SECURITY SECTOR REFORM FOR EFFECTIVE SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE Carolina G.

Hernandez, PhD

Introduction The Philippine Army (PA) has embarked on an exciting journey to improve its delivery of security to the people and the state within the framework of the countrys current Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan (IPSP). Aware of the need for change in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in general and in the Army in particular (as one of the AFPs three major service commands), the PA adopted its Army Transformation Roadmap 2028 (ATR) for the period 2010 to 2028. Consisting of three key components, the ATR envisions a transformed PA that would become a more capable, responsive, reliable, and professional Army committed to its mandate.1 The ATRs key components are the Army Governance Charter which defines the PAs strategic direction during 2010-2028, the Army Strategy Map which contains the strategy and approaches in order to realize its vision, and the CGPA Performance Governance Scorecard which translates the broad objectives into measurable items and actionable details to facilitate strategy execution, monitoring, and review.2 Now in its third year, the ATR is assisted by a Multi-Sectoral Advisory Board (MSAB) whose membership includes a diverse group of individuals from academe, business, government, and the broader civil society. The sincerity and commitment to the realization of the ATR among those behind it cannot be faulted. However, it is incumbent on those who are in the MSAB to share their understanding of concepts, ideas, variables, etc., that might have important implications for the realization of the ATR. This article is a modest contribution towards this end. Origins and Development of Security Sector Reform Security sector reform (SSR) gained its currency with the end of the Cold War on the one hand, and a desire on the part of official development assistance (ODA) donors to make their funding

1

. Philippine Army Headquarters, Army Transformation Roadmap 2028 Booklet (Metro Manila: Fort Andres Bonifacio, 2011), p. 3., 2 Ibid.

assistance more effective in recipient countries. One other way of framing aid effectiveness is in terms of achieving sustainable development within the context of peace at home and abroad. ODA donors needed a more effective governance tool to achieve this purpose. This marked the beginning of donors realization that security and development are intimately connected, nay, they are two sides of the coin of human well being.3 The end of the Cold War provided an opportunity to re-examine security beyond its former operational meaning of military defense from external armed attack, a state-centric view of security. This changed strategic environment led to the rise of alternative meanings of security including its comprehensive meaning as previously already understood in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan.4 Comprehensive security remains firmly state-centric up to the present. At the same time, donors in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted their guidelines in extending assistance to recipient countries to include market liberalization, democracy, human rights, sustainable development, reasonable levels of military expenditures (Milex), non-production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).5 In 1994, the erstwhile state-centric view of security was challenged by the concept of human security understood originally as freedom from fear and freedom from want.6 Henceforth, states needed to consider the security of individuals whether as citizens, ethnic groups, or even subjects in their consideration of state or regime security. The rise of challenges to the traditional interpretation of sovereignty in the form of the responsibility to protect (R2P or

This framing of the relationship between security and development can be seen in Carolina G. Hernandez, Linking Development and Security in Southeast Asia: A Concept Paper, in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Philippines, Occasional Papers: Southeast Asia: Security and Stability (Manila: KAS Philippines, n.d., but most likely ca 1996-97), pp. 33-47. This concept paper became the basis of a CIDA-funded project whose output was published in 3 volumes as David B. Dewitt and Carolina G. Hernandez, editors, Development and Security in Southeast Asia (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2003). 4 See among others, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), The Concept of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security (Kuala Lumpur: CSCAP Secretariat, December 1995); Muthiah Alagappa, Comprehensive Security Interpretations in ASEAN Countries, in Robert A. Scalapino, et al., editors, Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988); Jessica Tuchman Matthews, Redefining Security. Foreign Affairs, 68, no. 2 (1989): 162-177; Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Herfordshire, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 5 Collectively framed as principles of good governance, these norms to guide ODA were adopted during the OECDs London Summit in 1991. 6 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

Rto P) is a logical next step to human security.7The notion of human security has also since expanded to include new elements such as freedom from humiliation8 and/or freedom to live in dignity. These developments occurred simultaneously with the perceived triumph of the liberal democratic model of governance9 that inspired the formulation and implementation of SSR in the former authoritarian states in Central and Eastern Europe. In the area of political governance, SSR emerged from the post-authoritarian principle of democratic civil-military relations (CMR) or democratic control of armed forces (DCAF). The development from democratic CMR to SSR was informed by the experiences in the transition countries that democratic control of armed forces while necessary in the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule is not sufficient to deliver good (democratic) security sector governance. In Africa, it was understood that the provision of development assistance without regard to the proper governance of the security sector would not result in sustainable development. Thus, donors like the United Kingdom (UK), through its Department for International Development (DFID) framed development assistance in recipient African countries within the concept of security sector reform. It is for these twin reasons why SSR gained currency in Central and Eastern Europe and Africa ahead of other places in the world. The Meaning and Scope of Security Sector Reform At present there are many meanings attached to the concept of SSR and these are related to the scope of the security sector as understood by different actors; generally speaking, SSR is closely related to how the security sector is framed. In this regard, what belongs to a countrys security sector can be seen within a range that includes practically every actor that has to do with the delivery of security broadly defined to one that only includes the statutory armed services of

Originally mooted by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December 2001, R2P was unanimously adopted at the 2005 World Summit by the international community in its Outcome Document and unanimously reaffirmed twice by the UN Security Council through Resolution Nos. 1674 and 1894 in 2006 and 2009,respectively. 8 For this expanded framing of human security, see the Philippine Human Development Report 2005 (Manila: Human Development Network, 2005), pp 1-2. 9 A key inspiration is Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

security forces.10 The main assumption behind SSR is the recognition that the security sector is deficient if not entirely dysfunctional. In this sense, the ATR shares this assumption in that it starts with the recognition of the need for change because of deficiencies in the PA. The term SSR first gained official attention in a 1998 speech by the UKs Minister for International Development. Clare Short framed it as a plethora of issues and activities related to the reform of the elements of the public sector charged with the provision of internal and external security.11 This is probably the origin of the notion that SSR is a whole-of-government responsibility. Later on, DFID defined SSR as the transformation of the security system which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions so that it is managed and operated in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.12 Both definitions view the security sector as consisting of actors beyond the statutory armed services (sometimes called statutory security forces that include primarily the military, the police, paramilitary forces, the military and police intelligence services). In short, in these definitions, the security sector is constituted by not only the military and the police forces, but also presumably by those in the public sector that have a role to play in the provision of security. This suggests that the sector includes government oversight institutions with operational and administrative oversight functions over the security forces. When applied to the Philippines, the security sector includes all the statutory armed services, intelligence services, oversight bodies in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, as well as independent constitutional bodies such as the Commission on Human Rights and Commission on Audit, as well as special bodies to ensure accountability and transparency such as the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan. However, aware that the provision of security to the people and the state is the responsibility of the entire society, the project that sought to develop a security sector reform

10

A summary of these views on the constituent elements of the security sector can be found in Table 1 of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) publication, Developing a Security Sector Reform Index in the Philippines Towards Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building (Quezon City: ISDS, UNDP, OPAPP, 2009), p. 9. 11 Heiner Hanggi, Conceptualizing Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction, in Allan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi, editors, Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector (Geneva: DCAF, 2004), p. 4. 12 Heiner Hanggi, Making Sense of Security Sector Governance, in Heiner Hanggi and Theoor H. Winkler, editors, Challenges of Security Sector Governance (Geneva: DCAF), p. 30.

index (SSRI Project) for the Philippines adopted what it calls a middle-range approach through an expanded definition of the security sector to include all of the above as well as nongovernmental bodies such as academe, investigative media, human rights and peace advocacy groups which can play very useful oversight functions over the security forces as well as civilian oversight institutions themselves.13 Thus, the SSRI Project urges a whole-of-society approach to SSR. Security sector reform is generally understood as the entire gamut of changes that need to take place in the various constituent elements of the security sector to ensure the efficient and effective delivery of security to the state and the people. In this sense, reform in only one constituent element will not yield an improvement in the delivery of security. Neither will it result in good security sector governance in the absence of democratic governance principles. Mere efficiency in service delivery only means the prudent and most economical way of service delivery. To be efficient can also mean to be ruthless, brutal, and unmindful of the rule of law. This does not necessarily result in effective service delivery since those who experience ruthlessness, brutality, and similar manner of service delivery would not have a stake in the service delivered. In other words, it would be difficult to win the hearts and minds of the people if the delivery of security is only efficient. Thus, in the SSR narrative, advocates have added effectiveness to efficiency. And effectiveness has come to mean good democratic governance where the values of accountability, transparency, responsibility, responsiveness, and participation are present. When these values are observed, then it is easier to achieve the buy-in of the people who then become stakeholders in the achievement of sustainable security, peace, and development. Security Sector Reform and Effective Security Sector Governance While intimately connected, security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG) are not the same. In a forthcoming publication, it was argued that governance refers to the wide arena of philosophical and ideological underpinnings, as well as a whole system of structures, actors, processes, and functions by which a particular unit such as a government agency or the state itself is managed[while reform]refers to the process of changing an existing reality

13

ISDS, Developing a Security Sector Reform Index in the Philippines Towards Conflict Prevention and PeaceBuilding, pp.17-31.

whether a condition or a set of conditions, or agencies/institutions presumably by ensuring more effective and efficient delivery of the good or service for which it was originally intended.14 Thus, SSR is necessary to achieve good (democratic) SSG in the sense that the efficient delivery of security to the state and the people must be coupled with effectiveness. It is therefore not enough to undertake reform, it is also important to ensure that there is good governance to achieve sustainable peace and development. It is not enough to reform one constituent element of the security sector, it is important for SSR to become a whole-of-society undertaking. It is within this context that the ATR needs to be situated. The Philippine Army Transformation Roadmap and Effective Security Sector Governance From the foregoing, it is clear that reforming only the PA can be seriously problematic if one seeks to achieve sustainable peace and development, a goal that the IPSP Bayanihan seeks. Many conversations in SSR circles in the Philippines appear to limit the scope of the security sector only to the military, or only to the statutory security forces as a whole. In the case of the ATR, it is limited to the PA. The questions that can be raised in this regard include the following: Does SSR also take place in the two other major service commands of the AFP? What about in the other constituent elements of the Philippine security sector, particularly in the oversight institutions that are found in the three branches of government? In the independent constitutional and special bodies? In academic circles that are involved in so-called SSR programs of various government agencies and non-governmental bodies? In the countrys investigative media? Are they governed according to the values of good (democratic) governance? Do SSR advocates pass the test of good democratic behavior in their public and private capacities? There is indeed much merit in the integrity of both the singer and the song to be appreciated and emulated. There is a tremendous political risk embedded in a situation where only one actor is seriously undertaking some kind of SSR, such as that seen in the commendable ATR, while other key security sector actors and constituents are not similarly reforming, or if they continue to conduct business as usual. That is why SSR needs to be understood beyond a whole-ofgovernment undertaking; of necessity, it has to be a whole-of-society responsibility.

14

Carolina G. Hernandez, Peacebuilding and Security Sector Governance in the Philippines, in Yuji Uesugi, editor, Peacebuilding and Security Sector Governance in Asia (Geneva: DCAF, forthcoming 2013).