Nuclear Engineering and Design 240 (2010) 16991706

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Nuclear Engineering and Design

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Spent fuel transport cask thermal evaluation under normal and accident conditions
G. Pugliese, R. Lo Frano , G. Forasassi
Department of Mechanical, Nuclear and Production Engineering, University of Pisa, Via Diotisalvi, n 2-56126 Pisa, Italy

a r t i c l e

i n f o

a b s t r a c t
The casks used for transport of nuclear materials, especially the spent fuel element (SPE), must be designed according to rigorous acceptance criteria and standards requirements, e.g. the International Atomic Energy Agency ones, in order to provide protection to people and environment against radiation exposure particularly in a severe accident scenario. The aim of this work was the evaluation of the integrity of a spent fuel cask under both normal and accident scenarios transport conditions, such as impact and rigorous re events, in according to the IAEA accident test requirements. The thermal behaviour and the temperatures distribution of a Light Water Reactor (LWR) spent fuel transport cask are presented in this paper, especially with reference to the Italian cask designed by AGN, which was characterized by a cylindrical body, with water or air inside the internal cavity, and two lateral shock absorbers. Using the nite element code ANSYS a series of thermal analyses (steady-state and transient thermal analyses) were carried out in order to obtain the maximum fuel temperature and the temperatures eld in the body of the cask, both in normal and in accidents scenario, considering all the heat transfer modes between the cask and the external environment (re in the test or air in the normal conditions) as well as inside the cask itself. In order to follow the standards requirements, the thermal analyses in accidents scenarios were also performed adopting a deformed shape of the shock absorbers to simulate the mechanical effects of a previous IAEA 9 m drop test event. Impact tests on scale models of the shock absorbers have already been conducted in the past at the Department of Mechanical, Nuclear and Production Engineering, University of Pisa, in the 80s. The obtained results, used for possible new licensing approval purposes by the Italian competent Authority of the cask for PWR spent fuel cask transport by the Italian competent Authority, are discussed. 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Article history: Received 7 October 2009 Received in revised form 11 February 2010 Accepted 23 February 2010

1. Introduction The perspective of a worldwide nuclear renaissance for electricity production, is also related to the nuclear spent fuel issues in terms of both short- and long-term management. Nevertheless the problem of how to manage spent fuel in the interim, before a permanent solution is agreed upon, is widely discussed in all countries that use nuclear power for the reason that it is important to understand all the issues involved in spent fuel storage and transportation to make the best choices possible. Moreover nuclear power generation is recommended as a promising way to contribute to long-term energy supply and as a measure against global warming. In this context, waiting for the future deployment of the today under development Generation IV reactors projects, as well as of a closed fuel cycle, the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) represents an open

issue to be explored thoroughly the used uranium fuel is widely referred in literature to as spent fuel. Spent nuclear fuel is the nuclear fuel that has been irradiated in a nuclear reactor during the operation of nuclear power plants (NPP) to the point where it is no longer useful in sustaining a nuclear reaction. Historically, the generated spent nuclear fuel is designated as useful recyclable energy resource. SNF shall be properly stored until the reprocessing, that allows to chemically separate the valuable material, such as uranium or plutonium, from the waste, was done. Moreover intermediate storage of spent fuel is important as a means for contributing to the exible operation of the overall nuclear fuel cycle. In fact the design of the packaging system is strictly related to the need to protect the population and environment from exposure to the radiation emitted by the radioactive materials contained in the spent fuel. Therefore a cask packaging system must ensure that: The spent fuel remains contained even under severe accident conditions;

Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 050 2218093; fax: +39 050 2218065. E-mail address: rosa.lofrano@ing.unipi.it (R.L. Frano). 0029-5493/$ see front matter 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.nucengdes.2010.02.033

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Nomenclature AGN FEM IAEA NPP SNF SPE PWR TE Agip nuclear nite element method International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear power plant spent nuclear fuel spent fuel element pressurized water reactor environmental temperature

The radiation levels at the surface of the container during normal transport and under accident conditions are low; The transported spent fuel cannot accidentally undergo a nuclear ssion reaction. The use of a spent fuel packaging system, designed according to rigorous acceptance criteria and standards requirements, e.g. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ones (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2005), is also required to allow the transportation of SNF inside and away from the NPP site. This paper is intended to evaluate the long-term integrity of metal canister and actual materials (ensuring their safety functions), which characterize the spent fuel casks, as well as to assess the potential damage, if any, to the various components that may comprise the cask itself, under both normal transport condition and accident scenarios (Rains, 1999; Lee et al., 2004), such as impact and rigorous re events (Chun and Ryu, 2000) in according with the mentioned IAEA cask transport packaging test requirements and recommendations (that also serves as the worlds principal intergovernmental forum for scientic and technical cooperation in the nuclear eld). Moreover the thermal effects on the deformed shape of the spent nuclear fuel packaging subsequent to a free drop (or impact) were also investigated and analyzed. 2. Description of a cask packaging system International requirements regulate commercial nuclear power reactors, non-power application of radioisotope research, fuel cycle facilities as well as the design, manufacture, use and rules governing and instructions of the packaging for a low/high-level radioactive nuclear materials. The basic criteria for packages for shipping high-level nuclear materials and spent fuel originated in 1946 and were based on the National Academy of Sciences recommendations, which represented a guidance for manufacture of the early shipping casks for spent fuel, and have been adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In according with this regulatory requirement, nuclear power plants store spent fuel in enclosed typical container, referred to as a cask (cooling pools and, in some cases, in dry storage casks), to await shipment to a temporary storage or permanent disposal facility. Nuclear waste containers or packaging systems are an important factor in the design, cost and safe operation of nuclear waste repositories (Kar et al., 2008). Spent nuclear fuel refers to uraniumbearing fuel elements that have been used in nuclear reactors and that are no longer producing enough energy to sustain a nuclear reaction. The spent fuel assemblies are, however, able to generate signicant amounts of radiation and heat; for this reason spent fuel must be shipped in containers or casks that shield and contain the radioactivity and dissipate the heat. In NPP spent fuel is stored in enclosed cooling pools and, in some cases, in dry storage casks to await shipment to a tempo-

Fig. 1. Spent fuel packaging scheme.

rary storage, permanent disposal facility or reprocessing facility. An essential component for any safe transportation is a robust spent fuel container, or cask, an example of which is shown in Fig. 1 (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2003). Prior to transportation, SNF is handled from its temporary disposal pool and accommodated in a canister of stainless steel. The canister (weld-sealed or open) is put into a cask. The sealing performance (if needed) of the canister has to be sustained during the interim storage period. The cask (Fig. 1) is typically constituted of a steel cylinder body with either welded or bolted closure ends. The steel cylinder provides a leak-tight containment of the spent fuel. Inside the cask cavity, the fuel basket locates and supports the tubes of corrosion resistant material, being adapted to contain the spent nuclear fuel rod assemblies, in xed positions. The basket (horizontally or vertically oriented depending on the cask design) is surrounded by the inner steel shell/cylinder, the additional concrete, the outer steel shell in order to provide adequate radiation shielding to workers and members of the public. Moreover pressurized helium gas is, generally, used inside the cask to promote heat removal from the fuel assemblies to the cask wall, while air on the outside removes the heat. Due to the radioactive characteristics of stored spent fuel, the cask shall provide enough shielding to reduce external radiation to low carried out acceptable levels, according to the radiation standards during transport (in general the transport must be safely in large, heavy containers that shield the public from exposure). In addition one of the most important objective for a spent nuclear transportation cask design is to remove decay heat from the fuel array and maintain the peak cladding temperature below the design limits (Lee et al., 2009). Due to the fact that this limit temperature is usually not accessible to measurement, the design limit of cask depends and must be below the materials melting point. Standards requirements cover both normal transport condition and accidents scenarios such as impact tests and severe re event. The spent fuel storage and transport cask must therefore withstand various accident conditions involving impact, puncture, re, and submersion (Lee et al., 2004). To reduce the effects of the impact the SNF casks are normally encased in energy absorbing structures or protected by suitable impact limiters. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cask transport packaging test requirements include a 9 m (30 feet) drop onto a at unyielding surface and subsequent full exposure to an engulng re for 30 min (re test) or to an environment at 800 C temperature for a numerical simulation or for a furnace test. This paper deals with a cask, designed in Italy by AGN (Fig. 2) consisting of a cylindrical body, horizontally oriented during the

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Fig. 2. AGN-1 cask scheme.

transportation, with water or air in the internal cavity of the cask, i.e. the primary cooling system, in which the fuel element baskets are inserted. This cask had been certied after the mentioned IAEA regulation for LWR spent fuel transport in the 80s (Aquaro and Forasassi, 1983). The AGN-1 cask conguration, like shown in Fig. 2, is a multibarrier connement and containment system, having 54 t of weight, 4 m length and a maximum diameter of 1.5 m. It is characterized by a main body of carbon steel, internally and externally coated with a stainless steel liner. Two shock absorbers (or impact lim-

iters) of stainless steel with elliptical shape, situated at the sides of the body allow to reduce the mechanical effects of possible impacts, in the event of an accident. In fact these limiters might crush, absorbing impact forces and protecting the container and its cargo. The external cask surface is also characterized by an extensive cooling ns distribution which allow to increase the heat transfer capability and to enlarge the heat exchanger surfaces (secondary cooling system). Moreover a liquid shielding barrier is located in the gap between the cask body and the cooling ns.

Fig. 3. AGN-1 FEM models without air/water (a), and with air/water in not deformed (b) and deformed (c) cask shapes.

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The fuel elements are stored inside stainless steel sealed baskets containing water. Afterwards the fuel baskets, containing the SNF rod assemblies, are correctly inserted inside the cask internal cavity in xed positions, passing through appropriate canister channels. In this investigation, the thermal behaviour and the distribution of the temperature of the AGN-1 PWR spent fuel transport cask, evaluated both in mentioned (normal and accident) conditions according to the IAEA accident test requirements, are presented.

3. Thermal analysis methodology From the time the spent nuclear fuel elements are loaded into the cask until the end of the temporary storage, the container material is subjected to irradiation mainly due to s, temperature and pressure excursions, potential pyrophoric hazard and corrosive environments, etc.; an adequate design of the packaging is required. Therefore complex physical phenomena should be considered to accurately describe the temporary storage and transportation conditions. In this paper the structural effects and thermal performances of the AGN-1 cask, under the normal and hypothetical accident conditions of transport, were evaluated adopting a numerical approach in order to verify the cask capability to withstand the considered transport conditions without damages on the considered packaging system. In addition it was veried the decay heat removal was ensured, so that the temperatures of the spent fuel and of cask components remained within the allowable limits (e.g. the temperature of cladding oxidation).

Fig. 4. AGN-1 detailed cask scheme.

3.1. AGN-1 FEM model description In the present paper a deterministic approach was used to evaluate the thermal analysis effects, performed for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions. To attain the intent both steady-state and transient thermal analyses, considering also the maximum spent fuel decay heat load approved for this cask design, were carried out. The nite element code ANSYS was used in order to determine the temperature distribution which might arise in the event of re. The rst task in the adopted methodological approach was, therefore, the setting up and the implementation of a suitable 3-D nite element model, representing, in as much detailed as possible, the real and complex geometry of the AGN-1 packaging system. The set up AGN-1 cask model was characterized by double symmetry (transversal and longitudinal one). In Fig. 3(a) it was clearly represented the FEM model of AGN-1 cask with all the previously described internal and external structures, such as the fuel basket, the closure lid, etc., without the air or water inventory. In the shown model also the basket components, consisting of the basket elements, the connecting components (i.e. separation grids), the handling elements, etc. were implemented. Moreover in Fig. 3(b) and (c) it was shown the same model, implemented for both not deformed and deformed shock absorbers shapes/characteristics, with the air or water inventory. In order to achieve a reduction of the computational time it was assumed to neglect the geometrical differences between the closure lid and the bottom of the cask cavity, as it is represented in Fig. 4. Solid and thick shell thermal elements type were chosen in order to simulate all heat transfer mechanisms inside the cask and between the cask itself and the environment. The fuel elements, 28 cruciform specimen inside each basket, were assumed as thin cylindrical elements, like represented in Fig. 5. The AGN-1 FEM model elements number, equal about to 135,000, was found appropriate to achieve the needed accuracy required by the analyses.
Fig. 5. Spent fuel elements components inside the AGN-1 cask FEM model.

The carried out thermal analyses were considered as a support for the new licensing approval by the Italian competent Authority of the cask for PWR spent fuel transport. To match this intent, several important features were taken into account to attain thermal cask performances of the cask, like the following: The package geometry and materials; The structural and mechanical features that may affect heat transfer, such as cooling ns, insulating materials, surface conditions of the package components, and gaps or physical contacts between internal components. According to the storage concept, the heat decay of the spent fuels is removed through canister walls by dry/wet cooling; longterm integrity of the cask components must be therefore ensured and, in particular, the cask must have sufcient heat removal performance. The simulated thermal behaviour of cask was studied assuming that all the AGN-1 cask components, such as the canister or the basket, etc., were exposed to various temperature conditions depending on decay heat during the storage period (Huang, 1996). Moreover both the wet and dry fuel storage, inside the cask cavity, were analyzed; in the case of dry storage design the dissipation of the residual heat, generated by the stored spent fuel elements themselves, was one of the main safety thermal issues for licensing. Actually, in the dry or wet storage systems, the cask might act as the nal barrier to encapsulate spent fuels and radioactive materials. In what follows steady-state and transient analyses, according to the IAEA requirements, are reported and analysed, highlighting

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the cooling down conditions of the cask after the re event for a time long enough to achieve again the steady-state condition. Afterwards the methodological approach may be summarized in the following several important steps: Appropriate nite element modelling of packaging components with their real geometry and temperature-dependent material characteristics (models previously shown in Fig. 3(b) and (c) representing the pre- and post-impact test congurations, respectively indicative of the normal and accident condition transportations); Assumptions in representing heat sources, heat transfer paths and modes and thermal properties for the package materials; Setting up of suitable expressions for the conductive, the convective and the radiation heat transfer modes among the package components as well as the thermal boundary conditions; Evaluation of structural and thermal effects under normal conditions and accident conditions transportation (without and with deformed shock absorber shape); The heat transfer process in the cask is very complicated as a consequence of the inherent complex cask geometry and of the induced convection processes, which is dependent on the spent fuel decay heat, the thermal boundary condition, the orientation of the cask, etc. (Heng et al., 2002). Therefore to determine in a detailed and realistic way, the cask thermal performance, all heat transfer modes (conductive, convective and radiation ones) and thermal loads were taken into account, in the carried out thermal analyses, by means of adequate values and hypotheses, considering that: 1. The conductive coefcient values were consistent with the cask material properties and temperature; 2. The convective coefcient values were considered negligible for air or water, in the hypothesis of the absence of uid turbulence inside the cask, while those ones representative of heat transfer mode between the impact limiters-cask or the cooling ns surfaces and the external environment were assumed in according respectively with Eqs. (1) and (2) (experimental correlation) (Agip Nucleare, 1982): hf 1 = 1.23 ( t )
1/3 1/3

Table 1 Thermal analyses results (TE = 38 C) with not deformed cask shape. Item Maximum temperature [ C] Wet storage Impact limiter Overpack (outside) Gasket Overpack (inside) Canister Fuel rod 77 79 77 79 81 81 Dry storage 77 77 78 79 88 88

mental temperatures (TE ) of 10 C, 0 C and 38 C, even if in this study only the normal (38 C) and accident conditions are analyzed and discussed (some results of which are summarized in Table 1). Moreover, in Figs. 6 and 7 the obtained cask temperature distributions, considering an environmental temperature of 38 C, for dry and wet transportations, are shown. The obtained results highlighted that the maximum values of temperature are located in correspondence of the fuel elements basket and of the cooling ns. Moreover it was observed that, even if the results seemed quite similar, the wet transport condition allowed to obtain lower temperature values. The shown results highlighted, in fact, that the dry transport condition in respect to the wet one resulted in a more overheated basket components with fuel temperature values equal to about 88 C. It is important to note that the temperature propagation inside the cask, between the fuel basket and the outer steel shell, seemed to be mainly inuenced by the convection mode. Anyway in all the considered transport cases the safety of cask components is ensured. 3.3. Evaluation of thermal effects on the cask under accident transport conditions To determine the potential damage to the various components that might compromise the cask integrity deformed shock absorber congurations (after drop test) were implemented and assumed in the numerical simulations. In order to follow the standards requirements, preliminary thermal analyses in accidents scenarios were performed adopting a deformed shape of the shock absorbers, in order to simulate the mechanical effects of the previous mentioned IAEA 9 m drop test event and a 30 min re exposure (event characterized by a re temperature equal to 800 C with an emissivity of 0.9 and a cask adsorbivity equal to 0.8).

[W/m2 C] [W/m C]
2

(1) (2)

hf 2 = 0.835 ( t )

3. The uid region was characterized by conduction and radiation modes; 4. The radiation heat transfer mode was assumed to be characterized by an emissivity values equal to 0.5 and 0.8, respectively for normal and accident transport conditions, for the cask components; 5. The heat ux values were conservatively determined assuming that the solar irradiation on the external cask surface (in agreement with IAEA rules) was maximum, for a time period equal to 12 h. 6. The residual heat power decay of each fuel element, at the maximum burn up level, was assumed equal to 36.5 W. 3.2. Evaluation of thermal effects on the cask under normal transport conditions The implemented packaging model was rstly analysed assuming a steady-state thermal condition. In particular, the structural integrity for normal cask transportation was evaluated considering the internal heat loads as well as the thermal boundary conditions due to environment temperature. The numerical simulations were performed in order to evaluate the effects of a normal transport of the cask exposed to environ-

Fig. 6. AGN-1 temperature distributions for normal (38 C) dry transport.

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Fig. 7. AGN-1 temperature distributions for normal (38 C) wet transport.

The prescribed hypothetical sequence of accidents, fully engulfing pool re lasting 30 min with ame temperature no less than 800 C is designed to be more severe than 99% of all transportation accidents, and is assumed to conservatively bound all credible accident scenarios in the transport of spent nuclear fuel. Moreover a total leakage of the liquid shielding barrier contained in the gap between the cask body and the cooling ns is assumed as a consequence of the impact. The deformed cask shape adopted to perform the accident analysis is obtained from the actual carried out impact tests performed on the AGN-1 cask. These tests on scale models of the shock absorbers have already been conducted in the past (80s) at the University of Pisa (Fig. 8) (Aquaro and Forasassi, 1983). Therefore the transient thermal analyses were carried out on an appropriate deformed cask FEM model (for both dry and wet conditions), reproducing the maximum registered shock absorbers deformation in order to evaluate the thermal stresses and temperature behaviours, which can occur either during or after the re. Furthermore solar heat ux was also considered in the performed analyses, applied with 400 W/m2 , 800 W/m2 and 200 W/m2 for 12 h per day, respectively, for curved, horizontal and vertical surfaces (IAEA Safety Series TS-R-1, 2005). It is worthy to note that the cask steady-state temperature eld, preliminarily obtained assuming a deformed shock absorbers shape at an environmental temperature of 38 C, was used as input initial

Fig. 9. AGN-1 steady-state temperature eld at an environmental temperature of 38 C with cask deformed shape.

condition in the transient thermal analyses to evaluate the temperature distribution inside and along the cask in the re accident events condition (Fig. 9). Moreover in Tables 2 and 3, the temperature values, up to 0.5 h later the occurrence of the re event was also summarized. A further evaluation of the cask cooling down condition, in terms of temperature distributions, up to 3 h later the occurrence of the
Table 2 Thermal analyses results (TE = 800 C) with not deformed cask shape. Item Maximum temperature [ C] Wet storage Impact limiter Overpack (outside) Gasket Overpack (inside) Canister Fuel rod 701 630 124 104 90 81 Dry storage 701 630 124 106 92 88

Fig. 8. Vertical and lateral AGN-1 drop test.

G. Pugliese et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 240 (2010) 16991706 Table 3 Thermal analyses results (TE = 800 C) with deformed cask shape. Item Maximum temperature [ C] Wet storage Impact limiter Overpack (outside) Gasket Overpack (inside) Canister Fuel rod 701 631 128 108 95 84 Dry storage 702 631 129 97 90 89

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re event was also carried out. The obtained results are represented in the following gures, only for the dry transport condition. In Fig. 10, the temperature behaviour after half an hour of re exposure in agreement with the IAEA rules is shown. Although the exposure for 30 min at 800 C the temperature distribution inside the cask was evaluated to be about 8 times lower than the external ones. The maximum temperature value experienced by the fuel basket resulted to be lower than the one at which SNF cladding loss its integrity (593740 C) and, hence, not enough to determine

Fig. 11. AGN-1 temperature distribution post-accident condition.

severe structural damages. Moreover the temperature reached by the closure lid in correspondence of the sealing during the accident sequence was calculated and resulted equal to about 176 C and therefore no sufcient to attain a reduction of bearing and sealing capability of the seals themselves due to their characteristics. Fig. 11 represents the temperature distribution calculated 3 h after the accident event. It is possible to observe an overall reduction of the temperature values on the external cask surfaces due to the cooling condition operated by the external air. Otherwise the inner packaging system components suffer a lower increase of the temperature; in fact the high thermal inertia does not allow to dissipate, in the considered lasting time, the heat absorbed during the re exposure. Reviewing the obtained temperature values, it possible to remark that the cask packaging system and all its internal components resulted to be safely maintained within their minimum and maximum temperature criteria, for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, and support the performance of the intended safety function. 3.4. Validation of thermal analyses The need of a numerical approach validation was felt necessary in order to take into account the uncertainties that unavoidably affects the analyses, due to the assumed input parameters and the approximations introduced in setting up FEM models. To attain the intent, the same AGN cask structure was also implemented with FLUENT code (ANSYS FLUENT , 2003) at the University of Pisa, preserving the material properties, boundary conditions and the heat transfer modes. FLUENT code was chosen because it is generally used to perform thermal-uid ow analysis and solve problems with a variety turbulence, radiation, and heat transfer models, including ows in complex geometries. The validation analysis was hence carried out with the intent to point out and demonstrate the reliability and performance/accuracy of the adopted ANSYS code (ANSYS Software, 2007) to correctly represent the thermal heat transfer modes. The comparison among the obtained results in terms of temperature, in the case of cask in the re accident events condition, up to 0.5 h later the occurrence of the re event, highlighted a discrepancy less than 3% (as visible in Fig. 12) demonstrating the accuracy of modelling and the insensitivity of the model in respect to the code used to perform the transient thermal analyses.

Fig. 10. AGN-1 temperature distributions in the cask (a) and in the fuel rods (b) for accident condition after half an hour of re exposure.

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Fig. 12. Comparison between temperature distribution up to 0.5 h after the beginning of re event.

Considering that in the analyzed thermal scenarios the decay heat removal systems were passive, the maximum carried out temperature values were lower than the allowable limits for cask packaging system components (i.e. the fuel cladding temperature should also generally be maintained below 570 C for short-term off-normal, short-term accident, and fuel transfer operations (e.g., vacuum drying of the cask or dry transfer (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2000)) ensuring, therefore, the integrity of the considered packaging system. 4. Conclusion Numerical thermal analyses of a packaging system were carried, with reference to the Italian AGN-1 PWR spent nuclear fuel one in order to support the requirements of the a possible new licensing by the Competent Authority. Adopting a numerical approach the relevant heat transfer mechanisms between the spent nuclear elements inside the body and the external environment (re in the test or air at 38 C in the normal conditions) were analysed. Therefore a series of steady-state and transient analyses were performed taking into account all the heat transfer modes between the cask and the environment and inside the cask itself were taken into account. In order to follow the standards requirements, the thermal analyses in accidents scenarios were performed adopting a deformed shape of the shock absorbers to simulate the mechanical effects of a previous IAEA 9 m drop test. The obtained results for the normal transport condition case highlighted that the maximum values of temperature, located in correspondence of the fuel elements basket and of the cooling ns, are not enough to determine structural damage of the cask. As for the accident scenario it was observed that the high thermal inertia of the packaging system does not allow to reach relevant temperatures in the AGN-1 cask cavity also considering 30 min of re exposure. The post-accident analyses results, after 3 h of cooling down condition in air at 38 C, highlighted that only the outer parts of the cask have dissipated the heat absorbed during the re exposure, due to the cask thermal inertia in the heat transfer processes. In addition it was also demonstrated the capability of ANSYS program to manage heat transfer processes and loads coupled to complex geometry and various materials, in order to attain useful information to support the structural analysis, as well as the reliability of adopted ANSYS code.

Finally, the performed thermal analyses on AGN-1 cask system indicated that thermal damages are avoided because the temperature experienced by the internal cask components, during the simulated engulng re event, were about 120 C for the gasket and about 90 C for the fuel canister and rods and well below the cladding limit temperature, which is equal to about 570 C. Consequently the AGN-1 cask design provided reasonable assurance of adequate protection to people and environment against radiation exposure and possible leakage during transport. Acknowledgments The authors would thank Dr. N Forgione (University of Pisa) to kindly supply Fluent thermal analysis results, which were used in the present work to validate the cask packaging system thermal analysis methodological approach. References
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