards good fa ith in its original ethical sense. Good faith has always been, within human temp oral experience, from the original acts of Creation, a constitutive requirement of intimate (caring) human relations. But this has not been the case with non-in timate economic relations (e.g contracts). Thus in Common Law legal systems the legal maxim caveat emptor, let the buyer beware, has often been cited as a feature of their commercial laws. The ethical element within the criminal law is probab ly more widely appreciated. In a retributive regime of criminal law reaction whi ch criminal infractions evoked in former times may have resulted in the in iction of punishment for harm caused to another without reference to the state of

mind of the transgressor. Fault or guilt need play no part in a system of justic e which aims to exact criminal legal retribution, albeit on the basis of a princ iple of punishment proportionate to the criminal harm in icted. Hence the jural di mension within the ethical, unlike the ethical within the jural plays a constitu tive and not merely a deepening or enhancing role. Dif cult and imperfectly realis ed as the requirement of retributive balance may be the, internal jural requirem ent of balance within our ethical obligations doing justice to all our ethical res ponsibilities is nevertheless an essential element for being a loving and caring person with respect to friend, spouse, child etc. Legal Enforcement of Morality Assuming fairly general agreement in a society that a particular behaviour is i mmoral, for instance, prostitution, the question often arises as to whether and to what extent such behaviour ought to be legally proscribed or prohibited. As b etween a prostitute and his or her client assuming the service provided is consensua l the result of mutual agreement by adults, it might be argued there is no victi m and that to legally proscribe such behaviour is merely using law to express di sapproval of immoral behaviour. This argument has been used against the legal pr oscription of sex between consenting male adults, although in this case the gay community and gay life-style supporters would strongly argue that such behaviour is not immoral. It is not my intention here to address the issue of whether suc h behavior is immoral from a Christian standpoint but to indicate the proper rol e of law in relation to uncontroversally immoral behaviour, for example sexual a buse of children by paedophiles.

It will be recalled from my account of law and justice that in speaking of law i n this context we are referring to state law that has the function of coordinati ng and integrating the inner jural dimensions of external non-state communities, institutions and relations in a jural manner through reharmonising the disrupte d (re-)tributive harmony within the various non-state spheres of life family, ma rriage, business, education, etc. This is accomplished primarily through civil or p rivate law State law, however also binds all individual citizens and institutions within its jurisdiction, internally, into a public community of law through pro moting in a legal fashion their healthy ourishing according to some conception of the common good or public interest. This public law takes many forms. For example , the provision of public health, social welfare, educational bene ts and services and/or the funding of such services can only be implemented through public lega l authorisation (public law). Both public and private law, in their formation an d application, involve a retributive manner of balancing of actually or potentia lly con icting and competing jural interests within both the non-state and the sta te communities. In other words, state law is limited by its characteristic jural aspect to the providing of legal justice. Within the reformational perspective this irreducible jural function is distinct from the characteristically moral fu nction which characterises non-state communities and relationships such as famil ies and bonds of friendship. Hence a state cannot act as a real substitute for m embers of those ethical or morally quali ed communities in respect of theircharact eristic ethical or moral dimensions. That is to say only parents or kin can

love, care for, or nurture their children as parents or kin. Nor can the state o r its law replace the delity or good faith that is a necessary moral constituent of intimate personal relationships. It can, however, within the jural sphere of those relations and communities address the harmful disruption of jural interest s, the injustices, that occur within those communities. As a matter of justice, in the interests of the child and of the general public, parents may rightly be compelled to ful ll their parental (moral) duties, that which is owed in justice t o the child and the community as a whole, for example, the duty to ensure the ch ild is provided with formal education. Not to do so is not merely to be uncaring or unloving it is to in ict harm on the child and the wider society by depriving both of the bene ts of formal schooling. For that reason the state is justi ed in le gal intervention. Similarly, the state cannot in the jural manner of its acting make up for the in delities of human relationships, for lying dishonesty and dislo yalty and lack of good faith, whether it be in arms-length commercial relations or more intimate personal relationships, but it can address the injustices, the jural harm, that results from such immorality and unethical behaviour within its private common law and, in the public interest, promote ethical behaviour. It i s only where there is a gross and fundamental abdication of responsibility withi n a particular social sphere such as the family, or where private business enter prise is unable to meet pressing material needs, that the state is ever justi ed i n establishing by law a state-provided substitute for parents or staterun busine ss as a matter of public justice (in the public interest). Criminal law addresse s itself to jurally harmful behaviour (injustice) the harmful nature of which is regarded as especially serious in both a personal and social sense

owing to its (im)moral dimension. An inveterate liar may do untold (moral) damag e to his and others personal relations. But lying will not attract the attentions of the law unless it expresses itself in the form of fraudulent conduct that da mages the interests of other persons in an unjust fashion. Murder is unlawful an d the perpetrator subject to legally sanctioned punishment, not simply because t he act is immoral, but because he or she caused damage to the jural interests of another. It is, however, the moral quality of the unjust act, the presence of g uilt, fault or blameworthiness accompanying the act, usually, through it having been intentionally carried out, that makes the injustice so serious from the poi nt of view of both the victim and the wider society. For that reason the unjust act is labelled not merely as a wrong committed against another but also as an a ct that is damaging to the interests of society as a whole. Therefore, in the pu blic interest it is subject to criminal law and its penal sanctions and not mere ly to the law of civil wrongs and its civil forms of redress. Civil law, as we h ave seen in the case of contract law, also takes account of the moral character of interpersonal actions by demanding in many instances the ful lment of the oblig ation of good faith understood in its jural (contractual) sense. However, it is the more seriously harmful character of the jural harm caused by human actions s uch as interpersonal violence that differentiates crime from civil wrong and tha t differentiates, for example, criminal fraud from mere civil fraud. The dif culty with actions such as sexual intercourse between adults concerns the question as to whether and to what extent there is jural harm either to the one or both of the sexual actors, and/or to the society at large. Even

nonviolent sexual acts between consenting adults performed in private, if genera lly regarded as deviating from morally normative behaviour for all adult persons , may be viewed as socially harmful if widely practised and if that practice is encouraged by others. The issue then may not be whether or not the law ought to take an interest in such behaviour but concern the appropriate form of its inter vention. For it has been convincingly argued that the harm done to the rights of others through the invasion of privacy may outweigh any social bene t from enforc ing moral behaviour through the criminal law. Perhaps the state ought to promote socially normative sexual behaviour through supporting education programmes? Ho wever, the examples of homosexual acts and abortion are controversial precisely because of the lack of social consensus on the question of the (im)morality of s uch practices and therefore also on the question of the harm to the jural intere sts of individuals and society. Nevertheless, whatever view one takes on the mor ality of such behaviour (state), law can only play a part via the functioning of its jural aspect. The latter addresses itself to the primary issue of justice b y means of its retributive manner of weighing and balancing the jural interests (rights) concerned in the case of abortion, those of the mother, the foetus and the wider community (public interest). How that balance is struck, how those int erests are all taken into account and harmonised will depend upon the particular conception of justice that comes to be expressed in the democratic political pr ocess or through more authoritarian forms of government.Professional Ethics and the Jural Dimension Homosexual acts, as with heterosexual acts, partake of a mor al character because they typically occur within

intimate human relationships that are ethically or morally quali ed. In other word s it is the ethical or moral dimension which characterises that kind of human re lationship though they also display many other aspects. Sexual intercourse for a nimals and humans is a biological act, is founded in the biotic function of anim al and human life. But only for human creatures is it also a moral or ethical ac t, an act that cannot avoid complying with, or contravening, the ethical norms o f care and love. Sex carried out for mere sexual self-grati cation is immoral beca use it displays a lack of care and love for the other person that is a standing obligation for every intimate human relation. But sexually founded relations are not the only kind of ethically quali ed relationships. Friendships also are chara cterised by the mutual love and concern, loyalty and good faith that is required to constitute marriages and families. Indeed, we have seen that even for relati onships and human communities that are not typi ed by their ethical quality, for e xample business or commercial relations, the ethical dimension still has an impo rtant role to play. Good faith, honesty, integrity etc. amongst business people fosters trust and openness in commercial dealings which can only enhance busines s and commerce in the types of human enterprise qualifed by the economic functio n. Moreover, we have seen that, in the same retributive manner that state law se eks in furtherance of the public interest to promote those human relations and c ommunities displaying a typical ethical quali cation discussed above, it also seek s in a retributive manner to promote relations and organisations within the jura l sphere of contractual relations as a response to the calling to do

justice within economic relationships. This positive jural function includes pro moting the ethical dimension of such relationships, etc. through such legal conc epts as good faith. There are however, another kinds of relationships displaying an ethical dimension where the law and the jural aspect have a role to play. Th ese are broadly described as professional relationships. These relationships invol ve the provision of services by those with training and competence to provide th em. The examples of issues and debate within professional ethics provided at the beginning of this essay were taken from the speci c eld of legal ethics. Most of t he following, however, applies to professional ethics in general. The nature of the relationships between doctor and patient, accountant and client, teacher and pupil, or lawyer and client, is such that in order for them to become establish ed as ongoing and successful relationships requires as a necessary constituent t hat there be a relationship of trust and con dence between the parties. Although t he parties to such relationships may also enterinto an economic relationship a c ontract whereby the professional is paid for her service it is the duciary, faith , trusting, or con ding element that characterises the professional relationship i tself. The professional has to be able to completely trust the client, patient, etc. to furnish accurate and truthful information about herself and the matters concerning the service which he or she is to provide. The client, patient etc. m ust be able implicitly, not merely to rely on the technical skills of the profes sional, but also be able to trust the professional to promote and safeguard the interests of the client and to maintain con dentiality in

respect of all information relating to the client. It is the client, patient, et c. who is especially vulnerable in this mutually trusting relationship. This is so because of the harm which he or she may suffer if the professional abuses his or her position of knowledge and expertise by using information and/or economic resources of the vulnerable party acquired in the course of the relationship in order to serve the professional partys own interests or the interests of others. Trust and con dence is what typi es such professional relationships. For that mutua l trusting state of affairs to come into being requires qualities of good faith, trustworthiness, honesty and loyalty as a necessary ethical foundation. Now a c lient or a patient who tells a lie about himself or his affairs to the lawyer or doctor may very well damage the relationship but will rarely damage the interes ts of the professional in any substantial way. In fact such untruthfulness proba bly only affects the ability of the professional to further the best interests o f the client. However, a client or patient is much more vulnerable to harm in a jural sense. A solicitor who misappropriates the funds of his client not only ac ts unethically in an untrustworthy and dishonest manner but has at the same time in icted economic and other harm in a manner that constitutes a substantial injus tice to the client. Whatever may be their motivations, professional organisation s have realised how critical for the existence and continuance of professional r elationships are the ethical obligations that their members owe those whom they serve. Such bodies therefore have their own codes or rules of conduct which cont ain both ethical ideals and aspirations for their member to aspire to and also r ules or duties which, if transgressed by members, entail liability to being subj ected to the professions internal disciplinary processes.

Sanctions such as expulsion from the professional body and the removal of the ri ght to practise in that professional capacity may be imposed. Governments, recog nising that the maintenance of healthy professional relationships is important n ot only for the professions themselves but for particular victims of unethical p rofessional dealings and for the wider society at large, give legal support to t he establishment of professional internal codes of conduct, but also impose addi tional public legal requirements. First, they may mandate that certain professio ns formulate their own code of conduct if they do not already possess one. Secon dly, they may require in the public interest that those codes observe minimum pu blic legal standards in the norms of behaviour they impose on members and in the processes of discipline and sanctioning which they administer. This public law protection is matched by state private law that provides state legal redress for victims of professional misconduct within the professional private relationship over and above any redress that may be available via the internal rule-governed processes of the profession. State provided legal redress is found in the law o f duciaries which is speci cally addressed to such professional and other trust-bas ed relations as well as in the general law of civil obligations (contract, tort, restitution, etc). Applying our perspective developed here and in the earlier e ssay we see state law ful lling its public legal role of binding the internal jura l spheres of nonstate relationships, in this case, relationships quali ed by the d imension of trust or faith, to public legal norms of justice in a retributive ma nner. As in the case of contractual relations the state requires the exercise of good faith within these duciary relationships as a matter of justice (legal moral ity), both in the private sense that requires addressing the injustice as between the parties to the relationship (inter partes), and

also in the communal sense that refers to the general interests of the public co mmunity (the common good). Finally, the state legal regulation of legal ethics wit hin the legal profession is of especial public importance. This is because the s ervice which that profession provides is itself concerned with facilitating acce ss to the bee ts in the form of powers, rights and duties which the state provides in carrying out its jural calling of effecting public justice through its priva te and public law. Conclusion From the biblical truth that God has created a ric hly diverse world which functions in different ways and contains different kinds of things communities and relationships, Christian thought has arrived at an in sight into the diverse irreducible universal dimensions or aspects of human expe rience. The normative quality of this diversity is found in the distinctive norm ative aspects, such as the jural and the ethical, with which we have been primar ily concerned. But we have seen that normative diversity within Creation also di splays itself within each of these dimensions. Thus,within the juraldimension an d its expression in concrete law there is contained an ethical (and an economic, aesthetic, social, historical, etc.) element which always retains its jural sen se of retributive justice. So also in the ethical there is jural element that ne ver loses its ethical sense of caring love or faithfulness. Only from these key biblically grounded insights is it possible to explain the complexities of the r elationships between law and morality, between the jural and ethical aspects and the problems and debates which arise in respect of those

interconnections. The perennial debates over the issues of immoral law, the lega l enforcement of morality and more recently over the place of ethics within the professions will continue to perplex and confuse without a contribution from a C hristian perspective that takes account of these reformational insights. It does not mean that such problems will be easily resolved because they involve comple x and profound considerations that require persevering effort and deep practical wisdom as well as theoretical insight for their practical resolution. More impo rtantly, the radical imperfection of humanity that continues to religiously dire ct its faith towards idols of its own making will ensure that these problems of justice and ethics will persist in the human condition, prevent clear insight in to their nature and impede their removal from human experience. Ultimately, it i s only the transcending spiritual power of the One True God, redemptively reveal ed in Jesus Christ, and working through the obedient faith of those who choose t o follow Christ that will nally overcome injustice and immorality in human life. Human temporal law is a limited means for achieving that end in a fallen world, but its effectiveness is dependent upon the Spirit which gives it life. This obs ervation is not the mere statement of a utopian aspiration but in the case of We stern legal traditions, is justi ed by historical fact. The undoubted bene ts which Western law has contributed to peace and justice in international relations and to the internal peace, justice and good order of individual states could not hav e been realised without the establishment of the Christian faith and its outwork ing in the concepts and institutions of the law