Towards a Differential Calculus of Soft Systems

Working paper, January 1996

The Janus Centre for Research in Management Systems and Cybernetics
M.I. Yolles, Liverpool John Moores University
Abstract
It has been said that the methodologies of management systems exist in a fragmented
systems domain. A new holistic approach to systems methodologies is slowly being forged.
Within some of these developments one can also see the possibility of developing a calculus
of soft systems that centres on cybernetics, and is concerned more with qualities and
effectiveness than the existing hard systems differential calculus that naturally enables us to
seek quantities and optimisation.

1. Introduction
Management Systems is changing. Hard systems methods and methodologies have given
way to soft systems approaches to inquiry as situations that are seen to require intervention
are viewed as complex, uncertain and unpredictable. Further, the weltanschauung principle
tells us that there cannot be an objective view of a situation because individuals will each
develop different perspectives of a given situation that makes each view incomplete
(Weinberg, 1975). These ideas are embedded within the work of Rosenhead (1989), for
instance, who introduced a soft paradigm into Operational Research. It is also consistent
with other developments of the 1980’s, such as the appearance of managerial cybernetics
(Beer, 1985), and Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland and Scholes, 1990) A new
appreciation of the idea of complexity has, according to Nicolis and Progogine (1989),
heralded the encroachment of soft views of science on hard ones.
The transition from a hard to soft predominance in management systems has resulted in
conflict between the different paradigms, and confusion within a subject domain. As a result
we have what some would refer to as the development of fragmentation in the domain of
systems methodologies. This has been addressed by a group that can be referred to as
paradigm incommensurabilitists (a notion explored by Burrell and Morgan (1979)) who tell
us that methodologies cannot be compared or coordinated because the paradigms upon
which they are based are incommensurable.

In the face of this, a new holistic movement has developed that is led by such work as Flood
and Romm (1995; 1996) and Midgley (1995). It favours the idea of methodological
complementarism, that finds ways of validating the congruent use of distinct methodologies
that each derive from their own paradigms.

On another front, a new understanding of complexity has arisen. Complexity theory (Cohen
and Stewart, 1994) explains the notion of chaos and how we understand it through
emergence, and this has contributed to the development of a confrontation to hard systems.
From such considerations, others (Schwarz, 1994; Yolles, 1997) have supported the
development of Viable Systems Theory that can couple together with the very different
work of Beer (1985). This in turn has led to the idea of Viable Inquiry Systems (Yolles,
1997b) that links in with the previously mentioned work of Flood and Romm, and Midgley.

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The contribution of Schwarz (1994; 1994a) is important because it provides us with a way
of explaining how viable systems change when they begin to experience chaos. Viable
systems theory has a history in the soft systems domain of managerial cybernetics (Beer,
1985). The two areas have been brought together by Yolles (1997) to provide insights into
the relationship between chaos and cybernetics. One consequence of this work is to
postulate the emergence of a soft system differential calculus that centres on cybernetics.

2. Viable Systems, Self-organisation and Evolution

In the theory of viable systems we conceive that systems are organised images of the real
world that entail certain principles, and we build systems models because we can attribute
to them certain generic characteristics that we believe can help us explain what we
perceive as the real world. The real world is modelled as a system hierarchy composed of
networks of organisations seen as semi-autonomous systems.

By viable we mean able to maintain an autonomous (separate) and durable existence. In

particular, Schwarz (1994) explains that all systems become viable when they develop (a)
patterns of self-organisation that lead to self-organisation through morphogenesis and
complexity; (b) patterns for long term evolution towards autonomy; and (c) patterns that
lead to the functioning of viable systems. According to Beer (1979, p119), the autonomy
of viable systems is a “relative concept”, since even their natures and purposes are
subjective. A viable system is also seen to be autopoietic (Beer, 1979, p405), that is, it is
self-producing - having operations that are no longer controlled from its environment
(Mingers, 1995).

Schwarz (1996) does not see autonomy as a relative concept, but rather cares to
distinguish between fully and partially autonomous systems. Systems that are fully
autonomous have no logical connections with their environment, while systems with
partial autonomy can. Having said this, systems can be seen to have degrees of autonomy,
and this is determined by the intensity of the environment influence on the system. Except
in some very special cases, there are no objective standards by which we can determine
intensity of influence, and it is more likely to be a qualitative evaluation that is individual
perspective determined. We may thus see autonomy as a relative concept that in general
subsumes semi-autonomy. In general use of the word semi-autonomous occurs in order to
stress: (a) the relative nature of autonomy, and (b) to indicate the possibility of logical
connections with the environment.

So, viable systems have cybernetic processes that have logical (“interactive”) connections
to their environment causing “interventions in elemental autonomy” (Beer, 1979, p148).
Consequently, if we wish to talk of viable systems that have both autopoietic and
cybernetic processes, then it is probably safer to talk about VST relating to semi-
autonomous systems. This is not problematic, since Schwarz also tells us that fully
autonomous systems are difficult if not impossible to find.

Viable systems therefore participate in the development of their own futures through self.
The theory of viable systems is essentially the theory of networked purposeful semi-
autonomous open systems that exist together in a system hierarchy. We can refer to such

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systems as holonic (Koestler, 1967). A holon is complex semi-autonomous adaptive
purposeful systems that are models of situations in the real world. They may be seen in
terms of a set of parts that interrelate in such a way that properties or patterns of
behaviour emerges that are not also properties of the mutually interactive and purposeful
parts that compose them. This is referred to as its emergent properties. Thus, the whole is
greater than the sum of the parts. As a consequence, rather than talking about a system
hierarchy we can equivalently talk of a hierarchy of holons, or even better a holarchy.

Fundamental to viable systems is the work of Schwarz (1994, 1994a) that explains how they
change and evolve. It very much links in with the current theory of evolution, that itself
centres on complexity theory that is concerned with systems seen to be complex and
adaptive. Complex adaptive systems are: intricate complicated networks of independent
interconnected systems that can be chaotic and are self-organising (Wheelan, 1996, p57).
Viable systems are therefore seen as complex and adaptive self-organising holons
established in holarchies. They are fractal, and thus have broadly recursive structures, can
be described as being self-similar, and maintain the same characteristics at different levels
of inspection. The term fractal (coined by Mandelbrot (1982)) is used to describe the fine
convoluted and recurent shapes found in nature in both the mathematical and natural
worlds. The concept has become important for describing the development of stability in
complex systems that have become chaotic (Gleick, 1968). When in chaos a system
becomes structurally critical (Minorski, 1962, p185) so that small perturbations can affect
the stable positioning of the system, resulting in unpredictable behaviour.

In systems we talk of the idea of emergent properties. Emergence is meaningful only in

terms of the system as a whole, and not of the individual parts. Thus the property of a clock
to indicate the time is a function of the clock as a whole that none of its component parts
possess. The concept of emergence can be used to explain how systems are able to deal
with chaos, and is consistent with the idea of simplicity emerging from complexity.
During it, “chaos is collapsed” (Cohen and Stewart, 1995, p232) and order is brought to a
system that seems to be in random fluctuation. In principle the emergence of a metalevel
occurs through the conceptualisation of new macroscopic systemic properties. Schwarz
(1997) adopts this principle to explain how systems achieve stability through the
development of six successive steps:
(i) differentiation as a response to tension,
(ii) communication/interaction between differentiated parts,
(iii)integration of the parts due to their interaction,
(iv)emergence of an encompassing common metalevel,
(v) dynamical stabilisation of the whole,
(vi)recursion of above to result in more organisational metalevels and their integration.
In more specific terms, Schwarz explains that in viable systems self-organisation can be
seen in terms of a spiral pattern of stable behaviour. It has four successive recurrent
phases that are explained in table 1, and illustrated in figure 1. In Schwarzian Viable
Systems Theory two types of change are identifiable. Type 1 change occurs through
morphogenesis: if the perturbations cannot be regulated, then through self-organisation
the system will adapt, introducing modifications into its form. This in turn influences its

3
behaviour within its environment. Type 2 change is metamorphic: when a spontaneous
alteration in form occurs. It occurs when the conditions within the system are such that it
has reached a bound in its ability to adapt morphogenically with respect to the
perturbations from the environment. It is metamorphosis that is responsible for
innovation, unexpected novelty, and variety. It may be noted that in referring to
bifurcations, the common notion is a split into 2; however the mathematical definition is
slightly different, and refers to the mathematical study of qualitative changes in structure.

1.
Phase 4: Stability 2. system drift

8.
complex-
ification Phase 1:
Meta- Tropic
Phase3: morphosis drift 3. tensions

7.2 type 2
change Phase 2: 4. tension increase &
ALEA structural criticality
7.1
type 1 change 5. fluctuations
“more of the same” 6. bifurcations
7.0
system death
or disorganisation

Figure 1: The spiral of self-organisation (Schwarz, 1994)

3. The Generic Domain Model and its Application in Viable Systems Theory

To move our argument on from here, we need to introduce a generic domain model that is
based on the old structuralist idea of a deep domain being responsible for surface
phenomena (Chomski, 1975). We shall develop this model, and show that in viable systems
it is recursive and fractal. The model can be shown (Yolles, 1997) to apply to Schwarz’
model of existential/energy planes separated by a relational or logical plane that lies at the
heart of his explanation of change in viable systems explained above. It can also be applied
to the work of Beer (1979, 1981, 1985, 1989) in his cybernetic Viable System Model.
Within Beer’s conceptualisation, every viable human activity system has a metasystem that
is seen to be deterministically responsible for the manifested form and behaviour of the
system. Our intent in this section will be to in due course will explore some aspects of the
metasystem.

Consider first a viable system for which we shall define a generic model distinguishing
between a deep and surface domain. The two domains are separated by a
transmogrification1 or transformational processes, seen as (figure 2):

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 (a) a behaviour organising process that derives from the paradigm and represents a logical
organising process that results in patterns of behaviour; practices and methods result
from this process that is itself seen as a transformation
(b) a transformation that may be subject to surprises because the relationship between the
metasystem and the system can be disturbed due to chaotic perturbations that may cause
the system to pass through a morphogenesis
(c) occuring in a transmogrific or organising domain that may be seen as partly cybernetic
in nature since control and associated processes may be seen to occur there.

Phase Steps Explanation

1 Entropic 1. Stability This leads to disorder or more generally to the more probable, to
drift (tropic 2. Spontaneous the actualisation of potentialities. It is often the coherent
drift is the entropic drift actualisation of the potentialities of the parts of the system that
general case) 3. Tropic drift generate tensions and eventually break the global homeostatic or
4. Increase in even autopoietic networks that hold all the social agents together.
tensions
2 Bifurcation 5. Fluctuations Fluctuations occur internally, or in the environment as noise.
(ALEA: i.e., 6. Bifurcation Through amplification of fluctuations due to tensions following
crisis, 7.0. option 0: decay entropic drift, a discontinuity occurs in the causal sequence of
randomness, 7.1. option 1: type 1 events/behaviour. “Stochastic” selection occurs, influenced by the
hazard) change tensions within a problem situation. The tensions correlate to the
amplification of the fluctuations that occur. At this point three
options are possible: 7.1, 7.2, or 7.3. Decay represents a process of
either destructurising, disorganisation, regression, or extinction of
the system. This can be seen as the start of a catastrophe
bifurcation. In type 1 the process of change begins with “more of
the same” small changes that maintain it current state. However,
such changes may be in some way bounded.
3 Metamor- 7.2. option 2: type 2 In type 2 change, metamorphosis begins as a local morphogenic
phosis change event that is amplified within a critical structure to have a
8. Complexification macroscopic effect. In the critical structure a new form can arise
initiated by the non-linear condition. It is one of many possible
bifurcations that could have developed. Complexification can
occur during iteration of spiral. A form of autonomy may develop.
4 Stability 9. Dynamic stability Occurs through self-regulation and/or existential self-reference.
Table 1: The phases of self-organisation (taken from Schwarz (1994))

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 Transform ational/organising dom ain

Behavioural dom ain Paradigm

representation (form al world view)

organisation of develpom ent/ form ation/ Cognitive

Beh avioural world intervention learning consolidation dom ain

interpretation
W eltanschauung
(inform al world view)
reflection/creation

Figure 3: The Relationship between the Behavioural and Cognitive Domains

In any viable system the relationship between deep and surface domains may be recursive
so that the deep domain may itself be a surface domain in relation to other still deeper
domains. Let us begin by applying this to the simple idea that different actors (individuals
or coherent groups) see things differently, from their own worldviews. We refer to a
worldview as weltanschauung (Checkland and Scholes, 1990). An individual’s
weltanschauung is a worldview that is determined by beliefs, background, interest, and
environment. It generates a perspective, a cognitive representation of the relationships
and relative importance of things that is itself a mental model of an activity or situation.
Since different people have different weltanschauungen, they will also have different
perspectives, and consequently different mental models.

When a group of people come together for the first time, they form a non-coherent group
because they see no commonality across their weltanschauungen. If the group becomes
coherent, then it develops a shared weltanschauung. This occurs through a process of
socialisation (Berger and Luckmann, 1964), during which individuals become members
of the group when they identify with, and assign themselves to it. During this they take on
its members’ roles, attitudes, generalised perspective, or more broadly its norms. Identity
is thus “objectively” defined through the group. However, there is always a distinction
between the individual and the group. The two realities correspond to each other, but are
not coextensive (Ibid. p153).

Weltanschauungen can be related to paradigms by saying that the former is informal

while the latter is formal. A formalisation occurs when a language has developed that
enables a set of explicit statements to be made about the beliefs, propositions (and their
corollaries) of a shared weltanschauung that enable anything that must be expressed to be
expressed in a self-consistent way. A formalised non-normative or semi-formalised
shared weltanschauung can be created in the absence of a formally accepted paradigm,
called a virtual paradigm. It may only develop into a paradigm if it finds normative
support. Other than a language, a paradigm must also entail attributes of
weltanschauungen, and as illustrated in figure 2 is composed of (Yolles, 1996):
 culture having attributes of belief, attitudes, and values

6
 the culture can relate to both social and political aspect of the organisation, and thus
predispose the behaviour of individuals to social and political contexts
 a cognitive space within which are defined concepts, knowledge, meanings, the
propositional basis that defines logic and enables the formation of structural
relationships,
 language, enabling ideas to be expressed
 behavioural norms
 exemplars.
Attributes
Of culture Culture

Attitudes Beli efs Valu es Language

Cognitive
Normative space
Behaviour Concepts, knowledge &
Imperatives meaning to construct behaviour
Propositional base.
Action/behaviour Exemplars.
& commu nicati on
Paradigm

Figure 3: Context diagram for a Paradigm

We can express the relationship between weltanschauung and paradigm in terms of the
generic domain model as shown in figure 2. Shared weltanschauung acts as a cognitive
basis for the paradigm. Within it we develop cognitive models, that involve beliefs,
values, attitudes, norms, ideology, meanings, and concepts. We perceive “reality” through
our cognitive models as we interact with it through them. It is through the process of
cognitive formalisation that weltanschauung becomes manifested as a paradigm that itself
changes through a process of cognitive challenge. This may involve: a process of conflict
that should be resolved; reflection to enhance our understanding of what we perceive; and
conciliation enabling word view boundaries to change. The relationship between the
perceived real world and weltanschauung is partly through interpretation. By this we
mean that the “real world” is an interpretation that involves our perceptions, and these are
generally influenced by our beliefs. It also involves empirical challenge, which is
connected to observation. The real world is represented in the paradigm in a way that
conforms with its belief system. Action is manifested in the real world through an
organising process that is in effect a transformation. This means that the cognitive basis
of the paradigm is applied to what is seen as the real world according to some formalised
regime that involves a transforming organising process that effectively defines logical
relationships that become manifested as structures with associated behaviour in the
perceived real world. Another more familiar way of referring to this in the context of
inquiry is as method. Methods are used by inquirers according to their weltanschauung,
and weltanschauungen and paradigms are connected through cognitive development. The
relationship between weltanschauung and the real world is empirical and explains how

7
individuals become involved in perceived real world creation. Empirical explanations are
based on the observation of behaviour.

The very idea of there being an organising process is a consequence of the notion of
purposefulness, and results in purposeful behaviour. Purposeful behaviour is said to occur
because of cognitive purposes that direct the actions of individuals and groups in a given
situation. It is worldview determined, and can be expressed in terms of a behavioural
mission. Cognitive purposes are interpreted within a domain of action through a knowledge
of data processes and structural models, modelling processes that contain data, and
procedures or rules of operation and other models relating to the current situation, and a
mechanism for structured inquiry.

We can alter our representation of figure 2 by arguing that it can be better represented to
illustrate that transmogrification represents a homeomorphic mapping between the (inner)
cognitive and (outer) behavioural domains (figure 4). By this we mean that it is through
surprise and the innumerable possibilities that arise within the mapping process, that any
number of behavioural manifestations may appear. Shared weltanschauung exists at a
deep domain while the paradigm exists as a surface domain. Transmogrification is a
tranformational process of organising behaviour that results in a formalisation of the
shared attributes of weltanschauung, so that they become clearly visible to observers. A
network of recursions of the model is possible, so that for instance a “shared
weltanschauung” is a result of the interaction of a number of individual
weltanschauungen through a transmogrific process.

Paradigm

Transmogrification
(formalisation process)

Shared
weltanschauung

Figure 4: Relationship between shared weltanschauung and paradigms

We can also apply the generic domain model to the relationship between a paradigm and a
situation, as illustrated in figure 5. We have said that if a shared weltanschauung becomes at
least partly formalised through the development of language, then a paradigm (or virtual
paradigm) will form. A paradigm is essential for the creation of a metasystem, which can be
defined most easily as a system’s metaphorical “cognitive consciousness” (Yolles, 1997a).
While its role is important in the development of coherent groups, it is also important for
coherent situations that occur when organisations arise and develop. The development of
a coherent situation demands the existence of a coherent group, and thus the emergence
of a virtual paradigm and metasystem.

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 Situation

Transmogrification/
organising

Paradigm

Figure 5: Relationship between a paradigm and a coherent situation

Consider now an organisation seen as a system with a metasystem. The metasystem usually
operates from a single dominant paradigm, but in some cases a plurality of dominant
paradigms may be seen to coexist. If these are not balanced, then metasystemic conflict is
likely, resulting in what we might refer to as organisational schizophrenia. The relationship
between the metasystem and system is illustrated in figure 6. Recursive application of the
generic domain model suggests that deeper metasystems exist.

Form of system: structural relationships, processes

behaviour, context data, cultural manifestations

Transmogrification/
Organising

Metasystem:
cognition & purpose,
definition of knowledge,
desired generic class of
system that reflects
beliefs.

Figure 6: Relationship between system and metasystem (Yolles, 1997)

Networks of metasystems exist in any organisation, and have an effect transmogrific

processes that impact on a coherent situation under investigation.. It is useful, then, to
postulate on the relationship between the metasystems and the coherent situation through
transmogrification.

4. Transmogrification, Cybernetics and Methodology

Let us define a transmogrific region as a field potential in which all behaviour organising
processes are possible. In concert with the work of Schwarz (1994), we should see
transmogrification in terms of entity relationships or logical associations that derive from
the metasystem and determine the nature of the system. The transmogrific field is now
susceptible to deterministic adjustments of the potential, due to metasystem impulses.

9
This is the case since, as we explained earlier, the matasystem defines the nature of the
organising process through a “cognitive consciousness” that derives from the paradigm and
constrains the logical organising process that enables coherent activity/behaviour to
develop.

The notion of a transmogrific or organising field potential is also consistent with the ideas
proposed by Chorpa (1990). His interests lie in merging elements of eastern (Ayurvedic)
philosophy with medical science, and his thesis concerns the relationship between
biological behaviour in individuals, consciousness, and paraconsciousness (beyond-
consciousness). As part of his modelling process, a distinction is made between different
states such as conscious thinking, and the body’s biological self-organising know-how
that Chorpa calls its intelligence. These states are separated by a “gap” that he identifies
as a “quantum field” - a space of possibilities that enables the manifestation of events to
occur that are related to the two states, and is suggestive of our transmogrific domain with
its homeomorphic potential. There is further support for the notion that one can see the
transmogrific field as a quantum field. It comes from Pessa (1999), who argues that
macroscopic emergence is a breaking out of spontaneous symmetry that must necessarily be
associated with Quantum Field Theory.

This transmogrific field is also subject to perturbation that derives from changes in the
environment that act through the system. These perturbations can become severe and
disrupt the transmogrific organising process by introducing local, regional, or even global
turbulence. When this occurs, the relationship between the metasystem and system breaks
down. As a result the system may itself become non-coherent. It may regain coherence,
however, when any of the following occurs:
 the turbulence subsides and the system becomes re-connected to its metasystem,
 the system changes through morphogenesis as its metasystem undergoes change
 the system can pass through a metamorphosis as it develops a new metasystem.
The transmogrific field is also cybernetic in nature. Its metasystem directs the system
through impulses that logically order the participating members in a transmogrific field,
and control boundaries become established. In cybernetic terms we see the metasystem to
be acting as a coercive constraint on the system. When system behaviour passes beyond
that constraint, then from the perspective of the metasystem, the system is in danger of
becoming unstable with the failure of the control processes. The situation may thus
achieve a condition of being non-coherent.

These ideas apply to all related metasystemic and transmogrific domains whether they
belong to target situations that require intervention, or targeting organised inquiry into the
target situations. For organised inquiry it is possible to apply our generic domain model to
the relationship between (surface) method and (transmogrific) methodology as we have
above to target situations. Indeed, it is this model that enables us to distinguish clearly a
method from a methodology (Yolles, 1997). While methods involve a sequential ordering
of procedural steps that each pursues a goal, methodologies involve control and
communications that can alter the schedule of steps. We are aware that we can distinguish

10
between hard and soft methodologies. One way of doing this is to distinguish between the
natures of their cybernetic principles.

When hard system methodologies address a situation, they assume that its transmogrific
field is well known, so that the logical relationships between the definable parts of the
system are completely determinable. While the metasystem is recognised, deeper
metasystems are not admitted to have a cybernetic role, and thus are not involved in the
verification of an inquirer’s conceptualisations. Neither is it recognised that the
transmogrific field itself may be altered due to the inquirer or the inquiry. Consider for
example the System Development Life Cycle (Silver and Silver, 1989) as a methodology.
After an inquiry into levels of the metasystem, the situation being explored is supposed to
be well known. The paradigm maintains no specified principles to enable a deeper
metasystem to act as a control during the transmogrific process.

In soft methodologies the transmogrific field is supposed to be uncertain, and its

description by the metasystem must itself be inquired into. The metasystem is supposed
to operate from a dominant paradigm, and subsidiary paradigms are not normally a matter
of consideration. In other words, the logical relationships between the definable parts are
assumed not to be well known, and the field may be seen in ways that reflect the
weltanschauung principle. The metasystemic levels are used as controls on an inquirer’s
models. As a consequence, we must realise that soft approaches employ cybernetics that
involves a variety of levels of deep metasystems. As an example, the Soft Systems
Methodology (Checkland and Scholes, 1990) paradigm requires that for specified
procedural steps, relevant deeper metasystems are referred to. The purpose is to ensure
that any models that an inquirer has identified are validated by the deeper metasystems
for control and implementation purposes.

5. Cybernetics as a Differential Process

Cybernetics is fundamentally transmogrific because it controls the organising behaviour

processes of the system, and links the metasystem with the system. As we see from the
generic cybernetic model in figure 7, this relationship is primarily defined through
deviation that derives from the difference between the perceived state of a situation, and
some ideal or even abstract state as defined by the metasystem that we refer to as being
desirable. The purpose for exploring the deviation is to determine the status of the system
relative to the pre-definable “cognitive” characteristics defined by the metasystem that
bound the states of a system. If behaviour is perceived to be so bounded, then we have a
desirable state for the system.

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 deterministic System
direction Structures &
processes

Transmogrific
Metasystem field potential
(paradigm based)
deviation

Figure 7: Generic Cybernetic Model

During a cybernetic process a perturbation that shifts the system from a desirable state
initiates a correction on the system such that it regains its desirable state. When this
occurs then the system is said to be operating effectively. This is consistent with saying
that deviations should have a bounded or equilibrium tendency, and we can further say
that when this occurs the systems is in cybernetic equilibrium. We may note that if it is
found that corrective action does not engender cybernetic equilibrium, then in a viable
system the metasystemically defined bounds may be forced to change if system stability is
to be maintained.

We can immediately identify two cognitive models that relate to the generic cybernetic
model. One that we shall explore in some detail below, is a simple control model. The
other is the more complex cybernetic model (the Viable System Model (Espejo and
Harnden, 1989)) that is composed of 5 systems. The system is itself defined as system 1
(processes and structures), while the metasystem is composed of system 4
(futures/development), and system 5 (policy). System 2 (coordination) and system 3
(integration/control) are part of transmogrification.

The simple control model is shown in figure 8. It involves monitoring, feedback, and
cognitively definable boundary (standards or norms) against which measures are made
that can be represented symbolically as a loop (figure 9). Consider now that the controlled
process is itself under a control process as shown in figure 10. This is a recursive
relationship because the general control process is embedded within it. The main
difference between the two levels of control lies in the criteria against which comparison
is made:
1. In the inner control, the criteria are defined for the system according to homeostatic
requirements as determined by the metasystem.
2. In the outer control, the criteria are defined for the metasystem according to adaptive
requirements for the system seen from a meta-metasystem perspective.

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 Actuator output
input information Process
deviation

Real world Monitor

reference criteria
(e.g., n orms, standards)

Comparator
In formation about
output (e.g., measu res
of performance)

Figure 8: Basic Control Model that can be represented as a simple loop about a process

Process
input output

control

Figure 9: Representation of a Control Feedback Loop

Process
Input output

control

Process under control

control

Figure 10: Recursive Representation of Self-organisational Control

13
When changes to the system occur through control action. In Figure 10 the simplest often
refers single loop learning, but in deeper control processes changes due to the control
action of are often referred to as double loop learning. If, during the deeper control action
a break occurs between the higher level of control and the system, then the decision
criteria loses meaning and the system may seek its own states. The outer control affects
the inner control through adjustment of its criteria of comparison (in the comparator).
This can be seen as an action of change on the metasystem, through change in its
cognitive model that applies to the system of interest. We can link Schwarzian Viable
Systems Theory to ideas of cybernetics, so that repeated action of change can accumulate
as a process of evolution (table 2).

Step Cybernetic Control Process

1 Control of process fails as the threshold of stability is reached
2 In order to regain stability, the situational model is reconsidered in order to adjust output action
3 If stability still fails and a point of structural criticality exists that makes the structure susceptible
to local change, then the cognitive model is modified in an attempt to regain stability. Another
way of saying this is that change occurs at the metasystemic level that is manifested as
morphogenic change in the system. This process of morphogenesis can be seen as one of self-
organisation that is directed from the metasystem (deterministically).
4 If stability is successful, continue process until step 1 re-occurs. This is a process of positive
feedback in step 3.
5 If stability is not successful, a regional structural criticality may have occurred so that the
system’s metasystem cannot learn. In this case a metasystem from a higher focus of the system
may become involved. Morphogenesis may now have a regional rather than a local effect.
6 If stability cannot be re-achieved the system, as it is cognitively known, will fail. However, this
may be replaced by other stable systems that have materialised through the chaos of non-
deterministic self-organisation independent of metasystemic control. Generic identity typically
changes.
7 Regaining stability through non-deterministic self-organisation may not enable the system to
maintain its original individual identity.
Table 2: The relationship between the cybernetic control process and chaos

6. The Proposition of a Soft Systems Calculus

The term calculus means a particular method of calculation or reasoning, where
calculation can be taken to mean plan deliberately. A soft systems calculus will therefore
provide a way (that may be symbolic) of uniformly representing soft systems
explorations. Its proposed purpose would enable us to explore in a clear and relatively
simple way the nature of viable systems as viewed from a soft perspective. We define in
this paper a virtual paradigm, but remain in a position of waiting to see if it is considered
by its peer group to be sensible to see soft (viable) systems in terms of a differential
calculus.

The base proposition for the virtual paradigm is that viable systems possess a fractal
pattern formed by recursive application of the generic domain model. Another is that any
soft system approach must necessarily relate system change directly to the metasystem.

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This occurs through reference to desirable states of the system that are defined by the
metasystem. The next proposition is that cybernetic approaches are transmogrific. Finally,
cybernetic processes are concerned with deviation from a desirable state, and can thus be
classed as differential in nature. As a result, a soft system differential calculus can be
defined to exist.

Consider now a viable system for which we can define a soft system differential calculus.
From the arguments in the above section, we can define two levels of differentiation that
relate to the system and the metasystem:
 a first level differential (consistent with the action of single loop learning) in which
deviations over time can engender a systemic correction of some sort
 a second level differential (consistent with double loop learning) in which change in
deviations over time can engender a metasystemic correction of some sort.
We adopt time in these definitions simply because it is required for any correction to be
defined and implemented. Second level differentiation only occurs when the first level
differentiation does not reach equilibrium condition. This means that if it is perceived that
no system adjustment is able to occur, then this can lead to a “cognitive” change within
the metasystem. The nature of the change in these “cognitive” aspects of a metasystem is
determined by variety generation. This is because the environment itself generates variety
that is responsible for the perturbations that are seen in the transmogrific domain, and an
equilibrium deviation is consistent with achieving requisite variety.

We can also consider further levels of differentiation by examining again figure 4 that
explains the relationship between shared weltanschauung and paradigm (Yolles, 1997).
Thus a further level of differentiation would mean that we will be looking for the
cybernetic processes that relate directly to the individuals in a shared (and informal)
weltanschauung. Hence:
 a third level differential would relate to individual activities,
 a fourth level differential would be concerned with adjusting the cognitive domain of
individuals - that is a weltanschauung adjustment.
It would seem to be the case that each differential level in the cases cited can be related to
distinct focuses within the holarchy. As an example of this, in Organisational
Development (Yolles, 1997; Coghlan, 1994), the organisation, group and individual are
seen as different focuses in a holarchy that are normally interactively related, and may in
principle be cybernetically related. It may thus be possible to consider each focus as a
differential of the focus above. However, while this may occur in some instances, it is not
the general case, and it would have to be argued to be the case. This argument would
necessarily involve a recursive application of the generic domain model. This is because
while each focus has its own metasystem, the focuses above may - but do not in general -
define the metasystem of the system currently in focus. The only way that we can be sure
of our differential picture is to look for a recursive application of the generic domain
model that is capable of directly linking different differential levels.

While a soft system differential calculus can involve time in some way, a hard systems
differential calculus would make the argument that the cybernetic process is predicated on

15
time. In a hard system differential calculus, to be able to assemble the appropriate
mathematical tools we would likely: (a) make the assumption that the cognitive criteria of
the metasystem do not change in time (which they do in general), and (b) consider the
deviation as a time differentiation across the perceived states of the system relative to the
desirable states. These propositions would enable us to eliminate the metasystem from
consideration, and allow us to define an “objective” differential expression. As a
consequence, we see that the hard system differential calculus is restricted to the system
with the metasystem unrecognised. To be able to describe the structure and processes of
the system, it would normally also be assumed to be well structured.

Hard systems differential calculus is naturally quantitative in nature. When applied to

organisational situations, it seeks optimal conditions, and may thus be related to a search
for efficiency. Contrary to this, our interest lies in a differential calculus that naturally
relates to uncertain situations that are qualitative in nature, and seeks effectiveness. Based
on managerial cybernetics, this concept of differential calculus comes from a cybernetic
view of inquiry that is capable of contributing to the creation of effective organisation
through the examination of organisational qualities. The meaning of effectiveness is to be
able to accomplish something, and cybernetics establishes control and communications
mechanisms that facilitate effective action. However, facilitating effectiveness does not
make it occur, which is a state condition rather than differential activity that relates to
change. This is analogous in hard systems differential calculus to considering a
mathematical function for a well structured situation that describes its state condition.
The state function may be maximised or minimised with regard to a given variable by
zeroing the first differential with respect to that variable. However, achieving the
optimum with respect to that variable will be a function of organisational policy that may
or may not take into account the differentiation.

7. Conclusion

We can try to distinguish between a hard and soft system differential calculus by saying that
the former is naturally quantitative in nature, and seeks optimality. It can also be used to
force qualitative descriptions in complex environments, for example through the use of
landmarks that differentiate different qualities in a situation (Yolles, 1997). On the other
hand we perceive that a soft systems differential calculus is naturally qualitative in nature,
and is sensitive to effectiveness.

The ideas behind managerial cybernetics define it as a soft system differential calculus
that is directed towards qualities and behavioural effectiveness. This derives from many
of the considerations that currently exist in cybernetics that can be placed together to help
create a coherent picture. It might well be of interest to see a formalisation of this
approach through a symbolic representation. Necessarily this would have to be more
complex than normal simple differential calculus. This is because it would involve not
only at least four levels of differentiation for any system being explored, but also other
systems contained within the holarchy. There might also be a complicated relationship
between the levels of differentiation for a given system, and those in other levels of
holarchy.

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A question was put to Eric Schwarz during a conference presentation in Rome in October
1996 by a hard systems person. Would it be possible, it was asked, to represent viable
systems theory approaches mathematically using conventional approaches. Schwarz
responded by saying that the processes that are described in viable systems theory are much
too complicated for these methods. If this is the case, then perhaps a soft system differential
calculus, if agreed to exist, might be better able to do this.

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1
By transmogrification is meant a change from one appearance, state, or phase to another – in
the context defined here it is a transformational event that occurs between two ontologically
distinct domains of being.

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