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Kean
CHAIR
DOS INTERVIEW REQUEST NO. 6
Lee II. Hamilton
V I C E CHAIR
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Richard Ben-Veniste
(the "Commission") requests interviews with the following Department
Max Cleland of State officials during the weeks of September 29, October 6, or
Fred F. Fielding
October 13, 2003. Please provide a proposed date, time, and location for
these interviews no later than September 29, 2003, if possible. The
Jamie S. Gorelick anticipated length of each interview is two hours.
Slade Gorton
1. TomFurey
John Lehman
DOS interview
request no 6.doc...
Karl: Attached as a Word document is DOS interview request no. 6. Please
call
Tom Eldridge at 202-401-1686 with any questions about the topics to be covered
and to arrange for these interviews. Feel free to call Dan or me as well if
any issues arise. Thanks. Steve
Thomas H. Kean
CHAIR
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERVIEW REQUEST NO. [ ]
Richard Ben-Veniste
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the
Max Cleland "Commission") requests interviews with the following DOS personnel during
Fred F. Fielding the weeks of September 29, October 6 or October 13. Please provide a
proposed date, time and location for each interview no later than
Jamie S. Gorelick
September 25, 2003. Unless otherwise stated, the anticipated length of each
Slade Gorton interview is 2 hours.
John Lehman
1 . Tom Furey
Timothy J. Roemcr 2. Brian Flora
James R. Thompson
These interviews may involve the discussion of classified information. The
Philip D. Zelikow Commission reserves the right to re-interview these individuals based on the
KXECL'TIVK DIRECTOR
results of the requested interviews and the needs of the Commission.
/anne Accolla
Contact for Erenbaum and Cutler: Janice; contact for Fowler and DOS: Tom.
Steve - how will you notify us when these letters are signed and sent?? Need to know for follow up purposes - thanks.
Joanne M. Accolla
Staff Assistant
National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States
202.401.1774
jaccolla@9-11commission.gov
9/16/2003
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event: Tom Furey, Former Consul General and Acting DCM , Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Type of
event: Interview of Thomas Patrick Furey
Date: December 5, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Tom Eldridge
Team Number: 5
Location: Room 7516, State Department - Video Teleconference with London
Participants - Non-Commission:
Participants - Commission:
Tom Eldridge Counsel Team 5 202-401-1686
Susan Ginsburg Counsel Team 5 202-401 -1747
TEXT:
We interviewed Mr. Furey by videoteleconference from his office in London, U.K. It was
10:30 a.m. our time, and 3:30 p.m. London time. Mr. Furey was at a table in the Embassy
auditorium with 250 empty seats in front of him.
Mr. Furey served in Mexico City as Ministerial Counselor for Consular Affairs from
1997 - 2000. There he supervised the largest consular operation in the world, handling 2 million
NI visa applications per year in 2000. He supervised 120 consular officers and 350 FSNs doing
visa work. While in that job, he referred to the Best Practices Handbook "often" in order to
make the operation as efficient as possible.
Furey arrived in London August 23, 2001 where he assumed his current duties as the
Consul General. Prior to that, from September 10, 2000 to July 17, 2001, he was the Consul
General in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In addition, from April 19 - July 17, 2001, he was the Acting
DCM in Riyadh. Charles Brayshaw preceded Furey in the DCM job and moved up to be the
Charge D'Affaires when the ambassador (Fowler) left in April.
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9/11 Working-level Employee 9/11 closed by statute
\"::; . .... COMMISSION SENSITIVE \s Consul General in Riyadh, he both supervised directly the c
Riyadh, and he was a secondary supervisor over the consuls general and their operations in
Jeddah and Dhahran. He reviewed the evaluations of those individuals.
Serving under him in Riyadh wer^ jwho was his deputy. Als&,| |
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We asked Furey about his initial impressions of Riyadh and the visa operation. He said:
1. Consular officers were overworked, often processing applications until 8 p.m. in the
evening. Morale was very low.
2. The set up was dysfunctional
3. The waiting room was inadequate for the hordes of people who showed up. Saudis
would shove TCNs out of the way to get to the windows because they believed it was
beneath them to stand in line with TCNs. He said people were getting into fist fights in
the waiting room.
4. There were large crowds outside the embassy causing problems for the Saudi police
outside and U.S. employee guards inside. Furey believed the crowds could cause guards
to cut corners on screening entrants to the compound. The RSO Bill Lamb was "very
much in favor of ideas to minimize people coming into the embassy unnecessarily."
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6. Visa applications were increasing at a rate of about 5 % per year.
It cannot be emphasized enough that Furey heard NOTHING from the intelligence
agencies at post during his tenure there - including his time as DCM -- indicating that Saudis
were a security risk.
Furey talked with his predecessor Alan Kepchar about how to solve these problems. At
that time, there was no model for setting up an appointment system without using a 900 number.
The 900 number would allow the caller to pay a fee for the service of setting up an interview.
The Saudis had not legalized 900 numbers. Also, the consensus was that the Saudi mail system
was not reliable for sending passports. Accordingly, Furey gravitated toward a drop-box system
through which an applicant would drop off their application without coming into the embassy.
In other words, instead of controlling how applicants came into the embassy, they decided to
screen the applications.
We asked Furey whether he ever talked with CA HQ about the problems he was having
in SA. We specifically asked whether he ever asked for more resources to help with his
problems. He said he never did so explicitly. Rather, he said that in talking about the problem as
a whole, it was clear to him the perception back in Washington was that his problems did not
justify having more consular officers. Rather, the problem was a lack of efficiency.
Furey said the view - expressed in the Best Practices Handbook - was that if the post
had a pool of applicants with a historically low refusal rate, then the post should not be
interviewing all those applicants.
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Furey emphasized that the interview policy for Saudis when he arrived was that they
were not interviewed, and no policy change occurred on this subject from any policy he
subsequently adopted, i.e., Visa Express. "They were already not being interviewed."
Note: Furey said he believed that a "majority" of Saudis did not bring in their
applications themselves. Rather, they had an expediter, driver, or business employee do it for
them.
Furey agree with our statement that Saudis as a group were considered to have overcome
the presumption of inadmissibility in 214(b). This was true for citizens of all nations in the
GCC. The reasons for this presumption were (1) they did not overstay their visas, (2) they did
not work in the U.S., (3) they were not deported by the INS, (4) they did not commit crimes and
get criminal convictions in the U.S, and (5) they were not considered security risks. The
consensus was that they qualified for a visa.
Visa policy for TCNs was different because TCNs had more variety in their situation.
Some were good risks, and some were more likely to be intending immigrants.
These policies were not written down. "No one articulated a policy, per se," but the
refusal rate for Saudis had been low (he thought below 1 %) for longer than anyone could
remember.
Furey disagreed with the assertion that Saudis received preferential treatment. He said
Saudis were treated like cits of countries in the Visa Waiver program and for the same reasons.
Furey felt that the law always allowed a CO to deny a visa to an individual based on the
CD's belief that the person was lying to them.
Visa Express
Much ink has been spilled on Visa Express. In the creation of Visa Express, Furey drew
upon all of the above. The conclusion he drew was that the most feasible way to increase
efficiency and security was to use travel agencies as drop-boxes.
The prospective agencies were vetted by "all elements of the embassy." There were
many more that applied to participate and were not accepted. They selected those who had the
best reputations and complied with their security concerns such as having safes to hold the
passports. They also wanted agencies spread throughout the country. CQ| ]had
the lead on this project.! [oversaw selection and training of the travel agencies
participating in the program. .
We asked Furey how there was oversight of the travel agencies. He said the FSNs would
report on a daily basis about agency compliance,with the program's requirements. For example,
agencies would input the name put down by Saudis on their application, but Saudis would
frequently transliterate their name. Agencies would need to be told to use the name on the
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passport. Another issue was incomplete applications. FSNs would send back some incomplete
applications and tell them to have the applicant fill it in completely.
Furey said incomplete applications had been a problem before VE, but that they did not
always have time to catch the incompleteness in a way that allowed for meaningful correction.
We pressed Furey on this point. Why, we asked, couldn't the incompleteness be caught when
the application was submitted? After all, the form was not very long before 9-11. Furey said it
was a question of resources and could be viewed in the context of the broad CA budget problems
of the 1990s. Even though someone was at a window accepting visa applications, that person,
Furey said, did not always have time to screen the applications for completeness. Instead, the
FSNs would be taking cash from applicants for the visa fees, or doing data entry, or assisting
COs interviewing people. Meanwhile, the applicants and their expediters would be fighting over
who got to drop off their application. Applications with large blanks could be caught, but
completeness was not achieved uniformly at the time of submission before VE.
We asked Furey about the timing of the introduction of VE in SA. He said it was
mandatory as of June 1, 2001. He said this was for Saudis and for TCN renewals. Then, there
continued to be "chatter" reported in the intelligence about an impending AQ attack against the
embassy and mission in Saudi Arabia. There continued to be large numbers of TCNs at the
embassy gates posing a threat and an attractive target for terrorists. The RSO continued to
believe that the crowds were a target and caused stress on the guards. Furey said there were
many emergency action committee meetings. As a result, Furey ordered VE to become
mandatory for the whole country in late June 2001.
Furey said the travel agencies were "just a messenger service." We pressed him on this
point, asking whether they were performing any screening. He maintained they were not. We
asked whether they were not told to cull from the applications those that were incomplete or did
not contain the required paperwork. He said they were told to do these things. We asked, for
example, whether they were told to make sure the student visa applicant had an 1-20 attached,
and not to submit the application until they did. He said that was true. Nevertheless, he
maintained that the travel agencies had "no authority to screen out" applications by, for example,
advising the applicants that they were unlikely to be approved. He said they were not making a
preliminary adjudication, but rather were making sure the applicant was meeting the basic
requirements for an application.
We asked whether what the agents did was not similar to a consular officer making a
determination under Section 221(g) of the INA. He said it was not because the CO was saying
that the applicant "had gotten to first base" in the visa process by issuing a 221(g) denial,
whereas the travel agency - by not turning it in to the embassy — was saying the applicant had
not even gotten to first base. This explanation lacked logical force.
With regard to the issue of incomplete applications, Furey said there was no State
Department instruction that said that putting down the word "hotel" for one's destination was
unacceptable. He said VE did lead to more complete applications, something borne out by our
review of the hijackers who got their visas in June 2001.
With regard to the fact that several of the hijackers lied on their visa applications, Furey
said that it was the first he had heard this - a SIGNIFICANT POINT. When told one had lied
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about whether they had been to the U.S., he said that was unusual because most applicants would
have trumpeted this fact as proof they were good visa risks. Likewise, the fact that they had
applied for an been approved for a U.S. visa previously would have been in their favor, so to lie
about that, as several of the hijackers did, would have been unusual. Furey said the State
computer system would not bring up a prior approved visa for an applicant - and thus flag this
anomaly - before 9-11, only a refusal. Even today, while the system allows a CO to pull up this
information, it is not a part of the routine application processing or the name check process.
[Note: In SA, DHS employees probably do check for the truth of whether an applicant has
traveled to the U.S. before in the DHS databases.]
We asked Furey whether he had ever heard discussed the fact that someone might lie on
their application in order to hide the fact that they had a new passport. He said this had never
been brought to his attention.
Furey said he knew that people in Jeddah were not particularly enthusiastic about the idea of visa
express, but that he was not sure he ever understood their concerns. He said they told him they
were overwhelmed by people in their waiting room. He asked them if they had other ideas for
solving their problems, and they had none.
[Note: Furey was familiar with the unusual interview policy in Jeddah. See MFR of Robert
Waller.]
We asked Furey what he thought about the dismantling of VE in July 2002. To the
writer's surprise, he said this was "absolutely" a good idea. Furey said he now feels that
interviewing all applicants is the correct way to go. Furey said that the visa interview is both a
tool for the CO to help in making a good decision, and a "weak link" that can be exploited by the
terrorist. He acknowledged that the CO is rarely going to catch a terrorist in an admission that
they are a terrorist. However, the interview is still a tool, and one that should not be given up.
Waiving it creates a weak link and terrorists will be looking for the weak link.
"It should have been done in the past, but resource constraints appear to have been the
dominating factor in the visa adjudication process."
With regard to SA, Furey said, "I knew something about Saudi Arabia on September 12
that I didn't know on September 10 - Saudi visa applicants can be security risks."
Furey said that the prior attacks in SA he heard had been perpetrated by the Iranians:
Khobar and the 1995 OPM-SANG bombings.
Document Fraud
We asked Furey what capability he had in Riyadh to identify document fraud among visa
applicants. He said that in London, he has British employees who are so skilled as to be forensic
document scientists at detecting fraud. By contrast, in Riyadh he had no such expert. CA/FPP
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was covering the whole world and not particularly focused on Riyadh. He described the Saudi
passport as easy to falsify and not machine readable.
Best Practices
Were all about managing process in the most efficient way in an era of a shortfall of
resources. MRV's enabled State to get automated and produce the CLASS system.
Nevertheless, there were perpetual funding and personnel shortfalls. In Furey's view, CA did
"extraordinary things to take an incredibly dysfunctional process and make it right."
Furey said SecState Powell has made a lot of progress in making up these shortfalls with
his Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.
Furey said that he felt the "most important tool we can use" is biometrics. They are a
"huge step forward in increasing the integrity of the whole process." Soon, everyone can be
checked against the 14 million record INS database (IDENT) containing fingerprints of
overstays, criminal aliens, and EWIs.
Furey also felt that COs do need and have been getting more "systematic" training in how
to interview to detect deception. He said that the expectations for the visa interview are
unrealistic because you are asking the CO to "predict the future."
Furey sees visa waiver as a "weak link." See Richard Reid. Other weakness he sees is
the U.S. passport. If he were AQ, he would recruit either a visa waiver country citizen or a U.S.
citizen. U.S. cits don't need a passport to enter from the Western hemisphere, and this is a
weakness.
Furey says his understanding is that DHS personnel abroad are just checking people
against DHS databases, and he asks himself why they simply can't just make those databases
available to the State people.
The fact that Furey thinks in these terms - looking for "weak links" in the visa and border
security process - itself reflects a shift in thinking. Before 9-11, people involved in consular
work knew their work affected border security, but considered their job to involve security
concerns only as far as their checking the name check function in CLASS prior to adjudicating a
visa (with whatever attendant security advisory opinion followed) and their role in the Visas
Viper program. "Security" was not a Best Practice. Yet it would be terribly unfair to suggest
that State's inattention to security led to 9-11. It was State who created the only true terrorist
watchlist, and it was State who created the only worldwide automated border security system
(CLASS and the CCD). It is not that consular staff at State did not concern themselves with
security. Rather, consular personnel saw security as compartmentalized and injected into their
work at the two discreet points - name check and viper - and were comfortable having security
delegated to the National Security agencies providing information to those programs. Today,
consular administrators view themselves as involved at all times in security and the search for
"weak links."
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3. What familiarity did you have with Best Practices in other posts?
was the v*sa workload for SA actual and projected when you arrived in SA.
5. Did you ever seek additional resources for SA to deal with increased demand for
visas while in S A? If not, why not?
Security - long lines outside the embassy were a security problem. The RSO was
not happy.
7. Did Saudis routinely have their applications submitted by expediters? If so, about
what percentage would you say did this?
8. Did visa Express solve the problem of Saudis filling out applications incompletely?
9. What security concerns were communicated to you by the RSO during the Spring and
Summer of 2001, and what decisions did you make in response to those concerns/threats?
10. When precisely was Visa express implemented in SA and what were the reasons for
the dates? Same for Riyadh and for Jeddah?
1. Our understanding is that the original implementation program and dates were
hanged. Why and for whom?
12. What were the interview rates for applicants in SA and how were they captured?
13. Was there any change in the interview rates for Saudis as a result of Visa Express?
14. What about TCNs? Didn't it go down since they were now subject to the
interview by exception?
Family questions
Was Saudi Arabia the only country with known terrorist risks which had this accelerated approval?
Who initiated this process and what was the reason given for instituting the program?
Why were incomplete and erroneously filled out visa applications of the hijackers approved?
Why was Saudi Arabia given preferential treatment above all other nations in immigration?
Prior to Sept. 11, did Visa Express permit approximately 97 percent of Saudi applicants to obtain visas
without face-to-face interviews?
Whose job was it to check on the validity of student visas? Specifically, Hani Hanjour entered this country
on a student visa and never attended class, who was responsible for this?
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