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Sacrificial Refudiation
The Pups of War Cerberus

Acephale

No head is better than one.

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Acephale ..................................................................................... 1 K Summary................................................................................... 3 Shells Pups of War and Cerberus.................................................6 Essential Dual Purpose Blocks.....................................................22 Pups of War Essential Blocks.......................................................44 Cerberus Essential Blocks............................................................51 Links.......................................................................................... 68 Alternative Solves..................................................................102 A2 A2....................................................................................... 118

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K Summary
Thanks to all who labored exuberantly: Michael Barclay, Alex Dzeda, Aaaron Feinhandler, Josiah Garnick, Stephen Harb, Owen Jones, Thomas Kruse, Ryan Malone, David Neustat, Pilz Pillsbury. And of course to my helpers Flynn and Jake. This file contains two kritiks that have the same alt/MPX and many of the same blocks. You need to go through the beginning of the file carefully to figure out which blocks go with which kritik. But if not otherwise marked, the block is assumed to be for both. The Pups of War This kritik is designed against kritik-y affs, like Kritikal Turkey TNWs or Bagram. We kritik strategies that pressure the state, attempt to intervene in the democratic public sphere, deploy rational discourse, appeal to ethical goods/norms, avoid violence/death, and value knowledge as production. Instead, we prefer ecastic communication in the form of theatrical sacrifice. The alternative is Sacrifice the 1AC. Severe its head, flay its corpse, and wear its skin. Sacrifice enacts useless expenditure, wasting goods rather than accumulating them. It thus exemplifies human freedom, which Bataille calls sovereignty. We cut off their head as a rejection of rational knowledge and authority. We wear their skin to break down the boundaries separating us from others. Sacrifice thus severs the bounds of authority, expends the accumulating forces driving us to war, and shatter wholistic ontologies. Cerberus This kritk is designed against poliy affs, particularly ones that claim advantages based off the international system like heg or US/Japan relations. State sovereignty is necessarily criminal, and even its supposed stability manifests monstrus violence as insane excess. There is no balancing or stabilizing this sytem, and the discourses that promise security pave the way for new wars in the name of peace. The alternative is the same at TPW. We claim to expend the excess supposedly stabilizing the system, wasting the forces accumulating to nuclear war. On the role of the ballot question we emphasize our own sovereignty in this debate.

-Kirk

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Strategy Sheet
What follows is Daves notes on our gripe discussion about the various affs. Some of them are cryptic, but if you know the aff and neg they should mostly make sense. Thanks Dave!
1.

Turkey TNWs a. Neg


i. Taboo 1. Taboo demonizes the sacred 2. Taboo promotes violence and use ii. Root cause of nuclear weapons is surplus production 1. Removing the weapons is for the accumulation of diplomacy and deterrence 2. This leads back to nukes b.

Aff
i. Neg dismiss public discourse, which is key to solvency ii. Wittner 2AC card 1. Public debate frees us from the soveriengty of the state iii. Wittner 9 1. Advocating change good 2. Anti-nuclear movements work iv. Chasudoski 1. Public sphere good v. Massumi- pre-emption is accumulation- we attack them to save us- leads to state

violence 1. Impact is Goh 2. K needs to think about internal contradictions a. Ballot i. Is the sacrifice for the utility of the ballot? b. Alt solvency i. Does the K deploy rational discouse? Does its alternative achieve a good? c. To answer Ballot i. Reframe meaning of the ballot 1. The ballot is to create the theatre of debate into a sacred thing 2. It needs a winner and a loser 3. The loser is the sacrifice ii. Sacrifice is a radical challenge to utility, more so then the perm and the plan 1. This opens up ground for the permutation, because youre saying some utility is ok iii. Voting for the text of the alternative 1. Thats not utilitarian 2. Even if the alt ends up solving for goods, its accidental 3. The plan is calculated

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Strategy Sheet
Bagram torture aff a. Neg i. Exceptionalism K in case neg relates to second link card in this K ii. Fetishism- reinforce sacred attraction of torture iii. Life isnt precarious (butler) its exuberant 1. Precariousness is the universal condition, and is not a result of state violence, but should be embraced as exuberant b. Aff i. Torture is accumulation, we sacrifice it ii. Butler- expose dark chambers and win war iii. King 9- Demands empirically work- Gitmo 1. Neg: Gitmos not closed iv. Ethics of the affirmative- must reject torture- vulnerability 4. Just War theory Burke aff a. Neg i. Always questioning war bottles up the military- when it unleashes it will be big and devastating ii. Remove an inefficiency (occupation breaking military), allowing more accumulation of militarism iii. Kritik the quest for knowledge of why we go to war 1. This rational reflection is futile 2. Violence is a moment of decision, an event, reflection does nothing when its actually time to decide 3. Read the critical theory link a. Producing systems of rationality iv. Criticize rejection of violence v. Criticize rejection of the war on terror vi. Criticize totalizing ethics 1. Homogenous system always explaining when war is ok and not b. Aff i. Just war theory masks the violence of the state ii. Aff rejects utilitarian survival iii. No link- dont see the state as rational c. When debating an affirmative like this say that they have a lot of good ideas, but they wrap it up in state legitimacy and rational goals. This normativity fuels the state. d. They repeat the logic of just war theory with a new system of legitimacy in the international system
3.

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Shells Pups of War and Cerberus

Labor on, Hercules!


The living organism receives more energy than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of a system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessairly be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically for living matter in general, energy is always in excess; the question is always posed in terms of extravagance. The choice is limited to how the wealth is to be squandered. Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share v. 1

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The Pups of War 1NC Shell Link (v K aff)


We offer this debate to ecastic communication, sacrificing certainty to social exuberance. The 1AC models the political productivity of the state. More peace. More safety. More reason. More work. More talk. Less communication. The status quo is tragedy. The 1AC is farce. Act 1: The Annointing.
The pups of war are yelping, and the 1AC adds their bark of protest to the chorus.

Demands of restrint from the war machine mean nothing, for militarism thrives on the 1ACs fascinated indignation.
John Hutnyk

2003 [Goldsmith College at University of London; Critique of Anthropology v. 23]

Bataille was clearly a militant against the war, there is no doubting his engagement in this regard: ... we can express the hope of avoiding a war that already threatens. But in order to do so we must divert the surplus production, either into rational extension of a difcult industrial growth, or into unproductive works that will dissipate an energy that cannot be accumulated in any case. (Bataille, 1949/1988: 25) And
even after the war he maintained a theoretical interest in ways to escape restrictions. In the second volume of The Accursed Share, Bataille speculates on alcohol, war and holidays as the choices for expenditure. He is not so naive as to think that a larger participation in erotic games would help avoid war (nice thought), but he does rethink the ways of avoiding war: we will not be able to decrease the risk of war before we have reduced, or begun to reduce, the general disparity in standards of living (Bataille, 1991: 188). This banality is what Bataille sees as the only chance for an alternative to war, and it is possible even in the midst of the Cold War. The trouble was, faced with war itself, Bataille retreated to the library. Batailles contempt for and fascination with fascist community must Nancy says be behind his withdrawal (Nancy, 1991: 17). Unlike Marx in the Brumaire, Batailles analysis lls him with unease and inevitable failure in the face of a paradox at which his thinking came to a halt (Nancy, 1991: 23). It is this interruption that left Bataille susceptible to the postmodern- ist revision which drained any sense of a political programme the ght against fascism from his work.9He was conned to the library, resigned, introspective, and in the end left passing books on to others with a whispered recommendation (the review Critiquewas the last publishing venture he started, and it continues today).

Spiralling into the conagration of the sun, which gives energy without (obvious) return, he later wrote: The planet congested by death and wealth a scream pierces the clouds Wealth and death close in. No-one hears this scream of a miserable waiting. And then: Knowing that there is no response. (Bataille, 2001: 221) And, nally, from the Notebook for Pure Happiness written towards the end of his life: The only escape is failure. (Bataille, 2001: 223) Everything that we know is true, but on condition of disappearing in us (we
know better in ceasing to know). (Bataille, 2001: 247) Part IV Have I not led my readers astray? (Bataille, 1991: 430) Bataille cannot be left to rot in the library. How useful an experiment would it be to try to apply Batailles notion of expenditure to politics today? Klaus-Peter Kpping asks questions about modernity which arise explicitly from his reading of Bataille as a theorist of transgression, addressing political examples such as Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia and Indonesia

A more extravagant general economy framework for such questions might take up the massive accumu- lation that is the excess of an arms trade promoting regional conicts as integral to sales gures on the one side, with the performative futility of massed anti-capitalism rallies and May Day marches that fall on the nearest Sunday so as not to disrupt the city on the other. Expenditure and squan- dering today, in
(Kpping, 2002: 243).
Batailles sense, might be seen in both the planned obso- lescence of cars, computers and nearly all merchandise, as well as in the waste production and fast-food service industry cults and fashionista style wars, tamogochi and Beckham haircuts that currently sweep the planet. No doubt it would be too mechanical to rest with such applications, too utili- tarian, but the relevance is clear. The use-value of Georges Bataille is somewhat eccentric and the deployment of pre-Second World War circum- stances as a comparative register for today is of course merely speculative. No return to the 1930s (colourize lms now). Yet, taking account of a long list of circumstantial differences no Hitler, no Moscow, no Trotskyite opposition, etc. is also unnecessary since it is only in the interests of thinking through the current conjuncture so as to understand it, and change it, that any return should ever be contemplated. The importance of French anthropology Mauss as well as psycho- analysis and phenomenology, cannot be underestimated and all are crucial in Batailles comprehension of the rise of fascism. Can these matters help us to make sense of political debates in the midst of a new world war today? That the intellectual currents which shaped Batailles analysis were post- Marxist did not, then, replace the importance of Marx.

the compre- hension of Bushs planetary terror machine still requires such an analysis, but one that can also be informed by the reading of Batailles thought as shaped by the intellectual currents mentioned above. In a period of capi- talist slump, crisis of credit, overextended market, defaulted debt and threatening collapse, the strategy of war looms large. Even before the events of 11 September 2001 in New York, Bush was clearly on the warpath with missile defence systems, withdrawal from various international treaties and covenants, and massive appropriations for military and
Today

surveillance systems.

The imperial element is clear and sustained the aggression against the Palestinians, the adventure in Afghanistan and the war on Iraq (to defend papa Bushs legacy) obviously have their roots in the imperial- ist mercantile tradition plunder and war in pursuit of resources, primarily oil, secondarily armaments sales. If this is potlatch, it is of the destructive kind that Bataille feared. The possibility of a geopolitical solution other than war should be evaluated. But it is a matter of record that, under the Bush family regime, the USEurope alliance has not been interested in pursuing any programme of reduction of disparity, a few suspensions of Third World debt and UN summits notwithstanding. When Bataille

searches for an alternative to war in some vast economic competition through which costly sacrices,
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comparable to war, would yet give the competitor with initiative the advantage Bataille, 1949/1988: 172), he holds out
hope for a kind of gift without return. That he showed some enthusiasm for the Marshall Plan after the Second World War as a possible model for this might need to be ascribed to the exhausted condition of post-war France, but he soon revised his assessment. The Marshall Plan was not as disinter- ested as Bataille implied; it facilitated circulation and recoupment of surplus value as prot. The Cold War and nuclear proliferation turned out to be the preferred examples of reckless waste in actuality as recog- nized in volume two of The Accursed Share (Bataille, 1991: 188).

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The Pups of War 1NC Shell Link (v K aff)


Today, redistribution is not considered an option, the threat of Asian capitalism after the slaughter of millions can be ignored, and the war on Islam (known variously as the Gulf War, Zionism, and the War on Terror) appears as the primary strategy (combined with a war on South America, mistakenly named as a war on drugs, and a war on immigration disguised as a security concern). The secondary
( strategy is a newly hollowed out version of liberal welfare. In 1933 Bataille had written of the bourgeois tendency to declare equality and make it their watchword, all the time showing they do not share the lot of the workers (Bataille, 1997: 177). In the 21st century, Prime Minister Blair of England has made some gestures towards a similar pseudo- alternative. At a Labour Party congress in the millennium year he spoke of the need to address poverty and famine in Africa, and no doubt still congratulates himself on his pursuit of this happy agenda; as I write a large entourage of delegates and diplomats are ying to Johannesburg for another conference junket the Earth Summit. The party accompanying Blair and Deputy Prescott includes multinational mining corporation Rio Tinto Executive Director Sir Richard Wilson (The Guardian, 12 August 2002). Rio Tinto is hardly well known for its desire to redistribute the global share of surplus

If there are no gifts, only competitions of expenditure, what then of the effort of Bataille to oppose fascism? It is not altruistic, and yet it is the most necessary and urgent aspect of his work that is given to us to read for today. Is fascism
expenditure for the welfare of all. a charity-type trick? A deceit of double dealing which offers the illusion of more while giving less? Something like this psycho-social structure of fascism appears to be enacted in the potlatch appeasements of the propaganda spinsters surrounding Blair. The New Labour and Third Way public offering is ostentatiously to be about more healthcare, more police, more schools, but Blair spins and rules over a deception that demands allegiance to a privatization programme that cares only about reducing the costs (xed capital costs) of providing healthy, orderly, trained employees for industry, of short-term prot and arms sales to Israel, of racist scare-mongering and scapegoating of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants, of opportunist short-term gain headin-the-sand business-as-usual. Similarly, the gestures of multi-millionaires like George Soros and Bill Gates in establishing charity foundations to ease their guilt is not just a matter of philanthropy, it is a necessary gambit of containment (and these two in particular bringing their cyber-evangelism to the markets of Eastern Europe, South and South-East Asia).

The

liberal rhetoric of charity and the militant drums of war are the two strategies of the same rampant restrictive economy. Carrot and stick. Team A and team B of capi- talist hegemony the critique of the gift is clear, a gift is not
a gift but a debt of time and this is not really generosity or hospitality. The same can be said perhaps of war it is not war but prot, just as the gift reassures the giver of their superior status, the war on terror unleashes a terror of its own; war does not produce victories but rather defeat for all. Bataille shows us a world in ruins. September 11 has been made into the kind of event that transforms an unpopular (even unelected) gure into a leader under whom the nation coheres in a new unity much as Bataille saw Nuremburg achieve for the National Socialists. Of course I am not suggesting Bush is a Nazi he hasnt got the dress sense but

people were betrayed by the trick of a democ- racy that offers pseudo-

participation once every four years, and this time in a way that has consequences leading inexorably to a massive ght . The kowtowing to big business with a rhetoric of social security has been heard before it was called the New Deal (or welfare state) and was a deception almost from the start. Where there was perhaps some contractual obli- gation of aid in the earlier forms, today the trick of the buy-off bribery of service provision is contingent and calculated according only to corporate strategic gain. While we lurch towards endless war, governments reassure us with the of the wire. The largest prison population ever (under democracy or any other form of government), mass connement for minor offences (three strikes), colour overcoded death row (Mumia Abu-Jamal etc.), arrest and

watchwords of security that really mean death and despair to those on the wrong side

The incarcerated souls in the concentration camps of Sangatte,10 Woomera,11 Kamunting12 or Guantanamo13 are wired in and offered up as sacricial gifts to the rule of new judicial-administrative fascism. A new toothy-smiling Christian cult of death and technology, spun carefully via press conferences and TV sitcoms television has
detention without trial or charge, celebratory executionism, etc. given up any pretence of journalism in favour of infotainment. Does the US adminis- tration dream of a new post-war era where, once again like Marshall, they could come with a plan to rebuild upon ruins? This would indicate the exhaustion of the current mode of production, which, with information promised renewal but quickly stalled. Whatever the case, the enclosure of the US and Europe behind fortress walls does not experience now shows ensure prophylactic protection, and ruin may be visited upon all. It was Bataille who said that perhaps only the

Polite critiques and protest have no purchase orderly rallies against the aggression in Afghanistan, against asylum and immigration law, against the destruction of Palestine, etc.,
methods of the USSR would ... be equal to a ruined immensity (Bataille, 1949/1988: 1678).

get no airtime (instead, political soap opera like The West Wing, as the current equivalent in ideological terms to the Cold Wars Bomber Command). Every leader that accedes to the War on Terror programme and its excesses (civilian deaths, curtailment of civil liberty, global bombing) is an appeaser. This is like the dithering of Chamberlain, only this time the opposition activists are ghting in a post-national arena and Stalins slumber will not be broken, the Red Army cannot run inter- ference, there is no Churchill rumbling in the wings,

the fascist empire will prevail without militant mobilization across the board. This is the appeasers gift betrayal into the ranks assigned to us by generals and industrial magnates (Bataille, 1985: 164). The unravelling of the tricks of social welfare, of asylum and aid programmes, of interest even (the narrowing of news broadcasts to domestic affairs) or respect, of the demon- ization of others, of tolerance, the hypocrisy of prejudice all this prepares us for a war manufactured elsewhere. After the breakdown of the gifts tricks, fascism is the strategy, the obverse side of capitals coin. In this context, the geo-politics that enables, or demands, appeasement of the imperious corporate/US power is the restricted destruction we should fear, and we should ght in a struggle that goes beyond national defence, wage claims or solidarity. The discipline of the Soviets and of
Bataille could be our tools. Bataille reads on in his library. We are left speculating with him, rashly charging in with ideas that are less excessive, less exuberant, that modera- tion might withhold. But there is no more important time to consider the efforts in the arts to ght militarism out of control, and, as Bush drags the world into permanent war, it is worth asking why Batailles surrealistic opposition to Hitler was inadequate. Is it because there are no more thinkers in the Party? Is it that subversion is uninformed and its spirit quiet? Chained to the shelves, it is not enough to know that

appeasement of the military-industrial machine is the obverse side of liberal charity.

Why are we still unable to acknowledge this is the path to war? What would be adequate to move away from appeasement to containment and more? What kind of sovereign destruction would Bataille enact today? Against

the immense hypocrisy of the world of accumulation (Bataille, 1991: 424), the answer is clear: we should condemn this mouldy society to revolutionary destruction (Bataille, 1997: 175). The Bataille of La Critique Sociale might argue for a glorious expenditure as that which connects people together in the social and recognizes their joint labour to produce themselves, and this must be redeemed from the restricted economy that insists on expenNavigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.-motto of Hanseatic League 9

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diture for the maintenance of hierarchy. If he were leaving the library today, the Bataille of anti-war Surrealism might say it is time for a wake-up knock-down critique of the barking dogs. The castrating lions of appease- ment must be hounded out of town. Back in your kennels, yelping pups of doom. Fair call, Georges Bataille.

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Shell Cerberus 1NC Shell Link (v Policy Aff)


We declare ourselves sovereign, and refuse identification with the excess of the USFG. We offer this debate to ecastic communication, sacrificing certainty to social exuberance. Act 1: The Annointing The attempt to restore balance to the internatonal system denies the excessive violence at the heart of state sovereignty. The aff re-enacts political theater built upon the extermination of others.
Thomas Blom Hansen

and Finn Stepputat 2007

[Thomas Blom Hansen is Adjunct Professor of Anthropology at Columbia University, Senior Research Scientist at Yale University, Visiting Professor at the University of Edinburgh, and Professor of Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam where he served as Dean of the International School for Humanities and Social Sciences. Recently, Hansen was offered a position as full professor at Stanford University where he is to head a new research institute for the anthropological study of South-East Asia.[1] Finn Stepputat is Senior Researcher at Danish Insitute International Studies, Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Post-Colonial World http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i7996.html]
The attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001 aimed at what Al-Qaeda saw as the heart of America's global empire. The subsequent reactions in America and the rest of the world demonstrated that sovereignty and its ultimate expression--the ability and the will to employ overwhelming violence and to decide on life and death--have been reconfigured in the last decades of the twentieth century. The

"war on terror" and the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that underneath the complex structures of power in modern , liberal societies, territorial sovereignty, and the foundational violence that gave birth to it, still remains the hard kernel of modern states--an intrinsically violent "truth" of the modern nation-state that remains its raison d'tre in periods of crisis. Jus ad bellum, the possibility
of waging war against those one declares as enemies remains a central dimension of how a state performs its "stateness." At the same time, these reactions also vindicated Hardt and Negri's assertion that "imperial sovereignty" of the twenty-first century differs from earlier forms of imperial power (Hardt and Negri 2000, 161204). As opposed to earlier eras, today's empire of global network-power has no outside .

The enemies, or "deviants," within this space of moral-political-economic domination are all "within," and are often former allies of the U.S. government. In the simplified view of the Bush administration, these constitute an "axis of evil" that must be punished and disciplined in preemptive military strikes to secure internal peace in the United States and among its allies. The sovereign prerogative is to declare who is an internal enemy, and the "war on terror" is a war on internal enemies--within nation-states now policed under new stringent security acts, and within the global empire where legality and rights have been suspended for those declared "illegal combatants" and incarcerated in Afghan prisons, Guantanamo Bay, and other "spaces of exception." The global transformations of politics, economy, and culture have been explored in various ways by theorists of globalization
and international relations.1 Their obvious merits notwithstanding, these works still maintain an unbroken link between state power, sovereignty, and territory. Sovereignty resides in the state, or in institutions empowered by states, to exercise sovereign power in supra national institutions and within the nation-state defined by its territory and the control of its populations. The emphasis in this body of literature remains on sovereignty as a formal, de jure property whose efficacy to a large extent is derived from being externally recognized by other states as both sovereign and legitimate. This taking effective sovereignty for granted is questioned by Stephen Krasner (1999) in his influential work, "Sovereignty: Organized Hypocracy." Krasner shows how international sovereignty and the principles of nonintervention are being breached in numerous ways by imposition as well as agreement, but in his account, sovereignty remains inherently linked to territory and the state power of states. It seems that sovereignty cannot be imagined independently of the state. This volume questions the obviousness of the state-territorysovereignty link. In tune with a line of constructivist scholarship in International Relations theory (e.g., Kratochwill 1986; Ruggie 1993; Biersteker and Weber 1996) we conceptualize the territorial state and sovereignty as social constructions. Furthermore, we suggest to shift the ground for our understanding of sovereignty from issues of territory and external recognition by states, toward issues of internal constitution of sovereign power within states through the exercise of violence over bodies and populations. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel remarks that during "the feudal monarchy of earlier times, the state certainly had external sovereignty, but internally, neither the monarch nor the state was sovereign" (Hegel [1821] 1991, 315). This "internal sovereignty" of the modern state was only possible under "lawful and constitutional conditions," in a unitary "Rechtsstaat" whose "ideality" would show itself as "ends and modes of operation determined by, and dependent on, the end of the whole" (316, emphasis as in original). Hegel makes it clear that this modern "ideality" of sovereignty can only be realized insofar as local and familial solidarities of "civil society" are sublated to expressions of patriotism through the state, particularly in situations of crisis (316). Even in this, the most systematic thinker of the modern state, sovereignty is not the bedrock of state power but a precarious effect--and an objective--of state formation. Building on insights from a previous volume that sought to "denaturalize" the postcolonial state (Hansen and Stepputat 2001), and motivated by global events, we propose in this volume to take a fresh and ethnographically informed look at the meanings and forms of sovereignty in the same postcolonial zones of the world. Our aims are threefold. First, we suggest that sovereign power and the violence (or the threat thereof) that always mark it, should be studied as practices dispersed throughout, and across, societies. The unequivocal linking of sovereign power to the state is a

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historically contingent and peculiar outcome of the evolution of the modern state system in Europe since the West-phalian peace in 1648. The

discipline of International Relations has for decades assumed states to be both normal, that is, with de facto legitimate control of their populations and territory, and identical, that is, with similar interests, strategies, and expected patterns of action. To become a normal sovereign state with normal citizens continues to be a powerful ideal, releasing considerable
2

creative energy, and even more repressive force, precisely because its realization presupposed the disciplining and subordination of other forms of authority . We suggest that sovereignty

of the state is an aspiration that seeks to create itself in the face of internally fragmented, unevenly distributed and unpredictable configurations of political authority that exercise more or less legitimate violence in a territory . Sovereign power, whether exercised by a state, in the name of the nation, or by a local despotic power or community court, is always a tentative and unstable project whose efficacy and legitimacy depend on repeated performances of violence and a "will to rule." These performances can be spectacular and public, secret and menacing, and also can appear as
scientific/technical rationalities of management and punishment of bodies. Although the meanings and forms of such performances of sovereignty always are historically specific, they are, however, always constructing

their public authority through a capacity for visiting

violence on human bodies. continued


The "secret" of sovereignty seems, in other words, still to be defined in the tension between the will to arbitrary violence and the existence of bodies that can be killed but also can resist sovereign power, if nothing else by the mere fact of the simple life force they contain. If

sovereign power originates in excessive and exceptional violence that wants nothing or sees nothing beyond its own benefit or pleasure, its object, but also its ultimate resistance, is found in the simple life of bodies that desires nothing beyond itself and the simple moments of pleasure of everyday life. This fundamental embeddedness of sovereignty in the body was at the center of Georges Bataille's exploration of the concept and its meaning in the modern world. To Bataille, sovereignty is not merely an archaic form of power and subordination but articulated more fundamentally in attitudes, or acts, beyond the realm of utility and calculation. "Life beyond utility is the domain of sovereignty" (Bataille 1991, 198). 8 Sovereign enjoyment is excessive and beyond the needs of those enjoying . A sovereign command does not calculate minutely what it wants, but inadvertently reproduces obedience qua its very gesture of disregard of danger and death (225-30). Sovereignty resides in every human being and shows itself in the desire to enjoy and revel in brief moments of careless freedom, in sexual ecstasy, in moments of simple nonanticipatory existence, when an individual experiences "the miraculous sensation of having the world at his disposal" (199).
This was the original condition of man in "his non-alienated condition [. . .] but what is within him has a destructive violence, for example the violence of death" (214). A part of Bataille's essay anticipates Foucault's work by arguing that modern bourgeois society, and communism with even more determination, have striven to eradicate the wastefulness, irrationality

and arbitrariness at the heart of sovereignty: both as a mode of power, as a mode of subordination driven by the subject's projection of their own desire onto the spectacle of wasteful luxury of the court and the king, and as a space for arbitrary and spontaneous experiences of freedom and suspension of duties. The
essence of Bataille's proposition is that because the exercise of sovereignty is linked to death, excessive expenditure (depenser) and bodily pleasure can neither be contained by any discipline, nor be fully "democratized" into an equal dignity of all men. Because sovereignty revolves around death, the ultimate form of expenditure beyond utility, it constitutes in Mbembe's words an "anti-economy" (Mbembe 2003, 15). To Bataille ,

sovereignty has no positive existence but is a miracle intrinsic to human existence and can only be determined through what he calls a "negative theology" that captures the "miraculous moments " (241) in which sovereignty is experienced: in the awe of the leader or the king, in the disregard of death, of timidity, of prohibitions. Because sovereignty flows from the assertion of a basic life force that
foregrounds the body and the senses rather than the intellect, it is ultimately connected with the will to take life, and to give up one's life but not in a calculated and rational fashion. Sovereignty is the opposite of "faintheartedness" and Bataille writes: "Killing is not the only way to regain sovereign life, but sovereignty is always linked to a denial of the sentiments that death controls" (221). In Bataille's view, the divine is the ultimate sovereign phenomenon, organized around an unknowable but indivisible void, a "deep unity of NOTHING" (234), that only can be known through its effects, the enchantment it generates, the imagination it fires and the objects it sacralizes. 9 To Bataille, the mystery of sovereignty has an irrevocably archaic quality, an "animality that we perceive in sovereignty" whose reappearance as various forms of irrational excess upsets and disturbs the ideals of equality and reciprocity forged in modern bourgeois societies (and those under communism). Echoing Mauss's notion of gift-giving as an inherently unequal form of reciprocity because the giver always retains more than he/she gives, Bataille argues that "the universal aspiration of the sovereignty of the gift giver" (347), that is, the desire to impress, assert and dominate through excessive expenditure inevitably presents a problem for the bourgeois sense of "proportionality" (348). Bataille tried to understand sovereignty as a common denominator for what we may call the "gift of power"--the mystery of the will to power of certain individuals, the charisma that violence, selfishness, and ruthlessness generate--and he identified its origins in elementary life force that expresses itself in extraordinary actions and moments. For all its subtle insights, it is not surprising that Bataille's work has been accused of rearticulating themes in the philosophical "vitalism"--from Nietzsche's ideas of the willpower of a future superior being, Bergson's biological ideas of the elan vital as an irrepressible life force, to Heidegger's much deeper ontological reflections, and even Merleau Ponty's writings on emotional and embodied intensities. But, unlike these writers, Bataille shifted the emphasis from searching for the sources of the will to understanding will as an effect that is deducted from violence and other sovereign acts. However, on the whole, vitalist thinking had a troubled and ambiguous relationship with rightwing politics and critiques of modernity throughout the twentieth century. 10 The crux of this problem lies in Bataille's somewhat impoverished analysis of modern bourgeois society as governed by lifeless, disciplinary and commercial logics, and his view of sovereignty, the sacred, and the elementary forces of life as residues of an archaic age. The positing of sovereignty as a mark of something originary, of a will that is self-born and unaccountable and yet vitalizes the dull procedures of modernity, was even more pronounced in Carl Schmitt's earlier and controversial work on "political theology" from 1920. Written in the context of the

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upheavals following World War I, Schmitt's work on "the political" as an agonistic relation between friends and foes (Schmitt [1932] 1976) was deeply skeptical of parliamentary democracy and of rationalist or idealist notions of justice that in his view basically relied on only superficially secularised Christian ideas of mercy and salvation. Instead, Schmitt proposed the Hobbesian "decisionist" argument that law does not reflect the norms of a society but rather the will, the fortitude and authority of those who decide what is law. "For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists" (Schmitt 1985, 13). The key concept for Schmitt was here the notion of the "exception" (Ausnahme), which encapsulates what Bataille calls the "sovereign moment " in that it is a conceptual and normative void from where the law can be given but also where the vitality of the decision shows itself: "In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition" (15). In Schmitt's view, sovereignty does not have the form of law; it lies behind, and makes possible the authority of the law. The specificity of the legal form lies not in content or style but in a certain excess, a surplus content that precisely is the trace of a decision: "That constitutive, specific element of a decision is, from the perspective of the content of the underlying norm, new and alien. Looked at normatively, the decision emanates from nothingness" (33). Although Schmitt's decisionism on the surface may appear as hard-nosed realism, it is crucially dependent on a vitalist conception of modernity and democracy

modern society remains dependent on the passion and intensity derived from archaic and premodern phenomena such as religion, war, the magicality of the decision, and the sovereign power of the leader. Although sovereignty and state
as weak, formalistic, and dull social forms. In the view of Schmitt and his many contemporaries who were sympathetic to Nazism,

power is implicitly equated throughout Schmitt's work, his idea of the decision has a wider application and resonates in many ways with Bataille's idea of sovereignty as the sensual and embodied antithesis of the normative and customary. Both agree that sovereignty and its traces are ubiquitous and important in modern societies,

sovereignty is beyond definition, it is a "nothingness," a force or will that only can be known in the moment of its appearance. In the recent work of Giorgio Agamben, one finds a highly creative attempt to combine the insights of Schmitt, Bataille, Kantorowicz, and
always appearing under the sign of something excessive, or exceptional. Yet, for all the power attributed to the sovereign decision or moment, others, and yet, through a Foucauldian optic, to get beyond the unmistakably metaphysical and vitalist tenor of their expositions. Agamben rejects Foucault's notion of sovereignty as an archaic form of power superseded by modern biopolitics and suggests that,

"the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception" (Agamben 1998, 6). Instead of
beginning with Hobbes, the absolutist state and the origins of sovereign power in Christian theology, Agamben argues that "bare life," or simple biological life, "has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men" in the Western political tradition (7). In antiquity, the city and community proper consisted of free men and citizens--whereas women, slaves, outcasts, and other forms of life, that is, the majority of human beings, were excluded from the political community, and yet remained internal and crucial to society and economy. This

"inclusive exclusion" is captured in the Roman concept of homo sacer, the sacred man who is expelled and banished from the community and who may be
killed by members of the community--but not sacrificed as he is not worthy of this gesture of honor before the divine. This figure, the outlaw, the Friedlos, or the convict, was historically the symbol of the outside upon whose body and life the boundaries of the political community could be built. The expulsion of someone who used to have rights as a citizen, or simply to categorize some individuals in a society as a form of life that is beyond the reach of dignity and full humanity and thus not even a subject of a benevolent power, is the most elementary operation of sovereign power--be it as a government in a nation-state, a local authority, a community, a warlord, or a local militia. At the same time, Agamben shows the figure of the sovereign to be ambiguous--a figure whose status and corporeality appears as fragile and ambivalent but also exempted from the rules of ordinary life as that of his double, the homo sacer, the figure symbolizing simple, mute and bare life (Agamben 1998, 49-103). This logic of sovereign

violence that founds the political community by excluding various forms of "bare life" has not disappeared with the emergence of modern biopolitical forms of governance. On the contrary. The essential operation of totalitarian power was to reduce the population to pliable bodies that could be improved, shaped, and regimented, but also exterminated if deemed unnecessary or dangerous. CONTINUED. Modern states seek not only to produce citizens who are responsible and amenable to rational selfgovernance. They also seek to make these citizens bearers of the sovereignty of the nation and the state and thus, in a sense, produce their own ideal cause: the eighteenth-century idea, that the sovereignty of the state is the sum of, and expression of, the aggregate of each individual citizen. Thus, beneath the governance through reason and norms, lies the imperative of obedience to the rules, and further yet, the performance of violence and the armed protection of the community--Home Guards, civil patrols, the armed forces, and so
on. The assertion in Western states after September 11 of the "hard kernel" of sovereignty is, among many other things, manifested in substantial expansions of these forms of domestic defense forces, or the huge Homeland Security program in the United States, many of which are based on voluntary commitments from citizens. These institutions--the armed heart of the sovereign

The production of sovereignty through the nation and the state are, in other words, often exclusive projects that inadvertently presuppose and produce large numbers of poor, marginalized, or ethnic others as outsiders,
nations--are both the instrument of national integration (as in the United States and Israel) and simultaneously closed to anyone considered culturally or religiously "alien."

people who are not yet ready to become citizens or included in the true political-cultural community. The state finds itself in constant competition with other centers of sovereignty that dispense violence as well as justice with impunity--criminal gangs, political movements or quasi-autonomous police forces that each try to assert their claims to sovereignty. In such situations ,

the state is not the natural and self-evident center and origin of sovereignty, but one among several sovereign bodies that tries to assert itself upon the bodies of asylum seekers, "terrorists," or mere criminals.

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Act 2. The Cutting. Sacrifice the 1AC. Severe its head, flay its corpse, and wear its skin. Sacrificial theater offers a moment of transfiguration. Risk this intimate encounter with death to give your life meaning beyond mere existence and duration.
Liran Razinsky 2009 [The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009]
Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegels fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a being unto death (he uses Heideggers term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of mans fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, Hegel 335-36; 286). The

sacrificer both destroys and survives. Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that sacrifice is not a simulacrum, not a mere subterfuge. In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, and calls for the negation of individuals as such (The Festival 313; 215). We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire.
Batailles idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freuds paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an others death. Yet on some level this others death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die (Hegel 336; 287).

There is no sacrifice, writes Denis Hollier, unless the one performing it identifies, in the end, with the victim (166). Thus it is through identification, through otherness that is partly sameness, that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the
act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Batailles stress on the involvement of sight: and so he dies in seeing himself die (Hegel 336; 287), which brings him close to Freuds view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Batailles

, meeting death is a need, not uncalled-for. We must meet death, and we must remain as spectators. Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved , accompanied by the critical revaluation of values, which renders the meeting with death crucial for humanness. Note that both possibilities of meeting deathin the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turnare social.
description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly

Continued
Thus Freuds text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other.

Death perhaps cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped sideways, indirectly, vicariously through a mirror, to use Perseuss ancient trick against Medusa. The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. The safety that theater provides, of essentially knowing that we will remain alive, emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically enables us to really get a taste of death. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen
and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authorsthat we can meet death through the other and yet remain aliveis ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it

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invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But

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almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as wellone passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described abovenamely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided, he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him diehis wife, his child, his friend []. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (Thoughts 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, A Struggle) how Freuds reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and his whole being revolted against the admission. Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead (Freud, Thoughts 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, ones own death always being, says Freud, ones blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heideggers grappling with a problem similar to Batailles paradox. It is part of Heideggers claim, which he shares with Freud, that ones death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the others death is necessarily the others and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of ones own death (Hegel 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the fusion of beings in these moments of intensity (The Festival 307-11; 210-13; La Littrature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his whole being is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clearthere is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for himthat is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Batailles perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freuds attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freuds text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, A Struggle). One manifestation of this confusion is Freuds position regarding this culturalconventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from deaths exclusion from unconscious thought (Thoughts 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it:

But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the sons place with his mother, the husbands with his wife, the fathers with his children, if a disaster should occur. Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse. (It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.) (Thoughts 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freuds paper are
probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freuds Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examplesnot experimenting with explosive substancesseem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freuds position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in

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surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations necessary for his preservation, that he asserts the nature of his being (La Littrature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get

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close to it. But he also describes Mans need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due (Thoughts 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life more tolerable for us once again (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out experiments with explosive substances. In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines

Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. The sacred horror, he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: the richest and most agonizing experience. It opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this world and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (Hegel 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojve. Bataille gives it an emotional twist. The presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements (violence) bring life closer to a state where individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest. Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or intimacy: immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object (The Festival 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littrature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes
offered by Batailles worldview that I wish to interpret them here. seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freuds text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content (Thoughts 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the accumulation of deaths of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of who is to take our place, the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freuds claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. Survival,

he tells us, has a price. It limits

our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving

life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the future function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for the

threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things
where life runs its normal course. Man is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things (The Festival 312; 214).

Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life []. Death reveals life in its
plenitude (309; 212). Batailles neutral image of life is the equivalent of Freuds shallow and empty life. What Freud denounces is a life

the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life. Who is to take the sons place with his mother,
trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely
the husbands with his wife, the fathers with his children. Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. The

need for duration, in the words of Bataille, conceals life from us (The Festival 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life as it is is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity to meet death is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human. But the tension between the tendenciesto flee death or to embrace itis not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always
tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the

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exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things.

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Act 3 The Feast Sacrificing the goods of the 1AC enacts liberation, challenging the utilitarian logic that culminates in extinction.
Jesse Goldhammer 2005 [Lecturer/Instructor, Institute of Government Studies, U.C. Berkeley, The Headless Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought p. 10-14]
violence. Although Bataille agrees with Maistre, Sor,el, and the French revolutionaries that sacrificial violence can be adapted to modern political settings, Bataille disputes the historical association of sacrifice with political foundation and authority. Maistre, Sorel, and the French revolutionaries sought to place sacrifice in the service of moral revolutions in order to ground new forms of politics and legitimate power.
In chapter 4,1 examine how the renegade surrealist Georges Bataille used the sacrificial ideas developed by his predecessors to challenge the basic premise of the French discourse on sacrificial

human liberation requires not better politics, achieved through violent political foundation, but rather the sacrificial dismantling of the constitutive elements of modern political activity. Taking aim at liberalism and utilitarianism in particular, Bataille pursues an idea of revolutionary sacrifice that liberates human beings from all forms of servility, including morality authority, identity, community-the whole modern political enterprise. Bataille argues that revolutionary liberation requires the retrieval of sacrificial activities that subvert rational, useful, and productive modes of thought and action-anything that transforms human beings into things. Rather than producing something that the sacrificer can use, such as power rendered sacred, Bataillian sacrifice generates an ecstatic experience of self-loss. In Bataille's vie sacrifice must free humanity from politics, not support, establish, or reestablish it. Bataffle thus envisions that unproductive sacrificial activities will give birth to a
For Bataille, however, metapoitical community paradoxically defined by its permanent lack of foundation. In this way Bataille uses the works of Maistre and Sorel to repudiate the basic assumptions of the French discourse on sacrificial violence. Batalile's radical reformulating of political sacrifice reveals what is at stake in using sacrificial violence to found politics. During the t93os, Bataille increasingly distanced sacrificial practices from the realm of politics because he was fearful that founding violence would generate fascism rather than freedom. On the eve of World War II, Bataille extended this logic as far as it would go, imagining that sacrificial violence would achieve ecstatic liberation if it were practiced in the bedroom or on and through the text. Although Bataille never evinces any reticence about violence or cruelty I argue that he ultimately realized that sacrifice practiced in either a French revolutionary, Maistrian, or Sorelian fashion led to tyranny. Batallle's contribution to the French discourse on sacrificial violence is thus ironical. On one hand, he pushes the idea of sacrificial violence to its logical conclusion by arguing that the sacrifice of another being for the sake of political change cannot generate anything useful or productive. On the other hand, the legendary sacrificial crime-to borrow again from Machiavelli-permanently alters the sacrificers as well as the basis upon which they can form a community with others. Thus, Bataille recognized that seeking political change through sacrifice permanently destabilizes the basic elements of modern Western politics. Although Bataille lays bare the risk of using sacrificial violence to found politics, he also succumbs to the same temptation as his predecessors who condemned the use of sacrifice by others, but wished to harness it for themselves. Bataille criticizes the French revolutionaries, Maistre, and Sorel for placing sacrifice in the service of authoritarian structures of power. Like the other members of the discourse on sacrificial violence, however, Bataille never abandons the idea that sacrificial violence is a sacred, spectacular form of bloodshed that plays a vital role in the formation of human communality. During the Cold War, Bataille uncharacteristically developed this position into a quasi-scientific, general theory of

sacrificial loss that will save the modern world from the dangers of political sclerosis and the possibility of nuclear annihilation. In
political economy Representing a systematic critique of utilitarianism, this postwar theoretical work illustrates Bataille's effort to find contemporary examples of setting sacrifice to work, Bataille contradicts his prewar claims about the absolute uselessness of sacrifice. At the same time, he also demonstrates the sublime appeal-the attraction and danger-of adapting ancient ideas about violence and loss to modern political conditions. It was precisely this particular quality of sacrificial violence that originally attracted the French revolutionaries,.leading them to inaugurate the discourse on sacrificial violence. Defining sacrifice is difficult because of the ambiguity inherent in violence. Violence is generally defined in terms of physical injury or harm to subjects and objects. Violence directed against humans involves injury to or constraint of the body and mind. Against objects, violence entails damage or destruction. Metaphoric violence, the broadest aspect of the definition, includes innumerable symbolic, culturally specific notions of harm. The modern meaning of violence is limited and, unfortunately, confused by the fact that it is distinguished from "force," which today is often used to mean legitimate violence. Because there are various, irreconcilable concepts of right, there is also irresolvable debate about the difference between force and violence. In the ancient world, however, the concept of violence retained the ambiguity eschewed by the modern world, Vi "force," is the root of the Latin vi/coda, "violence," collapsing the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate bloodshed. I/jo lentus denotes "acting with (unreasonable) force towards others, violent, savage, aggressive."' In this case, "unreasonable" describes not the illicitness or illegality of a violent act, but rather its disproportionate, extraordinary; or distinctive quality: This definition of plo/cows is negative and thus departs from the more ambiguous meaning of vLs, which retains a positive quality. In addition to signifying the use of physical strength to compel or constrain vigorously as well as the unlawful use of force, pbs also implies binding force or authority.' J/ls thus encompasses the essential uncertainty of violence, the fact that it can be "good" or "bad," depending on the context. A subcategory of violence, sacrifice is etymologically an act that renders holy or sacred. If rendering sacred entails a process of setting apart from the quotidian or profane, then sacrificial violence is a paradoxical practice: it is a form of violence capable of breaking and forming distinctions or erasing and drawing boundaries. This definition is counterintuitive because the modern view of violence exclusively associates it with the breaking down of social distinctions, chaos, mayhem, disruption, anarchy, loss of control, and the like. In contrast, sacrificial violence involves a double movement; it transgresses limits in order to inscribe or reinscribe them. 'What is more, this is not necessarily a conservative operation. The

purpose of sacrifice is not limited to the restoration of a particular order, limit, boundary, or status quo. The function
of sacrifice is contingent upon how it "makes sacred." Some sacred things are pure, elevated, divine, majestic, and absolute; others are impure, debased, demonic, abject, and inassimilable. When violentia denotes the capacity to transgress, pollute, or profane things that are pure or sacred, it captures only the negative aspect of the violent dou-ble movement of sacrifice.Viewed from the

, sacrifice holds the potential to generate a positive sacredness, which mimics the legitimacy of political power. In this respect, sacrifice describes a variety of practices that transform the negativity of violence into something socioculturally
standpoint of force or legitimate violence acceptable. Like any other social phenomenon, violence has normal and exceptional manifestations. Socially acceptable violence does not call attention to itself or to its author; it is woven into the fabric of everyday life. Exceptional, spectacular; or transgressive violence creates a tear in that fabric and, in so doing, sets its authors and their victims apart from their fellow human beings.This separation by dint of violence is the essence of the sacrificial mechanism and the reason why such bloodshed is considered sacred. A process of collective destruction, sacrificial violence is often ritualized or culturally prefigured. Although this book is concerned with the meanings of human sacrifice in a modern political context, sacrifice has, more often than not, involved animal, vegetable, and inanimate objects. Ritual sacrificial practices and their meanings are typically inherited from the past and are usually invoked only in particular circumstances. As the very term implies, ritual sacrifice is anticipated, orchestrated, and socially acceptable; like Mass or potlatch, it is a symbolic form of violence that conforms to a regularized set of expectations. The participants in the ritual know what kind of violence will take place; they know how that violence will be conducted, and by whom; most important, they know whit category of victim (pridner ofwar, woman, racial or religious minority, etc.) will be selected. Although the actual function ofritual sacrifice may remain a mystery to those who practice it, its total meaning is predetermined. Thus, ritual sacrifice can be compared to a game of chance: the rules may not be written down, but they are fixed. These rules govern the selection ofthe victim, even though the specific victim and the actual outcome remain unknown. Finajly, like games of chance, sacrificial rites can have various outcomes, a reflection of their "success" or "failure?' Sacrifice is not always ritually prescribed. Two factors separate spontaneous sacrificial violence from its ritual cousin: the absence of agreement about sacrificial legitimacy and procedure. Without ritual prescription-knowing whom, when, and how to kill-communities that spontaneously sacrifice inevitably find themselves deeply divided about the reasons for and methods of killing. Indeed, in such cases, sacrifice may simply heighten communal conflict. Whifr ritual sacrifice expresses the rigidity and hierarchy of the social order that it serves, spontaneous sacrifice has no specific allegiance to any set of cultural symbols or social distinctions. Spontaneous sacrificial violence is potentially revolutionary when it symbolically manifests' ociocuIrural meanings and symbols

sacrifice can, through violence, open a space of contestation that serves to challenge status quo views and practices. It is a telltale sign that a
that compete with dominant, traditional ones. Disconnected from an orchestrated and authorized set of practices, spontaneous

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2NC OV Pups of War
The Aff is all bark and no no bite, chasing militarism like a dog running after a car. They have prouced a terrible yelping, but even if they caught the state it is doubtful they would no what to do. The 1ACs activism mirrors the productivity the state, and its indignation at militarism reinforces its awful fascination. Reject the role of the ballot as aligning yourself with the proper political discourse, and instead vote negative to theatrically dismember the aff. Offer this debate to useless sacrifice rather than political productvity, giving up the false security provided by the liberal discoruses of appeasement. Homo sacer is not here to be saved in this debate, but voting negative allows a moment of the sacred communication that is the prerequisite to the value of both life and debate.

2NC OV Cerberus
The affirmative promises peace and security through reigning in the destabilizing excesses of American power. But the state is violent excess, and the guarantee of stability is just another form of permanent war. The affirmative role-plays the state, simulating its sovereignty and even promises you survival as the cost of joining in their servility. But you are sovereign in this debate, and you should use your ballot to theatrically dismember the aff. This sacrifice releases us from utilitarian logic of good accumulation ,and cutting off the head of the 1AC fractures the lines of authority binding us in terror to the state. Vote negative as an act of sovereign exuberance, embraced the sacred communication that is the prerequisite to the value of both life and debate.

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Cross apply the link debate, which proves why their servility to the state means they cant solve our alt.

Our alternative severes the head of the 1AC, which makes the perm severance. The alternatves sacrificing of the goods of the 1AC is mutually exclusive with embracing the aff. This is a voting issue because it skews the sacrificial game debate by making all criticism of the aff impossible. The aff cant severe discourse, that is crucial to kritik ground. The aff claims to guarante survival, which means the perm is still trapped in utility. Extend Goldhammer and Razinski. Even if the perm is legitimate, it becomes just another rational discourse of the good. Sacrifice requires an intimate encounter with death, and the perm renounces the dangerous passions of existence which are necessary for the alt to solve.

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The perm links to all of their offense and doesnt solve our alt. Sacrifice combined with the program of the 1AC is the worst of both worlds, producing a politics of mass murder and annihilaton.
Jesse Goldhammer 2005 [Lecturer/Instructor, Institute of Government Studies, U.C. Berkeley, The Headless Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought p. 189-191]
It is true that The Accursed Share revisits eroticism and sovereignty, topics that led Bataille away from politics in the 193os. After the war, however, Bataille treated these concepts politically. For instance, in the epilogue of The History of Eroticism, Bataille speculates that human

beings will be driven to a "catastrophic war" unless they find outlets, such as eroticism, for their excess energy. Similarly, in "Sovereignty" Bataille argues that "sovereignty is no longer alive except in the perspectives of communism."" In the case of both eroticism and sovereignty Bataille is expressly looking for instances of unproductive expenditure or sacrifice, which may save human beings from their dangerously compulsive, modern need to engage in economic accumulation without loss. 'What sets The Accursed Share apart
from Bataille's prewar work is also what implicates Bataille in his own critique of the French discourse on sacrificial violence. Like his predecessors, Bataille ultimately puts sacrifice to work, a theoretically problematic endeavor that finds its strangest outlet in his consideration of the Marshall Plan. At the conclusion of World War II,

Bataille was fearful that:competition and excessive economic production in the United States and the Soviet Union would precipitate a devastating third world war. This Cold War pessimism was alleviated only by
the appearance of the Marshall Plan, which Bataille interpreted as a form of unproductive expenditure. Here he de-. scribes the Marshall Plan in terms of the general economy: "Mankind will move peacefully toward a general resolution of its problems only ([this threat causes the U.S. to assign a large share of the excess-deliberately and without return-to raising the global standard of living, economic activity thus giving the surplus energy produced an outle,t other than war." 94 By associating the Marshall Plan with unproductive expenditure, Bataille falls into the same theoretical trap as Sorel, Maistre, and the French revolutionaries. Bataille's argument for economic sacrifice may be less pernicious than the French revolutionaries' conviction that human sacrifice would help them to found a republic, but they nonetheless share an expectation that sacrifice will produce specific, ideal, and peaceful political outcomes. The belief that sacrifice will generate an ideal politics of any sort directly contradicts Bataille's fascism essay, where he argues that any

attempt to use sacrifice for the sake of traditional (elevated) sovereignty risks a violent, authoritarian politics. That essay illustrates, above all, that one cannot use fascist techniques to achieve antifascist ends without complicity in fascism 's
imperiousness. Similarly, the Marshall Plan may have provided humanity with an outlet for surplus energy, but it also "wasted" wealth productively, served utilitarian-minded liberals, and elevated American international interests, none of which was even remotely akin to the apolitical intentional communities originally desired by Bataille. His postwar work notwithstanding, Bataille fundamentally rejects the basic premise of the discourse on sacrificial violence that sacrifice founds new political regimes. By the end of the 1930s, Bataille declares politics an impossible task, rendering irrelevant the issue of foundation. If a

wholly unproductive sacrifice were to create anything, it would be metapolitical communities without conventional notions of authority and identity. As Bataille pushes the concept of sacrifice to its limit, shifting its locus from the street to
the bedroom and text, he reveals the difficulty experienced by Maistre, Sorel, and the French revolutionaries in assigning a political role to sacrifice. They put sacrificial violence to work in the establishment of politically significant fictions such as citizenship, authority, morality, and representation. In each case, there was an expectation that the sacrificial crime would lay the groundwork for a new era ofjustice. Following the Marquis de Sade, Bataille comes to appreciate the political absurdity of founding sacrifice: "An already old and corrupt nation, courageously shaking off the yoke of its monarchical government in order to adopt a republican one, can only maintain itse4'thongh many crimes,-for it is already a crime, and f it wants to move from crime to virtue, in other words from a violent state to a peaceful one, it would fall into an inertia, of which its certain ruin would soon be the result, "95 Sade observes that the regicidal crime, which inaugurated the French Republic as well as the French discourse on sacrificial violence, is a sacrifice destined to repeat itself because it strips away the possibility of distinguishing right from wrong. In other words, violent political foundation undermines its own possibility. Sade's admonishment applies to the Terror, when the French revolutionaries tragically repeated the regicide thousands of times. It anticipates Maistre, who imagines a world in which the unending sacrifice of the innocent redeems the sins of the guilty. It foresees the work of Sorel, whose myth of the general strike depends upon the working class's martyred repetition of Jesus' crucifixion. And, finally, it highlights the absurdity of Bataille's postwar search for unproductive expenditure in quotidian politics. In each of these cases, sacrifice works to produce virtue and redemption. Sade's argument is straightforward: violent sacrifice never founds politics without also giving rise to an endless repetition of the original crime. Bataille ultimately develops this insight into a notion of violent

waste, which he hopes will demolish the modern fictions that leave human beings powerless and servile. Bataille's sacrificial community does not repair, restore, or regenerate. It is incapable of establishing, founding, and inaugurating. It "begins" with the violation of the limits that make politics possible, and, tragically, it must exist in a permanent state of violation.

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The perms net benefit makes their sacrifice ridiculous. Sacred ecastasy requires us to gamble everything, identifying with waste beyond recuperation.
Jason Winfree, Assoc Prof Philosophy at California State University, 2009 [The Obssessions of George Bataille: Community and Communication ed. Mitchell/Winfree p. 42-44] With respect to the lover, we desire like a gambler wagers. "Like the winnings of a gambler;' writes Bataille, "sexual, possession
prolongs desire-or extinguishes it" (OC 6: 106/ON 86).The sheer momentum of the movement requires that its strength be squandered. Desire is unsatisfied not because it fails, but because it exceeds the search for satisfaction, because it is also raw expenditure. For this reason, desire is misunderstood if it is represented as the infinite tragic movement toward an inaccessible object, as though desire not only is prohibited by its very structure from attaining its aim, but as though its structure is fundamentally teleological. The obsession with this logic is always mournful (psychoanalysis) or moral (transcendental philosophy) and in both cases remains theological insofar as the concern is governed by or measured against an imaginary sense of propriety or ownership or end. The desire that binds lovers is not so much directed toward an unattainable sumnut, however, as it is itself the summit, the point "where life is impossibly at the limit."' Desire and summit can no more be separated than lightning and its flash. In this respect Bataille is unequivocal: "The

summit isn't what we 'ought to reach,' " (OC 6: 57/ON 39; tni)). Rather, "It's what is. Never what should be" (OC 6: 111/ON 91). If desire is unsatisfied, that is because it
exceeds the conservative search for satisfaction, because it is not teleological, because we are driven beyond the need of satisfaction without being driven to anything, because our unfinished character is in this very way excessive, [p. 42] not impoverished. If love is unsatisfied it is because it has perished, leaving us wasted and ruined. The lovers' love is sacred. It does not belong to the profane order of work and its accumulated labor, the profane and banal order of capital. For Bataille, the

The sacrifices brought about by the love of lovers require expenditure without recuperation; we give up our careers as dancers, we speak on the phone for hours on end, we waste the day in bed, and we give ourselves over entirely to that waste and identify ourselves with it. These sacrifices have nothing to do with the sacrifice of theology. As Bataille puts it, "in divine love, the limit is given in perfection," and this limit necessarily excludes play and its risk. Certainly, one risks nothing by loving God, whose infinite perfection is expressed through an infinite and undiscriminating love, just as one risks nothing by loving the flag. And that is as good as to say that in neither case does one really love, even if there remains operative a libidinal bind that does not fail to risk those others who refuse the religious-nationalistic sublimation of carnal desire, of the lovers touch or its absence . God and nation stand before us as the ugly symptoms of efficiency that guarantee that desire not only leaves the lover intact but also yields a profit. By contrast, carnal love and the love of lovers concerns the excess of suffering, and Bataille insists that "without this excess we could not play " (OC 6 86/ON 71).That is, it is by way of the excesses of suffering carnal desire that we are ourselves put into play, thrown like dice. And finitude is unbounded just in the sense that dice in their inevitable free fall carry an unpredictable combination that proves exhilarating or devastating, and in any case leads to ruin, even as it leads to the affirmation of what we
sacred designates an object that is beyond all others in value, but the sacred character of our carnal love has nothing to do with divine love . are in love. The oscillation expressed above in terms of the acceleration leading to summit or decline, the ecstasy of insufficiency, is not only a thematically explicit object in Bataille's writings, privileged and important because of the manner in which it bears upon and articulates the ontological task. Rather, Batailles work itself is characterized by the very movement it describes, constantly fluctuating between decline and glory in its expression. This is not to say Bataille's writing is motivated by the task of adequation between form and content, Sache and expression, but to insist that the ontological task is born from and gives expression to fundamental conditions of human life, conditions that enter into that expression and call it forth. Insufficiency is not, therefore, a category or concept to which the world must measure up, by which it would be rendered intelligible, but is rather the condition out of which Bataille writes. The work is ontological, then, not only because of its explicitly thematic ontological concerns, but because it exhibits in its very structure, expression, and aim, the ontological conditions it also diagnoses, the [p. 43] reciprocity of chance and insufficiency, isolation and contact. Thus, the same insufficiency thematized in the Sonirne athologique at once tears that work apart, rendering it dsoeuure-inoperative, unworking, fragmentary-and in this way it accounts for the alternately depressed and ecstatic articulations of naked existence exposed to chance, the violent and sometimes incoherent shifts of focus, mood, and intention. The work itself is an open wound communicating with those who read and those who are read, the elective community of Bataille's readership. Perhaps no part of the Somme exhibits the elective communities involved in this work and its unworking (dsoeuureinent as clearly as does On Nietzsche, which denies its readers any systematic or historical or critical exposition of Nietzsche, which is not even about Nietzsche at all, contrary to the most basic initial assumptions elicited by the title, but which offers instead articulations that have more to do with coffee shops, toothaches, and pretty girls than the academically overburdened and overdetermined will to power. Throughout the violent and radically unstable terrain of the works comprising the Sonune, Nietzsche is present neither as thematic object nor authoritative voice, but as part of an elective community, as participant in the bond of attraction and inclination to the community of chance and risk that requires of Bataille that he write. In Inner Experience, Bataffle announces, thereby placing the production of his own work squarely within the ontological claims it makes: "It is from a feeling of

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community binding me to Nietzsche that the desire to communicate arises in me, not from an isolated originality" (OC 5: 39/IF 26-27). And similarly from Guilty: "My life with Nietzsche as a companion is a community. My book is this community" (OC 6: 33/ON 9). Not a dialogical community of interpretation (Auslegung), but an affective community bound by chance, attracted to one another and the luck that configures that attraction-"Chance, it turned out, corresponded to Nietzsche's intentions more accurately than power could" (OC 6: 17/ON xxv). Bataille's books and those that read them are bound like lovers or suspended like a crowd before a dead-heat horse race entering the chute, one momentum configuring another and holding it together while luck falls. "Thus we are nothing, neither you nor I, beside burning words which could pass from me to you, imprinted on a page: for I would only have lived in order to write them, and, f it is true that they are addressed to you, you will bye from having had the strength to hear them" (OC 5: 111/IE 94; em). Not a community of like minds struggling to give shape to a Sache, but beings bound by the passion of chance, suffering their luck as their lot. When Nietzsche proclaims in On the Genealogy qf Morals, "atheism and a second innocence go together,""' he at once condemns the theological interpretation of the world as guilty. Nothing devalues our insufficiency like the attempt to lie meaning into the world, denying chance, personalizing [p. 44] luck, thus writing it off. But a

being subject to chance is acphalic, a headless being, a being not ordered theologically, and that is to say, not ordered at all , but shot through with desire and cast into the world as one particle among others. To the same extent that Acphale is not and cannot become a program, atheism is not a
belief or a position. It concerns rather, as Nietzsche puts it, "the meaning of the earth,"" that is, the sense of life without transcendence, the immanence of falling luck, the exposure to love and death, ecstatic and finite existence. Bataille's community with Nietzsche is the community of those attracted by that luck, bound to one another by the passion of chance, the lucky suffering that need not make of itself a meaning, the risk and play of ecstatic insufficiency that is effortless in its beauty and cruelty and momentum. The community with Nietzsche, the ecstasy of acphalic atheism, is the affirmation of desire and its risk, the incomprehensibility of the chance that constitutes our being: "Only when our response to desire remains incomprehensible is that response true .... ....We are to the degree that we

risk ourselves. If the risk ceases, if I withdraw some aspect to keep it from changing, the resulting regularity will be misleading: I'll pass from the tragic to the ridiculous" (OC 6: 87/ON 72; em). Nothing is more ridiculous, therefore, than theology and its guilt, nothing more absurd than the faade of our most serious understanding, which serves the social order and de facto community as its justification. Atheism is a matter of play, a matter of chance, a name for the way we are played by our luck. The community with Nietzsche, the community of lovers, the tragic community, elective community-never a matter of fact, but only value, the force of attraction that makes us crazy and feverish and delivers us over to one another in tears, laughter, and orgasm. Elective community is the point of acphalic contact.

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Perm instrumentalizes sacrifice for the good of the plans future, ruining the sovereign ecastasy of sacrifice. David Allison, Prof Philosophy at SUNY Stony Brook, 2009
[The Obssessions of George Bataille: Community and Communication ed. Mitchell/Winfree p. 124-125]

The breach in the psychophysical integrity of another and of oneself is not a means for a higher good, which would be communication. Corntnunication through these breaches in our and the other's psychophysical integrity turns in a vertigo, a solar explosion, independent of the consequences. Communication excludes concern for our interests, excludes concern for the time to come. Communication is not the good that we ensure or acquire through an action, which therefore requires us to coordinate, discipline, focus and narrow down, and subordinate our forces . It is itself not a future with which we are concerned: "the debauchee has a chance to reach the summit only if he has no intention to do so. The ultimate moment of the senses requires real innocence and the absence of moral pretensions and consequently even of the consciousness of evil" (OC 6: 57/ON 38; tm). Communication is not an enduring state; exhaustion comes quickly. It is not a good which requires conservation and preservation. When our strength begins to fail, when we feel ourselves declining, we become preoccupied with acquiring and accumulating goods of all sorts, with enriching ourselves in view of the difficulties to come. We act. Communication is disconnected from the concern for the future, but the relation between the summit and decline can be reversed in an effort to establish a relationship of utility between them. When sovereignty declines, communication is viewed and recuperated from the point of view of servile existence, of utility. Sacrifice and orgy will be viewed as actions achieving some good. T hey were seen to be expenditures useful for achieving victory in war. The victorious survivors knew the benefits of victory, acquired the women, booty, and territory. Sacrifice, which involves sacrifice of oneself with the victim, will be interpreted as a means to achieve personal salvation in another life. Sacrificing oneself was also seen as a means to achieve equality and justice for the community on earth. Throughout history, reasons were developed for one to head for the summit, releasing and risking all one's forces. Indeed, these reasons produced history.

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A2 Aff challenges militarism (Both)


Freedom requires the sacrifice of knowledge, even that which supposedly challenges American domination. The 1AC labors to produce global knowledge, enacting servility to the roguery of state violence. Malik 2006
[Suhail, teaches in the Department of Visual Arts, Goldsmiths College Theory Culture Society v.23 2-3]

. It follows that sovereignty

is rogue in democracy and democracy is therefore guaranteed and harnessed by a power that is itself rogue. If there is to be global

democracy, there must be global sovereignty and so a global voyoucracy, a rogue state that is beyond the terms of that democracy. The

sovereign state that orders legitimacy, which is the de facto condition of order, is necessarily voyou, rogue, counterordering; an identity of opposing categories whose condensation can here be marked (beyond the terms Derrida sets up) by the terms sovoyoureign or soverogue, a power that estab- lishes only a quasi-order. Today, Derrida continues, such states are only the USA and whatever (always subsidiary) allies it picks up in the course of undertaking such actions in implementing its sovereignty. But the USA is exceptional in this quasi-order in that it is the primary rogue state the only truly rogue state (as Chomsky also says for different reasons) because of its outstanding inter- national sovereign powers.

US international domination in the name of a common, global democracy is that of a global sovereignty (though this is not to say world sovereignty); it is, as is often declared, a global abuse of power necessarily so. This global sovereignty
of the USA is sometimes exercised through the UN but must also take place in terms of other outstanding manifestations of power if it is to be supersovereign, including that of its military (quaforce), its economics (quaconsumption), its cultural production (quaentertainment) and its politics (quademocracy). Such sovoyoureign or soverogue power(s) are not occasioned across or outside of democratic organization or polities at whatever level: it happens through and in democracy, insistently so. Soveroguery is the condition for the production of global knowledge and it is that by which knowledge in its globality has to be comprehended. But how is sovereignty to be under- stood in its identity with countersovereignty? We have seen that, for Derrida, Batailles coun- terconcept of sovereignty speaks to the counter-order of voyoucracy. We shall now take up this account in order to more exactly determine the sovereignty of American global domi- nance. Doing so will return us directly to the question of knowledge in the actual conditions of globalization. Batailles interest in sovereignty is in a general aspect that is opposed to the servile and the subordinate (1993: 197); it is general because it can belong to anyone. Such generality means that the determination of sovereignty cannot be restricted to its traditional identification with the power of either the State or law as it has been from Plato to Hobbes, Schmitt and, in a more complicated manner, Agamben. It can be the sovereignty of the voyou, for example. Bataille draws up an initial distinction between the general aspect of sovereignty and what the term means as regards a legally constituted and recognized state or individual (that is therefore subordinate to law). However, as Derrida proposes, in its sovoyoureignty or soveroguery, it is today the USA alone that sidesteps this distinction: yes, the USA is of course a sovereign state in the legally constituted sense and so is subject to international law; yet it is in a position to countermand the obeisance to any such law or consensus of a general will, since it alonehas the power to dominate and authorize non-legal actions in outright and blatant defiance of international convention and expectations. In this it exemplifies at a supernational level the general aspect of sovereignty beyond law of which Bataille speaks. The problem of the constitution of global knowledge can now be taken up since, for Bataille, sovereignty opposes and falls outside of servility, work and use, and knowledge is constituted in a temporal binding through just these actions. Sovereignty is external to knowledge for Bataille because, taking the stabilized modality of knowledge production known as science as example, to do science is to disregard the present time with a view to subsequent results (1993: 2012). Relatively uncontroversial as this characterization may be, several significant consequences follow from it: first, that the knowledge constituted in and by science, that is the present activity of science, is directed by a futural determination, a future organized in terms of use; second, knowledge unfolds in time; third, any knowledge that results from such an activity is itself subject to the same condition, that is, the knowledge that results from science is itself organized in terms of future results which is to say, fourth, that

to know is always to strive, to work; it is always a servile operation, indefinitely resumed, indefinitely repeated (1993: 202). Knowledge as it is constituted by science (as an exemplar) is organized with a view to use whether that use is practical (technics) or theoretical (science) is a secondary concern. Knowledge, then, is not sovereign at least, insofar as it is understood in terms of science or, more generally, a futural mobilizthrough the prospect of its use knowledge is constituted by the workof its future determinations. Hence Batailles part conclusion:

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ation. Put the other way, as Bataille affirms again and again, sovereignty cannot be known. Accepting this characterization of sovereignty, the co-determination of American domination and global knowledge is not then just a historical and political concern but also a theoretical and conceptual one. More specifically, as much as the fate and problems of American domi- nation(however it is characterized) is tied to the fate and problems of any attempt to construct a theoretical or practical case for a global knowledge, so the question of American sovereign domination of international and global politics in however complicated a sense is also a question as to the conditions and possibility of global knowledge. With Bataille, sovereignty is an experience that cannot be comprehended in science, not even political science, and certainly not with regard to law in its primarily futural determina- tion of the present. It cannot be regulated or experienced with view to any known future. Rather, sovereignty would have to occur in a moment which remains outside, short of or beyond, all knowledge (Bataille, 1993: 201). Such a moment cannot be known but is experi- enced; as Bataille puts it, consciousness of the moment is not truly such, is not sovereign, except in unknowing. Only by cancelling, or at least neutralizing, every operation of knowledge within ourselves are we in the moment , without fleeing it (1993: 203). It is the moment that is sovereign in how it seizes the mind and abjures from its own futural determination, refuting any conversion into work or use. The interruption or blocking of this futural aspect of experience is not a voluntaristic action or a programmable intervention but is for Bataille possible in
the grip of strong emotions that shut off, interrupt or override the flow of thought. This is the case if we weep, if we sob, if we laugh till we gasp (1993: 203). It is not the epiphenomena of strong emotions such as the burst of laughter or tears that stops thought; rather, the blocking of thought and knowl- edge are occasioned by the object of the laughter, or the object of the tears, that is, by the moments which occasion that laughter and those tears, as if we were trying to arrest the moment and freeze it in the constantly renewed gasps of our laughter or our sobs (Bataille, 1993: 203). It is the absolute momentousness and momentaryness of strong emotions, an experience that is always particular, that therefore apprehend what is involved in sovereignty, even as the latter defies knowledge or other attempts to determine it that can be futurally organized. This momentary experience without knowledge is risk.

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Sacrifice mimics the political function of the state without relinquishing our sovereignty to its tendrils of control Extend Goldhammer and Razinski. This debate is theater, and the theatrical sacririce of the alt is preferable to simulating the good of the 1AC. Vote neg to claim debate as a space of ecastic communication.

If Cerberus Role-playing assumes the sovereign violence of the state. Extend the Hansen and Stepputat 2007: The debate method of the 1AC trains us to become mini-states, actors whose ultimate sovereignty must go back to the fountainhead of the USFG. This trainsus to internalize the goods of peace and justice that enable endless wars of extermination.

They turn debate into a ritual of mastery disconnected from the realities of politics violence
Stephen Chan 2000 [Professor IR Dean Ethics at Notingham Trent University, Millennium Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 565-589] There are also more Lucifer-like dangers, ho wever. When you understand that a man believes he can change the world as a result of meditation and specific rituals, and when you try to find out wh y he is so certain that, after performing that ritual, he really will become master of the world or at least of his villagewell, there again is the temp tation of absolute liberty; in other words, the suppression of the human condition. Man is a limited, conditioned being. But the freedo m o f a god, or a mythic
ancestor, or a spirit no longer trammelled by a mortal body! Those are temptatio ns.25

Continued
the paradigm now of the person of IR? He or she goes to the Internatio nal Studies Association conferences and performs his or her knowledge to other performers. He or she reads (translations and summaries of) the texts of the moment, and seeks a reflexivity within those texts; locates a critical practice within the conference hall and classroo m; believes that discourse, and his or her participation in discourse, constructs the world. This is a professionalism pure and proper, and it is hermetically sealed fro m the world, rather than in hermeneutic dialogue with it. It is a conceit to justify comfort. And I guess it is a certain coming of age: having finally spoken and written a constructivism that says it is our purpose to speak and write, that the world that suffers is merely the victim of discourse, and that therefore, the purpose of the person of IR is to engage with discourse rather than engage with suffering. It is ingenious and disingenuous, and causes regret that Buddhism has no sense of actual purgatory. We have come to resemble those higher men and sublime men who so ught to distract Zarathustra from his eternal joy, and caused him to give in to what Eliade called the temp tation of the eternal return. Within IR, of course, we have the temptations of eternal return: ever a new paradigm, new debate, or merely new fashion, anything, to prevent us from confronting the fact that, since IRs inventio n, suffering, and IRs inaccessibility to it, have been constant.
. First, however, there are so me questions to ask about IR. For what is

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Debate as rational discourse dissolves the sacred, destroying the interpretive context that makes communication possible. Victor Li 2005
[teaches in the English Department at the University of Toronto. parallax, 2005, vol. 11, no. 3, 7286]

Though aided by the life-worlds intuitively known and unquestioned background convictions, communicative participants nonetheless still have to work to achieve mutual understanding or agreement when they are faced with an action situation or interpretive problem that emerges in the everyday world. They can reach agreement only through a conscious yes or no position they take on three differentiated validity claims that are raised respectively in the objective, social and subjective domains of their world: the claims are to truth, rightness or justice and expressive truthfulness or sincerity.19 Up to this
point, the life-world has been described as a stabilizing and conservative factor in the process of reaching understanding. Habermas in fact sees the life-world as the conservative counterweight to the risk of disagreement that arises with every actual process of reaching understanding; for communicative actors can achieve an understanding only by way of taking yes/no positions on criticizable validity claims.20 However, as Habermas points out, italicizing his statement for emphasis, The relation between these weights changes with the decentration of worldviews.21 The decentration of worldviews becomes possible through the growing reflexivity achieved in ontogenetic learning processes that act as pacemakers for the socio-cultural development of modernity. Thus as we become more and more reflexively modern, our worldview also becomes increasingly decentred. Correspondingly, the more our worldview is decentred, the harder it is to achieve consensual understanding since we can no longer rely on a pre-interpreted, critique-proof life-world, but have to turn instead to rational procedures for reaching understanding. Habermas characterizes this transition as the rationalization of the life-world and sees it as a switch from normatively ascribed agreement to communicatively achieved understanding.22 The rationalization of the life-world thus appears to follow a developmental trajectory much like that of the sociocultural evolution from pre-modern mythic to modern decentred worldviews. Habermas puts it this way: A directional dynamics is built into the communicatively structured life-world in the form of the polarity between a state of pre-established pre-understanding and a consensus to be achieved: in the course of time, the reproductive achievements switch from one pole to the other.23 This directional dynamics as shown in the rationalization of the life-world resembles the larger scale rationalization of society which Habermas, following thinkers like Durkheim and Weber, describes as the transition from primitive tribal groups with their prereflective, collectively shared, homogeneous life-world to the reflexive, differentiated, and communicatively achieved life-world of modern politics.24 Recognizing the similarity between pre-modern societies and the life-world in its original, concrete, pre-rationalized state, Habermas writes: The life-world concept of society finds its strongest empirical footing in archaic societies [] [which in their ideal state are] almost homogeneous, and nearly ultrastable.25 Just as the

nearly ultrastable, normative authority of the sacred and the mythic in pre-modern societies is linguistified, that is, dissolved by reflexive communicative action oriented to understanding, so too the rationalization of the lifeworld involves a process in which the pre-established agreements and prelinguistically guaranteed norms of the everyday concrete life-world are opened up to reflexive forms of discourse or argumentation with their yes/no stance on validity claims raised in the course of communicative interactions. By

the rationalization of the life-world, Seyla Benhabib notes, is meant nothing other than the increase in argumentative practices within the everyday world.26 Modern societies thus undergo a process of rationalization that Habermas also calls the linguistification of the sacred. The modern rationalized life-world is no longer beholden to the authority of the sacred, but depends solely on rationally motivated forms of understanding that lead to a consensus based on the authority of the better argument.27 In the idealized or fully rationalized life-world, we have a constant revision of fluidized traditions, i.e. traditions which have become reflexive;
[] a state in which legitimate orders depend on discursive procedures for positing and justifying norms.28 It should be noted, however, that the critical reflexivity, the constant sceptical revision of all pre-established traditions and norms we find in the rationalization process lands the life-world in an aporetic situation. On the one hand,

the life-world is the ever- present, intuitively understood background within which all communicative action and forms of understanding occur; it also provides a store of pre-interpreted knowledge which enables cultural understanding, forms group solidarity and shapes the competences of socialized individuals.29 On the other hand, the life-worlds rationalization gains it the critical reflexivity and autonomy that threaten to devalue, if not destroy, the very context in which it
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stands and the resources on which it draws. To his credit, Habermas recognizes this problem, though, as we shall see, his attempts at resolving it result in what Stephen Crook has

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described as an example of his having the honesty to make his own problem worse.30 The rationalization of the life-world thus involves a rather destructive hermeneutics of suspicion that calls into
question customary forms of life. As Habermas puts it: [T]he transition to argumentation has something unnatural about it: it marks a break with the ingenuous straightforwardness with which people have raised the claims to validity on whose intersubjective recognition the communicative practice of everyday life depends. This unnaturalness is like an echo of the developmental catastrophe that historically once devalued the world of traditions and thereby provoked efforts to rebuild it at a higher level.31 Words like unnatural and catastrophe attest to the radical change visited on all past claims and traditions by modern rationalization processes. J. M. Bernstein argues that the

distrust shown to all conventions established by tradition should cause alarm since it appears to suggest that up to the moment of modernity the forms of recognition that traditional practices permitted were illusory through and through.32 Such a sweeping skepticism is, however, central to Habermass view of rationalization as the progress towards a postconventional modernity: No normative validity claim raised in the life-world is immune to challenge; everything counts as a hypothesis until it has regained its validity through the authority of good reasons.33 Loss and Compensation If nothing in the life-world is immune to challenge and everything in it counts as a hypothesis, and if the life-worlds background knowledge is submitted to an ongoing test across its entire breadth,34 then a difficult question arises for Habermas: can the life-world still be an inescapable horizon or context of understanding and the source of cultural knowledge and normative values, if, at the same time, it is constantly challenged or tested across its entire breadth? Even though Habermas might respond that the life-worlds rationalization through moral argumentation (or discourse ethics) can be seen as a correction and transcendence of its conventional limits, doesnt the unmerciful gaze of rationalization threaten, at least in theory, to dissolve the very ground of the life-world from which the corrective gaze emanates? And wouldnt such a rational dissolution of normatively ascribed agreement for a risk-laden, counter- factual communicatively achieved understanding place us within the impossible space of an unlivable scepticism and undischargeable rationalism?35 In her perceptive study of Habermass work, Maeve Cooke worries, for example, that the life-worlds fabric could be worn away through constant critical examination and rejection of its traditions, practices, and fixed patterns of personality development.36

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Politics is war, and we refuse to make peace with the state. Heeding the Sirens Song of the USFG ensures a politics of extermination.
Nick Mansfield, Prof Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, 2008 [Theorizing War: From Hobbes to Badiou p. 120-125] In Clausewitz, war emerges easily when society opens its hand. Peace is not ashamed of war and uses it. Policy extends itself into war, drawing the whole of the society with it. The argument is even stronger than this, because
policy does not represent the cynical manipulation of the social, seducing or tricking it into war. The impulse of the social is controlled by policy, without which the drive to violence for its own sake, a violence of annihilation of the other, would be even stronger, even wilder. We have here two very different versions of the social and its relationship with war. Yet both reveal how the alternation of war and the social (war as the social's other, war as the execution of collective social intention) leads to a collapse of the foreign-ness between the two. This foreign-ness is assumed, then elaborately disproved, even if from opposite directions. In Hobbes, society moves away from war, but always drags it with it, as its compelling and unshakeable underside. War

accompanies every flexing of the social, every moment, and threatens to overwhelm what is determined to suppress or conceal i t. In
Clausewitz, society stoops, through policy, to the war that would seem to contradict it, but that is in fact the fullest activation of its energies. In Michel Foucault's account of the social war, we see something similar, when Foucault cheekily, cleverly, reverses Clausewitz's statement. At the outset of the series of lectures that comprise Society Must be Defended, he announces his hypothesis: "[plower is war," he writes, "the continuation of war by other means" (Foucault, 2003, p. 15). What this claim implies is that the relations of power in a society do not quell or disable war, but continue it, because they were founded in a real war that really happened and that can be specified. It also means that the establishment of supposedly peaceful social relations by the institution of formal putatively legitimate power is not intended to end or preclude the inequality in relations established in the violent struggle for power. Indeed, the purpose of the establishment of formal power as peace is to reinvigorate war throughout the social, "in institutions, economic inequalities, language, and even the bodies of individuals" [p. 121] (Foucault, 2003, p. 16). What this means, according to Foucault, is that within all social practices war

is continuing in displaced, disguised or re-represented form, undiminished if translated into a wholly other language of articulation. " We are always writing the history of the
same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions" (p. 16). Foucault sets two ways of analysing power against one another, On the one hand, we have a theory of power in terms of its legitimacy.

Sovereignty claims a legal authority underwritten by a civil

contractual logic, in which the natural "primal" (Foucault, 2003, p. 16) right of the individual is surrendered. When this legal authority exceeds itself, the
result is tyranny or oppression. On the other hand is another theory of power altogether, one in which the excess of power is not an abuse, but merely the inevitable extension of the logic of dominance that defines social relations, because it is its ancestry. The former is a model of order and hierarchy, where a legally constituted governing power has its limits strictly defined. It may overstep these limits and brutalise, but this violence

is always seen as a transgression of its proper power, perhaps one that can be explained in terms of the psychology or incompetence of the historical players periodically entrusted with that power. Beneath the excess, however, the legitimacy of the contract endures, embarrassed by violence and ostensibly separate from it. Violence in the contract system is a mistake. In the alternative model, social power merely translates the divisions and antagonisms of war into another form. Social institutions merely continue the war already well underway-perhaps so long underway, it is rarely recognised as war, even taken for granted. In what Foucault calls here the "war-repression" schema (Foucault, 2003, p. 17), what is at stake is not legitimacy but merely "dominance and submission" (p. 17). An account of society seen from the point of view of relations of
domination, rather than from the evaluation of legitimacy, will reveal a wholly other social logic. Foucanit outlines systematically the difference between the two. Foucault claims that European political thought since the Middle Ages has been preoccupied with the issue of the legitimacy of royal power, at the behest of that power. He quotes approvingly Petrarch's complaint "Is there nothing more to history than the praise of Rome?" (Foucault, 2003, p. 74), The sovereign progress of sovereignty as the ostensible clarification and consolidation of the good leads discourse to twin emphases: the legal elaboration of the right of the sovereign and the concomitant explanation of the duties of the subject. In this discourse, the duty to justify legitimacy leads to the assumed obligation to cleanse power[p. 122] of what might seem to compromise it: its reliance on violent domination. Domination is made to disappear and is not seen as intrinsically part of the sovereign power that accompanies it. Foucault produces here an inversion of the relationship between sovereignty and domination. Instead of adopting the more conventional line that dominance is a mere instrument of a sovereign power that pretends to be legitimate but is simply the rationalisation of the centralisation of power in the hands of the few, Foucault locates sovereignty within a larger unfolding of dominance. His recent work, he says, has been given over to stress the fact of domination in all its brutality and its secrecy, and then to show not only that right is an instrument of that domination... but also how, to what extent, and in what form right... serves as a vehicle for and implements relations that are not relations of sovereignty, but relations of domination. (Foucault, 2003, p. 27) It is not that dominance merely serves an established regime by arguing its legitimacy and disguising its violence by formulations of sovereign order. The doctrine of right is merely one aspect of a larger technique of dominance, and is subsequent, subordinate and junior to it. It is this elaborate and widespread mechanics of domination that needs to be revealed. Subordination is not the duty of those subject to legitimate power, but the fate of the dominated, not the acceptance of an authority necessary to save us from ourselves, but the continuation of a brutal violence in which many must forever be kept in check . The mode of analysis most appropriate to this situation must be unconventional. First, it must look at power not in terms of how its most petty manifestations can be justified from the logic of legitimacy at the putative centre. It must look at power in its most local and peripheral manifestations, at its extremities (Foucault, 2003, p. 27). Secondly, it must not see what is going on at these extremities as explained or reducible to what is

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intendedby sovereignty. To continue to reduce what happens at the periphery to what is intended at the centre ends by obscuring the detailed and particular forms of the operation of power produced as the mariner by which we live: "rather than asking ourselves what the sovereign looks like from on high, we should be trying to discover how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts and so on are gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects, or as the subject" (p. 28). It is here that Foucault stresses the difference between what he is trying to do and the Hobbesian schema, whereby the particularities of the operation of [p. 123] power in specific local contexts are made sense of by the construction of a single magnificent if monstrous body, where the localisation, plurality, incommensurability and fragmentation of social relations are denied, and where everything is seen as subordinate to a single logic of necessary legitimacy, a legitimacy to which all local grievances and desires are to be subject. As we have seen, this legitimacy is partly justified by its claim to be the only way in which our desires can in fact be satisfied. If we were left to our desires, our desires would not be fulfilled. Only by denying our desire can we have it. If, as in Foucault's view, the Leviathan is the "central soul" (p. 29) which obscures the detailed operation of power in its peripheral effects, then its complex logic of desire can be explained in another way: the desire of the individual subject is always and forever wrong, an illegitimate desire to be measured against the desire legitimated by the imagined social centre. The Leviathan thus produces an apparently "natural" desire whose function is to be contradicted by the correct desire sovereignty makes acceptable. Following the logic of Foucault's argument, therefore, sovereignty's imagined centralisation is really just itself something that operates to pressure what happens at the peripheral and local. The centre is just an image deployed at the periphery. The choice of terms like "centre" and "periphery" therefore is merely a way of disputing a political fiction on its own terms, not a reversal of priorities. Foucault is not arguing that we must suppress the centre and pay attention to the under-privileged periphery: there is only a periphery, where the centre functions merely as an image of an absent and unreachable ideal, one whose only function is to influence what happens locally. This is because power operates in endlessly mobile and fluid networks, where individual localities are constantly reinventing their relationship with one another, not as regions of a hierarchical system that makes sense from the top down. The local both operates and receives these flows of power. In sum, then, Foucault sees political analysis that concentrates on the issue of legitimacy imagined by Hobbes as the Leviathan as overlooking the more compelling and pragmatic

Sovereignty is a seductive issue, a "trap" (Foucault, 2003, p. 34). Each side of the social struggle has used sovereignty for its own purposes, ignoring the new modality of power that has risen alongside sovereignty, producing its own prolix discourses, not of the legitimacy of sovereign right, but of the standards of normalising truth. This new style of power that Foucault calls
issue of the techniques of the operation of dominance within which we live. "disciplinary power" (p. 36) is "absolutely incompatible" (p. 35) with sovereignty. Yet, it is between these two styles of power that since the nineteenth century, modern political life has unfolded [p. 124] in a tortuous negotiation between overt and tactical discourses of right and hall-concealed but insistent routines of discipline. The two cannot be reduced to one another and are radically disjunctive but they "necessarily go together" (p. 37). The saturation of the social body by petty relations of domination reveals a political organisation whose tendency is not towards the clarification and refinement of right, but towards an endless struggle. This struggle, Foucault argues, lies behind the structures of law. Law, he says, was "not born of nature- but but of real battles, victories, massacres and conquests" (p. 50). These wars are not abstract or hypothetical. They can be precisely identified. He writes, Law is not pacification, for beneath the law, war continues to rage in all the mechanisms of power, even in the most regular. War is the motor behind institutions and order. In the smallest of its cogs, peace is waging a secret war... we have to interpret the war that is going on beneath peace; peace itself is a coded war. We are therefore at war with one another; a battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and it Is this battlefront that puts us all on one side or the other. There is no such thing as a neutral subject. We are all inevitably someone's adversary. (Foucault, pp. 50-1) This perpetual struggle, which will be decided not by an adjudication of right, but by someone's victory and someone else's defeat, is immanent to all social relations. The discourse of sovereignty, which has done so much to distract us from this unfolding struggle, is merely a tactic in this battle, producing seductive and mystifying discourses of law and right. Beneath the condescension of universalising right, struggle goes on without let-up, the real struggle, the social war, the persistence of a war, explained away or supposedly overcome by right. Foucault's own writing then sees itself as both commemorating and activating an alternative concealed tradition of historico-political writing, the first legitimate one, he claims, since medieval times (Foucault, 2003, p. 52). This legitimacy derives from the discourse's awareness that it is itself taking sides and is a weapon in a struggle. The

discourse of sovereignty denies its implication in, even subordination to, this struggle, setting up the chimera of legitimacy as worse than a ruse. The discourse of struggle has its own logic of right, but not of a universal transcendental right, or particular and
partisan rights, once owned, then lost, now to be recovered. This discourse is unashamedly "perpectival" (p. 52). [p. 125] When it gives a complete account of the social struggle, arguing its own truth, presenting its own map of others' positions and motives, it does so tendentiously, using the truth as a weapon in its own campaigns, resisting the claim to universal, eternal and impersonal truthfulness. Truth as a tactic, then, not as an identity. The "pacified universality" (p. 53) of

juridico-political discourse ascendant since Ancient Greece is challenged, under threat. This discourse does not descend from the abstract and totalising domain of the super-human metaphysical. It rises from the below of society (p. 54), from the chaos, confusion and dim perceptions that are all available within the bitter and desperate grounds of the struggle itself. The partisanship is on the ground of the fight. It
is deflected into dim disproportions, refracted by particular angularities. It is in and of the struggle, it is the struggle itself. It is praised and activated by Foucault, even in its dark and poisonous hatred, and in its cruel and desperate luxury, he half-identifies his own hard discourse with it. We see here the cool historian-jurist--philosopher revealing what lies behind his own tropes of violence and war, of deployments, tactics, of occupation and regimen. The

sound of

politics may seem to be vociferous debate, but that is merely misheard gunfire . It is that double sound with which
Foucault wants to compare his own writing. This writing of history as struggle must remain bitter. It cannot be allowed to make sense. The risk of dialectical thinking as an alternative model of social struggle is that it ends by subordinating itself to a logic of order, resolution and identification, the redemption of the cruelty of struggle in the piety of sensible progress (Foucault, 2003, p. 58).

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The quest for political productivity empowers the public-private divide that is exterminating dissent. Only the kritiks social revolt solves. Harney and Martin 2007
[Stefano, Chair in Strategy Culture and Society at University of London & Randy theory & event 10:2 ]

Whatever the cornucopia offered by finance, something prevents access to the immanent luxury of the social, something 'destines life's exuberance to revolt,' to rebel against new forms of 'military exploitation, religious mystification, and capitalist misappropriation,' to seek out a more luxuriate mode of excess, a mode of discretion and difference lived by all. (Bataille 1993: 77) A mean and indifferent mode of excess burns off all this self-activity, if not all this revolt, and leaves behind an effect, a state effect. Bataille asks us in his studies to seek out the effects of the accursed share, the state effects that come to trace the state-form. We
mean by the state-form something more than the state as it is used as a category by political scientists. We mean something Bataille provokes us to consider. We mean that which becomes visible in the struggle over excess as an economy of excess, that which stands in for the mode of excess itself. So to ask what state-form corresponds to this mean and indifferent mode of excess is to take these state effects as clues, effects produced by a public capacity itself forged in the struggle today to produce capital's division of risk and at risk populations. To produce both the embracing of risk and the sorting of at risk populations that animate both financialization and the war on terror a certain kind of struggle, a certain kind of privatization must be at work. And this work of privatization can be read in the work

The contemporary state-form operates to criminal effect. Its crime is not simply violation of law it is charged to enshrine, or to legitimate private property as public theft. At its most comprehensive and constitutive , criminality issues from the state-form positioning against society as such--an anti-social opposition to the expansive sociality that is irrecuperable to narrow protocols of accumulation. This effect hints at what is new about the contemporary mode of excess. From the state we hear scarcely a word about the social. Rather, it positions itself on the meridian that delimits public and private. The effect of publicity in the state-form today is a
left to the state-form. contradictory one, one that hates the public, fears the social, courts the criminal, and cannot help itself. Let us use the terms publicity and privatization here to mean something terminologically specific, and historically specific to capitalism. Privatization here assumes that the sociality called forth by capital must be reduced and converted into private property if it is to be a recognizable form for capital of what Jean-Paul Sartre called the practico-inert. Privatization is also the struggle that produces publicity, what Jacques Ranciere calls the 'distribution of the public and the private' (Ranciere 2006, 55) and therefore what can count as common.

Publicity is the subsequent state economy dedicated to privatizing excess sociality. By naming itself as public, publicity continues the work of privatization that brought publicity into being, and ensures that collective action taken up in the name of publicity not only fetishes the public (Bratsis 2005), but leaves the real struggle of privatization as it is understood here, untouched. Understanding the state-form historically as the evidence of economy brought to bear on excess leaves room for
Privatization here comes first, not after some vulnerable public sector. what goes unmarked by conventional notions of public and private, even when those notions are employed in a Marxist framework as founding terms, and instead allows us see the excess of sociality as founding both public and private. Or as Jacques Derrida puts it: 'At its height of hyperbole, the absolute opening, the uneconomic expenditure, is always reembraced by an economy and is overcome by economy.' (Derrida 1980: 75) The

economy of public and private (here an at risk effect and a risk effect), signs of the mode of excess, emerge from the struggle against excessive sociality, and under capitalism, this privatization aims most vitally at the means of production. The publicity produced in the
period when the tendency to industrial capitalism predominated seems capacious today. The struggle over property and machinery, scientific patents and natural resources, produced a publicity that opened onto the commonality of social reproduction. The welfare state and wars against fascism, civil rights and anti-colonialism, all operated in the space produced by what was relinquished in the struggle in fields, factories, and offices. Of course publicity produces its own unruliness, much as the struggle of privatization itself. Exactly because publicity must be reproduced by a labour both internal and external to it, publicity sometimes does not know its own limits. In civil rights, in the popular front, and most seriously in anti-colonialism, the space of publicity was ab-used as Gayatri Spivak would say, and there was an attempt to move past the confrontation with the private to the struggle of privatization itself. (Spivak 2006) There was a feel for excess, and a prophecy of a new mode. But all the while finance and science was preparing an interdependency, a general intellect, that would shatter this publicity by altering the means of production and with it the stakes of the struggle for privatization. This new interdependency and its privatization is oddly foreshadowed by Bataille in his chapter on the Soviet Union where a new mode of excess takes shape in the drive for productivity and the building up of the means of production .

'In the end, all of one's waking hours are dedicated to the fever of work,' he writes. (Bataille 1993: 160) Here publicity takes the form of the means of production itself, produced by a privatization of all other aspects of life. Only productivity becomes a matter of commonality. All else, distinguished as social reproduction, is vulnerable to the violence of privacy. Of course this not the privacy of the conventional private, but of a privatization drive to destroy excess sociality and produce a state economy, a proper publicity of total work. One feels that this feverish work is with us today, but without even the vague hope of the publicity of the Soviet Union.
What is being privatized to permit such a fever to take hold, and what kind of publicity stokes this fire, and as ever, is threatened by the flames? The risk and at risk populations that reach publicity as private and public matters and are its objects of attention suggest a new tendency in privatization. This tendency turns on social

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reproduction but again not directly through what is conventionally understood by privatization, but at its roots, at its moment of production in the struggle over a new means of production.

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A2 Public Sphere/Demands on State Good (Both Ks)


It is only a symptom because today the struggle over privatization occurs at the level of life itself, and especially at the level of the cognitive and affective capacities of the body. The General Intellect that Marx identified with science, and undoubtedly with machinery, is recast by Conventional privatization is only a symptom of this struggle at the root, and one of an already advanced disease. autonomist thinkers as a mass intellectuality residing in brains and bodies of labour. A history of production across these bodies takes on all the difference of these bodies and becomes legible only in this context. The biopolitics identified in contemporary scholarship is often understood as the site of politics but might also be marked as the residue of politics, as what is left to publicity after a new means of production is privatized, taking off the table the politics of privatization and leaving only the politics of public and private as it is currently constituted, as biopolitics. So today it might be necessary as Patricia Clough recently put it in articulating the technoscience that underlies a subindividual ontology, to move 'beyond biopolitics.'iii For instance, in the work of Lauren Berlant there is an anticipation of this privatization of the reproductive realm. She notes the way that in the Reagan era what was the private sphere comes forward into the public sphere, but as a matter of immorality. (Berlant 1997) This was an early symptom of the consequences of privatizing social reproductive capacities, putting them to work, and leaving only the anti-reproductive moment to the public, a moment that begins in immorality and will end in just a few years in wholesale criminality. When social reproduction itself, when sociality itself, becomes the target of privatization, when not machinery but brains

and souls are to be rendered into dead

labour, into private property, biopolitics may be one word for what is left to publicity.

But even this term might be too generous, too sociable. Because when the social itself is privatized, only the anti-social, only the criminal remains for publicity. A state economy emerges that is not just concerned with the anti-social, but takes the anti-social as its modus operandi, takes indifference to qualities of society as its public face. In short, the couple risk/at risk in the public sphere of a criminal state-form. It must be quickly added that this criminal state-form is not criminal in the liberal sense of deviating from a societal norm , nor criminal in the traditional Marxist sense of supporting the theft of wealth through labour- time.

It is a state against society. The war on terror mixes riskembracing populations like soldiers and at risk populations like Arab civilians and seeks out a criminal path, and an anti-social outcome. But who can blame it for being in a true sense, and not in the sense used by economists, path
dependent? All visible sociality is fast being criminalized, marked as having been unsuccessfully privatized. Such sociality becomes a threat to productivity, to the basis of the state-form, to its criminality and thus the criminality of the state stands against sociality at every turn. Productivity is the metric by which privatization appears as self-rationalizing. But at the same time, this stance marks criminality as the last site

The fever of work is interrupted, risk is suspended, at the moment the criminal becomes its opposite, not anti-sociality but sociality. And of course this moment comes all the time as capital's dream of living only on dead souls is interrupted by the waking hunger for social genius, for mass intellectuality, for living labour. Suddenly the siege must be lifted, prisoners released, raids called off, risky deals bailed out, at risk populations made into relative surplus ones. The question of who is
of the un-privatized social.
attributed with the capacity to self-manage and who is deemed unmanageable brings us to governance. The ubiquitous term of comparison making formal equality of things more universal than ever, governance can be applied to hospitals, universities, countries, and corporations. But more importantly in can be applied to populations. Populations that embrace risk, that manifest the privatization of the General Intellect, embrace governance as the governmentality of indifference. Governance oversees the hedging of interest against interest. But more than that governance tests for a population's ability to produce interests, to risk those interests in the name of speculative accumulation. Governance is here a form of bioprospecting in the veins of mass intellectuality for collective cognitive capacities that can be applied to accumulation strategies. And governance is the mouth of the criminal state-form, calling out to the social, in order to privatize or criminalize it. Those who call back and identify their interests are the lucky ones, these newly identified interests and their bearers are made productive, made to take risks, and led into the fever of work. Those who do not answer, or cannot be heard, are said to be those without interests, the at-risk, the criminal. With interests rising out of populations and returning to private hands for example in corporate multiculturalism or fair trade or green consumption, the state is left only with those at risk, those feared to be without interest. And of course the figure today who is most without interest is a certain criminal character, the terrorist. And as Angela Y. Davis notes 'racism played a critical role in the ideological production of the communist, the criminal, and the terrorist.' (Davis 2005: 121-2) The roving racism of the at risk category is the business that is left to the state, but this is also the business that is left of the state. And this is why governance must also fail, why it must remain contradictory in the corporation, the nation, the NGO. If it were to work it would suggest a totality of structured in difference, to use an older phrase, that would be deadly to the anti-social character of the contemporary state-form. If governance were to do more than merely strip mine the general intellect and leave it scarred, it would become sociable, and would quickly become the enemy of the state. This is the condition of the war on terror, a flailing limb of the criminal state which constantly flings itself toward the very criminality, the very condition of being without interest, that it sees in the object of its violence. It works against proper environments of risk, against the extraction of new interests, and instead piles up at risk populations and smashes constitutions and remakes them in a Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde act that belies its criminal inheritance in the face of the privatization of all that is healthy for the reproduction of society. The state attacks itself here too. Clearly this is part of a wretched history that Marx identifies as Bonapartism in his account of the crisis of class representation in the 18th Brumaire. Within a century the notorious burning of the Reichstag will signal the mass mobilization of the state against itself that brings us fascism. Now the state is engaged in mass shedding, war is demobilizing even as its profiteering is part of the executive's curriculum vitae (including the notable intimacies with Enron and Halliburton). The self-destructiveness of today's politics is brought on by the incessant relinquishing of excess sociality, including that initiated by the state, to privatization. And what cannot be returned to the private must be criminalized and this is why in the end George W. Bush must criminalize himself. No matter how much he seeks out laws, in the end he is driven to move beyond them, to turn against himself as an instance of society. His wars, his camps, his dismissals of those charged with upholding the law, belie the impatience behind their own pleas for permanence. Unable to uphold the legality of his policy, he incriminates himself and uses this sentence to stay the course of execution. Bush delegates decision to maintain authority over those who would judge. But it is worse, because as much as the state is at risk in this publicity, poison to itself no matter how many wars it launches or jails it builds, it has not even the possibility of criminality. It is criminal, but it will never revolt. It can be anti-social, but it cannot abide any un-privatized sociality in its midst, no welfare state, no war on poverty. And yet this mode of excess is premised on un-privatized sociality, which is to say not on the criminal, the anti-social, but on criminality, the possibility that a population is not anti-social, not consumed by the fever of work, not smothered in risk. This criminality is itself the possibility of a structure of feeling beneath this fever, within this embrace, of a luxuriant excess privatized to make this work and speculation possible, but always escaping it. The fate of those at

the state today that is left to die. There is no difference between its typical operation and its normalizing exception. Only such indifference has been left to it. Nicos Poulantzas wrote in his late work that 'the state itself bathes in the struggles that constantly
risk, those immersed in criminality, the fugitive social-private, is to live, but the fate of the contemporary state-form, the criminal state, the anti-social public, is to die. It is

submerge it.'(Poulantzas 1980: 151) When those struggles have at their heart the excess produced by the social capacities carried in the brains and souls of living labour, privatization leaves nothing to the imagination. To look for some suspension of law when the ability to legislate is itself given over to capital in the form of governance, is to miss the residual character of the contemporary state-form. And yet Poulantzas also noted more than once 'the class enemy was always present within the state.' (Poulantzas 1980: 151) That the contemporary state-form is the effect of living labour coming into contact with the anti-social edifice of its deeds, the ruins of every social project, suggests that criminality remains present in the criminal state.

This criminality at the heart of the state economy destines revolt from the depths of the mode of excess.

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Impact Calculus versus Extinction (Both Kritiks)


We control probability, for the aff ensures the survival of a political order that guarantee extinction. Extend Goldhammer. The politics of survival ensures catastrophic expenditure. The risks our society faces come from over-accumulation. We have too much wealth, too much poverty, too much militarism, and too much utility. Trying to maximize the good of life just adds further fuel to this bonfire of accumulation, guaranteeing an explosive release of nuclear annihilaiton. Only the alternative has a chance of breaking this murderous cycle of accumulation. Were impact turning time-frame. Extend Razinski. Extending survival for the sake of survival turning existence duration, like a bad movie that will never end. But you are sovereign, and you should shoud walk out of the theater rather than sit still out of pure inertia. Face the blinding radiance of sacrifice, and quake in awe of the moments of exuberance that define the true value of existence. This means we control magnitude, for renoucning sacrifice for the the sake of survival empties life of joy. It is better to risk extinction than live in a world dominated by fear of future consequences. Thats Razinski and Goldhammer.

Turn-Their extinction impact calculus purges life of the exuberance that makes it worth living. Consequentialisms over-accumulation ensures nuclear extinction as the final sacrifice .
Alan Stoekl, Professor of Comparative Lit at Penn State University, 2006 [Reading Bataille Now ed. Winnubst p. 258-261]

Bataille's theory, at first, at least, would seem to posit just such a harmony, albeit one that involves the violence of sacrifice rather than the contentment of the lotus-eater. Man in his primitive state was in harmony, not with the supposed peace of Eden, but with the violence of the universe, with the solar force of blinding energy: The nave man was not a stranger in the universe. Even with the dread it confronted him with, he saw its spectacle as a
festival to which he had been invited. He perceived its glory, and believed himself to he responsible for his own glory as well. (Bataifle 1976a, 192) While LeBlanc's theory of sacrifice is functional-he is concerned mainly with how people use sacrifice, in conjunction with warfare, to maximize their own, or their group's, success-Baraille's theory is religious in that he is concerned with the ways in which people commune with a larger, unlimited, transcendent reality. But in order to do so, they must enjoy an unlimited carrying capacity. And yet, if we think a bit more deeply about these two approaches to human expenditure (both LeBlanc and Bataille are, ultimately, theorists of human violence), we start to see notable points in common. Despite appearing to be a theorist of human and ecological scarcity, LeBlanc nevertheless presupposes one basic fact: there is always a tendency for there to be too many humans in a given population. Certainly populations grow at different rates for different reasons, but they always seem to outstrip their environments: there is, in essence, always an excess of humans that has to be burned off. Conversely, Bataille is a thinker of limits to growth, precisely because he always presupposes a limit-if there were no limit, after all, there could be no excess of anything (yet the limit would be meaningless if there were not always already an excess, for the excess opens the possibility of the limit). As we know, for Bataille coo there is never a steady state: energy (wealth) can he reinvested, which results in growth; when growth is no longer possible, when the limits to growth have been reached, the excess must be destroyed. If it is not, it will only return to cause us to destroy ourselves: war. For if

we aren't strong enough to destroy, on our own, excessive energy, it cannot be used; and, like a healthy animal that cannot be trained, it will [p. 260] come back to destroy us, and we will be the ones who pay the costs of the inevitable explosion. (Bataille 1976a,
31; 1988, 24) In fact, Bataille sounds a lot like LeBlanc when he notes, in The Accursed Share, that the peoples of the "barbarian plateaus" of central Asia, mired in poverty and technologically inferior, could no longer move outward and conquer other adjacent, richer areas. They were, in effect, trapped; their only solution was the one that LeBlanc notes in similar cases: radical infertility. This, in effect, was the solution of the Tibetans, who supported an enormous population of infertile and

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unproductive monks (1976a, 106; 1988, 108). Bataille does, then, implicitly face the question of carrying capacity. Perhaps the

ultimate example of

this is nuclear war. The

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modern economy, according to Bataille, does not recognize the possibility of excess-and therefore limits; the Protestant, and then Marxist, ideal is to reinvest all excess hack into the productive process, always augmenting output in this way. "Utility," in this model, ends up being perfectly impractical: only so much output, finally, can be reabsorbed into the ever-more-efficient productive process. As in the case with Tibet, ultimately the excess will have to be burned off. This can happen either peacefully, through various posrcapitalist as the Marshall Plan, which will shift growth to other parts of the world, or violently and apocalyptically, through the ultimate in war: nuclear holocaust. One can see that, ultimately, the world
itself will been become vast chaos, fully developed, with no place for the excess to go. The bad alternative-nuclear holocaust-will result in the ultimate reduction in carrying capacity: a burned-out, depopulated earth. Humanity is, at the same time, through industry, which uses energy for the development of the forces of production, both a multiple opening of the possibilities of growth, and the infinite faculty for burnoff in pure waste I/acl/ire in,fine de consumation en pureperte]. (Bataille 1976a, 170; 1988, 181) Modern war is first of all a renunciation: one produces and amasses wealth in order to overcome a foe. War is an adjunct to economic expansion; it is a practical use of excessive forces. And this perhaps is the ultimate danger of the present-day (1949) buildup of nuclear arms: armament, seemingly a practical way of defending one's own country or spreading one's own values, of growing, in other words, ultimately leads to the risk of a "pure destruction" of excess-and even of carrying capacity. In the case of warfare, destructiveness is masked, made unrecognizable, by the appearance of an ultimate utility: in this case the spread of the American economy, and the American way of life, around the globe. Paradoxically, there is a kind of self [p. 261] consciousness concerning excess, djbense, in the "nave" society--which recognizes waste for what it is (in the form of unproductive "glory")-and a

thorough ignorance in the modern one, which would always attempt to put waste to work, even at the cost of apocalypse. Bataile, then, like Lefllanc, can be characterized as a thinker of society who situates his theory in the context of ecological limits. From Bataille's perspective, however, there is always too much rather than too little, given the existence of ecological ("natural") and social ("cultural") limits . The "end" of humankind, its ultimate goal, is thus the destruction of this surplus. While LeBlanc stresses war
and sacrifice as means of obtaining or maintaining what is essential to human (personal, social) survival, Bataille emphasizes the maintenance of limits, and survival, as mere preconditions for engaging in the glorious destruction of excess. By seeing warfare as a mere (group) survival mechanism, LeBlanc makes the same mistake as that made by the supporters of a nuclear buildup; he, like they, sees warfare as practical, serving a purpose. If, however, our most fundamental gesture is the burning off of a sur plus, the production of that surplus must be seen as subsidiary. Once we recognize that everything cannot be saved and reinvested, the ultimate end (and most crucial problem) of our existence becomes the disposal of a surplus. All other activity "leads" to something else, is a means to some other end; the only end that leads nowhere is the act of destruction by which we may-or may not-assure our (personal) survival (there is nothing to guarantee that radical destruction-consumation-does not turn on its author).

We work in order to spend, in other words. Survival and reproduction alone are not the ultimate ends of human existence. We could characterize Bataille, for this reason, as a thinker of ecology who nevertheless emphasizes the primacy of an ecstatic social act (destruction). By characterizing survival as a means, not an end (the most fundamental idea in "general economy, expenditure for Bataille becomes a limitless insubordinate ac t-a real end (that which does not lead outside itself). I follow Bataille in this primacy of the delirium of expenditure over the simple exigency of Personal or even social survival (which we can associate with LeBlanc). This does not preclude, however, a kind of ethical aftereffect of Bataille's expenditure: survival for this reason can be read as the fundamentally unintentional consequence of expenditure, rather than its purpose. Seeing a nuclear buildup as the wrong kind of waste-because it is seen as a means, not an end-can lead, in Bataille's view, to a rethinking of the role of expenditure in the modern world, and hence, perhaps, to the world's (but not modernity's) preservation.

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We control probability because war is motivated by irrationality. We must severe the head of the king to avert the ecastic extinction made inevitable by consequentialist reason.
Wendy C. Hamblet 2005 [Canadian philosopher with a specialization in ethics and violence. She teaches Ethics and Morality, and Political and Social Philosophy at Adelphi University Peace Review 17:39-45] mono-cephalic means one-headed

But, at this evolutionary apex, a problem arises in paradise. As the monocephalic state increasingly closes itself off, it sties social existence , smothers creative energies, chokes the passion from its citizen-devotees, suf- focates their spiritual urges, and reduces all sacrices to mundane utility. When the perfect eternality of the structure is complete and the nation duly deied, all labors have become coopted in utter servitude. Bataille names this culminating stage of development, the peaceful, stable end sought by all states, in its most excessive extrapolationfascism. Ultimately, however, life and time must break free and move forward into futures. This most solid state holds rm for a short while only; then there begins a condensation of forces. Life rises up and explodes the suffocating stasis, disintegrating the solid, erect whole. Existence and liberty ow forth in rage, blood, tears, and passion. The death of God is complete. For Bataille, these endless cycles describe the movement of history: the erection of unitary gods of knowledge and power that ultimately ossify into totalities, and then explode in hysterical, raging catastrophes, releasing the explosive liberty of life from mundane servitude. The acephalic chaos will eventually
recompose, slowly heaving up an ugly divine head once again. Life turns back on its chaotic freedom and develops what Bataille calls an aversion to the initial decomposition. The chaotic structure moves from the ek-stasis bliss of wanton pleasures and pains toward the stasis of the deity once again. Time, states, and human individuals, for Bataille, move between the two contradictory forms: stasis and ek-stasis. Time demands both forms in the worldthe eternal return of an imperative object, and the explosive, creative, destructive rage of the liberty of life. Batailles analysis of state evolution offers resolution to the mystery of the frequency of wars in the modern civilized era: It suggests that war composes a potlatcha manic ecstasy of useless self-expenditure that permits a breakout from mundane servitude. W e may not readily recognize, in our states, the extreme forms that Bataille describesfascist stasis or chaotic ecstasy. We believe that, although chaos is unquestionably undesirable, fascism is promoted only by madmenMussolini, Hitler, and Stalin. We may be convinced that fascist urges fade with global democracy where all people will, even- tually, know the order and security of the rst world. Modern Western states, we may object, compose a golden mean between Batailles two economies, aspiring neither to fascism nor to a manic primitivism, but to the reasonable metron of golden rules. But the

roots of the Western world are well planted in the fascist drive for hyper-order and changeless eternality. Hesiod and the PreSocratics, as much as Jewish and Christian myth, cite a common arche of the universe in the good works of a god that renders order (cosmos) out of chaos (kaos). For the ancients, one head (cephalus) is far superior to many; simplicity is beauty, whereas the many compose hoi poloi, an embarrassment of riches. The foundational logic that posits monocephalic order as ontologically and morally superior to acephalic multivocity remains an unquestioned assump- tion embedded in the Western lifeworld. A single well-ordered edice, stretching high into the skyerect, rigid, unyielding is preferable, in the Western mind, to the broadest playing eld studded with incongruous heroics. Batailles meditations on the dark underside of reasons projects and triumphs, on such prohibited subjects as monstrous tortures, illicit sexual excesses, and the colorful anuses of apes, provide a theater of cruelty and death that is designed to challenge the polite threshold of civilized culture, to shock and interrupt the philosophical tradition it invades, and to subvert the pretenses of rened sophistication thought denitive of civilized society. Bataille shows that people are torn by conicting drives, by lofty ideals, and by the dark concealed forces they suppress and deny. Lorenz states that Batailles treatment of the dark, concealed urges in human nature offer resolution to the paradox of the simultaneous lofty goals of modern states and the frequency of brutal aggressions by those very states naming themselves the most civilized. Perhaps the popularity and frequency of war even in the civilized modern era represents the release of suppressed subterranean drives within industrialized, rationalist, rigidly hierarchically ordered populations enslaved to reason and utility. T he
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violence that oods the globe in modernity, that claims to be serving reasonable projects of global freedom and democracy, may represent new forms expressing old desires, the projects of monocephalic statehood aspiring to deication. Bataille recognizes chthonic forces as instrumental in the modern world: The economic history of modern times is dominated by the epic but disappointing effort of erce men to plunder the riches of the Earth [and turn its re and metal into weapons] . . . . [M]an [lives] an existence at the mercy of the merchandise he produces, the largest part of which is devoted to death. The erce men of modernitygods, kings, and their modern sequels (presidents, popes, corporate rulers)extend their control to the ends of the planet. Fierce men disembowel the Earth and turn on their own kind the products of molten metal torn from her bowels to ensure the permanence of their nations. War, states Bataille, represents the desperate obstinacy of man opposing the exuberant power of time and nding security in an immobile and almost somnolent erection. Bataille believes that primitive urges are still at work in the projects of modernity. Human beings, as much as superstructures of power, must satisfy their dark urges for the good of their communities. They must release their death drives if they are to gather together in heartfelt communities. Human beings crave mystical, passionate, frenzied escape from the rigorous projects of their ordered systems. If Bataille is correct, people must ultimately break free from the mundane enterprises of their everyday lives. Their inner

demons will beckon them from their ordered worlds to revel in orgiastic festival. Surely Batailles claim that lifes erotic drives will out and fulll themselves in deathly destructiveness and wanton joyshould trouble us greatly, given the leveling effects of modern industrial society, its will to mediocrity, utility, and conformity. But is Bataille correct in his attribution of a measureless and rending character to modern war? Is modern warfare the aimless catastrophe that Bataille claims it to be? If so, then modern wars can be explained, according to Bataille, as ecstatic release from the fascist orientation of modern ordered states and from peoples imprisonment within the merchandise they produce. Modern war, with its Shock and Awe techno-theatrics, should provide a wondrous release from mundane servitude. War could be said to satisfy collective fantasies of manic omnipotence and the drive for selfsacrice for sacred values. Perhaps the wars of modernity occur with such rabid frequency because people must satisfy their suppressed lust for a sexualized release from the cold reality of state projects, the utilitarian reasons of state. This resonates with Clausewitzs claim that peoples martial enthusiasm must nd release in politically restrained wars or fulll itself in the maximum exertion of self-expenditure, that is, self-annihilation. For Clausewitz, modernity represents that unfet- tered stage when war has escaped all political bounds and reasonable restraint. Although ostensibly a world driven by the lofty goals, modernityfor Clausewitzcomposes an era of absolute war. The democratic revolution may
have embraced other goalscitizen welfare and the grandeur of their rulersbut democracy, for Clausewitz, composes merely one of a number of crucial forces (the scientic revolution that provides the technology, the industrial revolution that provides mass production of weaponry, and the imperialism that draws the entire globe into the war system) that have been successfully harnessed to the power- projects of the mightiest nations. The goods of the modern West, including the good of democracy, exist to extend Western hegemony globally in the marketplace of military power. But Bataille claims that war is useless expenditurea release of the primal urges of a community toward excessive overow. He states: Military existence is based on a brutal negation of any profound meaning of death and, if it uses cadavers, it is only to make the living march in a straighter line. But, if war is to be posited as an ecstatic release, it must compose orgiastic overow, an entirely useless and pointless expenditure of the nations nest goods. Excessive expenditure is defeated the moment the violent explosion of forces serves mundane projects of servitude and utility. When war serves the purposes of the state, it loses its manic and ecstatic character and ceases to fulll the peoples deepest needs for release from servitude and instrumentality. B ut Bataille is mistaken; the apparent uselessness of modern warfare is a deception, an illusion. War is one of the oldest traditions of our species. It has become a timeworn vehicle precisely because it serves a great many functions in states. Clausewitz names the institution of war a form of com- munication between nations. Franco Fornari states: War is a multifunctional institution. . . . It is extremely difcult to nd a substitute that would perform all of its functions. One of the most crucial functions that war provides in service of the state is the crystallization of its monopoly on violence. War is a crucial aspect of the centralizing, evolutionary process that culminates, ultimately, in fascist stability. The establishment of a massive and robust military is THE MANIC ECSTASY OF WAR 43 utterly necessary to the deication of the structure and the raising of a sturdy cephalus, because, along with the creation of strong policing and military forces, war serves to alienate the private violence of the citizens and place their collective aggressive energies into the hands of the cephalus. War serves the collective illusion of eternality. War serves other crucial functions in the state: it conrms the values, virtues, and meanings of ones own cultural group. Sacred symbolsags, national anthems, tales of past heroes, fallen ancestorsare put to work in luring the best of the nationits strong and courageous youthsto the extreme patriotism required to maintain order in fascist regimes. The seduction of the nations best to its wars includes their provision of an inter- national stage to display the collective prowess of the nation, a point of pride for all citizens, even the most oppressed of the society, and it allows for the individual display of the soldiers manly characterthe valor, the sel ess- ness, the loyalty. The wars of modern super-states continue in the tradition of imperialist projects of old. Posited as serving the most seless valuesthe advancement of freedom, democracy, and the spread of civilizationtodays wars clearly bring too massive a booty to be named seless expenditures. In fact, for the past fty years, wars have increasingly become shameless lootings of helpless peoplesthe projects of economists and accountants and big busi- nessmen puried by political propaganda and backed by an arsenal of modern techno-weaponry. War serves the needs of the cephalus; it serves the personal narcissism of the leaders, and the collective narcissism of the combatants and civilians. Above all, modern wars serve economic goals; their booty is prodigious. They may cost the sacred love-object (the nation) massive capital, human and monetary, but the generals, the political leaders, and their corporate cronies prot handsomely from the hostilities. War also serves the fantasy that the sacred love-object is the savior and benefactor of the globe; war serves the paranoid collective delusion that the cephalus is infallible and indestructible, unlimited as the god in its strength and in its moral substance. Killing the enemies, propagandized as evil, the collec- tive illusion is fed that evil is overthrown: thus the sanctity of the love- object is preserved. Sacred values are recomposed; the cephalus stands taller, more erect, more rm than ever in the wake of a good war. B ut for all the benets served by the institution of war, modern wars are deeply tragic; they do waste millions of innocent lives; they tear apart societies and disburse homeless families across the globe. One in nine of the earths seven billion now lives a miserable, wandering, hopeless existence on parched lands where even the earth mother is barren. WENDY C. HAMBLET 44 Ultimately the greatest tragedy of modern war lies in its stark utility to the few at the extreme expenditure of its many. The utility of war defeats the purposes of war by frustrating the deepest needs of the societythe peoples need to build heartfelt communities, a need that can only be served by expressing the collective aggressive energies of the society beyond utility. Bataille states that: Since [war] is essentially constituted by armed force, it can give to those who submit to its force of attraction nothing that satises the great human hungers, because it subordinates everything to a particular utility . . . it must force its half-seduced lovers to enter the inhuman and totally alienated world of barracks, military prisons, and military administrations. In fact, it may well be the non-release of ecstatic urges that explains a states return, year after year and decade after decade, to that old institution. It may be that the deepest paradox of modern war is that, in its usefulness to the cephalus and in its service to the fascist drives of the state, war proves utterly useless in dispensing its most fundamental function; it ceases to discharge the most vicious and cruel needs of the people, their deepest primitive motivations, whose collective release makes possible the formation of a heartfelt community. Bataille counts this failure as the most tragic of the multiple tragedies of modern war. The sacred values of communitylife, freedom, festival, and the joy of communal fraternityare rendered meaningful only in juxta- position to their opposites. Bataille states: The emotional element that gives an obsessive value to communal life is death. But, ultimately, insists Bataille, the sacrice will be celebrated beyond the reasonable purposes of the cephalus. If Bataille is correct, then we can be certain that

, for

those states whose wars are utterly utilitarian, self-annihilation is imminent.

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Even if they win they link turn, well still win that sacrifice is still the best way to solve our aff. Thats the alternative and impact debate.

Political discourse against the abuses of American militarism is appeasement. Extend Hutnyk, which makes two arguments. First, the state thrives on political discourse, for it reinforces the values of rationality and consent that enable its awful violence. The aff protest is careful not to oversep the bounds of democratic legitimacy, like the anti-war protestors who get a permit to make sure they dont disrupt the traffic. Second, the state is criminal, and demanding restraint only allows it to play the part of benevolent giver of peace. The democratic norms to which they appeal are a ruse, keeping us in line for more wars are prepared in the name of peace.

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The affirmative play-acts the rejection of war. Their repugnance sustains state violence.
Nick Mansfield, Prof Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, 2008 [Theorizing War: From Hobbes to Badiou p. 163-166] The general revulsion at war therefore is not necessarily incompatible with a generalisation of war in practice. Indeed, my aim has been to show the opposite: that the general deployment and the general rejection of war are part of a single complex. It is much too
simple, however, to see this complex as part of a willing blindness on the part of the bulk of humanity, wherein moral comfort and self-regard would be assured by

we play at rejecting wars from which we are actually happy to profit. Our rejection of war, like our purported commitment to democracy and human rights, is not merely hypocritical. It must be understood as part of a complex in which war and its other emerge together in a double relationship in which they both encourage and refuse one another: we reject war because it ruins social relations, shatters bodies and savages our human rights. Yet, we [p. 164] also look to war to preserve the social, protect threatened lives and enlarge rights. War kills and saves simultaneously. It destroys the things in the name of which it is implemented. To see a loss of difference between war and its other is to overlook the complex situations in which war emerges and which keep it alive despite our moral repugnance and endless official lamentations for those of us whom it has annihilated. To say that war is double and that it is implicated conceptually in other values that we
rejection of war even though affluent lifestyles may depend on war for their continued opportunity. It is too easy to see the war problem simply morally, that want to preserve is not to simply say that we should be resigned to war enduring. It is an attempt to provide a new and useful way by which war can be understood, and argues, as all analysis does, that material situations like war cannot be dealt with if they are not understood, and that new ways must continually be sought to rethink them. Theory is not an enduring ideal truth to be applied to practical situations, but the invention of new conceptual forms that may help us represent and explain hitherto obscure or enigmatic phenomena. Thinking of war in terms of the war/other complex means always seeing the emergence of war as the deployment of something else with it. The two must always appear in relationship with one another even if they are considered to be antagonistic or mutually destructive. So war and whatever its other might be in a particular context, facilitate the emergence of one another , even in their defiance of one another. It is this inseparability of war and its other that makes it possible to see war and its other as co-ordinated. What was Nazi war but a tribute, in its most organised and exultant murderousness, to life? What was Communist insurgency but the most regimented and anonymous embrace of the possibilities of freedom? And what are democracy's post-1989 wars but the most brutal and oppressive attempt to spread human rights? These complex situations can and should not be disguised by an eternal but vacuous resort to morality. The logic that attributes the doubleness of war to hypocrisy is a singularly unenlightening example of the ascendancy of moral discourse in discussions of war. Of course, our attitude to war must be moral: we could not protect ourselves from the cult of official violence if it were not, nor could we begin to see war as a problem and something to be surpassed, something I have assumed as relatively uncontentious from the outset. Yet, because war is politically, economically, and above all,

Since the Vietnam War, resistance to war has been fundamentally based on revulsion at its violence and destructiveness and the popular culture that naturalise it. This resistance has been primarily rhetorical and gestural , as it befits its interest in the aesthetics of war and in tune with the [p. 165] general aestheticisation of politics of the time. It has rested on general humanist clichs about community, fraternity and an ideal social future. In other words, it has relied on a banal and unsustainable understanding of the mutual alienation of the human and war. This conception is not wrong in any simple sense, but it is too uncomplicated to deal with the dynamics of the war/other complex, in which the human
conceptually situated, it must be recognised not as primarily a moral, but a political problem. can be as much a justification for war as reason for scepticism towards it, and is indeed probably both. To engage with war properly, we have to realise that this kind

Humanist sentimentality often attempts to present what we have identified as war's others as unquestionable or non-negotiable: How can we possibly contest the value implicit in love, or sociality or human rights? Is not this the worst kind of post-modern relativism, in which we allow what should be absolute values to be held up for debate? Yet it is these various "values" that accompany and facilitate the emergence of war, and that always wrong-toot us
of opposition is not enough. When war is in play, so is something else, war's various others. when we attempt to reject it. Do we not want dictators to be removed, women's rights restored and ethnic cleansing resisted? If we are in favour of these goals, how

The refusal to debate these values results in both an impotent and unworldly rejection of war, on the one hand, and a mindless acquiescence to it, on the other. The argument of this book has been that it is necessary to understand the complexity of the implication of such values in war.
can we resist the wars that aim to achieve them? Does not this make the rejection of war merely automatic and adolescent?

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Demanding restraint from the state legitimates endless wars waged in the name of peace. Nick Mansfield 2006
[Asociate Professor in Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University in Sydney theory & event 9:4] Discussing what is new about the "new wars," Herfried Munkler argues that in the wars that have developed in the decolonised world: "military force and organised crime go increasingly together."2He goes on: "The new wars know no distinction between combatants and non-combatants, nor are they fought for any definite goals or purposes; they involve no temporal or spatial limits on the use of violence."3In the low intensity, asymmetrical conflicts Munkler sees as typical of contemporary war, war is without limits, and has no identifiable outside, either in space or time. The inverse of this argument is Martin Shaw's identification of one of the key attributes of "the new Western way of war": "The key understanding, therefore, is that warfighting must be carried on simultaneously with 'normal' economics, politics and social life in the West. It is imperative it doesnot impact negatively on these." 4Western publics only tolerate a war that can be co-ordinated seamlessly with peace. This is not an alienation of war from social life, but its absolute co-ordination with it. It is not here a question of war being kept hidden behind a screen of peaceful social advancement from one day to the next. Instead, war under this dispensation becomes completely compatible with what we conventionally understand as peace. In the end, this is what allows the complete saturation of society by war: the ability to represent the normal unfolding of social life as relatively undisturbed. In their discussion of the paradoxes of global political governance, Dillon and Reid present a more complex account of the inter-relationship between war and peace. Here liberal governance both provokes and repudiates war. They write: "It . . . seems obvious that the radical and continuous transformation of societies that global liberal governance so assiduously seeks must constitute a significant contribution to the very violence that it equally also deplores."5Here, global political institutions which have charged themselves with the task of drawing fragile states into the contemporary world of transparent and open (especially financial) administration which makes them accessible to the flow of international capital, unsettle societies enough that warfare is risked, while equally bemoaning war as a sign of institutional failure. The pressure put, for example, on the small states of the Western Pacific by local powers like Australia both aggravates communal tensions by destabilising inherited power structures, while bemoaning the subsequent unrest as symptomatic of cultures seen as ill-equipped for contemporary global modernity. Each of these accounts presents a different insight into the various ways in which war and peace co-exist in the contemporary. War totally infiltrates peace, yet war is only allowed when it confirms the apparent inviolability of peace. The governance that insists on the rationalisation and stabilisation of civic society stokes instability and war. War is consistently incited in peace while being simultaneously alienated from it. Peace is administered in such a way that war presses to return, always and everywhere. But how are we to theorise this possibly epoch-making development? How do our philosophies of war and peace allow us to represent and consider this development and its consequences for the future global polity and for the identity of civil society, which, since Hobbes at least has always relied on the institution of social peace through the containment of war as its touchstone? The aim of this paper is to present a strand of thinking in modern and postmodern cultural theory that essays a formulation of the war/peace complex that history now so clearly proposes to us. It is in the long acknowledged but under-investigated connection between Georges Bataille and Jacques Derrida that one version of the reformulation of the war/peace complex becomes articulable.

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Liberation requires sacrifice, not a better political program. Extend Goldhammer 05. The ecastic experience of sacrifice frees us from utilitarian concern for the good, forming a sovereign existence not subjugated to the needs of survival. This forms of a space of political contestation that is the prerequisite to a sovereign community that is not just endless domination. Sacrifice enacts a theater of liberation. Extend Razinsky 09. Cutting off the head of the USFG challenges its political authority, while wearing their skins breaks down the wall separating us from others. Sacrifices radiation burns like the radiation of the sun, allowing an intimate encounter with death. The encounter with risk not subordinated to productivity or survival is the only way to access the exuberance that gives life meaning.

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Politics is theater, and it usually ends in tragedy. Only our sacred ecstasy can confront the dark drives pulling us to destruction. The rational political proposal of the aff brought a knife to a gun-fight.
Jason Winfree, Assoc Prof Philosophy at California State University, 2009 [The Obssessions of George Bataille: Community and Communication ed. Mitchell/Winfree p. 34-39]
The character of this psychological structure requires analysis the Left cannot provide, beholden as it is to this side of production. And along with

the emotive force that binds the energies of fascism , the analysis must extend to the "emotions that give the masses the surge of power that tear them away from the domination of those who only know how to lead them on to poverty and to the slaughterhouse" (OC 1: 409/VE 166), and more generally still, to "what holds us firmly together, what links our origins to the emotions that constitute it" (OC 1: 404/VE 163). Such is the only way to remain true to the struggle against capitalism and the various closed systems its instability provokes-restoration, fascism, nazism, communism. In short, both the political failures and the structural limitations of the Left require a new understanding, one directed toward what Bataille calls the "ocean of men in revolt," which alone "can save the world from the nightmare of impotence and carnage in which it sinks!" (OC 1: 412/yE 168). The ontological direction of research undertaken by the College has
palpable, practical motivations. Walter Benjamin, who attended the College of Sociology regularly, reportedly worried that it, along with the program of Acphale, lent itself all too readily to fascist and nazi appropriation.' Certainly the "ocean of revolt" that Bataille suggests might "save the world" is a disquieting response to threats immediately facing human life at the time, threats that clearly drew upon the very emotional bond that so interests the College. And Bataille himself identifies Mussolini and Hitler as heterogeneous elements initially recalcitrant to homogenous society. Certainly, heterogeneity does not guarantee desirable historical-political outcomes. But Bataille is also clear that the condensation of power in such figures of authority, "[t]he imperative presence of the leader, amounts to a negation of the fundamental effervescence that he taps; the revolution, affirmed as a foundation, is, at the same time, fundamentally negated from the moment that internal domination is militarily exerted on the militia" (OC 1: 362-63/yE 153). The dangers posed by affective emotion and its military constellation, far from requiring a retreat from the College's position, therefore, calls it forth. Even Benjamin's analysis of the aestheticization of politics---which he evidently began to level against the College-could not be proffered without this basis of attraction. This is no doubt the sense in which Bataile writes, what the College aims at, and what it oust critique

is "not merely the ground of an intellectual debate but rather ... precisely the theatre where the political tragedy is playing" (CS 159/83). [p. 37] The third crisis that marks the emergence of the College is, therefore, a crisis of the political itself, the fact that the most impending problems, in spite of their political shape, do not admit political solutions. Their miminence makes of the College an exigency. To address the unfathomable suffering wrought by the violence of limited political life and the established social order, it is necessary to develop a new, more comprehensive approach. Sacred sociology thus takes as its topos the "entire conimunifying movement of society" (CS 140/74), aiming at an understanding of the universal community affirmed
in the "Programme (Relative to Acphale)?' The task, in other words, is "to apply intelligence less to so-called political situations and to the logical deductions that ensue, than to the immediate comprehension of life" (OC 1: 409-10/yE 166). This explicitly ontological task occupies Bataille for the rest of his life, finding mature theoretical expression in The Accursed Share and Erotisni. During the period of the College, however, this task is developed in particular through the distinction between elective and traditional communities, and the interest of the College lay almost exclusively with the former. The College thus determines the ontological direction of its work in terms of an understanding of the relation of the individual and the social order, whose de facto ties are loosened in proportion to the formation of elective bonds. During the inaugural session of the College, llataille and Caillois east the scope of elective communities in terms of religious orders and secret societies (and no doubt this is what bothers Benjamin, as though the College abandons the problems of the day and seeks solutions in secret brotherhoods!). Yet Bataille's development of the notion of elective community tends almost entirely in the direction of the break with de facto community, on the one hand, and the community of lovers, 4n the other. To the extent that secret societies exemplify the field of research undertaken by the College, Bataille is more interested in the secret than he is the societies and religious orders that would provide for that research a more accessible and determinate object. Obsessed by the "secret" at the heart of our contact with one another, Bataille's interest has little or nothing to do with that which could be held or shared or protected by a secret organization. In relation to the two determinations of community set forth by the College-traditional and elective-the tragic human being and the lover, respectively, therefore, bear more and more the burden of Bataille's revolution. The contestation of community becomes less and less programmatic and at the same time, more fateful, its possibility belonging to the ontology of social life at the very point where action, will, and understanding discover their limits, and where this discovery is devoid of transcendence of a lecture Caillois was unable to deliver-"

and the possibility of recuperative accumulation. Thematically explicit in the title

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Brotherhoods, Orders, Secret Societies, Churches"-it is therefore [p. 38] remarkable and telling that Bataille's introduction to the event focuses on concerns altogether

three types of human being, three types of relation to de facto or traditional community, which at the same time successively correspond to the three crises described above. The first type , the "armed lout, aims at expelling everything foreign, forcing it to the outside, and he dominates the war, sustains it, as it were, and in doing so no doubt motivates the formation of the College. Like the "armed lout," the "man of law and discourse:' the second type, is also motivated by the threat of impotence, but his action is itself impotent and inevitably serves the inertia of arms. Because he perpetuates that against which he fights, the "man of law and discourse" is for Bataille a comic figure, like the fool who impotently wipes the shit from his shoe on his own carpet, ineptly spreading what repulses him, like leftist revolutionaries carrying the value of production into the revolution, or carrying the revolution into the state-sponsored halls of negotiation. Bataille writes, "Deep down 1 think there is something wretched, something obnoxious, about opposing a reality, such as the one threatening human existence today, with discourses alone, assertions of law, a whole blaring discord and the armies belonging to this discourse and this discord. I do not believe it is possible to oppose the rule of arms with anything except some other rule: and, other than the rule of arms, only that of tragedy exists" (CS 271/147). The third type, tragedy, is thus born from the impotence of human life in the face of blind and indifferent forces of nature, politics, or history. Both the structure of an event and a comportment in relation to the event, tragedy opposes the world of work and production and will as the necessary exposure to a recalcitrant and unworkable chance, what Bataille calls the "sovereignty of existence laid bare. Tragedy exposes the impotence of action, the fact that action always serves ends other than its own, that even its accomplishments are impoverished. "The neophyte learns that [even] the will to efficacious action is one that limits itself to dismal dreams," says Bataille (OC 1: 528/VE 226).
different from those Caillois intended to address. Rather than speak about the character of clandestine organizations, Bataille describes instead

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They cant perm because we have delcared war. At best their strategic alliance instrumentalizes the glories of sacrifice, betraying the flows of rage and hope that makes politics possible.
Jason Winfree, Assoc Prof Philosophy at California State University, 2009 [The Obssessions of George Bataille: Community and Communication ed. Mitchell/Winfree p. 31-34]

"WE ARE FEROCIOUSLY RELIGIOUS and, to the extent that our existence is the condemnation of everything that is recognized today, an inner exigency demands that we be equally imperious. What we are starting is a war. It is time to abandon the world of the civilized and its light. It is too late to be reasonable and educated-which has led to a life without appeal. Secretly or not, it is necessary to become completely different, or to cease being" (OC 1: 443/VE 179). Because it is explicitly mentioned, it is tempting to take the
religiosity of the statement as self-evident. However, nothing is further from the truth. For what alone is unmistakable here is the ferocity of the articulation-fierce not because it is designated so, but because of its mood, urgency, and pronounced combative character. It is the

force of contestation [p. 33] that is unmistakable in these lines, and it requires and effects a radical abandonment of that category of value that defines and justifies both religious and political discourse: education. Bataille's concern here is not for the
sake of a common good, already determined in advance and without question in the direction of upbuilding and formation, the good of the social order and the fulfillment of individual talent in its service. His concern here is rather a question of life and death. And there is a profound sense that life

has been dulled, deadened, and muted by the social bonds common to and developed through the communal or social forces of religion and politics alike, forces of normalization, security, and the accumulation of wealth.
Bataille's call to form a community is at once and unequivocally a call for the destruction of community in any traditional sense, It is a call to do away with the bonds we most readily and thoughtlessly define as communal. Item 7 of the "Programme" reads: "Fight

for the decomposition and exclusion of all communities, national, socialist, communist or churchly-other than universal community" (OC 2: 275/BR 121). It is a call for revolution. From the vantage point of apologists for capital or bourgeois democracy (and is there really a
difference?), there could be no distinction between these demands and those of militant revolutionaries, be they conunuuist, socialist, or anarchistic. For Bataille,

to become completely different, or cease being, requires a break from the formative dimension of revolutionary activity, its participation in congresses and talks, its displacement of debate from the space of the streets to the hallways of negotiation. The entire force of revolutionary creativity rests for Bataille in the emotional bond that wells up within the masses as refusal, the atmosphere of hope and rage that swells like an uncontainable wave. The need to become completely different requires the abandonment of political process--defined as it necessarily and inevitably is by those who already have a voice but not political practice. It is a refusal to concede that political thought and action must occur within the sphere of established discourse , which begins with distrust, "a complete lack of confidence in the spontaneous reactions of the masses," and which in this way, at just this point, unites militant revolutionaries and bourgeois intellectuals alike. Thus, Bataille can say at once, "it is necessary to produce and to eat: many things are necessary that are still nothing, and so it is with political agitation" (OC 1: 403/VE I 62).And at the same time: "When we speak to those who want to hear us, we do not essentially address their political finesse. The reactions we hope for from them are not calculations of positions, nor are they new political alliances. What we hope for is of a different nature.' What Bataille hopes
however, the need for is an affirmation of the bond that does not belong to discourse, production, or accumulation; a confrontation with the impotence perpetuated by traditional social structures of nationality, religion, party, and the like; a mobilization of hope and rage incomprehensible [p. 34] and irresponsible to everyone who tethers the question of the political to the axis of security. It is a contestation of the "morally empty and materially miserable life" perpetuated and sustained by institutional structures of power and their widespread internalization (OC 1: 402/VP 161). Undoubtedly, the "Programme" is destined to fail, if it really is a program at all. [tens 3 highlights this difficulty, stating, "Assume the function of destruction and decomposition, but as accomplishment and not as the negation of being" (OC 2: 275/BR 121). The demand not only poses insurmountable structural difficulties of understanding: how destruction could be deprived of its negative work, how it could be taken as an achievement in any positive sense. It also articulates a real political problem. Contributing

nothing worthy or capable of appropriation by the established order-that of discourse, the accumulation of wealth, the value of security, and so on-it beckons its own destruction. For it addresses itself solely to the raw violent drives society either represses or sublimates. What is more, not only does the "Programme" addresse itself to those drives, but it also gives them expression, and it deploys them in its very call. Its call to affirm crime is itself crimina l.5 Its refusal to calmly suffer for a placid future, its rejection of all political projects that sacrifice the present for an indefinite and impossible end, its demand to "[c]onsider the
world to come in the sense of reality contained as of now, and not in the sense of a permanent happiness which is not only inaccessible, but hateful"-in each of these affirmations, this project tears itself apart as project. What looks like a program is in fact a heterological operation , one that deploys

the form of program to effect a cut with everything every program supposes . Community is not an idea or concept, an aim or goal, nor is it an extant dimension of social reality. It is a declaration of war.
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Even if they withdrawal troops, they do so to stabilize the international system. Extend across the Hansen and Stepputat 2007 First, international stability is endless war, meaning at best they provide the system that enables accumulation for new rounds of extermination. Their turns assumes that the state is rational and restrained, building a faade or reasonable discourse that better enables it to enact its sovereign violence. Second, even if they win the turn, they still challenge militarism in the name of survival, which is a relinquishing of your own inner sovereignty to the state. Thats impacted with the Razinski and Goldhammer evidencethey destroy the value to life. Cross apply the impact debate, which proves that the logic of utilitarianism collapses in on itself, guaranteeing that the outcome of the plan is catastrophic war. Kritik turns the case. The knowledge behind the 1AC excess thrown off by the international system, ensuring plan becomes a way to wage new wars in the name of peace. Suhail Malik 2006
[teaches in the Department of Visual Arts, Goldsmiths College Theory Culture Society v.23 2-3]

Abstract Taking globalization to be in large part a consequence of American domination, we follow Derridas characterization of this domination as being a mode of sovereignty of world-scale institutions and force. Such sovereignty, which is also a roguery, is the primary actual condition for a global knowledge. Batailles characterization of rogue sovereignty, however, proposes that knowledge is eclipsed under such a condition by an experience that is irreducibly an unknowing. Knowledge is thus corroded by or, at best, in a critical relation to the manifestation of a global experience generated by the actual conditions of globalization. It is relatively uncontroversial to propose that global knowledge as a project, as a fact is
consequent to the process of globalization that has taken place under this name since the 1980s or thereabouts. But this obvious remark immediately indexes a question as to what knowledge could in fact be if it is subject to this process. There are two aspects to this question. The first, which we do not address here, concerns the very great difficulties that the global as a name or modality of ultimate extension poses for a rational tradition in which knowledge is (or has) a universal or absolute foundation. The second is what the current actu- ality of the term global, its historical constitution, means for anything that could be called global

specifics or content of knowledge are extended and transformed by globalization, as a maximum world-limit of any knowledge-base, -distribution, or -contes- tation. The question is whether what knowledge is also transforms in this process. It is proposed here that it does since global knowledge relies on the historical conditions of globalization for its realization and reconfiguration of knowledge, and these conditions are in turn primarily (which is not to say exclusively) occasioned and promulgated by Americas global dominance which, in a complex
knowledge. This will be our primary concern. It is self-evident that the manner, is sovereignly constituted. The following paragraphs attempt to schematize in the most rudimentary fashion this determination of what globalization qua Americas sovereign domination means for the possibility of global knowledge. The brevity of this contribution permits only the signalling of several hypotheses regarding global knowledge as it is thus occasioned. These hypotheses are consequent to the central issue that arises in the course of the following pages: whether in fact there can be knowledge at all in the condition of the global, or if the experience of that condition leads to the eclipse of knowledge. Accepting for the sake of speed the commonplace that political-economic globalization has been and continues to be secured and mobilized enormously by and for American interests,

question remains as to what Americas domi- nance is in this relatively new inter- and trans-national configuration of economic, political and cultural interests in short, how does the USA globally dominate? There is of course an enormous literature on this, some of whose proposals can be signalled
by terms such as Empire, hegemony, security, and, of course, globalization itself. However, in order to address the specific characterization of American sovereignty as primary condition for globalization, we take up the less familiar account of US dominance as a voyoucracy proposed by Jacques Derrida. Derrida takes up the term on the basis of the French translation for the phrase rogue state as tat voyou and from the French mid-19th-century bourgeois use of the term in order to

sometimes under the name of neo-liberalism, the

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denounce an illegal and outlaw power that brings together . .. all those who represent a prin- ciple of disorder a principle not of anarchic chaos but of structured disorder, so to speak, of plotting and conspiracy, of primordial offensiveness and offences against public order (Derrida, 2005: 66). The phrase rogue state is also used to denounce states

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that also represented a principle of disorder or of terrorism in the eyes of the USA and other supposedly legitimate states, as Derrida calls them, whose own legitimacy is founded in respect [of] an international law that they have the power to control for example, in the modern and complex formation of a heterogeneous but oftentimes closely knit and tightly bound group like the United States, the United Nations, and the Security Council, even NATO (to which one might add for good measure alliances and coalitions like the G8, the IMF, and so on). (Derrida, 2005: 68) The denunciation of rogue states is thus structurally homologous to the bourgeois denun- ciation of a voyoucracy in order to secure their own legitimacy (to legitimate, if it can be put this way). What is critical here is that the phrase rogue states came to have prominence exactly as the term and strategic policy of globalization

was being affirmed and instigated by the Clinton administration in its early years through national and international institutions. That is, rogue states are an indispensable designation for the securing of the claim to inter- national legitimacy for globalization, by which is therefore meant a certain global order (for which terrorism is a central rhetorical and factual operation, as Derrida mentions, 2005: 66). Of the many ramifications of this (de)legitimation strategy only two will be
taken up here: first the characterization of a voyoucracy and second what purchase on legitimacy is retroac- tively granted by the term on the powers that mobilize it. First, then, it is to be noted that a voyoucracy is not an outright abandonment of order but is (presented as) the power or force (a kratos) of an illegitimate and quasicriminal (voyou) counter-order. Voyoucracy signals a sovereignty exorbitant to the legitimate sovereignty of the State and law in the national or international domain. The denunciation of rogue states is thus a matter of one kind of sover- eignty against another, of legitimate against so-designated illegitimate sovereignties. To this end Derrida remarks in passing that if the voyou-cracy represents a power, a challenge to the power of the State, a criminal and transgressive countersovereignty, we have here all the makings of a counterconcept of sovereignty such as we might find in Bataille (2005: 678). We will return in due course to this particular characterization of a voyoucracy since it will bring us directly to the problem of whether a global knowledge can be established. Second,

international and national legitimacy and illegitimacy as it is proclaimed and insti- tutionalized by dominant powers relies on a discourse and politics of democracy and freedom or, in so-said contrary rogue political
formation, their deprivation. This is evident in the charters and ambitions of international institutions such as the UN, NATO, the G8, the IMF, the EU and also,

a legitimation of inter- national power, the democracy-globalization coupling serving to secure international political and economic dominance by already powerful states (which is why Chinas economic might and limited democratic polity presents a more vexed problem for globalization under this aegis than, say, India or Brazil).
notably, for the USA too. Democracy is in this way

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The aff stokes the fires of war. At best their so-called peace will seethe with limitless violence.
Nick Mansfield 2006 [Asociate Professor in Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University in Sydney theory & event 9:4]

. Dealing with the enemy becomes a mere extension of police work. In return, the domestic street is notionally militarized. This slippage allows both war and policing to be justified as mere analogies to one another: how can you contest the war against terror when it is really just a version of the police work that makes you feel safe in your home? And inversely, how can you possibly doubt the legitimacy of policing when it is really a version of the war fought against those who despise liberty and threaten innocence? It is a truism to say that each war redefines the nature of war itself, due to changes in arms technology, military organisation or geo-strategic history. The long war of terror is no exception, but what is most new about it, and what makes it most fit its age, is that it promises the erasure of the difference between war and peace, and concomitantly between war and civil society: terrorists and criminals swap identity, emerge anywhere
at any time and are imputed to share a hostility to the whole Western way of life. This rhetorical slippage, however, confirms what many theorists of war have been proposing in different ways for a long time. We will no longer have war and peace in the future, but ever more complex entanglements of one in the other, where

social policy, diplomatic manipulation and military strategy exchange characteristics, contriving enemies at home, representing political antagonists abroad as criminals, and abolishing not only the idea of a military frontier, but of warfare itself as simply a matter of literal or possible armed conflict. In the future, the question will be not "Why did we choose war instead of peace?" but "What configuration of the peace-war complex embroils us now? " Discussing what is new about the "new wars," Herfried
Munkler argues that in the wars that have developed in the decolonised world: "military force and organised crime go increasingly together."2He goes on: "The new wars know no distinction between combatants and non-combatants, nor are they fought for any definite goals or purposes; they involve no temporal or spatial limits on the use of violence."3In the low intensity, asymmetrical conflicts Munkler sees as typical of contemporary war,

war is without limits, and has

no identifiable outside, either in space or time.

The inverse of this argument is Martin Shaw's identification of one of the key attributes of "the new Western way of war": "The key understanding, therefore, is that warfighting must be carried on simultaneously with 'normal' economics, politics and social life in the West. It is imperative it doesnot impact negatively on these."4Western publics only tolerate a war that can be co-ordinated seamlessly with peace. This is not an alienation of war from social life, but its absolute co-ordination with it. It is not here a question of war being kept hidden behind a screen of peaceful social advancement from one day to the next. Instead, war under this dispensation becomes completely compatible with what we conventionally understand as peace. In the end, this is what allows the complete saturation of society by war: the ability to represent the normal unfolding of social life as relatively undisturbed. In their discussion of the paradoxes of global political governance, Dillon and Reid present a more complex account of the inter-relationship between war and peace. Here

liberal governance both provokes and repudiates war. They write: "It . . . seems obvious that the radical and continuous transformation of societies that global liberal governance so assiduously seeks must constitute a significant contribution to the very violence that it equally also deplores."5Here, global political institutions which have charged themselves with the task of drawing fragile states into the contemporary world of transparent and open (especially financial) administration which makes them accessible to the flow of international capital, unsettle societies enough that warfare is risked, while equally bemoaning war as a sign of institutional failure. The pressure put, for example, on the small states of the Western Pacific by local powers like
Australia both aggravates communal tensions by destabilising inherited power structures, while bemoaning the subsequent unrest as symptomatic of cultures seen as ill-equipped for contemporary global modernity. Each of these accounts presents a different insight into the various ways in which war and peace co-exist in the contemporary. War

totally infiltrates peace, yet war is only allowed when it confirms the apparent inviolability of peace. The governance that insists on the rationalisation and stabilisation of civic society stokes instability and war. War is consistently incited in peace while being simultaneously alienated from it. Peace is administered in such a way that war presses to return, always and everywhere. But how are we to theorise this possibly epoch-making development?

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Liberation requires sacrifice, not a better political program. Extend Goldhammer 05. The ecastic experience of sacrifice frees us from utilitarian concern for the good, forming a sovereign existence not subjugated to the needs of survival. This forms of a space of political contestation that is the prerequisite to a sovereign community that is not just endless domination. Sacrifice enacts a theater of liberation. Extend Razinsky 09. Cutting off the head of the USFG challenges its political authority, while wearing their skins breaks down the wall separating us from others. Sacrifices radiation burns like the radiation of the sun, allowing an intimate encounter with death. The encounter with risk not subordinated to productivity or survival is the only way to access the exuberance that gives life meaning.

No one knows what is coming. History throws off ecastic revolutions, sacred moments of transformation that disprove the cynicism of bitter realism.

Edgar Morin 2006 [Morin founded and directed the magazine Arguments (1954-1962). In 1959 his book Autocritique was published. In 1969,
Morin spent a year at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies in La Jolla, California. In 1983, he published De la nature de lURSS, which deepened his analysis of Soviet communism and anticipated the Perestroika of Mikhail Gorbachev. Morin was married to Johanne Harrelle, with whom he lived for 15 years. In 2002, Morin participated in the creation of the International Ethical, Scientific and Political Collegium.

Realism and Utopia Diogenes 2006 v 53 p. 135-144]

As the idea of a determinist order of the world and of History has completely
collapsed, you are obliged to confront uncertainty on all sides; as the limits of the reductive and compartmentalized mode of thinking are revealed more and more, you have to try to grasp the complex in the literal sense of the word complexus meaning that which is woven together. Blaise Pascal, in the 17th century, was already expressing what ought to be self-evident: All things, even the most separated from one another, are imperceptibly linked one to the other, all things assist and are assisted, cause and are caused an idea which already introduces the sense of reciprocity. Pascal goes on: I consider it impossible to know the parts if I do not know the whole, as it is impossible to know the whole if I do
not know each part individually. Pascal understood that knowledge was a shuttle passing from the whole to the parts and from the parts to the whole; it was the link element, that is, the capacity to contextualize, to situate an item of knowledge and an item of infor- mation within a context such that they might take on meaning. Why is it becoming more and more difficult for us to make use of our cognitive aptitudes which always function through contextualization and fitting things into wholes? Because, in effect, we are now living in a global era; the problems are ever more linked one with another and are more and more vast. But it is especially because we are more and more under the influence of disjunctive, reductive and linear thought. We have retained not the words of Pascal but those of Descartes, that is, that you have to break down things into their component parts in order to know them. As soon as you have elements which pose problems within a system, you have to separate out the problems; you solve the different problems individually and then you have the solution for the whole. You have to separate science and philosophy, you have to keep disciplines apart . . . yes, but on condition that they can link together again; whereas, today, there is a

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compartmentalization that is hermetic. There is a disjunction between the humanist culture that of the humanities, that which makes us reflect and think and so enriches us and the com- partmentalized scientific culture. And it is a fact that this disjunction has spread everywhere, even into politics. It is this fragmentary mode of thought which domi- nates, and which encloses the fragments within the world, whereas the other form of thought will dissect the world longitudinally, in slices related to economics, tech- nology and so on. This techno-scientific

thought which takes no account of creatures, people and cultures is clearly incapable of understanding the problems of these socio-centric human groupings; in the same way as such socio-centric groupings are incapable of realizing the problems associated with technicity . All of which today puts us in a very serious situation. From this point of view, the imperative is to create connections.
Creating connections is what complex thought strives to do. In the sphere of politics and human activity, my diagnosis is that we are witnessing a struggle between the forces of association and the forces of dislocation. Solidarity or barbarity .

We are going to burst asunder from a want of solidarity; we will burst asunder from a failure to reform our way of thinking. To what extent is it a problem of thought? To the extent that the classic alterna- tives block our thought. Realism and utopia are two antinomies that are mutually exclusive according to our received way of thinking. If you are realists, you cant be utopians. If you are utopians, you are excluded from realism. It is the same thing for unicity and multiplicity. The proponents of the former can but homogenize every- thing and unify the world in the abstract. Those arguing for the latter certainly perceive the worlds diversity, but they see it as compartmentalized. The problem lies in the impossibility of escaping these self-destructive alternatives, in the impos- sibility of thinking complexity. But this is the great challenge that faces us. Towards an anthropolitics Solidarity or barbarity is an alternative which
derives its sense not just from the sphere of the immediate, the concrete, the local, the experienced, but also from the European and global spheres. Wherever this debate is taking place, it obliges us to line up on the side of the forces of association and solidarity in the hope that they will prove stronger than the opposing forces of rupture, dislocation and wilful con- cealment. It impels us to be part of a movement which, if it is not broken, perhaps will no longer lead us to the best of all possible worlds, but may usher in the hope of a better world. Though we must set aside the messianic illusion of a radiant future, we can nevertheless nourish the hope of such a better world, even while recognizing that this hope may never be entirely fulfilled. For me, the terrestrial homeland takes shape in the realization that all of us human beings are derived from the same trunk, born of the same matrix the earth through our biological evolution. It is the awareness that we share the same identity and that, across our cultural diversities, made even more apparent since we have entered the global age, all human beings share the one destiny in relation to the great problems of life and death. It was this type of awareness that elicited the consciousness of belonging to a homeland. Otto Bauer,6 at the end of the 19th century, defined the homeland as a community of destiny, but which encapsulated the idea of a common identity across a culture, sharing a common, mythological, origin, tracing back to a common mythic ancestor. But in my terrestrial homeland, the ancestor is not at all mythical, he is a little bipedal creature. In him we find the grandfather of all. This idea of a common humanity and of a homeland co-extensive with the earth is both very realist, since it is based on an anthropological identity, but also very rational, given the challenges of life and death which confront us all. It could even be called religious in the sense that picks up the etymological origin of this term (Lat. religio = a binding together) by binding all humankind into a fraternity. Within our nation, as within Europe and throughout the whole world, we are having to confront immense problems. Socialism believed that the ills that afflicted humanity were the work of a single monster, capitalism: suppress capitalism and all these ills would also be suppressed. But we have seen that that did not suppress wars, nor did it suppress exploitation. We have come to realize that there is not just one monster, but a number of them. And they are not mini-monsters, they are more and more enormous in size: the technobureaucratic monster, the monster of the uncontrolled spread of technoscience . . . all these reverberate within daily life and create deep-seated ills. Our well-being is becoming a situation of ill-being. We should not forget to diagnose the weakness of political thought of the Left which, after the organic collapse of Marxism, found itself incapable of rethinking the historical problem of mankind in society and of envisaging a positive politics of history. When socialism was formulated in the 19th century, it grew out of an historical perspective. Today, such an historical perspective is once again necessary. I am afraid that, in the absence of a single unifying concept, if a sudden and violent crisis occurred, we would have to suffer catastrophic consequences. If a very great crisis were to come, we would not be sheltered from its terror. When the great crisis of 1929 struck, and Germany was frightfully smitten with conditions not only more severe than elsewhere but also exacerbated by the context of national humilia- tion in which they occurred, the world witnessed the rise of Nazism within an envi- ronment of complete legality. It must also be recognized, however, that the same period saw Roosevelts New Deal providing an alternative democratic solution. Why the New Dealworked was perhaps because the United States was a country of immigrants. We are urged to be vigilant, without opening the door to the improbable. Even recently we have had great expectations. But of what? There were the expectations of the general spread of democracy, of the emergence from an economy of constraint and poverty. There was hope that the United Nations could perhaps function properly. Such hopes arose not only in relation to the demise of the USSR, but also in Africa and Latin America where dictatorships were falling. But the springtime of the peoples in 1848 was followed by a terrible repression. That of the last century has seen a terrible regression. We can no longer continue to nourish disproportionate hopes, like those crazy hopes we in France had at the Liberation. We were coming out from under the yoke of

. So, does that mean that we are always likely to be disenchanted, seeing our hopes reduced to despair? In a word, no. I believe that we must live to the full the ecstatic moments of history; they are the consolation of so many years of mediocrity. I experienced the Liberation of Paris. May 1968 was a little moment of historical delight that I also enjoyed. I was fortunate to be in Lisbon at the time of the Carnation Revolution. As for the fall of the Berlin Wall, unfortunately I was only able to experience it by proxy, not being present, but I was happy to see Rostropovitch playing in front of the Wall. Life is bearable only if one can introduce into it not a utopia but poetry, that is, an intensity, a sense of festival, of joy, communion, happiness and love. There is an ecstasy of history which is a collective ecstasy of love. Francesco Alberoni, in Falling in Love7 whose wonderfully untranslatable
Nazism, but our great aspirations were rapidly disappointed

Italian title is Innamoramento e amore describing that marvellous, ecstatic moment when love comes upon one, wrote: Nascent revolutions are moments of falling in love. Its a phrase I like quoting. But such revolutions are not the final struggle, they are the initial struggle. I might even say the struggle before the initial struggle. They are the curtain-raiser, even, to the initial struggle. Why? Because what is needed is a formidable effort of intellec- tual reconstruction, a whole new way of thinking, even; we must show ourselves fit and able to confront the challenge of the uncertain, and there are two ways by which it may be confronted. The

we have a clear idea of what we want, what we aspire after, and so we wager on its realization even though we may fear that our ideas will be defeated. The second is through application of strategy: in
first is by way of a wager: other words, the ability, in terms of information received and chances met, to modify our manner of advancing. Resistance is not something purely negative. It does not consist simply in oppos- ing oppressive forces, but it looks ahead to liberations. It is the Polish example, its the example of the Soviet people, its the example of occupied France. Resistance has an inherent virtue.

We are condemned to resist. What I call living life is not just living poetically, it is also knowing how to resist in life. Heraclitus said: If you do not expect the
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unexpected, you will not find it. We come back to the idea of the possible

impossible, which we must explore in depth.

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Their realism is not realistic enough. We acknowledge the inevitability of violence, and they are the ones being nave about the rationality and restraint of the state. International relations is war, not the well-organized machine presented by the 1AC. The collapse of communism proves the futility of realisms predictions. Its false inevitability admits defeat in advance, blind to the ecastic possibilities of the present.
Edgar Morin 2006

[Morin founded and directed the magazine Arguments (1954-1962). In 1959 his book Autocritique was published. In 1960,
Morin travelled extensively in Latin America, visiting Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Peru and Mexico.He returned to France where he published L'Esprit du Temps. That same year, French sociologist Georges Friedmann brought him and Roland Barthes together to create a Centre for the Study of Mass Communication that, after several name-changes, became the Edgar Morin Centre of the EHESS, Paris[2]. Beginning in 1965, Morin became involved in a large multidisciplinary project, financed by the Dlgation Gnrale la Recherche Scientifique et Technologique in Plozvet. In 1968, Morin replaced Henri Lefebvre at the University of Nanterre. He became involved in the student revolts that began to emerge in France. In May 1968, he wrote a series of articles for Le Monde that tried to understand what he called "The Student Commune." He followed the student revolt closely and wrote a second series of articles in Le Monde called "The Revolution without a Face," as well as co-authoring Mai 68: La brche with Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort[3]. In 1969, Morin spent a year at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies in La Jolla, California. In 1983, he published De la nature de lURSS, which deepened his analysis of Soviet communism and anticipated the Perestroika of Mikhail Gorbachev. Morin was married to Johanne Harrelle, with whom he lived for 15 years. In 2002, Morin participated in the creation of the International Ethical, Scientific and Political Collegium.

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So what can we do to avoid being deceived by such pseudo-realists whose atti- tudes are in fact totally utopian? How can we stop ourselves from simply saying: Well, yes, if something cannot be made real it must be purely utopian . . ., and not thus become mired in a realism which cannot see beyond itself? The very present itself has an enigmatic and uncertain face. This is detectable even in the West. Everything that seems solid and functional is yet capable of falling apart. The present remains unknowable. We are living in a sort of cyclonic low-pressure zone. We get the feeling that the storm is about to burst at any moment, but then no, it doesnt, it seems to move away. And then, wait on, it hasnt really moved away at all. We dont really know what is going to happen. The present is the realm of uncer- tainty. Regarding the post-communist period, it is interesting to see just how surprising, or unsurprising, things turn out to be. The Russian historian Yuri Afanasevs3 analysis brings to light that once that gigantic apparatus that was the Soviet State became fragmented into a thousand pieces, each of the pieces changed into a little capitalist entity.

Continued

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Continued
Real-politikand the politics of the ideal To paraphrase Rimbaud: I have made the magic study Of happiness . . . one might say: I have made the interminable study Of the real. To be able to diagnose what the real consists of today, other sources of illumination would be necessary. But the subject is inexhaustible. T he first thing is to reject trivial realism, which insists that we must adapt to the immediate, to the established order, to the fait accompli and admit the victory of the victorious. But beyond such trivial realism, what remains? We need to recognize that the real is swarming with possibilities and we have no way of knowing what may emerge from it, nor how to choose ones own purposive direction or situate oneself in rela- tion to it. Within the sphere of human reality, the imaginary, the mythological and of course the affective all cohabit together, something that the compartmentalization of the social and human sciences does not sufficiently take into account. As for economics, it is much too refined a science. Why? Because its object is expressed in figures and quantities. But from such perfection, flesh, blood, passion, suffering, happiness and cultural expression have all been abstracted away. Therein lies the problem of todays reality, where politics, the art of the polis, has been made entirely subservient to economics, the art of the kosor household. To rediscover true reality, we have to be restored to a state of responsibility as subjects. It may be a commonplace to say so, but it must be constantly repeated: any knowledge be it of an object or a crowd-filled lecture theatre is a translation and a reconstruction. Of course, one can be deceived by hallucinations, one can be in error, but there is no knowledge which is a photographic reflection of what is real. Admittedly, knowledge in the form of ideas and theories is a translation/recon- struction of the real in a refined form, but this also can carry with it enormous illusion and error. Such illusions are the stuff of the whole of human history. Marx and Engels said that the history of humanity was that of the errors and illu- sions that human beings had made about themselves and about what they had achieved. But in so saying, they also committed the same types of errors and had the same illusions. So is it not worthwhile saying to oneself: Cant we at least try to react? Quite clearly, all knowledge is interpretation. The illusion lies in saying: I will call real what I think is real; that is to say: I label as realism that which derives from my personal conception of the real. Reality, even at its most objective, always has a cognitive and subjective element to it. To truly know reality, what is required is a subject capable of thinking critically within his/her own limited personal mental space, and then, through that ability, being capable of questioning the truths which present as selfevident within the doctrinal system into which they are incor- porated. It might be added that the discrediting of all individually autonomous moralities and all autonomous assertions of responsibility is the common feature of all belligerent nationalisms and all totalitarian systems, from stalinism to nazism.

Even if realism has validity, that doesnt prove the 1AC is claims are right. It does NOT prove that the aff doesnt reproduce the violent excesses leading to our destruction.

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Even if realism possesses truth, it is fragmentary and willfully ignorant about its own limits. Only a sacred methodology has a chance of understanding the international.
Stephen Chan 2000 [Professor IR Dean Ethics at Notingham Trent University, Millennium Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 565-589] Preconditions For Writing a Sacral IR The difficulty of writing an essay such as this is that it feels like the writing of fragments, only because the fragments are, within a particular discipline, unknown. That the discipline o stensibly concerns itself with the international makes the writing of such fragments tragic, or perhaps pathetic. Yet, it is IR that is a borrowing discipline. It cannot claim its borrowing of Kant and Hegelnever mind Nietzscheis for instance more than fragmentary. The tragedy lies in its circumscribed choice of fragments, and this circumscription is a repudiation of the international, and finally a repudiation of knowledge. The compound tragedy is that the fragmentary borrowing, the circumscription, and the repudiation are advertised as an unending and recurring quest for truth; but this truth can only ever, under such co nditions, be fragmentary and circumscribed. Truth as monolitheven if it fades and recursand truth-seeking as aristocratic, are conceits. I have tried to illustrate in this essay both the subjectivity and self- reflexive subjectivity o f any search for truth, and to o ffset the oriental stories with kno wled ge fro m Western disciplines and thinkers o utside IR. More to the point, I have tried to illustrate the desirability of various truths, and ho w the multiplicity of them sho uld be contextualised within a quest for good. Not only that, but the telling of truths, and the quest for good, establish an intersubjectivity which is amenable to a hermeneutics, as Ricoeur suggested, mo st plausibly established in art and stories. Thus, if the reader has an aversion to Tibetan devotional statuary, he or she still has the injunctions of IRs Roland Bleiker, which are injunctions towards the freely co mpositional.48 But it is not enough merely to tell stories. I am saying here that, in its rush to secularity, IR has forgotten the need to tell stories that are sacralthat are compositions towards the sacredand which are reflectivities upon long and different histories of establishing the conditions of goodness and, yes, o f truth/s. It is the methodologies o f reflection that, I propose, exist in the world s cultures as sacral devices. Nietzsche was right about the divided cogito, but did not infuse his Zarathustra sufficiently with it. Zarathustras exposure to the world are exposures only to provide him with to uchstones that reassert his o wn rightness. There is none of the irony of a Subcomandante Marcos, and his sense of co mp assion to all those who are imperfect before it is less than developed. Nietzsches creation is, finally, an assertion in the face o f the world, and not a Tibetan Boddhisattva who chooses very deliberately to remain within it. He has, in Ricoeurs terms, no intersubjectivity; in Kngs terms, no ethic for the world which disgusts him; and, in Eliades terms, departs the moral depredations of the world by giving in to his o wn temptation of Superhumanity as constant recurrence. He does not constantly recur in the world, but is engaged in continually approaching a truth that is beyond the world s detritus. This is not nihilistic, but only in the sense that it is beyond the context of nihilism: the world of struggle and the world of the international. To be in good, rather than becoming in truth, is the distinction drawn here between Nietzsches Zarathustra and Tibets Avalokitsvara. These are choices of stories, yes? And both are written sacrally, debating the methodologies towards transcending the material and secular. Only one of them, having the capacity to complete transcendence, draws back to live within the inco mplete: to attain not sacredness, but a conditio n of perpetual sacrality. This perpetual state draws from and prosecutes the cause of good, and this good is not the subject or object of discourse: it is kno wn by simple intersubjective experience. Finally, in his completed ethic, Kng got it right. There is nothing co mplicated about this. Good is simply so mething done. The trick, beyo nd IR, is simply that it can be done in one thousand truthful ways.

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Realism is mythology, blind to its reliance on untestable stories to make sense of vast array of empirical evidence The K solves best for IR methodology and education.
Cynthia Weber 2005 [Professor IR at Lancaster University, International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction p. xvi-xvii] What, for example makes realism's story about sovereign nation-states locked into a battle for survival or idealism's story about the possibilities of international cooperation so compelling? In this book I suggest that what makes these IR stories appear to be true are the IR myths upon which they are based. IR myths are apparent truths, usually expressed as slogans, that IR traditions rely upon in order to appear to be true. The 'truth' or the 'falsity' of an IR myth is beside the point. Examining how an IR myth functions to make an IR tradition appear to be true is the point. So, for example, the IR myth 'international anarchy is the permissive cause of war' is the apparent truth that realism and these days neorealism depend upon. Similarly, 'there is an international society' is the IR myth that makes the stories told by idealism and neoidealism appear to be true. None of this should come as a surprise to IR theorists. We know that different IR traditions rely upon very different IR myths in order to appear to be true. So how do we make sense of these contradictory ways of seeing the world for our students? The usual strategy is to test' the validity of the IR myths against the 'facts' of inter national politics to
determine which IR myth (and therefore which IR tradition) offers the most accurate description of international politics. Proving that an IR myth, tradition, or theory is wrong so that it can be replaced by another one which is 'true' is usually what we mean by doing 'critical IR theory'. But what if we push our analysis just a bit further? What if we unpack not just IR traditions but the IR myths upon which they are based? What if we ask of IR myths (as we do of IR traditions), what makes the story they tell about international politics appear to be true? What makes international anarchy appear to he the permissive cause of war, or why does there appear to be an international society? If we pursue these questions, then we not only push our analysis of IR traditions further. We push what it means to do 'critical JR theory'. Why is this the case? Because the alternative way of doing critical JR theory proposed in this book allows us to examine not only how one 'truth' replaces another 'truth' but also how 'truths' get constructed. This is beyond the scope of most traditional critical IR theory which concerns itself only with evaluating which 'truth' appears to be most 'true'. By declaring one theory 'true' and another one 'false', traditional critical IR theory cannot then go back and examine what makes the 'true' theory appear to be true. For example, realism

critiques idealism by 'proving' that its IR myth, 'international anarchy is the permissive cause of war', is 'more true' than idealism's myth, 'there is an international society'. But, in so doing, realism cannot ask what makes its IR myth about international anarchy appear to be true. And. without critically analysing its own IR myth, realism ultimately proves nothing. Asserting the 'truth' of one IR myth over another in no way guarantees the 'truth' of an IR myth, no matter how much empirical evidence is amassed to support the 'truth' of the myth. This is the case because the 'truth' of an IR myth depends as much upon how empirical evidence is organized into a coherent story about international politics as it does on the evidence alone. This is a central problem with
how critical theory is usually practised in the discipline of international relations. International Relations Theory takes this problem seriously. How it takes it seriously is by shifting its analytical emphasis away from looking for 'empirical evidence' to support the 'truth' of an IR myth towards an investigation of the organization of the 'facts' that make an IR story about international politics appear to be true. Doing critical IR theory in this way means we have to suspend our usual preoccupation with getting to the 'real truth' about an IR myth, tradition, or theory and ask instead, what makes a particular story about international politics appear to be true? Or. to put it somewhat differently, how does the 'truth' function in a particular IR myth? It is not accidental that this book as my answer to how to teach IR theory better should locus on stories and how they are told.

If the world is made up of 'facts' and stories that organize those 'facts'. then there is no more important skill to pass on to students than to make them better readers and writers of stories, better interpreters of not just the 'facts but of the organization of the 'facts'. With this in mind, international
Relations Theory does not try to be a comprehensive textbook crammed with every 'fact' about international life or even international theory. By focusing on the major IR traditions of realism, idealism, historical materialism, constructivism, postmodernism, gender, and globalization, it attempts to help students to read and write their world better by arming them with the ability to critically ask, how does the 'truth' get told?

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Humans might be violent, but NOT because of the inevitability of realism. States no longer pursue war as strategy, but instead as senselessly murderous excess. Adriana Cavarero, Prof Political Philosophy at Universit degli studi di Verona, 2009
[Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence trans. McCuaig p. 60-65]
. During the early years of the present century, the area of greatest suffering has been Iraq, where from 2003 through the first half of 2006 the estimated total
number of deaths among the population comes close to six hundred thousand.' This list is obviously arbitrary and incomplete. Nor is it a question of numbers, even if a focus on quantities is inevitable when we are dealing with mass

butchery and carnage are now directed-in the bulk of cases, although not exclusively-at the civilian population. In an epoch of "mass death unprecedented in history, 10 to continue to discuss war in terms of regulated conflict between states, in line with the classical and "symmetrical" model of a clash between men in uniform, is, in this sense, misleading. The kind of war that matured in the twentieth century and looms over the new millennium is not only asymmetric, as were and are all colonial wars, but, like them, consists predominantly of the homicide, unilateral and sometimes planned, of the defenseless. Nor does the rhetorical expedient, typical of military language, of 'collateral damage" do any good: on the factual plane, it does not
homicide.9 The numbers serve merely to emphasize how

succeed in masking the existence of "the blown-off limbs, the punctured eardrums, the shrapnel wounds, and the psychological horror that are caused by heavy bombardment:"' Struck one by one, in the singularity of their vulnerable bodies, the helpless ones stand at the center of modern destruction and highlight its drift into horrorism. This places them in a position of perspective on

Often execrated as a tremendous evil and as the maximal expression of human violence, war has been regarded as inevitable for millennia. But the modern age especially has been able to make use of theories that, variously articulated and cutting across different disciplinary levels, have succeeded in endowing this inevitability with a natural foundation. I refer to theories, originating in the early twentieth century and not untouched by the eroticization of horror already discussed, that trace violence back to "aggressiveness, defined as an instinctual drive, [that] is said to play the same functional role in the household of nature
horror that, in speaking of war, no discussion ought any longer ignore.
as the nutritive and sexual instincts in the life process of the individual and the species."2 This is Arendt's characterization, in an essay from the 196os in which she imputes this naturalistic acceptation of violence primarily to the modern social sciences. As the author implies, the term "social sciences" is not to be taken in a narrow sense. It is meant simply as a comprehensive label for the various fields of knowledge that emphasize the pulsional origin of the

, Hobbes was already speaking of war as part of human nature, in his celebrated description of the state of nature as a state of war. The modern social sciences, to stay with Arendt's thesis, go a step further, however; they ascribe war, like violence, not just to "an irrepressible instinct of aggression" but also to "a secret death wish of the human
phenomenon of vio [p. 63] lance. At the dawn of the modern era, for that matter

species. 1113 Thus Freud and psychoanalysis inevitably come to the foreground. The Freudian idea of a death wish is well known: "a death instinct, the task of which is to lead organic life back into the inanimate state."4 He describes it as a drive that, albeit originally directed inward in the form of self-destructiveness, also projects outward, "against the external world and other organisms. `5 In other words, and to adopt the technical imprecision Of Arendtian terminology; it is a desire for death that is at the same time an instinct of aggression. As is equally well known, Freud developed this theme during the final phase of the writings in which, from 1914 to 1922, he described the functioning of psychic activity. The background is the period during and shortly after the First World War, an epoch in which death and destruction were operative on a vast scale. It should also be noted that, as proof of the plausibility of the intrinsic linkage between the death wish and the impulse of destruction, he resorts to an argument taken from the field of biology; to be precise, he describes the passage from single-cell organisms to multicellular ones in terms of a death wish that, instead of directing its destructive impulse inward toward the single cell, is redirected outward. So when Arendt denounces the naturalistic conception of violence derived from the "modern social sciences:' she hits the mark: the incursion into the field of the natural sciences is a salient trait of psychoanalytic theory in its formative phase. Rather than at Freud, though, the denunciation ought to be directed at the immense success of certain Freudian categories in the second half of the twentieth century, especially at the way they have been absorbed and reworked, if not hypostasized, by the various disciplines that have intersected with psychoanalysis, one way or another, over the course of the century. The phenomenon is, to put it mildly, conspicuous. Especially on the plane of media popularization, the century saw the expansion of a horizon of meaning within which the death wish along with the destructive impulses, and not seldom their horrorist side a la Bataille, acquired the status of established, unquestionable, and evident principles. Any reflection on violence in general and war in particular was virtually obliged to take them into account. At the start of the third millennium, in other words in the era of socalled global war, a prime example of this is a book published in the United States by James Hillman in 2004. It is entitled A Terrible Love of War and is [p. 64] based on the Jungian theory of archetypes. But the book stands out not because of the reference to Jung, or to psychoanalysis in general, but because of the nonchalance with which Hillman recuperates and mixes together the main strands of twentieth-century naturalistic thought on violence to corroborate his thesis. He maintains that war "belongs to our souls as an archetypal truth of the cosmos"16 and that this archetypal truth is, as the title oF his second chapter puts it, "normal]' He proceeds with an analysis of the theme of a horror that remains human even in its atrocious inhumanity, adding that war is sublime and belongs to the sphere of religion .17 "If war is sublime, we must acknowledge its liberating transcendence and yield to the holiness of its call "18 This does not mean, obviously, that Hillman wishes for a perpetual state of war. His aim is rather to get rid of the "pacifist rhetoric'' that, in denying the natural-psychic-root of the phenomenon, impedes comprehension of it. As the reader will easily intuit, while the authors cited (often inappropriately) are highly disparate, it is principally categories deriving from psychoanalysis, the sociology of the sacred, and the anthropology of sacrifice that underpin the articulation of Hillman's discourse, The theoretical density, as well as the internal problematics of these categories, which in his text are forced to undergo drastic simplification, are transformed into banal clichs. In order to justify war as an uorenounceable and vital experience, Hillman often appeals not just to the authority of his authors but to a so-called common opinion that by now constitutes the vulgate, in the form of the stereotypical and the obvious, of those same authors. An example is the facility with which he takes for granted 'bur fascination with war films, with weapons of mass destruction, with pictures of blasted bodies and bombs bursting in the air."" To this Hillman adds, on a confessional note, "the fascination, the delight in recounting the dreadful details of butchery and cruelty. Not sublimation, the sublime."" Typical as well in the way it casts a shadow of abnormality-if not pathological stupidity or obtuseness-over those who do not share the fascination with butchery, Hillman's thesis

has its own stringent logic. Once violence is rooted in the natural realm of the impulses or, if one prefers, in the archetypical order of the cosmos, the horror of war cannot fail to transmit its fascination both to everyone's visual experience and to the literary
practice of some. And, even more logically, it is combatants with firsthand experience in the field who savor the full fascination. The words of the soldiers that Hillman diligently reports in his text for the purpose of documenting his theory prove it. Among them, the words of a cinematographic version of General Patton stand out, when, faced with the devastation of battle and kissing a dying officer, he exclaims, "I love it. God help me, I do love it so. I love it more than my life." Then there is the authen [p. 65] tic declaration of a marine who confesses, "The thing I wish I'd seen-I wish could have seen a grenade go into someone's body and blow it up:' No one else, though, rivals the laudable capacity to synthesize of the anonymous American soldier who, in

In the name of a realism grounded in the power of clich, the entire repertory of war's horror is thus reduced by Hillman to the realm of enjoyment. "The savage fury of the group, all of
describing a bayonet charge, defines it as "awful, horrible, deadly, yet somehow thrilling, exhilarating.' whose members are out for one another's blood:' which the celebrated work of Ren Girard inscribes in the phenomenology of ritual," becomes the trivial wage of the warrior. For that matter the stereotype of the soldier excited by killing has a long and prestigious history. A certain arousal by violence was already characteristic of Homer's warriors, and the warmongering rhetoric of every age, ennobled by writers and poets, is full of soldiers made happy by death. The events of the twentieth century, and even more those occurring right now, might suggest to the singers and scholars of massacre that they change register. Today it is particularly senseless that the meaning of war and its horror-as well, obviously, as its terror-should still be entrusted to the perspective of the warrior. If it is true, as the historian Giovanni Dc Luna laments, that "wars,

with the violence and cruelty they unleash, appear to have a common ground (killing and getting killed), always the same and impervious to chronology,"" it is also true that only warriors, after all fit this paradigm. The civilian victims, of whom the numbers of dead have soared from the Second World War on, do not share the desire to kill, much less the desire to get killed. Nor does the pleasure of butchery, on which Hillman insists, appear to constitute a possible common ground in this case. You would have to ask the victims of the bombing, cooked by incendiary bombs in the shelters of Dresden, or those whose skin was peeled off by phosphorous bombs in the Vietnamese villages, where
the pleasure and excitement was for them. .

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Their predictions mobilize a crowd of babies seeking security from the teat of the state. Democratic discourse cannot account for the its own fascination with violence, meaning only sacrifice can break with the status quo.
Blent Diken 2006 [Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, Alternatives 31 (2006), 431452 The evil is us. The war against the evil is not a matter of oppos- ing others but of confronting ourselves, our own desire. In this sense, Lord of the Flies is a story of fascism in us all. Thus in the famous preface he wrote for a book of ethics, Michel Foucault claimed that the major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism. . . . And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mus- solini . . . but also the fascism in us that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us.46Which is also the reason why Simon hears the following from the Lord of the Flies:

continued
. Democracy is great, so the film tells us, but it is also impotent. It lacks mobiliz- ing power and the capacity for radical acts. Both Piggy, the intel- lectual, and Ralph, the democrat, lack this abilityexcept in this incident, where Ralph dares to look
evil in the eye. The moment for a radical act is however surpassed: after Ralph has become the new enemy, no one needs the totem animal any more. Thus, Ralphs act does not amount to more than an empty gesture. But still we should not exclude the possibility of such acts; they have a time and a moment. And radical they are in aiming for the destruc- tion of our most cherished object. If

evil is in us, then an ethical act must be an act of self destruction, an act that undermines what make us a we. Significantly in this respect, Benjamin was the first to divide
Schmitts concept of exception, producing a remainder of it. For Schmitt, exception is a limit concept that presupposes a normal situation as its background. The state of exception aims at the preservation of this normality with extraordinary means. In other words, Schmitts project is to legitimize the state of exception, or to normalize what is exceptional. Along similar lines, we could argue that the state of exception on the island is reactionary, or, to phrase it differently, that violence is rational. The generalized exception, the festival, is Jacks way of strengthening his power. In this, everything is made fluid; all hierarchies are reversed. But one thing remains constant: Jack, the leader. To be sure, Benjamin was in many ways inspired by Schmitts methodological extremism, even though his own project was opposed to Schmitts. Whereas Schmitt wanted to legitimize Nazi power, Benjamin criticized it. Schmitt was conservative, Benjamin revolutionary. Indeed, this tension found its best expression in their understanding of sovereignty. Hence to Schmitts exception Benjamin opposed the suspension of suspension, a real excep- tion, or, better, an exception to exception itself. What is decisive here is the notion that, when generalized, exception loses its status as a limit of normality. The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the state of emergency in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism.57 Whereas in Schmitt exception is the political kernel of the law, it becomes divine justice in Benjamin. And then we are confronted with the difference between two exceptions: Schmitts exception is nothing else than an attempt at avoiding the real exception, the revolution, or divine justice. Benjamins exception, in stark con- trast, suspends the relationality between the law and its suspension in a zone of anomy dominated by pure violence with no legal cover.58The question of this real exception is the one that cannot be posed today without immediately facing the accusation of being a nihilist or a fundamentalist. And why is it so? To end with an answer to this question, let us focus on the final scene. Speechless The whole jungle is on fire. Ralph is being hunted. He is hopeless, without being able to find a shelter from violence. Running fre- netically, he makes his way to the beach, but collapses there. Worn out, breathless, he is about to surrender to his predators, who are not far behind him. But miraculously at this point, he notices a naval officer looking at him. Obviously a ship has seen the fire. He is saved by the fire, which was intended to destroy him. Shortly after, the other boys arrive with their painted bodies and sharp- ened spears. They are startled when they see the officer. The offi- cer, in turn, looks puzzled. With this scene, the film ends. But, unforgivably in our view, it omits an essential dialogue from the book. In the book, when the naval officer sees the naked boys with masks and weapons, he thinks they are playing, having fun and games, and crucially (mis)interprets the situation as a Jolly good show. Like the Coral Island.59 Coral Islandis R. M. Ballantynes childrens novel from the nineteenth century in which three British boys on a tropical island successfully defend civilization against pirates, cannibals, and wild animals. In other words, it is a nave version of Lord of the Flies. Which makes the dialogue essential, also because it is here that the first living adult figure appears. Crucially, however, this figure turns out to be an infantilized adult, for whom war is a game, like Blent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen 447 the Coral Island. Further, the boys in the film are rescued by sol- diers only to move to another war, to a more general state of excep- tion. In a sense, therefore, the world the film depicts is a world with no outside. The outside is as violent, and as infantilized, as the boys island. Indeed, by omitting this crucial point, the film creates the illu- sion that outside the island things are normalthat outside there is civilization. The irony, however, is that the boys are, in the first place, on the island because of a war. They are, so to speak, waging a war within a bigger war. This official war of the adults is not less butwith more technology, bigger crowds, and more powerful sadists more violent than everything that happens on the island. The two worlds are continuous.60 Herein lies the significance of the fact that the film is about boys. Why boys? Perhaps because Golding thought that boys, as half-formed beings, could be perfect symbols of the central conflict between civilization and barbarism. Thus the boys in the film occupy a grey zone of indistinction between society and nature. But still, why does the only man in the film appear like a boy? Indeed, Lord of

the childhood of society is the state of nature. And the nature that comes after society is the state of exception, a condition in which the citizen is reduced to a member of a crowd. At a first approximation, therefore, infantilization is about regressive evolution: a movement not from the child to the adult but from the adult to the child, from the human to the orangutan, from society, bios, to the nature, zoe. The state of exception is a world in which orangutan
the Flies is an allegory of infantilization. After all,

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beings. And, in a sense, the becoming orangutan of man is what explains the increasing infantilization of the contemporary culture, especially in the context of consumption and the war against terror. It is well known that in premodern times the child did not exist; that is, did not constitute a different being. Hence in paint- ings, for
example, the children were depicted as grown-ups, only smaller in size, as child-men.61First in modernity childhood took the form of an exceptional period in individual chronology, and the child emerged as a subject to be normalized and disciplined: the child-man is, per definition, desocialized. Therefore, some of the most significant panoptic institutions of modernity, the nursery and the school, for instance, mark the difference between the child and the man. To be a proper man one should first be a proper child; that is, disciplined and normalized in a site of con- finement. And then one could move forward to other institutions, to factories, universities, marriages, and finally to the elderly care, 448 From War to War living a life on the move from one closed site to another, each with its own laws, each marked by an inside-outside divide.62This is, however, changing in todays control societies, whose main symptom is the breaking down of panoptic boundaries: In disciplinary societies you were always starting all over again (as you went from school to barracks, from barracks to factory), while in control societies you never finish anythingbusiness, training, and military service being coexisting metastable states of a single modulation, a sort of universal transmutation.63 Perhaps today the discipline specific to the nursery is also mov- ing beyond the panoptic walls with the result that the man-child is, again, everywhere, in every domain. That ones childhood never finishes means that the nursery extends itself to the whole soci- etythat, in a sense, the exception becomes the rule. In this sense, infantilization is the end of the outside, of the divide between the child and the adult. In the smooth biographic space that emerges, the distinction between the child and the adult can be created only at a fantasy level, hiding the fact that the outside of the nursery is also a nursery: the infantilized world of the man-child. Otherwise, outside this fantasy frame, the child (the excep- tion) and the adult (the rule) are indistinguishable, and thus the imperatives that govern adult life are the same as those that govern the nursery: play, learning, protection. In the new spirit of capi- talism it is imperative to play; that is, to be nomadic, experiment- ing, and inspired.64Ours is a society in which play is consumption, consumption is play. Ideally, the consumer is a child, who shops impulsively, whose desire is to be aroused, channeled, and manip- ulated. Second, we live in a knowledge-based societyone in which we never finish learning. Continuous assessment is thus indis- pensable to it.65And finally, ours is a society of fear, of scaremon- gering, in which we are continually told that we need to be pro- tected. For security, we are advised to sacrifice even democracy. After all, in-fant means speechless. The children need no agora; if they had one, they would destroy it anyway, as they did the conch in Lord of the Flies. If the young human feels intense grief, anger, or other emotion, he is not able to contain it, and he is forced into acting out. A frustrated child is unable to internalize the discomfort or to release it by verbal expression. He rids himself of this unbearable tension by an act, like kicking against the floor. . . . Crying, head- banging, screaming, or other forms of temper tantrums are a childs way of obtaining a denied wish.66 Blent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen 449 It is no wonder that political

infantilization today comes with a rigid polarization between good and bad (you are either with us or against us), which reduces reality to fairy stories, or, rather, to a comedy of (t)errors: no weapons of mass destruction are found; Bin Laden is not caught; Afghanistan seems to be more deserted than ever; democracy has not arrived in Iraq, and so on. But every- thing goes on and on. In this, the audience is treated like an infantilized crowd. It is striking, in this respect, to observe the parallel between the infantilized subject of security and the frightened subject of terror, the hostage. The hostage is an anonymous figure, a naked, formless body, which is absolutely convertible: anybody and every- body can be a hostage.67 Likewise, the politics of security redefines the citizen as a fearful subject, like a child, to be protected . Any- body and everybody must be protected. Consequently, both the enemy and the friend are desubjectified; while the enemy is reduced to an illegal combatant or a fundamentalist, the friend, the subject of security, becomes infantilized. It is against this background that Lord of the Flies is an allegory of a biopolitical, or, better, a postpolitical society that elevates security to its most sacred principle of organization in the form of a permanent state of exception and tries to combine it with con- sumerism (so that we need security to
be able to consume and need to consume to be able to feel secure). After all, violence in Lord of the Flies was just an exceptional circumstance: The boys were just playing! The crucial question is whether this is a valid answer in todays society: Is the exception just an exception or is it general- ized? Who then today counts as evil, as the Lord of the Flies? And how is evil to be fought? Control society is a society in which fear/terror and businesses, like unidentical twins, work together through a disjunctive synthe- sis to form a single dispositif. It is, therefore, no coincidence that spite as a postpolitical strategy reemerges in todays society. Hence, with reference to the recent protests/fires in the French suburbs, Slavoj Zizek asks: Where is the celebrated freedom of choice, when the only choice is the one between playing by the rules and (self-)destructive violence, a violence which is almost exclusively directed against ones ownthe cars burned and the schools torched were not from rich neighborhoods, but were part of the hard-won acquisi- tions of the very strata from which protestors originate.68 In the contemporary, postpolitical society, the agora is not functioning as it is supposed to be: Violence cannot be translated into a political language and, thus, it can only assume the form of an obscene, irrational outburst. Such impotent violence is self- sacrificial, and loudly so. It is spite: Lord of the Flies as savior.

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Links
(Human) Rights Links
Human rights are about as radical as a David Matthews album. The affs activism is a buzzard flying around the corpses of war, and that dependence ensures the continuation of international violence. Nick Mansfield, Prof Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, 2008
[Theorizing War: From Hobbes to Badiou p. 167-168] Whenever the West is attacked it always believes that it is the Enlightenment that is the target. The Enlightenment legacy is still clung to as if it is novel and threatening to other societies, still insurgent, fragile, ever uncompromised and futuristic. Soldiers are sent out to defend or expand this legacy, or simply just to demonstrate
that it cannot be intimidated, and will be defended. These soldiers execute saturation bombings, high-tech sweeps of civilian neighbourhoods and brutal displays of the range of their materiel. They believe in the enlightened righteousness of the massive show of force. Soon, they will disrupt social networks, disable economic life, ridicule culture and perhaps even torture detainees and rape children. The havoc they wreak will be far more destructive than the regimes they have replaced. But this will not really matter or it will be dismissed as accidental, because they are agents of the Enlightenment, whose eventual triumph will justify everything. In conquered territory, political institutions will probably only be established via weak coalitions of communal groups or through the co-operation of warlords. In this way, a country can settle into a loose if pessimistic quiet, and you may even be able to pretend that the most sensational or publicised of your enemies, the Viet Cong or Al-Qaida, for example, have been defeated. At home, in pursuit of this defence of the Enlightenment, police powers will be increased, the courts will be restrained and the media either seduced or intimidated. Yet this war

will provoke ever greater activism on behalf of human rights [p. 168] and the Enlightenment legacy. Lawyers, judges, politicians, journalists, Internet bloggers, new political movements and even the leader writers of broadsheet newspapers will reassert their commitment to freedom and democracy. The relationship between war and human rights has never been any less complicated than this. Human rights achieved their present prominence not through ideological deliberation, but as the principles which victors, hoping for a new international covenant, held up as what they had been fighting for in the Second World War. Delivered by war, clear commitments to human rights would help both to prevent wars and also, ironically, to decide which ones to fight. Derrida said famously that there is no law without force (Derrida, 2002). There is no law without at least the possibility of it needing, one day, to be enforced. Analogously, there are no human rights without the possibility that they might one day have to be fought for. The history and politics of human rights in our era are thoroughly caught up in war. Human rights are simultaneously what wars have produced, what wars are for and how we can resist them . There are no human rights without the possibility of war and vice versa. In post-modern society, a commitment to human rights became a substitute for political engagement. Politics was so compromised, it seemed useless and immovable, Yet, the fact that the historical function of doctrines of human rights is implicated inextricably in warfare shows that there can be no separation of human rights activism from the most brutal execution of physical power. This is not to say that the two are
identical. Nor is it to reduce the importance of the clash between them: human rights and violence may be historically connected but they remain in fierce tension, even in contradiction with one another. This is the exact problem that we need to confront: we have an almost automatic ethical obligation to reduce violence, yet we cannot ignore the fact that simple goodwill cannot ensure rights . On the other hand, violence implicitly violates: mutilating bodies, casting lives adrift, ruining social networks, obliterating cultures and compromising the freedom of civic identities. There is no outside of the relationship between human rights and power, because there is no war simply and resolutely separable from its other. Human rights are a political and not a moral issue therefore,

and our hopes of advancing them requires a renewal of, and

commitment to, the political relationship.

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(Human) Rights Links


Rights discourse backfires, obscuring the excessive violence at the heart of sovereignty. Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat 2007
[Thomas Blom Hansen (born 22 January 1958) is a Danish anthropologist and leading contemporary commentator on religious and political violence in India. He has worked on religious identities, local political organization and informal networks in Bombay and pursued an interest in the anthropology of politics, thepostcolonial state and sovereignty. More recently he has done research on religious revival and the everyday meanings of freedom and belonging in post-apartheid South Africa. Hansen is part of an international research network entitled The Religious Lives of Migrants, funded by the Ford Foundation and the Social Science Research Council in New York, which explores religious meanings and institutions among international migrants in a global and comparative perspective. He is currently Adjunct Professor of Anthropology at Columbia University, Senior Research Scientist at Yale University, Visiting Professor at the University of Edinburgh, and Professor of Anthropology at the University of Amsterdam where he served as Dean of the International School for Humanities and Social Sciences. Recently, Hansen was offered a position as full professor at Stanford University where he is to head a new research institute for the anthropological study of South-East Asia.[1] Finn Stepputat is Senior Researcher at Danish Insitute International Studies, Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Post-Colonial World http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i7996.html]

In this "age of rights" (Bobbio 1996), it seemed possible, until very recently, to claim that the exercise of sovereignty in its arcane and violent forms was becoming a thing of the past, that sovereignty now finally rested with the citizens, at least in liberal democracies. The world order after September 11, 2001, seems to belie this optimistic assumption, and it may be useful to revise the standard history of what Foucault somewhat reluctantly called "democratization of sovereignty." The languages of legality have, he argued, "allowed a system of rights to be superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures--the element of domination inherent in its techniques--and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the state, the exercise of his proper sovereign rights" (Foucault 1994, 219). The crucial point is that, today, sovereignty as embodied in citizens sharing territory and culture, and sharing the right to exclude and punish "strangers," has become a political common sense, or what Derrida calls "ontotopology" (Derrida 1994), that defines the political frontlines on immigration in Europe, on autochthony and belonging in Africa, on majoritarianism and nation in South Asia and so on. In order to assess and understand the nature and effects of sovereign power in our contemporary world, one needs to disentangle the notion of sovereign power from the state and to take a closer look at its constituent parts: on the one hand, the elusive "secret" of sovereignty as a self-born, excessive, and violent will to rule; on the other hand, the human body and the irrepressible fact of "bare life" as the site upon which sovereign violence always inscribes itself but also encounters the most stubborn resistance.

Continued
A part of Bataille's essay anticipates Foucault's work by arguing that modern bourgeois society, and communism with even more determination, have striven to eradicate the wastefulness, irrationality and arbitrariness at the heart of sovereignty: both as a mode of power, as a mode of subordination driven by the subject's projection of their own desire onto the spectacle of wasteful luxury of the court and the king, and as a space for arbitrary and spontaneous experiences of freedom and suspension of duties. The essence of Bataille's proposition is that because the exercise of sovereignty is linked to death, excessive expenditure (depenser) and bodily pleasure can neither be contained by any discipline, nor be fully "democratized" into an equal dignity of all men. Because sovereignty revolves around death, the ultimate form of expenditure beyond utility, it constitutes in Mbembe's words an "antieconomy" (Mbembe 2003, 15).

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International Stability Link


What the aff calls stability is perpetual war waged in the name of order. Wendy C. Hamblet 2005
[Canadian philosopher with a specialization in ethics and violence. She teaches Ethics and Morality, and Political and Social Philosophy at Adelphi University Peace Review 17:39-45] Mono-cephalic means one-headed Because of wars great functionality to the state, there remains little mystery to the long-term success of war as a state institution over the formative millennia of civilization. The continuing popularity of war among modern states ostensibly dedicated to democracy, freedom, and the dignity of human beings, remains bafing to violence scholars. K arl von Clausewitzs On War, considered by many scholars to be the canonical treatment of the war philosophy, attributes to war a logic all its own: war composes a compulsion, a dynamic that aims at excessive overow, absolute expenditure of the energies of the state. War seeks abso- lutization as it feeds and res the populations martial enthusiasm; if unchecked by political goals, war will fulll itself in the maximum exertion of self-expenditureself-annihilation. War composes a potlatch of state resources, a useless splurge of the nations human and economic wealth for no better reason than wanton celebration of state power. The language of absolute expenditure resonates with the philosophy of Georges Bataille. His philosophy explains two principles of expenditure the principle of classical utility dened by utilitarian goals serving current power relations, and that of nonproductive expenditurethat is, orgiastic outow or ek-stasis that escapes mundane servitude to reason and utility. Political implications of the two economies are exposed in Batailles Propositions on Fascism. There, the two dialectical opposites represent extreme possibilities for the state structures. The rst model aspires to perfect order, like the timeless realm of the gods, a frozen homogeneous per- fection that is monocephalic (single-headed). Like the god, the monocephalic state becomes self-identied as a sacred entitychangeless, eternal, and perfect, its laws and customs xed and imperative. At the other end of the structural spectrum resides the second form of statethe acephalic statedisordered, anarchic, and volatile. This state is seen by ordered states as a terrifying, heterogeneous primitive lifeform where uncivilized tribes practice mystical thinking, incommensurable truths, and mad affective experience. Unreasonable. Useless. Mad. People within the acephalic social structure enjoy abundant ritual lives that offer escape from the mundane in orgiastic festivals involving drunken- ness, dancing, blood rites, wanton tortures, self-mutilation, and even murder in the name of dark monster gods. The monocephalic state, on the other hand, has overcome all death. The civilized state boasts an enlightened stable form that promotes reason, life, and progress, whereas the primitive society is referred to chaos, madness, and death.

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Biodiversity Link
We cannot kill nature, for nature is destruction. Even the current mass extinction event expresses a sovereignty that exceeds all human understanding. Allan Stoekl, Prof French and comparative literature at Penn State University, 2007
[Batailles Peak: Energy, Religion, and Sustainability p. 197]

If for a moment we assume that the global world of commerce, replete with electronic media, the Internet, virtual television, and whatnot, is the replacement for and the simulacrum of the nonunivcrsal21 city, we can only conclude that it can be so only as long as "nature no longer exists." But the fact that nature no longer exists, or at least seems no longer to exist, depends, ironically, on a natural given: the presence of fossil fuels in the earth-oil and coal, primarily. Labor power discovered these fuels, put them to work, "harnessed" them, transformed their energy into something useful. But labor power did not put the fuels in the earth. And perhaps more important from our perspective, it will be hard-pressed to replace them when they are gone. Nature-produced energy-the "homogeneous" energy that lends itself to work and the other, "heterogeneous" energy that is sovereign, not servile.22 If the very term "nature" is contestable, one thing that cannot be contested is that the primary sources of energy come from natural sources: millions of years of algae accumulating in certain ecosystems, for example.23 Thus pollution, dependent on this energy from natural sources, is ultimately natural; so too is global warming. So too is the incomprehensible unharnessed energy of the universe, which our labor and knowledge can only betray. So too will be massive die-off of humans and other organisms at the point of depletion. Man as the author of his own creation-homo faber-is opened by the radical exteriorityi the finitude, the heterogeneity, but also the infinite richness of"nature."Man, as Sade would remind us, can never hope to have his reason domesticate a nature that "threatens the adequacy of rational systematicity"24 or that defies the seeming necessity of all human activity. Nature deals death, and there is no way, finally, to grasp it by simply exploiting it ("knowing" it) as a resource or analyzing away its threat as sublime difference.

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Economy Link
At best the aff feeds the economys addiction to excess. Constant exposure to catastrophic collapse is the permanent state of late capitalism.
Marcus A Doel 2009 [Centre for Urban Theory, School of the Environment and Society, Swansea University, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2009, volume 27, pages 1054 ^ 1073]
By strange coincidence, I find myself revising this paper amid a financial crisis that foregrounds the question: what, if anything, is happening? The credit crunch that began in the summer of 2007 precipitated in September and October 2008 the spec- tacular failure of bedrock financial institutions (eg AIG, Fannie May, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch), the paralysis of money markets and interbank lending, the mark-to-market write-down of hundreds of billions of dollars worth of `toxic assets' linked to securities and derivatives, and a palpable sense of panic and disbelief as market participants, politicians, and media commentators teetered on the edge of the abyss.

Exorbitant asset bubbles burst, incalculable off-balance-sheet originate- to-distribute risks overwhelmed the banking system, counterparty trust evaporated, and 1068 M A Doel financial markets froze. At this juncture, financial capitalism was neither an ideological formation nor a self- correcting mechanism. It was a broken apparatus on the cusp of implosion. The habitual discourse of dissimulation credit squeeze, distressed and impaired assets, market corrections, write-downs, and negative growth
was more or less completely supplanted by a frank discourse of crisis: systemic failure, banking collapse, financial meltdown, and economic depression. Some even mooted that the end of capitalism was nigh, at least in the guise of structured finance (Blackburn, 2008; Wade, 2008), while others argued for a resurgence of the Real (Badiou, 2008b; Haldane, 2009). In a desperate attempt to avert calamity, states across the world committed over $2 trillion dollars to recapitalize and, in some cases, nationalize the banking system, acquire a vast array of toxic assets, guarantee interbank lending, and stimulate liquid- ity. Even with this level of sovereign risk, however,

the financial system remains vulnerable to widespread credit defaults, rapid deleveraging, rampant debt deflation, and illiquidity, all of which would be exacerbated by a sharp global recession. Given the
severity of the global financial crisis, miserly thinking has reimposed itself with a vengeance. Financial institutions and regulators have been accused of almost criminal recklessness and negligence, risk management has been found want- ing, and financial capitalism stands accused of sacrificing the Real of servicing production and distribution on the altar of wanton speculation. Hedge funds, short sellers, credit-ratings agencies, mark-to-market accountancy, and the bonus culture amongst bankers have borne the brunt of the witch hunt. The quest for a new financial architecture, tighter regulation, and countercyclical capital requirements is

excessive risk taking, excessive leverage, excessive exposure, excessive short selling, excessive specula- tion, excessive off-balance-sheet transactions, etc. The fundamental difficulty, however, is that none of these activities is an epiphenomenon. Each is an essential aspect of financial capitalism. All that miserly thinking can deliver is a recalibration that cannot but fail to thwart the crisis tendencies of financial capitalism. Whether it is cast as probable or improbable, exposure to systemic risk and catastrophic failure is always the fate of the system. The financial crisis has dramatized the system's perilous exposure to the catas- trophic risks of exorbitant asset
already on the agenda. The aim is to rein in the excesses of financial capitalism: bubbles and the products of structured finance. It has also dramatized the fact that the financial architecture of the world economy holds together only insofar as it is held together (Langley, 2008). The scope and scale of state intervention have underscored the fact that fragility is distributed throughout the entire constellation of associations. And, for all of the talk of a distinction between the financial system and the Real Economy, the

crisis has highlighted the baselessness of value. For when market participants, politicians, and media commentators teetered on the edge of the abyss, what they sensed was the
palpable absence of a `floor' to value. State intervention was not simply an attempt to relieve the banking system of its exposure to catastrophic risks, toxic assets, and incalculable loses; it was first and foremost an attempt to put a `floor' under the baselessness of value. For at the heart of the financial crisis is the void, and this void has a very precise location. This location is a cornerstone of financial capitalism: off-balance-sheet entities (OBSEs), especially asset-backed securities and credit derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), constant proportion debt obligations, and credit default swaps. By 2007, while

the world's gross domestic product was a mere $54 trillion, the total asset value of developed economies had been inflated to circa $300 trillion and the total value of derivatives contracts exceeded $500 trillion . Little wonder, then, that state-backed fiscal stimulus packages and quantitative easing are unlikely to have much effect. From restricted economy to global financial crisis 1069

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Hegemony/Rogue State Link


The USA is the only rogue state. It exemplifies the violent excess of destabilizing sovereignty.
Suhail Malik 2006 [teaches in the Department of Visual Arts, Goldsmiths College Theory Culture Society v.23 2-3]
The denunciation of rogue states is thus structurally homologous to the bourgeois denun- ciation of a voyoucracy in order to secure their own legitimacy (to legitimate, if it can be put this way). What is critical here is that the phrase rogue

states came to have prominence exactly as the term and strategic policy of globalization was being
affirmed and instigated by the Clinton administration in its early years through national and international institutions. That is, rogue states are an indispensable designation for the securing of the claim to inter- national legitimacy for globalization, by which is therefore meant

a certain

global order (for which terrorism is a central rhetorical and factual operation, as Derrida mentions,
2005: 66). Of the many ramifications of this (de)legitimation strategy only two will be taken up here: first the characterization of a voyoucracy and second what purchase on legitimacy is retroac- tively granted by the term on the powers that mobilize it. First, then, it is to be noted that a voyoucracy is not an outright abandonment of order but is (presented as) the power or force (a kratos) of an illegitimate and quasi-criminal (voyou) counter-order. Voyoucracy signals a sovereignty exorbitant to the legitimate sovereignty of the State and law in the national or international domain. The denunciation of rogue states is thus a matter of one kind of sover- eignty against another, of legitimate against so-designated illegitimate sovereignties. To this end Derrida remarks in passing that if the voyoucracy represents a power, a challenge to the power of the State, a criminal and transgressive countersovereignty, we have here all the makings of a counterconcept of sovereignty such as we might find in Bataille (2005: 678). We will return in due course to this particular characterization of a voyoucracy since it will bring us directly to the problem of whether a global knowledge can be established. Second, international and national legitimacy and illegitimacy as it is proclaimed and insti- tutionalized
by dominant powers relies on a discourse and politics of democracy and freedom or, in so-said contrary rogue political formation, their deprivation. This is evident in the charters and ambitions

, the democracy-globalization coupling serving to secure international political and economic dominance by already powerful states (which is why Chinas economic might and limited democratic polity presents a more vexed
of international institutions such as the UN, NATO, the G8, the IMF, the EU and also, notably, for the USA too. Democracy is in this way a legitimation of inter- national power

problem for globalization under this aegis than, say, India or Brazil). Drawing on the example of the UN, Derrida notes that the ordering authority over the international domain which promotes and acts as a supposed guarantor for democracy must in fact be the strongest power in that putatively democratic institution and polity. As such it organises and implements for use by the United Nations precisely so that it itself may then use the United Nations all the concepts, ideas (constitutive or regulative), and requisite political theorems, beginning with democracyand sovereignty (Derrida, 2005: 100, emphasis in original). An immediate contradiction or aporia comes then to be demonstrated in the claim to legitimacy, to setting the terms of legitimacy in and of democracy, by the currently dominant state power(s): that if the constitution of this force is, in principle, supposed to represent and protect this world democracy, it in fact betrays and threatens it from the outset in an auto- immune fashion (Derrida, 2005: 100). Put starkly, the contradiction is this: universal democ- racy, beyond the nation-state and beyond citizenship, in fact calls for a supersovereignty that cannot but betray it (Derrida, 2005: 101). The contradiction between democracy and sovereignty is rendered here at a supernational level but this is only a particular version of what takes place at all dimensions of democratic organization: that sovereignty is the condition of democracy even as it prohibits a fully oper- ational democracy. And, as is well known from the protest of anti-globalization movements, this non-democratic, even anti-democratic, sovereignty that guarantees and legitimizes democ- racy is in democratic terms only ever an abuse of power; an abuse that is, as Derrida puts it, constitutive of sovereignty itself and so constitutive of democracy. It follows that sovereignty is rogue in democracy and democracy is therefore guaranteed and harnessed by a power that is itself rogue. If there is to be global democracy, there must be global sovereignty and so a global voyoucracy, a rogue state that is beyond the terms of that democracy. The sovereign state that orders legitimacy, which is the de factocondition of order, is necessarily voyou, rogue, counterordering; an identity of opposing categories whose condensation can here be marked (beyond the terms Derrida sets up) by the terms sovoyoureign or soverogue, a power that estab- lishes only a quasi-order. Today, Derrida continues, such states are only the USA and whatever (always subsidiary) allies it picks up in the course

But the USA is exceptional in this quasi-order in that it is the primary rogue state the only truly rogue state (as Chomsky also says for different reasons) because of its outstanding inter- national sovereign powers. US international domination in the name of a common, global democracy is that of a global sovereignty (though this is not to say world sovereignty); it is, as is often declared, a global abuse of power necessarily so. This global sovereignty of the USA is sometimes
of undertaking such actions in implementing its sovereignty. exercised through the UN but must also take place in terms of other outstanding manifestations of power if it is to be supersovereign, including that of its military (quaforce), its economics (quaconsumption), its cultural production (quaentertainment) and its politics (quademocracy). Such sovoyoureign or soverogue power(s) are not occasioned across or outside of democratic organization or polities at whatever level: it happens through and in democracy, insistently so. Soveroguery is the condition for the production of global knowledge and it is that by which knowledge in its globality has to be comprehended. But how is sovereignty to be understood in its identity with countersovereignty? We have seen that, for Derrida, Batailles coun- terconcept of sovereignty speaks to the counter-order of voyoucracy. We shall now take up this account in order to more exactly determine the sovereignty of American global domi- nance. Doing so will return us directly to the question of knowledge in the actual conditions of globalization. Batailles interest in sovereignty is in a general aspect that is opposed to the servile and the subordinate (1993: 197); it is general because it can belong to anyone. Such generality means that the determination of sovereignty cannot be restricted to its traditional identification with the power of either the State or law as it has been from Plato to Hobbes, Schmitt and, in a more complicated manner, Agamben. It can be the sovereignty of the voyou, for example. Bataille draws up an initial distinction between the general aspect of sovereignty and what the term means as regards a legally constituted and recognized state or individual (that is therefore subordinate to law). However, as Derrida proposes, in its sovoyoureignty or soveroguery, it is today the USA alone that sidesteps this distinction: yes,

the USA is of course a sovereign state in the legally constituted sense and so is subject to international law; yet it is in a
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exemplifies at a supernational level the general aspect of sovereignty beyond law of which Bataille speaks.

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Ethics Link
Their ethical stance allows the aff to think of themselves as good, creating a distance from their own violence that makes annihilaiton inevitable.
Kenneth Irzkowitz 1999 [Assoc Prof Philosophy at Marietta College, College Literature 26.1]
Bataille rejects the notion of a unified good. When he criticizes the moral good, this is because by assuming such unity, morality

has blinded us to the importance of disutility, to the praiseworthiness of nonproductive usages serving no end beyond themselves. We generally assume that there are no such praiseworthy usages, but Bataille insists that there are. Indeed, there is a whole realm of them, he contends, as well as the need for an ethics corresponding to them, one able to take their violence into account.

Continued
The purpose of offering a series of such strong, disturbing characterizations is not to dismiss ordinary moral values but to supplement them, to say that such values are not enough for us. At the same time that we outlaw and condemn all of these ruinous squanderings, our sovereign aspirations demand them. The list includes

brutality, murder, prostitution, swearing, sex, infamy, ruin, degradation, and finally treason. These are activities we must prohibit, activities we cannot allow ourselves to participate in, but which at the same time identify who we are. Hypermorality instructs that while we cannot take up such behaviors, we cannot not take them up either. We cannot not squander ourselves in these and other ways, many of which are
offensive of mention to ordinary morality. To help emphasize just how offensive, there is a passage near the beginning of Death and Sensuality depicting the spectacle of primitive ritual human sacrifice, the communal production of a wasteful expenditure witnessed in common. Bataille uses the word "sacred" to describe the experience of the witnesses, underlining just how fundamental and revelatory to us he thinks such events were. Disturbing as it must be to us, he holds that the event of the spectacle of ritual sacrifice has power of conveying a profound meaning, This sacredness is the revelation of continuity through the death of a discontinuous being to those who watch it as a solemn rite. A violent death disrupts the creature's discontinuity; what remains, what the tense onlookers experience in the succeeding silence, is the continuity of all existence with which the victim is now one. Only a spectacular killing, carried out as the solemn and collective nature of religion dictates, has the power to reveal what normally escapes notice. (Bataille 1962, 16) It is a disturbing thought that only a spectacular killing, that only events of this kind, can satisfy the human desire for the experience of sacred meaning. Along with a fear of our own immoral excess comes the question of whether hypermorality invites unleashing this destructive excess. Would Bataille like to see us unleashed, perhaps in the style of Charles Manson, to produce our own spectacles of ritual sacrifice? Certainly Bataille describes irrational violence as having an undeniable meaning, one that is revelatory of the sacred continuity alluded to in the previous citation. Soon after that citation he similarly asserts that we seek "the power to look death in the face and to perceive in death the pathway into unknowable and incomprehensible continuity" (1962, 18). Where do we find this power? We find it in transformative experiences akin to the sacrifice described above. In other words, to acquire the power to know the unknowable, the production of transformative violence is the key. In the name of this power, the production of violence is not an accident but a goal. This production is the key to the transformative experiences that give our lives a sense of intensity, depth, and meaning. Hence, we always have

violence will be produced. Moreover, no morality will ever be able to put an end to these productions . No morality has the power to stop the persistence of the sacred violence in our lives, since this violcnce is the only key we have to the experience of the miraculous, of the sacred. As for Charles Manson, Bataille would certainly try to understand Manson's and our own violence in this context of the sacred, of our need for depth and meaning. The production of transformative violence is fundamental to our being, whether we are conscious of it in this way or not . He, then, would not regard Manson's production as an anomaly, as unlike
ample motive to seek such experiences, to seek to bear witness to transformative violence. Given such ample motive, violence and spectacles of such what he himself would be driven to produce. Yet in our lives there are also limits. It is unlikely that Bataile would applaud Manson for the same reason he ultimately rejects Sade. They are both indiscriminate; they both go too far. "Continuity is what we are after,' Bataille confirms, but generally only if that continuity which the death of discontinuous beings can alone establish is not the victor in the long run. What we desire is to bring into a world founded on discontinuity all the continuity such a world can sustain. De Sade's aberration exceeds that limit. (Bataille 1962, 13) In other words, our wasteful consumption must also have limits. To actually approve of our own self-destruction goes too far. Later on in Death and Sen suality, Bataille continues, Short of a paradoxical capacity to defend the indefensible, no one would suggest that the cruelty of the heroes of Justine and Jullette should not be wholeheartedly abominated. It is a denial of the principles on which humanity is founded. We are hound to reject something that would end in the ruin of all our works. If instinct urges us to destroy the very thing we are building we must condemn those instincts and defend ourselves from them. (Bataile 1962, 179-80) This passage is crucial for understanding Bataille's ethics. Usually Bataille writes on behalf of the violence that remains unaffected by absolute prohibitions. Prohibitions cannot obviate this transformative violence. There is always ample motive to produce the experiences of sacred transformation, i.e., to transgress the prohibitions. Yet self-preservation is also a fundamental value for BatailIe there is also ample motive to resist the violence that denies the value of the well being of life itself. As he says in the second of the above passages, we must condemn what threatens to destroy us; our sovereign aspirations can be taken too far. In another passage he speaks of our need "to become aware of... [ourselves] and to know clearly what... [our] sovereign aspirations are in order to limit their possibly disastrous consequences" (1962, 181). It is when we are ignorant of these aspirations that we are most vulnerable to them, enacting them anyway, albeit inattentively. In the end, hypermorality asks us to encounter our aspirations to evil, to join in what Bataille calls "complicity in the knowledge of Evil" in order to construct what he calls a "rigorous morality" (1973, unpaginated Preface). What does it mean to encounter such aspirations, to join in such complicity? Bataille's hypermorality requires that, as a culture, we appreciate the value of becoming more active in our productions of violence. From his earliest writings to his latest, Bataille always bemoaned the decline of the practice of sacrifice in the modem world, beginning in the West, and he always believed that such a decline only obscures our productions of violence, rather than doing away with them or the needs from which they stem. Two closely related discussions of this appear in his early essays "The Jesuve" and "Sacrificial Mutilation and the Severed Ear of Vincent Van Gogh," where Bataille suggests that the decline of the practice of sacrifice has been far less than a blessing for us. He argues that the production of violence continues, the danger of this production continues, although in the most unrecognizable forms. The examples given in the essay "Sacrificial Mutilation" emphasize both how easy it is to distance ourselves from this danger as well as how

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Ethics Link
terrible such a danger could be. They include a man twisting off his own finger and a woman tearing out her own eye, both terrible examples of our strange, cruel, and uncontrollable needs for expenditure. Along similar lines, as a commentary on events of this kind, Bataile argues, The practice of sacrifice has today fallen into disuse and yet it has been, due to its universality, a human action more significant than any other. Independently of each other, different peoples invented different forms of sacrifice, with the goal of answering a need as inevitable as hunger. It is therefore not astonishing that the necessity of satisfying such a need, under the conditions of present-day life, leads an isolated man into disconnected and even stupid behavior. (Bataille 1985, 73) Here as throughout his writings, Bataile emphasizes two key aspects of the decline of sacrifice that we ignore at our own peril. In the first place, he contends that the violent need that ritual sacrifice was once able to address remains with us despite all optimism to the contrary. We don't put violence on display in the same ritualized fashion, but the need remains constant. We've only become less aware of it in ourselves, and less aware of ourselves as those who have need of such violence. Thus Bataille's first point is that the need for nonproductive usages does not diminish when it is denied. His second point is that this denial in which the need persists represents a decline in self-awareness, one with obviously dangerous consequences. No longer do we congregate as a community to witness the violence we desire to bring into this world and to affirm our lack of control over this violence, our lack of control over this desire. We no longer congregate to produce the sacrificial spectacle, to produce thereby a community of mutual complicity in the knowledge of the sacred continuity of being. We no longer allow ourselves to organize spectacles in the name of the sacred that enact that which exceeds the good. Such spectacles would have to violate every stricture of human rights known to us today. Yet we have not changed, according to Bataile, except for becoming less known to ourselves than ever. We

are now more than ever the condemned on the way to becoming the destroyed by way of imagining ourselves as the good. Even an utter catastrophe like the Holocaust does little to alter our naive self-image. In his short piece on David Rousset's book The Universe of the Concentration Camp, Bataille refuses to side with the moralists because moralistic self-delusion here is our problem, not our solution, There exists in a certain form of moral condemnation an escapist denial. One says, basically, this abjection would not have been, had there not been monsters .... And it is possible, insofar as this language appeals to the masses, that this infantile negation may seem effective; but in the end it changes nothing. It would be as vain to deny the incessant danger of cruelty as it would be to deny the danger of physical pain . One hardly obviates its effects flatly attributing it to parties or to races which one imagines to he inhuman. (Bataille 1991, 19) Based on what we have already seen in this paper, Bataille can never accept the moralist's claim, distancing us from the purveyors of evil, no matter how attractive it is to join hands at a particular moment of victory over an oppressive enemy. It would be inconsistent for him to specify a particular set of disagreeable behaviors and state that they aren't human, that they aren't ours. Even at this point, standing in the ruins , the main point would be to obstruct our all-too-ready inclination to find ways of denying the cruelty at the heart of us all; to interfere with our desire to attribute all cruelties to the monstrous one or the aberrant few. For hypermorality, this cruelty is precisely what we need to take into account of ourselves, rather than to deny it as the evil of others.
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How is this to be done? Bataille faces a serious dilemma that a contrast between his hypermorality and Aristotle's morality helps to show. The goal of morality is to take virtuous behaviors into account, to make them part of our lives by learning through habituation to enjoy right behaviors with respect to our pleasures and pains. Aristotle says that it is the job of "legislators [to] make the citizens good by forming habits in them .... and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one" (1941, 952, 1103b). He continues saying that "the whole concern both of virtue and of political science is with pleasures and pains; for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly bad" (1941, 955, 1105a). As he puts it, "We assume ... that excellence tends to do what is best with regard to pleasures and pains, and vice does the contrary" (1941, 955, lIlO4b). How do we become excellent? We begin with instruction by role models, who demonstrate the praiseworthy behaviors and the rule to follow in practice until we follow it automatically, internalized as part of our second nature of moral character. Such learning is by imitation of those who delight in shunning the wrong pleasures, who delight in withstanding the right pains. Such imitation is difficult but noble and good, making us excellent. In contrast to these virtuous displays serving Aristotle's purposes of moral instruction, what about the kinds of spectacles or displays Bataille proposes with his hypermorality? Whereas Aristotle's are displays of virtue, Bataile's would be closer to displays of vice . Whereas the former invite imitation of the right relations to pleasure and pain, the latter would invite imitation of morally wrong relations. In the former case we have a heroic role model. In the latter case ,

the role model would be closer to the opposite, to the traitor, the practitioner of vice; the role model would be closer to Sade

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The rejection of violence is the rejection of our humanity, ensuring explosing excess culminating in extinction
Kenneth Irzkowitz 1999 [Assoc Prof Philosophy at Marietta College, College Literature 26.1] It would be pointless to deny that most illegal violence is abhorrent or immoral. At the same time, however, given the violence of the life of our culture , we need to understand immoral violence more deeply than any blanket condemnation of it will allow. Beyond our condemnations, we need to recognize that the acts we most prohibit are paradoxically also the very ones we most celebrate. A foremost proponent of this need is the French philosopher and writer Georges Bataille. Relying on a notion of excess energy and the problem of its expenditure, Bataille argues that the transgression of law is what he calls an accursed yet ineluctable part of our lives. We make laws in the name of prohibiting acts of violence, yet the problem of the expenditure of an excess of energy requires behaviors that violate the very same rules we cherish and intend to uphold. The commentator Jean Piel took note of how Bataille managed "to view the world as if it were
animated by a turmoil in accord with the one that never ceased to dominate his personal life" (1995, 99). Here, the fact of an individualin-turmoil reflects the surplus of energy disturbing life in general, rather than a moral deficiency for which an individual can be held accountable. For Bataille, an individual's wasteful behaviors are ultimately reflections of the problem of the surplus of solar energy. Piel put it this way: "The whole problem is to know how, at the heart of this general economy, the surplus is used" (1995, 103). How should the surplus of solar energy be used? Bataile contends that this surplus is never extinguished and that its expenditure always leads towards the commission of violence. The surplus of energy is accursed and finally cannot serve us productively. The accursed excess confronts us with the problem of how to expend energy when this results in usages that cannot made be useful. Thus the production of violence has a value for us as those condemned to the realm of non-productive expenditures. We undoubtedly deny this value, as Bataille notes, when "Under present conditions, everything conspires to obscure the basic movement that tends to restore wealth to its function, to giftgiving, to squandering without reciprocations" (1988, 38). Nonetheless, as Bataille puts it, "the impossibility of continuing growth makes way for squander" (1988, 29). When this impossibility of useful expenditure is ignored, then we fail to recognize ourselves on the deepest level, as who we most fundamentally are. Against this failure and in the name of a kind of inverted Hegelian selfrecognition, Bataille calls for the transgression of our prohibitionist moral values. We need an ethics of squandering goods, of squandering what is good, in recognition of an overabundance over and beyond all others, i.e. an overabundance that can only, at best, be squandered. He writes, life suffocates within limits that are too close: it aspires in manifold ways to an impossible growth; it releases a steady flow of excess resources, possibly involving large squandenngs of energy. The limit of growth being reached, life enters into ebullition: Without exploding, its extreme exuberance pours out in a movement always bordering on explosion. Bataille 1988. 30) As living lives that must enter into ebullition , we find ourselves fundamentally committed no more to moral righteousness than to immoral out pourings of energy, to sudden and violent outbursts

The protests of moralism are secondary and never responsive to Bataille's questioning of morality: "Supposing there is no longer any growth possible, what is to be done with the seething energy that remains?" (1988, 31). We are told by reason and morality to do what is best, which is to prohibit behaviors that are nonproductive or harmful. Our morality identifies the right with the useful and productive, with whatever makes us better. Bataille, however, argues against this morality and for the requirement of useless, nonproductive, violent outpourings of energy-a requirement for what he calls "a draining-away, a pure and simple loss, which occurs in any case" (1988, 31). These violent, nonproductive outpourings, according to Bataille, are required of us all as living beings regardless of whether or not we take the responsibility to manage and arrange their occurrence in our lives. At issue, for Bataille, is energy in excess, energy as an excess. As an excess, such energy must be discharged explosively in outpourings that, in the end, are inevitable. Does it make a difference how an excess of energy is squandered if, in
exceeding all rational considerations . the end, the results will have to be violent, if we cannot avoid taking actions that must be acknowledged as wrong? Bataille proposes that we face up to the value of the choices that remain, rather than continue to shrink from the available options, especially those moral prohibitionism would regard as either dirty or simply unacceptable. All expenditures, even acts of squandering, cannot be equally unacceptable; our available options lie with respect to the contrasting degrees of unacceptability of various acts and the various amounts of waste each entails. He states that "in no way can [an] ... inevitable loss be accounted useful . . . but there remains] a matter of an acceptable loss, preferable to another that is regarded as unacceptable (1988, 31). The key to the possibility of an ethics for Bataille is that beyond the nave hopes of our prohibitionist morality, we can see that some acts of violence are preferable to others. He contends in this vein that we need something counterintuitive, a kind of morality of evil, a morality able to face up to what he refers to as "a question of acceptability, not utility" (1988, 31). This distinction between the acceptable and the useful transforms the idea of a moral project to where it becomes right to enact those wrongs that would constitute the best (i.e., least damaging) uses of energy given the requirements of expenditure in situations of limited growth. For Bataille, it is "right" to "constructively" suspend moral

prohibitionist morality is an inevitable failure in even imagining how a surplus of energy may best be discharged. By default, this morality results in more violent discharges of energy, in lives that are, as a consequence, made worse. Like Nietzsche, Bataille proposes a revaluation of
prohibitions in order to substitute less damaging acts for the more violent alternatives. Our moral values, a transformation of what Nietzsche calls "herd" morality. For both Bataille and Nietzsche, ordinary morality is too constricted with respect to the biggest picture, to conducting the totality of our lives. The value of the "herd" morality breaks down when taking human life as a whole into account. To recognize ourselves for all that we are means having to change the outlooks that now constrain us. In recognizing ourselves we alter our values and behaviors in the name of living the fullest lives possible. A system of moral values, under construction, may be regarded as analogous to any system of valuation. For example, we may also construct a system of

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trading equities on the stock exchanges. This latter value-system will select some equities as preferable to others, and makes trades accordingly. Good trades acquire better equities while bad trades acquire worse ones. Moreover, the value-system as a whole is better to the extent it maximizes good trades. The best value-system makes the greatest number of good trades, thereby maximizing profits, and minimizing what is lost. Analogous to this kind of value-system, a morality may be regarded as a system of exchanges with the aim of maximizing excellence in living. As such, a morality values actions and intentions as better or worse in the name of right and wrong. We ordinarily assume that an action is wrong simply if it violates the system of moral rules (the Ten Commandments, for example) and right if the rules are upheld. Given this assumption, to do the right thing is analogous to using the stockpicking system correctly. On this level, when morality tells us what to do, we are either right or wrong, depending simply on whether or not the rules are obeyed. But Bataille's Nietzschean morality demands that we evaluate the value of the moral value-system itself, the success or failure of the system generating the rules. Those who trade equities know not to stand by a set of rules that loses money. A value-system may sometimes have to be abandoned. For Bataille, the same is true for a dysfunctional set of moral values. Yet our moral system that sets the standard of value for our behaviors has been subjected to no standards of evaluation. We need to abandon the assumption that the rules of morality are absolute, productive in all contexts, and beyond dispute. We need to make it possible to employ so-called 'immoral" values when these have life affirming effects, and to suspend or transgress 'moral" values when these serve a sufficient life-affirming purpose. The key is to recognize ourselves as the extreme beings we are. Bataille sees human life as beyond the limits set by morality, as desiring nothing less than the wild, destructive, celebratory excesses by means of which we are granted ecstatic gifts. We produce acts of violence in part because they have a supreme value for us, even though the thought of such acts as having supreme value is always laughable and almost always denied. A typical day betrays little in the way of a lust for outrageous excess. However, for Bataile, a typical day reveals only a part of our being. According to Literature and Evil, just as certain insects, in given conditions, flock towards a ray of light, so we all flock to an area at the opposite end of the scale from death. The mainspring of human activity is generally the desire to reach the point farthest from the funereal domain, which is rotten, dirty and impure. We make every effort to efface the traces, signs and symbols of death. Then, if we can, we efface the traces and signs of these efforts. (Bataille 1973, 48). In other words, there is a radical duality at work in our lives, although traces of this duality are ordinarily effaced. For Bataille, there is first the fundamental value of the unacceptable and second the unacceptability of this first fundamental value, i.e., the overwhelming need to efface the value of the unacceptable along with every trace of it as a value in our lives. He contends that both the left and right poles of this duality are mainsprings of human selfrecognition. With the right pole of effacement, we suppress the awareness of the left pole, of the presence of our own destructive desires. He acknowledges that the resulting self-conception does fit us to the extent that "the being which we are is primarily a finite being (a mortal individual)... [with] limitations [that] are no doubt necessary" (1973, 50). Yet, at the same time, Bataille's own writings never fail to emphasize the primacy of what is harmful to us, of what is neither useful nor good, of what is beyond our mere finitude. Throughout Literature and Evil, for example, he repeatedly affirms the destructive behaviors and dark values that must come at the expense of survival needs. Mere survival is the necessary but insufficient condition of striving to live a full life. To live fully actually means to live at the expense of future survival, to completely waste ourselves, blind to all consequences. Along these lines, Literature and Evil argues that to live life really means nothing less than that we don't "flee wisely from the elements of death [but instead] enter the regions that wisdom tells us to avoid" (Bataille 1973, 50). To live fully we must shun wisdom; in living fully we laugh even at death itself, in the awareness that "When we enter the regions that wisdom tells us to avoid... we really live" (1973, 50). When we achieve "a heightened consciousness of being," we burn, because only "by going beyond ... these limitations which are necessary for... preservation... [are we able to] assert. the nature of... [our] being" (1973, 50). The first chapter of Literature and Evil similarly contends that "Death alone-or, at least, the ruin of the isolated individual in search of happiness in time-introduces that break without which nothing reaches the state of ecstasy" (Bataille 1973, 13). This is because for every individual, "an irreducible, sovereign part of himself is free from the limitations and the necessity which he acknowledges" (1973, 16). Indeed, in the same chapter, Bataille celebrates the desire for self-ruin as a divine or sovereign inspiration, as one taught to us by religion, Greek tragedy, and the great books. In his words, The lesson of Wuthering Heights, of Greek tragedy and, ultimately, of all reli gions, is that there is an instinctive tendency towards divine intoxication which the rational world of calculation cannot bear. This tendency is the opposite of Good. Good is based on common interest which entails consid eration of the future. Divine intoxication . . . is entirely in the present. (Bataille 1973,

the dark forces that drive us towards ruining ourselves cannot be dismissed-these forces are a crucial part of who we are. Concomitantly, we suffer from a problem of self-recognition, of not knowing ourselves for who we are. This failure to know ourselves does not limit our dissoluteness and ruinousness, only our self-knowledge as such. The selfimage of ourselves as good prevents our acknowledging the problem of the surplus of energy that must be squandered, as the problem of who we ourselves are beneath and beyond that of the irrational atrocities that particular individuals commit. Our prohibitionist morality deals with evil only after the fact, without taking into account the prior, fundamental value disruption has for our lives. The epigraph to this article from Literature and Evil says that we won't recognize ourselves for who we are until we see ourselves as condemned, which Bataille considers his main point (1973, 25). But the failure to recognize ourselves has an alarming implication, that we may be headed in the direction of self-destruction, and that we are actually driven in this direction by our need to produce our own final condemnation . Bataille gives us reason to pause to wonder whether we are blundering towards self-annihilation beneath the amazingly resilient image we have of ourselves as good. Do we have sufficient motive to avoid proceeding violently and negligently, to the very moment of our own demise? To not have to go all the way to self-destruction, we need to show and know ourselves outside of the house of the good, to recognize ourselves for who we are also as evil, as condemned. But when we remain complacently within this house or realm, Bataille's dialectic of self recognition remains for the most part unknown. From within the house of the good, it makes little sense to alter the image of the human to include the necessity of evil. Indeed it seems like an irrational or frivolous act to do so, as stated in The Accursed Share,
9) The main point, for Bataille, is that

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Labeling genocide a systematic product of modernity allowing us to ignore the violence within ourselves.
Dan Stone, Professor of Modern History at University of London, 2006 [History, Memory and Mass Atrocity p. 4-12] In the light of research findings about 'ordinary men' it might at first seem inappropriate to talk of the 'sacrificial' nature of the Holocaust. There is, however, an equally large body of literature which reveals the antisemitic context in which the 'ordinary men' operated.' In the case of the Einsatzgruppen, these apparently contradictory characteristics of order and purity and sacrifice and violence - coexist in equal measure. What this reveals is neither the 'underside of modernity' nor a 'relapse into barbarism'; rather, it simply means that the Nazi project of order and beauty was to be attained by unleashing an untrammelled violence.

CONTINUED
Does this fact mean that violence was eliminated from the latter stages of the Holocaust? Even excluding the hundreds of thousands who perished miserably in ghettos and mass-shootings, those [p. 10] subjected to the Nazi machinery of destruction - the most singlemindedly bureaucratic murder process yet devised - were not free from the exercise of violence. Violence need not involve the relation of individuals; the state is just as capable of treating the 'object of violence' as one 'potentially worthy of bodily harm, or even annihilation'. With or without the element of pleasure to the perpetrators of violence," the

Holocaust was no clinical ; every survivor

operation devoid of emotional input.

There are many recorded acts of sadism and brutality in the death camps, acts which are often dismissed as the personal

proclivities of individual guards in a situation where they were free to act out their fantasies, but which do not typify the death procedure. This is simply not true

account of the camps is suffused with an atmosphere of terror which only a power relationship built on total inequality can
produce. It is not even necessary to provide explicit details; listen, for example, to Elie Wiesel's description of arriving at Auschwitz: It was night. There were thousands, at least it seemed to me that there were thousands and thousands of Jews, who came here from everywhere and went into the fire. And I was afraid, I asked myself whether this meant the end of the Jewish people.28 This simple depiction positively reeks of fear, its undertone of violence inescapable. Those who talk of 'industrial death' have not reflected on what it might be like to arrive at a death-camp, a terrifying experience which is one of the key moments in many testimonies. But apart from the violence experienced at every moment in the camps,29 it is possible to see the death process as a whole as an outburst of violence, one which mobilised itself through channels of industrial technique. This brings us to the heart of the confusion.

Is it the role of technique in itself that marks out the Holocaust as so horrific, because it was so devoid of the passions associated with murder? Arendt thought so: the seemingly irresistible proliferation of techniques and machines, far from only threatening certain classes with unemployment, menaces the existence of whole nations and conceivably of all mankind. [17] This is a way of thinking which leads to thoroughgoing indictments of modernity. Gianni Vattimo, for example, writes of: the discovery that the rationalisation of the world turns against reason and its ends of perfection and emancipation, and does so not
by error, accident, or a chance distortion, but precisely to the extent that it is more and more perfectly accomplished.30 [p. 11] This is probably convincing enough to mean that thinkers who

. Nevertheless, although enticing, Vattimo's argument is too simple to be entirely convincing. It fails to acknowledge that not all modemities end in catastrophe, and that not all bureaucracies are inherently genocidal (though they may become so). One of the good things
today call for a completion of the 'project of modernity or who appeal to universal reason are being naive

to emerge out of the Goidhagen debate was proof of a widespread reluctance to admit that the killers could enjoy their violence, or at least to admit that the endless catalogue of atrocities found in survivor testimonies amounts to more than anecdotes of unusual, isolated incidents. Taking photographs seriously as historical evidence has also helped demonstrate that everyday violence was part of the experience of genocide. Nevertheless, it is clear that the

dominance of the 'modernity' critique means that there is a certain perverse comfort to be derived from believing that it was the procedures of a disciplinary, medicalised, rationalised society which led inexorably to the death world of Auschwitz. The indictment of rational society helps blind us (willingly, if unconsciously) to the extreme violence and, worse, the desire for violence, which characterised the Holocaust experience.
It is an indictment which perpetuates a process of not listening to the victims, of concentrating on the 'objective' documents of the perpetrators. Yet this concentration on the perpetrators paradoxically replicates a rationalised thought process in order to condemn rationalised society per se. It therefore becomes all the more difficult to face the fact that violence

deriving from the desire to break free of a rationalised world was a defining characteristic of the Holocaust.
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Their moralistic outrage to torture is a vampire, sucking outrage from the state
Avital Ronell 2008 [Diacritics Volume 38, Numbers 1-2, Spring-Summer 2008]

Not to remain stuck to a fatherlandnot even if it suffers most and needs help mostit is less difficult to sever ones heart from a victorious fatherland. Not to remain stuck to some pitynot even for higher men (hheren Menschen) into whose rare torture and helplessness some accident allowed us to look.
Not to remain stuck to a scienceeven if it should lure us with the most precious finds that seem to have been saved up precisely for us. Not to remain stuck to ones own detachment, to that voluptuous remoteness and strangeness of the bird who [End Page 165] flies ever higher to see ever more below himthe danger of the flies. Not to remain stuck to our own virtues and become as a whole the victim of some detail in us, such as our hospitality, which is the danger of dangers for superior and rich souls who spend themselves lavishly, almost indifferently, and exaggerate the virtue of generosity into a vice. [52] The inventory prescribes extreme forms of detachment, even to the extent of urging the detachment from detachment, so that independence and the ability to command are properly tested. The problem with testing ones independencethe test for Nietzsche is bound up with the possibility of independenceis that it copies the word that tries to describe the freeing perspective for us: in-dependence, Un-abhngigkeit. In other words, independence depends on dependence, and can only come about by the negation of dependency. But dependence comes first and always squats in any declaration of independence; so-called independence can never shake loose its origin in dependent states. The un or in of what depends and hangs onto has to undo the core dependency and produce a nonaddictive prospect. This way of skating on the rim of negativity is typical enough of the Nietzschean maneuver that, keeping up its stamina, endeavors not to trigger a dialectical takeover. The test site circumscribed by this text occupies a zone between negation and projected reconciliation; it carves a hole in any possible synthesis. Independence can never be stabilized or depended upon, which is why it has to submit punctually to the test of its own intention and possibility. The nots that Nietzsche enters into the decathlon of testing are also a way of signing his own name by courting and swerving around the nihilistic threat: Nicht/Nietzsche. This is the text, remember, in which Nietzsche says that every philosophical work installs a biographical register; he makes it clear that he has strapped himself into this text and also that its articulation should not be limited to the disseminated indications of this or that biographeme. Nonetheless the test run that he proposes bears the weight of his history, including his never-ending break-up with Richard Wagner. Thus the first self-testing command says: Not to remain stuck (hngenbleiben) to a personnot even the most lovedevery person is a prison, also a nook [52].

Beginning with the necessity of wrenching oneself loose from a beloved person, whether a prison or shelter, the inventory goes on to name the urgency of breaking with ones country, even in times of war or need, even when the patriotic introject wants and calls you. A superpower nation-state should be the easiest to sever with. If the inventory is set up in terms of serial nots this is no doubt because Nietzsche needs to enact the complicity of the Versuch with its linguistic appointees: the tester or attempter must desist from adhering to the temptation that calls. The act, if such it is, of desistence is not as such a negative one, as Derrida has argued in his reading of Lacoue-Labarthe: Without being negative, or being subject to a dialectic, it both organizes and disorganizes what it appears to determine [Desistance 41]. Being tested, which brings together attempter with the tempting, does not fall purely into the zone of action or its purported otherpassivitybut engages both at once. Already the locution
being tested, always awkward and slightly wrenching, invites the intervention of the passive where action or at least some activity is indicated. The test takes one through the magnetizing sites to which one is spontaneously, nearly naturally, attracted. This could be a resting place, a shelter and solace overseen by the friendly protectors of the pleasure principle. But Nietzsche, like the other guy, takes the test beyond the pleasure principle. Elsewhere Nietzsche states that pity toppled the gods; pity,

the most dangerous affect, counts for the one to which we are most prone. We are tempted and tested by pity, roped in by its grim allure, and even if we are not gods, pity can make us crumble and christianize. (This does not mean that Nietzsche advocates the vulgarity of some forms of indifference. Only that action and intervention should not eventuate from pity, as do benevolent racism [End Page 166] and the like. Liberal pity policies would be nauseating to Nietzsche; they are not radical, strong, or loving enough. Of course nowadays, I would even take liberal pity.) Science belongs to
the list of the desistedresistance would come off as too strong a term, too repressive and dependent on what presents itself. The inclusion of science in the subtle athletics of the not may reflect the way Nietzsche had to break away from his scientific niche of philology, but there is more to it. It is not just a matter of releasing oneself from a scientific commitment in order to pass the Nietzschean test. As the other term in the partnership, science itself stands to lose from too tight a grip and needs eventually to loosen the bond. A true temptress, science fascinates, perhaps seduces and lulls. It captivates and often enough gives one a high, an intoxicating sense of ones own capacity for mastery. Yet science itself is implicated in the relation thus structured. For science not only curates the test from a place of superiority, but is itself subject to the rigors and renewals of testing. So even if it invites the blindness of fascination and the sum of addictive returns, science needs to be released if only to go under, to dissolve its substantial mask and be turned over to fresh scientific probes. The movement of dislocation and disappropriation continues even to the point of disallowing sheer detachment. Increasing the dosage of desistance to the level of turning on itself, Nietzsche proposes that one should not remain dependent on ones experience of voluptuous detachment. He keeps the tested being in the vehicle of the dis-, and rigorously refuses to issue a permit for sticking to any moment or structure of being that would seem welcoming or appropriate. (It is appropriate only to disappropriate, to trace ones own expropriation from a site that persistently beguiles with the proper.) Thus one must desist even from becoming attached to ones own virtues, such as hospitality. Virtue itself, no matter how generous or exemplary, can trip up the one being tested. Virtue

can enlarge itself, take over; it is vulnerable to imperial acts of expansion. One can become enslaved to ones virtue, attend to it immoderately, and turn oneself into a hospital for the vampirizing other. In this ward, as in other Nietzschean wings, strong and superior beings encounter the danger of
infection, a weakening. They give too much and spend themselves as if they were infinitely capable of the offerings for which they are solicited. The offerings turn into sacrifice; the superior soul gives itself away, finding that it is spent, exhausted. Thus the virtue of generosity, coextensive with hospitality, is turned into a vice. Virtue tips into its other, and generosity soon becomes a depleting burden.

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The aff presents torture as a deviation from the norm, ignoring the exuberant cruelty inherent to modern war. Only the alt can address the dark motivations that make the theatrics of torture inevitable. .
Adriana Cavarero, Prof Political Philosophy at Universit degli studi di Verona, 2009 [Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence trans. McCuaig p. 76-77] The official investigations and judicial proceedings following the scandal of the Abu Ghraib photographs have tried, as everyone knows, to promote the thesis that the essence of the misdeed lay in the sadistic and deviant behavior of a few of the soldiers involved, a handful of "bad apples:"22 Corroborating the classic connection
between politics and lying, this has not only confirmed a deeply rooted tendency of the U.S. authorities to engage in dissembling behavior but has obviously helped to supply new matter for modern reflection on torture, 2,3 compelling the critical literature on the matter to bring its own arguments up to date. Special emphasis has thus been placed on "interrogational torture,"" that is, on the difference that supposedly separates harsh but legal interrogation techniques from the degeneration of these techniques into torture. The task of extracting information from the victims, or, if one prefers, making them confess the truth, belongs for that matter to the traditional paradigm of torture illustrated by Foucault. Obviously though, for analyzing the facts of Abu Ghraib today, things are more complicated: once you allow legal practices intended to make the prisoner suffer in mind and body, perhaps even listing them in detail in dedicated manuals and thus recommending them, to distinguish between harsh interrogation and interrogational torture often amounts to no more than abstruse and ghastly quibbling.25 Nor do things become any simpler when it comes to the second type of torture discussed in the literature on the subject, terroristic torture, by which is meant a technology of pain intended to frighten and

the discourse here passes over not only into therealm of intimidation but into that of revenge and humiliation, which allude symptomatically to the supplice. And yet we are always, even in terms of frank horrorism, within the domain of rational, or at any rate strategic, behavior, in the domain of violent acts that appear to select their own ends or rather pretend to do so. 26 As though to torture rather than simply kill served some useful purpose. As though a certain utility-information in the case of interrogational torture; intimidation, humiliation, or revenge in the case of terroristic torture-were the upshot.
intimidate both the victims who actually undergo it and their accomplices and supporters. Cutting loose from the pretended legality of the interrogational model,

That utility played any fundamental part in the atrocious theater of Abu Ghraib is, however, doubtful. Most of them bit players, 90 percent of the detainees in the Iraqi prison "were of no intelligence value"27 according to the assessment of the American authorities themselves, in other words were of no utility when it came to supplying information. As for intimidation, revenge, and humiliation, the torture certainly included them among its goals and drew nourishment from them for its own cruelty, yet not in such a way as to assign these objectives a decisive role and make them the pivot of a strategic economy. As the photographs demonstrate, what prevailed was the pleasure of farce, the entertainment of a horror transformed into caricature, a license to dehumanize on the part of willing actors in an atrocious pantomime. In this sense, in the contemporary era and in the global spotlight of history, the viewpoint of the regular fighter-in regulation uniform and endowed with regular horrorist "appetites"achieved its most expressive portrait at Abu Ghraib. In an age in which the traditional figure of the enemy has been definitively replaced by the defenseless as casual victim, the traditional figure of the warrior has also promptly adapted to the general festival of violence against the defenseless by making way for an obscene caricature of itself.
To compare the incomparable, you could even say that, after the images from Abu Ghraib, what has emerged is a contrast between the actors of a violence against the helpless who show that they accompany their crime with a certain trivial enjoyment and the actors on the other side who reveal a propensity for the grim and the lugubrious, even though they sometimes hymn the joys of paradise as the reward for slaughter. But in this respect, the phenomenology of contemporary horrorism is so complex in the array of its modes, attitudes, and tones as to discourage any reductive contrast. The very disconcerting fact remains that Abu

Ghraib presented horror in the imbecile and idiotic form of the leer . As though, having lost even the howl that freezes in her throat, all that remained of Medusa today were a dull repugnance.

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The war on terror will not bow to the rational kritik provided by the 1AC. Their stance of transgressive innocence bolsters the war machine
Nick Mansfield 2006 [Asociate Professor in Critical and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University in Sydney theory & event 9:4]
An example Bataille gives of this is Aztec human sacrifice. The Aztecs, according to Bataille, captured and then feted a particular human individual, on whom they lavished the greatest wealth and luxury, art and adornment. At the end of a specified period of time, this individual would be brutally and ostentatiously slaughtered. The aim of this festival was to open a channel through the otherwise sealed world of logical order, and allow humans to connect with the flows of continuity that represented the truth of being, and from which in daily life, people needed to struggle to exempt themselves. This process was what Bataille understood as transgression. Because they involved a wilful destruction of all that had been painstakingly accrued through disciplined practices of husbandry and production, Bataille named these transgressive practices "consumption." War

is one of these transgressive rituals. Rather than seeing war as an emotional explosion of primitivism, or the result of calculating strategy, Bataille saw war as one of the processes whereby human societies broke out of the constraint of purpose and order to encounter the truth they could not always live. Several things need to be said about this process. Firstly, to summarise the complex logic here. Transgression expresses a society's engagement with the irrational and excessive flows of energy that have made all its systems and logics possible, but which also exceed and threaten them. Engagement with these flows is a fulfilment of our nature, but it must be felt as a contradiction of our normal, rational, life, that it simultaneously confirms. War opens up possibilities of ecstasy, intensity and violence, while retrospectively constructing before and to endure beside and beyond them, an imagined culture of reason, innocence and meaning . Dissociation and excess require this zone as the antecedent of transgression, in fact, what is to be transgressed. Reason, morality and purpose then are constructed as the necessary counterpart and context of excessive violence and disarray. Following this logic, war then cannot be simply something executed by "the social" nor can it be a simple version of it. It defines the social as the locus of an innocence that violence is to transgress, a rightness that needs to be defied by a brutality that confirms and consolidates it . Innocence thus needs war as that which both confirms and justifies it as innocence. Secondly, this process of transgression requires a rethinking of subjectivity. The subjectivity of normal social life is an artificial construct made available by the flows of energy, but perched precariously upon them. Such specific, individual or localised subjectivities are mere fictions, chimera. Bataille wasn't afraid to say that the truth of subjectivity was available, but only through the process of transgression, the drive to radical exteriority. Only the subject that could instantiate the flows of the cosmic energy field was authentic to Bataille, and humans recognized and tried to live this subjectivity. The figure that incarnated or represented this asymptotic subject, Bataille called the sovereign 11. The sovereign embodied a subjectivity that lived the intense basic truth of cosmic force. Individual identity was only ever a pathetic degradation of this heroic possibility. The subject of war, then, is radical exteriority imagined as livable, and is in defiance of any of the constraints and order that define conventional subjectivity. T his sovereignty is both the same as and different to the one Agamben derives from Benjamin and Carl Schmitt. It is a logic of exception from historical accountability. However, in Bataille crucially, it is less a hardened singular authority than a dream of the instantiation of radical chaos, one that subjectivity aims to emulate in its truth. As Derrida argues in "Force of Law"12and most recently in Rogues, this sovereignty must be seen in its dangerous doubleness, as both the risk of the worst and the only promise of justice. Thirdly, Bataille thought that rituals of sacrifice proposed a question. Rituals dramatised the human need to make contact with the forces of the cosmos, but why did they have to take this form: the slaughter of a human being? What was specific about this process that made it sensible as an engagement with cosmic truth? Sacrifice, he postulated, annihilated its object. It took something we might recognize as a version of ourselves, another human subject more or less equivalent to us, and it turned this subject into an object and then destroyed it. Bataille argued that this process of annihilation of the object defined what consumption was all about. It was simply the human act of denial of our own objectivity .

By thoroughly destroying the object, human beings separated themselves from the possibility of considering themselves to be objects, and thus showed that
they could not be reduced to the level of the merely calculable that defined the rational practices of daily life. The human approach to objects in general involves, firstly, this insistence on their reduction to pure objectivity, and secondly, on their being used up, being annihilated as a display of control over and contempt for the objects that we believe we are showing are ontologically different from ourselves.

War then, turns what is not an object into an object, and then annihilates it in order to show that we are not like it. It does this by first annihilating any impression or
trace of alternative subjectivity in the object, and then consuming it as an object, by physically destroying it in order to show the triumph of its own claim to not only exclusive subjectivity, but a subjectivity projected backwards to us from the radical exteriority in which our truth resides. It would be possible to use this insight to speculate in subjective-cultural terms on the US government's response to the terrorist attacks of September 11.

Horrified at being objectified, being turned into a passive target by Al-Qaida, the US mounted a massive attempt to reclaim the prerogatives of subjectivity. It needed to turn itself from object to subject, by insisting on the objectivity of others, at first in Afghanistan and then Iraq. These others must have their subjectivity minimised -- by in the case of Iraq, the
ontology of the nation being reduced from millions of people to one demonised name ("Saddam Hussein"), by the obscuring of the casualty rates of the Iraqi people, and by having their political aspirations reduced to being identical with the middle of any Western democracy. This objectification of subjectivity licenses violence and restores subjectivity to the US. More than vengeance, more than strategy or oil, the original political popularity of the Iraq venture could be seen as an attempt to reclaim a subjectivity lost by the mystery, the abject confusion of

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In sum, then, war allows us access to a triumphal and exterior subjectivity we feel is our truth, by annihilating the other first as subject and then as object. Although this project fulfils us, we always
having been objectified. represent and understand it as a transgression, a contradiction of our normal rational innocence. This latter point helps us to a provisional answer to one of the questions we have been pursuing: how a war-like culture with a history of relentless conquest and genocide is able to believe itself so peace-loving and innocent. The logic of war is understood as an adventure beyond innocence and reason and its conventional liberal interiorities out into an exteriority that provides a subjectivity beyond constraint. An innocent domain then is perpetually retrospectively reinvented by the wars it requires as the thing that war leaves behind. Similarly, defining a social rift, or even a policy, as a war -- war on crime, war on drugs, a culture war -- retrospectively identifies the social as a transgressed innocence, a site of authentic self-identity and normality threatened by the poor, drugs, liberal dissent, and so on. According to Bataille's double logic, then, war unfolds as a transgression of radical innocence and of reason. Innocence and war would be part of one complex, necessary to one another, but they would be understood to be and represented as fundamentally separate, and notionally opposite to one another. How does this complex relationship play itself out? Beside its transgressive nature, we have identified two other things about war: the radical exteriority of its understanding of subjectivity and its will to annihilation of its object. It achieves this by first erasing any trace of subjectivity in the object, and then destroying it as object. The aim here, according to Bataille's theory of consumption, is to arrogate subjectivity to oneself, by rendering any notion of the subjectivity and consequently the being of the other impossible. One's own subjectivity emerges only as an uber-subjectivity, as the supersession of subjectivity in an act of destruction. The destruction of the subjectivity of the war-object also then involves the destruction or at least the surpassing of the warrior's own subjectivity. In destroying the subjectivity of the other, it imagines itself out in the stream of larger entropic energy that Bataille saw as the meaning of the cosmos. The logic

of the annihilation of the other and the exteriority of subjectivity are the same

logic therefore.

The war/society complex can be seen then as the exteriorization of the subject by pursuing the will-to-annihilation of the object. This defines the war/society in its radical disloyalty to itself. The war/society produces this logic in both its peaceful and aggressive phases: in military force, police tactic, media campaign or social policy, but also in its economics, its consumption and its consumerism, yet the war/society is able to insist on the radical disjunction between its different phases, a disjunction it cannot even really produce let alone stabilize. (Where exactly would the dividing line fall?) This common ground, even when disguised by a refuge in the logic of transgression, indicates the dominant mode of the globalizing West, on its mission as the ultra-violent bestower, even incarnation, of peace. By constructing its own subjectivity as the supersession of subjectivity through the annihilation of all alternative subjectivities, the subjectivity of the war/society is at work in war, but not at stake. Not only does war provide an image of innocence by representing its violent self as other to society, but the exteriorising subject never has content enough to be in any way answerable. Because its logic requires the annihilation of its object, it can refuse to acknowledge the position from which it could be interrogated or accused. Hence the refusal of the United States to imagine being answerable to the International Criminal Court. The

war/society is protected from accusation, until it is defeated, and becomes an object again. The west will not suffer interrogation of its innocence while it remains triumphant. What this means is that the war/society will not amend itself, will not become responsible or fair or selfreflexive as long as it continues to believe that its historic mission has been a success . This cannot be summarily dismissed as a commitment to the doctrine of "might is right," though the continuity between the ancient faith in providence's manifestation of its truth through trial-by-violence and contemporary belief in military victory as implicit vindication would repay investigation. What we can say with some certainty is that what has been unwittingly chosen is a radical commitment to defeat as the only impetus towards self-knowledge. Thus, as we have seen with the Vietnam War, only the indefinite postponement of the acknowledgement of defeat can allow faith in war to endure.

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The affirmatives rational appeal against nukes reinforces the drive to nuclear destruciton
Ira Chernus, Assoc Prof Religion at the University of Colorado, Boulder, 1985 [Journal of the American Academy of Religion]

The relationships between war and myth illuminate at least part of that mysterious human nature which apparently baffled Thomas Powers when he sought the irrational motives of war. They also help explain the relative futility of four decades of persuasively logical arguments for nuclear disarmament. While all wars are compounded of both pragmatic purposes and mythic dimensions, the nuclear age has reduced pragmatic purposes to
virtual insignificance. War be- tween super-powers, whether cold or hot, is now almost entirely mythic enactment. When rational motives dwindle to irrelevance, it is not only superfluous but actually dangerous to keep decrying the irrationality of war. We could go on debating the possibility of finding rational purposes for

nuclear weapons until they begin falling from the sky. That would be the ultimateand ultimately pyrrhicvictory for the "defense intellectuals." Would it not be wiser to shift the grounds of the debate and bring the deeper motivations of the nuclear arms race into the light of public understanding? The first step in such a shift is to look at the mythic paradigms that have shaped our perceptions of weapons and war in the nuclear age.

Continued
The persuasiveness of this mythic framework is enhanced by the media that disseminate it. Most people learn whatever they know about the nuclear issue from "the news;" "the news" disseminates and legitimizes all our reigning mythologies. But the average person sees no connection at all between "the news" and myth, because myth is taken to mean a lie (or at best a fantasy) while "the news" is assumed to be a literal record of real happenings in the real world. So nuclear myth passes for literal truth. In a culture that defines literal truth as the only form of truth, any mythology must pass as literally true to be credited. But the myth of rational nuclear balance rests especially heavily

on literal acceptance, for the faith in technical reason enshrined in the paradigm depends on an equally firm faith in literalism. Indeed, the two faiths are two mutually reinforcing sides of a single coin. Literal truth confines us to the realm of abstract reason which can only calculate causes and effects, means and ends. It is essential to our fantasy of a world wholly comprehended and wholly controlled,
and thus to our dream of humanly-constructed global balance. Our passion for literalism fueled the similar dreams and fantasies that led to a world dominated by technologythe technology whose ultimate product and most fitting emblem is the Bomb. Seeing only means and ends, however, literalism blinds us to the mythic dimension. A myth which depends on literal acceptance therefore has a blindness to its own mythic nature built into it. It prevents us from understanding our own

Literal truth also fosters the nuclear contest because it is neces- sarily single-minded truth, insisting on absolute oppositions between true and false, right and wrong, and (by extension) good and evil. Our passion for literalism reinforces our vision of nuclear armament as an apocalyptic crusade against the twin evils of the Soviet Union and irrationality itself. At the same time it creates a onedimensional world in which the given reality is the only possible reality. It stifles the capacity of myth to stimulate imagination, discover new possibilities for the future, and show us the multiple dimensions of truth. Robert J. Lifton has written at length on this aspect of nuclear age psychology. His theory of psychic numbing rests largely on the insight that the "mythic zone" of our minds, in which new images arise to reflect changing realities, has been frozen by the terror of nuclear annihila- tion. But this new terror only intensified a process that began long before Hiroshima. Western civilization had been learning for several centuries to see the world as a collection of inert objects, totally amenable to human manipulation. Inevitably, we began to see other human beings as equally inert objects, and then finally our own selves as inert and therefore dead. Literalism was as much a source as a sign of this process. When taken literally, as it inevitably must be, the myth of rational nuclear balance is a myth of and for "death in life." If our pervasive psychological deadness continues its triumphant march, it will some day culminate in a universal physical deadness. Since there will be no retrospect afterwards, we must observe now in
deepest motivations. prospect that the paradigm of rational balance will be a fundamental contributing factor to nuclear annihilation. So the danger of debating about the rational uses of nuclear weapons is not confined to the futility of a debate that misses the essential point.

There is perhaps even greater danger in continuing the debate because its terms and assumptions all lie in the realm of literal technical reasoning. It reinforces the potentially lethal paradigm we have been describing, regardless of the conclusions it attains.

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The affirmatives crusade against the deadly irrationality or nuclear weapons plays the enemys game. Only the alternatives theatrical war can challenge nuclear violence.
Ira Chernus, Assoc Prof Religion at the University of Colorado, Boulder, 1985 [Journal of the American Academy of Religion] Rather than trying to score more points in a game it cannot win, the disarmament movement would be well advised to reject the game and its premises altogether. What would this mean in practical terms? It would mean a new focus on the mythic dimensions of the issue and a concerted effort to apprise the public that all it stands to gain from
nuclear armament is the mythic satisfaction of re-enacting the domi- nant vision of nomos. Assuming that everyone knows what there is to lose, the public (this being a democracy) could then make informed decisions about nuclear policy. At the very least, discussion of the mythic aspects could get us off the merry-go-round of endlessly recycling the same old arguments. It is difficult to predict what new topics might come to the fore. I can only offer here a few tentative possibilities.

The absurdities of nuclear policy have led us to recognize the preponderant element of mythic play in the nuclear contest, and in war as a whole. The next step might well be to notice a similar element in many of the institutions of
society, and then go on to see the large majority of human life as mythic enactment repeated for its own intrinsic satisfactions. When we speak of "the human drama" (or "the human comedy") we voice an age-old intuition that life

may be best understood as an immense playor, more precisely, an infinite number of little plays, interwoven in immensely complex ways. Indeed, the human species might be defined as a living theater in which this endless play of plays is played out. War is one scene in which the drama reaches heightened levels of intensity; but the same mythic dynamics we have
uncovered in war are constantly working (though most often unconsciously) throughout our lives. This is a rather large claim to make in a small paragraph. And I do not intend here to begin unravelling its tangled complexities. I want only to suggest that there would be some important practical, as well as theoretical, implications to such a view of life. One implication is a new understanding of the uniqueness of nuclear weapons. They are qualitatively different from all previous weapons because they are the first weapons that can destroy the theater in which the human drama unfolds. From this perspective war between super-powers is indeed obsoletenot because it lacks any rational purpose or practical gain, but because the human drama will end if the theater is demolished. The nuclear disarmament move- ment's most compelling cry is not "No more war!" but "The show must go on!" In fact, it seems unlikely that the human drama will ever dispense entirely with its war scenes

. The appeals of war that we have outlined are probably too deeply alluring to

be relinquished. But the many

links between war and myth suggest a new approach to this issue too. Generally, when the question of the abolition of war is raised, the answer is said to hinge on the issue of violence; those who believe that violence is innate in human beings hold that war is forever, while those who disagree see a hope of eliminating war. The analysis offered here suggests that violence is not the crucial element in understanding war. Certainly the power and intensity of war are related to its physical violence, but they are not identical with nor reducible to that violence. And the appeals of war go significantly beyond its

although some form of warfare may be inevitable, it is not clear that warfare need involve killing. It may be possible to find other mythic scenarios that will offer the same fulfillments as traditional war without demanding loss of life or even physical violence (Brown: 180-183). It is naive, of course,
intensity and power. Therefore, to avoid the issue of violence altogether. There may be something in human nature that makes the abolition of violent war a futile dream. Even if this were the case,

War approached as play is likely to be less destructive than war seen as a crusade against absolute evil. Its goal is not so much destruction of the enemy as re-enactment of the intertwining of life and death in the human theater. In the nuclear age, its
we could still learn to see "conventional" war as a form of deadly serious play. message takes on particularly potent meaning. While all "conventional" wars destroy life and nurture death, nuclear war would destroy death as well as life; it would bring the cycle of life-and-deaththe very lifeblood of the human drama, as it is of warto a dead stop. Those who hope to abolish all warfare generally fail to see this dimension of war. With their

moral commitment to maximize life and minimize death, they see the two only as logical opposites and argue logically on behalf of life. Here, as in their logical arguments against the Bomb, they may be defeating their own cause by accepting their opponents* premises. The "defense intellectuals" and other devotees of unlimited human control have an equally passionate belief in the rational conquest of death, though their path to conquest leads dangerously close to the abyss. The nuclear peril is a sign that the denial of death, however well-meaning its motives, is a questionable course. Rather than declaring war obsolete in order to stave off death, it may be wiser to declare that the show, with its ever-turning wheel, must go on. Yet there is certainly a valid moral
imperative to seek peaceful solutions to every conflict. Philosophical speculations should not give us license to accept violence passively and stop searching for meaningful alternatives. The overriding imperative of the present, however, is to find forms of war that do not threaten to destroy the theater in which war dramas and all other dramas are enacted. The most valuable form of war today may be the war of human beings against weapons of omnicide. Many disarmament activists are loathe to see themselves as engaged in a war. Yet unconsciously the traditional war paradigm holds sway over all of us, no matter how committed we are to peace. I suspect that a large majority of disarmament activists do uncon- sciously feel themselves in a warindeed a war to the deathagainst the weapons that could destroy nomos forever. As the anti-nuclear movement grows, it will attract increasing numbers of people who feel comfortable with the war

The image of a nonviolent war against weapons may be a useful aid in creating a broadly based mass movement for disarmament. It simply recognizes that most people will not give up their attachment to a war of cosmic significance unless they are given another such war in its place. Those who insist on the total abolition of war will not be happy with this suggestion. But those who
paradigm and many who positively enjoy the idea of a good fight in a good cause.

insist that the show must go on, with war and all, may see merit in it.

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Link TNWs
The affirmative deploys the means-ends reasoning that makes nuclear war possible. Only the alts sacred over-flowing can confront the violence of nuclear weapons.
Ira Chernus, Assoc Prof Religion at the University of Colorado, Boulder, 1985 [Journal of the American Academy of Religion] Beyond these practical considerations, the shift to a mythic perspective has significant theoretical aspects. Many of the terrors of the modern world, both nuclear and nonnuclear, have grown out of an exclusive concern with technical means-and-ends reasoning. While much of life is still re-enactment of scenes from the human drama, undertaken for its own sake, Western civilization has come to deny this truth. A new focus on mythic play could teach us how frequently we are pursuing ends in themselves without knowing it. More importantly, by raising this fact to consciousness it could give us a conceptual framework in which to assess the value of those ends and thus free us to choose new ends. If nuclear armament has become largely an end in itself, it is hard to imagine a more desperately needed lesson. We might discover that freedom to perceive and choose our forms of play is also freedom from the rationalism, literalism, and psychic numbing that plague us so perilously. We might discover, too, that we need not justify our lives as means to some end which is in turn only a means to some other end. As our world overflows with more and more means, it is increasingly drained of consciously perceived ends to give meaning to those means. Surely this sense of meaningless futility is deeply related to our numbed apathy in the face of impending disaster. The more we try to calculate purely rational means to save ourselves, the more firmly we fasten ourselves into this trap. The myths and teachings of religious tradi- tions can help to free usnot so much by preaching the moral sanctity of life as by teaching us to value ends over means and to find fulfillment in the play of life as an end in itself. Only if we see life as an end in itself will we cherish it and preserve it. The world will always be filled with conflict and folly and evil. We will always be tempted to ask, as Walt Whitman once did, what good life and self can be amid "the empty and useless years." If we learn to see life as an infinite theater, though, we may find deep meaning and comfort at such moments in Whitman's simple answer: "That you are herethat life exists and identity, that the powerful play goes on, and you may contribute a verse."

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Terrorism
Terrorism is an excess generated by the solutions designed to address it. There is no end to the cycle of terror and counter-terror. Stefano Harney & Randy Martin 2007
[theory & event 10:2 ]

If the Cold War contested the future, its apparent heir, the war on terror battles over the present. This is more than the hyper-vigilance of a politics of fear. The terrorist is the quintessential figure of bad risk however effectively it may be deployed. We cannot await it. The only safety lies in bringing its moment into our midst, that is, by pre-emptive strike. Terror's temporality is anti-utopian, it implies the immanence of the future in the present. The risk economy, the investment action upon a possible future difference in the present, shares the same sensibility. Foreign and domestic applications of risk management forge a nefarious connection in George W. Bush's 2002 National Security Document. In this proud proclamation of imperial
doctrine, pre-emption is bequeathed to one nation and friends (whether old or newly acquired) affirm their allegiance by replicating U.S. anti-inflationary monetary policy. Low and behold this same language turns up in Iraq's strategy for national development. Inflation, when it is not an assault on labor (as low unemployment or high wages) anthropomorphizes the world of goods (supply being chased by demand and puffing itself up accordingly). Just as industrialization forced association upon self-sufficient labor, and consumerism wove a common web of dreams in the marketplace, financialization imposes a generalized condition of mutual indebtedness. Personal finance, like free wage labor, amounts to an enormous aggregation of the capacity to produce financial value while assuming the risks of failure to realize value. Like production and consumption, financialization is also a form of dispossession of one array of life-making circumstances that forces an elaboration of what people must subsequently do and be together. The future itself becomes a factor of production as each possible outcome is shifted into an actionable present. The derivative represents the moment when a small intervention, an arbitrager's momentary opportunity, seizes upon a highly dispersed volatility and leverages it to extensive effect. Unlike the entrepreneur, born of initiative, the arbitrager exists only through the action of others, deriving themselves as a cluster of volatilities. The derivative is the extensive energy within the body of finance. It is also incorporated into the grand strategy for engaging and negating unsupportable risk and excess.

Terror wars are in this respect derivative wars. They "deter forward" using small deployments of risk capable special forces to leverage imperial intervention. They succeed in their initial displacements (of toppling regimes) but produce the very thing they claim to fight but that are in actuality their condition of further circulation, namely terror. Terror is an inassimilable excess that occasions intervention without end. Unlike earlier imperialisms that sought to extract, civilize and develop, this logic of occupation
quickly becomes indifferent to its prize and impatient with itself. It would be tempting to see in the gap between a general interest in combating terror everywhere, and a particular occupation of two energy states an affirmation of Bataille's equilibration of devastation and profit. Afghanistan's geo-strategic potential for transshipment of oil and gas, Iraq's prized proven oil reserves, Halliburton's corrupt profiteering would seem to affirm the straightforward arithmetic captured by the slogan, "blood for oil." Control of energy consumption would prove the ultimate colonization of Bataille's accursed share. As compelling as the slogan has been to lay bare the motives of imperial excess, Bataille's thought would also have us refuse the enclosure of our own surplus capacity in so certain a lock down of interest-borne scarcity. There can be no denying oil's requirement to the present economic convention. But the necessity of oil politics as they are presented must be contested if the present mode of excess is to be seen as other than laying us all to waste as an inexorable drive to war to control supply in the face of imminent scarcity. Specifically, blood for oil is a pipeline that has smuggled in a Malthusian logic of genocidal scarcity. The argument goes like this. The days of expanding oil supply are behind us. The rate at which new wells are drilled has been eclipsed by the rate at which new demand has expanded, in consequence, a bell-shaped forecast named for the geo-physicist who made it, "Hubbert's Peak," pinpoints the date of diminishing returns. Population growth assures that there will not be enough oil to go around. Security for the imperium dictate that it grabs hold of whatever remains. Oil and war are fraternal twins. Yet Hubbert's peak, so pointed in sounding the alarm, is also vulnerable on its own economic foundations. As oil prices rise, abandoned fields again become profitable, along with the rationale for further investment to extract oil from otherwise unappealing shale. The conflation of access to oil with control of its sources certainly lines up with imperial history. But that history discloses how the very regimes installed to control oil territories repress domestic populations and wind up destabilizing access, a lesson reflected in the fully While financial protocols have been installed as governing ideas, the occupation of Iraq looks like anything but a design for control. Instead, oil exports have held steady, and risk has been distributed financialized oil futures markets by meeting volatility with arbitrage. i

throughout a population that has been cleaved from its national form and from its own productive capacities. Iraq's Public Distribution System, the last remnant of Baathist socialism is to be displaced by small cash handouts to fuel the now rampant speculative economy. ii But to render socialism scarce is to commit an error of measurement and concept. The extensive energy of consumption privileged the erotic as the alter to commodification, and maintained socialism as that portion of the world devoted to a social economy that capital could not absorb. The erotic which animated consumer desire has now been displaced by risk, which inhabits the intensities of circulation. Populations at risk may be treated instrumentally but they are also freed from instrumentality-they exist, not to accomplish further accumulation, but as human assemblages in their own right. The war on terror claims that population makes no difference and touts its capacity to

intervene anywhere at anytime. Its excess belies another . The notion that intervention can be anywhere raises the
prospect that it could be for anything. The empire of indifference passes intervention from necessity to the realm of discretion, acting upon difference becomes a luxury within reach. Added to this is the discretionary force of something like the derivatives market, a hitherto unfathomable wealth sundered from use that exists only to further itself. The recourse to war that cannot discern between foreign and domestic, that attacks terror, but also crime, drugs, culture, and the like, sketches in negative relief the magnitude of the difference that state and capital now resist. Never mind that they had a hand in proliferating it all. The abundance of difference in our midst, along with excess wealth advertised for all-purposes, presents the immanence of the social as a self-expanding luxury for all. The war on terror is not the only project legible in the transfer of Bataille's mode of excess into the present. Terror gives urgency to the proliferation of financial risk but

it also deflects attention from that excess which the state has increasing trouble concealing--its own criminality. If capital morphs under the present mode of excess, so too does its strange bed-fellow, the state-form.
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Link Respect/Empathy for Other


The rhetoric of empathy and respect is a rhetoric of method. Only the alternatives willingness to risk communication as violence and interruption allows an ethical relationship to the other.
GARY PETERS 2004 [University of the West of England, Human Studies 27: 187206]
The essence of rhetoric is its lack of essence, its emptiness, which, nonethe- less, bewitches and persuades thanks to a speech that literally formulates the body of the speaker for the duration of the teaching event. This body does not mirror the other but, rather, flares-up as an embodied language: an improvi- sational gesture that radically exceeds the reflexive power of the alter-ego, thus constituting a teaching, albeit one devoid of a body of knowledge that can be passed from teacher to student. As Merleau-Ponty affirms: nothing really passes between them and yet the fact is we have the power to under- stand over and above what we may have

178) But, and this is the point, it is a power that is produced by the movement of rhetoric into an exteriority that is radically absent from given forms of knowledge. In this respect, and contrary to the derogation of rhetoric, it is an art of persuasion that does not hide absence behind the illusory presence and substance of its fine words. On the contrary, rhetoric draws attention to and intensifies the experience of a fundamental ontological void, the primordial silence (1981, p. 184) between the speaking word (1981, p. 197). This is the power of rhetoric, the power to produce a world in the face of a radical phenomenological pluralism that, in spite of Husserls efforts, unravels the intersubjective lifeworld, casting its inhabitants out into a solitary exteriority that only rhetoric can speak to, albeit obscurely. By all accounts this describes very well Heideggers manner of teach- ing, creating, in his case, a pedagogy where
spontaneously thought. (1981, p. phenomenology and rhetoric, working in tandem, become the vehicle for the radical transformation neces- sary to remember and address again the question of Being. Anticipating, in a sense, Merleau-Pontys observation that nothing passes between teacher and student and yet there is transformation, Rudiger Safranski grasps the absence at the core of Heideggers singular, but famed, teaching when he recalls Jas- pers comments on Heidegger: It is astonishing how Heidegger manages to captivate us. . . Admittedly, his students then will have felt much the same as we do today that one is drawn into his thought until one arrives at the moment of rubbing ones eyes in astonishment and asking oneself: that was quite something, but what use is the. . . experience to me? Karl Jaspers strikingly formulated this experi- ence with Heideggers philosophizing in his notes. . . This is what Jaspers said about Heidegger: Among contemporaries the most exciting thinker, masterful, compelling, mysterious but then leaving you empty-handed (Safranski 1999, p. 100). All of the rhetorical ingredients are here: mastery, compulsion, mystery and nothingness.

Rhetoric gives nothing, it does not instruct, it persuades, and persuasion masters the other not through a superior grasp of a knowledge that can be bequeathed by the teacher, but through the production of a fascinat- ing, seductive and compelling body, occupying in a specific manner, an other, more powerful world. Merleau-Ponty, with typical subtlety, grasps this par- ticular mode of learning: I begin to understand
a particular philosophy by feeling my way into its existential manner, by reproducing the tone and accent of the philosopher. In fact, every language carries its own teaching. . . (Merleau-Ponty 1981, p. 179). Merleau-Ponty is not describing empathy but something quite different. The model of learning suggested here is, like Kants, imitative or reproductive and forms part of the model of exemplification where the singular manner of the teacher provides the model to be adopted by the students and used in their own way. (Kant, 1973, para. 49) In this regard, and with the phenomenological project in mind, it is the fundamental productivity of the phenomenological/ rhetorical compact which ensures that the reproduction in question is, para- doxically perhaps, the reproduction of production: production can

A pedagogy based upon the reproduction of production will not be empathic but, rather, pluralistic. Instead of eroding the barrier between self and other through dialogue and understanding, the infinite plurality of producers (and the production of infinite plurality) creates what Blanchot
only be re- produced. Pluralism, Language and Estrangement calls a relation of the third kind. He writes: Now what founds this third relation, leaving it still unfounded, is no longer proximity proximity of struggle, of services, of essence, of knowledge, or of recognition, not even of solitude but rather the

strangeness between us: a strangeness it will not suffice to characterize as a separation or even as a distance. Rather an interruption An interruption escaping all measure (Blanchot, 1993, p. 68). Teaching, in this view, would resemble a regime of estrangement rather than of empathy, where teacher and student are cast as strangers rather than ana- logical twins, and where the phenomenological continuity between self and other, so important for Husserl as a guarantor for a predictable intersubjective world beyond/after the reduction, suffers an interruption that, as Blanchot will argue, breaks the bonds of intersubjectivity. Instead of an organic/psychic bond there is an interval; an empty space, a between that demarcates a radical pluralism not based upon the all-too- familiar notions of diversity, co-existence and toleration, all of which sit only too comfortably alongside empathy and dialogue, but one signifying a fun- damental inequality that strips the other of its horizon (its sphere of own- ness), its position in space and time, its selfhood. For Blanchot this does not leave nothingness but, rather, it leaves speech the violence of speech.
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Link Schmitt
Schmitt is right that the state is built on the sovereign exception, but their politics justifies endless extermination. The alternatives solves by declaring itself sovereign through the act of sacrifice, creating the exception to the exception.
Blent Diken 2006 [Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, Alternatives 31 (2006), 431452 Significantly in this respect, Benjamin was the first to divide Schmitts concept of exception, producing a remainder of it. For Schmitt, exception is a limit concept that presupposes a normal situation as its background. The state of exception aims at the preservation of this normality with extraordinary means. In other words, Schmitts project is to legitimize the state of exception, or to normalize what is exceptional. Along similar lines, we could argue that the state of exception on the island is reactionary, or, to phrase it differently, that violence is rational. The generalized exception, the festival, is Jacks way of strengthening his power. In this, everything is made fluid; all hierarchies are reversed. But one thing remains constant: Jack, the leader. To be sure, Benjamin was in many ways inspired by Schmitts methodological extremism, even though his own project was opposed to Schmitts. Whereas Schmitt wanted to legitimize Nazi power, Benjamin criticized it. Schmitt was conservative, Benjamin revolutionary. Indeed, this tension found its best expression in their understanding of sovereignty. Hence to Schmitts exception Benjamin opposed the suspension of suspension, a real excep- tion, or, better, an exception to exception itself. What is decisive here is the notion that, when generalized, exception loses its status as a limit of normality. The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the state of emergency in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism.57 Whereas in Schmitt exception is the political kernel of the law, it becomes divine justice in Benjamin. And then we are confronted with the difference between two exceptions: Schmitts exception is nothing else than an attempt at avoiding the real exception, the revolution, or divine justice. Benjamins exception, in stark con- trast, suspends the relationality between the law and its suspension in a zone of anomy dominated by pure violence with no legal cover.58The question of this real exception is the one that cannot be posed today without immediately facing the accusation of being a nihilist or a fundamentalist. And why is it so? To end with an answer to this question, let us focus on the final scene.

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Link Theory (e.g., Critical Theory)


You must sacrifice the theoretical knowledge of the 1AC. It is servile production that ultimately means nothing. Jason DeBoer no date given
[Bataille versus Theory http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:7XwWuL0tswIJ:www.sauerthompson.com/essays/Bataille%2520Versus%2520Theory,%2520an%2520essay%2520by%2520Jason %2520DeBoer.doc+Bataille+versus+Theory%E2%80%9D+Fierce+Language&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us]
The writings of Georges Bataille have recently become the object of a certain resurgence, or rather, a recuperation, within the academy. As Batailles death in 1962 recedes into the past, the number of critical essays and articles about him continues to grow at an incredible rate. Most of this criticism has taken the approach of situating Bataille and his ideas into a pre-determined framework of postmodern thought, either through the systematic embellishment of his role as an intellectual influence on Foucault, Derrida, and others, or his role as an intermediary figure between Nietzsche and the French postmodernists. While there certainly is merit and validity in linking Bataille intellectually to these writers, it is the radicalness and originality of Batailles writing which ultimately becomes lost in these analyses when viewed through such an historical lens. It seems inevitable that Bataille, like Nietzsche, will be subjected to a critical scrutiny, which,

in the guise of earnest analyses and close readings, serves foremost to dispel the threat that such writers pose to academia. A calculated process of intellectual taming is deployed against these radical thinkers; this procession of commentaries and dissections
nearly always leaves nothing but a dilution of the original work. To avoid this, I will not concern myself with situating Batailles writings within the present state of theory (whether it be philosophical, critical, sociological, or psychological). Rather, I think it would be more noble to attempt a critique of the theoretical enterprise by analyzing it through Batailles own array of concepts. If the ideas of thinkers like Nietzsche, Sade, or Bataille are to be afforded the credence they deserve, it is only fitting that theory itself be judged according to their claims, which may run in opposition to the claims made by traditional theory. Georges Bataille organizes his writings around many core concepts or ideas, many of which remain diffuse and somewhat underdeveloped in their definitions or meanings. Communication, sovereignty, heterology, inner experience, the sacred, dpense or expenditure, transgression, excess, etc.; each concept appears in his texts as a momentary connotation, a brief enunciation that creates an impact in the reader, then disappears before becoming fully ensnared within the parameters of conceptualization. Perhaps it is this vagueness or ambiguity inherent in all of Batailles concepts that prevents them from being appropriated by the theoretical mainstream and being put to work in a dogmatic system. In order for an idea to be put to work, for it to be able to perform a function, perhaps it must first have a proper definition... which many of Batailles concepts lack. The broadness of his terms (indeed, Batailles move from a restrictive to a general economy shows a digression from the specific, from specialization) may keep them from being utilized by others; this subversion of utility arises from the difficulty of pinpointing where or when a Bataillean concept begins or ends. This sacrifice of clarity certainly is an intentional strategy, Batailles own employment of unworkable concepts. It is within this arena of thought that I wish to examine the contemporary state of theory. When one wants to discuss things such as philosophy, literature and poetry, as such, in their broadest sense, it seems impossible to provide a working definition which encapsulates enough of the defined to provide a basis for meaningful discourse. As soon as one makes statements about philosophy, etc. the stage is set for interpretive breakdown. Without a general concept of philosophy there will be confusion as to the terms meaning; with such a normative concept, there will be disagreement over the validity of such a norm. Traditionally, philosophers have countered the problems of conceptual vagueness by imposing stricter and stricter specialization on their terms. Bataille, on the other hand, has reveled in the imprecision of such terms as philosophy, and, instead of specializing and building on such traditional notions, he has deployed his own set of concepts from the basis of whim (which he saw as the opposite of specialization). His attacks against philosophy strike it as a generality, before the complexities and specialties of epistemology, ontology, philosophy

philosophy must be attacked insofar as it is a general project, not in its particular and multiple manifestations, and this can only be done by contrasting philosophy with other general concepts which differ from and oppose it... the sacred, excess, communication, etc. With this view in mind, I will attempt to compare and critique the theoretical enterprise itself, using Batailles notions as both guidelines and weapons. Firstly, though, I should remark on the victim, the generality referred to as theory. Theory (again, whether it be philosophical, critical, sociological, etc.) can be said to consist of a variety of related movements. It can be thought of as the analyses of givens, predictions for the future, the systematic organization of knowledge, the very path along which thought must follow, or even thought itself. Theory is almost invariably a process that maintains knowledge (guaranteed by certainty) as its end result. Bataille contests the claim that a process of examination leads somehow to knowledge, because for him this external theorizing can only depart from or deny the only certain knowledge that humans may have: We have in fact only two certainties in this world -- that we are not everything and that we will die. Bataille posits
of language, etc. muddy the issue and make such a meta-critique more difficult. For Bataille,

knowledge of death not as the end result of a theoretical operation, but as an inner experience from which everything else radiates. This knowledge of death is in no way an understanding or comprehension of death; it is only the certainty that death will some day consume us, only a knowledge of mortality. Death cannot be regarded as an object of knowledge because it cannot be managed or subordinated by thought. Death is sovereign, hence inconceivable. Knowledge of our own mortality can only be peripheral to death itself. (Batailles other certainty, that we are not everything, paves the way for his notions of heterology and discontinuity, which I will examine in another essay.) Thus, the supposed endproduct of theory, knowledge, is declared impossible by Bataille, except for the certainties of death and the discontinuity of beings. He writes: we can have no knowledge except to know that knowledge is finite. Death, in the end, consumes thought. Any truth claims of theory are not sustainable according to Batailles rigid criteria for knowledge (namely, that only absolute certainty could guarantee knowledge). Batailles thought desires to exceed the very notion that knowledge is possible or that theory produces what it claims: going to the end means at least this:

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that the limit, which is knowledge as a goal, be crossed. Bataille

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continues to attack knowledge insofar as it relates to the strivings of theory, with knowledge either as the end product of theorys work or as the

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Link Theory (e.g., Critical Theory)


presumed foundation from which theory issues. Since knowledge is always linked to work and project, it is always servile to a concern for the future; it takes us away from the sovereignty of inner experience, which is only concerned with the moment. This inner experience is incapable of theorization; it evades the project-oriented grasp of language:
Everyday the sovereignty of the moment is more foreign to the language in which we express ourselves, which draws value back to utility: what is sacred, not being an object, escapes our apprehension. There is not even, in this world, a way of thinking that escapes servitude, an available language such that in speaking it we do not fall back into the immutable rut as soon as we are out of it. Batailles suspicion, even hatred, of language runs deep. However, this does not prevent him from according theory, philosophy, and science their place in the world. He believed that man should relegate such operations to a less prominent role in his thought, and instead concentrate more on his own inner experience. Bataille creates a dichotomy between experience and theory with silence, sovereignty, and concern with the moment functioning as aspects of inner experience, and language, servility, and preparation for the future existing as inherent aspects of theory. By opposing language with inner experience, Bataille creates a dilemma for himself and his own writings. His steadfast position makes him something of an idealist regarding inner experience; Bataille leaves little room for reconciliation between a true silence which resists definitions and a sovereign use of language which is able to resist project. It is poetry, he finally decides, that is able to occupy this space, as a form of language that is sacreda term Bataille used atheistically, meaning opposed to utility, usefulness, and concern for the future. Even with his extreme cynicism that theory could ever transgress the servile nature of language in order to offer a glimpse into inner experience, Bataille continued to write, and not just poetry. In order to justify the agenda behind theoretical writings like Nietzsches or his own, which were able to perform a metaphilosophical critique of theory while still using some of its forms of questioning, Bataille needed to temper his idealism with a modified definition of project: Nevertheless inner experience is project, no matter what. It is suchman being entirely so through language which, in essence with the exception of its poetic perversion, is project. But project is no longer in this case that, positive, of salvation, but that, negative, of abolishing the power of words, hence of project. In other words, his is a theory which questions itself by attacking the foundation of theory itself: language. In this way, through a type of writing that strives for silence, even topics such as inner experience can be broached. Principle of inner experience: to emerge through project from the realm of project. Although Bataille writes that the nature of experience is, apart from derision, not to be able to exist as project, it is this derisive character of experience that can be expressed in a theory that ridicules itself, that acknowledges the impossibility of its own goal: knowledge. Bataille finds the perfect form of such anti-foundational thinking in the aphoristic writings of Nietzsche: I am talking about the discourse that enters into darkness and that the very light ends by plunging into darkness (darkness being the definitive silence). I am talking about the discourse in which thought taken to the limit of thought requires the sacrifice, or death, of thought. To my mind, this is the meaning of the work and life of Nietzsche. Not only did Nietzsche mirror Batailles own disgust for Christianity and philosophy, but the writing form which Nietzsche championed, the aphorism, became another weapon in Batailles arsenal, a useful tool against the utility of philosophical language. Only an aphoristic, fragmentary writing can harbor the violent, sacred qualities of poetry; only an incomplete form of writing can trace or elucidate the impossibility of knowledge as a product of theory, by revealing a lack within knowledge itself. For Bataille, the swift violence of aphorism was the most effective method of attacking philosophical theory, by critiquing all theoretical foundations in a series of broad strokes: A continual challenging of everything deprives one of the power of proceeding by separate operations, obliges one to express oneself through rapid flashes, to free as much as is possible the expression of ones thought from a project, to include everything in a few sentences... It was this stylistic strategy that Bataille adopted for circumventing theoretical project, and he understood the difficulty (in fact, the impossibility) of proceeding any other way. Bataille believed that only a violent theory could usurp a utilitarian one, only a violent theory could clear the way for violence, which would put an end to the possibility of language. The excess of violence is silent, the opposite of the solidarity with other people implicit in logic, laws and language. In a way, violence consumes theory; its very excess countermines reason. He writes: the expression of violence comes up against the double opposition of reason which denies it and of violence itself which clings to a silent contempt for the words used about it. And there certainly is a violent nature to Batailles nihilistic critique of theory and philosophy. Indeed, he may consider one deficit of philosophy to be that it does not strive violently for silence, but instead only meekly labors over question after question: Philosophy cannot escape from this limit of philosophy, of language, that is. It uses language in such a way that silence never follows, so that the supreme moment is necessarily beyond philosophical questioning. At any rate it is beyond philosophy as far as philosophy claims to

theory, lost in the servility of work, is doomed to struggle from an untenable foundation (a non-arbitrary basis for language) to an impossible end-product (certain knowledge, besides that of mortality or the discontinuity of beings). Bataille believed that goal and authority are the requirements for discursive thought and that subsequently discourse forms projects. If this goal is knowledge, this authority, for philosophy, is ultimately external and metaphysical, hence religious. For Bataille, the only authority is inner experience, but its authority is in no way externalized. Outside the
answer its own questions. Philosophical

self, there was only chance and the randomness of the universe. Instead of God, chance. If theory sought the guarantee of God to support its claims, it was both misguided and ultimately empty of value. For those who grasp what chance is, the idea of God seems insipid and suspicious, like being crippled. Bataille was no irrationalist, but his critique of the metaphysics anchoring theory finally involved a rejection of reason itself, in order to purge the mind of any need for a connection with a God or metaphysical foundation. But the supreme abuse which man ultimately made of his reason requires a last sacrifice: reason, intelligibility, the ground itself upon which he stands man must reject them, in him God must die; this is the depth of terror, the extreme limit where he succumbs. It is an ecstatic moment of doubt. He believed that one

reaches

ecstasy by a contestation of knowledge. Batailles challenge to theory reaches its zenith as the abandonment or transgression of reasons
need for God. Salvation is the summit of all possible project and the height of matters related to projects. Batailles atheology replaces the authority of metaphysical foundation with the sovereign authority of experience, and the work of philosophy is overcome in an act of transgression: Compared

with work, transgression is a game. In the world of play philosophy disintegrates. If transgression became the foundation-stone of philosophy (this is how my thinking goes), silent contemplation would have to be substituted for language. This is the contemplation of being at the pinnacle of being. It is at this pinnacle that theory becomes a victim, a sacrifice at the hands of a great, silent theorist, Georges Bataille.

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Agamben Link
Agamben reduces sacrifice to a political problem of homo sacer. The failure to fully confront the sacred nature of violence dooms them to repeating communities of extermination. Jeffrey Librett 2007 [Professor German University Oregon diacritics 37.2-3]

This philosophical program in Agambens early essays guides his later work on the homo sacersovereign relation but also distorts and disturbs the later work in three principal ways. First, it prompts him to propose an exclusively juridicopolitical understanding of the sacredness of the homo sacer, effectively scapegoating the juridical sphere for a more broadly theopolitical problem, while placing the specifically Christian background [End Page 11] of his antinomianism in a misleadingly secular, rational, and universalist light. Symptomatically, in order to accomplish this juridicopolitical reduction Agamben must reject Batailles analysis of sacrifice along with the entire modern anthropological reading of the sacredout of hand. For this rejection protects his discourse against any sustained confrontation with the importance of the sacrificial dimension fo r both what he calls the homo sacer and his own approach to law in his theorization of the homo sacer.. Second, Agambens philosophical program impoverishes the account he provides of the Nazi death camps as an extreme example of the sovereign- homo sacer relation by making it impossible for him to appreciate the importance of Christian antinomianism in the formation of National Socialist ideology. For Agambens philosophical orientation requires or presupposes that he ignore or underestimate, first of all, the sacrificially anti-Semitic dimension of Christian antinomianismthe tendency of such antinomianism to make Judaism responsible for the ontological desert into which representation exiles us all. Further, as a consequence of his continuing commitment to this tradition, Agamben cannot see how important the tradition remains, even if in a displaced form, for Nazi anti-Semitism. I argue that Agambens animus against the letter blinds him to the Christian and sacrificial dimensions of the Holocausthe ignores the former and explicitly, emphatically denies the latter dimensionbecause this animus represents his own commitment to the Christian antinomianism that, in its racialized National Socialist form, attempts to rid itself of the letter by sacrificing not only Judaism but the (biologically, racially construed) Jews. Because his radically antinomian program would become unsettled by his recognition of its important overlap with the ideological bases of National Socialism, Agamben cannot ultimately acknowledge the Christian and sacrificial aspects of the Holocaust. Finally, in Remnants of Auschwitzhis main reading (outside of Homo Sacer) of the significance of the Nazi death campsAgamben positions testimony as the exemplary instance of the speaking of speech, the taking-place of language. The result of the destruction of European Jewry becomes here the revelation of poetic speech as a manifestation of the absolute. Unwittingly, Agamben ends up participating in the very kind of theodicy he ostensibly wished to avoid by denying the sacrificial character of the Holocaust in the first place. This observation makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that his politics is to be founded not merely on metaphysics, as Adam Thurschwell rightly stresses, but also on positive religious commitments [see note 1] as in turn his religionor his messianismis, as he repeatedly suggests, to be realized as a politics.2

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Psychoanalysis Link
Reject their mournful psychoanalys, which treats desire as lack rather than glorious excess. Our commitment to risk destruction for exuberance cannot be second-guessed under the sterile gaze fo the analyst. Jason Winfree, Assoc Prof Philosophy at California State University, 2009 [The Obssessions of George Bataille: Community and Communication ed. Mitchell/Winfree p. 39-44]
In giving expression to the sense of elective communities, Bataille's exposition relies heavily on the figure lovers. Lovers are exemplary of elective community, finding one another by chance, attracted by one another [p. 40] with a momentum and intensity indifferent to the demands of work and social cohesion. The appearance of the beloved on the scene falls with the swiftness and decisiveness of an ax, tearing the lover away from all other interests, including that of self-preservation, bestowing on him the exhilaration of total risk. The beloved shines with a "precarious radiance" that exerts upon the lover a violence and suspension like that of falling dice, which arrange existence anew. "The lovers' world, like life," writes Bataille, "is built on a set of accidents that give an avid, powerful will to be the response it desires" (CS 51/20). In other words, the attraction configured by chance requires the lover to stake herself, putting her entire being in play, ut it requires this as an obsession and not an obligation. As Bataille puts it n On Nietzsche ,

"the desire in us defines our luck," shapes the chance constellation of beings and events wherein it finds itself, and it does so by risking itself and by virtue of the risk it itself is (OC 6: 88/ON 73; tm). And that means the coincidence of wills in the face of chance-which is the contact of love itself-results from a gamble and not a calculation. "It 'risks' me and the one I
love"; it plays us [II inc 'use! en jets, met en jets l'tre aiin], says Bataille of carnal love. The lover's response to the radiance of the beloved is incomprehensible and outrageous! So much so that "[c]ompared to the person I love, the universe seems poor and empty" (OC 6: 84/ON 69). The example of lovers is of particular importance because it articulates both the insufficiency and the innocence that dominate Bataille's ontological considerations. In a sense, the tenuousness and tenderness of lovers reflects a more generally constitutive condition of human life, that "[t}here exists at the basis of human life a principle of insufficiency" (OC 5: 97/IE 81). When that insufficiency is repressed and mythologized into the ontological primacy of the individual, making of sociality a contract added on for the sake of security, existence is rendered guilty. But guilty

insufficiency is as restricted a sense of human being as Marxist economic analysis is of community; indeed, both subsist on the reftssal of chance, the one staking its future on the calculated probability of survival, the other on dialectical necessity. The lovers who chance everything and are constituted in that risk (hasard), however, exhibit all the "magnificence" of an existence "created in the image of a universe untouched by the defilement of merit or intention" (CS 53/21). Their contact is so innocent that it excises itself altogether from the world of reward and punishment, justification and critique, their insufficiency excessive to the impoverished world of need. Thus, Bataille insists, "What characterizes man from the outset and what leads up to the completed rupture at the summit is not only the will
for sufficiency, but the cunning, timid attraction on the side of insufficiency" (OC 5: 105/EE 88). And "what attracts isn't immediate being, but a wound" (OC 6:

The cracked being, however, is at once, at the very point where its self-enclosure ends and it opens onto the world, exposed and naked, falling outside itself, a lucky being, a chance being. Insufficiency and the excess of suffering that characterizes it is the
45/ON 22). Excessive insufficiency is an ontological condition, since "[aj being that isn't cracked [p. 41] isn't possible;' writes Bataille (OC 5: 259/G23). condition of play. with it and through it "we go from enduring the cracks (from decline) to glory (we seek out the cracks)" (OC 5: 259/G 23). Community is not, therefore, an extant division or willed unity within the social order, but a configuration of luck and chance where one being opens onto another and is what it is only through this opening. The language of exposure and ex-position goes a long way in articulating the structural conditions of this occurrence, but it is nevertheless insufficient to characterize the contact here at issue. Bataffle insists rather that this opening is a wound and elective community the affective attraction of one lacerated insufficiency by another. Community is constituted in the overlapping of wounds , the sharing not only of what cannot be shared, but the sharing of a suffering that is neither mine nor yours, a suffering that does not belong to us, but which gives us to one another, and in doing so both maintains and withdraws the beings so configured. In community, the other does not complete me but completes my insufficiency, shares the luck which is never only mine. Elective community is like a lovers' kiss-an exhilarating affirmation of chance, the will to be what befalls it but that its will could never produce. With respect to the lover, we desire like a gambler wagers. "Like the winnings of a gambler;' writes Bataille, "sexual, possession prolongs desire-or extinguishes it" (OC 6: 106/ON 86).The sheer momentum of the movement requires that its strength be squandered .

Desire is unsatisfied not because it fails, but because it exceeds the search for satisfaction, because it is also raw expenditure. For this reason, desire is misunderstood if it is represented as the infinite tragic movement toward an inaccessible object, as though desire not only is prohibited by its very structure from attaining its aim, but as though its structure is fundamentally teleological. The obsession with this logic is always mournful (psychoanalysis) or moral (transcendental philosophy) and in both cases remains theological insofar as the concern is governed by or measured against an imaginary sense of propriety or ownership or end. The desire that binds lovers is not so much directed toward an unattainable sumnut, however, as it is itself the summit, the point "where life is impossibly at the limit. "' Desire and summit can no
more be separated than lightning and its flash. In this respect Bataille is unequivocal: "The summit isn't what we 'ought to reach,' " (OC 6: 57/ON 39; tni)). Rather, "It's what is. Never what should be" (OC 6: 111/ON 91). If desire is unsatisfied, that is because it exceeds the conservative search for satisfaction, because it is not teleological, because we are driven beyond the need of satisfaction without being driven to anything, because our unfinished character is in this very way excessive,

The lovers' love is sacred. It does not belong to the profane order of work and its accumulated labor, the profane and banal order of capital. For Bataille, the sacred designates an object that is beyond all others in value, but the sacred character of our carnal love has nothing to do with divine love. The sacrifices brought about by the love of lovers require expenditure without recuperation; we give up our careers as dancers, we speak on the phone for
[p. 42] not impoverished. If love is unsatisfied it is because it has perished, leaving us wasted and ruined. hours on end, we waste the day in bed, and we give ourselves over entirely to that waste and identify ourselves with it.

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The Revolution must be awesome. A The aff works to liberate the futrue through accumulation of anti-capitalist productivity. This drive to hoarde dooms them to new cycles of capitalist accumulation. We cannot escape the ghosts of past oppression through laboring for the future. Wendling, 2k6. (Amy Wendling, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ Creighton College. Reading Bataille Now. Ed. Winnubst. P 64-51)
Sovereignty and the Revolutionary Subject Bataille's discussion of "sovereignty" occupies the entire third volume of The Accursed Share. This volume explains the final two chapters of volume 1, in which Bataille sketches the forms of consumption characteristic of Soviet industrialization as a modality of the forms of

In sovereign consumption, consumption is not subjected to an end outside of itself. In the terms of classical Marxism, to act sovereignly is to privilege use over exchange value, or individual over productive consumption. In a temporal schema, to act sovereignly is to privilege the present over the past or future. We might recognize sovereign consumption as noncoercive pleasure or play, consumption that exceeds a productive, work-driven economy. A
consumption characteristic of the bourgeois world, as a cruel accumulation. sovereign world would have the vision-and the language-to accommodate such a recognition and to accommodate it in a mode other than dubbing it irresponsible, irrational, childlike, or mad. Let me offer an example of sovereign consumption from the realm of sexuality, a realm that Bataille also highlights in both his fiction and his philosophy. The compulsory productive heterosexuality characteristic of bourgeois cultures is also part of the coercion to production. Bataille's por [p. 47] nography, all of which describes nonreproductive if mostly heterosexual sex, fits into his project for this reason. Nonreproducrive sex-sex for sex's sake, queer sex, or sex for pleasure-are all modes of nonproductive, or sovereign consumption: consumption that does no work, produces no new workers, and uses energy without recompense. All bourgeois cultural taboos about sexuality are rooted in the coercion to production. For Bataille, the sovereign individual, a version of the Nietzschean noble or Hegelian master (1991b, 219; 1973, 267), "consumes and doesn't labor" (199lb, 198; 1973, 248). Like Nietzsche, Bataille argues that bourgeois societies-we

Accumulation eclipses the character of the sovereign: we stockpile, hoard, and hold in reserve rather than use or enjoy. Our deepest pleasures derive from the hoarding itself: from the security of knowing it is there, should we want it. Because of this out pleasures remain vicarious, theoretical, indefinitely deferred and abstract. In an inversion of economic values, the pressure to accumulate eclipses Bataille's sovereign consumption. Similarly,
readily recognize them as our own-have made this sort of consumption impossible for us by inverting the values attached to it .

in Nietzsche, the priest's inversion of moral values eclipses the goodness of nobility. For Bataille, the bourgeois class is the first-and ultimately only- r revolutionary class: an ascetic class that revolts specifically against the sovereign nobility in favor of accumulation. The bourgeois revolution over against sovereignty conditions and inescapably schematizes all subsequent revolution and appeals to revolution. The very idea and practice of revolution is itself bourgeois. Revolution

is a bourgeois concept, and the world in which Bataille finds himself continues to be the world of a feudal order that is breaking down. Bataille writes: 1 cannot help but insist on these aspects: I wish to stress, against both classical and present-day Marxism, the connection of all the great modern revolutions, from the English and the French onward, with a feudal order that is breaking down. There have never been any great revolutions that have struck down an established bourgeois domination. All those that overthrew a regime started with a revolt motivated by the sovereignty that is implied in feudal society, (1991b, 279; 1973, 321) Conceptually, revolution demarcates the transition from sovereignty to accumulation. Revolution will always be connected with the dissolution of a feudal order and the privileges emblematized by
such an order: access to nonproductive consumption, enjoyment, or use-value itself, by right of birth. [p. 48] But why not, rather, a conception of plenitude and entitlement for

all, also by right of birth, instead of competition and struggle for survival?

Such a view is impossible when Nietzschean ressentiment is the impetus for liberation, because postrevolutionary subjects have learned to demonize the very things that they most desire. This point goes some distance toward explaining why revolutionary class hatred is insufficiently analytic and confuses the aristocracy with the bourgeoisie. It also explains why the revolution attempted in 1848 was a disaster. Bataille
writes: The days ofJuue, the Commune, and Spartakus are the only violent convulsions of the working masses struggling against the bourgeoisie, but these movements occurred with the help of a misunderstanding. The workers were misled by the lack of obstacles encountered a little earlier when the bourgeoisie, in concert with them, rose up against men born of that feudality which irritated everybody. (1991b, 289) Under this historical error, born of the precipitous mixing of classes, the particularity of the bourgeoisie is misunderstood. The bourgeois is no lord or lady waited upon, but a money-grubbing, guilt-ridden, obsessive worker, too cheap to hire help, self-righteously confirmed in his or her work ethic and ascetic way of life. I am not suggesting that the bourgeois does not have privileges. He or she does, but not in the same way as the feudal lord or lady. The bourgeois goal is always further accumulation, never consumption, and therefore never sovereignty . Bataille writes, "The masses have never united except in a radical hostility to the principle of sovereignty" (l99lb, 288; 1973, 329). The masses do not unite against accumulation, except when that accumulation is expressed as sovereignty, and therefore not as accumulation at all, but as consumption . The proletarian

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worker perceives an excessive consumption as the necessary result of the bourgeois accumulation of property. But this is a misperception, for the bourgeois

When the proletarian worker comes to power, a bourgeois revolution recurs because this mass worker, the slave ascendant, forever operates in an economy of scarcity: hoarding resources from the memory of being deprived. The problem of accumulation begins again. The structure is of actual scarcity, followed by perceived scarcity and hoarding that holds on as a historical remainder. Never fully overcome, this remainder becomes part of the historically sedimented fear through which bourgeois cultures function. The problem is that a resentful revolutionary subject is unfit and unable to enjoy wealth and, by extension, political sovereignty . In
does not enjoy but accumulates. The German Ideal [p. 49] ogy, Marx answers this criticism by claiming that through the process of revolutionary action, the proletariat is able to overcome accumulated habit and conditioning, learn to consume well, and thus become fit for rule (1978, 193). Only an upsurge of violent revolutionary action will be a sufficient lesson in consumption, a trial by violence that returns the bondsman back to the scene of the struggle to the death. For Marx, the emergent subject, baptized

the process of revolutionary action instills not liberation but a fearful repetition of servitude, now internal. In short, transformation is never so neat as Marx would have it. The problem of how subjects who have lived through oppression wield power has been notoriously sticky, reappearing in all thoughtful considerations of postrevolutionary subjects.
by fire, is transformed into a being capable of sovereignty-or dead-at the end of the process. But we have seen that

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B. The alternative sways to the rhythms of the revolution. Only abandoning the security of programmable protest can exorcise the capitalist demons haunting anti-capitalist production.
Wendling, 2k6. (Amy Wendling, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ Creighton College. Reading Bataille Now. Ed. Winnubst. P 64-51)

Conclusion T remain hopeful about postrevolurionary subjects and the abilities of such subjects to occupy positions of power in critical and self-aware ways. I also remain hopeful about a notion of sovereignty partially liberated

from the context of oppression in which it was forged and about consumption as enjoyment that somehow exceeds a context of production, or work. In seeking to keep sovereignty alive, Baraille too does not envision a return to the oppreslive sovereignty characteristic of a feudal system . Sovereignty operates for Bataille more as a conceptual, methodological, and practical postulate rather than as a historical nostalgia. But it is precisely because of this that sovereignty can stage its insurgency anywhere.
Baraille suggests that enjoyaunt itself is the upsurge of sovereignty: "The enjoyment of production is in opposition to accumulation (that is, [in opposition) to the production of the means of production) . . . [Sovereignty is] neither anachronistic nor insignificant [because it is the general) condition of each human being" (1991b, 281; 1973, 322, my emphasis). Sovereignty is the

overcoming of the urge to hoard; the overcoming of bourgeois subjectivity; the refusal of the historical sedimentation of cruelty, accumulation, and the bad conscience, Acting sovereignly, I leave behind fear, and I stop living in expectation of death. I fear the loss of enjoyment more than death. Bataille's sovereignty anticipates the existentialist refrain of freedom at any cost. But unlike in existentialism, Bataille's sovereignty preserves corporeality : I live sovereignly, not despite my feats of death, but because of my enjoyment of life. For according to Baraille, "if we live sovereignly, the representation of death is impossible, for the present is not subject to the demands of the future. That is why, in a fundamental sense, living sovereignly is to escape, if not death, at least the anguish of [p. 51] death. Not
that dying is hateful-but living servilely is hateful" (1991b, 219). Nor has Bataille given up on communism: "Sovereignty is no longer alive except in the perspectives of communism" (1991b, 261; 1973, 305). For communism is the only kind of thinking and practice that tries to restore individual consumption, to restore use-value and with it enjoyment as the general condition of life. Bataille knows that the jury is out on communism: its historical moment is too near to rake a clear view of its implications as a whole. Because of its historical proximity, communism has fallen between the cracks of dogmatic and politicized positions. Bataille writes that "the lack of interest in understanding communism evinced by practically all noncommunists and the involvement of militants in a cohort acting almost without debate-according to directives in which the whole game is not known-have made communism a reality that is foreign, as it were, to the world of reflection" (1991b, 264). Bataille's comments on communism in volume 3 of The AccnrsedShare seek to redress this gap, forcing the owl of Minerva to rake her customary flight earlier than usual. Cleansed of teleology, communist revolution becomes the theoretical and practical pursuit of such enjoyment, of a different kind of liberation. And in contemporary thinkers as diverse as Jacques Derrida, Donna Haraway, and Antonio Negri, we find sketches of

non-teleological liberations, which are no longer revolutions that reinstate repressive subjectivities. Derrida speaks of ongoing, underground practices of resistance (1994, 99). Haraway insists on the non-innocence and impurity of all positions of resistance that appear alongside hegemonic cultural ideals (1991, 1997). Addressing the temporal deferral of communism itself,
Negri writes, "Communism does not come in a 'subsequent period,' it springs up contemporaneously as a process constituting an enormous power of antagonism and of real supersession" (1991, 181). Anticipating these thinkers, Bataille situates the real

interest of communism in its vision of a human being whose general condition is to play without labor in an economy of plenty . No price must be exacted for enjoyment, and there is no
question of entitlement. The

eclipse of this assertion, in favor of the accumulating and stockpiling of the means of production for future use, is communism missing its own best point

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We must sacrifice the need to promote the greater tood to break with capitalism.
Yang 2k. (Mayfaire Mei-Hui, Professor of Anthropology @ the U of California, Santa Barbara. Current Anthropology, Volume 41, Number 4. Aug-Oct. 2000)
Another body of critiques of capitalism emerging in French intellectual circles (Schrift 1997, Botting and Wilson 1998) offers a very different approach from the more dominant tradition of political economy which privileges the tropes of labor and production. Inspired by Marcel Mausss (1967) classic work on primitive gift economies and by a Nietzschean challenge to the asceticist ethics and utilitarianism of capitalism, these writers include Georges Bataille (1985, 1989a, 1989b), Jean Baudrillard (1975), Pierre Bourdieu (1977), Marshall Sahlins (1972, 1976), and Pierre Clastres (1987). Instead of taking capitalism as the subject of analysis, these writings seek to mount their critique from outside capitalism, focusing on the radical difference of primitive economies and the way in which primitive

sacricial, ritual, and festival economies present oppositional logics and harbor the potential for alternative social orders. Despite certain shortcomings, these works are more conducive to re- conceptualizing capitalism in such a way as to
gift, reveal the multiplicity of economies, the tensions between them, and their differential embeddings within the larger social formation. The passage from The Grundrisse with which we began is also cited by Baudrillard in The Mirror of Production (1975:8687), but he does so in order to launch his unique critique of historical materialism. Baudrillard ob jects to Marxs assumption that the contradictions of labor and ownership in capitalism can be projected back to precapitalist societies such as primitive, archaic, and feudal forms as their structural pivots. Although Marx

.challenged bourgeois society, his theories did not go far enough to extricate themselves from the productivist and utilitarian ethic of capitalism found in such concepts as subsistence, labor, economic exchange, and relations and means of production. For Baudrillard, this failure to achieve a radical break from capitalist epistemology means that Marxism liberates workers from the bourgeoisie but not from the view that the basic value of their being lies in their labor and productivity. Historical materialism is thus unable to grasp the profound difference between societies based on symbolic circulation and societies based on ownership and exchange of labor and commodities. Notions of labor and production do violence to
these societies, where the point of life and the structural order are predicated not on production but on symbolic exchange with humans, spirits, and ancesors. Historical materialism cannot see that these

societies possess mechanisms for the collective consumption of the surplus and deliberate antiproduction whenever accumulation threatens the continuity of cycles of reciprocity (p. 143). It fails to recognize that they did not separate economics from other social relations such as kinship, religion, and politics or distinguish between infra- and superstructure. It also perpetuates the Enlightenment invention of Nature as a resource for human production rather than an encompassing symbolic eld whose offerings to humans must be compensated through sacrice.13 Baudrillards emphasis on consumption and the radical difference of precapitalist formations owes much to the earlier work of Georges Bataille.
Bataille produced a very different kind of critique of capitalism, one focused not on production but on consumption. He found that in archaic economies production was subordinated to non- productive destruction (1989a:90). The great motive force of these societies was not the compulsion to pro- duce (which unleashes a process of objectication whereby all forms of life, including humans, become things) but a desire to escape the order of things and to live for the present moment through exuberant consumption in the form of excesses of generosity, display, and sacrice. The societies of Kwakwa _ka _wakw potlatch feasting, Aztec human sacrice, Islamic militarism, and Tibetan monastic Lamaism all understood the necessity of nonproductive expenditure (Bataille 1989b). They set aside a major proportion of their wealth for expenditures which ensured the wasting and loss of wealth rather than rational accumulation. This destructive consumption allowed them to avoid the deadly hand of utility and to restore some of the lost intimacy of an existence without a separation between sacred and profane. Whereas Weber (1958) looked to religion to explain the origins of the capitalist ethic, Bataille looked to archaic religion for seeds of a subversion of capitalism. If forms 13. of archaic ritual prestation and sacricial destruction of wealth could be reintegrated into modern economies, capitalism would have built-in mechanisms for social redistribution and for limiting its utilitarian productiv- ism and incessant commodication of nature and culture. Its expansionary tendencies would suffer frequent shutdowns and reversals. Baudrillard contests the functional explanation that primitive magic, sacrice, and religion try to accomplish what labor and forces of

sacrice is engagement in reci- procity with the gods for taking the fruits of the earth (1975:8283). Batailles project called for widening the frame of our economic inquiry to what he called a general economy, which accounted not only for such things as production, trade, and nance but also for social consumption, of which ritual and religious sacrice, feasting, and festival were important components in precapitalist economies. In
production cannot. Rather than our rational reading of sacrice as producing use values, Batailles approach, religion was not an epiphenomenal derivative of the infrastructures of production but an economic activity in itself. A general economy treats economic wealth and growth as part of the operations of the law of physics governing the global eld of energy for all organic phenomena, so that, when any organism accumulates energy in excess of that needed for its sub- sistence, this energy must be expended and dissipated in some way. What he proposed in his enigmatic and mes- merizing book The Accursed Share was that, in our mod- ern capitalist productivism,

we have lost sight of this fundamental law of physics and material existence: that the surplus energy and wealth left over after the basic conditions for subsistence, reproduction, and growth have been satised must be expended. If this energy is not destroyed, it will erupt of its own in an uncontrolled explosion such as war. Given the
tremendous productive power of modern industrial society and the fact that its productivist ethos has cut off virtually all traditional avenues of ritual and festive expenditures, energy surpluses have been redirected to military expenditures for modern

warfare on a scale unknown in traditional societies.


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Ba- taille thought that the incessant growth machine that is the post-World War II U.S. economy could be deected from a catastrophic expenditure on violent warfare only by potlatching the entire national economy. In giving away its excess wealth to poorer nations, as in the Mar-shall Plan to rebuild war-torn Europe, the United States could engage in a nonmilitary rivalry for prestige and inuence with the Soviet Union, that other center of industrial modernitys radical reduction of nonproductive expenditure.14 Thus, Bataille wished to resuscitate an important dimension of the economy, nonproductive expenditure, that has all but disappeared in both capitalist and state socialist modernity.

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Sacrificial expenditure challenges the logic of accumulation that sustains consumerism Yang 2k. (Mayfaire Mei-Hui, Professor of Anthropology @ the U of California, Santa Barbara. Current Anthropology, Volume 41, Number 4. Aug-Oct. 2000) Scholars such as Jean-Joseph Goux (1998) have pointed to a troubling overlap between Batailles views on luxury and sacricial expenditure and postmodern consumer capitalism. Consumer capitalism is also predicated on massive consumption and waste rather than on the thrift, asceticism, and accumulation against which Bataille directed his theory of expenditure. It exhibits potlatch features in the tendency for businesses to give goods away in the hope that supply creates its own demand; it collapses the distinction between luxury and useful goods and between need and desire (Goux 1998). Unlike modernist capitalism, postmodern consumer capitalism is driven by consumption rather than production. Thus, Batailles vision of the ritual destruction of wealth as defying the principles of accumulative and productive capitalism does not address this different phase of consumer capitalism, whose contours have only become clear since his death in 1962. It seems to me that despite their overt similarities, the principles of ritual consumption and those of consumer capitalism are basically incompatible. If Bataille had addressed our consumer society today, he would have said that this sort of consumption is still in the service of production and productive accumulation, since every act of consumption in the world of leisure, entertainment, media, fashion, and home de cor merely feeds back into the growth of the economy rather than leading to the nality and loss of truly nonproductive expenditure. Even much of modern warfare is no longer truly destructive but tied into the furthering of military-industrial production. Nor, despite its economic excesses, does our consumer culture today challenge the basic economic logic of rational private accumulation as a self-depleting archaic sacricial economy does.15 Furthermore, capitalist consumption is very much an individual consumption rather than one involving the whole community or social order.

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Alternative Solves
Alternative Solves Extincton
Only a confrontation with the violence of human ritual can prevent extinction Wendy Hamblet, Asst Prof Philosophy at Adelphi University, 2004
[Sacred Monstrous: A Reflection on Violence in Human Communities p. 7-13] The ontological assumptions and logical mechanisms that structure our actions and are played out in our experiences issue from an existential ground far deeper and more complex than can be fathomed by rational analysis, and they exercise a power far greater than that of rational argument-a fact that, until the postmodern era, perhaps Nietzsche alone hilly appreciated.
Nevertheless, persistent mechanisms structuring sequences of actions can be rationally analyzed. They can be identified, tracked and employed as an interpretive device to indicate possibilities for future actions. Persistent mechanisms have been traced over lifetimes, over generations of lifetimes, over centuries and even millennia. This is because sequences of actions repeated over long periods of time become inscribed into the bodies of the participants, just as, over time, sequences of practices become inscribed into the "bodies" of participating cultures-into [p. 8] the painful recollections of their elders, into the submissive timidity of their womenfolk, into the fleshy expectations of their young. Bodily practices come to settle deep into the resentment-riddled, guilt-prone, swaggering or timorous materiality of their progeny. Actions repeated over long periods become "ritualized." That is, they take on, by virtue of their time-defying persistence, a portentous seriousness--a "sacred" import-in the minds of practitioners and their inheritors. This is how traditions are formed and come to assume a "timeless validity." The practices that mark individuals as belonging to a cultural group, and that mark cultures as self-identical over time and distinct from alien others, come eventually to be obsessively regulated with strict governance over the place, time, and circumstances of their repetition. All manner of valuable-and not so valuable-practices become part of a people in this way. People become wedded to their customs ("rituals" in ethological parlance). Giving up what we do comes to be equated with giving up who we are, forsaking the glory of our pasts and betraying our destinies. Thus rituals acquire a time-honoured weight in a community. Their communicative power extends the identity and indeed often, in the beginning, the very life of the group across vastly fluctuating politico-economic circumstances. Rituals comprise a medium of continuance, a powerfully conservative force, precisely because they compose a kind of communication, the most concrete kind, Rituals, as sequences of actions rooted in pragmatic interactions, convey the traditional "wisdom" that regulates the life of the group-matters of hygiene, sexual practice, marriage custom, rites surrounding birth and death, and especially rites of passage initiating newcomers to full membership in the fold. Many of the practices persisting in this way were originally adaptive and many remain crucial to the healthy continuance of the group. Whether they remain adaptive within the evolving social unit or not, their "goodness" is categorically affirmed with each repetition by each new generation, perceived as empirically tested and reconfirmed across time. Ritual traditions thus become emotionally-significant, utterly tangible, materially embedded realities, and though their origins and functions may have become utterly lost to the group's memory or shrouded in myth, their communicative power remains fully functional even without memory or

ritual traditions do not simply convey rationally-identifiable and meaningful information-ideologies. In fact some rituals do not convey any explicit messages at all, but, rather, they comprise an in-form-ing process that directly "affects" (in all the multivocal senses in which this term is classically understood) the addressee as much as the addressor. Many scholars, like Mircea Eliade, have argued that the truths expressed in myths comprise ontological and ideological disclosures that dictate visions of cosmic reality and patterns of dominance and exchange. However, if
understanding.' Therefore

myths are the symbolic expression of deeper, older, experiential truths, as contemporary scholarship now agrees, then it is reasonable to accept the claim of many anthropologists that our thinking and our behaviors today remain in-form-ed by the practices repeated by our distant forbears. [p. 9] Experiences speak to the core of our psyches. They seep into the very sinews of our bodies and carve themselves into our feelings and desires so that new 'needs" crop up where old practices have gone before, new needs that now require satisfaction. Walter Burkert explains this biological process called "imprinting": Biology has drawn attention to the phenomenon of "imprinting," an irreversible modification by experience, distinct from normal learning by trial and error; it is most notable in early stages of life. In fact, religious attitudes seem to be largely shaped by childhood experience and can hardly be changed by arguments; this points to the imprinting effects of ritual tradition. 4 There are other indications that ritual practices have powerful and lasting effects. Since the rituals practiced by early human communities were almost entirely rituals of murder, torture and expulsion, long-standing rituals may very well have manipulated the evolutionary chain. After all, ritual murders, ritual castrations, and ritual expulsions are very real extinction, very real closure of certain genetic lines, very real ejection from the genetic pool of the social group. Thus, the powerful individuals who oversaw the ritual life of the community (priests, kings, medicine men) could not only self-select for survival. They were in a position to fix and manipulate the biological-as well as the religious and moral-composition of the group and define, by elimination of the "contaminating" elements, the markers of identity peculiar to it. 5 For a number of sound reasons, then, the power of ritual histories and their mythological expressions needs to be taken seriously. Thus it seems important for thinking human beings to examine not only their present rituals and their recent histories, for traces of the in-form-ing violences, but to consider as well the rituals that were practiced by our ancestors in the distant past of human time. Granted, this examination of self and species may expose things more comfortably left concealed. As Edward Shils has asserted in his article "The Sanctity of Life": To persons who are not murderers, concentration camp administrators or dreamers of sadistic fantasies, the inviolability of human life seems to be so self-evident that it might appear pointless to inquire into it. To inquire into it is embarrassing as well because, once raised, the question seems to commit us to beliefs that we do not wish to espouse and to confront us with contradictions which seem to deny what is self-evident.6 Thus I do not expect that an exposure of the continuity between our current supposedly benign self-defining practices and the bloody practices whereby human communities have historically taken shape will prove reassuring of our assumptions of the moral progress of the species. But, hopefully, this exposure will require us to look at ourselves differently. Perhaps it will unsettle the selfrighteous assumptions peculiar to Western capitalist nations and force us, as [p. 10] individuals, to question our own behaviors and suspect a personal quota of the legacy of violence. Ancient rituals have proven fascinating to experts from a wide range of disciplinary fields. Psychologists, behaviorists, classicists, philologists, literary theorists, historians, zoologists and anthropologists have contributed to the rich discourse on this intriguing subject. What strikes me as uncanny is the number of correspondences among the various theories, correspondences all the more significant for the diversity of inductive bases grounding the various disciplines, for the dissimilar approaches and methods of investigation, and for the diversity of assumptions and impulses driving their pursuits for insight. I shall assume that the mysterious correspondences among the theories can offer us a firm ground for thought about the nature of our species' early ritual histories. The Exaggerated and the Grotesque The debate over ritual's penetration into human psyches and cultural forms first began in the 1960s with the shocking claim of behavioral physiologist Konrad Lorenz that human adaptive rituals, designed to ensure species survival, had turned maladaptive early in the dawn of human time, thwarting the healthy development of the species in the direction of a grossly exaggerated aggressiveness. In his masterpiece, On Aggression >7 Lorenz does not simply claim that humans maintain beastly instincts, but, rather, that the beasts are more adaptively evolved than humankind and thus less disposed than humans to murder their own kind. Lorenz explains that, in early humans, the development of cultural artifacts rapidly outpaced biological evolution. Humans developed an arsenal of weaponry of unparalleled destructive potential and variety of form, while failing to develop the inhibitors, natural to animals, that would discourage their turning those weapons upon each other. Lorenz's point is precisely that humans are different from animals (a point lost to many of Lorenz's more critical readers8). Animals adapted more effectively to environmental changes along a slower evolutionary path so that healthy braking mechanisms kept pace with their destructive potential. Human beings were not so "evolutionarily" lucky. Intra-specific aggression is

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originally an adaptive process, Lorenz explains. It develops in species to serve four important selective

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functions. First, it helps to maintain an even distribution of animals over a given inhabitable area. Second, it aids in sexual selection. The rival fight naturally selects the hardier, more aggressive fighters to command both territorially and sexually. Thereby a third benefit is accomplished. Family defense is enhanced since the selective process favors the evolution of particularly strong and courageous defenders of family and herd. Fourth, intra-specific aggression leads to the establishment of a ranking order in the group, a feature Lorenz notes as crucial to the development of advanced social life in higher vertebrates. Ironically, the "pecking order" that [p. 11] results from aggressive rivalry ultimately brings stability to the community since it creates a social situation in which fights between the members are limited to the service of sorting and ordering functions." intra-specific aggression, then, serves important functions in the healthy evolution of the animal group and remains adaptive where its limits are intact. Under restricted conditions, it accomplishes the cooperation and cohesion that hind the group and enhance its chances for survival in hostile environments and over against other animal groups. Humans, however, are distinguished from animals in this regard: humans evolved very quickly into the kinds of beings who were not restricted by their environment. They gained a relative freedom ti-om environmental exigencies very early in their evolution, beginning with their mastery of fire. This remains the crux of the problem for humankind's exaggeratedly aggressive urges. In a particularly disturbing passage, Lorenz tells: Obviously, instinctive behavior mechanisms failed to cope with the new circumstances which culture unavoidably produced even at its very dawn. There is evidence that the first inventors of pebble tools, the African Australopithecines, promptly used their new weapon to kill not only game but fellow members of their species as well. Peking Man, the Prometheus who learned to preserve fire, used it to roast his brothers; beside the regular use of fire lie the mutilated and roasted bones of sinanthropos pekinensis himself. !O Lorenz explains that when intra-specific aggression exerts selective pressures uninfluenced by environmental pressures, it can develop in a direction that is markedly maladaptive. Evolution of the species can then take a turn that can he irrelevant or detrimental, or even catastrophic to the

Aggressive behavior can, more than any other qualities and functions, become exaggerated to the point of the grotesque and the inexpedient. Humans have been particularly exposed to the
survival of the species. ill consequences of maladaptive selective processes, according to Lorenz, The "grotesque and inexpedient" destructive intensity of the human being is a "hereditary evil" that drove the earliest men to slaughter their fathers and brothers and neighbours. Lorenz asserts that selective processes gone astray are what we are still witnessing today in elaborate displays of aggressive prowess, those perverted elaborations of swaggering machismo and overblown bravado still practiced in obsessively patriarchal societies. In nature, fighting is an ever present phenomenon and the weapons and behavior mechanisms that serve that process are highly developed. Yet fights between intra-specific rivals rarely end in death. Encounters between prey and predator may result in death but this does not constitute aggression, on Lorenz's terms. According to Lorenz, a victim sought for food does not incite "aggressive" impulses any more than a chicken in the refrigerator incites human aggression. Animals stalking food do not display the "expressive movements" that signal aggression. On the other hand, those signals are clearly displayed in the [p. 12] way young boys thrash each other in the schoolyard or young men brawl in barrooms, or eyed in the heated explosions characteristic of political debates or sports contests (among both participants and spectators). 1 venture the speculation that the

mere invention of atom bombs by beings as flammable as we are testifies to the perversion of human aggressive impulses toward "the grotesque and the inexpedient." Lorenz distinguishes between rituals transmitted by tradition and those passed by heredity, but the distinction
is a moot one, Rituals that have begun as traditional practice, like the redirected aggression ritual (a ritual that prevents aggression toward the mate or another intimate member of the social group by diverting it toward a more remote or defenseless object) become, after long practice, part of what Lorenz calls "the fixed instinct inventoiy"2 of the species. This indicates that rituals

take hold one way or another. They will eventually become identifying marks of the group whether consciously accepted, enforced and transmitted to the young, or absorbed into the bodies of the participants to develop into needs that become, in turn, driving forces that require their means of discharge. Perhaps the most stunning among Lorenz's many shocking claims is the priority of aggression rituals
to rituals of love, nurturance and friendship. The latter, explains Lorenz, developed over many generations as trans form at ions of "ceremonies of appeasement," rituals meant to redirect aggression by placating the attacker. Intra-specific aggression-selective practices grown "grotesque and inexpedient"-are fundamental to the human world, thousands of years older than love or friendship, and source and origin of the latter. Lorenz asserts: intra-specific aggression can certainly exist without its counterpart, love, but conversely there is no love without aggression. 13 Even laughter in its original form was probably an appeasement or greeting ceremony developed from redirected aggression.' 4 I suggest that we can still witness its aggressive roots in the cruel way that children (and many adults) ridicule others who are mentally or physically different or culturally alien to the home group. Lorenz's project is to demonstrate that, by observing the natural behavior patterns of the animal world, we will discover not only much that will remind us of our own behavior, but much that warns us that our behavior may not be under the strict governance of reason that we believe it to be. Lorenz is committed to collapsing the popular fallacy (the fallacy upon which was originally founded the discipline of anthropology) that all that is "natural" is adaptive. Our inclinations may all too often follow blindly the patterned materiality of our histories and, since our histories are primarily murderous, that is a problem for healthy human engagement. Many people today still refuse the evolutionary explanation for the development of humankind on earth. It not only contradicts their religious myths and challenges the notion of human centrality in the cosmic drama, but the claim that we are evolved from apes offends their sense of species supe [p. 13] riority. However, if Lorenz is correct, the common origin of human and beast is not at all the problem. It is the differences between us and the animals since the forking in the evolutionary chain that causes our greatest problems. Lorenz has fallen from the foreground of the discussion of human nature largely because he employs the language of "instincts" to speak about human behavioral dispositions. The concept of instinct has lost favour in philosophical and social scientific discourse not merely because that term reminds us of the discomfiting fact of our animal ancestry, but because the admission of instinctive behaviors suggests a "biological fatalism" that precludes the viability of analytical solutions to human problems." Instincts are morally blind and thus it is disturbing to think our behaviors under their sway. But it is important to note that Lorenz himself was no biological fatalist. He firmly believed that we can, over time, alter even fundamental dispositions. But his final analysis of the human situation was not overly optimistic, as the concluding words of his book testify: how abjectly stupid and undesirable the historical mass behavior of humanity actually is. 16 Lorenz does not intend to clear human beings of the charge of maladaptive behaviors. Rather, he wants the history of that inaladaptativeness to stand as an ethical warning to the species.

Unless we develop healthier rituals of engagement, we are doomed to the biologically just deserts of species extinction.

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Sacrifice confronts the horrific violence dripping through our language of justice and peace. The aff dooms us to excessive murder in the name of the good.
Kenneth Irzkowitz 1999 [Assoc Prof Philosophy at Marietta College, College Literature 26.1]

The problem with equating Bataille and Kierkegaard is that the depiction of sacrificing the low for the high suggests a more conventional moral position than Bataille puts forth, one where sacrifices are understood as good, in the name of a greater good, whether we reach this good or not. This is precisely the position Bataille sets out to
resist, however, and not only because, as he puts it, "we do not possess the excessive store of strength necessary to attain the fulfillment of our sovereignty" (1962, 167). The problem is more one of the value or direction of our exertions than of their strength or brute force. Some of our exertions are good but others are evil.

Sovereignty actually takes us in the latter direction, with our sacrifices authenticated but in the name of something other than the good, perhaps something not higher but lower. Bataille's own words to this effect are that "Evil-an
acute form of Evil-has a sovereign value for us. But this concept does not exclude morality: on the contrary, it demands a 'hypermorality" (4973, unpaginated preface). indeed, his view is that our ultimate aspirations will be misunderstood unless we see them less on the side of good than of evil. When he calls for a hypermorality, he demands we recognize that in fully accounting for ourselves, the prohibition of evil aspirations does not suffice . Here Bataille invokes Sade to represent sovereign aspirations as entirely gratuitous, what Bataile calls "the need for an existence freed from all limits" (1962, 162). Sade is an exemplar to show us that we have such aspirations. What we can see in him, says Bataille, "is the ruinous form of eroticism. Moral isolation means

"pleasure is . . close to ruinous waste" (1962, 166), with "[e]rotic conduct ... the opposite of normal conduct as spending is the opposite of getting" (1962, 166). In this view, we regularly engage in behaviors that actually amount to an extravagant exercise in" squander[ing ourselves] ... to no real purpose" (1962, 166). Moreover, these include both
that all the brakes are off; it shows what spending can really mean" (1962, 167). One thing such spending shows, according to Bataile, is that sexual behaviors as well as others far more extreme, &uta&ty aa munlcc are further steps in the same direction. Similarly prosti tution, coarse language and everything to do with eroticism and infamy play their part in turning the world of sensual pleasure into one of ruin and degradation. Our only real pleasure is to squander our resources to no purpose, just as if a wound were bleeding away inside us; we always want to be sure of the uselessness or the ruinousness of our extravagance. We want to feel as remote from the world where thrift is the rule as we can. As remote as we can: that is hardly strong enough; we want a world turned upside down and inside out. The truth of eroticism is treason. (Bataille 1962, 166-67) The purpose of offering a series of such strong, disturbing characterizations is not to dismiss ordinary moral values but to supplement them, to say that such values are not enough for us. At the same time that we outlaw and condemn all of these ruinous squanderings, our sovereign aspirations demand them. The list includes brutality, murder, prostitution, swearing, sex, infamy, ruin, degradation, and finally treason. These are activities we must prohibit, activities we cannot allow ourselves to participate in, but which at the same time identify who we are. Hypermorality instructs that while we cannot take up such behaviors, we cannot not take them up either. We cannot not squander ourselves in these and other ways, many of which are offensive of mention to ordinary morality. To help emphasize just

, the communal production of a wasteful expenditure witnessed in common. Bataille uses the word "sacred" to describe the experience of the witnesses, underlining just how fundamental and revelatory to us he thinks such events were. Disturbing as it must be to us, he holds that the event of the spectacle of ritual sacrifice has power of conveying a profound meaning, This sacredness is the revelation of continuity through the death of a discontinuous being to those who watch it as a solemn rite. A violent death disrupts the creature's discontinuity; what remains, what the tense onlookers experience in the succeeding silence, is the continuity of all existence with which the victim is now one. Only a spectacular killing, carried out as the solemn and collective nature of religion dictates, has the power to reveal what normally escapes notice. (Bataille 1962, 16) It is a disturbing thought that only a spectacular killing, that only events of this kind, can satisfy the human desire for the experience of sacred meaning. Along with a fear of our own immoral excess comes
how offensive, there is a passage near the beginning of Death and Sensuality depicting the spectacle of primitive ritual human sacrifice the question of whether hypermorality invites unleashing this destructive excess. Would Bataille like to see us unleashed, perhaps in the style of Charles Manson, to produce our own spectacles of ritual sacrifice? Certainly Bataille describes irrational violence as having an undeniable meaning, one that is revelatory of the sacred continuity alluded to in the previous citation. Soon after that citation he similarly asserts that we seek "the power to look death in the face and to perceive in death the pathway into unknowable and incomprehensible continuity" (1962, 18). Where do

described above. In other words, to acquire the power to know the unknowable, the production of transformative violence is the key. In the name of this power, the production of violence is not an accident but a goal. This production is the key to the transformative experiences that give our lives a sense of intensity, depth, and meaning. Hence, we always have
we find this power? We find it in transformative experiences akin to the sacrifice ample motive to seek such experiences, to seek to bear witness to transformative violence. Given such ample motive, violence and spectacles of such violence will be produced. Moreover, no morality will ever be able to put an end to these productions. No morality has the power to stop the persistence of the sacred violence in our lives, since this violcnce is the only key we have to the experience of the miraculous, of the sacred. As for Charles Manson, Bataille would certainly try to understand Manson's and our own violence in this context of the sacred, of our need for depth and meaning. The production of transformative violence is fundamental to our being, whether we are conscious of it in this way or not . He, then, would not regard Manson's production as an anomaly, as unlike what he himself would be driven to produce. Yet in our lives there are also limits. It is unlikely that Bataile would applaud Manson for the same reason he ultimately rejects Sade. They are both indiscriminate; they both go too far. "Continuity is what we are after,' Bataille confirms, but generally only if that continuity which the death of discontinuous beings can alone establish is not the victor in the long run. What we desire is to bring into a world founded on discontinuity all the continuity such a world can sustain. De Sade's aberration exceeds that limit. (Bataille 1962, 13) In other words, our wasteful consumption must also have limits. To actually approve of our own self-destruction goes too far. Later on in Death and Sen suality, Bataille continues, Short of a paradoxical capacity to defend the indefensible, no one would suggest that the cruelty of the heroes of Justine and Jullette should not be wholeheartedly abominated. It is a denial of the principles on which humanity is founded. We are hound to reject something that would end in the ruin of all our works. If instinct urges us to destroy the very thing we are building we must condemn those instincts and defend ourselves from them. (Bataile 1962, 179-80) This passage is crucial for understanding Bataille's ethics. Usually Bataille writes on behalf of the violence that remains unaffected by absolute prohibitions. Prohibitions cannot obviate this transformative violence . There is always ample motive to produce the experiences of sacred transformation, i.e., to transgress the prohibitions. Yet self-preservation is also a

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fundamental value for BatailIe there is also ample motive to resist the violence that denies the value of the well being of life itself. As he says in the second of the above passages, we must condemn what threatens to destroy us; our sovereign aspirations can be taken too far. In another passage he speaks of our need "to become aware of... [ourselves] and to know clearly what... [our]

It is when we are ignorant of these aspirations that we are most vulnerable to them, enacting them anyway, albeit inattentively. In the end, hypermorality asks us to encounter our aspirations to evil, to join in what Bataille
sovereign aspirations are in order to limit their possibly disastrous consequences" (1962, 181). calls "complicity in the knowledge of Evil" in order to construct what he calls a "rigorous morality" (1973, unpaginated Preface). What does it mean to encounter such aspirations, to join in such complicity? Bataille's hypermorality requires that, as a culture, we appreciate the value of becoming more active in our productions of violence. From his earliest writings to his latest, Bataille

the decline of the practice of sacrifice in the modem world, beginning in the West, and he always believed that such a decline only obscures our productions of violence, rather than doing away with them or the needs
always bemoaned from which they stem. Two closely related discussions of this appear in his early essays "The Jesuve" and "Sacrificial Mutilation and the Severed Ear of Vincent Van Gogh," where Bataille suggests that the decline of the practice of sacrifice has been far less than a blessing for us. He argues that the production of violence continues , the danger of this production continues, although in the most unrecognizable forms. The examples given in the essay "Sacrificial Mutilation" emphasize both how easy it is to distance ourselves from this danger as well as how terrible such a danger could be. They include a man twisting off his own finger and a woman tearing out her own eye, both terrible examples of our strange, cruel, and uncontrollable needs for expenditure. Along similar lines, as a commentary on events of this kind, Bataile argues, The practice of sacrifice has today fallen into disuse and yet it has been, due to its universality, a human action more

sacrifice, with the goal of answering a need as inevitable as hunger. It is therefore not astonishing that the necessity of satisfying such a need, under the conditions of present-day life, leads an isolated man into disconnected and even stupid behavior. (Bataille 1985, 73) Here as throughout his writings, Bataile emphasizes two key aspects of the decline of sacrifice that we ignore at our own peril. In the first place, he contends that the violent need that ritual sacrifice was once able to address remains with us despite all optimism to the contrary. We don't put violence on display in the same ritualized fashion, but the need remains constant . We've only become less aware of it in ourselves, and less aware of ourselves as those who have need of such violence. Thus Bataille's first point is that the need for nonproductive usages does not diminish when it is denied . His second point is that this denial in which the need persists represents a decline in self-awareness, one with obviously dangerous consequences. No longer do we congregate as a community to witness the violence we desire to bring into this world and to affirm our lack of control over this violence, our lack of control over this desire. We no longer congregate to produce the sacrificial spectacle, to produce thereby a community of mutual complicity in the knowledge of the sacred continuity of being. We no longer allow ourselves to organize spectacles in the name of the sacred that enact that which exceeds the good.
significant than any other. Independently of each other, different peoples invented different forms of Such spectacles would have to violate every stricture of human rights known to us today. Yet we have not changed, according to Bataile, except for becoming less known to ourselves than ever. We are now more than ever the condemned on the way to becoming the destroyed by way of imagining ourselves as the good. Even an utter catastrophe like the Holocaust does little to alter our naive self-image. In his short piece on David Rousset's book The Universe of the Concentration Camp, Bataille refuses to side with the moralists because moralistic self-delusion here is our problem, not our solution, There exists in a certain form of moral condemnation an escapist denial. One says, basically, this abjection would not have been, had there not been monsters .... And it is possible, insofar as this language appeals to the masses, that this infantile negation may seem effective; but in the end it changes nothing. It would be as vain to deny the incessant danger of cruelty as it would be to deny the danger of physical pain. One hardly obviates its effects flatly attributing it to parties or to races which one imagines to he inhuman. (Bataille 1991, 19) Based on what we have already seen in this paper, Bataille can never accept the moralist's claim, distancing us from the purveyors of evil, no matter how attractive it is to join hands at a particular moment of victory over an oppressive enemy. It would be inconsistent for him to specify a particular set of disagreeable behaviors and state that they aren't human, that they aren't ours. Even at this point, standing in the ruins, the main point would be to obstruct our all-too-ready inclination to find ways of denying the cruelty at the heart of us all; to interfere with our desire to attribute all cruelties to the monstrous one or the aberrant few. For hypermorality, this cruelty is precisely what we need to take into account of ourselves, rather than to deny it as the evil of others. How is this to be done? Bataille faces a serious dilemma that a contrast between his hypermorality and Aristotle's morality helps to show. The goal of morality is to take virtuous behaviors into account, to make them part of our lives by learning through habituation to enjoy right behaviors with respect to our pleasures and pains. Aristotle says that it is the job of "legislators [to] make the citizens good by forming habits in them .... and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one" (1941, 952, 1103b). He continues saying that "the whole concern both of virtue and of political science is with pleasures and pains; for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly bad" (1941, 955, 1105a). As he puts it, "We assume ... that excellence tends to do what is best with regard to pleasures and pains, and vice does the contrary" (1941, 955, lIlO4b). How do we become excellent? We begin with instruction by role models, who demonstrate the praiseworthy behaviors and the rule to follow in practice until we follow it automatically, internalized as part of our second nature of moral character. Such learning is by imitation of those who delight in shunning the wrong pleasures, who delight in withstanding the right pains. Such imitation is difficult but noble and good, making us excellent. In contrast to these virtuous displays serving Aristotle's purposes of moral instruction, what about the kinds of spectacles or displays Bataille proposes with his hypermorality? Whereas Aristotle's are displays of virtue, Bataile's would be closer to displays of vice. Whereas the former invite imitation of the right relations to pleasure and pain, the latter would invite imitation of morally wrong relations. In the former case we have a heroic role model. In the latter case, the role model would be closer to the opposite, to the traitor, the practitioner of vice; the role model would be closer to Sade. Hence, finally, whereas in Aristotle, the learner easily accepts the identification with the role model and wants to continue to imitate his/her virtuous pursuits and aversions, in the latter case, such identifications would

hypermorality proposes that we witness ourselves as we can never accept ourselves. In the sacrificial spectacle, we witness ourselves far removed from the Aristotelian model, closer to vice than virtue, closer to evil than good, closer to the other's pain than to his or her pleasure. For Bataille, only by witnessing ourselves in this way (as we are) do we begin to take into account the cruelty that lies at the heart of us all. Still, how far in the direction of
have to be tenuous at best, always fraught with ambivalence and would even be unacceptable. In this sense, Bataille's praiseworthy cruelty can we really go? Bataille bemoans the decline of the practice of ritual sacrifice, seeing in our cultural and personal excesses of violence the same need at work as in the ritual sacrifice, albeit in a far more destructive fashion. But there can be no clear solution to this problem we face, even assuming it has been correctly understood and portrayed. Bataille himself admits in discussing Sade that we cannot consent to practices that are overly destructive On the other hand, only the sacrificial spectacle would seem to be effective in showing us to ourselves, with the prospect of such showing lying at the heart of hypermorality itself. What to do in the face of such a dilemma? It is obviously horrible to exercise cruelty, yet perhaps even worse to do

, "Our ignorance only has this incontestable effect: It causes us to undergo what we could bring about in our own way, if we understood" (1988, 23). Pie! asks us, in support of Bataille, to consider the only options we have, Will. - [we] continue to "undergo" what.. [we] could "bring about." that is, to let the surplus provoke more and more catastrophic explosions instead of voluntarily 'consuming" it, of consciously destroying it through ways .[we) can choose and" agree to"? (Pie! 1995, 104).
nothing, to find no way to praise and pursue this exercise. Doing nothing, we can have the pleasant ease of remaining ignorant of our situation and dilemma. But as Bataile explains

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The tragic spectacle of sacrificial violence enacts the best ethical relationship to the horror described by the 1AC. As we wound, we ourselves are broken. If we flay the affirmative, we also wear their skin.
David Allison, Prof Philosophy at SUNY Stony Brook, 2009 [The Obssessions of George Bataille: Community and Communication ed. Mitchell/Winfree p. 122-123, 127] To communicate with another is to break through his integrity, his independence, his autonomy, his nature-to intrude upon him, unsettle him, wound him. Communication takes place when beings put themselves at risk, each putting himself and the other in the region of death and nothingness. Communication is suicidal and criminal. It is striking that the longing to communicate with those most unlike ourselves-with sacred and
demonic beings-so dominates ancient humanity. The outer zone where the sphere of work and reason comes to an end is the sacred--sacrum,

Sacrifice-of goods, other animals, even of our firstborn children--is the most significant of all human acts (OC 2: 1 3/VE 73). It is as fundamental as the satisfaction of needs. The word sacrifice-sacrum ficio---etymologically means "to make sacred. In a sacrifice something supremely precious-our finest harvest and livestock, our firstborn son- _is set aside from all use, separated absolutely from the profane sphere. What is set apart from all profane use is separated absolutely, definitively, in being destroyed. The knife that tears open the body of the sacrificial victim, tears apart his protective hide or skin that kept him functioning, releasing blood and the writhing turmoil of spilt organs, reveals the violence of a stag or boar taken from the wilderness, the inner violence of its life, reveals anonymous untamed forces in the child.
"separated. The shaman, the priest, Abraham penetrates into the sacred zone, and there, in the violence of the knife and consuming fire, sacrifice reveals the sacred. The sacrificial priest leaves the profane sphere to perform the sacrifice and act in the name of the people who identify with his act. Bringing to him of their harvest and

Those who perform sacrifice identify themselves with the victim. The[p. 123] Aztec priests covered themselves with the blood of the sacrificial victims, excoriated them, and pulled the skin of the victims over their own naked bodies. And
livestock, the beast of the wilderness, or their firstborn child, they participate in his deed. we who consign to the sacred sphere our resources, the game from our hunt, our own children, identify with them, identify with the victims. The stag or wild boar sacrificed would have sustained and nourished us, How could we not identify with our own firstborn child, sacrificed to the mountain god Jahweh? At the moment of the blood sacrifice, the participants find their own identity plunged into the void. When the fire blazes upon a sacred victim, it blazes too on us .

We slash open, crucify, or burn in holocaust the divine force that has been revealed in the sacrificial victim. The slashings and fire we inflict on what is precious to us-our finest livestock and harvest, our firstborn son wounds us irremediably. We communicate with wounds inflicted and self-inflicted. The communication takes place between humans and sacred beings, each rent, wounded, exposed to one another by their wounds. God and humans communicate in the violation of the integrity of their natures, in crime. Continued.
Tragedies, whether the real tragedies of individuals or those represented in tragic theater, hold us in anxiety and in fascination. Our energies are expended in contact with terrifying cataclysms of nature and with individuals torn asunder, whose agonies rend our self-sufficiency. Tears and grieving disconnect the future and recognize that the force and meaning of the past have come to an end. The forces of life hold on with strength and will to the present with all its irrevocable loss, inconsolable with words and projects. Tragic art holds humans in thrall to losses that they themselves have not known. Communication occurs when doctors, nurses, and truck drivers go to the 50 million people today displaced by wars and famine, to perform surgeries in dusty tents, distribute sacks of food, nurse children dying of AIDS. [p. 127] "What seems 'faultless' and stable-a whole that has a look of completion (house, person, street, landscape or sky). The 'fault,' or defect can appear though" (OC 5: 266/C 30). They, too
are incomplete. They are not crystallizations in the intersections of the universal laws of the universe. "On the same level you find-the ridiculous universe, a naked woman, and torment" (OC 5: 267/C 31). In current language, communication strongly denotes communication among humans; but Walter Benjamin found biologists wondering whether in fact all animate organisms communicate, whether communication belongs to the nature of animate organisms. However, communication there meant the transmission of information. In Being and Time, Heidegger, replacing the substantive account of things with the relational account of implements, reduces things to the force that informs the user. The term communication, as Bataille uses it, to denote the contact of a sovereign being with what is other, is first the

communication with the sacred and demonic; it is also communication with other species, inanimate things, the material universe. It is with our incompleteness, our orifices gaping open, and our unanswerable questions that we communicate with a world out of joint, spread about us disconnected, a concatenation
of riddles, fragments, and dreadful accidents.' Indeed, communication with the sacred and with natural things is prior to communication with other humans.

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Sacrifice enacts ecastic community, celebrating a non-servile ontology beyond enslavement to fear of loss Jesse Goldhammer 2005
[Lecturer/Instructor, Institute of Government Studies, U.C. Berkeley, The Headless Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought p. 179-191]

I propose to assume as a law that human beings are never united with each other except through tears or wounds, an idea that has a certain logical force in its favor. When elements arrange themselves to create the whole, this is easily produced when each of them loses, through a tear in its integrity, a portion of its particular being for the benefit of the communal being. Initiations, sacrifices, and festivals represent just such moments of loss and communication between individuals.78 This passage captures the important interconnectedness of sacrifice, ontology, and community in Bataille's thought. Human beings are not united by self-interest or altruism; they are not bound together by fear, faith, or contract. Com p. 184 munity begins only when useless, violent, and wasteful activities force humans to confront death, calling the integrity of their selves into question. This confrontation with nonbeing is liberating because it generates a nonservile ontology: Indeed, in this state of being, one is not even a slave to one's self. Bataille writes: " The sacrificial tear opening the festival is a liberating tear. The individual who participates in the loss is vaguely aware that this loss engenders the community sustaining him."" Community and liberty thus paradoxically arise during frenzied, violent moments of self-disintegration, when communication between individuals is nondiscursive and ecstatic. The group Ac6phale, Bataille's final collaboration of the 393 as, attempted to use sacrificial practices in
order to conjure a Bataillian community into existence. Unlike the Cercle or ContreAttaque, Acbphale was a secret society whose members expressed no interest in engaging in politics or organizing a mass movement. Instead, Acphale met and conducted sacrificial rites in the Saint-Nom-la-Bretbche forest outside Paris. In an effort to practice what the College had been content merely to debate, Acphale sought to reconstitute the sacred in everyday life. Its goal, according to Stoekl, was "to stimulate the rebirth of the kind of social values Bataffle had espoused in the Critique sociale essays: expenditure, risk, loss, sexuality, death ?'8 In creating Ac6phale, Bataille wished to bypass politics, which had proved to be only an impediment to the formation of his sacrificial community. The members of Acphale ominously contemplated conducting a real human sacrifice, but no one was willing to play the role of executioner. The failure of these sorcerer's apprentices-the term used by Bataille to describe Acphale's "work"-illustrates the exhaustion of Bataille's concept of sacrifice. There is a direct connection between Bataille's reading of the regicide of Louis XVI and Acphale's conjuring of a sacrificial community. The sacrifice of the king and of politics prepares for the possibility of a community formed by a tragic but joyful disposition toward death. Death is vital to communal formation because, as Richmart remarks, "it reveals to all persons both their finitude and extension into unbounded ecstasy."81 In notes titled "Joy in the Face of Death:' Bataille ruminates on the regicide's principal mystery, which inaugurated the discdurse on sacrificial violence: "Human hearts never beat as hard for anything else as they do for death?' Maistre marvels at soldiers' enthusiasm on the battlefield. Sorel reflects on the attractive, contagious, and sublime qualities of martyrdom. Bataille responds similarly to the importance of the experience of sublime violence:"It seems that a sort of strange, intense communication p. 185 is established among men each time the violence of death is near them?' Batailie, like Maistre and Sorel, believes that the individual experience of death promotes a kind of ecstatic communication that possesses important social effects. Unlike them, however, Bataille points to a fundamental disruption of being as the impulse to communicate: The grave, decisive change that results from death is such a blow to spirits that, far from the usual world, they are cast, transported and breathless, somewhere between heaven and earth, as if they suddenly perceived the dizzying, ceaseless motion possessing them. This motion then appears to be partly dreadful and hostile, but external to the one threatened by death or the one dying; it is all that is left, depriving the one who watches the dying as much as the one who dies. Thus it is that, when death is present, what remains of life only lives on outside, beyond and beside itself .

Ecstatic experience-life that "lives on outside, beyond and beside itself"-is the basis for the kind of communication that renders Bataillian community possible. This experience is instantiated sacrificially, allowing the sacrificer to participate in the unrecoverable loss of the sacrificed. The cumulative effect of such a confrontation with death is ontological destabilization, which Bataille characterizes as a permanently wounded self. For Bataille, the regicide involves such a total loss that it augurs the formatioi of a community in which all political concepts, including man himself, have been sundered, leaving nothing behind save unemployed negativity itself. While participating in Ac6phale, Bataille
held that sacrifice's tearing of being would join humans together through communication that invoked a unique. communality: "Those who look at death and rejoice are already no longer the individuals destined for the body's rotten decay, because simply entering into the arena with death already projected them outside

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themselves, into the heart of the glorious community of their fellows where every misery is scoffed at ... The community is necessary to them in order to become aware of the glory. bound up in the instant that will see them torn from being.""

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Sacrifice breaks with the ontology of goods, enabling ecastic community beyond the humanist subject Chris Gemerchak, PhD Philosophy from Katholike University in Leuven Belgium, 2009
[The Obssessions of George Bataille: Community and Communication ed. Mitchell/Winfree p. 64-78]

Bataille assimilated the wisdom of the underground man who realized the inhumanity of subjecting oneself to reason and mathematics, calculation and prosperity, and who asserted the positive value of letting pure caprice and whimsical desire command one's actions, even if-no, precisely because-it goes against reason and common sense. Alternatively, I could have asserted that the foundation of Bataille's ethics rests on a refusal to submit to the homogeneous economy of goods insofar as that is to forfeit the fullness of our humanity, that one should not treat others as things insofar as that is to turn oneself into a thing among things, self-same, separate and
isolated. Neither response would have been wrong, but neither do they get to the obscure heart of the matter-the very obscurity of which is why it was and remains a very challenging question, one that has stayed with me ever since that sweltry afternoon. For while it may be true that there are obvious answers, it is not necessarily the case that they do justice to the question, or even understand the question in a deep sense. On the one hand then, it is possible to specify clearly Bataille's views concerning ethics or morality as those terms are commonly understood: namely, as concerning the deliberative choices of a subjective agent, an individual who autonomously determines the best course of action in the interest of the greatest good and according to existing norms. For it is precisely this style of normative, utilitarian ethics that Bataille will challenge on the grounds that it is inadequate to the breadth and ambiguity of life. And this is because every term involved in such an ethics-deliberation

and action, but particularly individual, interest, good and shouldis representative of the very type of humanist ideology and representational thinking that Bataille sees not only as distorting but also as alienating with regard to the human province . This is not to suggest that Bataille advocates an unrealistic, anarchistic gesture of eliminating morality full stop. In fact the existence of traditional morality is rather convenient in terms of having something against which one can resist. What he contests rather is the hegemony of an ethics that adheres to the principle of reason, which, as he asserts frequently, comes down to the calculations of interest for the good of the individual or a community of individuals and is oriented toward survival in the future rather than life in the present. If he is to contest
the ethical perspective that guarantees the sovereign rights of these terms-'individual' and 'community,' 'good' and 'interest'-then the first step is to undermine the stability of these terms themselves. To approach the core of Bataille's thought with respect to being "ethical"-or ethical being-we will thus follow Bataille's methodology as he tries to unearth the component elements of traditional ethics from their sedimentation. This method involves a double gesture. The

first move is a radical questioning-or better, putting at risk-of the ethical individual, the [p. 65] humanist subject (individual or group) as the paradigm of an ethical being. That which undermines the individual perspective, and
thus is at the core of his ethical thought, is a moment of communication, an "inner experience" (l'exptirience intrieure) that reveals the existence of community. This will become clearer as we continue. For now let us say that his new ground and paradigm of ethical thought will be community. The second move then, as just suggested, will be to rethink this alternative "ground" of ethics and to rethink "the Good" which is at stake, a task that will engage us in an exploration of his thought concerning the transformation of communal being, the being of community No Interest in the Individual Bataille was infamous for the lengths to which he would go to undermine our habitual perspectives, and the fundamental target at which his various excesses took aim is the one habit it seems hardest for us to unlearn-the individual perspective. As indicated above, the first step in any articulation of his morality is the calling into question of the subjective agent itself, the human subject understood in the traditional sense of an active, self-reflexive identity or ego (the "I" or the Cartesian subject) who autonomously determines a course of action based upon prior knowledge of its goals and in conformity with a doctrine of human goods and norms. In question is effectively any notion of a transcendental subject with

The central problem to address when articulating Bataille's ethics of community is thus his critique of the ideology of the subject qua individual, which is the primary obstacle to overcome if community is to emerge. Yet Bataille knew how recalcitrant our mentality is when it comes to challenging this notion. He knew that the individual
good intentions. perspective is not to be swept away with a single gesture. Indeed, one of the cornerstones and constants of his thought is precisely the attempt to undermine the notion of a self-identical subject-the subject as a thing-or the notion of identity full stop. One might even go so far as to say that the entirety of his anthropological and religious thinking rests on the notion of the insignificance of the individual in isolation. This assertion, however, brings with it an entire shift of perspective concerning our activities and values, our capitalist economy and parliamentary democracy, and of course our ethical doctrines. For with this challenge to humanist ideology as a starting point, all those ways in which an individual affirms oneself and pursues ones own interest-right down to the very desire to persevere in being, to stay alive, to banish death from life-are viewed as betrayal of the truth of existence: the truth of "intimacy." Intimacy, to be sure, is a term which resists positive definition. It is not a state that [p. 66] can be achieved.

It is simply there in anguishing and ecstatic moments of self-loss or coniniunication: anguishing because of the violence enacted on the individual who has the impression of being torn, of dying to oneself as an individual; ecstatic in that the habitual perspective of being a separate individual-of having one's own existence apart from others and the things of the world-dissolves in communication with the outside, a brief moment of release that effectively extends one beyond (one's) being and out into nothingness. These terms will be clarified as we continue. In short then, the challenge of intimacy or communication to the hegemony of individuality is the hidden foundation of Bataille's

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identifiable morality. The challenge is precisely this: intimacy and communication occur in moments where one puts one's existence into play by assuming the risk of death (se niettre ell'/e,4), such that failure to do so, to flee from death or fear for one's continued existence in the future is to forgo the truth of "sovereign" (free and useless) existence and accept a life of servitude: "Play ... leads to the inoperable spirit (ci l'esprit dsoeuvr)" (OC 5: 234/US 208; tm); play has "as its end the indifference to every end, being only an occasion to show a soul beyond the concerns of utility " (OC 12: 106). To the "obvious" answers to the question of Bataille's
ethics that I mentioned above, we could thus add something like this: to exist in the service of some interest, to subordinate present life to an end or future goal, to judge actions according to their usefulness, consider the greater good or even think of consequences beyond the present moment ... in short, to work or employ one's negativity in any way is a betrayal of the humanity within us, is a "fragmentation" of existence and the time of existence.

Continued
It is possible to pinpoint almost exactly the crossroads where this difficulty first became explicit. We jump to July 4, 1939, the date of Bataile's final lecture to the loose association of influential intellectual figures known as the "College of Sociology?' Political forces and technological rationality had combined to bring Europe to a state of critical mass, With the dying breath of the College, Bataille articulates what he claims to be the "final question of man, or, to take it further, the ultimate question of being," which hangs in the balance as the group disbands, and its members go their separate ways. Now during his lecture leading up to the formulation of this 'ultimate question,' Bataille refers to certain cardinal notions that had emerged in his most recent writings and that he would continue to reformulate and refine with an increasing sense of urgency in the years that immediately followed.' Foremost among these is one of his most influential concepts penned in the seminal article from 1933 ("The Notion of Expenditure," OC I: 302-20/yE ll-29) and pursued under different guises for the better part of thirty years, namely, the "principle of loss" or "nonproductive

expenditure. With this he means violent, destructive, or "unreserved" expenditure that is blind to and in defiance of recompense and that generates sacred, symbolic, or nonutilitarian value. In addition to, and perhaps in contradiction with, the active sense of loss as excessive expenditure that had often dominated his thought to this point, in this final lecture to the College he also emphasizes one of his other fundamental principles, the "insufficiency" of being(s)," which brings with it mutually implicative ontological and anthropological connotations. First, the principle of the insufficiency of being rejects the traditional notion that Being is something substantial and knowable (or even something at all), some higher identity or essence that serves as a foundation and goal of existence. Being, rather, is no-thing and nowhere, is movement and pure difference. Second, this principle also establishes the radically desirous, open, or social nature of the
human being. According to the insufficiency of being, the human [p.70] being is desire pure and simple: "revealed nothingness, an unreal emptiness, the presence of the absence of a reality,"" which seeks to recognize itself in another being of desire, another emptiness housed within an external form. If one is not to close one's eyes to an upsetting consciousness of the truth of existence, then one must be willing to acknowledge the fact that one is essentially nothing, an absence misguided by reflection into thinking it is a presence. It is just such a revelation that Bataille, in countless ways, attempts to bring to light. But as suggested earlier, the principle of individuation is always putting up its defenses to this abysmal truth. Consequently, the insufficient or "incomplete" nature of the human being entails that the being in question is always and everywhere searching for something that will provide it some self-assurance and restore its sense of identity. If the subject is essentially insufficient or incomplete it will attempt to fulfill or complete itself outside itself, whether through production, acquisition, or merger. It would seem then that the human

being is defined by a fundamental impasse: the desire to lose is coupled with desire as insufficiency, which quickly translates into the desire of the individual to "lose itself in some other ['vaster being"] that exceeds it" (OC 2: 369/VE 250), to gain being by losing it. Again, he declares a fundamental 'need' for loss as expenditure: "Men, assembling for a sacrifice and for a festival, satisfy their need to expend a vital excess. This "loss," however, is not exactly irrevocable: "The individual who participates in loss is obscurely aware that this loss engenders the community that supports him" And this brings us back to Batailles "ultimate question," which reads as follows: "[I]t is difficult to know to what extent the community is but the favorable occasion for a festival and a sacrifice, or to what extent the festival and the sacrifice bear witness to the love individuals give to the community" (OC 2: 371/VE 251). This simple opposition, proving undecidable, would have a crippling effect on Bataille's attempt to identify a real community that would remain faithful to his inviolable principles.

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Sacrifice shatters the ontologies of wholeness we use to rationalize the world Alexander Irwin, Asst Prof Religion Amherst College, 2002
[Saints of the Impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the Politics of the Sacred p. 161-163]
Because sacrifice resists rational or moral purpose, Bataille provides it with a radically different charge. During most of the, rg3os, Bataille views sacrifice as a form of collective violence, but one that no longer operates within the domain of people's beliefs, serving to structure and bound them in politically meaningful ways. Instead, Bataille conceptualizes the effects of sacrificial violence ontologically because he identifies reification, not moral decadence, as the fundamental modern problem. In his view, capitalism, utilitarianism, and parliamentarianism have reduced human beings to servile things. The spirit of Bataille's diagnosis of the human condition is not, prima facie, dissimilar from that of either Maistre or Sorel. They, too, argue that the morally regenerative properties of sacrificial violence will serve to heal human beings of their reification. But because Baraille includes morality itself among those phenomena that contribute to the decadence of the modern age, he rejects his predecessors' concern with a return to moral and spiritual wholeness. Bataille criticizes the goal of human wholeness as a

religious and philosophical fantasy that serves only to enslave human beings to the ideal dictates of reason and morality. Furthermore, even if wholeness were desirable, sacrificial violence, as Bataille conceives of it, no longer possesses a regenerative capacity. Rather, sacrifice is a violent operation that exposes human beings to death, loss, rupture, and fragmentationelements of accursedness that Bataille treats as essential components of humanity. Rather than allowing human beings to flee from their base humanity into realms of idealism and purity, such as religion, philosophy, or politics, Baraille suggests that sacrifice offers them a visceral reminder that their humanity is thoroughly intertwined with what humans reject as radically orher, namely, death or not -being. Thus, the antidote to reification in the modern age consists not in regenerative morality or reconstructed wholeness, but rather in a confrontation with what Bataille calls the accursed share (ha part inaudite).14 For Bataille, unity and wholeness are antithetical to being human, which avoids reification only when it confronts its own absence, an experience achieved through sacrifice. Although Bataille radically rejects many of the previous definitions of sacrificial violence in the French discourse, he retains its most important feature: communality. Even in Bataille's hands, sacrificial violence illustrates the paradox of a community built around violent destruction . Maistre characterized sacrificial loss conservatively: death reinvigorated preexisting, divinely sanctioned, social and political norms. The French revolutionaries and Sorel viewed sacrifice more creatively as the collective taking of a life for the sake of a new sociopolitical order. Because Bataille defines sacrifice as violent, unrecoverable loss, it contributes to a concept of community fundamentally opposed to those envisioned by Maistre, Sorel, and the revolutionaries. Republicanism, monarchism, and anarcho-syndicahsm all presuppose the possibility of authority, even if they posit radically different embodiments of it. Baraille's concept of sacrifice gives rise to a community in which the act of foundation never coheres. What binds the community together is the shared experience of unrecoverable violent loss. Sacrifice cultivates community by fostering a nondiscursive communication between human
beings whose sundered individuality permits the formation of an ecstatic bond. This bond gives rise to a metapolitica.l community in which sovereignty has neither basis nor dominion. In Bataille's view, sacrifice cannot participate in the construction of republicanism, monarchism, or anarcho-syndicalism because, like the obelisk, those ideas of community betray their sacrificial origin by positing the possibility of a renewed erection of authority. Baraille's concept of sacrifice invites reflection on what community would be if it were never to recover what was violently destroyed to create it. This is a fundamentally antipolitical notion of community insofar, as it subverts all the concepts that have historically made politics possible. Although Maistre, Sorel, and the French revolutionaries agree on little politically, all posit a theory of sacrificial violence that requires replacement or recovery of that which sacrifice destroys.

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Rational political discourse fails. Only claiming the sacred enables resistance to power.
Alexander Irwin, Asst Prof Religion Amherst College, 2002 [Saints of the Impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the Politics of the Sacred p. 214-225] How, in the context of a country without a future, a society whose moral bases had collapsed, a civilization poised on the brink of suicide, was it possible to find meaning in life, to articulate ethical positions, to speak of beauty, loyalty, love? No area of individual or collective life appeared unaffected by the contagion of meaninglessness, violence, cynicism, and sham (RCL, ). The language itself in which conventional philosophical and political discourse had
been conducted appeared corrupted to the point of uselessness. For many, words like "democracy," "freedom," or "revolution" -to say nothing of the still more vacant abstractions of theology and old-fashioned moral philosophycould elicit nothing but indifference, or a sneer. The old values were unquestionably defunct. But how (from what materials and according to what guidelines) were new values to be discovered or "created" (BOG II, a73)? Even if new, legitimate values were somehow to emerge, moreover, it seemed doubtful they could be disseminated. Public

debate on ethical and political questions -whether in the academy, the intellectual and artistic world, or the parliamentary institutions of bourgeois democracy -appeared to lead nowhere. Rational discussion degenerated into demagoguery or remained powerless in the face of immediate or threatened violence. An endless proliferation of mutually exclusive theories, claims, and programs filled a plethora of short-lived reviews, bulletins, journals, books, and manifestos, yet the outpouring of frantic intellectual energy generated few if any meaningful results. To argue political and moral [p. 215] positions honestly appeared impossible when the very language of discussion had been undermined by propagandistic misuse and when Hitler's example seemed to demonstrate conclusively that not ideas but brute force ultimately charted the course of history. How, even if good ideas could be devised, could they ever be convincingly expressed and allowed the chance to exert influence? The better political and social ideas were, Weil argued in the concluding pages of Reflections, the more likely they were to challenge fundamental societal assumptions, and the more certain it became that media enfiefed to the status quo would caricature or ignore these ideas, effectively preventing them from ever becoming matters of serious public debate. These are the challenges with which Well and Bataille found themselves confronted in the 19305. They are issues that will perhaps strike us as not wholly unrelated to our own experience. The difficulty Bataille, Weil, and their contemporaries confronted was the necessity both to create (or discover) values and to communicate them. The social context rendered these tasks urgent and inseparable. As Weil again noted in the
later pages of Reflections, the structures of education, information, capital, and power in European society had created a situation in which those possessing the skills and tools for effective communication had nothing meaningful to say, while those with insights into the truth of the social mechanism were deprived of means of reflection and communication, How (if at all) could the two dimensions -truth and expressive power, content and form - be brought together? The problem may again strike us as not without relevance to our own historical moment.

CONTINUED
The elusive, "sliding" quality of the sacred was one of the concept's most important advantages from Bataille's and Well's perspective. In closing, I would like to focus on a particular aspect of this elusiveness. Connected to the Durlcheimian polarity between "right" and "left" forms of sacrality is another fundamental ambiguity, one Bataille and Weil turned to advantage. In both Bataille's and Weil's work, passages can be found in which sacredness appears as what can best be termed a textual phenomenon: a particular way of writing or representing beings, relations, and practices: above all a mode of writing/performing one's self. Seen from this angle ,

sacredness or sainthood would be above all a style of self-production and specifically a literary-political attitude of mobile otherness adopted with respect to the normalizing, monopolar, monolithic power Bataille labeled "homogeneity" and Well "the social." On this reading, sacredness appears not as a particular, fixed content or attribute, but as a shifting stance of perpetual self-giving in and as self-distancing: a stance that maintains the gap between the self and the social order, holding open that separation or wound as the free space for critique and spontaneous creative action . If the sacred is seen in this way, sacredness or "sainthood" might be understood as a tactical self-positioning
comparable to that described by David Halperin in his discussion (within the framework of an impressive piece of contemporary hagiography) of opportunities for a

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Foucauldian queer political praxis. Halperin analyzes queer "identity" not as a rigid essence but as a tactical posture of resistance. Queerness is not a stable feature, disposition, or set of predetermined behaviors. Instead, for Halperin, queer "identity" is or should be an "eccentric positiouality" or "strategic possibil [p. 221] ity" defined by its oppositional character and subject at all times to shifts and revisions.' As another theorist has succinctly phrased it, "The great virtue of 'queer' [lies] precisely in its undefinability; [...] The point is precisely to refuse the accepted identities, the expected and predictable alignments or divisions." Whatever its ultimate fate within the field of contemporary

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theory, the notion of queerness as "positionality" illuminates a significant aspect of the way in which notions of the sacred functioned for Bataille and Well. Bataille and Well frequently discussed sacredness, heterogeneity, or sainthood in terms that allow these qualities to appear as names or markers for a strategic stance or "potentially privileged site for the analysis of cultural discourses." 12 For these figures, sacrality names an intellectual style, a pattern of self-positioning in political spaces. Sainthood as practiced by Weil and Bataille is a systematically critical orientation to society and politics, always operating from a stance of heterogeneity and risk. Sacrality is the performative assertion of alterity and unmasterability. As Weilian good or as Bataillean evil, the sacred is a "sliding" positionality of resistance to the normalizing effects of dominant social value systems, the perpetual reassertion of a critical "nonidentity. 1113 This sort of nonidentity, much more than a haughty rejection of communal bonds as such, was what Weil intended with her famous refusal to "live in a setting [milieu] where one says 'we' and to be a part of that 'we'" (AD, z6). To position! construct oneself as sacred is to model a movement confounding hegemonic forces' efforts to assign stable, manipulable social and political identities (e.g., "woman," "Jew," "philosopher," "leftist," or "homosexual") correlated with predictable patterns of thought and behavior. Weil's and Bataille's mobilization of religious language in political space functioned as a means to elude standard grids of ideological localization and control. Yet numerous passages can also be cited in which both authors describe and invoke the sacred not as a "textual" phenomenon, but as a real and potent force capable of exerting a concrete influence on the world. This is patently true of Weil's absolute good (object of the saint's love and radical obedience), which she routinely characterizes as a binding and transforming energy, an "active force" (E, 336) whose powerful effects on individual human be [p. 222] ings and communal milieus can be discerned, by the qualified observer, with a precision and assurance comparable to those attained in the prediction, verification, and measurement of physical forces by the natural sciences." Meanwhile, Suzanne Guerlac has shown convincingly that Bataille,

too, is concerned with the sacred not merely as a textual phenomenon or literary trope, but as a real affective force capable of generating real political effects. In contrast to his later admirers in the Tel Quel group, preoccupied
above all with textual transgression and with "a question of philosophy, and of its end," Bataille himself pursued "the religious question of the sacred (which, since Durkheim, is related to the implicitly political issue of social cohesion)." As Guerlac indicates, this preoccupation has been a source of discomfiture for Bataille's antireligious admirers and exegetes, who have generally sought to "evacuate" the dimension of the sacred from their interpretations of his work." Which is it, then? Is the sacred a critical positionality, or is it an explosive emotional force unleashed through certain forms of individual and collective practice and capable of altering the shape of what it may no longer be appropriate to call "subjectivity"? Is sainthood a stance one adopts, a theatrical mask one borrows, or is it a heterogeneous force that

the protean (call it "formless" [BOG I, 117]) character of the sacred enabled this equivocation. Therein lay a part of its appeal. "The sacred" could point simultaneously and equally to an " eccentric positionality" and to an emotional energy, a "force agissante" unleashed through the communicative practices these writers sought to model. Precisely this double valence made the concept valuable for the revisionings of political and literary practice on which Bataille and Weil embarked, Yet if sacredness is a force (the motor of the "sovereign operation"), it is never in these two writers the unilateral discharge of power. On the contrary, sacrality/sovereignty manifests itself as perpetual "revolt ," never "the exercise of power" (BOG V, zar). Sacredness is the mobile, multifaceted contestation of all efforts to fix power in rigid hierarchies that place some human beings "at [p. 223] the disposal" of others (RGL, 52, 83-84). That this stratification and the resulting exploitation regenerate themselves perpetually within any complex social order as a consequence of its unavoidable division of labor only means that resistance to oppression must be just as tirelessly renewed. Sainthood became for Bataille and Weil a way to name (and, by naming, summon) the real energy of moral wakefulness necessary for this ongoing effort. The sacred as Bataille and Well embodied it was not the engine of a theocratic tyranny, nor an investment of certain structures of power with supernatural legitimation, but rather the endless contestation of all forms of authority that would confiscate autonomy or claim unconditional allegiance. The divine (the impossible) provided leverage for the relativization
borrows us (and that transforms, transmutes, perhaps "decreates" us in the process)? Bitaille and Well refused to decide this question in binary terms, and of all merely human, merely "possible" power claims. As the religious insurgents of all eras have known, men and women inhabited by the holy assume a "marvelous," though no doubt also dangerous, freedom vis--vis the established social order (BOG I, 270). For Bataille and Well, such freedom - which may become an "obligation" (EL, 8o84) - is the liberty to venture perpetually into those "places" (social, political, religious, erotic) that are "most repugnant to decent society" (BOG I, 270). It is in the experience of this transgressive freedom that the emotive and political dimensions of sainthood (its dual aspects as active force and critical positionality) come together. It is to participation in this interminable performance, the never-completed "rites of liberation" (270), that Bataille and Weil incite.

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Sacrifice enacts a headless community, radically challenging all hierarchy and authority
Jesse Goldhammer 2005 [Lecturer/Instructor, Institute of Government Studies, U.C. Berkeley, The Headless Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought p. 157-160]
Because the obelisk is like an authoritative pile driven into a foundational swamp filled with sacrificial blood, it cannot return to the French what they, in a fit of revolutionary fervor, destroyed. In the Place de la Concorde, spatially speaking, an empty notion of authority surrounds a traditionally elevated one. As Denis Holier writes, "Bataille's Place de la Concorde ... is the place where loss is incarnate-embodied in a man who identifies himself by his lack. The

headless man,

Acephalus, rises up where the guillotine let in the freezing gales of empty space. "' Holier's observation reveals
Bataille's agreement with Maistre: the regicide was a profoundly evil act, which Maistre lamented and Bataille celebrated. Rather than auguring the return of God, as Maistre had hoped, the regicide killed him, leaving in his place an absence so complete that it forbids the accumulation of transcendental power. Negativity or

destruction without recompense: such is the fruit of the regicide and the basis for Bataille's concept of sacrificial violence. The regicide does not make way for the obelisk, which represents none other than the next generation's sovereign intentions. Rather, the regicide calls into question any future claim to authority, leaving the Place de la Concorde to represent not a place of peace, but rather one of permanent disorientation and subversion. Somewhere under the
obelisk remain the impression of the guillotine and the blood of the king. Informing Bataille's novel interpretation of the regicide, antipathy toward morality, and subversion of power-indeed, his attitude toward politics in to lo is a trenchant rejection of idealism. He rejects all traditions of thought that value the ideal or elevated over the material or base. One of his most eloquent critiques of idealism appears in an early essay in which Bataille argues that the big toe is "the most human part of the body." Using the big toe as a metaphor for seductive baseness, Bataille explains that human beings reject aspects of their uniqueness when they celebrate all that is noble and pure in the hope of masking all that is low and impure: Although within the body blood flows in equal quantities from high to low and from low to high, there is a bias in favor of that which elevates itself, and human life is erroneously seen as an elevation Human life entails, in fact, the rage of seeing oneself as a back and forth movement from refuse to the ideal, and from the ideal to refuse-a rage that is easily directed against an organ as base as the foot. 'O Bataille uses the image of the big toe to criticize the metaphysics of elevation. Humans err in their belief that humanity is uniquely an ideal achievement. Idealism is reason's attempt to hide the truth about being human from human beings. This error led human beings to demonize the very part of their bodies that Bataille argues is the most human, an exercise in self-loathing. Without the "grotesque" big toe, humans could not stand erect, nor could they differentiate themselves from beasts. This observation recalls Maistre's claim that the greatest human achievements are mired in the worst. Bataille's celebration of the big toe is a reminder that what it means to be human is inescapably deformed, dirty, base, immoral, material, and incapable of rational thought. At the same time, however, Bataille does not seek to elevate the big toe to a higher status. Its value consists paradoxically in its abjectness. Like the regicide, the big toe symbolizes a permanent destabilization of the boundaries established by idealistic thought. When the former royal executioner Sanson guillotined the king, neither monarchists nor republicans imagined that the sacrifice would be a permanently destabilizing loss. Both the Roman and Christian sacrificial traditions instructed otherwise. During the Revolution, the examples of Brutus and Jesus illustrated that different forms of sacrificial violence could be used to destroy as well as create authority. In the minds of the revolutionaries, and then later in the writings of Maistre and Sorel, the concept of sacrificial violence became inextricably linked to the formation of both political and spiritual communities bound together by traditionally elevated notions of power. Sacrifice accomplished this remarkable task by skillfully manipulating the sacred categories that structure people's perceptions of authority. Impurity and purity, sin and redemption, moral decadence and regeneration-these are the dueling sacred polarities altered by sacrificial bloodshed in the French discourse. Sacrifice negotiates be-tween these terms by fostering different forms of exchange. Kill the king, the revolutionaries believed, and the republic would be purified. Embracing a similar logic, Maistre claimed that the Terror would punitively cleanse the French of their secular hubris. More than a hundred years later, Sorel argued that proletarian martyrs would regenerate working-class morality saving-in the religious sense of the word-French society from bourgeois decadence. In all three cases, the sacrificial death of one human being generated new social bonds by neutralizing and reconfiguring the sacred bases of the old ones. Sacrificial loss thus came to be associated with the creation of new morality, new authority, and new political regimes. Sacrificial Innovation in the Work of Bataille Bataille's interpretation of the regicide as a sacrifice that cannot recover what it has lost presents a radical challenge to the Roman and Christian sacrificial traditions as well as to their incorporation into the French discourse on sacrificial violence.

Unrecoverable sacrificial loss is a violent operation that only wastes. In producing nothing useful, sacrifice subverts all idealistic distinctions. Stripped of idealism, Brutus' filicide and Jesus' crucifixion can no longer participate in the task of foundation because sacrifice loses its ability to produce popular authority or redemption . In order for
authority to be legitimate or for redemption to cleanse bodies or souls, the sacrificial operation must be capable of establishing stable, hierarchical boundaries between sacred polarities. Cathartic, expiatory, and redemptive exchange permits this delimitation to take place because violent loss is balanccd against some kind of psychological, spiritual, or moral gain. However, regicide that does not recover something from the violent destruction of the king-that does not make sacred in a particular way-is useless. In this way, Bataillian

spcrifice permits no establishment, no obelisk, no higher source of power or authority, because it is a total loss without sacred exchange. It has no capacity to establish order, as, for instance, between sacrilegious and divine bloodshed, or between force and violence. It can neither recover, nor make useful, the pure sacred authority of the king. Only if conceived in ideal and compensatory terms can the collective taking of a life delineate between high and low, pure and impure. If the desire to practice the art of politics were compared to the myth of Icarus,a favorite of Bataille's, then sacrifice would correspond to the sun's blinding, wasted energy, which melted Icarus' wings, reminding all human beings of the fragility of their activities and their existence. Bataillian sacrifice challenges human beings to confront and test the limits of their being, without ever allowing for the reestablishment of order. It is a violent and ecstatic state of permanent alternation between purity and impurity With no finality, no conservation, and no reserve, Bataille's
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concept of sacrifice reflects not just a critique of idealism but also, more specifically, of Hegelian dialectics. Bataille attended A.lexandre Kojve's lectures on Hegel during which Kojve famously declared history to be over. Bataille's confrontation with Hegelian philosophy left him feeling "suffocated, crushed, shattered, killed ten times over."" If history was over, what was left to do? In a letter to Kojve, Bataille wondered what it meant to act freely in such a condition: "If action ("doing") isas Hegel says-negativity, the question arises as to whether the negativity of one who has 'nothing more to do' disappears or remains in a state of 'unemployed negativity' Personally I can only decide in one way, being myself precisely this 'unemployed negativity' (I would not be able to define myself more precisely). ,12

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A2 A2
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This argument is irrelevant--we dont have to prove Bataille is right about everything to win that the aff is utterly incapable of addressing the states inherent tendency to excessive violence Sacrifice provides the key to understanding violence in human societies Jesse Goldhammer 2005
[Lecturer/Instructor, Institute of Government Studies, U.C. Berkeley, The Headless Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought p. 23-25] Turner argues that sacrifice permits human collectivities to cope with the "negative sentiments" that accumulate as a result of hierarchical social structures. His point about the origin of sacrificial rites is political: the distribution of power in any society-ancient or mo4ern-produces conflict, which, in turn, finds an outlet in sacred practices. Turner overemphasizes the extent to which sacrifice serves as a valve for the release of social pressure. Sacrifice has too many differ-' ent modalities and meanings to be reduced to one function. At the same time, however, Turner makes clear that one important function of sacrifice is the reduction of conflict, which he characterizes as the fostering of "generic human communality" Unlike Ren Girard, who limits the role of sacrifice to the reduction of intracommunal violence, Turner recognizes that sacrifice is also a ritual stage upon which communities play out social, political, and economic conflicts, sometimes with the intention of renovating them, sometimes with the goal of reconfiguring them altogether.32 In claiming that sacrifice fosters communal unity, Turner assumes a distinct political attitude toward sacrifice. This attitude hinges upon his recognition that sacrifice is an ambiguous and process-oriented form of violence that alternates between structure and chaos. According to Turner's terminology, sacrifice is, on one hand, a prophylaxis, which functions to maintain, reinforce, or construct socio-moral boundaries. In this form, sacrifice is highly ritualistic, a preventive talisman against communal disaggregation and harm. On the other hand, Turner writes that sacrifice "may be an indicator of the dissolution of all structuralfines or boundaries, an annihilator of artificial distances, restorative of communitas however transiently,' 133 In contrast to prophylactic sacrifice, this description of sacrificial "abandonment" captures the capacity of sacrifice to dissolve
the bounding limits of social life. Together, these opposing sacrificial impulses illustrate that the sacrificial process is not, strictly speaking, a movement to or from an ordered society. Instead, the sacrificial process contains opposite movements-consistent with Nietzsche's Apollonian and Dionysian forces-that contribute in different ways to communal unity and coherence. Describing this double movementjurner writes: In the sacrifice of abandonment, the classical theological notions of sin, redemption, and atonement all find their places as phases in a process which seeks personal and social renewal through the surgical removal, interiorly in the will, exteriorly by the immolation of a victim, of the pollution, corruption, and division brought about by mere participation in the domain of social structure. Sacrifice is here regarded as a limeo, or entry into the domain of corrununitas, where all that is and ever has been human and the forces that have caused humanity to be are joined in a circulation of mutual love and trust. In the sacrifice of prophylaxis, structure certainly is cleansed, but left intact; here enlightened self-interest

Turner's sacrificial process holds in tension and displays opposing Violent impulses. The sacrifice of abandonment restores a "primitive," undifferentiated unity to the sacrificing community; the prophylactic sacrifice instantiates moral frameworks and structural bonds. According to Turner, prophylactic sacrifice "employs the metaphor of death to
prevails. establish or reestablish structures of society and culture, with which orderly life may be lived?' Thus, the prophylactic sacrifice captures the dominant meaning of martyrdom, which uses the "metaphor of death" to highlight a set of ideals or particular way of life. In contrast, the sacrifice of abandonment generally maps to scapegoats, in whose destruction communities cathartically

sacrifice is not exclusively a reaction to crises, to the natural or human forces of dissolution. Sacrifice can also serve to set in motion disuniing forces in order to es tablish power relations on a new basis. For Turner, sacrifice is ultimately a potent structuring, restructuring, and "destructuring" force capable of bonding communities. 34 Turner's political attitude toward sacrifice is instructive for thinking about the French Revolution, which encompassed such a
participate. Finally, Turner reveals that variety of sacrificial practices. Paradoxically anachronistic and modern, these practices formed a sacrificial process through which different segments of French society alternately sought political protection and dissolution. In the hands of the revolutionaries, who were self-consciously aware of their intention to transform French politics radically, sacrifice came to serve both functions. The revolutionaries used sacrifice to demolish the Old Regime and to shore up the new Republic. The instrumental use of sacrifice during the French Revolution illustrates that there is no conservatism intrinsic to the sacrificial mechanism. Echoing Nietzsche, it also demonstrates that ancient ideas of communal violence can participate in as well as mask modern political struggles

. Those who dismiss the sacrificial practices of the French revolutionaries as anachronistic barbarism fundamentally miss how those selfsame acts contributed to the dissolution and establishment of political obedience. According to this violent tradition, which has such powerful roots in ancient Western politics and religion, authority and communit' begin with neither the word, the deed, nor the contract. Instead, in the
for power

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A2 Kritik contradicts itself because productive/achieves good


Voting neg enacts the sacrifice described in the alternative text. Even if achieves some external goal, that is purely an accidental by-product. At the moment of sacrifice, it is pure expenditure without the expectator of reward. Even if they win thats the alt is somewhat calculative, the aff and perms subsumption of sacrifice to a political program links a great deal more. The fact that we are willing to risk the 1ACs impact proves we are giving up the goods that block our access to the sacred. If the kritik is productive, it is only accidently. The initial moment of the alternatives sacrifice is one of pure loss. Alexander Irwin 2002
[Prof Religion at Amherst College, Saints of the Impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the Politics of the Sacred p. 14-15] Revolution is not- at the very least, not primarily - a means to a practical end (the overthrow of capitalism, the creation of a workers' state); it is an end in itself, a sacrifice in defiance of the principle of utility. The Bataillean revolution aims not at victory, but at pure loss. The political triumph of the proletariat, if it were in fact to come about as a result of such an effort, would have to be seen as a kind of accidental by-product. Yet Bataille is not entirely limpid on the questions of ends and means. Certain passages in "The Notion of Expenditure"
(including the lines just cited on the desire of "the miserable" to enter "the circle of power") can be read as positing overarching political aims for the sacrificial revolution, thus calling into question the purity of "pure loss" in the political realm. While he challenged Durkheim's domestication of the sacred, the reduction of sacrifice to social utility, Bataille recognized that such utility did in fact attach to sacrificial operations (as Mauss had shown that it did to potlatch) and that not only sociologists but the practitioners of "primitive" sacrifice themselves might very well, if questioned, describe their ritual behaviors in terms of utilitarian aims. Bataille did not deny the utilitarian

aspects of sacrifice and its equivalents, but he did maintain that these aspects were secondary and that in the concept of pure expenditure he had identified sacrifice's essential nature.

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A2 Util Good
Utils search for the greatest good collapses into the greatest evil, for it imposes a false bottle-kneck that ensures catastrophic expenditure.
Dan Stone, Professor of Modern History at University of London, 2006 [History, Memory and Mass Atrocity p. 70-73] In his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), a book originally intended as the preface to a huge tract on crime and punishment, Bentham sought 'to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of the law'.4 In this first 'scientific' penal code, Bentham argued that human nature was
governed by two basic feelings: pleasure and pain. He believed these feelings existed as empirical facts and required no special proof. But from this basic premise he jumped [p. 71] to a value judgement that people desired the maintenance of pleasure at all times, a kind of psychological hedonism, which he described thus: By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. [PML: 11-121 Bentham's 'calculus of felicity', the support of the majority for a given policy, required no justification, because it was necessarily bringing the greatest

happiness to the greatest

number.

Given the possibility for immoral applications of Bentham's utilitarianism, we can see why so many today feel appalled by it. For example, how is the liberty of a rapist to be balanced with the pain of the victim? Benthamite arbitration is based not on concerns of equality but on vague notions of 'general welfare'. Clearly, one cannot countenance a philosophy which necessitates a degree of pain commensurate with the degree of happiness to be attained, and that has no moral

The extermination of the Jews was justified (when it was mentioned at all) on similar utilitarian grounds - the creation of the Volksgenieinschaft. It would thus appear to be the ultimate proof of the unacceptability of Bentham's philosophy . But can the origin of the Nazis' goal be explained rationally?
argument against the misery of the few. Since it is borne of 'irrational' fears of racial pollution and so forth, the justification complies with utilitarianism, but the birth of the thought and its realisation do not: 'Only the truly mad could have believed that it was war that they were waging against the Jews.'5 Thus, no matter how indebted to the workings of Zweckrationcditdt (purposive rationality) the bureaucracy of mass murder was, the utilitarian justification of genocide for rhetorical purposes seems only to scratch the surface of the Holocaust.6 The Nazis did justify their actions on utilitarian grounds, and without formally deviating from the hedonistic psychology of Bentham. But one never escapes the feeling that this was merely a cover. Despite the findings of historians with regard to what ordinary people knew at the time, so that it is no longer possible to claim 'Niemand war dabei and keiner hat's gewujlt',7 the extermination of the Jews was not (other than tacitly) a publicly mandated policy. And since Bentham himself worried that increased state intervention would only diminish the possibilities for the pursuit of individual happiness, the utilitarian claim becomes, in the Nazi context of the '55 State', simply an official [p. 72] lie, although those involved in the actual killings attempted to convince themselves and others of the veracity of this he. As SS-Obersturmfiihrer Karl Kretschmer wrote to his wife on 27 September 1942: 'As I said, Jam in a very gloomy mood. I must pull myself out of it. The sight of the dead (including women and children) is not very cheering. But we are fighting this war for the survival or non-survival of our people.'8 Nor can one equate Hitler with the Benthamite ideal of the lawmaker, even given the claim that the 'happiness of the individuals, of whom a community is composed ... is the end and the sole end which the legislator ought to have in view', that it is 'the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be made to fashion his behaviour' (PML: 34, Bentham's emphasis). The trouble is that Bentham equated utilitarianism with conscious calculation, hence usefulness, even though this was not consistent with his basic definition of the principle of utility. In other words, for Bentham, the greatest happiness for the greatest number must necessarily be with the aim of increasing production, of providing benefits for its recipients. And as Hannah Arendt reminds us, it is precisely the absence of utilitarian

What is required here is a utilitarianism that goes beyond utility, that accounts for the apparent paradox that utilitarian goals can aim at uselessness as much as at 'usefulness'. This might provide a clearer response to the Holocaust than the statements so typical of earlier commentators, caught in the
criteria for the concentration camps which lends them their 'curious air of unreality'.9 same trap as Bentham. They, on the one hand, claimed that the Holocaust must be irrational precisely because it served no useful purpose. It is usually the fact that the murders diverted energy away from the war effort that is cited in order to back up this claim; as Alain I'inkielkraut writes: 'We know today that the Germans went against their own interests by eliminating an often irreplaceable labour force which fed their wartime economy." An emphasis on the usefulness of the 'useless' might provide more insight than those theories which, on the other hand, sought to account for the Holocaust within some sort of Malthusian scheme of the ridding of surplus populations (Rubenstein/Aly and Heim), or within a 'Marxist' framework in which the language of the 'Jewish Question' was merely a front for the economic gains to be had from the elimination of the Jews (Kraus and Kulka). Both interpretations can be disproved on straightforward empirical grounds )'

An interpretation of utilitarianism founded on uselessness would be thoroughly consistent with the logic of Bentham, but fundamentally out of step with his emphasis on the benefits to be derived from it. Such a system of thought is to be found in the writings of Bataille. Central to his work is a denial that the energy within human society is [p. 73] adequately accounted for by the notions of production and conservation contained within classical economic theories. Such theories, he claims, are therefore those of a 'limited economy'. As much a critique of Marx as
of Smith, Bataille argues, from his essay 'The Notion of Expenditure' (1933) to Eroticism (1957), that the production and distribution of wealth cannot encompass the entirety of human activity:

The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of a system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or
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if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically.12 Indeed, Bataille affirms that the excess can never be completely absorbed into the rational economy , that profit will unavoidably be squandered by

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A2 Util Good
'dissipat[ing] a substantial portion of energy produced, sending it up in smoke' (AS, I: 22). The 'general economy' comprises both the 'limited economy' of Marxists and liberals, as well as the energy which cannot be used 'profitably' for the increase of equipment.3 The experience of this 'life beyond utility' Bataille terms 'sovereignty' (AS, II: 198). Where Bentham talked of affect in terms of pleasure and pain, and the controlled balance between them to be maintained by calculated action, Bataille's concept of sovereignty was to give full reign to affect: sovereignty is 'the negation of prohibition' (AS, II: 254; cf. 403). In contrast to the utilitarian goal of the production of production (that is, spending on the basis of an expectation of future returns), sovereignty justified all useless consumption, all nonproductive spending (AS, II: 312). Sovereignty was the experience of society's 'heterogeneous energy', entirely dissociated from instrumental action. Failure to permit the functioning of the general economy, that is to say, failure to permit the squandering of excess energy, leads to bottlenecks in the system and 'deprives us of the choice of an exudation that might suit us' (AS, I: 23-4), with potentially catastrophic results. Already we can see where such thought is leading us with regard to the Holocaust. Can the Holocaust be seen as the attempt, under the bourgeois 'limited economy', to attain a life ruled by banished sovereign values?

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Util fails because it is impossible to distinguish between pleasure and pain. Mark Sullivan 2004 [MD PhD, Department Editor of American Pain Society Bulletin American Pain Society Bulletin v. 14 n. 6 Pain and Ecstasy: From Suffering to Sacrifice to Exaltation]
As Sontag mentions, the modern view is that pain and pleasure are directly opposed to each other. One excludes the other in a simple zero-sum game. Jeremy Bentham founded that most modern of ethical theories, utilitarianism, on just this hedonic calculus. Utilitarianism calculates the ethical value of an action by summing the pleasure created and subtracting the pain produced. This theory acknowledges that something could be both pleasurable and painful. But the possibility that something could be pleasureable because it is painful throws the theory into disarray. Subsequent modern philosophers have challenged parts
of Benthams calculus. For example, John Stuart Mill thought some pleasures were higher, or qualitatively better, than others, but he did not challenge the opposition between pleasure and pain. This theme can be found in modern poetry as well. The first stanza of Emily Dickinsons poem 125 is: For each ecstatic instant We must an anguish pay In keen and quivering ratio To the ecstasy. The modern framework rationally balances pain and pleasure in terms of ethical value and of what is deserved. To understand ones reaction to the photo of the ecstatic tortured Chinese man, one needs to look beyond this framework. This photograph does not really show the simultaneous experience

of pain and pleasure. It shows both pain and ecstasy. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ecstasy as the state of being beside oneself, thrown into a frenzy or stupor, with anxiety, astonishment, fear or passion. So it is clear that ecstasy can be produced by unpleasant experiences. As they further explain, The
classical senses of [the Greek word for ecstasy] are insanity and bewilderment, but in the late Greek the etymological meaning received another application, viz., withdrawal of the soul from the body, mystic or prophetic trance; hence, in later medical writers the word is used for trance etc., generally. Both the classical and post-classical senses came into the modern languages, and in the present uses they seem to be blended ( OED Online, accessed 9-22-04). So

ecstasy encompasses the mystical state of rapture where the body was supposed to become incapable of sensation, while the soul was engaged in the contemplation of divine things. The Chinese man does indeed appear as if he might be engaged in the
contemplation of divine things. To help with the understanding of how pain is compatible with ecstasy, Sontag refers us to the ecstasy of martyrs like St. Sebastian. St. Sebastian was an early Christian popularized by Renaissance painters and believed to have been martyred during the persecution of Christians by the Roman emperor Diocletian. When it was discovered that he was a Christian who had converted many soldiers, Sebastian was ordered to be killed by arrows. The archers left him for dead, but a Christian widow nursed him back to health. He then presented himself before Diocletian, who condemned him to death by beating (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2004). A martyrs death brings him to God. This is enough to make the dying process ecstatic. The pain thus endured was thought to provide a cleansing of sins and perhaps thereby to further contribute to ecstasy. The example of St. Sebastian helps one understand pain as a path to ecstasy. But this Chinese man is not known to be a martyr in the traditional religious sense, so some broader path between pain and ecstasy must be found. Perhaps this man murdered the prince as part of a popular revolt, and thus became a martyr for a political cause. Even if this were true, one still needs to understand the path from pain to ecstasy on psychological rather than purely spiritual terms. Sontag offers us a suggestion of this path: from pain to sacrifice to exaltation. The pain is suffered for the sake of another. The purpose of the pain lies outside of the sufferer. And the experience of pain for this purpose literally takes the sufferer out of himself in ecstasy. This is a view of pain and suffering rooted in religious thinking, but perhaps the sense of sacrifice need not be explicitly religious. One nonreligious modern example of pain and ecstasy is the Ecstatic Birthing program in the United Kingdom. Ecstatic Birth is a system designed to help women give birth consciously, easily, and without medical intervention. We can give up our devotion to pain and struggle, expand and give birth to our babies, our projects and our lives in ecstasy (Ecstatic Birth, 2004). This program is similar to other natural birth programs in the United States that focus on relaxation through breathing and visualization as a means to avoid pain medication and other medical intervention (Gaskin, 2002). Although a primary purpose of these programs is to avoid the hospital and medications, the programs also focus on using the pain of uterine contractions as energy that may promote bliss. This is supposed to produce a healthier and happier baby. What is not modern about this image of the Chinese man,

and what makes the viewer cringe, is its picture of extreme suffering as a kind of transfiguration. This simply does not compute in a secular and scientific world view. In this world, pleasure is good, and pain is bad. The notion that pain and pleasure can fold back onto each other in complex ways is absent. The ways in which pain and pleasure can annihilate the self and liberate one from the bounds of the ego are not included. One exception to this rule is an intriguing study that showed that noxious thermal stimuli produced activation in putative reward circuitry as well as classic pain circuitry. (Becerra, Breiter, Wise, Gonzales, & Borsook, 2001). The authors conclude that their data support the notion that there may be a shared neural system for evaluation of aversive and rewarding stimuli. Although this finding provides a possible physiological mechanism for the ecstasy of martyrs, it makes it no less disconcerting. Here, let us return to the eroticism that was Batailles primary concern. He considered eroticism a little death precisely because the boundaries of the self are overcome in sexual climax and the edicts of the rational ego often ignored in its pursuit. We dismiss the pursuit of sexual ecstasy through pain, i.e., masochism, as a perversion that has nothing to teach the rest of us. But for Bataille, this was only one example of liberation through surrender, a paradoxical but universal feature of the human psyche. So, gaze upon this disturbing image of the Chinese man and observe how it makes you feel. Draw your own conclusions.

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A2 Cede Political to the Right/Militarism


We outweigh. At best, this argument proves we arent politically productive. Were winning the imperative to recover the ecstasy of sacrifice is more important than politics, even if it dooms us to nuclear war. Turn-The political discourse of the aff has ZERO chance of checking back militarism. Wars exuberant horror has become its own reward, and the affs indignation conceals the utter irrationality of state violence.
Nick Mansfield, Prof Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, 2008 [Theorizing War: From Hobbes to Badiou p. 95-98] Similarly, the method used by the State to subordinate the war-machine to State-purposes and meaning remains always problematic for the State. We have seen above how the State appropriates and subsumes nomadic logic, marshalling and harnessing it, but that then, the institutions of the State overspill the constraints of
State logic to reinvent themselves as war-machines. The same thing happens specifically in relation to war. The State appropriates the war-machine and gives it war as its set object. Because of its universalising thinking and its commitment to finality, the State always drives to transform its war-machine into total war. This links State war to capitalism, according to Deleuze and Guattari, because only capitalism can provide the resources that make total war possible. Furthermore, in total war, the social and its future change from being a mere resource to being the meaning and purpose of war. Alternative [p. 96] societies in total war are not merely to be subdued but annihilated. In this sense, total war "merely realizes the maximal conditions of the appropriation of the war machine by the State apparatus" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 421).

But unconditioned war is itself always a threat to the State, not only the States it targets but the State that seeks to put
it into operation. Once warfare has become unlimited, with an absolute object, then the State is itself encountering its limits and flirting with the perilous game of trying to put them into operation. The State has given rise to a worldwide war-machine to which it increasingly becomes subordinate. "the appropriation has changed direction, or rather that States tend to unleash, reconstitute, an immense war-machine of which they are no longer anything more than the opposable or apposed parts" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 421). The war-machine then encompasses the whole earth, and exceeds the States that have chosen it. This remapping of the planet by a war-machine in excess of the State was, in Deleuze and Guattari's hands, a way of describing in a new way a world under threat of Mutually Assured Destruction, during the Cold War. However, it is worth considering this in terms of the War On Terror, which has equally held the world hostage to a war-machine perhaps impossible to control. "[lit is necessary to follow the real movement at the conclusion of which the States, having appropriated a war machine, and having adapted it to their aims, reimpart a war machine that takes charge of the aim, appropriates the States, and assumes increasingly wider political functions" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 421). The

war on terror unleashes a total warmachine that overflows the logic of the State and that the State is unable to control. In turn, the culture of the State, its commitment to identity; citizenship and order are under threat from the impulse to violence and domination ostensibly used to protect the State. Because it does not recognise responsibility, the war-machine, even when the State believes it has it under control in the institution of the military order, cannot be held accountable.
As we have seen in Freud and Bataille, the inclusion of this logic within the State always means that the military order can so easily slip over into atrocity. It also means that the imperative of war can be used to evade the normal constitutional restraints of civil society: the culture of war brings into politics a violence and desperation protected from legal niceties like civil rights by a sentimental and physical crudeness and impatience that over-rides the subtleties of law, and even the discussion of political priorities. We must pay attention to the gravity of generals. We must support the troops no mailer how cynical or absurd is the war in which they are prepared to fight. [p. 97] There are other, perhaps more phantasmatic, ways in which the warmachine redefines the State. For example, in entertainment ,

politics becomes subordinate to a kind of lust, in which the State becomes the mere nominal shell of a visceral violence. A teenager secretly refights the Gulf War, He wins a faster, a simpler victory this time, purging his country's purpose of any complication or hesitation. He can ignore all nagging voices. So pure, so patriotic, so uncompromising, so intent, so meaningful, so violent is his trajectory, the parliamentary, bureaucratic, media-savvy sophistries that the State itself has to negotiate cannot inhibit him. There is a clean, vicious, notable and unironic splendour in his violence that he feels he needs to hide, even though he is proud of it. He is more merciless, more purposeful, more right than even the righteousness he commemorates. Folded into his glory is the
validation of the victory of his nation and the carnal luxury of the cruelty it licenses but cannot publicly enact. His mission is a daylight validation of the troops but lacks the conscience and constraint, and the reason to be right. So, his dirty war is a dirty secret he keeps from even himself. Bodies fly backwards over his head, uncounted, unnamed, an ill-defined yet maniacal vermin, easily forgotten. Even the righteous victory of the missionary State played out in your darkened room is shameful: a bit too unrestrained, a bit too cruel, a bit more than might be necessary. The licence provided by the victorious State validates but chokes the cruel subterfuge of the vicious righteous child.

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The hot cathexis of national solidity ensures the President of inalienable righteousness. From here on in, it is all just planning and persuasion. He knows it can only end well. Even cruelty and subterfuge are allowed, perhaps even enjoyed in the confirmation of righteousness. Who can stop us? Force and then

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A2 Cede Political to the Right/Militarism


success excuse everything, creating realities on the ground that must be accepted. Who then can say they are better than us when we have won? There is no logic of empire, just aggrandisement, the meaningfulness of more, of stronger, of , of FREEDOM. No one can take it away. The point is that even when it is validated by the higher reason of the State, even when it is suppressed into the strict lineaments of the military apparatus, even when there is a liberalism, a humanism, a liberation, a democracy, a rationalism, an idealism, human rights, a coherent academic argument, a law, a justice, a discourse of gender equity, national progress, human meaning and so on and so forth, it is always a violence unleashing cruelty, righteousness, calumny, honour, intimidation, sentimentality, brutality and all the other logics of the rampant war-machine, the war-machine and reason allowing, excusing, validating, concealing one another. [p. 98] How does the fighting child connect with the righteous president, the pondering general, the ambitious journalist and the anxious activist? They play
out a meaningful give and take where different levels of decision validate one another. The hidden lineaments of the fighting boy may or may not feed the hard calculation of the president; the heroic worldliness of the soldier may or may not require the president's duty of cynical care, but draws on it, and is released by it anyway. 'What lies behind the decisions that get made, what memories? What traces? What trust in now or never, now and forever? What lusts are in question? Something gives us energy, faith, hope, trust, where does it come from if not the unleashing of the disruptive energy of rebuilding to which our violence is committed? In other words, we are doing it now. The double logic of the war-machine and the State run through the social body, the way it twists in on itself, choosing and unchoosing the violence that brings both order and freedom, in our politics, in our diplomacy, in our social vision, in our relationships and in our entertainment, all enfolded in and over one another, refusing, frustrating and feeding on one another. The

war that appals us, that we conjure as the forever last resort, defies all of our values, but it also reassures us, flatters us and frees us, and we trust it. The order that we implement is the consolidation of the energy of disruption, harm, movement and self-mutilation we revile, and, in turn, only order requires movement. It will not end, this feeding and folding over of that which despises multiplies and alienates itself. It will never be over.

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A2 Cede Political to the Right/Militarism


The affs critqiue of militarism is redundant. Only sacrifice without purpose or good creates the glorious expenditure and community that can avert extinction.
Allan Stoekl, Prof French anc comparative literature at Penn State University, 2007 [Batailles Peak: Energy, Religion, and Sustainability p. 189-192] There is virtually no point any more in trying to work out a critique of modernity: depletion does it for us, relentlessly, derisively, definitively. Perhaps the knowledge modernity has provided, both technical and theoretical, has been necessary; in this case the fossil fuel regime inseparable from modernity has been a necessary, if ephemeral, stage of human development. But the fall, the die-off, looms. The larger problem (entailing a task never fully undertaken by Bataille) is to think a "good" duality the postmodern affirmation of sheer expenditure through dread and the recognition of limits (interdiction, the mortality of reference) on the
scale of human muscle power and the finitude of the body. A return to the past? Not really, since the imminent depletion of fossil fuel resources will push us in that direction anyway: muscle power, body power, will be a, if not the, major component in the energy mix of the future." But certainly

what is imperative is an awareness that any economy not based on the profligate waste of resources (commonly called a "sustainable" economy) must recognize and affirm the tendency to expend, indeed be based on it. And inseparable from that tendency, as we know, are the passions, as Bataillewould call them: glory, but also delirium, madness, sexual obsession. Or, perhaps closer to home, a word rarely if ever used by Bataille: freedom. Not the freedom to consume, the waste of fossil fuel inputs, but the freedom of the instant, from the task, freedom disengaged from the linkage of pleasure to a long-term, everreceding, and largely unjustified goal. An "intimate" freedom-but not the
freedom of prestige, rank, not the freedom of Man in and as security. "Expenditure without return" is a floating concept, defined in opposition to the restrained economy whose possibility it opens but which it defies. As an end not leading outside itself, it could be anything; but what is most important is that with it there

is a movement of "communication," of the breaking of the narrow limits of the (ultimately illusory) selfinterested individual, and no doubt as well some foriiilf personal or collective transport, enthusiasm. This concern with a mouvement hors de soi
can no doubt be traced to Sade, but it also derives from the French sociological tradition of Durkheim, where collective enthusiasm was seen to animate public life and give personal life a larger meaning." As Bataille puts it in L'economie a hi mesure de l'univers (Economy on the Scale of the Universe): "You

are only, and you must know it, an explosion of energy. You can't change it. All these human works around you are only an overflow of vital energy ... You can't deny it: the desire is in you, it's intense; you could never separate it from mankind. Essentially, the human being has the responsibility here [a la charge in] to spend, in glory, what is accumulated on the earth,what is scattered by the sun. Essentially, he's a laugher, a dancer, a giver of festivals." This is clearly the only serious language. (CC, 7:15-16) Bataille's future, derived from Durkheim as well as Sade, entails a community united through common enthusiasm, effervescence, and in this sense there is some "good" glory-it is not a term that should be associated exclusively with
rank or prestige. Certainly the Durkheimian model, much more orthodox and (French) Republican, favored an egalitarianism that would prevent, through its collective enthusiasm, the appearance of major social inequality. Bataille's community would continue that tradition while arguing for a "communication" much more radical in that it puts in question stable human individuality and the subordination to it of all "resources." On this score, at least, it is a radical Durkheimianism: the fusion envisaged is so complete that the very boundaries of the individual, not only of his or her personal interests but of the body as well, are ruptured in a community that would communicate through "sexual wounds." De Certeau brings to any reading of Durkheim an awareness that the effervescence of a group, its potential for "communication," is not so much a mass phenomenon, an event of social conformity and acceptance, but a "tactics" not only of resistance but of intimate burn-off and of an ecstatic movement "out of oneself" If we are to think a "communication" in the post-fossil fuel era, it will be one of local incidents, ruptures, physical feints, evasions, and expulsions (of matter, of energy, of enthusiasm, of desire)-not one of mass or collective events that only involve a resurrection of a "higher" goal or justification and a concomitant subordination of expenditure.) Yet there is nothing that is inherently excessive. Because waste can very easily contribute to a sense of rank, or can be subsumed as necessary investment/consumption, no empirical verification could ever take place. Heterogeneous matter-or energy-eludes the scientific gaze without being "subjective."This is the paradox of Bataille's project: the very empiricism we would like to guarantee a "self-consciousness" and a pure a'epense isitself a function of a closed economy of utility and conservation (the study of a stable object for the benefit and progress of mankind, etc.). Expenditure,

depense, intimacy (the terms are always sliding; they are inherently unstable, for good reason) are instead functions of difference, of the inassimilable, but also, as we have seen on a number of occasions, of ethical judgment. It is a Bataillean ethics that valorizes the Marshall Plan over nuclear war and that determines that one is linked to sacrifice in all its forms, whereas the other is not. In the same way we can propose an ethics of bodily, "tactical" effort and loss. We can go so far as to say that expenditure is the determination of the social and energetic element that does not lead outside
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itself to some higher good or utility Paradoxically this determination itself is ethical, because an insubordinate expenditure is an affirmation of a certain version of the posthuman as aftereffect, beyond the closed economy of the personal and beyond the social as guarantor of the personal. But such a determination does not depend on an
"in-itself," on a definitive set of classifications, on a taxonomy that will guarantee the status of a certain act or of a certain politics.

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A2 Sacrifice is violent
Humans cannot escape the problems of violence and death. Extend Goldhammer and Razinski. At best, we can enact a theatrical sacrifice that disperses the violent energies that would otherwise be accumulated by the state for its policies of extermination. This argument proves why they will never win a link turn or perm. If they are too squeamish to confront the sacrifical violence of the 1AC, then they have no chance of contesting the appalling savagery of the state. Violence is inevitable, which means sacrifical expenditure is the best way to break apart the dominating violence of the state.
Alexander Irwin, Asst Prof Religion Amherst College, 2002 [Saints of the Impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the Politics of the Sacred p. 39-40]
This chapter's exploration has already clarified significant points regarding Bataille's attitude vis--vis a possible "closure" of sacrifice.

Even as he resisted the Durkheimian view of sacrifice's utility and reasonableness, Bataille remained Durkheimian enough to see sacrificial dynamics
as the enduring paradigm for relations between individual and collectivity . Bataille never fully banished from his writing the Durkheimian schema of a sacrificial convulsion productive of shared meaning and communal cohesion (even if, for Bataille,
what is shared is the calling into question of all meaning, at the "extreme limit of the possible"). Thus, the specter of a (constantly suppressed, constantly resurfacing) "utility of the useless 1154 haunts Bataille's writing on/of sacrifice. On the border (along the dchirure) where sacrificial violence passes into language, perhaps matters could not be otherwise. Nancy's demand for a politics that renounces dark "outsides" retains its force. Yet if the price of dissipating the specter of sacred [40] violence is subscription to the bald claim that "There is no 'obscure God.' There is no obscurity which would be God," then we can see that the closure of the sacrificial vision must be undertaken not only "after Bataille [...j and beyond him,"55 but directly against him. For if it is undeniable that "fascination is already proof that something has been accorded to obscurity and its bloody heart,"- 16 is no less true that Bataille as the Acphale held his own bloody heart in his hand and vowed to "live only from what fascinates" (BOC I,

Through the avatars of sacrifice, Bataille interrogated the permutations of


what he saw as the fundamental violence of the human being. He sought to understand, on the one hand, how violence connects humans to an acephalic universe and, on the other, how violence functions in the political realm.

Violence (sometimes overt, sometimes veiled) is the key instrument of political tyranny , of "Caesarian" domination and the exploitation of the poor by the rich. How could such domination and exploitation be opposed? Since Bataille considered violence an irreducible aspect of
human nature, it could not for him be a question of "nonviolent resistance," but of searching for a different kind of violence that could resist dominating force. Bataille's investigation of sacrifice was an ongoing quest for liberative potentials in the conjunction of violence and an atheistic "religious spirit. 11-17

As Bataille pursued his obsessive investigation of sacrificial violence in its psychological, political, and poetic dimensions, another French thinker was exploring related issues. Simone Weil saw in the concept of "force" a principle connecting war, social exploitation, cosmic order, and mystical truth. For Weil, force was encountered as the instrumentality of dehumanizing oppression. Yet to eliminate force from human life was impossible, since in a real sense our existence is made of force composed of that which destroys it. Chapter z will trace Well's efforts to come to terms with the challenges posed by this contradiction.

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A2 Sacrifice is violent
Sacrifice creates a community against the violence of the state. We are motivated by a tragic politics mutually exclusive with the extermination their evidence asssumes.
Alexander Irwin 2002 [Prof Religion at Amherst College, Saints of the Impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the Politics of the Sacred p. 22-24]

While Acphale sought communal bonds, the accents of a defiant individualism also reemerged in Bataille's writings in this period. One expression of this ambiguous coexistence of group identification and individual authority was the "shamanistic" position occupied within the secret society by Bataille himself . Roger
Calllots notes that for Bataille, the "theoretical interest" of shamanism was vivid "only to the extent that he could aspire to become a shaman himself. 1130 At the same time that he preached the ideal of the headless community "without a chief" (BOG 1,489), there can be no doubt that, in the group Acphale as actually constituted, Bataille himself claimed the clear and unequivocal leadership role, amounting to a sacerdotal authority. "The cards were in his hands alone; he dealt them out in his own way following a hierarchy of participants of which he remained the only master" (ML, zz).

If the community was

to be the matrix of a rekindling of sacred forces,

Bataille in his own person was the primary channel and vector of those forces. Pierre Klossowski, who participated in some of the group's rituals, affirms that the acephahc figure that symbolized the aspirations of the community was in fact a portrait of Bataille himself. The Acphale is "purely Bataille emblematized by Masson. The figure of the god with his attributes" the sword, the flame, the labyrinth represented by the visible entrails - "formed a sort of mandala in which Bataille contemplated, and invited us to contemplate, his own experience."31 Bataille thus cast himself in a double role incorporating the two dimensions of Durkheimian sacrifice. As the Acphale, Bataille became both a symbolic figure representing the community to itself and a shaman or sacrificial priest palpably unleashing sacred forces through rituals intended to fuse the members in intense solidarity. The Acphale is a forbidding and isolated figure, but his solitary self-mutilation liberates the energies that make possible the cohesion of the group. Nietzsche had also been a lonely thinker haunted by the notion of community. Placing Acphale under Nietzsche's intellectual sign, Bataille underscored the significance for the community of the emblematic or heroic individual. Thus, Bataille's mythologizing of "Nietzsche-Dionysos" in the pages of the journal Acphale con [p. 23] stitutes not only a homage to a philosophical predecessor, but an account of the role Bataille envisaged for himself. Following Karl Jaspcrs's suggestions in Nietzsche: Fin fuhrung in this Verstandnis seines Philosophierens (1936), Bataille believed an "imitation of Nietzsche" (atheistic rewriting of the imitatio Christi) was possible and necessary, for those willing to abandon the confines of a "small politics" for the open-ended exploration of the "total possibilities of humanity."" Shaping oneself to the Nietzschean ideal opened the road to a community freed from all forms of servility. In the Acphale texts devoted to defending Nietzschean thought against fascist co-optation, Bataille stressed both Nietzsche's representative character (which enables Nietzsche to point to, in some sense to become, the binding force of a new form of human community) and the terrible solitude that was Nietzsche's lot. "Because he could not confuse emasculation and knowledge, and because his thought opened on a lucid explosion which could not cease before having exhausted his forces [...], Nietzsche collapsed in a humiliating solitude." But

Nietzsche became by his very isolation a symbol and rallying point, the "hero" of all who refused conformity and servitude (BOG I, 480). "In the image of the one [Dionysosj he was avid to be

even to his madness, Nietzsche is born of the Earth torn by the fire of the Sky, is born lightning-struck and in that way charged with this fire of domination becoming FIRE OF THE EARTH" (484). Nietzsche, fused with Dionysos, rises to messianic stature: "THE SACRED -NIETZSCHEMJ - FIGURE OF TRAGIC DIONvsOs DELIVERS LIFE FROM SERVITUDE" (484). Bataille salutes in Nietzsche the "incarnation" of humanity's

maddest and most exalting possibilities, life and thought transformed into a "festival," the assertion of a freedom so vast that "no language would suffice to reproduce its movement"
As a sacred figure, Nietzsche forms a pendant to the "heterogeneous" fascist leader, radiating a "force that shatters the regular course of things" and inspires ecstatic communal devotion (BOG I, ',4. Yet the

community summoned by Nietzsche is rooted not in imperative violence but in a "tragic experience of self and world," an "experience of the negative [...] or of the impossible," consisting precisely in the "affirmed certainty that it is not possible to place oneself outside the reach of traged y. 1133 [p. 24] This is what

Bataille means by "religion": a community without domination, united at once by the demand for a mad freedom and by the awareness of shared
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vulnerability to tragedy. From the conjunction of freedom and tragic consciousness springs a paradoxical, nonhierarchical, permanently wounded
sovereignty. Such sovereignty separates people from each other irrevocably in the very moment that it exposes them to each other in the nakedness of tragic compassion. (The Acphale stands naked and isolated, with his heart in his hand and a death's head lodged in his groin.)
Decisive for Bataille's subsequent thought is the understanding that humans commune in the limit experience of the tragic sacred and that sacrality must be crystallized or channeled ("incarnated") by a sacred-symbolic individual. This figure animates community while at the same time remaining separated from community in an infinite solitude that is both sovereignty and "humiliation."

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A2 Alt > Fascism


We produce a headless community, a commitment to sacrifice the political authority that would make fascism possible. All their arguments about how the kritik rejects the state prove that we are 100% aligned against totalitarian politics. The alt ruptures the authority that enables fascism. Only the perms linking of sacrifice to the sovereign imperative of the plan produces the fascism they describe.
Jesse Goldhammer 2005 [Lecturer/Instructor, Institute of Government Studies, U.C. Berkeley, The Headless Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought p. 169-174] acephalic meand without head

Most important, Bataille's fascism essay reveals that his sacrificial view of proletarian revolution is in tension with his critical understanding of fascist power.
Seeking to prevent the proletarian revolution from taking a fascist turn, Bataille argues that any attempt to use sacrifice for the sake of political foundation risks fascism, the logical culmination of sacrificial founding violence used to constitute authority. By claiming that unproductive sacrificial loss ruptures political authority, Bataille's discussion of fascism begins his repudiation of the French discourse on sacrificial violence. In his

essay on unproductive expenditure, Bataille offers no vocabulary for the internal dynamics of transformative sacrificial processes. How does the unrecoverable sacrifice of a person or thing affect the participants? What role does such sacrifice play in the realm of politics? Seeking to answer these questions in his essay, on fascism, Bataille significantly broadens his analysis

He introduces the concepts of homogeneity and heterogeneity in order to describe two opposing modes of existence, each of which highlights different roles of the sacred in modern life. Homogeneity, which is similar to the profane, describes societies structured by production, rationality, specialization, organization, conservation, predictability, and preservation. For Bataille, these terms characterize modern Western bourgeois society, which excludes anything that does not conform to its homogeneous structure. "Above all:' writes Michle Richman, "homogeneity is identified as comtnensurabiity among elements and a consciousness of the process whereby 'human relations can be maintained by a reduction to fixed rules based on the identity of person and well-defined situations; in principle, violence is excluded from the course of an existence so defined! '129 The hallmark of the
of sacrifice from a study of the act itself to an inquiry into the sacred concepts upon which it depends. homogeneous society is the contract, which forms the basis of all social bonds because, as jean-Michel Heimonet observes, "the contract establishes a general equivalence among men, things, and men and things."" Heterogeneity; which is more closely associated with sacredness, is a bipolar category that encompasses everything that is unproductive, irrational, incommensurable, unstructured, unpredictable, and wasteful.While

homogeneity excludes violence, heterogeneity is the chief domain of violence. Bataille offers five descriptions of heterogeneous elements: (i)

taboo and mana; (2) everything resulting from unproductive expenditure, including excrement, eroticism, and violence; (3) ambiguous phenomena that are simultaneously attractive and repulsive; (4) excess, delirium, and madness; and () any reality that is affectively forceful or shocking.3t The bipolarity of heterogeneity captures two related but opposing, shifting, and unstable characteristics of sacred things; purity and impurity." Pure sacred and impure sacred, which Bataille labels "right" and "left" respectively, challenge Mauss's and Durkheim's rigid theoretical views on sacred objects, which they consider (negatively) as the source of all prohibitions.33 Mauss and Durkheim qualir the sacred as dangerous and repulsive. In contrast, building upon Maistre's observation that the pure authority of-the king requires the impure violence of the executioner, Bataille captures the ambiguity of the sacred by qualifying it as a form of energy that fluctuates between two oppositely charged poles.34 Bataille also counrerintuitively describes both heterogeneous sacred polarities as sovereign in an effort to convey the double significance of the sacred.When qualified with the word "imperative," the term "sovereign" describes sacred things, such as kings, who are noble, pure, elevated, and singular.35 In contrast, Bataille uses words like "base:' "abject:' and "accursed" to characterize subversive sovereignty, sacred power that is ignoble, impure, mired, or chthonian. The executioner, who also participates in the formation of monarchical power (imperative sovereignty), exhibits subversive heterogeneity that is radically impure, and as a result is placed completely outside the social hierarchy defined by the king. Thus, Bataille's theoretical elaboration on Maistre's original distinction reveals that both the king and his executioner are sovereign, but in consequence of opposite sacred qualities and with different ontological effects. Bataille's dualistic concept of heterogeneity serves as the basis for his novel understanding of sovereignty. Because heterogeneity is its primary animating force, sovereignty has two forms, the imperative and the subversive. Imperative sovereignty describes ruling power whose legitimacy is constructed on a hierarchical, elevated, and amplified basis. In his postwar writings on sovereignty, Bataille describes its imperative form as belonging to kings, priests, chieftains, and "all men who possess and have never entirely lost the value that is attributed to gods and 'dignitaries."36 Although imperative sovereignty is the preeminent source of state power and is typically associated with mastery and supremacy, Bataille argues that it,is actually servile because it is useful. In contrast, subversive or revolutionary sovereignty derives its power from the abject and useless. Bataille writes: "Life beyond utility is the domain of sovereign ty:'37 Subversive sovereignty is experienced as unproductive loss and dissolution; instead of authoritatively establishing limits (laws), this revolutionary form of power comesinto being when limits are transgressed. For this reason ,

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essential role in the invocation of an impure heterogeneous sovereignty. When useless, sacrifice also gives rise to an acephalic community, which has no trace of, imperative sovereignty and, therefore, no leader or authority. No headless community can form, however, if its members seek to conserve some aspect of the sacrifice. Bataille rejects sovereignty that relies upon purity and hierarchy in order to establish dominion. Bataille uses the concepts of
homogeneity and heterogeneity to describe the affective qualities of politicalpower embodied by leaders, institutions, symbols, and the like. All traditional forms of political power combine homogeneous and heterogeneous elements, albeit in different ways. Consider three extremes: liberalism, monarchism, and fascism. The liberal state is the most homogeneous. As Stoeki interprets Bataille's fascism essay, however, homogeneous forces

"The imperative, or sovereign, form of heterogeneity goes to aid the homogeneous forces: it guarantees the stability of a society which can give itself meaning only through the sadistic exclusion of
never completely exclude heterogeneous ones, even in liberal states:

impure heterogeneity."" Stoeki's reading of Bataille suggests a quasi-Weberian interpretation of liberal states: -parliamentary regimes remain stable thanks to legal-rational authority, which they achieve, in part, through the force of the law, namely violence. The homogeneous state maintains, through the army and police, a store of imperative heterogeneity, which guards the boundaries of the state's homogeneous authority through violent exclusion. Monarchies and fascist regimes operate differently. As Stoeki points out, "The king or the fascist leader (as imperative heterogeneity) is in a way excluded from the homogeneous activities of society, but he dominates that society and embodies it."" In the case of the king, the imperative sovereignty of the monarchy, which itself relies on the equally imperative heterogeneity of Christianity, cooperates with and coopts the subversive (impure) heterogeneity of the executioner in order to police the boundaries of the royal body. For the fascist leader, as Bataille's essay reveals, the mixture of homogeneity and heterogeneity becomes increasingly potent and complex. His analysis, which focuses particularly on fascism's appropriation of religion and the military, reveals a fascination with the important role of imperative

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A2 Alt > Fascism


Although Bataille recognizes, even admires, the revolutionary potential of this mixture of pure and impure sacred fascist power, he remains convinced that only communities organized on the basis of subversive heterogeneity can be truly liberating. The fluidity of the categories used by Bataille to describe the
heterogeneity in the fascist movement. psychological structure of fascism demonstrates the importance of the sacrificial mechanism, which inserts an element of agency into what otherwise appears as an unchangeable world of sacred polarities. The crucifixion of Christ clearly demonstrates this mechanism when it transforms the impure, bleeding, and agonized body of Christ into the pure, transcendental figure of the corpus nsysticurn.

Bataille, like his predecessors in the discourse, recognizes that sacrificial violence makes things sacred . Unlike them, however, Bataille also realizes the theoretical importance of the capacity of sacrifice to negotiate between different forms of the sacred . For Bataille, the imperative heterogeneity of the army is not the same kind of sacred power as the subversive heterogeneity of the proletariat . Indeed, in his discussion of the army Bataille characterizes it as imperatively heteroge-neous: hierarchy and discipline in the service of death. Because the army amalgamates purity and violence, it possesses an ambiguous attractive power, which Bataille describes in the following way: "This process is the intermediary through which disgusting slaughter is radically transformed into its opposite, glory-namely, into a pure and intense attraction. "40 Although armies are not engaged in

sacrificial acts per .se, the military demonstrates that violence can be transformed into a positive, glorious accessory of political power. Similarly, religion has a dual characterization that contributes to its own form of attraction. Bataille writes: "The supreme being of theologians and philosophers represents the most profound introjection of the structure characteristic of hooaigeueity into heterogeneous existence: in his theological aspect, God preeminently fulfills the sovereign form?'41 Religion is attractive because it elevates the abject through sacrificial symbolism, such as Christ's sacrifice. Religion confers order, status, and purity on death, which is originally and profoundly impure. In describing the affective power of fascism, Bataille focuses on the army and religion because of their long, combined historical complicity in the foundation and exercise of political power. Bataille perceives both institutions as possessing violent and/or sacrificial mechanisms that provide for the purification of impure heterogeneity. In their ability to convert subversive heterogeneity into pure or imperative heterogeneity-to transform abject sacred into pure sacredthe army and the church support the augmentation and stabilization of authoritarian political power. Like the French revolutionaries, Maistre, and Sorel, Bataille appreciates that the effectiveness of political power-its authority-is intimately linked to the afectivity of violence. Bataille's analysis of the emergence of fascism also suggests that he is particularly attuned to the affective impact of fascism's use of both martial and religious violence. "Fascist power;' Bataille writes, "is characterized by a foundation that is both religious and military, in which these two habitually distinct elements cannot be separated."" Bataille discovers that fascism taps into the same sacred well of affectivity as other regimes, but in ways that

Although Bataille admires fascism's ability to convert impure heterogeneity into a pure sweetener of its authority, he rejects the desirability of a revolution based on imperative heterogeneity. Like other forms of Western politics, fascism is politically unfeasible without imperative heterogeneity, the pure sacred product of armies or churches. Sword and scepter participate in the establishment of authority by
vastly increase mass enthusiasm. conferring legitimacy upon the exercise of power, which is elevated and concentrated in the leader or Fhrer. With or without these institutional props, Western forms of authority, be they traditional, legal-rational, or charismatic,

in the Western political tradition, this uplifting of power to the status of right always occurs at the expense or with the complicity of subversive (impure) heterogeneity What makes fascism unique, according to Bataille, is that it is the most authoritative of all political regimes. Bataffie compares the "total
rely on the pure sacred qualities of imperative heterogeneity. Furthermore, power" of the fascist chief with that of a king, who "manifests ... the fundamental tendency and principle of all authority: the reduction to a personal entity, the individualization of power."43

Fascism requires supreme authority, which is concentrated like royal power in its chief. It is this kind of authority that Bataille hopes to destroy by marshaling the impure heterogeneity of unproductive sacrificial violence.

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A2 Alt > Nihilism


Extend the alt debate from above. Sacrifice is key to both liberation from domination and an ethical stance that can give value to our existence. The ecastic community provides the only avenue for politics and ethics in an age of totalitarianism masquerading as liberal democracy.
Christopher Stanley

1998 [University Leeds, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law VoI.XI no.32]
BataiUe is neither

This point is made through the apparent movement in the thought of Bataille from exteriority to interiority, which I interpret as a move from lapolitique to le politique. Bataille appears to stop "thinking" community in a turn to "inner experience": but this is only an appearance.

concerned with the inner or experience (as Derrida notes in his essay on Bataille)) 6 The event of excess leading to this point of rupture in terms of Bataille's "activities in community" were both political and aesthetic
(totalitarianism and surrealism). This

period of excess resonates with the contemporary. This may appear as an unexpected allusion. However, statements to "think the political" in terms of radical finitude express
the realization that the current manifestation of democratic liberalism is that of an "unheard totalitarianism" and that "democracy is to come". The excesses of the contemporary may be less obvious than that of the 1930s and 1940s. The eradication of conflict in terms of ideology and political economy which contemporary democracy purports to deliver incurs the flattening of meaning and the totalisation of value. The political sphere has been "closed" in a process of simulation and multiple ordering of representatio n (as Baudrillard would suggest). 17 It is in response to this appearance of closure that a re-thinking of the political occurs. The space of this "thinking the political" is in the interstitial of the remainder at the "end of politics ": a rejection of the tyranny of representation and the
commencement of thinking the political through the philosophical as the only response available in "opposition" to the sovereignty of form externally determining desire and language. "After" law and society comes justice and community both in terms of repressive rhetoric and in the affirmation of finitude and imminence. Bataille's realisation at the point of his "turn" to interiority having thought the limit of community was that the limit is not of the subject's interiority but a crossing (glissement) beyond and toward the outside of the limit. There is less contradiction than might at first appear between Bataille's writings on transgression and desire and those on sovereignty and community. Both are expressions of working at the limit as excavations in the communication of communality. They are reliant upon one another. 18 If his later work (such as "Inner Experience" which is often interpreted as reflecting a Sartrean existentialism in the sense of raising an engagement)19 has been neglected within contemporary commentaries it is because it has been possible to appropriate Bataille to the excessive and relativist claims of the postmodern. However, it is the "uneasiness of political exigency" haunting Bataitle, which (and this is the parallel move in the postmodern) causes him to consider sacrifice not in terms of economy and transcendence but in terms as finitude and abundance: from the economy of the limit as scarcity to the economy of the limit as abundance and excess of communication (the limit as a point of passage not closure in a Heideggarian sense). There is a relation between sacrifice and finitiude in terms of economy but it is Bataille's "move" from exteriority to interiority which suggests thinking at "another limit" wherein the issue of sovereignty is re-figured in terms of finitude and sacrifice as abandonment as opposed to transgression. This "move" to abandonment is the subject of the dialogue between Blanchot and Nancy and can be traced through Bataille's involvement in the Ac~phale Group and in his novel "The Blue of Noon" (1935). Significant at this stage is Bataille's thought on the dynamics of social groups leading him to the think the "limit" (contestation) of community in "Inner Experience" (1943). By means of "experiments" conducted in the second half of the 1930s in the names of groups such as Contre-Attaque, Acdphale and the College de Sociologie, Bataille sought to grasp the nature of communal existence through the experience of political extremity in the form of the Soviet experience and Fascism. 20 Bataille wanted to understand the mystery of the social bond distinguishes Bataille's world of excess, irony, violence, Blanchot's economy of impersonality and nocturnal dispersion, and the Levinasian universe of gravity, disymmetry and responsibility, a single configuration of communication insists." See Joseph Libertson, Proximity: Levinas, Blanchot, Bataille and Communication (Boston MA: Kluwer, 1982), 3. and perceive in the same gesture the sense of awakening of the Great Politics for which Nietztsche so longed. Bataille's activities during this period were informed by the belief that totalitarianism "completed" history and that there was another way of being-together save the seduction of Fascism or betrayal by the bureaucratic horror of Stalinism. 21 These two ideas motivated Bataille to rethink the social bond in terms of ritual, myth and sexuality, engaging in a reconfiguration of the political in the remainder of the excess of ideological and aesthetic forms. In the end, in the early years of the Cold War, Bataille appears to capitulate in the sense of relying on a political neutrality, he by-passes the opposition between resistance and collaboration in the recognition that neutrality meant the refusal of all action and a distancing from all political undertaking. This apparent failure can be contested if "Inner Experience" is interpreted as a text not of aesthetics (in the sense of Heidegger's "move" to poetics after the Rectoral Address of 1933 or of Blanchot's recits during the Cold War period after his ambiguous political position during the Occupation). The point of contestation crucial to this "move" is Bataille's idea of experience as ek-stasis referring also to the outside, as the prefix ek determines. The experience is also something impossible (the limit in the extreme limit of possible).

Bataille's

politics becomes not a politics of the possible but a politics of the impossible: he remains political in the sense of Beardsworth's
re-thinking of the question of the political in terms of radical finitude. Bataille moved during the 1930s from an "outward", action-orientated definition of desire (virility) to an "inward" one. It is a move "from" politics to philosophy enabling a re-thinking of the political. It is a move related to the evolution of European politics and the outward definition only achieves resonance again in Paris in May 1968 in the marginality of the situationist or autonomes. Prior to the point of Bataille's "withdrawal" from the political he experienced the conflict between opposition and collaboration which thrust him toward partial solutions through alternative mechanisms of communality, sacrifice and sovereignty. In May 1968 it appeared as though the collective rituals that had fascinated members of the "secret societies" Bataille was involved with in the 1930s were being staged on the boulevards of the Latin Quarter in Paris. 22 This "explosive communication" (at the limit of communication in the sense of the affirmation of exposure to the outside (other) in the incompletion of meaning) resulted from a dissymmetry of desire which is the foundationof an ethic of all relations with others (following Levinas). In this formulation desire is both fatal and vital and is placed as a sovereign function above or removed from law and convention. The political and social context Bataille witnessed denied him the ability to experience desire and community out-with the Law in this form as

The restrictions of excessive political economy forced Bataille's "turn" to "inner experience". 23 The tension before the limit of the political
abundance because of activity: work as opposed to un-working; experiment as opposed to innovation.

apparently causes Bataille to withdraw from the political. It is a withdrawal which enables him to discover an "abundance" of desire (desire without the limit imposed by the sovereignty of law) through the "devastation" of the subject through inner experience as the exposure of the subject to the outside. It is this "devastation" (the exposure to abundance) and his rejection of the aims of Acephale (that communality should commence with the relationship between the group and sacrifice as foundational in the construction of the social bond and therefore in the interrogation of the prohibition which eliminates violence) which could prompt Bataille to state " The community of those who do Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.-motto of Hanseatic League 136

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Bataille could only arrive at this comment through the arrival at the limit of death in the sacrifice of another whose existence confirms the existence of the singular being, forcing the confrontation or exposure with the limit of being at the point of finitude It is a move from a restricted to a general economy of desire which eliminates sovereignty through the "devastation" of the subject whose desire is otherwise than for Law. Bataille's recognition is that of the limit of the social bond (as com-unus or com-munis) which in the 1930s he had struggled to understand but which could only be comprehended through unworking (at which point sovereignty is no-thing) and at the limit of thought and language.
.

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A2 K Romanticizes Natural/Past
We do NOT romanticize the past. We invoke a new form of sovereignty, not a return to some natural essence.
Bataille conflicts with romanticism --- cant return to lost origins
Rebecca Comay 1990 [Yale French Studies 78]
"

Intimacy" would involve, then, not the transparency of identity, but rather the

opaque intransigence of what connects at the point of greatest secrecy. "Normal" communication (in the "profane" sense of correspondence and consensus) cannot be more fragile, therefore, than when "sovereign communication" silently rules. The darkness of "common subjectivity" (to use Bataille's language) would thus be prior to the communal mergers of intersubjectivity, at least as classically conceived. Communication, in my sense, is in fact never stronger than when communication, in the weak sense, in the sense of profane language which makes us-and the world-penetrable) proves useless,

This incessant effort. would be apparently impossible if we were not first bound to one another by the feeling of common subjectivity, impenetrable to itself, and for which the world of distinct objects is impenetrable. [9, 311] And is it enough to point out that Bataille's "nostalgia" is at best an "uneasy" one (5, 155), opposed to every form of pastoralism and every form of naive escape? This "unease' is, indeed, at the root of Bataille's confrontation with Breton,9 with Bumler (1, 447-65), with Romanticism (9, 206), with Hemingway (8, 230-33), with (at times) Proust (5, 156-75), with naturalism ("the poetic fallacy of animality" [7, 293]), with sexual liberationism,' with "Orientalism" (5, 30): with every attempt to reduce transgression to the sentimental movement of restoration and return. Such nostalgia would have the "suspicious and lugubrious" (5, 540) stupor of an idealizing aestheticism: "the European's sickly taste for an exotic color" (5,
and becomes the equivalent of darkness. We speak in various ways to convince others and to seek agreement ....

conditions which only masks an accommodation to the status quo. It would occlude the historic specificity of the given with the passive longing for the past, hypostatizing present circumstances by the very appeal to bygone days. History itself would
30)-"like a film about 'primitive' countries" (1, 530)-a numbing abstraction from present

prevent such an easy overcoming. 9. Bataille's (not unambivalent) critique of the surrealists tends to focus,
among other things, on the naivet of their appeals to transcendence (the "sur") which would, in his view, obscure contemporary social conditions (with its concomitant technical rationality) thus leading to various regressivities and archaisms. For the clearest elaborations of this argument, see "La 'vieille taupe' et le prefix sur dans les mots surhomme et surrealiste" (2, 93-112), "La Valeur d'usage de D. A. F. de Sade" (2, 54-69), "La Religion surrealiste" (7, 381-95), and "Le iurralisme en 1947" (11, 259-61). 10. "Despite

appearances, I am opposed to the tendency that seems to prevail today. I am not one of those who see in the abolition of sexual taboos a way out" The radical impurity of beginnings and ends-the ambivalent birth and death of "history"-should prohibit any temptation to regress. "The nostalgia for a bygone world is ... based on a shortsighted judgment . . ." (7, 126). Even if we do have a paradoxical nostalgia for it, we
can only by some aberration regret the loss of the religious and royal edifice of the past. The effort to which this edifice responded was only an immense failure and Hit is true that the essential is missing from our world we can only go further, without imagining, even for an instant, the possibility of a return back. [8, 275] From what would one escape? It is too late to speak of leaving. Has not the "experience" of fascism itself blurred forever the line between effervescence and utility, organizing lumpen uselessness into the efficiency of state service, fusing charismatic sovereignty with the mechanical rationality of order, marking the final penetration (to speak Habermasian) of Zweckrationalitat into the lifeworld of pure dpense? (1, 339-7 1). Such blurring indeed would erode the last enclave of uncontaminated spontaneity-implicating the body, the unconscious, desire, sexuality itself within the restricted circuit of the commodity exchange. A blurring which would paralyze-as Adorno and Horkheimer saw all too clearly, Marcuse not clearly enough-all hope of exit and mock every fantasy of regression as being the collusive daydream of the herd. Making "Auschwitz" henceforth (as Bataille puts it, with an almost Adornian pathos) the very "sign of man" (11, 226), the decisive rubric of our day. Turning the present into a "field of ashes" (5, 40), without an option of escape.

To what would one return? Historic precedents are neither conceivable nor provided. There is no historic form of sovereignty which is not already implicated in the machinations of profane rationality. Even the most "primitive" potlatches of the Tlingit and Kwakiutl were already contaminated by the calculus of acquired rank and power (Bataille does not, despite appearances, share Mauss's idealizations of the communifying bond of archaic "generosity.") Early potlatch was already caught up in the rational circuit of exchange . Tribal depense proves to be a "comedy" (7, 73) of

compensation and control 82 Yale French Studies an insurance policy underwritten by the machinations of a "crooked will" (7, 75). For the Pacific chieftain indeed is guaranteed to win through losing-gift summoning countergift-stockpiling prestige and honor in return for the dilapidations of the fiscal reserve. "He enriches himself with his contempt for wealth, and what he shows

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himself to be miserly of is the power of his own generosity" (7, 72 ).

Sacrificial Refudiation K Nor is prehistoric "nature" a

nostrum.

If it is true that, in his invocation of "ends in themselves" (1, 305), Bataille would seem to invoke the most classical split between the natural and the cultural the immanent entelechy of phusis pitted against the exteriority of techn (Aristotle); the apparent "purposelessness" of the flower pitted against the functionality of the artifact (Kant); the wasteful effusions of the songbird pitted against the niggardly efficiencies of the craftsman (Schiller) -he is unsentimental in his attachments, and dismisses every yearning for archaic Nature as being just "poetic fulguration" (7, 294). Despite appearances. It is true that our meager acts of effervescence are said to be just "the expression of the Earth and its laws" (2, 155) -the very laws of "cosmic energy" which one would ignore, warns Bataille, at one's own peril (7,33). True, too, that "communication" at

And it is true that the undulations of expenditure seem to suppose a "link between lovemaking and lightwaves" (5, 283)-"perhaps arbitrary," demurs Bataille, but no less telling. But this is not the "cosmic
times seems modelled on the labyrinthine bondings of molecular existence (1, 433ff.). to animality" (8, 196).

Lebensphilosophie" some might imagine. '1 For natural immediacy is not an option. "In this kind of situation there is no recourse

The unfettered immediacy of natural existence (apparently unquestioned by Bataille)'2 is neither possible nor desirable for humanity. For one thing, such immediacy remains "unfathomable" (7, 294). For another, it lacks all verve. The soggy indifference of "life" ("like water in water" [7, 295]) in fact is devoid of sacred tension. The animal (unfettered by work and prohibitions) knows not the joyful horror of transgression; it knows just the "slumber" (7, 313) of instinctual life. Libertarian appeals to 11. Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987(, 235.
12. On evidently Hegelian grounds. The epigraph to Thorie de Ia religion cites Kojve (whose testimony is taken to be impeccable( on the difference between the immediacy of animal hunger and the mediated "negativity" of human desire REBECCA COMAY 83 nature would only neutralize "sin" as wholesome spontaneity (fun sex, healthy appetite): Genet and Sade,

For the violation of taboos is not a "return to animal violence" (10, 68): transgression (dialectically?) 1-3
Baudelaire and Proust knew rather the awful attraction of forbidden fruit.

preserves the very prohibition it would surmount.

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Sacrificial Refudiation K

A2 Alt is patriarchal
Turn: Our model of sacrifice is expenditure, breaking down the accumulating forces that enable traditional masculine conquest
Jesse Goldhammer 2005 [Lecturer/Instructor, Institute of Government Studies, U.C. Berkeley, The Headless Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought p. 179-181] Although virility is commonly defined as an accumulation of male force, especially sexual potency Bataille views it through the lens of unproductive expenditure. The result is a concept of male power that relies on an ontology of waste, not accumulation. For Bataille, the male erection has no purpose other than to waste itself, an image captured by Troppman, the main character in Bataille's novel Le Bleu du clef (Blue of Noon), written in 1935 but not published until 3957. Susan Rubin Suleiman remarks that Troppman is symbolically castrated, a reflection of Bataffle's characterization of the impotence felt by antifascist French intellectuals in the I93 0s. For instance, when Troppman is unable to make love to a beautiful woman named Dirty, she euphemistically taunts him: " If only you could lose your head?'60 Suleiman argues that this slippage between castration and decapitation indicates increased virility from a uniquely Bataillian perspective: Decapitation is a symbolic castration, if Freud is to be believed; but Troppman is already symbolically castrated, so his decapitation would be redundant. (Troppnian, incidentally, was the name of a mass murderer beheaded in Paris in 5870.) Unless, of course, "losing his head" restored his potency, according to that characteristically Baraillian equation which states that a violent loss of control is the precondition ofjouisaauce, a radical letting go. 61 It is precisely this "violent loss of control:' anticipated by unproductive expenditure, celebrated in Blue of Noon, and captured in Bataille's Contre-Attaque writings, that characterizes Bataille's concept of virility.Virility is paradoxically a form of orgiastic powerlessness or jouissance, a sort of antiauthoritarian authority. This state of being forms an exact parallel to Bataille's notion of sub p. 180 versive or acephalic sovereignty62 In disposing of itself effervescently, virility permits ontological self-sacrifice in the service of a revolution that wastes unproductively all that it opposes. The revolutionary role of sovereign virility is thus metapolitical because it promises a self-wounding masculinity that turns the proletariat inward and upon itself. Sovereign virility also thwarts traditional notions of political foundation, which require idealism and elevated authority.

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Sacrificial Refudiation K

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