Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
Joanne Accolla
February 10,2004
Joanne -
Please add this to Mary Ryan's file. I just spoke with her over the phone and asked her a series of questions about the intelligence
she received while the Assistant Secretary of CA.
She told me that her staff assistants would have collected the information from INR in the morning before she arrived (she usually
arrived at around 7 a.m.). She would read it, and then her staff assistants would coordinate getting it back to INR by day's end.
To her recollection, she only received and read the Secretary's Morning Summary. She did not recall ever reading the UBL dailies
or weeklies. She believed that this was the same summary read by other high-level policy makers at State although she could not
be sure. She used materials she read in this document to initiate a meeting with other State bureaus on, e.g., a threat warning to
American citizens.
- Tom Eldridge
2/10/2004
Government Executive Magazine - 7/15/02 <font size=-l>Border and Transportation Sec... Page 3 of 5
Mary Ryan
Assistant Secretary of State for
Consular Affairs
State Department
(202) 647-9576
http://www.govexec.com/features/0702/HSborder.htm 12/5/2003
1 Of 120 DOCUMENTS I
SPEAKER:
U.S. SENATOR DIANE FEINSTEIN (D-CA), CHAIRMAN
WITNESSES:
JAMES ZIGLAR, COMMISSIONER, INS
GLENN FINE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
MARY RYAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS
STEVEN CAMAROTA, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES
TONY DOONAN, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION
SYSTEMS, NEC TECHNOLOGIES
GREG SPADORCIO, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT INDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS
PAUL COLLIER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BIOMETRICS FOUNDATION
DAVID WARD, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION
BODY:
SPEAKERS:
U.S. SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN (D-CA)
CHAIRWOMAN
U.S. SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR. (D-DE)
U.S. SENATOR HERBERT KOHL (D-WI)
U.S. SENATOR MARIA CANTWELL (D-WA)
1 of 120 DOCUMENTS
HEADLINE: U.S. SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY (D-MA) HOLDS HEARING ON ANTI- TERRORISM
BORDER CONTROLS
SPEAKER:
U.S. SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY (D-MA), CHAIRMAN
WITNESSES:
JAMES ZIGLAR, INS COMMISSIONER
MARY RYAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
LINO GUTIERREZ, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
JEANNE BUTTERFIELD, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS,
ASSOCIATION
DEMETRIOS PAPADEMETRIOU, CO-DIRECTOR OF THE MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE
RICK NORTON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL BIOMETRIC, INDUSTRY
ASSOCIATION
BODY:
SPEAKERS:
U.S. SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY (D-MA)
CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN (D-CA)
U.S. SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER (D-NY)
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN (D-IL)
U.S. SENATOR MARIA CANTWELL (D-WA)
Karl Williams
22 October 2003
CT - counter Terrorism
©Crown copyright 2003
7 March 2003
Questions
for
Ambassador Mary Ryan
Visa processing.
Q. Ambassador Ryan, the Department of State in general, and the Bureau of Consular
Affairs in particular, was criticized heavily after September 11 for creating a so-called
"courtesy culture" in which - it was alleged — the interests of foreign travelers were
favored over the national security interests of the United States. Why do you think some
people have this perception, and why are they wrong?
Q. The Foreign Affairs Manual before September 11 stated: "it is the policy of the U.S.
government to give the [visa] applicant every reasonable opportunity to establish
eligibility. " Who wrote this policy, and did anyone in any branch of the USG question it
as sound policy before September 11, 2001?
Q. What role did Vice President Gore's Reinventing Government initiative and what role
did Congress have on the approach to customer service taken by the Bureau of Consular
Affairs?
Q. The GAO in their report (p. 18) noted that none of the visa applications of the
hijackers were filled out completely. Why did the State Department accept applications
like this before September 11, 2001? Were applicants' signatures on visa applications a
strict requirement?
Interviewing rate.
Q. The GAO, in their report, concluded that the interview rate for Saudi Arabian citizen
visa applicants was approximately 2 %. Why was the interview rate for visa applicants
who were Saudi Arabian citizens so low before September 11, 2001?
Q. In retrospect, do you think it was a mistake to not have interviewed more visa
applicants from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere before 9-11?
Visa Express.
Q. The GAO found that the Visa Express Program "did not affect the likelihood that
Saudi visa applicants would be interviewed. " (p. 19, fn. 29) . To your knowledge, did
Visa Express do anything to increase the chances that a Saudi applicant's visa would be
approved?
Q. Were Travel Agency Referral programs such as Visa Express designed, in part, to
improve security around embassies and consulates?
Congress and budget issues
Q. Did you ever get the impression during your tenure in the 1990s that the budget
situation for Consular Affairs would improve, and there would be new resources devoted
to hiring consular officers?
Q. What was the effect on your staffing levels from the fact that CA was an entirely
domestic bureau and the Department's regional bureaus controlled the overseas consular
officers?
Q. CA was criticized for not performing an after-action inquiry on the visas issued to the
9-11 hijackers. For many people involved, the first time they were interviewed formally
was by the GAO or the State Inspector General in 2002. Why didn't CA perform such an
after-action review when it was clear the pivotal role they played in the 9-11 chain of
events?
FBI
Q. What information on criminals or terrorists in the possession of the FBI did the State
Department try and include in its watch list before September 11?
Q. What efforts did State make to get this information, and what did the FBI respond
when these requests were made?
Q. When and how did the State Department get access to NCIC data?
Questions
for
Russell Travers
Deputy Director for Information Sharing and Knowledge Development
Terrorist Threat Integration Center
Q. Nominations. You have discussed the increase in names provided to the TIPOFF
database since September 11. Are you satisfied that all agencies have nominated
the names they have maintained in their own files?
Q. FBI nominations. We have learned that the FBI historically nominated very few
names to TIPOFF, because it did not focus primarily on non-U.S. person residing
abroad, and that after 9-11 has increased its submissions over 100percent. Do
you have a timetable for ensuring that the FBI submits all the names it has in its
files to the terrorist database? What is TTIC's experience with FBI and
information sharing?
Q. Nominations process. Please discuss the standards the Community uses for
including people on a watchlist and for forwarding names to the Terrorist
Screening Center.
Q. Removal of names. Is there a process for removing names from the database
who are demonstrated not to be terrorists?
Q. Watchlisting training. You state the watchlisting training is mandatory for all
line offices in the Counterterrorism Center. Does that include mandatory training
for intelligence officers going overseas? Intelligence officers in DIA, NSA, and
the other military human and criminal investigative services? For the FBI? Does
TTIC have the authority to ensure that proper training is conducted by all
agencies that may encounter terrorists?
Q. Aliases. We heard this morning that Khaled Sheik Mohamed was able to obtain a
passport using an alias. How big a problem do alias passports present in your
view? How frequent are they among al Qaeda and similar groups? How will the
new U.S. VISIT system affect terrorists' ability to use alias passports?
Q. Lost and stolen passports. We heard this morning that lost and stolen passports
play an important role in al Qaeda travel. Do you receive lost and stolen
passport information from foreign governments? Should more be done in this
area?
Q. Al Qaeda in the U.S.? Will TIDE contain information on the known locations of
terrorists? Have you received any information that terrorists are in the U.S.?
Q. Privacy. Your statement addressed advanced analytic tools and the role they can
play in watchlisting. Is TTIC reinventing Total Information Awareness?
Q. Challenges. What are the biggest challenges TTIC faces as it confronts its
mission?
Questions
For
Donna Bucella
Director, Terrorist Screening Center
Q. Personal. Would you tell us about your background and how you came to take
the job as the director of the Terrorist Screening Center?
Q. Authority, budget, and oversight. You state that the authority for the TSC
comes from a Presidential directive. Who authorizes your budget? Which
department funds the TSC? Who provides your personnel? Do you see the need
for legislation and Congressional oversight for the TSC?
Q. FBI or DHS? Would you explain why the TSC is located in the FBI and not the
Department of Homeland Security? Do you think it should stay in the FBI?
Q. Al Qaeda in the U.S.? Since the TSC was established in December, have you
learned of any Al Qaeda terrorists in the U.S. through call-ins from state and local
officials?
Q. Response time. Would you describe TSC rules for response time? Has there
been any change in the response time for queries from State Department offices?
Q. Users. Which agencies are the biggest users of the TSC so far?
Q. Nomination process. Do you accept names directly into the TSC database or is
the decision about what is included in your databases made by the TTIC Terrorist
Identities Group?
Questions
For
Peter Verga
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense,
Department of Defense
Q. National Guard support. Did you see a national security benefit to the country
from the presence of the Guard at the airports and border ports of entry following
September 11? Was this National Guard support paid for by the military or by
civilian agencies? To what extent is your office prepared to provide funding
support for national emergencies in the future?
Q. Funding and staffing of border authorities. In your view, is the funding and
staffing model for civilian border authorities commensurate with their national
security responsibilities in detecting and preventing terrorist entries? Do our
border inspection agencies have the staffing to protect our borders and deal with
terrorist emergencies?
Q. Training by the military at our borders. Can you describe the military's
support to civilian agencies with respect to technologies that may be useful to
detecting illegal entries between the ports of entry staffed by inspectors from
Customs and Border Protection?
Q. Navy arrests at sea. The media reported that the Navy halted two vessels with al
Qaeda members transporting illegal drugs. Can you confirm those reports? Does
the Navy have a plan to address terrorist access to the U.S. by sea?
Questions
for
Assistant Secretary of State Maura Harry
Visa processing.
Q. In your testimony you refer to a "rules based process." What do you mean by
"rules based process"?
Interviews.
Q. The 9-11 families have questioned why visa applicants in Saudi Arabia were
rarely interviewed. What is different today about the interview policy for visa
applicants?
Q. Now that we are interviewing far more visa applicants, are there any examples
where expanded interviewing led to our finding terrorists and stopping them from
getting visas?
Q. How have the changes to the interview policy since 9-11 affected consular
resources?
Waiting times.
Q. What is the average waiting time for a South Korean businessperson applying for
a U.S. visa? Are there other consulates with similar waiting times? Do you see a
solution to these long waits?
Incomplete applications.
Q. One of the major concerns of the 9-11 families is that the hijackers acquired visas
without filling out their applications completely or truthfully. Is visa policy
different today on these issues such that, were the hijackers to submit their
applications today, they would be rejected for their incompleteness?
Q. Would the kinds of lies on the hijackers' applications - about having applied for a
visa previously and about having traveled to the U.S. previously - be detected
today?
Q. What databases are automatically checked when a person applies for a visa? Do
we search for prior visa approvals before adjudicating a visa? Do we search for
prior admissions to the U.S. before adjudicating a visa?
Foreign Service Nationals.
Q. What is the current policy on the use of FSNs in visa adjudication - are they being
phased out? What security advantages are there for using FSNs with knowledge
of local conditions, populations, and documents?
Passport scrutiny.
Q. What facility and process is there for careful scrutiny of applicants' passports at
post?
The law
Q. You mentioned that you now provide consular officers with training on the use of
21(a)(3)(b). What are you telling consular trainees on the use of this provision
that was not told to them before September 11, 2001?
Q. Does the law allow a consular officer to deny a visa to someone if they believe,
based solely on an interview with the person, that the person is a terrorist? If not,
what level of evidence is required to deny a visa based on terrorism?
Q. Can a consular officer deny a visa to someone solely because they believe the
person is lying to them? If so, what provision of law do they use?
Q. What steps have you taken to improve the availability to consular officers of
specific terrorist intelligence relevant to their post?
TIPQFF
Q. Have we stopped terrorists from getting visas since 9-11 using TIPOFF? How
many true TIPOFF hits have there been?
Q. What are the key aspects of TIPOFF that need to be preserved as it moves to the
TSC?
Q. What would your ideal watchlist contain, and how would it work?
DBS
Q. What is DHS doing at posts and are they adding value? To your knowledge, has
DHS identified any terrorists that were not identified by TIPOFF or consular
officers during interviews?
Q. What is State's position on the DHS budget request to increase significantly their
overseas personnel involved with visa adjudication and why? If you don't favor
significant DHS increases, what do you favor for increasing border security?
Q. Should fraud prevention and the law enforcement functions associated now with
DS be more incorporated into the work of CA?
Condor
Q. We now have a terrorist screening center, run out of the FBI, to screen visa
applicants against terrorist watchlists. At the same time, we have the FBI
performing a separate name check on certain visa applicants through what is
known as the Condor program. You have testified previously that there have been
125,000 Condor name checks, and that not a single applicant has been denied a
visa based on one of these checks. In addition, the CIA has declined to
participate in this program, we understand, on grounds that it adds no value
beyond that of the terrorist watchlists run by the TSC. Given these facts, is the
Condor name check program a waste of resources that makes us no safer?
Visa Waiver
Q. Are we going to make the October 4, 2004 deadline for biometric passports by the
Visa Waiver Program countries?
Q. If the Visa Waiver countries do not make the deadline, what will be the
implications for CA in terms of visas that will need to be issued to visa waiver
country citizens?
Q. Do you think that the passport requirements are enough to ensure full screening of
visa waiver country travelers? Are there other steps that could or should be
taken?
Q. Why is pre-clearance and pre-inspection - currently used in Dublin, Montreal,
and a few other locations — not more broadly in place to move out our borders in
places such as visa waiver countries?
Western Hemishpere
Q. The fact that citizens of the U.S. and Canada are not required to present their
passport in order to cross into the United States from Canada is a significant
vulnerability in the U.S. border security system. It is widely acknowledged that
many Islamic extremist groups, including Al Qaeda, have terrorist cells in
Canada. What is the current state of study on this issue — to determine how many
U.S. and Canadian citizens cross the border each year — and what would the State
Department have to do to accommodate demand for U.S. passports in the event
such a requirement were imposed?
National Security
1. Student tracking. As stated in the staff statement this morning, the INS did not
fund its student tracking pilot with the $800 million technology monies
appropriated by Congress, and ultimately deferred launching of a biometric
student identification card and developing the pilot program nationally.
a. Why did you not use the significant funding from Congress for technology
improvements to develop and launch the student tracking program?
b. Considering the widespread and known fraud that existed throughout the
student visa process, why was development and testing of the biometric
student identification card deferred from 1998 on? What was your view of
the use of biometrics for foreign students?
c. hi your conversation with White House counterterrorism advisor Dick
Clarke about student tracking, what were his interests and how did you
respond?
3. Intelligence access. You stated during your interviews with Commission staff
that you did not require staff to provide you with regular intelligence briefings,
and therefore had no knowledge of the activities ofal Qaeda during your tenure
as INS Commissioner. You also told us that you did not have regular
intelligence briefings because they weren 't of good enough quality to inform
your day-to-day decisions. You stated that the poor quality was due to a number
of reasons, including the INS' limited access to timely intelligence from the
intelligence community.
a. If you had had access to timely intelligence on al Qaeda activities, how
would this information have informed INS strategy on the border (ports of
entry and Border Patrol), in the interior, and in benefits adjudications?
b. Both interior enforcement policy planners and the National Security Unit,
which was created in 1997, prepared and submitted counterterrorism
strategies to their senior managers. However, these senior managers
never responded. Several INS personnel interviewed by the Commission
have stated that, in fact, you were generally anti-enforcement and that
therefore such documents would not have received your attention or
approval. Please respond.
4. Length of permitted stay for B2 tourists. Seventeen of the 19 hijackers were
admitted for six months. This allowed them to enter in the spring of 2001 and
remain legal through the hijackings. One hijacker only requested 20 days, but
was still authorized for a six month stay. Our understanding is that the length
of permitted stay of six months for B2 tourists dated back to the 1980s, before
you became Commissioner.
a. What was the reasoning behind establishing a six month length of stay rule
for a tourist?
b. The Visa Waiver Pilot Program included a review process for countries
that sought to be brought into that program. National security was
considered. Did you or anyone with whom you worked ever raise the
issue of the six month tourist length of stay being too long? Did you or
anyone with whom you worked ever consider a rigorous country-by-
country review process for length of stay, similar to that used for visa
waiver decisions?
5. Use of immigration law to remove terrorists pre-9-11. Much has been made
since September 11 about the use of immigration law in the war on terror.
However, not much has been discussed publicly about the role of the INS in
removing terrorists via the use immigration law prior to September 11.
a. Would you outline for us how immigration law was used to remove
terrorists prior to September 11, and any special problems posed by
terrorist cases?
b. What is your view of how immigration law was used post-9/11 in the war
on terror?
PANEL THREE
Questions for former INS Commissioner (8/01-12/02) James Ziglar
2. Chatter in the summer of 2001. During the summer of 2001 it has been widely
reported there was much "chatter" in the air that certain persons in the
administration were aware that al Qaeda may attempt an attack, and called
meetings. Both Kevin Rooney and you told Commission staff during interviews
that neither of you recall any meetings or discussions with any other persons in
the administration in which you were told of a potential threat.
3. INS role in counterterrorism. What role did you see for the INS in countering
terrorism, before and after September 11th?
4. The September 11 detainees. You were tasked with helping the FBI search for
aliens with immigration violations that may have been connected to September
11. Please explain how the INS was tasked with the effort, as well as your view of
the process at the time. I note that the use of immigration law as a
counterterrorism tool changed after 9/11. Prior to 9/11, specific information was
developed about the terrorist activity and then a decision was made to include
immigration charges in the investigation if they were available. After the attacks,
immigration violators on a terrorism "tip " were arrested and held until a
determination was made whether there was a genuine nexus to terrorism or
immigration violation to further pursue.
a. hi retrospect, did this effort provide any value to the war on terror?
b. Were any terrorists caught in this manner?
2. Challenges on the border. Both of you have been in charge of the border
inspection process.
a. Mr. Ziglar, what do you think the biggest challenges are in ensuring
legitimate travel while assuring national security?
b. Commissioner Bonner, what are your biggest challenges today in ensuring
legitimate travel while assuring national security?
PANEL TWO
Questions for Customs and Border Protection Inspector Jose Melendez-Perez
1. Atta and Al Shehhi's January 2001 entries. In the staff statement presented
earlier, the facts concerning Atta and Al Shehhi 's entries were presented. In your
experience and training as an 11 year veteran of the INS, I would like to run a
couple of hypotheticals by you.
a. First, if a B2 tourist applicant for admission shows an 1-20 school form
upon entry, states that he is going to school and has adjusted his status
previously from B2 to Ml vocational student, what would you do? (The
INS Field Manual says if a B2 conies in with a legitimate lack of
paperwork for schooling, he may be deferred.)
b. What happens in secondary when you check INS databases and learn that
he was an overstay by a month upon his last departure the week prior; he
has not adjusted his status to student, rather his application was still
pending when he departed; and further that he has completed his
schooling. What would you do with these facts?
2. Hazmi and Midhar's lookouts in August 2001. The Customs database TECS
and the INS lookout system NAILS did not contain records on hijackers Hazmi
and Mihdhar until late August 2001. What procedures were in place pre-9/11 if a
terrorist or criminal lookout appeared at primary inspection? What were the
procedures in place at secondary? Would the lookout, pre-9/11, have resulted in
an expedited removal? What were the other possibilities?
3. Law enforcement follow-up on Kahtani. Has anyone from the FBI, CIA or the
military officer ever discussed with you your interview and removal of Kahtani?
4. Six month length of stay for tourists. Tell us how a B2 tourist permitted length
of stay of six months is adjudicated. Does this rule curtail the inspector's
discretion to determine the appropriate length of stay for a tourist?
PANEL FOUR
Questions for Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner
Former Customs Commissioner (9/20/01-3/02)
1. Student tracking and US Visit. Your agency is a client of the new student
tracking and US VISIT systems. We have seen their potential importance to
national security. Can you tell us of the successes so far with both of them?
What more work needs to be done before they are fully operational?
2. Customs practices. As we have heard, there were 33 hijacker entries, and two
referrals to Customs secondary inspection. (One (pilot Marwan Al Shehhi) upon
his first entry at JFK by a roving inspector, and the other (Waleed AlShehri) when
he went through pre-clearance in the Bahamas on May 16 2001). For Al Shehhi,
the Customs secondary inspection report simply states that a random check was
done and the inspection complete. For Al Shehri, the secondary inspection report
states that a secondary inspection was complete and Al Shehri was not permitted
entry into the Bahamas and returned to Florida by Bahamian immigration.
a. Please explain the Customs secondary inspection process and the purpose
of a rover; the purpose of pre-clearance; and the difference between self-
referrals, watchlist referrals, and random checks.
b. If Customs found an incoming passenger who showed up on a watchlist
before 9/11, was there an internal policy that required Customs officials to
alert INS inspectors at primary? What would have been the Customs
procedures in such an event?
3. One face at the border. You have talked about the importance of having "one
face at the border", referring to the merging of the immigration, customs, and
agricultural functions at the borders. You have appointed legacy Customs
officers to head nearly all of the major air ports of entry. We hear that morale is
low, especially among legacy INS employees, and that legacy employees from
both agencies are balking at being cross trained. Both Customs and INS rules
are famously complicated.
a. Can you reassure us that immigration expertise and ability to detect
terrorists at primary is greater than on September 11, 2001?
b. What training are customs inspectors receiving who are now assigned to
primary immigration inspection lines?
Mary A. Ryan was the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs from May 1993
until July 2002.
Ambassador Ryan, who entered the Foreign Service in 1966, began her career as
Rotational Officer in Naples. She then served as Personnel Officer in Tegucigalpa,
Honduras, and as Consular Officer at the Consulate General in Monterrey, Mexico. Her
succeeding tours of duty were as Roving Administrative Officer for Africa and as Post
Management Officer in the Bureau of African Affairs in Washington. She went on to
become Career Development Officer in the Bureau of Personnel also in Washington.
Returning overseas in 1980, she served as Administrative Counselor at U.S. embassies in
Abidjan and Khartoum. Ambassador Ryan has also been a Foreign Service Inspector and
the Executive Director of the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs. She was
Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary for Management for three years immediately
before being assigned as Ambassador to Swaziland in 1988.
Ambassador Ryan was the recipient of the Presidential Distinguished Service Award in
1998 and 1992, the Arnold L. Raphel Award in 1996 and the Award for Outstanding
Public Service in 2001. She was promoted to Career Minister in 1992 and Career
Ambassador in 1999.
Ambassador Ryan was born in New York City and has a BA and MA from
St. John's University in New York.
STATEMENT
BY
MARY A. RYAN
BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to describe the role of
the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the Department of State in our country's border
security program. My remarks will cover the period from May 1993 until July 2002, the
years I was the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs (CA). I retired from the
Department of State in September 2002 after 36-!/2 years as a career Foreign Service
Officer during which I served eight Presidents: Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan,
Bush, Clinton and Bush.
When I assumed my duties as Assistant Secretary, very few posts had on-line
name checking capability, hi fact, most were still using microfiche to check the look-out
system.
Steve - attached are 2 interview requests: John Arriza, current DOS; Mary Ryan - former
DOS. The contact on team 5 is Susan Ginsburg. We also have a CIA interview request
(classified) that we will hand to you tomorrow at the staff meeting; Susan is the contact
for this request. Thanks.
Joanne M. Accolla
Staff Assistant
202 .401.1774
jaccolla@9-llcommission.gov
Gov
Daily Briefing
By Brian Friel
bfriel@govexec.com
The Bureau of Consular Affairs issues visas to people who wish to enter the
United States. The INS then processes people with visas at border entry
points, and is responsible for tracking people who overstay their visas. The
FBI, CIA and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies are supposed to
provide information to the INS and the Bureau of Consular Affairs so that
their officers can block potential terrorists from entering the country.
When Feinstein said the Sept. 11 attacks revealed a failure of the visa system,
Ryan interrupted the senator and defended consular officers, reiterating her
contention that the attacks demonstrated a failure of intelligence, not visa
issuance.
http://www.newsmax.com/showinside.shtml?a=2002/7/13/202600 9/10/2003
Letter to the State Department Regarding SEVIS Page 1 of3
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Last Wednesday morning, the higher education community met with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for an update on the
implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
System (SEVIS). While most of the issues surrounding SEVIS
implementation are technical and operational, there is one important
policy matter—the collection of a fee to pay for the operation of the
system—that remains to be resolved.
http://www.acenet.edu/washington/letters/2002/03march/state.sevis.cfm 9/10/2003
ILW.COM - the leading immigration law publisher (www.ilw.com) Page 1 of 3
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to explain the role of the Bureau of Consular
Affairs, and most particularly our visa processing system, in documenting foreign students to study in
the United States. I am keenly aware that the events of September 11 have heightened congressional
attention on this issue. My testimony will focus on the process and criteria we use to determine the
eligibility of applicants by foreign nationals to study in the United States. I will also note how our
activities and those of the INS are designed to complement each other.
It is a tribute to the quality of the educational system in the United States that so many foreign
nationals seek to pursue their studies here. Our student visa policy is based on the democratic values
of an open society and the general perception of the American public that foreign students make a
tremendous contribution to our nation's intellectual and academic climate as well as to our nation's
economy. In addition, a U.S. education plays an invaluable role in spreading American values
overseas and in strengthening our bilateral and person-to-person ties with countries throughout the
world.
The criteria of U.S. immigration law have for many years made it relatively easy for bona fide students
to pursue study in the U.S. There are no quotas and few restrictions. Prospective students can freely
contact U.S. academic institutions to find a program that suits their interests and financial
circumstances in very much the same manner as U.S. students.
Many of our overseas consular and public diplomacy sections, Fulbright Institutions, and other
educational organizations go to great lengths to meet the demand for information from prospective
students through outreach programs, web sites, and handouts. These generally reflect our nation's
long-standing interest in promoting study in the United States.
Consular officers evaluate student visa applications as they do all nonimmigrant visa applications - by
looking at the full range of criteria established by U.S. immigration law. The most pertinent elements
are the credibility of applicants' plans to study in the United States and whether they have the financial
means to pay for their education. As further required under U.S. law, the officer also determines
whether a student visa applicant has a residence abroad that he or she has no intention of
abandoning, and intends to depart from the U.S. upon completion of the course of study.
Every prospective student must present Form I-20A-B, Certificate of Eligibility For Nonimmigrant (F-1)
Student Status - for academic and language students, or Form
I-20M-N, Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant (M-1) Student Status - for vocational students,
http://www.ilw.com/cgi-shl/pr.pl 9/10/2003
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Date: 2003-2004
Pages: 51
Box 4