Cody Walker History 197 4/11/13

The Transformation of Eisenhower

Introduction
While the history between the U.S. and Cuba has been there for as long as many can remember, the relationship started soon after the United States was beginning to form. The view of Eisenhower, the President, is different than

Eisenhower, the soldier. At the time of, and soon after, Eisenhowers presidency, many historians thought that he was weak and poor. They said that he was elected on his war accolades, and not his ability to lead the country. Looking at various sources, that view as remarkably changed. presidents in the United States history. Eisenhower is now one of the top 10

Although he follows others like Lincoln,

Jefferson, FDR, and Wilson, Eisenhowers place in history has changed due to the n ew studies of his policies. Between January 1959 and January 1961, the Eisenhower administration's policy toward Castro and the Cuban Revolution changed dramatically from a policy of wait and see to a policy designed to overthrow the Castro regime and reorient the

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direction of the Cuban Revolution1. To this degree I agree that the change was slow and took time, but the outcome of the policy change could not have changed. By late 1959, key officials, including the President, had come to the conclusion that Castro regime was contrary to the interests of the United States. If the existence of the regime was allowed to continue, they feared that it would cause serious adverse effects on the U.S. In this paper, I will examine the evidence that is laid out before the American citizen, in order to understand the possibility of a purposefully changed relationship between the United States and Cuba in the years prior to the failed mission of The Bay of Pigs. In the meetings that President Dwight D. Eisenhower had with his cabinet, advisors, the National Security Council, and those within the State Department in the late stages of 1958, it was feared that a Castro victory was possibly not the best answer in relations to U.S. interests. In the final days of 1958, the Central

intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the best interests of the United States.2 Although earlier reports had surfaced about Castros possible ties to Communism, they were unreliable because th ey had been authored by those loyal to Batista 3 . Eisenhowers attitude towards the Cuban

Revolution when it started was one of support for Castro. Although the U.S. had to act in accordance with the founding charter of the OAS (Organization of American

Krieg, Joann. Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman. Westport, Connectitcut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1987. 207-10. Print. 2 Waging Peace: 1956-1961. Dwight D. Eisenhower (1965). Garden City, NY. 521. 3 Ibid.

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States), the U.S. followed a policy of non-intervention, even though there was widespread sentimental support of Castro.4 Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA and brother to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, had once told the President that "Communists and other extreme radicals appear to have penetrated the Castro movement," Allen Dulles said. "If Castro takes over, they will probably participate in the government. 5" On the other hand was the American private sector, with American businessmen meeting in Havana, urging the President for rapid recognition with the basis that the Castro government appeared far better than anything they could have dared hope for. 6 Between these two factors, President Eisenhowers decision to take a wait and see approach paid off. The Eisenhower Administration was not tied to the rise and fall of the Castro regime, but it also didnt make Castro public enemy number one, at least no t until late 1960. Eisenhowers policies and decisions reiterated the history and belief of many Americans. Ever since colonial times, many Americans had uniquely defined and perceived their national security interests in the Western Hemisphere. They viewed the hemisphere as a refuge for freedom and democracy. 7 During this time of the Cold War Era, that belief system was still intact and going strong. American policy and lawmakers viewed Soviet imperialism and international communism as a

4 5

Waging Peace, 520. Waging Peace, 521. 6 Waging Peace, 522. 7 Soldier, President, Statesman, 208.

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threat, not only to the principles of democracy, but also the integrity of the interAmerican system.8 The first months of the Castro era produced frustrations within Washington over the disorder in the new government, but no serious conflicts arose during this time. It was also noted that the Cuban Communists seemed to have little influence, and no significant threats to U.S. interests arose.9 The main cause for concern with the new Castor government was Castro himself. Although he was not a member of the government, his unconventional political approach troubled those in Washington. Castro spoke on all subjects, and often times, spoke so bluntly that it bordered on defiance when he talked about the relations between the U.S. and Cuba. 10 President Eisenhower wrote this in his biography: Even though, at times, Castro's public performances appeared to be the acts of a man mentally unbalanced, it was clear we would have trouble getting unanimous agreement that Castro posed in fact any threat to an American nation.11 The suspicion of communism within the Castro regime was reported out in January of 1959, after the government declared that the Communist Party would be allowed to operate legally. Toward the end of January the press carried reports that Communists, long underground, were new supporting Castro.12 Cuba, however was not the first possible covert mission to be carried out to overthrow a government. Previous successes include the overthrow of Mosaddegh in Iran in 1953 and Arbenz of
8 9

Ibid. The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution, Benjamin, Jules (1990). 169. 10 Ibid. 11 Waging Peace, 524. 12 Waging Peace, 522.

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Guatemala in 1954. So on the heels of these success, the CIA was to find a way if necessary to overthrow Castros regime.

1959: The Beginning of a Strained Relationship

The same problems that the U.S. government was having with Cuba were also being reported on within the New York Times. A combination of a vast amount of political inexperience and close ties with either known Communists, Raul Castro (his brother), or Communist sympathizers.13 In CIA reports, the agency reported that the provisional president, Manuel Urrutia, seemed indecisive and that many of the new government officials lacked experience.14 These problems led to others facing not only the U.S. government, but also the American citizens and American businesses that were currently in Cuba. Evidenced by Mr. Rubottoms report to President

Eisenhower that 1,972 Americans had been evacuated by Sunday evening [January 4].15 This mass evacuation was caused by the chaos from the lack of control and leadership after the revolution took Havana. In a telegram from the U.S. embassy in Cuba, the picture is clear that the masses were scared.
Undisciplined groups engaging in destruction, sacking and looting, principally in downtown Habana and in town of Marianao. Plant of Masferrer paper Tiempo destroyed. Buildings of two Ministries reported looted. Several casinos wrecked with consequent damage to some hotels. Several stores and bars wrecked and

13 14

U.S. Remains Patient Under Castro Attack, E.W. Kenworthy. New York Times, 1959. E7. The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution, 170. 15 Editorial Note, Foreign Relations Of The United States (FRUS), 19581960 Volume VI, Cuba, Document 215.

Walker 6 looted Mob of several thousand forced open Principe prison and freed all prisoners, both political and criminals. General strike slowly spreading. All

transportation except private cars paralyzed. Domestic and international airline operations suspended. More than 200 American tourists stranded.
16

The inexperience of the government was also reported on by the New York Times. An interesting article was written suggesting that it was highly unlikely that he (Castro) could today formulate a coherent social and political philosophy. movement was primarily concerned with overthrowing the Batista regime.17 In early January 1959, President Eisenhower ordered the return of Earl E. T. Smith, then the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba. President Eisenhower asked Smith for His

immediate consultation. This was done for multiple different reasons. The first and foremost of those was to allow President Eisenhower to gain vital information from the source, with Smith having been the Ambassador to Cuba from 1957 until he was recalled in early 1959. Another reason was because President Eisenhower already knew that the new Cuban government was likely to ask for his removal because of his friendly nature towards former dictator Batista.18 By March, Senator Powell of New York, asked to speak to a Representative of the State Department regarding Cuba. On the 10th of that month, Senator Powell had spoken to Castro while in Cuba, with the feeling that Castro was incoherent and could have a breakdown at any time. During his discussion with William Wieland and Robert

16 17

Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, FRUS 1958 1960 Volume VI, 210. Cuba Course Unclear Under Castro Regime, Herbert Matthews, New York Times, 1959, E6. 18 The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution, 169.

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Stevenson of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs within the State Department, the Senator told the men: He has gone haywire. Many friends and staunch supporters of Fidel reported to him this same concern. Also, Mr. Powell believes that the Communists are taking advantage of the chaotic conditions to move in to positions of strength wherever they can and with disturbing success so far. He said that Lopez Fresquet has tried twice to resign in disgust over Fidels countermanding of his measures of which he learned only by reading of it in the papers the next day. Faustino Perez of the Ministry for the Recovery of Misappropriated Assets is completely disgusted and does not report for work in his office; Ray, the Minister of Public Works, is disillusioned.19 After being appointed as the new U.S. Ambassador in Cuba, Philip Bonsal, met with the president to understand what he needed to do, and also believes it would be most useful to be received by you as it would underscore your personal interest and support of his mission to Cuba.20 After this meeting, Bonsal went to Cuba, and found out during his one of this first interviews with Castro, that the Premier had accepted an invitation to speak in Washington at the annual meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, scheduled for April 16-18. With the knowledge of the invitation to Washington, Eisenhower met with Acting Secretary Herter, Under

19 20

Memorandum of a Conversation, FRUS 19581960 Volume VI, 260. Editorial Note, FRUS 19581960 Volume VI, 256.

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Secretary Dillon, and General Goodpastor on March 31. 21

During this meeting,

Eisenhower informed the men that he was planning to be away from around April 6 th to the 19th. Mr. Herter welcomed the news, knowing that Eisenhower wished not to deal with Castro, and giving the president a reason for not meeting him in Washington. On April 1st, Ambassador Bonsal informed Castro that he had been invited to a luncheon by Acting Secretary Herter, while he was visiting for the conference. After accepting the invitation, Castro passed word to Herter that he would like to talk to Vice President Nixon, with Bonsal urging Herter to schedule it early in the visit as it would be the most constructive. By the middle of 1959, Castro had made it publically known that he would not allow the United States to interfere with any Cuban domestic affair s. Premier Fidel Castro declared last night that Cuba would never accept any interference in her domestic affairs by any international organization or nation, including the United States.22 President Eisenhowers response to this message was that the U.S. would depend primarily on the OAS to take awareness of these complications, and if they can find any reason for action, that they, the OAS, are the ones that must recommend it. This response looks to a continual theme, having Eisenhower wishing to strengthen the power and bond of the OAS, and continue with good favor gestures within Latin America. We knew that precipitate, unilateral action could easily be fatal to our

21 22

Editorial Note, FRUS 19581960 Volume VI, 269. Castro Rules Out Any foreign Hand in Cuban Affairs, R. Hart Phillips, New York Times, 1959, 1.

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hopes of strengthening the Western Hemispheres Organization of American States for dealing with international problems.23 Towards the end of 1959, Communist Newspapers began popping up in Cuba, including one in Chinese. Cuban delegations also met with Chairman Mao in Peking, and the CIA reported that an expert from the Soviet Union was sent to Cuba to help guide the course of its revolution. 24 With all of this movement in Cuba, the

Eisenhower administration was seriously discussing a change in the law that required the United States to buy about half of Cubas sugar crop annually at premium prices.25 While they were discussing that possible route, another suggestion was to begin efforts to convince all of the Latin American governments to watch Castro as carefully as possible, and try and counter any move to promote revolution in the hemisphere. One of the problems that the U.S. had to deal with on a day-to-day basis was the fact that Fidel Castro was a hero to the masses in many Latin American nations. They saw him as a champion of the downtrodden and the enemy of the privileged who, in most countries, controlled the wealth and governments. 26 The Eisenhower

administration had allowed the CIA to covertly look into ways of removing Castro if necessary, and within weeks of Castro taking Havana, the administration informally began to examine different measures that would have an effective chance at restraining Castro if he developed into a menace for the United States.

23 24

Waging Peace, 525. Waging Peace, 524. 25 Ibid. 26 Waging Peace, 525.

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Given the problems that faced Eisenhower, the president decided that a trip to South America was in order. This trip had multiple reasons for the timing and the placement. Not only did this trip allow the president to talk with the leaders of the countries that he was visiting, but it would also show the people of South America that the United States cared about them and respected them. Recognizing the need for the trip was easy. Planning for it was no simple matter While it was manifestly impossible for me to visit each of these countries, I did hope, by following a well-laidout itinerary, to make the entire continent feel that our interest extended to all of the Latin American republics. 27 Eisenhower had the State Department send out invitations to the ambassadors of the countries that he would not be able to visit, so that they would not feel as though they didnt matter, or that a restricted visit was only to study particular areas. Less than two weeks after returning, Eisenhower

directed the CIA to begin training of Cuban exiles, mainly in Guatemala.28 Eisenhowers dislike and distrust of Castro and the government in Cuba was built on the foundations of Eisenhowers hatred of Communism. Eisenhower spent most of his military life fighting against communism in Europe and Asia, so why would a man trust a government that had a tendency to lean towards the communistic teachings of the old Soviet Union. Although it took years for Castro to show his true colors, he did allow for the Communist party in Cuba to be legal, to go along with letting communism gain in popularity, with the rise of the communist newspapers and the passing of the communist style laws. Even though the U.S. government was fine

27 28

Waging Peace, 525. Waging Peace, 533.

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with some of the laws passed, such as the agrarian reform law, the American business owners that had their land confiscated with little compensation.

Ambassador Philip W. Bonsal

Our first actions, therefore, were directed to give Castro every chance to establish a reasonable relationship with us. As a first

gesture, we extended quick recognition and I immediately appointed a new Ambassador to Cuba who was singularly well regarded by Cubans and Latin Americans and who could have established a fruitful relationship with Castro if anyone could.29 Ambassador Bonsal points out that there are differing views of the United States and Cubas history, as the traditional view holds that the United States has consistently played a benevolent role in its dealings with Cuba and has showered moral and material benefits on a sometimes unappreciative, ungrateful, and occasionally badly behaved small neighbor30, while the revisionist view points out that for much of its history, Cuba has been the victim of materialistic exploitation by the Colossus of the North.31 When Castro came to power, he started to attack the history books. He revised the Cuban American relation with intensity and cynicism, while attacking the U.S. in his public speeches.

29 30

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol. 20, part 9, Ch. 22, pg. 2002. Bonsal, P.W., (1971). Cuba, Castro, and the United States. 1st ed. USA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 33. 31 Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 33.

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In his book, Cuba, Castro, and the United States, Bonsal has a different view of how the U.S. should have approached the Cuban Revolution. Meanwhile I held that the United States should avoid the use of superior force, military or economic, to overthrow Castro. Our

treaty commitments, the absence at that stage of any Cuban alternative to Castro, and the practical difficulties involved in intervening against a leader with such fervent support among the Cuban masses justified a passive policy even in the face of the deliberately provocative slander and calumny that Castro carried to such extremes.32 After that statement, Bonsal goes on to describe his way of dealing with Castro. Saying that he relied on the eventual emergence of a Cuban resistance movement. He felt that if the leadership of this new resistance could identify with the anti-Batista forces, which had helped Castro to power, but remain as uncontaminated as possible of the less savory phases of the Cuban political life. Such a movement would have given Castro and his followers a good deal more trouble than either the Washington-sponsored coalition of refugee political figures in early 1961 or the handful of brave patriots landed under American direction at the Bay of Pigs that spring. Even if the movement I envisaged had

32

Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 6.

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been at first unsuccessful, it would have sown the seeds of further struggle in a genuinely Cuban context.33 Ambassador Bonsal has had a history with the Latin American community, as he served in both Bolivia and Columbia through the U.S. State Department. Bonsals

qualifications also include his exposure to Cuba in the form of his fathers writings. His father was a correspondent during the final years of Spanish rule in Cuba. While

serving abroad, Ambassador Bonsal was well liked by many people, as President Eisenhower received letters of recommendation for the Cuban position as well as letters of wonder and sadness as to who was going to fill the position vacated by the appointment of Bonsal. During his time in Washington D.C., in which he was being briefed on Cuba, Bonsal came to the conclusion that many others did as well. My two weeks of

concentrated briefings on recent events, personalities, and prospects in Cuba confirmed my impression that the island was entering uncharted seas under a pilot whose skills were unknown and whose course was unrevealed except in the most general terms.34 The United States did not know what was going to happen when Castro came to power, but they could start the process of creating a relationship with the new regime. Bonsal notes in his book that the early days of Castros government was almost chaotic, as

33 34

Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 6. Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 28.

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Cubans of all classes, especially the wealthy, had climbed on the Castro bandwagon and were reaching for the steering wheel35 After having the chance to finally meet and converse with Castro, Ambassador Bonsal came away with a feeling as though the relationship got off to a good start, I was encouraged to believe that we could establish a working relationship that would be advantageous to both our countries36. In a telegram sent to the State Department from Cuba, the Ambassador notes that he was able to get some points a cross 37, even though the conversations were more of the public matter.38

The Cuban Agrarian Reform Law

Early in 1959 the masses from whom Castro drew his strength looked to him as the guarantor of long-desired social and economic reforms. Beginning with the restoration of the political processes

contemplated in the Constitution of 1940, these reforms included the full implementation of that constitution. reform, tax reform, of the administrative public They embraced land reform, a perhaps stimulation the of

nationalization

utilities,

industrialization and of agricultural diversification.39

35 36

Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 29. Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 53. 37 Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State. Havana, March 5, 19596 p.m. 38 Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 53. 39 Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 57.

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The Agrarian Reform that Castro signed into law in June of 1959, was something that not only worried the American government, but also the American sugar mills in Cuba. In the months leading up to the signing of the law, representatives of the 34 US sugar mills visited the U.S. Embassy to discuss the effects of the Agrarian reform. 40 While the sugar mills in Cuba were discussing the varying effects of the possible, and expected reforms, the State Department sent a telegram to the Embassy in Cuba informing the Ambassador and staff that Washington and the American sugar circles were concerned about the redistribution of 50,000 caballerias, and Castros reported statement didnt help their cause for concern.41 These concerns were enough to warrant a meeting with Ambassador Dihigo of the Cuban Embassy. Ambassador Dihigo commented that an official text of the law had not as yet been issued, but that he is confident that this measure will in no way endanger the ability of Cuba to supply its quota in the United States sugar market.42 When the topic of compensation for the land that was to be distributed came up, the Cuban Ambassador said that he could not comment on it, because the law was yet to be finalized.43 In early June, Ambassador Bonsal delivered a note to the Cuban Minister of State. That note contained the views of the American government regarding the Reform Law 44. After reviewing the text of the soon to be law, the Embassy noted that the law took

40 41

Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 308. 42 Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 310. 43 Ibid. 44 Editorial Note, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 318.

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little account of the views expressed by the Sugar Mill Owners Association, the National Cattle Growers Association, the Rice Growers Association, and the small tobacco growers of Pinar del Rio45 While meeting with Castro a few days later, Ambassador Bonsal noted that Castro didnt seem upset about the note.46 Bonsal reiterated the two concerns of the U.S. when it came to the reforms, (1) possible decline in sugar production affecting supplies to American market and (2) compensation for expropriated properties.47 Later in the message, Bonsal notes that Castro found the compensation concern natural, and stressed the point that the Cuban government would fulfill the promises to pay for the land. Castro did mention that the government lacked resources to pay promptly in cash unless it could reach some financial arrangement with US. Castro made sure to point out that the land reform couldnt wait until the government had the resources to pay for the land, and that once it was started, it had to be carried out everywhere.48 Nothing that Castro had said, nothing contained in the agrarian reform statute Castro had signed when he was fighting in the hills in October 1958, and nothing in the law that was promulgated in the Official Gazette of June 3, 1959, warranted the belief that within two years a wholesale conversion of Cuban agricultural land to state ownership would take place.49

45 46

Editorial Note, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 318. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 320. 47 Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 320. 48 Ibid. 49 Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 71.

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Eisenhowers view was much different than that of the Embassy. We were directly affected when Castro, choosing the Agrarian Reform Law version advanced by the extremists, authorized the expropriation of extensive American properties without acceptable provision for compensation.50 In the eyes of Eisenhower, the American properties were seized while the Cuban government didnt even observe their own laws, going on to say so far as I know the promised bonds have not even been printed.51 Bonsal seconds this thought when he stated this Land Reform Law was the first of the revolutionary measures that seriously affected multiple American interests in Cuba52 In Washington D.C., there were meetings amongst the large land owners in Cuba and the Secretary of State, Christian Herter. One of which, between Herter and a rancher who owned land in Cuba, was to bring attention to the Secretary about the side effects of the new land reforms. The Rancher, Robert Kleberg, told the Secretary The agrarian reform program, unless very materially changed, he said, would not only cause him to lose virtually his entire investment but would fall with equal weight upon all other American landowners, including the large and well-known American-owned sugar companies.53 Secretary Herter carried this message onto the National Security Council the following day. Secretary Herter informed the Council that U.S. business interests in Cuba were very frightened and were now clamoring for U.S. economic action against

50

Eisenhower, D. D. (2001). The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency: Keeping the Peace, Vol. XX. United States, Johns Hopkins University Press. 2002. 51 Keeping the Peace, 2003. 52 Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 71. 53 Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 334.

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the Castro regime.54 With this message, and the regional governments in mind, the council discussed some of the possibilities, with the Secretary determining that it would be best to work through the Organization of American States (OAS) instead of acting unilaterally.55 Once again the Cuban question was raised in a meeting of the National Security Council. This time, Allen Dulles the director of Central Intelligence, noted that Castro was facing increased domestic unrest in Cuba. He seemed altogether determined to push the application of his agrarian reform law. There were even reports that he might give up the office of Prime Minister for which he regards himself as not very well suited, and concentrate on carrying out the agrarian reform.56 This constant problem with the land reform in Cuba not only had the CIA, but also the Department of State worried. Ambassador Bonsal was told, by a source that he deemed reliable, that Castro was upset about the U.S.-Cuba relations, and wished to possibly come to some terms. While the Ambassador did tell the source that he was open to meeting with Castro, Bonsal wanted to get the final call from Washington on possible conversation points. One of those points was the American private businesses in Cuba, as the Ambassador noted: American private interests in Cuba being carefully watched by American Government and public opinion. These private enterprises
54

Memorandum of Discussion at the 411th Meeting of the National Security Council, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 325. 55 Ibid. 56 Memorandum of Discussion at the 412th Meeting of the National Security Council, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 331.

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have made important contribution to economic progress of Cuba. Private enterprises represent means of further cooperation between our two countries and in fact is most important source of foreign capital which Cuba, according to most economists, Cuban and foreign, desperately needs in order improve standard of living.57

A New Direction
I anticipate that, as the situation unfolds, we shall be obliged to take further economic measures which will have the effect of impressing the Cuban people the cost of this communist orientation. We hope, naturally, that these measures will not be so drastic or irreversible that they will permanently impair the basic mutuality of interests of Cuban and this country.58 By the later parts of 1959, the atmosphere in Washington was one of growing impatience and puzzlement.59 When Ambassador Bonsal was called back to Washington for a few days, the ambassador noted that the spirit of toleration for the young revolutionaries was wearing thin. In some quarters, at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, sentiment was increasing for a more hard-nosed attitude toward

57 58

Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 336. Keeping the Peace, 2005. 59 Castro, Cuba, and the United States, 93.

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Castro.60 After the first six months of Castros revolution, the Eisenhower Administration was starting to grow tired of the endless anti-American rhetoric. While it was still relatively early in the young government, the U.S. decided to maintain its foreign policy towards Cuba, while it investigated other options. Despite these developments, it was not feasible for us immediately to take a hard line towards Castro We are deeply committed, especially in this Hemisphere, to the policy of nonintervention We could simply not afford to appear the bully.61 Even though many wanted to take a different approach to Cuba, and find a solution to the problem, the administration even knew that something had to be done the questions were what, when, and under what circumstances?62 In the Department of State there were as yet no concrete plans as to what might be done. On balance there was a disposition to continue a policy of patience or, as some put it, to give Castro more rope.63 In late October, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Mr. Rubottom wrote a memorandum that encompassed the basic policy towards Cuba. In it he states: As you are aware, we have been giving Castro every opportunity to follow a course consistent with good U.S.-Cuban relations and have exercised in public great restraint in order to make it possible for him to modify his attitudes and policies if he had any inclination to maintain the bonds of friendship and common interest which have
60 61

Castro, Cuba, and the United States, 93. Keeping the Peace, 2003. 62 Waging Peace, 525. 63 Castro, Cuba, and the United States, 93.

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linked this country to Cuba. To date, he has failed the test by which his intentions with respect to maintaining good relations can be judged. Our restraint has generally been answered by continued attacks on the United States by Castro and his lieutenants.64 This approach was continued on by Secretary Herter in a memo sent to President Eisenhower as Mr. Herter summarized the policy with two points. The first point was all actions and policies of the United States Government should be designed to encourage within Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America opposition to the extremist, anti-American course of the Castro regime65, while the second requested that the U.S. maintain a policy of avoiding the notion of direct intervention against Cuba, except where defense of legitimate United States interest is involved.66 He has met United States restraint with increasingly violent outbursts against this country, culminating in the charges two weeks ago that we were giving assistance to his enemies. In fact, he has apparently determined to make anti-Americanism a fundamental policy.67 Castro continually carried an anti-American status in all of his speeches. In November, Castro attacked the U.S. press, along with the vested interests, of campaigning against the revolution.68 Within the Eisenhower Administration the thoughts of some were changing. Vice-President Richard Nixon stated that as early as the middle of 1959 he was a
64

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 376. 65 Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 387. 66 Ibid. 67 U.S. Remains Patient Under Castro Attack, E. W. Kenworthy, New York Times, 1959. 68 Castro Broadcast Assails U.S. Again, New York Times, 1959.

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member of a minority that advocated instructions to the Central Intelligence Agency.69 Nixon was also the one who stood in for President Eisenhower in a meeting with Castro, when the Premier was invited to speak at the American Society of Newspaper Editors convention in April. At that time, Nixon came away with the feeling as though Castro was not a Communist, but after less than six months the Vice-President changed his view. I was made fully aware of the mounting concern in the highest circles of our government.70 As the concern rose, so did the prospect of rational relations between the U.S. and Cuba. One of the unfavorable developments that had happened was the change in Cubas voting at the United Nations General Assembly.71 Cuba abstained on the vote to seat Communist China in the United Nations instead of voting firmly in the negative as had been its practice.72 Other developments followed, as the Cuban Government seized the records of all the foreign companies that had been prospecting for oil in Cuba. There were many of these enterprises and most of them were American,73 and also took steps to depend less on U.S. imports, by manipulating exchange controls.

69 70

Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 93. Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 94. 71 Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 96. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid.

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Recognizing the Change

After Castros October 26th speech in which he attacked and blamed the U.S. for the bombing74 of Havana, Ambassador Bonsal knew that the U.S. no longer had any hopes to remain trying to have a relationship with Cuba.75 Soon after Castro began remaking his cabinet, and by late November he had finished. That minimum of reciprocal confidence and trust that makes productive relations between governments possible no longer existed. The American attempt to establish such relations had be decisively rebuffed.76 Pazos was replaced by Che Guevara at the National Bank. Manuel Ray, the able Minister of Public Works, an engineer both competent and of high repute, was also eliminated and replaced by Camilo Cienfuegoss Communist brother. The Minister of the Treasury, Rufo Lopez-

Fresquet, did not resign for several weeks but his participation in the government became minimal and his adversary position increasingly notorious.77 The breaking point had been reached, and with the American Embassy knowing that, Ambassador Bonsal noted that the fact that the attempt to find a basis for constructive relationships between the Cuban Revolution and the United states

74

Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State, FRUS, 19581960, VOLUME VI, CUBA, DOCUMENT 375 75 Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 108. 76 Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 109. 77 Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 108.

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Government had foundered.78 As Castro continued his reforms, he turned more and more towards the Communist Bloc, either by the addition of Anti-American cabinet members or by the deals that he made with Russia. So far as Castro was concerned, it had now become clear and would become clearer that he denied to the United States and to American private interests in Cuba any rights whatever that he felt bound to respect.79 Castros vicious fiction about the bombing of Havana and his appointment of Che Guevara to head the National Bank marked a watershed in Cuban American relations. Henceforth, as long as

Castro ruled Cuba, productive diplomacy was out of the question. So I reported to the Department of State early in December.80 As far as the internal administration of Cuba was worried, the future of the country laid firmly in the hands of its people, even though there was constant oppression from Castro and his people.81 Castro was now stepping on the revolutionary accelerator. He erased the anti-Communist complexion of most of the labor unions in November through a vigorous exercise of the magic of his personality that persuaded his followers.82 This removal of the anti-Communist movement was aided by the lack of opposition, as many of the supporters of the previous were

78 79

Ibid. Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 109. 80 Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 110. 81 Cuba, Castro, and the United States, 111. 82 Castro, Cuba, and the United States, 112.

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excluded from any type of effective political action, because of the nature of the organization that they had been identified with.83 By early November, high profile Cuban exiles were meeting with other countries trying to sway them to help the United States. The Department of State sent word to the Embassies and told the Ambassadors that they should continue stating the nonintervention policy of the United States.84 Rufo Lopez-Fresquet dropped by the American Embassy one morning and mentioned to Ambassador Bonsal that Castor is in fact weak and easily influenced in spite of his extreme sensitiveness to criticism and his spectacular rages.85 The United States media even got involved in the Cuban affairs, much to Castros disliking. There is a deliberate campaign in US to discredit the Cuban revolution. Destruction of tourist trade, like calumnies of wire services, is a part of this campaign Proof that US press paid to campaign against Cuban revolution is contained in letter of July 18 from Nunez Portuondo to ex-Cuban Ambassador.86 The Premier went on to mention that the reported construction of missile bases under Russian commands were utterly wrong.87 Castro also pointed out in a speech that if U.S. treats us honorably, decently, morally, Cuba will respond in kind.88

83 84

Ibid. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics, FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 385. 85 Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) and the Cuban Minister of Finance (Lopez Fresquet), FRUS 19581960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 389. 86 Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, FRUS 1958 1960 VOLUME VI, CUBA, 391. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid.

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Within the next month, the Eisenhower Administration began discussion potential economic policies that would act like sanctions. One policy that they worked on was one that would reduce the amount of Cuban sugar the U.S. would buy, and how much it would cost them. As they were still in the planning phase, they knew it was going to be a rough ride in order to have Congress allow such a plan. The Vice President then inquired about the sugar subsidy and Secretary Herter indicated his belief that this problem would be the subject of a battle royal in the next session of Congress.89 Although it is possible that economic pressures will build up in the near future which would be sufficient to endanger the Castro government, it is not probable that such will be the case. Despite the substantial decline in Cuban foreign exchange earnings, the extremely low level of official dollar reserves, and the internal economic frictions resulting from government policies aimed at increased state direction of and participation in the economy, the indications are that the Castro government will be able to maintain a viable economy for an indefinite period90 At times, the Eisenhower Administration seemed confused as to what to do, as after research showed that a complete exclusion of Cuban sugar in the U.S. markets would reduce Cuban national income by only 5 per cent.91 The Administration also

89

Memorandum of Discussion at the 428th Meeting of the National Security Council, FRUS 1958 1960, VOLUME VI, CUBA, 408 90 Memorandum From the Chairman of the Working Group on the Cuban Economic Situation (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann), FRUS 19581960, VOLUME VI, CUBA, DOCUMENT 409 91 Ibid.

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took into account as to what kind of impact new policies would have on the people of Cuba, and how they would look at the United States after those policies took place. The U.S. wanted to keep its image and reputation as keeping to its non-intervention policy, but wanted to remove Castro from power. Although the first part of 1960 is filled with more drama between the countries of the United States and Cuba, the transformation of the Eisenhower Administration is focused in the first year of the Castro regime. As we saw that the U.S. went from quickly recognizing the Castro regime and replacing the American Ambassador to trying to find solutions to the Castro problem. There were voices within the Administration that spoke out on some of the policy issues, but there were also some that were AntiCastro right from the start. The moves that Castro made, such as the Agrarian Land Reform, and the disrespect he should towards the United States on a consistent basis were only some of the reasons the Administration changed their course of action. In 1960, that course of action continued to change, has by April Ambassador Bonsal was recalled back to Washington D.C., and the Administration was starting to look at covert action against Castro. By July, President Eisenhower had signed legislation authorizing presidential action to fix the quota on Cuban sugar imported in the United States until March 31, 1961.92

92

Waging Peace, 535.

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This action amounts to economic sanctions against Cuba. Now we must look ahead to other moves economic, diplomatic, strategic.93 The transformation that took place, was one of the entire Administration, not just President Eisenhower or Ambassador Bonsal. Everyone from the Department of State all the way to the Department of Defense. Anyone who was involved in the politics of the Castro situation changed their minds, maybe not all at once, but over time. Even the American press changed how they covered Castro, as they first invited him to speak that the ASNE, and then started a campaign against Castro. The American view towards Castro and Cuba transformed in his first year in power.

93

Waging Peace, 535.

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References
Benjamin, Jules R. 1990. The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Bonsal, Philip W. 1971. Cuba, Castro, and the United States. United States: University of Pittsburgh Press. Eisenhower, Dwight D. 2001. The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency: Keeping the Peace, Vol. XX. United States: Johns Hopkins University Press. . 1965. Waging Peace: 1956-1961. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. Ferrell, Robert H. 1981. The Eisenhower Diaries. New York: W.W. Norton. Keagle, James M. 1987. "The Eisenhower Administration, Castro, and Cuba." In Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman, by Joann P. Krieg, 366. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc. Kenworthy, E. W. 1961. "Regime is Scored." The New York Times, January 4: 1. . 1960. "U.S. And Castro: Washington Sees little hope for An Improvement in Relations." The New York Times, September 25. . 1959. "U.S. Remains Patient Under Castro Attack." The New York Times, November 8: E7. Matthews, Herbert L. 1959. "CUBA COURSE UNCLEAR UNDER CASTRO REGIME: Victors Plan 2 Years of Reform But Their Unity May Not Last." The New York Times, January 11: E6. Phillips, R. Hart. 1959. "Castro Rules Out Any Foreign Hand In Cuban Affairs." The New York Times, July 4: 1. . 1960. "Cubans Turn Ire on Eisenhower." The New York Times, January 23. . 1960. "Hope of U.S. Shift Voiced By Castro." The New York Times, November 29: 19. State, Department of. 2013. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960. Vols. VI, Cuba. Washington DC: Office of the Historian.