Section 14 Article 3 PH Constitution

No person shall be held to answer of a criminal offense without due process of law. In all criminal prosecutions, 1) the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, 2) and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, 3) to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 4) to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, 5) to meet the witnesses face to face 6) and to have a compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

As to the extent of the privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the English text of the Jones Law, which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This text is not limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." Moreover, as we are concerned with a principle contained both in the Federal constitution and in the constitutions of several states of the United States, but expressed differently, we should take it that these various phrasings have a common conception. In the interpretation of the principle, nothing turns upon the variations of wording in the constitutional clauses; this much is conceded (ante, par. 2252). It is therefore immaterial that the witness is protected by one constitution from 'testifying', or by another from 'furnishing evidence', or by another from 'giving evidence,' or by still another from 'being a witness.' These various phrasings have a common conception, in respect to the form of the protected disclosure. What is that conception? (4 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 863, 1923 ed.) As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence obscure, that is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret. (28 R. C. L., paragraph 20, page 434 and notes.) (Emphasis ours.) ISSUE:

BELTRAN vs. SAMSON

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58. Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether the constitutional provision invoked by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute what is enjoined upon him by the order against which these proceedings were taken. Said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni se le obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso criminal" and has been incorporated in our Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4 ) and section 56.

WON the request of the fiscal to the petitioner constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination. The question, then, is reduced to a determination of whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.

In the case of People vs. Molineux (61 Northeastern Reporter, 286), it cannot be applied to the instant case, because there, as in the aforesaid case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting. We cite this case particularly because the court there gives prominence to the defendant's right to decline to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. The following appears in the body of said decision referred to (page 307 of the volume cited):

while in the case at bar, the question deals with something not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought to compel the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this means, evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create this evidence which may seriously incriminate him.

BERMUDEZ vs. CASTILLO

For the reason it was held in the case of First National Bank vs. Robert (41 Mich., 709; 3 N. W., 199), that the defendant could not be compelled to write his name Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. And as to such production of documents or chattels. which to our mind is not so serious as the case now before us, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4, page 864): We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. The same holds good in the case of United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145), were the defendant did not oppose the extraction from his body of the substance later used as evidence against him. In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the office of the SolicitorGeneral against the respondent, in connection with this administrative case, said respondent filed, in addition to other evidence in support of this defense, the six letters. He then contended, as he now continues to contend, that said six letters are the complainant's, but the latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness in rebuttal. She admitted, however, that the letters were in her own handwriting. As the respondent believed that the three letters admitted by the complainant to be hers were insufficient for purposes of comparison with those questioned in this case and as he was determined to show that letters were the complainant's, he required her to copy them in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator. The complainant, upon advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the trial to which it was desired to subject her, invoking her right not to incriminate herself and alleging that the letters already in the respondent's possession, were more than sufficient for what he proposed to do. The question raised before this court is not new. In the case of Beltran vs. Samson and Jose ([1929], 53 Phil., 570), a similar question was raised before this court. The petitioner, invoking the constitutional provision contained in section 3, paragraph 3, of the Jones Law which reads: ". . . nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to witness against himself", refused to write and instituted prohibition proceedings against the therein respondents. This court granted the petition and ordered the respondents to desist and abstain absolutely from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation by hand for the purpose of comparing his handwriting. The reasons then adduced therein can and must be adduced in this case to decide the same question; and all the more so because Article III, section 1, No. 18, of the Constitution of the Philippines is worded in such a way that the protection referred to therein extends to all cases, be they criminal, civil or administrative. The constitution provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." The respondent invokes

Ex Parte Crow (14 Pac. [2d series], 918), to the effect that ". . . a witness may not arbitrarily refuse to answer a question on the ground that his answer might incriminate him when the court can determine as a matter of law that 'no direct answer which the witness may make can tend to criminate him.'" The respondent likewise invokes in his support doctrine laid down in re Mackenzie (100 Vt. Rep., 325). This court is of the opinion that what had been said in the above-cited case is not applicable to the case under consideration. The privilege against self-crimination is a personal one. . . . But the privilege is an option of refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry. Hence, when an ordinary witness is on the stand, and self-criminating act relevant to the issue is desired to be shown by him, the question may be asked, and then it is for the witness to say whether he will answer it or claim its privilege, for it cannot be known beforehand what he will do. This court, however, is of the opinion that the foregoing is not applicable to the case of the herein complainant, firstly, because she has made no disclosure; she confined herself to denying the letters in question were hers when the respondent, appressing in court with them, said rather than insinuated, that they were hers, presenting in support of his statement, other letters which, by reason of the handwriting, were to all appearances similar thereto; and secondly, because her testimony, denying that she was the author of the letters in question, may be attacked by means of other evidence in the possession of the respondent, which is not precisely that coming from the complaint herself. The reason for the privilege appears evident. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction.

It was then alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered on November 16, 1976 petitioner that the failure to arraign him is violative of his constitutional right to procedural due process, 3 more specifically of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. 4 There was thus, at the very least, a grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General, 5 when asked to comment, agreed that the procedural defect was of such gravity as to render void the decision of the City Court affirmed by the Court of First Instance. The comment was considered as answer, with the case being submitted for decision.

Respect for the constitutional rights of an accused as authoritatively construed by this Court, duly taken note of in the comment of the Solicitor General, thus calls for the grant of the writ of certiorari prayed for. 1. The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the criminal case against him finds support in the procedural due process mandate of the Constitution. It requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. This Court, in People v. Castillo, 7 speaking through Justice De Joya and following the language of the American Supreme Court, Identified due process with the accused having "been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded with the authority of a constitutional law, ..." 8 An arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required to meet ... " 9 In the terse and apt language of the Solicitor General: "Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal prosecution." 13 Procedural due process demands no less. 2. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of Possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. Verily the records clearly show that petitioner was not arraigned at all and was not represented by counsel throughout the whole proceedings in the respondent City Court." 15 It is indisputable then that there was a denial of petitioner's constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel.

BORJA vs. MENDOZA

The jurisdictional infirmity imputer to respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining which was not remedied by respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza in this certionrari proceeding was the absence of an arrainment of petitioner Manuel Borja, who was accused of slight physical injuries. This notwithstanding respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in abssentia and thereafter, in a decision promulgated on August 18, 1976, found him guilty of such offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty days of arresto menor.

He added further that such "constitutional right is inviolate." 18 There is no doubt that it could be waived, but here there was no such waiver, whether express or implied. It suffices to refer to another leading case, People v. Holgado, 19where the then Chief Justice Moran emphatically took note of the importance of the right to counsel: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. 4. The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in absentia is unavailing. It cannot justify the actuation of respondent Judge Senining. Its language is clear and explicit. What is more, it is mandatory. Thus: "However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." 21 As pointed out then by the Solicitor General, the indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come "after arraignment."

interpreter despite repeated requests from counsel, it was held:

... The Constitution of this state expressly provides that an accused has a 1) right to be heard by himself and counsel, also, 2) to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and, 3) further to be confronted by the witnesses, who are to testify against him. In constructing this constitutional provision it needs no discussion in deciding that all this must be done in a manner by which the accused can know, the nature and the cause of the accusation he is called upon to answer, and all necessary means must be provided, and the law so contemplates, that the accused must not only be confronted by the witnesses against him, but he must be accorded all necessary means to know and understand the testimony given by said witnesses, and must be placed in a condition where he can make his plea rebut such testimony, and give his own version of the transaction upon which the accusation is based. In the absence of an interpreter it would be a physical impossibility for the accused, a deaf-mute, to know or to understand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and, as here, he could only stand by helplessly, take his medicine, or whatever may be coming to him, without knowing or understanding, and all this in the teeth of the mandatory constitutional rights which apply to an unfortunate afflicted deafmute, just as it does to every person accused of a violation of the criminal law. In other words the physical infirmity of this appellant can in no sense lessen his rights under the Constitution, and, in the proper administration of its laws, this great and sovereign state must and will accord the means by which its citizens, humble and afflicted though they may be, shall receive all the rights, benefits and privileges which the Constitution, laws, regulations, and rules of practice provide.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISOLOGO, alias "AMANG"

On 5 May 1976, a criminal complaint was filed against the accused Zosimo Crisologo alias "Amang," a deaf-mute, for robbery and homicide. That he robbed Martin Francisco of one (1) "Seiko 5 Actus" wrist watch valued at Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos and a two battery flashlight valued at Thirty (P30.00) Pesos in the total amount of Four Hundred Thirty (P430.00) Pesos On 12 December 1977, arraignment was set. The accused was allegedly informed of the charge against him through sign language by Special Policeman Alejandro Munoz a childhood acquaintance. Mr. Munoz subsequently entered a plea of guilty on behalf of the accused. Upon objection of counsel, however, this plea was disregarded and arraignment was rescheduled until such time as the Court could avail of the services of an expert in the sign language from the school of the deaf and dumb. On 26 June 1979, no such expert was made available. On 9 November 1982, apparently no sign language expert or representative ever arrived. On 6 April 1983, the accused through a counsel de oficio waived the reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. On 10 February 1986, without the services of an expert in sign language ever being utilized at any stage of the proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and sentenced to die by electrocution.

We find the trial court's decision essentially lacking in that degree of certainty in reason and conscience which is necessary to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As held in U.S. v. Lasada, 5 "By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this. certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense." The accused is acquitted, on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.SALAS

but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. 1 As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. 2 Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped. 3 The respondent judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. 4 But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. 5 The respondent judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. 6 The order of the trial court is now before us on certiorari and mandamus. 7 The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the literal reading of the rule when he should have viewed it from the broader perspective of its intendment.
Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as follows: Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the 8 defendant's escape. The old case of People v. Avancea required his presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not reappeared or remained at large. As his right to be present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia, Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.

The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that trial in absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified under Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will Identify the accused. Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v. Mendoza because it was held notwithstanding that the accused had not been previously arraigned. His subsequent conviction was properly set aside. But in the instant case, since all the requisites are present, there is absolutely no reason why the respondent judge should refuse to try the accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he was released on the illegal bail bond. The order of the trial court in denying the motion for the trial in absentia of the accused is set aside. The respondent judge is directed to continue hearing the case against the respondent Mario Abong in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it is terminated.
10 9

TUBB vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

This is a petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. On August 15, 1947, accused George L. Tubb called on complainant William R. Quasha. Tubb talked Quasha into investing in the rattan business, and said that rattan could be bought for P0.20 a piece in Southern Luzon and sold for P0.70 a piece in Manila. Quasha delivered the sum of P6,000.00 to the accused on the following day, August 16th, with the understanding that the money shall be used exclusively by the accused in the purchase of rattan for resale in Manila; that the rattan so bought shall be brought to Manila within a few days; and, that the profit to be realized from the sale shall be divided equally between the accused and the complainant after the capital of P6,000.00 has been returned to the latter. Sometime in 1948, Quasha met the accused at the Manila Hotel. Quasha asked the accused what he (accused) had done with his P6,000.00. The accused merely said that there was no use telling what happened, but that he will try to pay the complainant back as he was then working

for one Gabino Angchuan of Cebu City and could get money from his said employer. Quasha did not hear from the accused for a long time again after their chance meeting at the Manila Hotel. The complainant wrote to him, threatening him with a criminal action if he did not pay within a period of one month. The trial court convicted the accused of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, subsection 1 (b), of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced him to an imprisonment of one year of prison correccional, to indemnify the complainant in the sum of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals was: Under the above facts and circumstances, appellant is clearly guilty of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code, and not under subsection 1(b) of the Code, as correctly contended by the Solicitor General. The defense of lawful partnership cannot be sustained. There can be no legal partnership where one of the supposed partners, taking advantage of a friendship which seemed to have ripened into a relationship of trust, represents himself to the other as one engaged in a business transaction when in fact he is not. The penalty provided by the applicable law is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or from 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months. There being no modifying circumstances to consider, the medium degree of the penalty should be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, appellant should be, as he hereby, sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 4 months of arresto mayor to 1 year and 1 day of prision correccional.

This offense is, however, entirely different and distinct from that described in paragraph 1 (b) quoted above. Moreover, some of the essential elements of the offense defined in said paragraph 2 (a) are not alleged in the information herein. For instance, there is no averment therein of any "false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud," which distinguishes said offense from that referred to in paragraph 1 (b), the main characteristic of which is "unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence", and this is the essence of the crime charged in said information. The allegations thereof are such as not to permit petitioner's conviction for estafa under said paragraph 2 (a), without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

HELD: The Court of Appeals convicted him of swindling by means of false pretenses, under paragraph 2(a) of said Article 315, which punishes estafa committed 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transaction or by means of other similar deceits.