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G.R. No.76353 September 29,1989 SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU, BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA. REMEDIOS BALTAZAR, CORAZON BUNDOC, JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHEILA DINOSO, RAFAEL ENCARNACION, ANNALIZA EVIDENTE, FRANCIS FERNANDO, ZENNY GUDITO, EDGAR LIBERATO, JULIET LIPORADA, GABRIEL MONDRAGON, JOSE MARIA PACKING, DOMINIC PETILLA, MA. SHALINA PITOY, SEVERINO RAMOS, VICTOR SANTIAGO, CAROLINA SARMIENTO, FERDINAND TORRES, RICARDO VENTIGAN and other students of the PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (Q.C.) similarly situated, petitioners, vs.PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), DR. JUAN D. LIM, in his capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of PSBA, ATTY. BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, in his capacity as Vice- President for Admission and Registration, MR. RUBEN ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, MR. RAMON AGAPAY, in his capacity as Director of the Office of Student Affairs and MR. ROMEO RAFER, in his capacity as Chief Security of PSBA, respondents. PARAS, J.: On May 2, 1988, this Court through its Second Division rendered a Decision in the instant case which prodded the Intervenor Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union) to file a motion for reconsideration. Its argument hinges on the pronouncement that
Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachers are for one semester. It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with intervening teachers. Such being the case, charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties.

with the allegedly inevitable consequence of extenuating the pernicious practice of management to arbitrarily and wantonly terminate teachers simply because their contracts of employment have already lapsed. The motion likewise points out the fact that two of the faculty members, namely Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo, and Mr. Rene Encarnacion, supposedly found guilty by the Investigating Committee headed by Mr. Antonio M. Magtalas (p. 342, Rollo), had been issued permanent appointments (not mere temporary contracts) by no less than the President of the School himself. The appointment of Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo dated August 9, 1986 (p. 887, Rollo) can attest to this claim. It is on the basis of the foregoing that We hereby amend Our previous statements on the matter. In a recent Decision, 1 this Court had the opportunity to quite emphatically enunciate the precept that full-time teachers who have rendered three (3) years of satisfactory service shall be considered permanent (par. 75 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). Thus, having attained a permanent status, they cannot be removed from office except for just cause and after due process. Now applying the same principle in the case at bar, Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo having stayed in the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA, for brevity) for three and one-half (3 1/2) years (in a full-time capacity) may be deemed a permanent faculty member provided, of course, the services rendered have been satisfactory to the school. However, because the investigation showed that Mr. Tamayo had participated in the unlawful demonstration, his services cannot be deemed satisfactory. In the case of Mr. Rene Encarnacion, and Mr. Severino Cortes, Jr. who taught in PSBA for two and one-half (2 1/2) years and one and one-half (1 1/2) years respectively, to them a permanent status cannot be accorded for failure to meet the minimum requirement of three (3) years set by the aforementioned Manual of Regulations. Of equal importance, at this point, is the fact that the letter of appointment had been extended only to Mr. Tamayo and not to Mr. Encarnacion, neither to Mr. Cortes, Jr.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons adverted to hereinabove, the motion for reconsideration, except insofar as We have made the aforementioned clarificatory statements about the tenure of full-time teachers and professors, is hereby DENIED.

In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students to complete their education in the school or university of their choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort to rallies and demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as a part of their freedom of speech and their right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always be conducted peacefully, and without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic freedom in all its forms, demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvert freedom into degenerate license. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 183572 April 13, 2010 YOLANDA M. MERCADO, CHARITO S. DE LEON, DIANA R. LACHICA, MARGARITO M. ALBA, JR., and FELIX A. TONOG, Petitioners, vs. AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE-PARAAQUE CITY, INC. , Respondent. BRION, J.: The petitioners Yolanda M. Mercado (Mercado), Charito S. De Leon (De Leon), Diana R. Lachica (Lachica), Margarito M. Alba, Jr. (Alba, Jr.,), and Felix A. Tonog (Tonog), all former faculty members of AMA Computer College-Paraaque City, Inc. (AMACC) assail in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the Court of Appeals (CA) decision of November 29, 20072 and its resolution of June 20, 2008 that set aside the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC) resolution dated July 18, 2005. THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS The background facts are not disputed and are summarized below. AMACC is an educational institution engaged in computer-based education in the country. One of AMACCs biggest schools in the country is its branch at Paraaque City. The petitioners were faculty members who started teaching at AMACC on May 25, 1998. The petitioner Mercado was engaged as a Professor 3, while petitioner Tonog was engaged as an Assistant Professor 2. On the other hand, petitioners De Leon, Lachica and Alba, Jr., were all engaged as Instructor 1. The petitioners executed individual Teachers Contracts for each of the trimesters that they were engaged to teach, with the following common stipulation: 1. POSITION. The TEACHER has agreed to accept a non-tenured appointment to work in the College of effective to or for the duration of the last term that the TEACHER is given a teaching load based on the assignment duly approved by the DEAN/SAVP-COO.

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For the school year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new faculty screening guidelines, set forth in its Guidelines on the Implementation of AMACC Faculty Plantilla. Under the new screening guidelines, teachers were to be hired or maintained based on extensive teaching experience, capability, potential, high academic qualifications and research background. The performance standards under the new screening guidelines were also used to determine the present faculty members entitlement to salary increases. The petitioners failed to obtain a passing rating based on the performance standards; hence AMACC did not give them any salary increase. Because of AMACCs action on the salary increases, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on July 25, 2000, for underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and overload compensation, 13th month pay, and for discriminatory practices. On September 7, 2000, the petitioners individually received a memorandum from AMACC, through Human Resources Supervisor Mary Grace Beronia, informing them that with the expiration of their contract to teach, their contract would no longer be renewed. The memorandum entitled " Notice of Non-Renewal of Contract" states in full: In view of the expiration of your contract to teach with AMACC-Paranaque, We wish to inform you that your contract shall no longer be renewed effective Thirty (30) days upon receipt of this notice. We therefore would like to thank you for your service and wish you good luck as you pursue your career. You are hereby instructed to report to the HRD for further instruction. Please bear in mind that as per company policy, you are required to accomplish your clearance and turn-over all documents and accountabilities to your immediate superior. For your information and guidance The petitioners amended their labor arbitration complaint to include the charge of illegal dismissal against AMACC. In their Position Paper, the petitioners claimed that their dismissal was illegal because it was made in retaliation for their complaint for monetary benefits and discriminatory practices against AMACC. The petitioners also contended that AMACC failed to give them adequate notice; hence, their dismissal was ineffectual. AMACC contended in response that the petitioners worked under a contracted term under a non-tenured appointment and were still within the three-year probationary period for teachers. Their contracts were not renewed for the following term because they failed to pass the Performance Appraisal System for Teachers (PAST) while others failed to comply with the other requirements for regularization, promotion, or increase in salary. This move, according to AMACC, was justified since the school has to maintain its high academic standards. The Labor Arbiter Ruling On March 15, 2002, Labor Arbiter (LA) Florentino R. Darlucio declared in his decision that the petitioners had been illegally dismissed, and ordered AMACC to reinstate them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay them full backwages, attorneys fees and 13th month pay. The LA ruled that Article 281 of the Labor Code on probationary employment applied to the case; that AMACC allowed the petitioners to teach for the first semester of school year 2000-200; that AMACC did not specify who among the petitioners failed to pass the PAST and who among them did not comply with the other requirements of regularization, promotions or increase in salary; and that the petitioners dismissal could not be sustained on the basis of AMACCs "vague and general allegations" without substantial factual basis. 15 Significantly, the LA found no " discrimination in the adjustments for the salary rate of the faculty members based on the performance and other qualification which is an exercise of management prerogative."16 On this basis, the LA paid no heed to the claims for salary increases. The NLRC Ruling On appeal, the NLRC in a Resolution dated July 18, 2005 denied AMACCs appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the LAs ruling. The NLRC, however, observed that the applicable law is Section 92 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (which mandates a probationary period of nine consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for academic personnel in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis), not Article 281 of the Labor Code (which prescribes a probationary period of six months) as the LA ruled. Despite this observation, the NLRC affirmed the LAs finding of illegal dismissal since the petitioners were terminated on the basis of standards that were only introduced near the end of their probationary period. The NLRC ruled that the new screening guidelines for the school year 2000-20001 cannot be imposed on the petitioners and their employment contracts since the new guidelines were not imposed when the petitioners were first employed in 1998. According to the NLRC, the imposition of the new guidelines violates Section 6(d) of Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, which provides that "in all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement." Citing our ruling in Orient Express Placement Philippines v. NLRC, the NLRC stressed that the rudiments of due process demand that employees should be informed beforehand of the conditions of their employment as well as the basis for their advancement. AMACC elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It charged that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) ruling that the petitioners were illegally dismissed; (2) refusing to recognize and give effect to the petitioners valid term of employment; (3) ruling that AMACC cannot apply the performance standards generally applicable to all faculty members; and (4) ordering the petitioners reinstatement and awarding them backwages and attorneys fees. The CA Ruling In a decision issued on November 29, 2007, the CA granted AMACCs petition for certiorari and dismissed the petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal. The CA ruled that under the Manual for Regulations for Private Schools, a teaching personnel in a private educational institution (1) must be a full time teacher; (2) must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must be satisfactory before he or she can acquire permanent status. The CA noted that the petitioners had not completed three (3) consecutive years of service (i.e. six regular semesters or nine consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service) and were still within their probationary period; their teaching stints only covered a period of two (2) years and three (3) months when AMACC decided not to renew their contracts on September 7, 2000.

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The CA effectively found reasonable basis for AMACC not to renew the petitioners contracts. To the CA, the petitioners were not actually dismissed; their respective contracts merely expired and were no longer renewed by AMACC because they failed to satisfy the schools standards for the school year 2000-2001 that measured their fitness and aptitude to teach as regular faculty members. The CA emphasized that in the absence of any evidence of bad faith on AMACCs part, the court would not disturb or nullify its discretion to set standards and to select for regularization only the teachers who qualify, based on reasonable and non-discriminatory guidelines. The CA disagreed with the NLRCs ruling that the new guidelines for the school year 2000-20001 could not be imposed on the petitioners and their employment contracts. The appellate court opined that AMACC has the inherent right to upgrade the quality of computer education it offers to the public; part of this pursuit is the implementation of continuing evaluation and screening of its faculty members for academic excellence. The CA noted that the nature of education AMACC offers demands that the school constantly adopt progressive performance standards for its faculty to ensure that they keep pace with the rapid developments in the field of information technology. Finally, the CA found that the petitioners were hired on a non-tenured basis and for a fixed and predetermined term based on the Teaching Contract exemplified by the contract between the petitioner Lachica and AMACC. The CA ruled that the non-renewal of the petitioners teaching contracts is sanctioned by the doctrine laid down in Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora20 where the Court recognized the validity of contracts providing for fixed-period employment. THE PETITION The petitioners cite the following errors in the CA decision: 1) The CA gravely erred in reversing the LA and NLRC illegal dismissal rulings; and 2) The CA gravely erred in not ordering their reinstatement with full, backwages. The petitioners submit that the CA should not have disturbed the findings of the LA and the NLRC that they were illegally dismissed; instead, the CA should have accorded great respect, if not finality, to the findings of these specialized bodies as these findings were supported by evidence on record. Citing our ruling in Soriano v. National Labor Relations Commission,22 the petitioners contend that in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusions. They submit that the CA erred when it substituted its judgment for that of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who were the "triers of facts" who had the opportunity to review the evidence extensively. On the merits, the petitioners argue that the applicable law on probationary employment, as explained by the LA, is Article 281 of the Labor Code which mandates a period of six (6) months as the maximum duration of the probationary period unless there is a stipulation to the contrary; that the CA should not have disturbed the LAs conclusion that the AMACC failed to support its allegation that they did not qualify under the new guidelines adopted for the school year 2000-2001; and that they were illegally dismissed; their employment was terminated based on standards that were not made known to them at the time of their engagement. On the whole, the petitioners argue that the LA and the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion that the CA can validly cite. THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT In their Comment, AMACC notes that the petitioners raised no substantial argument in support of their petition and that the CA correctly found that the petitioners were hired on a non-tenured basis and for a fixed or predetermined term. AMACC stresses that the CA was correct in concluding that no actual dismissal transpired; it simply did not renew the petitioners respective employment contracts because of their poor performance and failure to satisfy the schools standards. AMACC also asserts that the petitioners knew very well that the applicable standards would be revised and updated from time to time given the nature of the teaching profession. The petitioners also knew at the time of their engagement that they must comply with the schools regularization policies as stated in the Faculty Manual. Specifically, they must obtain a passing rating on the Performance Appraisal for Teachers (PAST) the primary instrument to measure the performance of faculty members. Since the petitioners were not actually dismissed, AMACC submits that the CA correctly ruled that they are not entitled to reinstatement, full backwages and attorneys fees. THE COURTS RULING We find the petition meritorious. The CAs Review of Factual Findings under Rule 65 We agree with the petitioners that, as a rule in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA does not assess and weigh each piece of evidence introduced in the case. The CA only examines the factual findings of the NLRC to determine whether or not the conclusions are supported by substantial evidence whose absence points to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the recent case of Protacio v. Laya Mananghaya & Co., we emphasized that: As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial evidence. The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate courts reversals of the decisions of labor tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence. As discussed below, our review of the records and of the CA decision shows that the CA erred in recognizing that grave abuse of discretion attended the NLRCs conclusion that the petitioners were illegally dismissed. Consistent with this conclusion, the evidence on record show that AMACC failed to discharge its burden of proving by substantial evidence the just cause for the non-renewal of the petitioners contracts. In Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, we laid down our basic approach in the review of Rule 65 decisions of the CA in labor cases, as follows:

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In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case? Following this approach, our task is to determine whether the CA correctly found that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the petitioners were illegally dismissed. Legal Environment in the Employment of Teachers a. Rule on Employment on Probationary Status A reality we have to face in the consideration of employment on probationary status of teaching personnel is that they are not governed purely by the Labor Code. The Labor Code is supplemented with respect to the period of probation by special rules found in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. 27 On the matter of probationary period, Section 92 of these regulations provides:
Section 92. Probationary Period. Subject in all instances to compliance with the Department and school requirements, the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis.

The CA pointed this out in its decision (as the NLRC also did), and we confirm the correctness of this conclusion. Other than on the period, the following quoted portion of Article 281 of the Labor Code still fully applies: The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. b. Fixed-period Employment The use of employment for fixed periods during the teachers probationary period is likewise an accepted practice in the teaching profession. We mentioned this in passing in Magis Young Achievers Learning Center v. Adelaida P. Manalo,28 albeit a case that involved elementary, not tertiary, education, and hence spoke of a school year rather than a semester or a trimester. We noted in this case: The common practice is for the employer and the teacher to enter into a contract, effective for one school year. At the end of the school year, the employer has the option not to renew the contract, particularly considering the teachers performance. If the contract is not renewed, the employment relationship terminates. If the contract is renewed, usually for another school year, the probationary employment continues. Again, at the end of that period, the parties may opt to renew or not to renew the contract. If renewed, this second renewal of the contract for another school year would then be the last year since it would be the third school year of probationary employment. At the end of this third year, the employer may now decide whether to extend a permanent appointment to the employee, primarily on the basis of the employee having met the reasonable standards of competence and efficiency set by the employer. For the entire duration of this three-year period, the teacher remains under probation. Upon the expiration of his contract of employment, being simply on probation, he cannot automatically claim security of tenure and compel the employer to renew his employment contract. It is when the yearly contract is renewed for the third time that Section 93 of the Manual becomes operative, and the teacher then is entitled to regular or permanent employment status. It is important that the contract of probationary employment specify the period or term of its effectivity. The failure to stipulate its precise duration could lead to the inference that the contract is binding for the full three-year probationary period. We have long settled the validity of a fixed-term contract in the case Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora 29 that AMACC cited. Significantly, Brent happened in a school setting. Care should be taken, however, in reading Brent in the context of this case as Brent did not involve any probationary employment issue; it dealt purely and simply with the validity of a fixed-term employment under the terms of the Labor Code, then newly issued and which does not expressly contain a provision on fixed-term employment. c. Academic and Management Prerogative Last but not the least factor in the academic world, is that a school enjoys academic freedom a guarantee that enjoys protection from the Constitution no less. Section 5(2) Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. The institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide and adopt its aims and objectives, and to determine how these objections can best be attained, free from outside coercion or interference, save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompass the freedom of the school or college to determine for itself: (1) who may teach; (2) who may be taught; (3) how lessons shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study. AMACCs right to academic freedom is particularly important in the present case, because of the new screening guidelines for AMACC faculty put in place for the school year 2000-2001. We agree with the CA that AMACC has the inherent right to establish high standards of competency and efficiency for its faculty members in order to achieve and maintain academic excellence. The schools prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and to determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom that gives the educational institution the right to choose who should teach. In Pea v. National Labor Relations Commission, we emphasized:

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It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since quality education is a mandate of the Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are reasonable and not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them aside. Schools cannot be required to adopt standards which barely satisfy criteria set for government recognition. The same academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for itself the terms and conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the overarching limitations under the Labor Code. Academic freedom, too, is not the only legal basis for AMACCs issuance of screening guidelines. The authority to hire is likewise covered and protected by its management prerogative the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as hiring, the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods, process to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers. Thus, AMACC has every right to determine for itself that it shall use fixed-term employment contracts as its medium for hiring its teachers. It also acted within the terms of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools when it recognized the petitioners to be merely on probationary status up to a maximum of nine trimesters. The Conflict: Probationary Status and Fixed-term Employment The existence of the term-to-term contracts covering the petitioners employment is not disputed, nor is it disputed that they were on probationary status not permanent or regular status from the time they were employed on May 25, 1998 and until the expiration of their Teaching Contracts on September 7, 2000. As the CA correctly found, their teaching stints only covered a period of at least seven (7) consecutive trimesters or two (2) years and three (3) months of service. This case, however, brings to the fore the essential question of which, between the two factors affecting employment, should prevail given AMACCs position that the teachers contracts expired and it had the right not to renew them. In other words, should the teachers probationary status be disregarded simply because the contracts were fixed-term? The provision on employment on probationary status under the Labor Code is a primary example of the fine balancing of interests between labor and management that the Code has institutionalized pursuant to the underlying intent of the Constitution. On the one hand, employment on probationary status affords management the chance to fully scrutinize the true worth of hired personnel before the full force of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution comes into play. Based on the standards set at the start of the probationary period, management is given the widest opportunity during the probationary period to reject hirees who fail to meet its own adopted but reasonable standards. These standards, together with the just and authorized causes for termination of employment the Labor Code expressly provides, are the grounds available to terminate the employment of a teacher on probationary status. For example, the school may impose reasonably stricter attendance or report compliance records on teachers on probation, and reject a probationary teacher for failing in this regard, although the same attendance or compliance record may not be required for a teacher already on permanent status. At the same time, the same just and authorizes causes for dismissal under the Labor Code apply to probationary teachers, so that they may be the first to be laid-off if the school does not have enough students for a given semester or trimester. Termination of employment on this basis is an authorized cause under the Labor Code. Labor, for its part, is given the protection during the probationary period of knowing the company standards the new hires have to meet during the probationary period, and to be judged on the basis of these standards, aside from the usual standards applicable to employees after they achieve permanent status. Under the terms of the Labor Code, these standards should be made known to the teachers on probationary status at the start of their probationary period, or at the very least under the circumstances of the present case, at the start of the semester or the trimester during which the probationary standards are to be applied. Of critical importance in invoking a failure to meet the probationary standards, is that the school should show as a matter of due process how these standards have been applied. This is effectively the second notice in a dismissal situation that the law requires as a due process guarantee supporting the security of tenure provision, and is in furtherance, too, of the basic rule in employee dismissal that the employer carries the burden of justifying a dismissal. These rules ensure compliance with the limited security of tenure guarantee the law extends to probationary employees. When fixed-term employment is brought into play under the above probationary period rules, the situation as in the present case may at first blush look muddled as fixed-term employment is in itself a valid employment mode under Philippine law and jurisprudence. 45 The conflict, however, is more apparent than real when the respective nature of fixed-term employment and of employment on probationary status are closely examined. The fixed-term character of employment essentially refers to the period agreed upon between the employer and the employee; employment exists only for the duration of the term and ends on its own when the term expires. In a sense, employment on probationary status also refers to a period because of the technical meaning " probation" carries in Philippine labor law a maximum period of six months, or in the academe, a period of three years for those engaged in teaching jobs. Their similarity ends there, however, because of the overriding meaning that being "on probation" connotes, i.e., a process of testing and observing the character or abilities of a person who is new to a role or job. Understood in the above sense, the essentially protective character of probationary status for management can readily be appreciated. But this same protective character gives rise to the countervailing but equally protective rule that the probationary period can only last for a specific maximum period and under reasonable, well-laid and properly communicated standards. Otherwise stated, within the period of the probation, any employer move based on the probationary standards and affecting the continuity of the employment must strictly conform to the probationary rules. Under the given facts where the school year is divided into trimesters, the school apparently utilizes its fixed-term contracts as a convenient arrangement dictated by the trimestral system and not because the workplace parties really intended to limit the period of their relationship to any fixed term and to finish this relationship at the end of that term. If we pierce the veil, so to speak, of the parties so-called fixed-term employment contracts, what undeniably comes out at the core is a fixed-term contract conveniently used by the school to define and regulate its relations with its teachers during their probationary period.

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To be sure, nothing is illegitimate in defining the school-teacher relationship in this manner. The school, however, cannot forget that its system of fixed-term contract is a system that operates during the probationary period and for this reason is subject to the terms of Article 281 of the Labor Code. Unless this reconciliation is made, the requirements of this Article on probationary status would be fully negated as the school may freely choose not to renew contracts simply because their terms have expired. The inevitable effect of course is to wreck the scheme that the Constitution and the Labor Code established to balance relationships between labor and management. Given the clear constitutional and statutory intents, we cannot but conclude that in a situation where the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-term contract not specifically used for the fixed term it offers, Article 281 should assume primacy and the fixed-period character of the contract must give way. This conclusion is immeasurably strengthened by the petitioners and the AMACCs hardly concealed expectation that the employment on probation could lead to permanent status, and that the contracts are renewable unless the petitioners fail to pass the schools standards. To highlight what we mean by a fixed-term contract specifically used for the fixed term it offers, a replacement teacher, for example, may be contracted for a period of one year to temporarily take the place of a permanent teacher on a one-year study leave. The expiration of the replacement teachers contracted term, under the circumstances, leads to no probationary status implications as she was never employed on probationary basis; her employment is for a specific purpose with particular focus on the term and with every intent to end her teaching relationship with the school upon expiration of this term. If the school were to apply the probationary standards (as in fact it says it did in the present case), these standards must not only be reasonable but must have also been communicated to the teachers at the start of the probationary period, or at the very least, at the start of the period when they were to be applied. These terms, in addition to those expressly provided by the Labor Code, would serve as the just cause for the termination of the probationary contract. As explained above, the details of this finding of just cause must be communicated to the affected teachers as a matter of due process. AMACC, by its submissions, admits that it did not renew the petitioners contracts because they failed to pass the Performance Appraisal System for Teachers (PAST) and other requirements for regularization that the school undertakes to maintain its high academic standards. The evidence is unclear on the exact terms of the standards, although the school also admits that these were standards under the Guidelines on the Implementation of AMACC Faculty Plantilla put in place at the start of school year 2000-2001. While we can grant that the standards were duly communicated to the petitioners and could be applied beginning the 1st trimester of the school year 2000-2001, glaring and very basic gaps in the schools evidence still exist. The exact terms of the standards were never introduced as evidence; neither does the evidence show how these standards were applied to the petitioners. Without these pieces of evidence (effectively, the finding of just cause for the non-renewal of the petitioners contracts), we have nothing to consider and pass upon as valid or invalid for each of the petitioners. Inevitably, the non-renewal (or effectively, the termination of employment of employees on probationary status) lacks the supporting finding of just cause that the law requires and, hence, is illegal. In this light, the CA decision should be reversed. Thus, the LAs decision, affirmed as to the results by the NLRC, should stand as the decision to be enforced, appropriately re-computed to consider the period of appeal and review of the case up to our level. Given the period that has lapsed and the inevitable change of circumstances that must have taken place in the interim in the academic world and at AMACC, which changes inevitably affect current school operations, we hold that - in lieu of reinstatement - the petitioners should be paid separation pay computed on a trimestral basis from the time of separation from service up to the end of the complete trimester preceding the finality of this Decision. The separation pay shall be in addition to the other awards, properly recomputed, that the LA originally decreed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition, and, consequently, REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 2007 and its Resolution dated June 20, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96599. The Labor Arbiters decision of March 15, 2002, subsequently affirmed as to the results by the National Labor Relations Commission, stands and should be enforced with appropriate re-computation to take into account the date of the finality of this Decision. In lieu of reinstatement, AMA Computer College-Paraaque City, Inc. is hereby DIRECTED to pay separation pay computed on a trimestral basis from the time of separation from service up to the end of the complete trimester preceding the finality of this Decision. For greater certainty, the petitioners are entitled to: (a) backwages and 13th month pay computed from September 7, 2000 (the date AMA Computer College-Paraaque City, Inc. illegally dismissed the petitioners) up to the finality of this Decision; (b) monthly honoraria (if applicable) computed from September 7, 2000 (the time of separation from service) up to the finality of this Decision; and (c) separation pay on a trimestral basis from September 7, 2000 (the time of separation from service) up to the end of the complete trimester preceding the finality of this Decision.
The labor arbiter is hereby ORDERED to make another re-computation according to the above directives. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993 ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S. J., DEAN CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS HERRAS, FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE CLARO TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON ERENETA. petitioners, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTC-Makati, Br. 134, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO AMADO SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM JR., MANUEL ESCONA and JUDE FERNANDEZ, respondents. ROMERO, J.: In 1975, the Court was confronted with a mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, a religious seminary which has a working arrangement with the Ateneo de Manila University regarding accreditation of common students, to allow petitioner who had taken some courses therein for credit during summer, to continue her studies. Squarely meeting the issue, we dismissed the petition on the ground that students in the position of petitioner possess, not a right, but a privilege, to be admitted to the institution. Not

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having satisfied the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding since there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of the respondent to admit the petitioner, the petition did not prosper. In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, as recognized by the Constitution, the concept encompassing the right of a school to choose its students. Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to refuse admittance to its students, this time in Ateneo de Manila University proper, is again challenged. Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the opening paragraph, the individual concerned was not a regular student, the respondents in the case at bar, having been previously enrolled in the University, seek re-admission. Moreover, in the earlier case, the petitioner was refused admittance, not on such considerations as personality traits and character orientation, or even inability to meet the institution's academic or intellectual standards, but because of her behavior in the classroom. The school pointedly informed her that ". . . it would seem to be in your best interest to work with a Faculty that is more compatible with your orientations." On the other hand, students who are now being refused admission into petitioner University have been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The case attracted much publicity due to the death of one of the neophytes and serious physical injuries inflicted on another. Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add another dimension to the concept of academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, this time a case fraught with social and emotional overtones. The facts which gave rise to this case which is far from novel, are as follows: As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in joining its ranks. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of petitioner university, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital on February 10, 1991. He was not the lone victim, though, for another freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-FacultyStudent Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. 3 Through their respective counsels, they requested copies of the charges and pertinent documents or affidavits. In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge on or before February 18, 1991; otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defenses. On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board composed of petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio Escolin, Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges against respondent students. In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent students were informed that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The complaint/charge against you arose from initiations held on February 8-10, 1991. The evidence against you consist of testimonies of students, showing your participation in acts prohibited by the School regulations." Finally, it ordered respondent students to file their written answers to the above charge on or before February 22 1991, otherwise they would be deemed to have waived their defenses. In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students, through counsel, requested that the investigation against them be held in abeyance, pending action on their request for copies of the evidence against them. Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear before it at a hearing on February 28, 1991 to clarify their answer with regard to the charges filed by the investigating committee for violation of Rule No. 3. However, in a letter to petitioners dated February 27, 1991, counsel for respondent students moved to postpone the hearing from February 28, 1991 to March 1, 1991. 7 Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on March 2, 1991 for clarificatory questions. 8 They were also informed that:
a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in accordance with the rules laid down in the case of Guzman vs. National University; b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the affiants-neophytes; c) Hazing which is not defined in the School catalogue shall be defined in accordance with the proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No. 3815; d) The Board will take into consideration the degree of participation of the petitioners in the alleged hazing incident in imposing the penalty; e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to the President of the University, i. e., Respondent Joaquin Bernas S. J.

On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean Castillo that, "in cases where the Disciplinary Board is not prepared to impose the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that the Board leave the decision on the penalty to the Administration so that this case be decided not just on the Law School level but also on the University level." In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The Board found that respondent students acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege," which allows them to participate in the physical hazing. Although respondent students claim that they were there to assist and attend to the needs of the neophytes, actually they were assigned a definite supportive role to play in the organized activity. Their guilt was heightened by the fact that they made no effort to

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prevent the infliction of further physical punishment on the neophytes under their care. The Board considered respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of hazing. In conclusion, the Board pronounced respondents guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through acquiescence. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. 11 Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the President of the University the decision of whether to expel respondents or not. Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10, 1991, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus: "that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that even assuming they did not lay hands on the neophytes," respondents students are still guilty in accordance with the principle that "where two or more persons act together in the commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is responsible for the whole." Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which led to the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the "offense of the respondents can be characterized as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian education and contrary to civilized behavior." Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. 12 In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and concurred in by petitioner Fr. Bernas, 13 the Board excluded respondent students Abas and Mendoza from the coverage of the resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch as at the time the latter resolution was promulgated, neither had as yet submitted their case to the Board. Said resolution also set the investigation of the two students on March 21, 1991. On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 14 alleging that they were currently enrolled as students for the second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order is issued, they would be prevented from taking their examinations. The petition principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal. On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order the enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent students and stopping the former from conducting hearings relative to the hazing incident. 15 Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary restraining order were then held. On April 7, 1991, the temporary restraining order were issued on March 18, 1991 lapsed. Consequently, a day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon Ereeta to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, to include the aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional respondents to the original petition. Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement Petition arguing that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process in the conduct of investigations by the Disciplinary Board against respondent students; that a supplemental petition cannot be admitted without the same being set for hearing and that the supplemental petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in effect, extend the previous restraining order beyond its mandatory 20-day lifetime. Acting on the urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondents Judge Capulong, granted respondent students' prayer on April 10, 1991. On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent students. Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to conduct special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the students were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final determination of the issue of the instant case. Lastly, it directed respondent students to file a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. 19 On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza and directed the dropping of their names from its roll of students. The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by respondents of a bond dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00. Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of respondent judge. In the case at bar, we come to grips with two relevant issues on academic freedom, namely: (1) whether a school is within its rights in expelling students from its academic community pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (2) whether or not the penalty imposed by the school administration is proper under the circumstances. We grant the petition and reverse the order of respondent judge ordering readmission of respondent students. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he ruled that respondent students had been denied due process in the investigation of the charges against them. It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them was arrived at without affording them their right to procedural due process. We are constrained to disagree as we find no indication that such right has been violated. On the contrary, respondent students' rights in a school disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National University, Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C. Branch 23 and Non v. Dames II have been meticulously respected by petitioners in the various investigative proceedings held before they were expelled. Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their argument that it is Ang Tibay case and not the Guzman case which is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

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(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident, 27 the records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. 28 While of the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their statements. 29 Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them. The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students. Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. 31 Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz. Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions. With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault petitioners for not explicitly defining the word "hazing" and allege that there is no proof that they were furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of students who aspire to be future members of the Bar. It cannot be overemphasized that the charge filed before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved. As we have had occasion to declare in previous cases a similar nature, due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. 34 Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal information or complaint. Having given prior notice to the students involved that "hazing" which is not defined in the School Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be said. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation under scrutiny. Hazing, as a ground for disciplining students, to the extent of dismissal or expulsion, finds its raison d' etre in the increasing frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the neophytes by their insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes the test of reasonableness and absence of malice on the part of the school authorities. Far from fostering comradeship and esprit d' corps, it has merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of those who aspire to eventual leadership in our country. Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, 36 as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from petitioner university. Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a Temporary Restraining Order since petitioners do not stand to suffer irreperable damage in the event that private respondents are allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and found by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do. More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitutions. At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, thus: (1) who may teach: (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study. Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of the State" has deservedly earned for himself a respected place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of his was the "best, the most sensible, and the most sensible, and the most just man of his age." In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of hemlock as punishment for alleged "corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own words how this charge of "corruption," the forerunner of the concept of academic freedom, came about:

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Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord: they like to heart the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and examine others themselves; there are plenty of person, as they soon discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me. This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth. And then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has been detected which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies.

Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have similarly defied the stifling strictures of authority, whether State, Church, or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein to their ideas. Particularly odious were the insidious and blatant attempts at thought control during the time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval universities, renowned as intellectual centers in Europe, gradually lost their autonomy. In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the way, were gradually crystallized in the cluster of freedoms which awaited the champions and martyrs of the dawning modern age. This was exemplified by the professors of the new German universities in the 16th and 17th centuries such as the Universities of Leiden (1554), Helmstatdt (1574) and Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to freedom of inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental human rights of the 19th and 20th centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words, with the right of individuals in university communities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external interference or pressure. But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have been stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. The components of this aspect of academic freedom have been categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach. It is to be realized that this individual aspects of academic freedom could have developed only pari passu with its institutional counterpart. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study. In the Philippines, the Acts which are passed with the change of sovereignty from the Spanish to the American government, namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made no mention of the rights now subsumed under the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most especially true with respect to the institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting of the Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal protection. The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which stated: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." The only State University at that time, being the University of the Philippines, the Charter was perceived by some as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said institution at the expense of the rest. In attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973 Constitution provided in its Section 8(2): "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his interpretation of the provision, former U.P. President Vicente G. Sinco, who was also a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, declared that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the University as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." Has the right been carried over the to the present Constitution? In an attempt to give an explicit definition with an expanded coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of the 1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none too different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom." 40 More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . . . " Gascon finished off the broken thought, "the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes." Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 41 we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. "For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This extends as well to parents as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools." Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.

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Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the ponoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in Holfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their own a Christian school that includes Theology as part of its curriculum and assidously strives to turn out individuals of unimpeachable morals and integrity in the mold of the founder of the order of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their barbaric and ruthless acts are the more reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man. In essence, education must ultimately be religious not in the sense that the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is "an education which inculcates duty and reverence." 45 It appears that the particular brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila has been lost on the respondent students. Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them. Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student body." 46 Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such a congruence between the offense committed and the sanction imposed was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento. Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by petitioner university, we see no reason to reverse its decision founded on the following undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing activities; that respondent students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a result of the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious physical injuries, while Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of respondent students upon those whom ironically they would claim as "brothers" after the initiation rites, how can we countenance the imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even suspension? We, therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon respondent students. This finds authority and justification in Section 146 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of respondent Judge dated May 17, 1991 reinstating respondents students into petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of Ateneo de Manila University dated March 1991, is REINSTATED and the decision of the Special Board DISMISSING respondent students ADEL ABAS and ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May 20, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 103142 November 8, 1993 MANUELITO A. ISABELO, JR., petitioner, vs. PERPETUAL HELP COLLEGE OF RIZAL, INC., and DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents. VITUG, J.: A student, Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., filed the instant petition for mandamus with the following prayer:
WHEREFORE petitioner prays for a writ of mandamus addressed to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) to implement its order to re-admit him as a senior graduating student of respondent Perpetual Help College of Rizal (PHCR), and for the latter to re-admit him as a senior graduating student for March, 1992. He prays for a temporary mandatory restraining order to compel his re-admission as a senior graduating student for March 1992 while his petition is pending resolution.

We granted, in our resolution of 23 June 1992, the temporary mandatory relief prayed for. Manuelito was enrolled at the Perpetual Help College of Rizal ("PHCR") for the degree of Bachelor of Science in Criminology. He was elected Public Relations Officer ("PRO") of the Supreme Student Council sometime in August 1990. Until September 1991, he was the hold-over PRO and the acting Secretary of the student council. In this capacity, he was invited to attend a meeting with PHCR officials on 08 May 1991. Prior to said meeting, he was asked by the Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. Grace De Leon, to sign Resolution No. 105 that would implement, among other things, a 20% tuition fee increase for the school year 1991-1992. 2 Manuelito refused to sign the resolution; instead he asked for a 2-week period to take the matter up with fellow officers. 3 During the scheduled 08 May 1991 meeting, the student council presented to PHCR a 9-point proposal. With an assurance that the request of the student council would be considered favorably, the petitioner finally signed Resolution No. 105. On 06 August 1991, PHCR announced that its application for increase in tuition fees and other school charges for SY 1991-1992 for the three levels, namely, the Grade School, High School and College, was approved by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"). 4 The student council filed with the DECS a motion for reconsideration. Acting on the students' motion, the DECS, in its letter of 28 August 1991 addressed to the President of PHCR, advised that the "collection of the increase (should) be held in abeyance pending the resolution of (the) matter." In the meantime, the CMT commandant furnished PHCR a memorandum, dated 20 August 1991, containing a list of PHCR CMT students (Manuelito included) who were dropped during the first semester of school year 1991-1992, with a recommendation that appropriate action be taken on said students. On 04 September 1991, the school administration circulated a memorandum 7 to the effect that Manuelito had been dropped from PHCR's list of students. On even date, a letter from Registrar Necy Buen was received by Manuelito, informing him that PHCR was voiding his enrollment for the first semester of 1991-1992 because of the following deficiencies:
* Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No. 80, S. 1991 and PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007; * No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology course;

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* Official Admission Credential not yet submitted; * Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and 22) which are docketed in the registration card.

Beginning 05 September 1991, Manuelito was no longer allowed to enter the school premises. He forthwith sent a letter to the DECS informing the latter of the matter. On October 15, 1991, Director Rosas of the DECS issued an order 9 addressed to the President of PHCR, stating, inter alia, that:
. . . concerning the dropping from the rolls without due process of the students petitioners . . . , Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., . . ., please be advised that pending resolution thereof, the propriety of allowing the students to continue attending their classes to protect their interest as well as that of the school, is hereby enjoined. In this connection, it is hereby directed that the above-named students be re-admitted to classes and be allowed to take all examinations that they have missed pending final resolution of this case/issue.

PHCR did not comply with the directive. Hence this recourse. The petitioner questions PHCR's act of voiding his enrollment. While this Court, on 23 June 1992, issued a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering and directing PHCR to readmit the petitioner for enrollment, the same was interdicted by PHCR's motion for clarification 11 that indeed would require factual assessments that have yet to be conclusively passed upon administratively. The petitioner claims that the real reason why PHCR has voided his enrollment as a senior graduating student had been because of his active participation in opposing PHCR's application for tuition fee increase with the DECS. The private respondent, on the other hand, invokes "academic freedom" in dropping the petitioner from its roll of students. It argues that the petitioner has only been allowed to enroll "conditionally" during the first semester of school year 1991-92 pending the completion of his remedial classes in CMT, in which he failed. The rule in this jurisdiction since Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology, reiterated in Tangonan vs. Pao, 13 has been to uphold the rule that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon the school and that such an admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right, on the part of the student. In Ateneo de Manila University vs. Capulong, this Court cited with approval the formulation made by Justice Felix Frankfurter of the essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompassing not only "the freedom to determine on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught and how it shall be taught," but likewise "who may be admitted to study." We have thus sanctioned its valid invocation by a school in rejecting students who are academically delinquent, or a laywoman seeking admission to a seminary, 17 or students violating "School Rules on Discipline." Like any other right, however, academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every "person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Another observation. In Non vs. Dames II, we have already abandoned our earlier ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA, (that enrollment of a student is a semester-to-semester contract, and that the school may not be compelled to renew the contract) by recognizing instead the right of a student to be enrolled for the entire period in order to complete his course. We have also stressed that the contract between the school and the student, imbued, as it is, with public interest, is not an ordinary contract. In this instance, it would seem that the principal reason forwarded by the private respondent in dropping the petitioner from its roll of students was his failure to complete some remaining units in the CMT course. He was unceremoniously dropped from the roll when the semester was about to end sometime in October. He took special training during the semestral break (which was the most reasonable time to comply), and he was able to pass it, but PHCR still refused to give him that accreditation, insisting that he by then had ceased to be a student of PHCR. While we ordinarily would not delve into the exercise of sound judgment, we will not, however, hesitate to act when we perceive taints of arbitrariness in the process. The punishment of expulsion appears to us rather disproportionate to his having had some deficiencies in his CMT course. Indeed the DECS itself is conceding to the grant of the instant petition. The circumstances lend truth to the petitioner's claim that the private respondent has strongly been influenced by his active participation in questioning PHCR's application for tuition fee increase. There remains, however, an administrative determination, to be yet resolved with finality by the DECS, i.e., whether the petitioner really deserves to be in senior class, as he claims, or has a number of school deficiencies to overcome, as the respondent school counters. Hence, the issuance of a writ of mandamus at this time would not be warranted. We have repeatedly said that for a writ of mandamus to issue, a petitioner should, on the one hand, have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be, upon the other hand, an imperative duty of respondent to perform the act sought to be mandated. This Court, not being a trier of facts, must remand this matter to the DECS for its own evaluation and final determination.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the department of Education, Culture, and Sports for its expeditious determination on the unresolved administrative issues raised in the instant petition. No costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 79237 October 18, 1988 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS and VICTORIA A. SATORRE petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JENNIFER C. LEE, respondents. GANCAYCO, J.: The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a university to confer a degree with honors. The secondary question is whether or not the refusal of that university to confer honors would constitute bad faith so as to make it liable for damages. Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filed an action for mandamus with damages against petitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A. Satorre, docketed as Civil Case No. R22022 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Cebu, asking that petitioners be compelled to confer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, cum laude, retroactive to March 28, 1982, to execute and deliver to her all necessary credentials evidencing her graduation with honors, and to pay her moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

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After trial, the lower court rendered its Decision dated January 29, 1986, 1 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, and accordingly, defendants University of San Carlos and Dean Victoria A. Satorre are ordered to confer upon plaintiff, Jennifer C. Lee, the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in accounting, with cum laude honors (sic), retroactive to March 28, 1982, and to execute and deliver to plaintiff all the necessary school credentials evidencing her graduation with such honors; and said defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P75,000 as moral damages, the sum of P20,000 as exemplary damages, with interest thereon at 12% per annum beginning July 22, 1982, until said amounts are fully paid: and the sum of P15,000 as attorney's fees. The counterclaim is ordered dismissed. Costs against defendants. 2

Petitioners appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-09368. In a decision dated May 28, 1987, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in a Reso. of the appellate court dated July 7, 1987. Hence, this petition where petitioners allege as grounds thereof(a) A university may not be compelled by mandamus to grant graduation honors to any student who, according to the university's standards, rules and regulations, does not qualify for such honors; and (b) The decision penalizing petitioners to pay excessive moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees is not justified by the facts and circumstances of this case and disregards the many decisions of this Honorable Court setting reasonable standards and limits in the award of such damages.

Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University of San Carlos (USC), during the first semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of the second semester of that school year, she obtained a grade of "I.C." Incomplete in Architecture 121, and grades of "5's" failures in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123. The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the USC. Some of the units she had completed when she was still an architecture student were then carried over and credited in her new course. As a commerce student, she obtained good grades. However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in the College of Architecture and that the same would be taken into consideration in the evaluation of her overall academic performance to determine if she could graduate with honors. So, on December 10, 1981, she wrote 5 the Council of Deans of the USC, requesting that her grades of 5s in Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the computation of her grade average. She wrote a similar letter to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports MECS in Region VII on January 5, 1982 6 and this letter was referred to the President of the USC for comment and return to the MECS. In the 3rd Endorsement dated February 4, 1982, the President of the USC informed the MECS that the university policy was that any failing grade obtained by a student in any course would disqualify the student for honors; that to deviate from that policy would mean injustice to students similarly situated before who were not allowed to graduate with honors; that the bad grades given to her were justified and could not be deleted or removed because her subjects were not "dropped" as required; that she had two failures and one incomplete grade which became a failure upon her inaction to attend to the incomplete grade within one year; and that while her three failures did not affect her graduation from the College of Commerce, they nonetheless caused her disqualification from graduating with honors. She was furnished a copy of said endorsement but she did not ask for reconsideration. On March 17, 1982, when the USC President was out of town, private respondent wrote to the USC Registrar' requesting that her failing grades be changed. The USC Registrar 7 referred her letter to the MECS and the request for change of grades was approved in a 4th endorsement of March 22, 1982. 8 Thus, her grade of IC in Architecture 121 was changed to "1.9" by Professor Victor Leves Jr. and the grades of "5" in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 were changed to "W" (Withdrawn). On March 24, 1982, Mr. Marcelo Bacalso of MECS' Higher Education Division discovered that the change of the grade of private respondent from "IC" to "1.9" did not have the supporting class record required, so he wrote to MECS Supervisor Mr. Ortiz requesting the submission of the class record. On March 28, 1982, the USC held its graduation exercises, and the private respondent graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, without honors. On March 31, 1982, the private respondent, assisted by counsel, demanded from Dean Victoria A. Satorre that she be allowed to graduate, cum laude. 10 Dean Satorre explained that the matter was held in abeyance pending compliance with certain requirements of the MECS through the memo of Mr. Bacalso. 11 On May 24, 1982, Arch. Leves Jr., the teacher required to produce the class records, reported he could not produce the same. Thus, on May 27, 1982, Dean Satorre wrote to the MECS Regional Director Aurelio Tiro asking for the revocation of the change of grades of private respondent. The request was denied as there was no positive proof of fraud. It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. In this case, the petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students and all other interested parties advise on the University policies and rules on enrollment and academic achievements. Therein it is provided, among others, that a student may not officially withdraw from subjects in the curriculum if he does not have the written permission of his parents or guardian. 15 For an incomplete grade, there must be an application for completion or removal within the period announced by the school calendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it automatically becomes final. A "DR" (Dropped) subject which is in the same category, as a "5" disqualifies a student from receiving honors. 17 A candidate for honors should have earned no less than 18 units per semester but a working student should earn no less that 12 units. A failure in any subject disqualifies a student from honors. Good moral character and exemplary conduct are as important criteria for honors as academic achievements. Private respondent should know and is presumed to know those University policies and is bound to comply therewith.

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It is precisely because she knew of these rules that she exerted all efforts to have her final grades of "5's" in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 be disregarded in the computation of honors. When her request was denied by the university, she did not ask for a reconsideration thereof. Instead, in the middle part of March 1982 when the USC President was out of town, she wrote another letter to the USC registrar asking her failing grades be changed as above related. The matter was referred to the MECS and the request was approved on March 22,1982. However, when it was discovered thereafter that the change of private respondent's grades from "IC" TO "1.9" was not supported by the corresponding class records and its production was required the same could not be produced. There is thus no justification for said change of grade. Moreover, the request for the change of the grade of incomplete was not made by private respondent within one (1) year so that it became final according to the rules. By the same token, the change of the grades of private respondent from "5" to "W" (Withdrawn) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 was without the written permission of her parents or guardian. Indeed, it is unusual that a student who got a "5" in a subject, as in this case, should still be allowed to withdraw from such subject. Withdrawal from subjects is not ordinarily allowed after mid-term examination 20 much less after a failing grade in the subject has been received. The change of grades of private respondent is thus open to question. Obviously, private respondent employed undue and improper pressure on the MECS authorities to approve the change of her grades to remove all obstacle to her graduation with honors. Petitioners' claim that the change of grades of the private respondent was attended with fraud is not entirely misplaced. Petitioners cannot be faulted for refusing to vest the honors demanded of them by the private respondent. One failure would have been sufficient to disqualify her but she had one incomplete and two failures. Her only change was to reverse her failing grades. This she accomplished thru the back door. Nevertheless, even if she succeeded in removing her failing grades, it was still within the sound discretion of the petitioners to determine whether private respondent was entitled to graduate with honors. The Court finds that petitioners did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying the honors sought by private respondent under the circumstances. Indeed, the aforesaid change of grades did not automatically entitle her to the award of honors. Private respondent not having demonstrated that she has a clear legal right to the honors sought, her claim for damages must necessarily fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the subject decision of the respondent court of May 28, 1987 and its resolution of July 7, 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 88386 August 17, 1989 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE UP BOARD OF REGENTS AND DEAN PATRICIO LAZARO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Br. VI, RTC-BAGUIO CITY, AND UP COLLEGE BAGUIO HIGH SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, SALVADOR VALDEZ, JR., respondents.BIDIN, J.: This is a petition for certiorari, with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, seeking to annul the Orders of respondent Judge dated May 25, 1989 and June 14, 1989 in Civil Case No. 1748-R entitled, "UP College Baguio High School Foundation, Inc., et al,, v. The University of the Philippines, et al.," restraining petitioners from implementing the decision of the Board of Regents to phase out the UP College Baguio High School (UPCBHS) and the Memorandum of petitioner Dean Patricio Lazaro directing the principal of UPCBHS not to accept new incoming freshmen for the school year 1989-1990. Sometime in 1972, the UP Board of Regents approved the establishment of UPCBHS as an integral part of the graduate program in education to serve, among others, as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective teachers. Provided, however, that UPCBHS must be self-supporting and should not entail any subsidy from the budget of the UP. In 1978, the Board of Regents provided for the establishment of a Division of Education in UP College Baguio (UPCB) which shall be composed of a Department of Professional Education and a High School Department. However, the Department of Professional Education was never organized, although the High School Department has been in continuous operation. In 1981, the Committee to Review Academic Program recommended the abolition of the UPCBHS. In 1985, the Program Review Committee likewise asked the UPCB to look into the viability of its secondary education program on account of limited financial resources plus the fact that UPCBHS failed to serve as a laboratory school for teacher training program as UPCB does not offer programs in Education. Subsequently, various discussions were held on the proposed phase-out of the UPCBHS. On January 30,1989, the UP Board of Regents approved the proposed phase-out of UPCBHS on the grounds, inter alia, that only an insignificant number of UPCBHS graduates qualified for admission and actually enrolled in UPCB and that UPCBHS is not serving as a laboratory or demonstration school for prospective teachers much less a selfsupporting unit. Subsequently, petitioner Dean Patricio Lazaro issued a memorandum directing the UPCBHS Principal not to accept new incoming high school freshmen for the school year 1989- 1990. On May 25,1989, respondent UP College Baguio High School Foundation Inc., represented by its president, filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Br. VI, presided by respondent Judge against herein petitioners, for Injunction with preliminary preventive and mandatory injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No. 1748-R, alleging among others, that the decision of the UP Board of Regents to phase out the UPCBHS is without legal basis and unconstitutional. Thereafter, respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders restraining petitioners from implementing the Board's decision to phase out UPCBHS and the memorandum of Dean Patricio Lazaro. Petitioners' motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 1748-R was denied by respondent Judge. Hence, this petition. On June 27,1989, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the implementation of the assailed orders of respondent Judge. Petitioners contend, among other things, that the decision of the UP Board of Regents to phase out the UPCBHS is an exercise of academic freedom guaranteed by the Constitution (Art. XIV, Sec. 5, par. 2).

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Respondents, on the other hand, take issue not with the exercise of academic freedom but rather on the right to quality education (Art. XIV, Sec. 1) and free public secondary education (Art. XIV, Sec. 2, par. 2) mandated by the Constitution and RA 6655, otherwise known as "Free Public Secondary Education Act of 1988." Respondents ' contend that the abolition of the UPCBHS would be violative of said rights. The conflict of the present petition pits the concept of academic freedom as against the right to free public secondary education. Art. XIV, Section 2, [2] of the Constitution, provides: "The State shall establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the right of natural parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age." On the other hand, Art. XIV, Section 5 [2], provides: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." Is secondary public education demandable in an institution of higher learning such as the University of the Philippines? We rule in the negative. It is beyond cavil that the UP, as an institution of higher learning, enjoys academic freedomthe institutional kind. In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology (68 SCRA 277 [1975]), the Court had occasion to note the scope of academic freedom recognized by the Constitution as follows:
It is to be noted that the reference is to the 'institutions of higher learning' as the recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent.
xxx xxx xxx

It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedom of a universityto determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study "' (Emphasis supplied; citing Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 491, (1962) and the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (354 US 234 [1957]).

RA 6655, otherwise known as the "Free Public Secondary Education Act of 1988," includes in its coverage state colleges and universities (SCUs) offering secondary courses. Respondents contend that since a secondary course is being offered in UPCB, petitioners cannot unilaterally withdraw therefrom, otherwise, the said Act would be nothing but a mere nullity for all other SCUs. Besides, respondents contend, petitioners already recognized the applicability of Rep. Act No. 6655 when they implemented the same at the UPCBHS for School Year 1988-89 and petitioners' assertion that UPCBHS was established only if it would be "self-supporting and should not entail any subsidy from the budget of UP" is but a lame excuse. At this juncture, it must be pointed out that UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditionalities, e.g., it must be self-supporting, it can serve as a feeder for the UP at Baguio, it can serve as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective teachers, failing in which the University can order its abolition on academic grounds, specially where the purposes for which it was established was not satisfied. Specifically, the University of the Philippines was created under its Charter (Act No. 1870 [1908], as amended) to provide advanced tertiary education and not secondary education. Section 2 of said Act states that "the purpose of said University shall be to provide advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and to give professional and technical training." It is apparent that secondary education is not the mandated function of the University of the Philippines; consequently, the latter can validly phase out and/or abolish the UPCBHS especially so when the requirements for its continuance have not been met, Rep. Act No. 6655 to the contrary notwithstanding. The findings of facts by the Board of Regents which led to its decision to phase out the UPCBHS must be accorded respect, if not finality. Acts of an administrative agency within their areas of competence must be casually overturned by the courts. It must be emphasized that UPCBHS was established as a component of the tertiary level, i.e., the teacher/training program. As it turned out however, the latter program was not viable in UPCB thereby necessitating the phasing out of UPCBHS, the rationale being its reasons for existence no longer exists. On this score, UPCBHS differs from the other UP high schools in Iloilo, Diliman, Cebu and Los Ba;os. The latter schools serve as laboratory schools for the College of Education in said areas, whereas, in Baguio, there is no College of Education. A careful perusal of RA 6655 could not lend respondents a helping hand either. Said Act implements the policy of the State to provide free public secondary education (Sec. 4) and vests the formulation of a secondary public education curriculum (Sec. 5), the nationalization of public secondary schools (Sec. 7) and the implementation of the rules and regulations thereof (Sec. 9) upon the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). RA 6655 complements Sec. 2 (2), Art XIV of the Constitution which mandates that the State shall establish and maintain a system of free public secondary education. However, this mandate is not directed to institutions of higher learning like UP but to the government through the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). As an institution of higher learning enjoying academic freedom, the UP cannot be compelled to provide for secondary education. However, should UP operate a high school in the exercise of its academic freedom, RA 6655 requires that the students enrolled therein "shall be free from payment of tuition and other school fees. In view of the foregoing, respondents do not have a clear legal right to UP secondary education. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to Grant the petition. The assailed Orders of respondent Judge dated May 25, 1989 and June 14, 1989 are hereby Set Aside and respondent Judge is ordered to Dismiss Civil Case No. 1748-R. Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports is requested to make arrangements with the other high schools in Baguio City for purposes of accommodating the students herein affected. The temporary restraining order issued is made permanent. SO ORDERED.

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