1.. Monticalbo vs. Judge Macaraya AM No.

RTJ-09-2197 April 13, 2011 Facts: Complainant Monticalbo is one of the defendants in a civil case for collection of a sum of money filed by Fatima Credit Cooperative against him and his wife before the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte (MCTC). The case was dismissed by the said court in its February 1, 2008 Order on the ground that the representative of Fatima Credit Cooperative had no authority to prosecute the case. 3 The MCTC, however, did not rule on the counterclaim of complainant Monticalbo for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. For said reason, he filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the court. Aggrieved, complainant elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte (RTC), where his appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. CN-89. He then filed a motion for extension of time to file a memorandum on appeal, which was granted by respondent judge in his Order dated June 25, 2008. In his August 26, 2008 Order, respondent judge dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time. Complainant Monticalbo imputes the following errors on the part of respondent judge: (1) respondent erred in ruling that Civil Case No. CN-89 is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, considering that the total claim of the plaintiff in the said case exceeded P10,000.00; (2) respondent, motivated by bad faith and corruption, cited the non-existent case of Jaravata v. Court of Appeals in his questioned Order; and (3) respondent accepted bribes in the form of food from plaintiff cooperative in Civil Case No. CN-89, through Margarito Costelo, Jr., then Sheriff of the trial court presided over by respondent judge, and Chairman of the Board and President of the said cooperative. Complainant further avers that he personally witnessed the respondent judge enjoying a drinking spree with Costelo and his other male staff members in a nipa hut annexed to the building of the trial court during office hours in the afternoons of July 9, 2008, August 6, 2008 and September 10, 2008. The administrative complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City Station, for raffle among the justices thereat for investigation, report and recommendation. On April 13, 2010, Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon issued his Report and Recommendation, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows: In sum, it is recommended that respondent Judge be ABSOLVED from the charge of grave misconduct and corruption. However, the citation of a non-existent case by the respondent Judge in his assailed order of dismissal is tantamount to a misrepresentatiand therefore reflect poorly on his esteemed position as a public officer in a court of justice, it is therefore recommended that he be ADMONISHED AND STRICTLY WARNED that a repetition thereof will be more severely dealt with.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Macaraya is liable for gross incompetence and grave abuse of authority. Held: The Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating Justice. In order to merit disciplinary action, it must be established that respondents actions were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred or were attended by fraud, dishonesty or corruption.15 In the absence of such proof, the decision or order in question is presumed to have been issued in good faith by respondent judge. In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave misconduct, bias or partiality cannot be presumed. Neither can bad faith or malice be inferred just because the judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to complainant. Time and again, this Court has held that charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. Complainant miserably failed to substantiate his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery. He merely alleged hollow suppositions to shore up his Complaint. Consequently, this Court has no other option except to dismiss the administrative complaint for lack of merit. The Court now deals with the charge that respondent judge cited a non-existent case Jaravata v. Court of Appeals with case number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 in his questioned Order. A search of available legal resources reveals that no such decision has been promulgated by the Supreme Court. Besides, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, "CA G.R." And, it cannot be considered a CA case because the respondent is the "Court of Appeals." This undoubtedly runs counter to the standard of competence and integrity expected of those occupying respondents judicial position. A judge must be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence." The Code of Judicial Conduct also demands that he "be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence." WHEREFORE, the complaint for Grave Misconduct and Corruption is hereby DISMISSED. For citing a non-existent case, however, respondent judge is ADMONISHED to observe due care in the performance of his functions and duties and WARNED that a repetition thereof would be dealt with more severely.

2. Tan vs. Judge Usman AM No. RTJ-11-2666 February 1, 2011 Facts: It appears that complainant, together with his co-plaintiffs in the civil case/co-accused in the criminal case, filed a Motion for Inhibition against respondent. The movants attached to their motion the Affidavit of complainant. Complainant claims that during the hearing of the Motion for Inhibition, respondent became very emotional, coerced her to testify without the assistance of counsel and demanded a public apology from her; and that while she requested to refer the motion to the Executive Judge, respondent interrogated her relentlessly following which he issued an Order of August 28, 2009 finding her guilty of Direct Contempt and ordered her detention. In his January 14, 2010 Answer to the complaint, respondent explained that during the hearing of the Motion for Inhibition, the employees of the court appeared before complainant but she failed to name any of them as having allegedly told her that Jaime Cui, Jr. was bragging that they have disbursed a substantial amount of money to him (respondent); that Atty. Lee M. Zosa, the private prosecutor in the criminal case, and Atty. Benly Frederick Bergonio, counsel for the PNB in the civil case, moved that complainant be cited for Direct Contempt of Court and that she be detained until she divulges the name of her informant; and that Atty. Jose M. Mendiola, complainants lawyer, failed to give any comment because, according to him, complainant did not consult him about the filing of the Motion for Inhibition. Respondent went on to explain that since he issued his August 28, 2009 Order in an official capacity, the remedy of complainant was to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, not an administrative case; that he gave complainant a maximum of 30 days detention to give her a wider opportunity to either apologize or divulge the name of her informant, so that even before the expiration of the period, the court can lift the Order of Contempt. By Report of November 25, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) came up with the following evaluation of the Complaint: The instant administrative case is partly meritorious. Complainant Tan failed to prove that respondent Judge Usman committed an Act Unbecoming a Judge by shouting at her at the hearing on the Motion for Inhibition. The charge of Mental Dishonesty has no merit. Tan failed to prove by substantial evidence her charge of Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Order. Complainant Tan likewise failed to prove the charge of Bribery/Corruption. Bare allegation alone is insufficient to hold respondent Judge Usman liable.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Usman should be held liable for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law.

Held: Based on the evidence presented, respondent Judge Usman gravely abused his authority and is grossly ignorant of the rule on Direct Contempt of Court. In its Report, the OCA also listed the other administrative complaints filed against respondent and their respective status. Failure to follow basic legal commands as prescribed by law and the rules is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law. By accepting the exalted position of a judge, respondent ought to have been familiar with the legal norms and precepts as well as the procedural rules. Contrary to respondents claim, complainant has no remedy of appeal, as the above-quoted Section 2 of Rule 71 shows. And the penalty for direct contempt if imprisonment is imposed should not, as Section 1 of Rule 71 provides, exceed 10 days. As stated earlier, complainant was detained for 19 days or 9 days more than the limit imposed by the Rules. More. Respondent did not fix the bond, in violation of the same Section 2 of Rule 71, which complainant could have posted had she desired to challenge the order. And on the same day the Order was issued, respondent ordered the confinement of complainant to the provincial jail. WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, Judge Sibanah Usman is FINED in the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

3. Pimentel vs. Judge Salanga G.R. No. L-27934 September 18, 1967 Facts: Petitioner is counsel of record in cases pending before respondent judge, viz: (1) Civil Case 21-C, entitled "Pablo Festejo et al., petitioners, vs. Marciano Cabildo et al., respondents," a special civil action for mandamus to compel payment of salaries of elective and appointive municipal officials; (2) Criminal Case 4898 and C-5, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Constante Anies, accused," for frustrated murder; (3) Criminal Case C-93, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Romeo Pimentel, accused," for frustrated homicide; (4) Election Case 2470, entitled "Avelino Balbin, protestant, vs. Clemente Abaya, protestee," an election protest involving the office of mayor of Candon, Ilocos Sur; Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact that he is complainant in an administrative case he himself lodged in this Court on May 12, 1967, against respondent judge upon averments of "serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and incompetence."1 Petitioner seeks in the complaint therein to have respondent judge immediately suspended; On July 31, 1967, petitioner moved in the court below to have respondent judge disqualify himself from sitting in Civil Case 21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election Case 2470 aforesaid. On August 1, 1967, respondent judge rejected the foregoing motion. A move to reconsider the foregoing resolution failed of its purpose. Civil Case 21-C was rescheduled for hearing from August 10 and 11, 1967 to August 22 and 23, 1967. Hence, the present petition. Issue: Whether or not the judge disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of record for one of the parties is his adversary in an administrative case said counsel lodged against him? Held: The petition herein for certiorari and prohibition is denied, respondent judge is not legally under obligation to disqualify himself

Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, which reads in full: Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consaguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which be has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

4. Hon. Julieta Decena vs. Judge Malanyaon A.M. No. RTJ-02-1669 April 14, 2004

Facts: The regular session of a municipal council was interrupted by a heckler in the audience hurling various accusatory remarks and insults at the council members. The heckler is a judge, the incident, the subject of this case. On 26 May 2000, the Office of the Court Administrator received a Joint AffidavitComplaint executed by various municipal officials of Bula, Camarines Sur. The affiantscomplainants, Mayor Julieta A. Decena (Decena), Vice-mayor Virgilio D. Pontanal (Pontanal), and Councilors Amelita A. Ibasco (Ibasco), Gerry D. Raa (Raa), Pedro N. Mora, Jr. (Mora), and Ferdinand T. Aguila (Aguilar) sought the dismissal from the service and the disbarment of respondent Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon (Judge Malanyaon), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, of Pili, Camarines Sur, on account of his conduct during the 21 February 2000 session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula. In a Resolution dated 19 June 2002, the Court referred the matter for investigation, report and recommendation to Court of Appeals Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.After Justice Rosario sought to be excused owing to his forthcoming retirement then, the Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals for assignment to a Justice by court-wide raffle.The case was raffled to Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. After conducting several hearings on the case, Justice Reyes, Jr. rendered a Report and Recommendation (Report), which was received by this Court on 22 July 2003. On 21 February 2000, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur convened its regular session, with Vice-mayor Pontanal presiding. Among the matters on the agenda was the revocation of two previous council resolutions authorizing Rolando N. Canet (Canet) to operate a cockpit in the municipality. A former vice-mayor of Bula, Canet is also the nephew-in-law of Judge Malanyaon. Both Judge Malanyaon and Canet attended the 21 February 2000 session of the Sangguniang Bayan. Canet, however, came along with many supporters. Noticing his presence, the Sanggunian offered to recognize Judge Malanyaon; but he declined, saying that he merely wanted to be an observer. Issue: WON the conduct of Judge Malanyaon relative to the 21 February 2000 legislative session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula is inexcusable and simply cannot be condoned. Held: Judge Malanyaon deserves to be taken to task for his outrageous behavior as it clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct.

First. The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and even vulgar. Indeed, such utterances should not be expected of a public official worthy of his office. At fault is not the sentiment harbored, but the impolitic choice of words employed to express such sentiment. It is not even particularly relevant if Judge Malanyaon was inebriated at that time, for the reckless character of his remarks are in themselves palpable, whether they were delivered in a drunken or sober state. Second. Judge Malanyaons harangue was directed at the members of the Sangguniang Bayan in the course of a regular session of the body. The members of the Sanggunian are, by reason of their public office, entitled to the respect of other people, especially their fellow public officers. Judge Malanyaons diatribe indicates his inability to accord his fellow public officials their due. Third. Judge Malanyaon made his remarks in a public forum. Obviously, however, he forgot or even failed to realize that he is a representative of the judicial branch of government, the judge being the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. The judiciary is loathe to interfere with the due exercise by co-equal branches of government of their official functions, absent any justiciable action brought in due course. Fourth. It must be understood that Judge Malanyaons remarks were aimed at preventing the Sanggunian from revoking the cockpit license of Canet. In doing so, he was attempting to interfere with the will of the Sanggunian as an independent legislative body. As observed by Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr., the awkward situation was aggravated when Judge Malanyaon publicly humiliated the councilors in front of their constituents, making them look witless and obtuse, and thereby creating a mockery of the proceedings.The disruptive presence of several supporters of Canet, a local town politician, porated the protest against the plan to revoke the cockpit license with political color. Judge Malanyaons active participation in apparent concert with Canets supporters exposed him as nothing but a common lobbyist, as he forgot to act as a judge with the standard judicial temperament and prudence. Fifth. Judge Malanyaon obstructed the Sangguniang members from performing their official duties. As Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr. pointed out, the acts complained of Judge Malanyaon is no less a crime under Article 144 of the Revised Penal Code. As a judge, respondent should very well know how deleterious it would be to the discharge of his functions if the court hearings he presides over would be rudely interrupted by fulsome tirades delivered by a spectator in the audience. If such a situation arise in his courtroom, Judge Manlayaon would have every right to take offense to the disruption in the proceedings. A legislative session is no less an official proceeding as a court session and any one who disrupts either proceedings deserves to be sanctioned. Sixth. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall neither allow family relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor allow the prestige of judicial office to be used or lent to advance the private interests of others. It does not escape our attention that Judge Malanyaon was agitated during the Sanggunian session because the interests of his nephew-inlaw were under attack. Perhaps, Judge Malanyaon honestly believed that the revocation of Canets cockpit license was illegal. Yet, it would not justify his undisguised attempt to prevent the threatened detrimental action against his relative with his influence. We agree with the conclusion of Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr. that Judge Malanyaon allowed himself to be used by his nephew-in-law to promote the latters private interests, in contravention of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Judge Malanyaon needs to be reminded that his judicial identity does not terminate at the end of the day when he takes off his judicial robes. Even when garbed in casual wear outside of the halls of justice, a judge retains the air of authority and moral ascendancy that he or she wields inside the sala.

5. Sison vs. Judge Caoibes , Jr. A.M. No. RTJ-03-1771 May 27, 2004 Facts: The instant administrative complaint arose when Salvador Sison, a Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) traffic enforcer, filed a verified Complaint[1] dated October 12, 1999, charging Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. and Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 253, with grave abuse of authority. In turn, the complaint stemmed from an Order[2] dated September 15, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 99-002[3] which the respondent judge issued, requiring the complainant to appear before him to explain a traffic incident involving his son and the complainant. The said Order reads, thus: Per information from the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court on September 8, 1999, at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of said date, said authorized driver, while on board the official car of the undersigned on an official errand was flagged by the accused along the Epifanio delos Santos Avenue while he was positioning the car he was driving to the right lane as he was then to make a right turn; that after he stopped, he was told by the accused that swerving to the right lane was prohibited when it appeared that the sign therefore was still far off and not readily visible to the naked eye; that nonetheless, he introduced himself as the authorized driver of the undersigned, his son in fact, and showed to the accused the calling card of the undersigned with a notation in (sic) the dorsal portion thereof introducing the bearer of the card and requesting for assistance from law enforcers, and accordingly begged that he be allowed to proceed on his way considering that there was no danger to limb, life and property occasioned by his alleged traffic violation; that notwithstanding such introduction and plea, the accused confiscated the drivers license of the authorized driver, even bragging in the process that he did the same to somebody who introduced himself as a lawyer the day before. The aforementioned actuation of the accused, if true, is not only indicative of his arrogance and deliberate disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation accorded to a court of law and/or its representative but is one constitutive of indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specially considering that the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court was then on official errand. Issue: WON the respondent Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 253, GUILTY of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge for violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct Held: The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which smacks of retaliation, as in the case at bar, is appalling and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge should so behave at all times to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.The very delicate function of administering justice demands that a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people, for he is the visible representation of the law.The irresponsible or improper conduct of judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary; as such, a judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. We do not agree, however, that the respondent judge should be merely reprimanded for his actuations. The Court has not been blind to the improper use by judges of the erstwhile inherent power of contempt which, in fine, amounts to grave abuse of authority. The penalty imposed by the Court in such cases ranges from a fine of P2,500;one months salary, suspension from the service without pay for a period of three months;and even the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service. Furthermore, we take judicial notice that the respondent judge was previously sanctioned by the Court for violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, where he was meted a fine of P20,000. He was found guilty of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge, for delivering fistic blows on a complainant judge. To our mind, the instant case falls under similar conduct, which the Court avowed would be dealt with more severely if repeated, and of which the respondent was duly warned. The respondent was, likewise, found guilty of gross ignorance of procedural law and unreasonable delay in the issuance of an order of execution, where he was meted a fine of P30,000; and delay in resolving a motion to dismiss in a civil case pending before his sala where he was, likewise, fined P40,000. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 253, GUILTY of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge for violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its instrumentalities including government-owned and controlled corporations.

6. OCA vs. Former Judge Leonida AM No. RTJ-09-2198 January 18, 2011 Facts: This administrative case at bench stemmed from a judicial audit and inventory of pending cases conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (Branch 27, Sta. Cruz), and in Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Malabon City (Branch 74, Malabon). The audits were conducted because respondent Judge Leonardo L. Leonida (Judge Leonida) applied for Optional Retirement effective July 5, 2008. Judge Leonida was the presiding judge of Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, from October 1997 until his retirement and was detailed as assisting judge of Branch 74, Malabon. On May 21, 2009, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez issued a Memorandum [1] on the audit teams findings, among which are: 1) As of audit date, March 5 and 6, 2009, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz had a total caseload of 507 cases consisting of 280 criminal cases and 227 civil cases based on the records actually presented to, and examined by, the audit team. 2) Out of the total number of pending criminal cases, no further action was taken after varying considerable periods of time in 14 cases. 3) Pending incidents and motions filed by parties in 8 criminal cases were left unresolved for more than one (1) year in 3 cases, and three months in 2 cases. 4) Twenty-nine (29) criminal cases submitted for decision, the earliest in 2001, were undecided. 5) Of the 227 civil cases lodged in the court, no setting for hearing and no further action was taken on 46 cases. 6) Twenty-four (24) civil cases have pending motions/incidents awaiting resolution, the earliest since 2002. 7) Fifty-seven (57) civil cases submitted for decision from 2000 to 2009 were undecided at the time of the audit. 8) In the course of the audit in Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, several records of criminal cases were found to be incomplete. The records were not paginated. Certificates of arraignment, minutes of hearings and notices of hearing were missing from the files. 9) The record of one case, Criminal Case No. 12178, an appealed case submitted for resolution, is missing and is in the possession of Judge Leonida as per certification issued by Atty. Bernadette Platon, the Branch Clerk of Court. Regarding Branch 74, Malabon City, the OCA also looked into the Monthly Report of Cases submitted by said branch for August-October 2008 and January-March 2008 and noted

that 95 criminal cases and 18 civil cases were submitted for decision. Considering that Judge Leonida applied for Optional Retirement effective July 5, 2008, he should have decided 91 of the 95 submitted criminal cases and 16 of the 18 submitted civil cases. In sum, Judge Leonida failed to decide 102 criminal cases and 43 civil cases both in Branch 27 and Branch 74, and failed to resolve motions in ten (10) civil cases in Branch 27. On October 22, 2009, Judge Leonida filed a Manifest and Memorandum expressing his willingness to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings. He explained that he failed to finalize and promulgate cases pending in his sala because of the severely clogged docket of Branch 74. With an overwhelming number of more than 1,000 cases, he calendared an average of 30 cases daily in order to keep all the cases moving. According to Judge Leonida, the court sessions together with the preparation/correction/review of the orders in the cases set for hearing almost ate up his time as a judge. The fact that Branch 74, a commercial court, was still included in the raffle of regular cases exacerbated the situation. Voluminous pleadings requiring extensive dissection and research, and cases involving numerous intervenors who raised different and complex issues, made matters much more difficult that he even had to conduct hearings on applications for search and seizures until nighttime. Judge Leonida further claimed that his work encroached upon the time he had to devote to his wife and eight children. Finally, the reconstruction and review of case records submerged in flood waters added up to his struggle to expedite the disposition of cases assigned to his court. In its evaluation of the charges against Judge Leonida, the OCA recommended that for his failure to resolve motions in ten (10) civil cases; decide eleven (11) criminal cases, and twentyseven (27) civil cases in Branch 27, and to decide ninety-one (91) criminal cases and sixteen (16) civil cases in Branch 74, he be found guilty of gross incompetency and inefficiency, and fined the amount of P50,000.00 pesos to be deducted from his retirement benefits. Issue: Whether or not the reasons of Judge Leonida in incurring delays in deciding cases are tenable. Held: Precedents have shown that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary period warrants administrative sanction. The Court treats such cases with utmost rigor for any delay in the administration of justice; no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice; it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute. His proffered explanation is unacceptable given the ample period that he had. He cannot take refuge behind the common excuse of heavy caseload to justify his failure to decide and resolve cases promptly. He could have asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to dipose of the cases but did not. Due to his inefficiency, the constitutional right of parties to a speedy trial was violated out of neglect. Instead of justice wrought by efficient and competent handling of judicial business, the lower courts handled and assisted by Judge Leonida produced unnecessary financial strain, not

to mention physical and emotional anxiety, to litigants. Delay derails the administration of justice. It postpones the rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly prosecuted. It crowds the dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to take short cuts, interfering with the prompt and deliberate disposition of those cases in which all parties are diligent and prepared for trial, and overhanging the entire process with the pall of disorganization and insolubility. More than these, possibilities for error in fact-finding multiply rapidly between the original fact and its judicial determination as time elapses. If the facts are not fully and accurately determined, even the wisest judge cannot distinguish between merit and demerit. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Leonardo Leonida, former Presiding Judge of Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and Assisting Judge in Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Malabon City, GUILTY of gross incompetence and gross inefficiency for failure to decide one hundred two (102) criminal cases and forty-three (43) civil cases for which he is FINED P50,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity benefits.

7. Juson vs. Judge Mondragon AM No. MTJ-07-1685 September 3, 2007 Facts: On 6 June 1996, a certain Silverio Pareja (Pareja) filed a Complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land, and damages and attorneys fees against Dominador Almirante (Almirante) before the MCTC of Makilala-Tulunan, North Cotabato, docketed as Civil Case No. 355. Within the period for filing an answer, Almirante filed a Motion To Dismiss alleging that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provision of the statute of limitations; and that the complaint states no cause of action. Thereafter, a series of conferences was held to strike out a compromise agreement as there was a possibility of an amicable settlement, but the efforts of the parties proved futile as no outof-court settlement was reached between them. Meanwhile, herein Juson filed an Answer in Intervention on 3 May 2002 claiming that he is the registered owner of the same parcel of land which was the subject matter of Civil Case No. 355. Thereafter, the case was scheduled for hearing on 23 May 2002 wherein Jusons counsel manifested that he would file a Motion for Intervention. The hearing was reset to 25 July 2002. For reasons not shown in the records, the scheduled hearing was again apparently reset to 7 August 2003 when Parejas counsel reminded the court that it had not yet resolved Jusons Motion for Intervention. Accordingly, Judge Mondragon issued an Order on the same day declaring that he would act on the said Motion before the next hearing set on 9 October 2003. By the hearing on 9 October 2003, Judge Mondragon still had not yet acted on Jusons Motion for Intervention. Judge Mondragon again promised to take action on Jusons Motion for Intervention before the next hearing set on 2 December 2003. However, the hearing was again postponed to 12 January 2004, then to 5 February 2004. The 5 February 2004 hearing was again postponed to 16 March 2004 because Judge Mondragon had not yet acted on Jusons Motion for Intervention. In the 16 March 2004 hearing, Judge Mondragon still failed to act on Jusons Motion for Intervention despite the presence of all the parties before his court. Up until 17 October 2005, Jusons Motion for Intervention remained unresolved, to his damage and prejudice. Hence, this Complaint filed by Juson claming undue delay in the resolution by Judge Mondragon of his Motion for Intervention in Civil Case No. 355. Judge Mondragon admits the delay in resolving the motion and explains that such delay is attributable to the fact that he is supervising three courts at a time, to wit: as Presiding Judge of MCTC Makilala-Tulunan, Cotabato; as Acting Judge of MTC Magpet, Cotabato; and as Acting Judge of MCTC Roxas-Antipas-Arakan, Cotabato. Also, he invokes his failing health since his

stroke in 1997. As a matter of fact, he wrote the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) inquiring about the requirements for the filing of an application for Disability Retirement effective on 1 January 2007. Issue: Whether or not Judge Mondragon is liable for Delay in Rendering Order. Held: This Court agrees in the recommendation of the OCA. As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. The office of the judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official duties. [13] Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for decision or resolution. Moreover, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the integrity, competence, and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice more efficient. Time and again, this Court has stressed the need to strictly observe this duty so as not to negate its efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued Philippine courts. Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics also exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts. His illness should not be an excuse for his failure to render the corresponding decision or resolution within the prescribed period. While the Court sympathizes with his woes, the demands of public service cannot abide by his illness. In case of poor health, the Judge concerned needs only to ask this Court for an extension of time to decide/resolve cases/incidents, as soon as it becomes clear to him that there would be delay in his disposition thereof. This Court cannot overstress this policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards. [21] Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reasons, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.[22] WHEREFORE, Judge Vicente C. Mondragon is found GUILTY of undue delay in the disposition of the Motion for Intervention of Gideon B. Juson in Civil Case No. 355 and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00).

8. Rallos vs. Judge Gako, Jr. AM#RTJ-99-1484 Facts: Two administrative cases were filed against Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr. Filed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, the first is a Letter-Complaint charging him with ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority. Allegedly, respondent ordered the release of 25,000 sacks of imported rice to the claimants, notwithstanding the pendency of seizure and forfeiture proceedings before the Bureau of Customs. The second was an Administrative Complaint filed by Joselito Rallos, Simon Rallos, Josefina Rallos Vallar and Teresita Rallos Yap. They assailed the respondents Order dated March 15, 1999, which had falsely stated that complainants, who were petitioners in Special Proceedings Case No. 1576-R entitled "Intestate Estate of Simeon Rallos," were present during the hearing on the said date. Issue: W/N respondent is GUILTY of grave abuse of authority and partiality.

Held: First Case Pending before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision of the CA affirming respondent judges Orders dated January 11, 1999, and January 25, 1999 the same Orders that are the subjects of the present Complaint for gross ignorance of the law. In view of the present peculiar circumstances, the disposition of this administrative case should be held in abeyance. We must, however, emphasize that this action is motivated solely by considerations of the smooth and orderly disposition of the cases, for a decision on the merits of the Complaint herein would preempt the disposition of the Petition for Review. Second Case Respondent is guilty of GUILTY of grave abuse of authority and partiality aggravated by dishonesty based on three points. On the first point, considering that the case had been pending before the trial court for a long time, it was improper for the judge not to resolve the complainants Motion to remove or replace the administrator. As to the second point, we must clarify at the outset that complainants are not questioning the resetting of the scheduled March 17, 1999 hearing to March 15, 1999. What they are stressing, and rightly so, is the apparent dishonesty of respondent judge in making it appear that they were present during the March 15, 1999 hearing. We are not convinced by his claim that his

Order was merely a harmless error caused by mental fatigue. The phrase "[t]he oppositors and their counsel [were] also around" refers to a substantial matter that cannot be overlooked, considering that it is inconsistent with the first sentence of the questioned Order. Finally, regarding the third point, SC agree with the OCAs conclusion that the transfer of Daisy Estella from the sala of respondent judge was prompted by her unfavorable testimony against the latter. Indeed, the branch clerk of court ] also testified that the judge scolded Estella after she testified, and that her testimony was the reason for her transfer. These three points, taken together, paint a picture of bias or partiality that calls for disciplinary sanction. Worse, respondent manifested dishonesty when he altered his Order and made it appear that the complainants were present during a hearing that they had not in fact attended. Respondent judge violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.02, as well as Canon 2 and Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Thus, he must be sanctioned.

9. Tugot vs. Judge Coliflores AM#MTJ-00-1332 February 16, 2004

Facts: Complainant is one of the plaintiffs in a civil which was dismissed by the respondent judge in August 1998. The decision was allegedly without any factual and legal basis, and prepared not by the respondent judge but by the respondent Clerk of Court. The plaintiffs appealed but the notice of appeal was not attached to the records of the case transmitted to the appellate court. They were informed that the notice of appeal together with the other documents were lost so they were advised to file another notice of appeal and to pay another filing fee. Plaintiffs filed a motion to transmit the entire records of the case to the Regional Trial Court but the same was not acted upon because the records were not complete. Thereafter, they received a request from the respondent Clerk of Court for a copy of the notice of appeal since the courts copy was misplaced.

Issue: W/N respondent judge is guilty of negligence and violation of a Supreme Court Rule and directive.

Held: YES. Respondents Administrative Liability. Courts exist to dispense and promote justice. The realization of this solemn purpose depends to a great extent on the intellectual, moral and personal qualities of the men and women who are called to serve as judges. Verily, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that they possess the highest degree of competence, integrity and independence. In the present case, respondent judge failed to demonstrate the required competence in administering an ejectment case. He caused undue delay in dispensing the civil case. He failed to observe the period within which to conduct the preliminary conference which, according to Section 8 of Rule 70, shall be held [n]ot later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed. In the present case, the preliminary conference was conducted more than two years after the filing of the last answer.

Negligence in the Performance of an Administrative Responsibility. In the absence of the branch clerk of court without designation of an officer-in-charge, the duties of the former were

assumed by Judge Coliflores. He has the direct responsibility for the proper discharge of the official function of his court personnel and may not put blame on his subordinates for his remissness. Respondent judge should also be sanctioned for misplacing complainants Notice of Appeal. As administrative officers of the courts, judges should organize and supervise court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, as well as the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity at all times. Failure to Follow the Courts Directive. Respondent judge belatedly filed his Comment on complainants Reply, without offering any explanation. In a Resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Court directed him to submit the Comment within 10 days from receipt of the Resolution. It took him almost two years to comply. It bears stressing that a disregard of Court directives constitutes grave or serious misconduct. A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request. It should be complied with promptly and completely.

10. Santos vs. Judge Arcaya-Chua A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 February 13, 2009

Facts: Complainant, alleges: that in the first week of September 2002, she asked respondent's help, who was then the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 63 of Makati City, regarding the cases of complainant's friend, Emerita Muoz, pending before the Supreme Court. Respondent, a former employee of the Court, said that she could help as she had connections with some Justices of the Court; she just needed P100,000.00 which she would give to an employee of the Court for the speedy resolution of said cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave respondent P100,000.00 in the privacy of the latter's chamber. When complainant followed up the cases in February 2003, respondent told her that there was a problem, as the other party was offering P10 million to the Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the P100,000.00; however respondent could no longer be contacted. In her Comment dated August 19, 2005, respondent denies the charges against her Complainant and respondent filed several pleadings reiterating their respective claims. The Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred the instant case to Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon of the CA for investigation.

Issue: Whether or not, respondent is liable for gross misconduct.

Held: Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits. She is WARNED that the commission of the same or a similar act in the future shall merit a more severe penalty. The office of a judge is sacred and imbued with public interest. The need to maintain the publics confidence in the judiciary cannot be made to depend solely on the whims and caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein. Thus, withdrawal of a

complaint or desistance from a complaint will not deprive this Court of its power under the Constitution to ferret out the truth and discipline its members accordingly. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while "gross," has been defined as "out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.