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POLITICAL LAW
BAYAN, KARAPATAN, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), GABRIELA, et. al. v. EDUARDO ERMITA, et. al. GR No. 169838, 25 April 2006 FACTS: All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 8801, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy recently announced. CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacaang dated September 21, 2005 STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. In Jacinto v CA, the Court said: It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater, the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. In Primicias v Fugoso, the Court said: The exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils enact ordinances for purpose. In Reyes v. Bagatsing: It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted
SEC. 4 of the Consitution. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
For the complete text of BP 880, pls see end of this digest.
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The Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. The Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance, and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance under BP 880. There is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed
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(b)
(d)
SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application. (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. (b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter. (d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance; If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed; If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not
SEC. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times. SEC. 10. Police assistance when requested. It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines: (a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of
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(b)
(c)
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SEC. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed. SEC. 13. Prohibited acts. The following shall constitute violations of the Act:
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SEC. 14. Penalties. Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding section shall be punished as follows:
Because of this, Santiago was not able to collect her salary, which, were used to pay her cash shortage. She then requested reconsideration of the directive alleging that there is no valid basis for the application of her salary, without her consent, to the unconfirmed accountability, and that there is no final judicial order that she incurred such accountability. Her request was denied by the COA. ISSUE: WON the salary of a govt employee be ordered withheld, retained and applied to the payment of public funds allegedly embezzled under the employees care on the basis of an audit report and the filing of administrative and criminal (malversation of public funds) cases against the employee. HELD: YES. Under Par 8 of the COA Guidelines, the examiner/auditor is authorized to direct the proper officer to withhold the payment of any money due the accountable officer, except retirement pay or gratuity due her/him, as soon as the cash shortage is ascertained and is not contested. In this case, Santiago never disputed the demand letters informing her of her cash shortage. Hence, the directive of State Auditor del Rosario to withhold petitioners salary was in order. The State Auditors finding of cash shortage against Santiago, which has not been satisfactorily disputed is prima facie evidence against her. The prima facie evidence suffices for the withholding of her salary, in order to safeguard the interest of the Government. However, it must be stated that although State Auditor properly directed the Mayor to withhold Santiagos salary and other emoluments, she incorrectly directed that the same be applied or set off against Santiagos cash shortage. As ruled in Villanueva v. Tantuico, before set-off can take place under Sec 21 of the Administrative Code of 1987, a persons indebtedness to the government must be one that is admitted by him or pronounced by final judgment of a competent court. In this case, the indebtedness was not admitted by Santiago and a competent court has not yet pronounced final judgment thereon. As a result, the amount of Santiagos salary remitted to the local govt treasurer as payment of Santiagos cash shortage should be considered merely withheld until final resolution on her indebtedness. In the event that petitioner is found not liable for the cash shortage, the withheld salary and other emoluments will be released to her; otherwise, it will be applied in payment of her indebtedness. The petition was partly granted. The COA is authorized merely to withhold Santiagos salary but not to apply it to the alleged shortage for which her liability is still being litigated.
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LABOR LAW
PLDT v. IMPERIAL G.R. No. 149379, June 15, 2006 Facts: Imperial, a PLDT lineman, was ordered by PLDTs Senior Line Foreman to drive the service vehicle of the group of Foreman Buenaventura, Barroga, and Cruz to recover cable wires in Taguig. The cable wires, about 457 ft cut into 3 rolls, were recovered by the group. But on their way back to the warehouse, the service vehicle allegedly had a mechanical malfunction (initially Imperial, Barroga and Cruz said that vehicle sustained sliding clutch; later, they said that the heavy weight of cable wires caused the unloading; Finally however, in a report filed by Barroga, he said that the only defect of the vehicle was the muffler!) which prompted Foreman Buenaventura to order the unloading of 254.3 ft of recovered cable wires valued at P26900 to another PLDT employee Flores house nearby. More than a week later, PLDT retrieved from Flores the 254.3 ft of cable. Prosecutor recommended information for Qualified Theft be filed against Imperial, Buenaventura, Barroga, Cruz and Flores, which was approved by provincial prosecutor and filed before RTC. RTC acquitted the accused for insufficiency of evidence. However, PLDT already terminated employment of all the accused. Imperial filed complaint for illegal dismissal before DOLE against PLDT. Labor Arbiter held for PLDT, believing Imperial was dismissed for just cause: 1) Imperial was one of those who unloaded the cable wires and then stored it in Flores house; 2) he presented a questionable affidavit of Cable
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Article 1412 does not apply coz it refers to a situation where the cause of the contract is unlawful or forbidden but does not constitute a violation of the criminal laws. This case involves a criminal offense so the applicable law is Article 1411 of the CC.
ARTICLE 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
CIVIL LAW
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complaint for accion publiciana considering that it had been filed before the lapse of one year from the date the last letter of demand to respondent had been made. Issue 1: WON RTC is without jurisdiction to hear case, making the entire proceeding null and void. Held: The allegations of a complaint determine the nature of the action as well as which court will have jurisdiction over the case. The complaint would be deemed sufficient if, on its face, it shows that the court has jurisdiction without resorting to parol testimony. Since ejectment proceedings are summary in nature, the complaint should contain a statement of facts which would bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy. Petitioners complaint could fall under two kinds of ejectment suits, the first being for unlawful detainer cognizable by the MTCs under Rule 70 and the second being for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTCs. An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied. This summary action should be filed with the municipal trial courts within one year after the occurrence of the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. Beyond the one-year period, the real right of possession may be recovered through the filing of an accion publiciana with the RTC. Respondent insists, that the one-year period must be reckoned from the date of the second demand letter to vacate. Considering that petitioners complaint was filed within days from this date, respondent contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case. Demand or notice to vacate is not a jurisdictional requirement when the action is based on the expiration of the lease. Any notice given would only negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to extend the period of the lease. The one-year period is thus counted from the date of first dispossession. Subsequent demands which are merely in the nature of reminders or reiterations of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which to commence the ejectment suit considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the original demand. Moreover, it is too late for respondent to invoke the defense of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the action was filed before the lapse of one year from the date of last demand. Based on the records, respondent never pursued this line of argument in the proceedings before the trial court and even in his appeal to the CA. A partys active participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that same courts jurisdiction. Issue 2: WON respondents appeal had become moot and academic with the expiration of the lease contract upon his appeal rested. Held: By respondents own claim, the term of the alleged written lease contract expired several months before the decision of the CA was rendered. The CA should have taken
The case at bar involves forgery. (Cecilia does not deny the allegation of forgery of Dolores signature). It is punishable under Sec. 4, Title IV of the RPC. But petitioner argues that the object or cause is the transferred real properties and there is nothing illegal about them. The Court said that object and cause are two separate elements of a donation, and the illegality of either element gives rise to the application of the doctrine of pari delicto. Object: is the subject matter of the donation Cause: is the essential reason which moves the parties to enter into the transaction.2 In the case at bat, the donated properties, being the object, are legal. But the cause which moved the parties to execute the documents (the motive behind the forgery) is the desire to evade the payment of publication expenses and inheritance taxes, which became due upon the death of Dolores, which is undeniable an illegal cause. Hence, Article 1411 applies. Both Potenciano and Cecilia, being in pari delicto, have no cause of action against each other. Court will leave them as they were at the time the case was filed. GERMELINA TORRES RACAZA AND BERNARDITA TORRES PARAS VS. ERNESTO GOZUM G.R. No. 148759, June 8, 2006 Facts: The plaintiffs are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land with a 2-storey, 3-door apartment, which was formerly owned by their father. Defendant leased the back portion of the property and continued to occupy the same even after the death of plaintiffs father. Plaintiffs thereafter sent a letter of demand to vacate the premises. An ejectment case was filed but was dismissed due to technicality. Almost two years thereafter, plaintiffs sent a new a formal demand letter to vacate on the ground that the verbal contract of lease over the property had already expired and the same has not been renewed and since then, defendant had discontinued paying the monthly rentals. When demand was not heeded, a complaint for recovery of possession or accion publiciana was initiated before the RTC. RTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Respondent appealed to the CA, relying on the contract of lease to justify his continued possession. CA reversed and set aside decision of RTC, holding that RTC had no jurisdiction over the
2
The cause is the immediate, direct and proximate reason which justifies the creation of an obligation through the will of the contracting parties (Tong Brothers Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court , G.R. No. L-73918, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 726).
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2)
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establish the partys psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Also, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (03/15/2003), states that a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged (d) What to allege). Facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered in totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned. Petitioner herein failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the acts and behavior of private respondent that petitioner cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no proof that the former exhibited a similar predilection even before or at the inception of the marriage.
TAXATION
BICOLANDIA DRUG CORPORATION vs. CIR G.R. No. 142299, June 22, 2006 Facts: Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7432 (Senior Citizens Act) and RR 2-94, Bicolandia Drug Corporation (BDC) granted to qualified senior citizens a 20% sales discount on their purchase of medicines covering the period from July 19, 1993 to December 31, 1994. Upon filing its corresponding corporate annual income tax returns for 1993 and 1994, it claimed as a deduction from its gross income the amounts representing the 20% sales discount it granted to senior citizens. On March 28, 1995, however, alleging error in the computation and claiming that the aforementioned 20% sales discount should have been treated as a tax credit pursuant to R.A. No. 7432 instead of a deduction from gross income, it filed a claim for refund or credit of overpaid income tax for 1993 and 1994. HELD: The 20% sales discount cannot be deducted from gross income. The term cost in Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 refers to the amount of the 20% discount extended by a private establishment to senior citizens in their purchase of medicines. This amount shall be applied as a tax credit, and may be deducted from the tax liability of the entity concerned. If there is no current tax due or the establishment reports a net loss for the period, the credit may be carried over to the succeeding taxable year (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation). The law expressly provides that the
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage." 4 "mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
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REMEDIAL LAW
PAL vs FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP) G.R. No. 143088, January 24, 2006 Facts: 1. FASAP and Bhagwani filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against PAL before the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC. 2. Ruling in favor of Bhagwani on the issues of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, PAL was ordered to pay damages thereof. 3. NLRC later modified the decision by setting aside the finding that PAL was guilty of ULP but affirmed the rest of the decision. 4. When PAL filed a petition for certiorari against the decision with the Court of Appeals, it was accompanied by a Certification of Non-Forum Shopping executed by Cesar R. Lamberte and Susan Del Carmen, Vice-President Human Resources and Assistant Vice-President Cabin Services of PAL, respectively, who are not parties to the case. 5. The certification, however, was without proof that the two affiants had authority to sign in behalf of petitioners. 6. As a result, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case for failure to show the authority of affiants to sign for PAL and for failure of the other petitioners to join in the execution of the certification. 7. A motion for reconsideration was filed with a Secretarys Certificate attached evidencing that affiants Cesar R. Lamberte and Susan Del Carmen have been authorized by Board Resolution No. 00-02-03 to initiate and/or cause to be filed on behalf of PAL petitions and pleadings in all labor-related cases. 8. As to the other petitioners, it was argued that they are mere nominal parties so that their failure to execute the certification does not justify dismissal of the petition. 9. Despite this submission, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. 10. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Doctrine: The required certification of non-forum shopping must be valid at the time of filing of the petition. An invalid certificate cannot be remedied
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