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Greeks Lecture 9 Phronesis Socrates, Plato and Aristotle on Virtue, Knowledge and the Good Life

Socrates (in the Meno and the Gorgias) Virtue is knowledge definitional knowledge is necessary and sufficient for virtue. Virtue is necessary and sufficient for happiness. The elenchus philosophical dialectic is the way to search for definitional knowledge, i.e. to seek virtue and therefore happiness. This underlying view appears in various startling claims Socrates makes: No one does wrong willingly. (Denial of the possibility of weakness of will.) It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. The view also underlies all Socrates (sincere) arguments against Gorgias, Polus and Callicles. Plato (in the Meno) Plato is in broad agreement with Socrates views, especially this early in the development of his thought. But he begins to criticise: Worries about definitional knowledge. Worries about the elenchus as the way to search for knowledge and become virtuous. The doctrine of recollection as an attempt to answer these worries, illustrated by the slave-boy episode. Worries about whether virtue can reliably be taught. Aristotle (NE) Aristotle agrees with much of Socrates views, but introduces important distinctions that allow him far greater sophistication: Virtue requires a kind of intellectual ability, the intellectual excellence phronesis. But virtue also requires more, the training of the passions. Virtue is necessary but not sufficient for happiness. Becoming virtuous requires both training of the passions and acquiring the intellectual excellence phronesis which will need philosophy.

The Hole in the story about Virtue


Unanswered questions about Virtue What is the rational principle that determines the mean? What is the man of practical wisdom like? What is the difference between self-control and true virtue? Remember the brave man. What is the difference between merely doing a virtuous act and really being virtuous? Very important for becoming virtuous. What has reasoning to do with identifying genuinely valuable ends of life?

Phronesis is the answer VI.5 The remaining alternative, then, is that phronesis is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. Phronesis is the intellectual excellence that makes the truly virtuous man so, enables him to hit the mean, or choose what is appropriate, and is the way reasoning, practical reasoning, governs choice and action.

The Tripartite Soul


SO UL 1 R a t io n a l E le m e n t I r r a t io n a l E l e m e n t 3 F u l l y I r r a t i o n a l E le m e n t

2 O b e y s R a t io n a l E l e m e n t

1.Has intellectual excellences Five crucial: art (techne); scientific knowledge (episteme); philosophic wisdom (sophia); intuitive reason (nous) and practical wisdom (phronesis). 2.Has excellences of character Familiar virtues: courage, moderation, justice etc.

Aristotles view of practical reasoning


A familiar view of practical reasoning: Hume Reason and passion are distinct, quite separate things that do not act on each other. Ends are set by desire or passion. Reason has the subordinate role of calculating the best means to those ends. Reason is the slave of the passions. On this view, two points to note: 1. Our ends dont fall within the scope of reason. 2. Practical reason is just ordinary reason applied to means to ends. It is not distinctive. Two stories about phronesis if reason and passion are distinct 1. Practical reason grasps the end. Excellence of character then motivates us to pursue the end practical reason identifies. OR 2. My state of character determines my ends. Then ends are set and phronesis is needed only to work out how to achieve ends set by my excellence of character.

Does phronesis merely figure out the means to a given end? VI.9: If, then, it is characteristic of men of phronesis to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what conduces to the end which phronesis apprehends truly. VI.9 the incontinent man and the bad man, if he is clever, will reach as a result of his calculation what he sets before himself, so that he will have deliberated correctly, but he will have got for himself a great evil. Aristotle contrasts this with true excellence in deliberation, which tends to attain what is good. NO. The end is grasped by phronesis, which is a distinctive faculty, not the same as mere cleverness in deliberation planning and execution. Does phronesis merely choose the ends of practical deliberation? VI.9: If, then, it is characteristic of men of phronesis to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what conduces to the end which phronesis apprehends truly. Phronesis is the intellectual virtue which ensures excellence in deliberation, so phronesis is thoroughly and completely involved in all aspects of practical reasoning. NO. Phronesis is a distinctive faculty involved in both grasping the right ends of practical deliberation, and also in working out how to achieve those ends. Phronesis is a pretty comprehensive intellectual virtue concerned with action. Reason and passion closely interwoven VI.2 choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect, or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character. VI.2 choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire VI.2 What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good. For Aristotle, whats involved in grasping an end cannot involve what Hume would think of as pure reason. For Aristotle, to grasp an end, to grasp it as an end, is to be motivated by it. Reason and motivation Reason: the various intellectual virtues that aim at truth. Phronesis concerned with truth and correctness in action. Motivation 2 fundamentally different kinds: Appetite: aims always at pleasure. Rational wish: desires overall long term good. Appetite can move you to action thoughtlessly, rational wish always involves thought, although that does not imply such action needs time to consider. Appetite can be brought into harmony with rational wish fully virtuous man will only find good things pleasant.

Phronesis and more minor intellectual excellences Phronesis must choose actions that conduce to the desired good end. That will require: Understanding ability to sum up a situation Judgement having summed up, ability to judge what is right and proper Cleverness executive not ability to make plan and successfully carry it out. Understanding and judgement are minor intellectual virtues.

Questions about virtue


Difference between doing the right thing and true virtue? Natural virtue: e.g. action of a child being brave fending off a scary dog from her little brother. Full understanding is lacking of the risk, and the goodness of the end, the protection of her brother. The child acts well, but merely as he or she has been taught. The lack is intellectual, both in the understanding and in the fact that the childs appetites are not fully in line with reason. Self-control: e.g. adult afraid but standing in the defence of the city. He experiences fear, and it does motivate him to run, but his understanding, and his rational wish to save the city, hold firm. The fully brave man experiences fear, but it doesnt motivate him to run. The overall conclusion of his passions, as well as his emotions, is to stand. Appetite does not act in him as in the self-controlled man, because while he has both appetite and rational wish to preserve his own life, he finds saving the city the most pleasant thing. The lack is that the emotions are not properly attuned to reason, fear only as strong as it should be, and the tendency to find noble ends very pleasant not yet developed properly.

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