T3 B6 Final Staff Statements FDR - Entire Contents - Emails - Notes - Withdrawal Notices (1st PG Only of Staff Statement 7) 074

Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Dan Marcus

Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 12:00 PM
To: staff
Subject: IMPORTANT REMINDER: Guidelines re handling of staff statements
Now that we are finishing up work on one set of staff statements and preparing the next set, here's a
reminder of the guidelines we need to follow in working with staff statements:
(1) Drafts of staff statements (going forward) need to include footnotes indicating the source for
information in the text, and each footnote needs to indicate the classification level of the source, e.g.,
(U), (S), (TS), etc.
(2) Drafts of staff statements that rely on any information derived from classified sources (documents
or interviews) must be marked "SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW" at the top and bottom of each
page.
(3) Drafts of staff statements that rely on any information derived from classified sources must be
handled as classified documents based on the highest classification of source documents or interviews.
In particular:
(a) Such staff statements must be drafted and edited only on classified computers.
(b) Draft staff statements derived from materials up to the Secret level may be worked on in
any Commission office; draft staff statements derived from TS/SCI material must be
worked on at the K Street SCIF or another SCIF.
(c) Such staff statements may only be transmitted by secure means, e.g., classified fax or lock
bag.
(d) Such staff statements must be stored and transported securely.
(4) Such staff statements cannot be treated as unclassified documents until the relevant Executive
Branch agencies have completed their classification review and the Commission has satisfied (through
negotiation and/or modification of the statements) all of the classification issues raised by the relevant
agencies. The Front Office will make the judgment about when this process is complete.
If you have any questions, please talk to Graham, Chris, Steve, or me. Thanks for your attention to
these important procedures.
3/22/2004
EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:30 AM ON MARCH 24, 2004
'«-UNITS'*
Intelligence Policy
Staff Statement No. 7
Members of the Commission, with your help, your staff has developed initial findings to present
to the public on the use of our intelligence agencies hi countering terrorism. These findings may
help frame some of the issues for these hearings and inform the development of your judgments
and recommendations. Today we will focus on the role of the Central Intelligence Agency as an
instrument of national policy. The issues related to the collection of intelligence, analysis and
warning, and the management of the intelligence community will be taken up at the
Commission's hearings next month.
This report reflects the results of our work so far. We remain ready to revise our understanding
of events as our investigation progresses. This staff statement represents the collective effort of a
number of members of our staff. Alexis Albion, Michael Hurley, Dan Marcus, Lloyd Salvetti,
and Steve Dunne did much of the investigative work reflected in this statement.
For this area of our work we were fortunate in being able to build upon a great deal of excellent
work already done by the Congressional Joint Inquiry. The Central Intelligence Agency has
cooperated fully in making available both the documents and interviews that we have needed so
far on this topic.
Framing the Issue
The CIA plays a dual role in counterterrorism. Like other members of the Intelligence
Community, the CIA is an intelligence producer: it collects and analyzes foreign intelligence and
provides this information to policymakers. When directed by the president, the CIA is also
responsible for executing policy through the conduct of covert action. U.S. law defines a covert
action as a U.S. government activity to influence conditions in another country, "where it is
intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged
publicly." The law requires a formal presidential finding to authorize a covert action, which is
also briefed to congressional leaders. Significant actions under a finding are often authorized in
a separate Memorandum of Notification informing congressional leaders.
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), from whom you will hear his morning, also has dual
responsibilities. He is the president's senior intelligence adviser. He is also the head of an
agency, the CIA, that executes policy. In speaking with the Commission, DCI Tenet was blunt:
"I am not a policymaker." He presents intelligence and offers operational judgments, but he says
EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:30 AM ON MARCH 24, 2004

called off because of a lack of reliable intelligence on Bin Ladin's specific location,
and in part because of concerns regarding the loss of life to innocent civilians.
Finding Bin Ladin required human intelligence, which many Pentagon officials
have said must be strengthened in the fight against terrorism.
While military plans were modified to include different options for attacking
al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin targets in Afghanistan, policymakers always fell
back on the option of launching cruise missiles. However, the lack of actionable
intelligence and concerns about collateral damage all but made this "default
option" no option at all. That left the policymakers without any viable military
tool to attack al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin targets after the August 20 strikes
and before 9/11.
Many things changed after the 9/11 attacks. The policy and military obstacles to a
large scale invasion of Afghanistan dissolved. Most importantly, the requirement
for intelligence before there could be military action was lowered. The military
could finally bring the fight to al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin.
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Conclusion to the Military Staff Statement
On August 20,1998, the United States military responded to the East Africa
embassy bombings with missile strikes on al-Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin-linked
targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. Following the August 20 response, the United
States military developed plans for follow-on strikes against additional al Qaeda
targets. However, from August 20,1998 until after the 9/11 attacks, the United
States refrained from additional strikes in Afghanistan. This was despite the
October 2000 attack of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen resulting in the deaths of 17
sailors. And while the new Bush administration was developing a comprehensive .
strategy for going after al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin during the summer of (^
2001 that incorporated a military role, no steps were taken by the Pentagon to
develop additional military plans to support that strategy.
Obstacles were both military and policy in nature. The difficulty of the United
States to garner support from states surrounding Afghanistan, particularly
Pakistan, made it difficult to put boots on the ground or to use airborne platforms
to launch a strike. Bases did not exist and legal impediments to overflight of
neighboring country airspace posed problems for the use of airborne assets.
There were many references in the interviews of Pentagon officials to "Desert
One" and the "Somalia Syndrome," where in both cases special operations
missions resulted in failure and negative United States reactions. America was
not ready to insert Special Operations Forces into an environment where there
was no actionable intelligence on Bin Ladin's location and no support from
nearby nations. Policymakers concluded the risks of using Special Operations
Forces in a mission against al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin in Afghanistan were
too high, and the chances of success were too low. Many senior policymakers
also told us the public would not seriously support a large military campaign to
invade Afghanistan that would topple the Taliban. As a result, there were no
plans for large scale military action of the type that took place after the 9/11
attacks. Finally, the United States was hampered by the policy decision of
avoiding casualties to innocent civilians. General Zinni, the military commander
Prepared by: BJenkins

in the region, was concerned about the high potential for unwelcome
consequences to U.S. regional security interests.
Many Pentagon civilians and military officials told us that the most significant
limitation on military action was the need for actionable intelligence. Secretary
Cohen put it best when he stated that while the Pentagon was always ready to
capture or kill Bin Ladin and put its troops at extraordinary risks to do so, any
operation would require actionable intelligence, which was always lacking. As
Secretary Cohen explained, the goal of the August 20,1998 strikes in Afghanistan
was to hit Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants that intelligence indicated were
gathered at a meeting in a Bin Ladin training camp in southern Afghanistan. If
no one was hit, the United States could still damage the camp and send a message
that the United States would not tolerate terrorist activity against America.
However, the public and congressional outcry after the strike of the alleged
pharmaceutical plant with links to Bin Ladin in Sudan raised the level of the
quality of intelligence that was necessary to strike a target. Now, Usama Bin
Ladin himself was the predominant target, and a strike could not be conducted
unless there was assurance Bin Ladin would be at a particular location at the time
the strikes would hit the target.
The standard for actionable intelligence after August 20 was extremely high,
perhaps too high, particularly for a target that moved around a great deal and
remained elusive. Nowhere is this illustrated more clearly than on the three
occasions the military prepared to launch a missile strike only to have it called off
because of a lack of reliable intelligence on Bin Ladin's specific location, and in
part because of concerns regarding the loss of life to innocent civilians. The
military did little to solve this problem until the Predator flew in fall 2000 and
did not develop other options to gain adequate actionable intelligence.
While military plans were modified to include different options for attacking
al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin targets in Afghanistan, policymakers always fell
back to the option of launching cruise missiles. However, the lack of actionable
intelligence and concerns about collateral damage all but made this "default
option" no option at all. That left the policymakers without any viable military
tool to attack al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin targets after the August 20 strikes
and before 9/11.
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3, 9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107
WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008
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COPIES: 1 PAGES: 4
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements
DOCUMENT DATE: 03/18/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Draft
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: NSC #8
This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information
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SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission
COPIES: 1 PAGES: 1
ACCESS RESTJUCTEDJ
DOCUMENT DATE: 03/18/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/fProfs Notes)
FROM: CIA
TO: Zelikow, et al
SUBJECT: substantive comments on #8

9/11 Closed by Statute
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Mike Hurley
From: Steve Dunne
Sent: Thursday, March 18, 2004 5:45 PM
To: Front Office; Team 3
Subject: FW: Staff Statements
fyi
Original Message
From: Dan.Leviniusdoj.gov [mailto:Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov]
Sent: Thursday, March 18, 2004 5:34 PM
To: Philip Zelikow; Dan Marcus; Steve Dunne
Subject: Staff Statements
1. No CIA classification comments on statements #6 or #8.
2. Just faxed some additional substantive CIA comments on #6 and CIA substantive comments
on #8 will probably come tomorrow.
3. Just faxed NSC comments on #7: they include one substantive comment (p. 5 - labeled
as factual); the proposed redactions on pages 8-9 are contingent on resolution of the
issue (i.e., those portions should be redacted but the remaining may be kept in if the
resolution is reached; otherwise the entire section should be redacted); for last three
sentences of first paragraph on page nine: redacte unless Berger for first two and Clarke
for last one have said that publicly; if they only said in interviews with you then it
should be redacted.
4. Hope to have other NSC comments tonight or tomorrow
5. Hope to have DOD comments tonight or tomorrow
Call fi you have any questions.

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FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Supplemental

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DOCUMENT DATE: 03/17/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Editorial Note
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: Comments on 9/11 Commission Staff Statement nNumber 6

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DOCUMENT DATE: DOCUMENT TYPE: Note/Notes
FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: CIA Comments on Staff Statements 5 & 7

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FROM: Dunne
TO: Hurley
SUBJECT: FW: Comments of statement #7

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Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
From: Philip Zelikow

Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2004 1:11 PM
To: Team 3; Doug MacEachin; Tom Dowling
Cc: Front Office
Subject: Language for Staff Statement #5
Folks -
Having weighed the many excellent arguments, we'll change the last para on p. 9 as follows:
In the first line, change "seemed to" to "may"
Delete the last two sentences and replace them with:
For a time, Bin Ladin was reportedly considering relocating away fromto other countries. We will report further on
this topic at a later date. In any event, Bin Ladin stayed in Afghanistan.
Philip
3/17/2004
Page 1 of 1
Mike Hurley
Cc: Front Office
Subject: FW: Language for Staff Statement #5
Sorry, I pressed the button accidentally before this message was complete.
The correct text is below:
—Original Message—
Cc: Front Office
Subject: Language for Staff Statement #5
Folks -
Having weighed the many excellent arguments, we'll change the last para on p. 9 as follows:
In the first line, change "seemed to" to "may"
Delete the last two sentences and replace them with:
For a time, Bin Ladin was reportedly considering relocating and may have authorized discussion of this possibility
with representatives of other governments. We will report further on this topic at a later date. In any event, Bin
Ladin stayed in Afghanistan.
Philip
3/17/2004
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FROM: Dunne
TO: Front Office
SUBJECT: FW: Further comments on statement #6

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FROM: Zelikow
TO: Hurley, et al
SUBJECT: RE: Possible Insert on Diplomacy Statement

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FROM: Dunne
TO: Team 3
SUBJECT: FW: substantive comments on staff statements 5 &7

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DOCUMENT DATE: 03/16/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/(Profs Notes)
FROM: Marcus
TO: Team 3
SUBJECT: FW: Pre-Publication Review

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FROM: Leopold
TO: Front Office
SUBJECT: Rumsfeld and Tenet

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DOCUMENT DATE: 03/15/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/rProfs Notes)
FROM: Dunne
TO: Front Office
SUBJECT: FW: Initial responses to statements #5, #6. #7

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FROM: Allan
TO: Zelikow, et al
SUBJECT: RE: Amendment to my earlier message

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
Dan Marcus
From: Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 7:21 PM
To: Dan Marcus; Steve Dunne
Subject: Draft letter Levin to Marcus re prepub review (12 Mar 04)bc.doc
Dear Mr. Marcus:
We have received the first three staff statements for the Commission's hearing
currently scheduled for March 23-24. We are committed to the expeditious review of
materials you provide and to the maximum possible public disclosure of information
consistent with national security and the important constitutional principles involved.
As you know, at Secretary Card's direction, we have taken the extraordinary step of
establishing a special high-level review group of senior officials at the relevant
departments and agencies to help accomplish this. The Commission, however, also has a
responsibility to ensure that this process works properly.
As you know, the Commission has committed to providing us with materials prepared by the
Commission for public disclosure with a reasonable time to review them so that we can: (i)
verify that no classified information is contained in the materials and (ii) determine the
extent to which the materials implicate interests protected by the constitutional doctrine
of executive privilege (see, e.g., your letter to Thomas Monheim, dated July 29, 2003).
Neither of these functions can be performed efficiently and effectively unless the
Commission adequately sources and marks its material and provides sufficient time for the
process to work. As you know, we discussed the timing issue with you following the review
of the last round of staff statements.
In particular, as we have previously advised you, it would greatly facilitate our review
of these and any future staff statements or portions of your final report if you could:
(i) provide a sourced version of the statement (or portion of the report), indicating the
documents or other sources for the various statements made; (ii) mark as unclassified only
that information the government has provided to you as unclassified; and (iii) mark as
currently classified that information which was provided as classified but which you think
either should be declassified or should not have been marked as classified when provided.
Where you have specific arguments for declassification (or believe that something should
not have been marked as classified), it would be helpful if you could provide those
arguments when the statement (or portion of the report) is provided.
We believe we have organized to efficiently and effectively review the materials you
provide and that with your assistance we can achieve our mutual desire for an expeditious
and appropriate pre-publication review. Any inability or unwillingness on your part to
provide that assistance, however, will jeopardize that goal and significantly impede our
ability to conduct an appropriate and timely review.
Moreover, in addition to helping facilitate our pre-publication review of the materials,

the Commission must properly mark materials derived from classified materials as part of
its obligation to protect national security and comply with applicable security
regulations. See, e.g., Executive Order 12,958 (as amended). In this regard, we hope
that the Commission's Security Officer has reviewed the draft staff statements and
approves of their marking and handling. Commissioners and staff, of course, have no
classification or declassification authority and may only "derivatively" classify newly
produced documents by marking portions derived from documents, interviews, or meetings, at
the same level as the original information itself.
As you know, we have previously expressed our concern about the Commission's ability and
willingness to properly protect privileged, sensitive, and classified information from
unauthorized disclosure and advised you that continued access to sensitive and privileged
materials depended upon our ability to rely on Commission assurances that it will not
disclose information made available by the Executive Branch. We continue to urge the
Commission to make as one of its highest priorities the proper protection of such
information.
Given past incidents, which we have discussed with you, including the reading on
1
jievision of a list of names of U.S. Government intelligence officers, we also urge you
co put into place and enforce procedures to ensure that public discussions of information
derived from Executive Branch documents, Congressional documents containing classified
information, or interviews or meetings with Executive Branch officials, are confined only
to topics and particular information which have been provided to the Executive Branch for
review and approved. We look forward to working with you to ensure that such safeguards
are in place prior to the next round of public hearings.
If you are able to provide sourced and marked versions for any of the staff statements for
the March 23-24 hearings please do so as soon as possible. In any event, please provide
any future staff statements or portions of the report with appropriate sourcing and
marking. You should be aware that the provision of such portion marked materials in a
timely fashion will be necessary to facilitate Executive Branch clearance both of future
staff statements and the Commission's report in a timely fashion.
Thank you.
cc: Thomas Monheim, Associate Counsel to the President

Bryan Cunningham, Deputy Legal Advisor to the National Security Council
Statement by the President http7/www. whilehousc.gov/news/rcleiscs/2001/05/prinl/20010508. html
Click to Print
this document
President George W. Bush
For Immediate Release

Office of the Press Secretary
May 8, 2001
Statement by the President

Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Protecting America's homeland and citizens from the threat of weapons of mass destruction is
one of our Nation's important national security challenges. Today, more nations possess chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons than ever before. Still others seek to join them. Most troubling of
all, the list of these countries includes some of the world's least-responsible states — states for
whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. Some non-state terrorist groups have also
demonstrated an interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
Against this backdrop, it is clear that the threat of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons
being used against the United States — while not immediate — is very real. That is why our Nation
actively seeks to deny chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons to those seeking to acquire
them. That is why, together with our allies, we seek to deter anyone who would contemplate their
use. And that is also why we must ensure that our Nation is prepared to defend against the harm
they can inflict.
Should our efforts to reduce the threat to our country from weapons of mass destruction be less
than fully successful, prudence dictates that the United States be fully prepared to deal effectively
with the consequences of such a weapon being used here on our soil.
Today, numerous Federal departments and agencies have programs to deal with the
consequences of a potential use of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon in the
United States. Many of these Federal programs offer training, planning, and assistance to state
and local governments. But to maximize their effectiveness, these efforts need to be seamlessly
integrated, harmonious, and comprehensive.
Therefore, 1 have asked Vice President Cheney to oversee the development of a coordinated
national effort so that we may do the very best possiDie job of protecting our people from
catastropjilc~harm. I have also asked Joe Allbaugh, the Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, to create an Office of National Preparedness. This Office will be responsible
for implementing the results of those parts of the national effort overseen by Vice President Cheney
that deal with consequence management. Specifically it will coordinate all Federal programs
dealing with weapons of mass destruction consequence management within tne Departments of
DeYense,~iTealth and Human Services. Justice, and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency,
ana otner federal agencies. The Office of National Preparedness will work closely with state and
local governments to ensure their planning, training, and equipment needs are addressed. FEMA
will also work closely with the Department of Justice, in its lead role for crisis management, to
ensure that all facets of our response to the threat from weapons of mass destruction are
coordinated and cohesive. I will periodically chair a meeting of the National Security Council to
review these efforts.
No governmental responsibility is more fundamental than protecting the physical safety of our
Nation and its citizens. In today's world, this obligation includes protection against the use of
weapons of mass destruction. I look forward to working closely with Congress so that together we
can meet this challenge.
# ##
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FROM:
TO:
SUBJECT: handwritten notes

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TO: Allan
SUBJECT: high-level diplomatic contacts

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FROM: Hurley
TO: Zelikow, et al
SUBJECT: Team 3's Staff Statements

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Page 1 of 1

From: Dan Marcus

Staff Statement No. 7

Framing the Issue

EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:30 AM ON MARCH 24, 2004

Prepared by: BJenkins

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 73 DOC ID: 31207961

FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements

DOCUMENT DATE: 03/18/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Draft

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 74 DOC ID: 31207962

FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements

DOCUMENT DATE: 03/18/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/fProfs Notes)

SUBJECT: substantive comments on #8

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

1. No CIA classification comments on statements #6 or #8.

5. Hope to have DOD comments tonight or tomorrow

Call fi you have any questions.

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 75 DOC ID: 31207963

FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements

DOCUMENT DATE: 03/18/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Draft

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 76 DOC ID: 31207964

FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements

DOCUMENT DATE: 03/17/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: Editorial Note

SUBJECT: Comments on 9/11 Commission Staff Statement nNumber 6

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 111 DOC ID: 31212164

FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements

DOCUMENT DATE: DOCUMENT TYPE: Note/Notes

SUBJECT: CIA Comments on Staff Statements 5 & 7

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 77 DOC ID: 31207965

FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements

DOCUMENT DATE: 03/17/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/fProfs Notes)

SUBJECT: FW: Comments of statement #7

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

From: Philip Zelikow

In the first line, change "seemed to" to "may"

Delete the last two sentences and replace them with:

The correct text is below:

In the first line, change "seemed to" to "may"

Delete the last two sentences and replace them with:

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 79 DOC ID: 31207967

FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements

DOCUMENT DATE: 03/17/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/fProfs Notes)

TO: Front Office

SUBJECT: FW: Further comments on statement #6