Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology

54 ETHOS

Psychoanalysis and Phenomenology

Thomas J. Csordas

Abstract

If psychoanalysis and phenomenology are thoroughgoing, comprehensive, and complementary

accounts of subjectivity, anthropological analyses of subjectivity can benet from them both as well as from the dialogue between them. In the rst part of this article I present and elaborate a preliminary outline of conceptual correspondences between phenomenology and psychoanalysis. These are pairs of ideas that seem intuitively to go together on either a parallel level of analysis or in terms of the role they play within the broader intellectual movement. In the second part I call attention to a preexisting body of work that explores the relation between psychoanalysis and phenomenology. This is work in phenomenological or existential psychiatry that developed sometimes as a synthesis of the two elds, and sometimes as a critique of and alternative to psychoanalysis. I conclude by suggesting that anthropology is a eld sufciently fertile for such a cross-pollinated mode of thinking to take root. [anthropology, subjectivity, psychoanalysis, phenomenology]

In the spring of 2008, I attended two conferences, one week apart. At the rst someone stood and said that they were moving away from cultural phenomenology and toward psychoanalysis because of inadequacies they sensed in the former. At the second conference someone stood and said that they were going to become a cultural phenomenologist as a way to get out of psychoanalysis. Having already accepted the invitation to discuss the relation between phenomenology and psychoanalysis at the Emory conference which was the immediate precursor of this dialogic collection, I was pleased that events had conspired to endow me with an opening anecdote. To my mind, the signicance of the back-to-back declarations is to suggest that there is a kind of symmetry between these two intellectual pursuits that constitutes a mutual invitation from one to the other, and in this article I place considerable emphasis on this symmetry. First, however, I must comment on one apparent element of asymmetry: why did both speakers feel a need for an adjective to modify the term phenomenologywhy did they both refer to cultural phenomenology but not to cultural psychoanalysis? Perhaps the asymmetry suggests a feeling that there is an implicit vagueness in phenomenology relative to psychoanalysis. There may be a sense that phenomenology species method without content, or more precisely that the subject matter of phenomenology is so all-encompassing that it requires a qualier, whereas the content of psychoanalysis is given relatively more self-evidently in the domain of unconscious psychic conicts. But it is not incidental that the key phrase is cultural phenomenology instead of the phenomenology of culture. After all, anthropology does not provide the content and philosophy the method. What is at issue instead is convergence of an ethnographic and a phenomenological sensibility, an

ETHOS, Vol. 40, Issue 1, pp. 5474, ISSN 0091-2131 online ISSN 1548-1352. Association. All rights reserved. DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-1352.2011.01231.x

2012 by the American Anthropological

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attunement to the immediacy of experience. I admit to having a vested interest in this terminology, since I have been using the phrase cultural phenomenology to describe one aspect of my own work. To me the phrase means on the one hand using phenomenological method, phenomenological concepts, or phenomenological sensibility in the interpretation of ethnographic data, and on the other hand using ethnographic instances as the concrete data for phenomenological reection. This being said, in what follows I attempt to elaborate my intuition of symmetry between psychoanalysis and phenomenology, in part by highlighting corresponding terminological pairs from the two traditions, with the aim of enhancing the potential for dialogue between them within anthropology. If psychoanalysis and phenomenology are symmetrical intellectual pursuits, one element of that symmetry is that they share a deep concern for the relation between science and subjectivity. Phenomenology is an effort to establish a philosophy that can be a rigorous science by becoming fully aware of the subjective conditions of knowledge, and psychoanalysis is an effort to understand psychic life on the basis of scientic principles, a systematic study ultimately grounded in our biological nature. Neither is adequately described as a science of subjectivity, and there is no simple agreement on the nature of the subject, but the message of both is that any science that eschews the subjective element is inadequate as science. Because of this fundamental congruence, in contrast to what was implied by the conference speakers I mentioned in opening, there is in principle no necessity to give one up in order to pursue the other, and in fact a dialogue between them is both inevitable and necessary.1 In this spirit I rst address the relationship between psychoanalysis and phenomenology in general. I do so briey in terms of encounters between adherents of the two movements, then in somewhat more detail by juxtaposing concepts within them that appear to pertain to similar levels of analysis. I then proceed to examine a specic instance of synthesis in the work of phenomenological psychiatry, considering the contributions of Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss in particular. I conclude with several remarks on the implications of a shared agenda for phenomenology and psychoanalysis within anthropology.

Dialogical Partners
There are a number of ways to initiate a dialogue between psychoanalysis and phenomenology, some more or less relevant to anthropology.2 One could undertake an intensive comparison of the works of Freud and Husserl, contemporaries who nevertheless did not directly address one anothers work, or one could conduct an analysis of all the variants and schools generated by the two movements. Each of these approaches would require a sustained analysis whose relevance to anthropology could only be assessed upon their completion, and my ambition in this article must be considerably more modest. One could also examine commentaries or syntheses attempted by members of one movement or the other, and concrete instances of dialogue between adherents of the two movements; this will be considerably more enlightening in the short term, though here I can only point to some of this work. Spiegelberg (1972) has observed that such interaction was far more common and productive in the French than in the German phases of the two movements. It is certainly relevant that Paul Ricoeur (1970) brought his phenomenological sensibility to bear on the oeuvre

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of Freud, particularly given the inuence of Ricoeurs understanding of interpretation on Geertz and the widespread inuence of his work on narrative. Maurice Merleau-Pontys career long interest in psychoanalysis has been observed (Phillips 1996; Slatman 2000), and Slatman attributes to him a mature attempt to formulate a psychoanalysis of nature that amounts to an integration of phenomenology and psychoanalysis, blurring the distinction between conscious and unconscious, and virtually equating intentionality and desire.3 Perhaps of greatest consequence in this respect is the relatively sustained dialogue between the phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty and the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (e.g., see Lacan 1961, Merleau-Ponty 1964), both of whom have made a signicant mark on contemporary anthropology. Here I can only point to a small but intriguing literature that examines this dialogue. Most comprehensive is Phillipss (1996) outline of the decades long interaction, including the axis of disagreement due to the consequences of their respective starting points in consciousness and perception versus the unconscious and language, and Merleau-Pontys perspective that psychoanalysis should be considered one among a variety of approaches versus Lacans that psychoanalysis required a comprehensive reformulation of contemporary thought. ONeill (1986) compares the approaches of the two thinkers on the infants encounter with a mirror, treating the origins of subjectivity in terms of selfother relations, infantile passivity and narcissism, and postural identication and schema. Shepherdson (1998) offers an interpretation of Lacans reading of Merleau-Pontys posthumous book, The Visible and the Invisible, emphasizing their differing understandings of the gaze and the esh in relation to a theory of the subject. As valuable as it would be to extend a consideration of the dialogue between Lacan and Merleau-Ponty, for present purposes I will adopt another strategy, which is to present an outline of conceptual correspondences between phenomenology and psychoanalysis from the standpoint of an anthropologist interested in both. I formulated these pairings without an explicit method and with awareness that my own knowledge of psychoanalysis and phenomenology is limitedin other words, by intuition. However, this intuition was guided by the two criteria that the pairs of ideas seem to go together on either a parallel level of analysis or in terms of the role they play within the broader intellectual movement. Then I asked myself what I mean by these intuitive pairings. Some are obvious, others contestable. The pairings do not exhaust the main concepts of either phenomenology or psychoanalysis, and in some cases it is open to debate whether they are best described as parallel, symmetrical, overlapping, convergent, or contradictory. Thus the following can be taken only as an incitement to further discussion (see Table 1). The rst pair is that which at the conceptual least common denominator denes the overt goal of each intellectual movement. Phenomenology is descriptive, and what it describes are phenomena, meaning everything that exists or can possibly exist for us as humans. Psychoanalysis is therapeutic, and what it treats are pathologies, meaning conditions of emotional distress or developmental frustration. This initial statement is of course too simple.4 Within phenomenology there can be what we can call two stances toward the descriptive task, namely transcendental and existential. Husserl said that the term transcendental refers to

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Table 1. Conceptual Correspondences between Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis Phenomenology Descriptive Always beginning Existence Essence Dasein Immediacy/ Presence Intersubjectivity Embodiment Intentionality Being-in-the-world Horizon Epoch e and Reduction Imaginative free variation Psychoanalysis Therapeutic Never ending Unconscious Conict, complex, imago Ego Memory/Reminiscence Transference/Object relations Biology Drive/instinct Human nature Defense Dream interpretation Free association

the motif of inquiring back into the ultimate source of all the formations of knowledge, the motif of the knowers reecting upon himself and his knowing life . . . the motif of a universal philosophy which is grounded purely in this source and thus ultimately grounded (Husserl 1970:9798). The existential stance is more directly concerned with description of the life world or world of everyday life, the phenomena encountered in the course of existence and being-in-the-world. Likewise there can be what we can call two methodological orientations, namely reective and hermeneutic. Reective phenomenology is a direct examination of the contents of consciousness or, leaning on the basic structure of intersubjectivity to put oneself in the shoes of another, a reection on the consciousness of another person. Hermeneutic phenomenology is an examination of phenomena treated in the manner of texts which can be inhabited or lived-into, elaborated and explicated. Within psychoanalysis, treatment can be carried out under a topographical model, a structural model, an economic model, a conict model, an object-relations model, or an intersubjective model. We can also observe that the method is not always only applied to the suffering of an individual in a treatment setting, such that we can say that there is not only therapeutic but theoretical psychoanalysis. In the latter category we are familiar with psychoanalysis in the study of literary texts, in certain kinds of cultural and media studies, in work on psychosexual development and personality, psychohistory or psychoanalytic biography, and ethnography that looks for Freudian themes and dynamics or applies psychoanalytic concepts. The second contrast is in part tongue-in-cheek because it is based on stereotypes of phenomenology as always beginning and psychoanalysis as never ending, which nevertheless have an important common basis in the nature of human experience. Most of Husserls works were programmatic and indeed framed as introductions to phenomenology. In a more pedestrian sense, phenomenological works sometimes seem to spend so much time laying out their theoretical position and methodological concepts that the real work of analysis is never engaged. Anthropology, with a richness of data, has the potential to complete this

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program. In this task anthropologists should remain cognizant that phenomenology does not require a different kind of data, but is a manner or style of thinking (Merleau-Ponty 1962:viii) with which one approaches data. That psychoanalysis has no ending is not simply a stereotype based on the often-years-long process of treatment. Beyond the criterion of successful resolution of transference, it is also an actuality based on the difculty of determining what constitutes a cure and the careful negotiation of treatment termination. In both cases, when phenomenology appears to be always beginning and psychoanalysis appears never to have an ending, each taps into the open-ended character of life that allows one to recognize stillness and stasis not as peace but as constant movement and change, not as chaos but as life itself. This consideration is in accord with the pairing of existence and unconscious as terms that dene what I call the ground, terrain, or eld upon which phenomenology and psychoanalysis carry out their respective intellectual agendas. They occupy parallel levels of analysis insofar as existence and unconscious identify not a content but a locus; they are not about existence or the unconscious, but their entire problematic is predicated on these open-ended zones of life activity. In elaborating this point, it is not very useful to say that the two concepts have different scope in the sense that there is nothing outside, beyond, or over against existence in the same way we could say that the unconscious can be distinguished from the conscious.5 It is more useful to say that they constitute two styles of approaching the meaning of being human, insofar as both are dening features of what distinguishes human being from the nonhuman. For psychoanalysis the contents of the unconscious are typically hidden or inaccessible while for phenomenology the elements of existence are typically taken-for-granted or nonthematized. In both cases the method is to bring these contents into the light of day and understand their consequences for peoples lives. What are the contents to which we have just referred, the objects of these two modes of understanding? For phenomenology they are essences. Because of the recent history of anthropology we have to introduce this concept with some caution. Essentializing an identity or a category is not the same thing as describing the essence of a phenomenon. Essence is a kernel of human meaning at the intersection of all possible takes on the phenomenon, the description of what it is in all its modalities across all imaginable contexts, and in its distinctive relations with other phenomena that can be understood as more or less discrete and distinct from the phenomenon of interest. On the other hand, essentializing as it has been critiqued in anthropology stands for the attribution of something universal and immutable. Thus in phenomenology, and particularly in cultural phenomenology, the goal is not to dene the universal essence, but to describe the essence of the particular. That is to say, essence does not reside in a general class of phenomena but in the concrete instance of a phenomenon; it is not described as a catalogue of shared traits but as the unique instantiation of a trait; there is no universal essence of humanity but the particular essence of you or me as human. The essence of the particular opens out upon the intelligibility of existence as truth. Now, to nd a psychoanalytic concept that corresponds on any level to this one is a challenge; I am uncertain as to whether there is such a concept, or whether my knowledge

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of psychoanalysis is simply inadequate to nd one. It may also be that different schools of psychoanalysis diverge on this issue whereas various forms of phenomenology are more generally in agreement about the study of essences. Given these reservations, I venture that insofar as psychoanalysis is fundamentally concerned with intrapsychic development, what is at issue is the outcome of ongoing attempts to resolve the underlying conicts which determine that development. Again, it may be more appropriate to say that the psychoanalytic notion of the complex is the equivalent of the phenomenological essence, and is embedded in the unconscious as the essence is embedded in existence. This reading perhaps also depends on an early Lacanian denition of the complex as dominated by cultural rather than instinctual factors (Lacan 1938:6), where the complex reproduces a reality of the environment at a certain developmental stage, and this xed reality is called into play and further conditioned by subsequent experiences. Yet again, insofar as the Lacanian complex admits of being at least partially accessible to consciousness, perhaps the equivalent of the essence is the fully unconscious representation labeled the imago which Lacan calls the fundamental element of the complex (1938:6). This is as far as I can follow this thread, since the next series of questions would take me into consideration of whether one must dene imago as potentially positive or necessarily negative, as distillation or distortion of experience, as individual (e.g., the maternal imago) or collective (e.g., the archetype). If for a moment I can say that the objects of phenomenology and psychoanalysis are essences and imagos respectively, then what are their subjects? Here we can be relatively condent about pairing dasein and ego, noting that dasein comes from the Heideggerian branch of phenomenology and ego is most strongly associated with a certain phase in the development of Freuds thought. The pairing makes sense because dasein does not simply translate as an abstract being-there, but can be used with the indenite article to denote a particular being there. Yet the term dasein connotes something more inchoate, preliminary, and holistic whereas one tends to think of the ego as not only already formed but analytically distinguishable from id and superego; and indeed one might need to include the full idegosuperego trinity as a better match for dasein.6 Phenomenology and psychoanalysis also have favored ways in which the dasein and ego engage temporality. To be precise, the dasein is typically described in the mode of immediacy and presence in the face of existence and the world of everyday life. The ego is treated in the mode of memory and reminiscence to reconstruct the unconscious processes in which it was constituted and continues to act. With respect to sociality, the key concept for phenomenology is intersubjectivity. The debate is whether intersubjectivity is experientially and ontologically prior to subjectivity, with anthropologists in particular tending to favor the primacy of the intersubjective both because of an intellectual predisposition toward shared meaning and social interaction, and as a way to sidestep the solipsism which in some instances creeps into phenomenological discourse. Psychoanalysis does not foreground a general concept equivalent to intersubjectivity, but places considerable emphasis on specic experientially salient forms of intersubjectivity. Transference and countertransference are critical components of intersubjectivity between analyst and analysand, object relations describe the unconscious grounds of

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intersubjectivity among emotionally consequential others, and projection is an example of distorted intersubjectivity in the egos immediate social milieu. The next pair of parallel concepts has to do with the stance toward the body, wherein the position of phenomenology can be summarized in the term embodiment and that of psychoanalysis by biology. For phenomenology, embodiment does not denote a process in any sense such as that meaning is put into the body or that experience is ltered through the body, but refers to the primordial condition of human existence. In this respect it is not just that the body or its sensory experience is a phenomenon to be studied, but that embodiment is the essential ground of existence and experience. For psychoanalysis, biology is not just a condition of experience but the starting point for understanding because all experience is ultimately conditioned or determined by biology. The difference is not merely a matter of emphasis reecting Husserls background as a philosopher and Freuds as a medical doctor, but an important consequence of Freuds explicit espousal of a natural science position that psychic reality is grounded in neurobiology. Coordinate with the embodimentbiology contrast, in the domain of motivation broadly stated the central concept for phenomenology is intentionality whereas the parallel concept for psychoanalysis is the drive. Intentionality is a global concept not limited to the specic intention associated with an action but a kind of tension in relation to the world or a tending toward engagement in the world. It is a going-out to the world and connecting to it through innumerable intentional threads, as Merleau-Ponty was wont to say. There is a kind of tropism implied in the phenomenological notion of intentionality, but more of a kind related to an inherent vitality (as Brentano, a teacher of Husserl, might say), rather than to an autonomic response as with the heliotropism of a sunower. The drive, on the other hand, is predicated on biological instinct. It is a genetic rather than an existential characteristic of the human species, and originates in a place that connects to our animality. It also implies a kind of tension, but more of a kind suggestive of the buildup of pneumatic or hydraulic pressure than of taut muscles reaching toward another or engaging in movement, and certainly more explicitly focused on the attainment of pleasure and the satisfaction of desire. At the most general level of conceptual contrast, for phenomenology the body affords a particular mode of being-in-the-world, adding a strong measure of specicity to consideration of existence and the dasein. For psychoanalysis the body connotes a particular understanding of human nature as determined by biological evolution, in the manner that was espoused by the generation of psychoanalytic anthropology dened by scholars such as George Devereux, Weston LaBarre, and Melford Spiro. The next conceptual pair I have juxtaposed are the phenomenological notion of horizon and the psychoanalytic notion of defense. My rationale is that in some way both terms dene a kind of experiential limit. The importance of horizon is evident in its literal sense for the phenomenology of perception, but perception is not the only human phenomenon that has a horizonal structure, and these others can be considered metaphorical only in the narrow sense that the basic idea is designated by a term borrowed from visual distance perception. Thus we can talk in a very concrete sense about an emotional horizon, an intellectual horizon,

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a horizon of creativity, a horizon of aspiration and so on. The horizon is a moveable limit that depends entirely on a persons perspective and position and is constantly readjusted in accordance with the persons movement in the world. There is always a horizon, but it is always in principle possible to nd out what is on the other side. If there is something on the other side for psychoanalysis, in the absence of psychoanalytic intervention the defense prevents one from arriving there. The defense masks, walls off, or distorts an experience and its emotional consequences, and most precisely it is a foreclosure of experience. In distinct contrast to a horizon, it does not move with the movements of the person, and whereas the horizon is an intrinsic part of the worlds structure, the defense is precisely a mechanism, an artice constructed and self-imposed on the psyche. It not only prevents one from arriving at the emotional truth of a specic developmental moment or life experience, it often impedes ones ability to move in other domains such as emotion, intellect, or aspiration. Two nal pairs of contrastive concepts have to do with method. First, in phenomenology a privileged place is given to the epoch e and reduction, and in psychoanalysis an equally privileged place is given to dream interpretation. Each method is in its own way concerned with sorting through the residue of consciousness and the secondary baggage of experience in order to attain an essential kernel of experiential truth. This is a truth profoundly bound up with the perspective of an individual subject, but far from being solipsistic it is the case for both phenomenology and psychoanalysis that the most unique, private, and idiosyncratic moment opens out onto the universal human panorama, and moreover is ultimately reinserted either descriptively or therapeutically into the life context that produced it. The epoch e is often described as a bracketing, suspension, or abstention of the world of everyday life in order then to reduce a phenomenon to its unencumbered essencein anthropology the term best names the process of identifying and thematizing the taken-for-granted.7 The method could just as well be described as a methodical taking apart and putting back together of a phenomenon to see precisely how it works, like a curious child dismantles and reassembles a clock to see what makes it tick. Something similar could be said of psychoanalytic dream interpretation, where nothing is taken at face value as multiple levels of meaning are peeled away like the layers of an onion, and a jumble of images is spread out as if on a table so that particularly meaningful images can be isolated and examined for their emotional consequences.8 A second methodological pair is the phenomenological technique of imaginative free variation and the psychoanalytic technique of free association. With as much spontaneity as can be mustered or tolerated, the phenomenologist concentrates on the phenomenon of interest reduced as far as possible to its existential core, while the psychoanalytic patient concentrates on his or her immediate state of emotional sensibility. The phenomenon is subjected to the imaginative equivalent of studying a stone by turning it over and over in ones hand, feeling it and viewing it from all possible angles, and furthermore seeing it fall from the clouds, lie silently in a dark cave, be worn by millennia of owing water, become part of a rustic stone house or an imposing cathedral. The essence of the phenomenon is to be found at the intersection of all its possible contexts and associations, to the point of testing the limits of reality and feasibility. It is precisely the limits of reality and feasibility

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that are of utmost concern in psychoanalytic free association, since it is the patients grip on reality and the emotional feasibility of his or her mode of life that are most at stake therapeutically. In this sense the valence of the phenomenological technique is shifted toward pure possibility while that of the psychoanalytic technique is shifted toward fantasy; said another way, phenomenology in this respect engages the imagination while psychoanalysis taps the imaginary. For phenomenology there is a methodical engagement of the imaginative process to supplement spontaneity, and this measured approach stands in contrast to the feeling in psychoanalysis of either apprehension that nothing will come up or that one will be deluged with tangled ideas and feelings. The attitude of free variation is to leave no stone unturned and the potential pitfall is interpretive incompleteness or lack of closure, whereas the attitude in free association is that something is being avoided and the potential pitfall is foreclosure of meaning.

Phenomenological Psychiatry
The second part of my contribution is to call attention to a preexisting body of work that has already posed our question of the relation between psychoanalysis and phenomenology. This is work in the area of phenomenological or existential psychiatry that developed sometimes as a synthesis of psychoanalysis and phenomenology, sometimes as a critique of and alternative to psychoanalysis. For the present I will take only a small rst step in a study of this area, touching on the work of Ludwig Binswanger, the Swiss psychiatrist and director of the Bellevue psychiatric hospital who received his medical degree under Carl Jung and served his internship under Eugen Bleuler, was a friend and correspondent of Freud, and a colleague of Heidegger who invited his colleague Heidegger to lecture at his hospital; and Medard Boss, also a Swiss psychiatrist who trained under Eugen Bleuler, read Binswanger, was associated with Jung, friends with Heidegger, taught by Karen Horney and Kurt Goldstein, and analyzed by Freud. This exercise will be of use rst in addressing the theoretical grounds of the convergence between psychoanalysis and phenomenology, second in its relevance to our empirical interests in psychiatric anthropology and cultural inuences on psychopathology, and third in the light it can shed on how the methodological intersection between phenomenology and psychoanalysis can help dene what is at stake in the anthropology of experience. Binswangers essay Dream and Existence, originally published in 1930 (Binswanger 1986) and known as the rst substantial work in existential psychiatry, is like a sonata in three movements. The rst part closely examines the existential theme of rising, falling, and hovering in dream imagery, particularly as manifest by birds soaring and falling dead, but also as modulations in sensuous and erotic feelings, fading and intensifying of light and vision, or sensations of ying and hovering. This existential theme is the same as that appearing in poetry or everyday language when one expresses disappointment by phrases like falling from the clouds or having the rug pulled out from under ones feet, and it points to an element of subjectivity that is objectively shared and helps dene the meaning of being human, or as Binswanger says, the who of our existence.

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This starting point is one step removed from, or one step prior to, the Freudian locus of dream analysis in the individual ego and its unconscious. However, this locus is strictly speaking neither biology nor language. In the rst instance, the idea is that the imagery is rooted either in the living structure of the organism or an asthenic affect that takes the form of falling as a physical model: According to this view, our falling from the clouds or the giving way of ground beneath our feet is a purely analogical or metaphorical transference from the sphere of the body to that of the mind, and within the latter it is simply a picturesque form of expression without genuine content or substance, a mere fa con de parler (Binswanger 1963:223). This position, revived several decades later by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) is unsatisfactory to Binswanger. In the second instance, Binswanger remarks in the opening paragraph that it is language that envisions and thinks for all of us before any one individual brings it to the services of his own creative intellectual powers (1963:222). Yet, although this statement appears to grant language a determinative status comparable to that granted by Foucault to discourse and discursive formationsand I will return to this point momentarilythere is something even more basic than language at issue here:
When, for example, we speak of a high and a low tower, a high and a low tone, high and low morals, high and low spirits, what is involved is not a linguistic carrying over from one existential sphere to the others, but, rather, a general meaning matrix in which all particular regional spheres have an equal share, i.e., which contains within it these same specic meanings (spatial, acoustic, spiritual, psychic, etc.) . . . language of itself . . . grasps hold of a particular element lying deep within mans ontological structure . . . Language, the poetic imagination andabove allthe dream, draw from this basic ontological structure. [Binswanger 1963:224225]

Binswangers position here is that there is not simply a linguistic carrying over or extension from biology to other domains; and neither is language itself given a more privileged status than the poetic imagination or the dream. Instead, biology participates in, and language grasps hold of, a basic ontological structure that is the ground of human existence. The second movement of Binswangers dream sonata changes keys and discusses the dream in ancient Greek society. Many of the images are still of birds in ight, but the existential structure is markedly different. There is no necessary distinction among the dream as subjective process in the dreamers psyche, the signication of an event in the external world, and the pronouncement of an oracular cult. This is because the subject source of all three is one and the sameZeusand thus all three form an inseparable unity. Binswanger elaborates:
Where do we hear any talk of an individual subject and where, then, is the possibility of the ontological grounding of that individual? And who can say here whether truth is to be sought in the inwardness of subjectivity or in the outwardness of objectivity? For here all inner is outer, just as all outer is inner. It is thus of no consequence whether an oracular event follows upon a dream or bears no connection with itjust as often a dream alone, without the oracular, can express the will of the godhead. [Binswanger 1963:237]

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One might be tempted to say in Foucaults terms that ancient Greek discourse constituted a different regime of truth of dreamsbut we must be wary of this position, and again we shall return to the reason why it is of interest in a moment. In the early Greek imagery Binswanger nds no mention of rising and falling in the sense of the life-ow of a particular individual, but instead The individual, the species, fate, and the godhead are intertwined in one common space (1963:238). Likewise there is no contrast between inner and outer such as emerged with Neoplatonism and remains characteristic of contemporary psychology, but instead there is the opposition of night and day, darkness and light, earth and sun (Binswanger 1963:238). More than a discursive regime of truth that is incommensurable with that of the contemporary world, what is of interest for Binswanger is that we nd in this existential spacewhich differs so markedly from our ownso clear a manifestation of the ontological structural element of rising and falling (Binswanger 1963:238). In the third movement, Binswanger arrives at the problem of individual subjectivity, citing the doctrine (associated with Heraclitus, Plato, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger) that it is a distinct mode, type or way of being human and stands in a particular relationship to the communal, the universal, and the intersubjective world of mutual understanding. In this view image, feeling, subjective opinion, and doxic form stand in contrast to mind, objectivity, truth, reective thought, and Logos. Life according to individual understanding or private thoughts is dreaming regardless of ones physiological state, and only a sensibility that grounds one in the universal humandivine community of understanding can be called awakeness. In this state of awakeness Binswanger interprets Hegels understanding of the spirit as an individuation of objectivity: it is not singular in its universality (1963:243). He immediately makes this abstract insight concrete by referring to psychoanalysis, in which the patient must decide whether, in pride and deance, to cling to private opinionhis private theater, as one patient put itor whether to place himself in the hands of a physician, viewed as the wise mediator between the private and the communal world, between deception and truth (Binswanger 1963:244). The therapeutic process does not relieve the patient of images, feelings, wishes, and hopes, but removes them from the sphere of despair and descent to that of ascending and even soaring life by reclaiming objectivity in subjectivity through authentic resolution of the transference. Where Binswanger claims to go beyond Hegel is to recognize with Kierkegaard that here we are not dealing with objective but with subjective truth, with the innermost passion by virtue of which subjectivity must work itself through objectivity (the objectivity of communication, consensus, submission to a superpersonal norm) and out of it again (Binswanger 1963:245). Binswanger asserts that these issues remain dormant in Freuds theory of transference because of his attempt to derive human spirit from instincts rather than recognizing that these two concepts are incommensurable and each belongs to its own proper sphere. He feels that Jungs theory of individuation is stronger, but it too remains unsatisfactory because it does not adequately take into account the contrast between imagefeeling and intellect, which continues unmitigated both in the notion of the collective unconscious and that of the self. From here he returns to the initial theme of disappointment as falling, feeling that I

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didnt know what hit me, and where in Heideggers terms Dasein knows neither the how nor the what of the happening (Binswanger 1963:247). Binswanger ends with a crescendo in one of the most profound statements that is simultaneously about the ontology of dreaming and about life lived in a dream in their relation to anxiety. To dream means: I dont know what is happening to me (1963:247). The dreamer awakens to selfhood only when she or he decides to determine what hit me and furthermore to take hold of the dynamics in these events . . . to bring continuity or consistency into a life that rises and falls, falls and rises (1963:247). Here the person nally goes beyond mere dreaming as life-functionthat which, once again to invoke Foucault, is the primary subject of biopoliticsand creates life-history. In the nal analysis these are again just as incommensurable as are instinct and human spirit; nevertheless, the transition between them is gradual and indistinct because, and most importantly, they share a common base in existence. The reason I have made occasional allusion to Foucault in my exposition of Binswangers existential theory of dreams is that Foucaults rst published work as a doctoral student in 1954 at age 28 was an Introduction to Binswangers essay (Foucault 1986). It will be worthwhile to spend a bit of time with this Introduction, which is twice as long as Binswangers piece, not only because Foucault starts with acknowledgment that Husserls Logical Investigations and Freuds Interpretation of Dreams were published only one year apart (1899 [Husserl 2001] and 1900 [Freud 2010], respectively), but that from our current stance there is something amusingly gratifying to imagine being able in 1954 to describe Foucault as a brilliant young phenomenologist. In addition, Foucault uses the term anthropology to describe his undertaking, and denes it in such a way that we can recognize the common ground between philosophical anthropology and cultural anthropology. For him, the theme of anthropology is the human fact, if one understands by fact, not some objective sector of a natural universe, but the real content of an existence which is living itself and is experiencing itself, which recognizes itself or loses itself, in a world that is at once the plenitude of its own project and the element of its situation. Anthropology may thus call itself a science of facts by developing in rigorous fashion the existential content of presence-to-the-world (Foucault 1986:32). In this context, Foucault lauds Binswanger for his ability to continually cross back and forth between the anthropological forms and the ontological conditions of existence . . . bringing to light, by returning to the concrete individual, the place where the forms and conditions of existence articulate (1986:32). Foucaults fascination with the essay on dreams is in Binswangers gamble that existence can be understood by examining the mode in which it is least engaged with the world. This approach goes beyond a hermeneutic of symbols toward comprehension of existential structures, and furthermore implies a whole anthropology of imagination requiring a new understanding of how meaning is manifest. In setting up the exposition of how Binswangers dream theory implicitly surpasses Freud, Foucault makes the critical observation that Freud caused the world of the imaginary to be inhabited by Desire as classical metaphysics caused the world of physics to be inhabited

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by Divine Will and Understanding: a theology of meaning, in which the truth anticipates its own formulations and completely constitutes them. The meanings exhaust the reality of the world which displays that reality (Foucault 1986:35). One can see here a foreshadowing of the argument that later led to a critique of the repressive hypothesis in the history of sexuality, as well as the notion of the discursive constitution of regimes of truth, but here following Binswanger the critique of Freud takes a different direction. Foucault formulates the problem as that Freud analyzes the dream only in its semantic function, leaving its morphological and syntactic structure in the dark, and again in Saussurian terms that the dream has only the status of speech to the neglect of its reality as language. He argues that The imaginary world has its own laws, its specic structures, and the image is somewhat more than the immediate fulllment of meaning (Foucault 1986:35). In this he is clearly alluding to the ontological structure identied by Binswanger, and he carries on to say that Freud is ultimately unable to handle the relationship between meaning and image despite his analysis of the mediating functions of repression and fantasy. In Foucaults view, this is probably because of an inadequate concept of symbol as the point of contact between image and meaning, inner world and external world, unconscious impulse and perceptual consciousness. This gap has been exaggerated in the development of psychoanalysis as a eld, with Melanie Klein on the side of image attempting to determine meaning solely from the movement of fantasy, and Lacan on the side of meaning attempting to identify in the Imago the essential movement of language. Foucault then asks whether Husserl offers a theory of the symbol that can successfully reinstate the immanence of meaning to the image. The answer is yes, because unlike psychoanalysis, Husserl distinguishes between the index elements of which the symbol is composed and which designate an objective situation, and the signication of meaning such as incestuous desire or narcissistic envelopment which constitute the dream experience from within. Furthermore, phenomenology does not make the psychoanalytic mistake of assuming an immediate identity between meaning and image, but instead nds their common ground in the expressive act, or to be precise in the immediacy of the expressive act insofar as that act opens a horizon of additional meaning, or meaning somewhat different from what was expected. In this specic respect the difference in the two approaches is that

Freudian analysis could see only an articial connection between meaning and expression, namely, the hallucinatory nature of the satisfaction of desire. Phenomenology, on the contrary, enables one to recapture the meaning in the context of the expressive act which founds it. To that extent, a phenomenological description can make manifest the presence of meaning in an imaginary content. [Foucault 1986:38]

The critical point in this last comment, however, is not that phenomenology is ultimately successful, for it ends up stranded in the imaginary. The conclusion is thus that psychoanalysis has never succeeded in making images speak, while phenomenology has succeeded in doing so but has given no possibility of understanding what they say. Still, taken as a twofold tradition, phenomenology and psychoanalysis pose the problem of a common foundation to objective structures of indication, signicant ensembles, and acts of expression. This,

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Foucault says, is what Binswanger tried to bring to light, though without ever saying so either explicitly or implicitly. Foucault had more to say than this, but I want to move on to a brief consideration of the relation between psychoanalysis and daseinanalysis as conceived by Medard Boss. Boss made an explicit distinction between psychoanalytic therapy and psychoanalytic theory, holding that the sensibility of daseinanalysis was much more in harmony with the former than with the latter. His enthusiasm for the compatibility of Heideggers approach to being and Freuds therapeutic stance is somewhat undercut by the fact that the positions explicitly articulated by Heidegger are most often asserted by Boss to be implicit in Freud. Nevertheless, there are some interesting points here. The central insight they share is into existence as being of the nature of a primordial openness and lucidity. No thought of unveiling hidden phenomena could have occurred in Freuds mind without his tacit awareness of mans existence as an open, lucid realm into which something can unveil itself and shine forth out of the dark (Boss 1963:62). Boss gives an extended discussion of how this tacit insight is displayed in Freuds insistence that patients lie down during treatment, allowing the patient to loosen up physically with all limbs horizontal and thus on a hierarchically equal level, to neutralize self-assertion and create the possibility for the patient to be totally delivered up to himself such that infantile impulses emerge in complete openness without the obstruction of a face-to-face adult relationship. According to Boss, Freud as therapist also transcended the natural science attunement to cause and effect and implicitly achieved a Daseinanalytic valorization of meaning and sense in the form of a life history that verged on a Heideggerian understanding of fundamental human temporality. He also sees similarities between Freud and Heidegger in their conceptions of humanity in relation to morality and in the centrality of language as the home of Being-ness. Perhaps most signicant to Boss, however, is the commonality he perceives in their conceptions of human freedom. For Heidegger, freedom was the ability to choose or renounce engagement in meaning-disclosing relationships to other beings, and this freedom in the Daseinanalytic sense is the condition for the possibility of psychoanalytic practice as taught by Freud (Boss 1963:67). Yet both Heidegger and Freud saw that humanity basically and customarily avoids independent, responsible selfhood (Boss 1963:68) and that living in the lucidity of existencewhat from Binswanger I also call awakenessrequired overcoming what Freud tellingly called resistance. To encourage freedom and openness, the relation between analyst and patient for Freud becomes an almost limitless playground (Tummelplatz) where all the patients possibilities for relating come out into the open. The silent analyst as a mirror is not cold and glassy but ultimately respectful of patients individuality and wary of obstructing his or her freedom. Finally, Freud insisted that the stance of the analyst not be one of intervening care but of anticipating care based on being quietly ahead of the patient in his existential unfolding so that the patient can become transparent to himself and free for his existence (Boss 1963:73). Boss feels that he has decisively made his case when he points out that the terms intervening and anticipating are applied directly from Heideggers description of the two kinds of existential care.

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Boss devotes a much longer discussion to the critique of psychoanalytic theory from a Daseinanalytic perspective. He is unequivocal in arguing that through rigid adherence to a natural science approach Freud destroyed the immediate and primary understanding of humans acquired in practice in a truly catastrophic fashion. In his theoretical approach, Freud objecties the psyche into a reex mechanism that operates by the cathexis and discharge of libidinal energy, bisects the mutually caring therapist and patient relationship into the medical observer and observable object, and introduces a further split among psyche, body, and world that not only precludes their being recombined but leads to a further dissection of humanity into a multiplicity of psychic elements (e.g., instincts, partial instincts, idegosuperego), while the external world can be reduced to mere stimuli. While transference and resistance are real observable phenomena in treatment, theoretical ideas such as the brain as an isolated organ or the notion of act of consciousness are conceptual abstractions beholden to prescientic presuppositions. Freuds theory and much of that offered by his followers remain inadequate from the stance of Daseinanalysis because insofar as they do not allow us adequately to understand mans essential nature as being of meaningdisclosing, elucidating character, we remain unable even to understand how someone is able to perceive a fellow man as a fellow man, let alone how he could enter into so-called interpersonal relationships (Boss 1963:80). Boss proceeds to examine a series of concepts beginning with that of an idea, or psychic object representation, which he regards as an abstraction predicated on an equally abstract entity called the psyche. Instead of an analysis of neurosis that begins with the idea of a tree, Boss wants to back up and start with the immediacy and authenticity of a tree as a being. It is not that humans dont have ideas, but that we are not certain what an idea actually is, and therefore the idea is not an appropriate starting place for understanding. He moves next to the hypothesis of an unconscious and psychic topography. The signicant development was transformation of the insight that unconsciousness can be a property of a mental phenomenon into an entication of the Unconscious as a psychic locality or system with properties and laws peculiar to itself (Boss 1963:88). The situation becomes more obscure when consciousness is then explained in terms of the unconscious, as the surface of a psychic apparatus that allows for an abstract capacity for becoming aware which is much more simply understood as direct evidence of mans primary openness and awareness, which, in turn, is the very essence of his existence and never merely the property of an unknown X (Boss 1963:92). Boss then makes the bold claim that Daseinanalysis renders the Unconscious superuous, making it unnecessary to go beyond immediate experience because it has not prejudged a whole host of phenomena according to an arbitrary decision as to the nature of the world and reality (1963:94). Boss will not brook a question of the form where does an idea go when it goes out of awareness. With some convincingness he presents Daseinanalytic interpretations of the way in which one is existentially with another being when thinking about an idea, as well as in terms of posthypnotic suggestion, everyday parapraxes, pathogenic factors, and symptoms in neurosis. These interpretations dispense with the unconscious and related notions of depth and surface, psychic locality and entity, replacing them with existential openness and closedness, presence and absence,

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complete existence and partial observation, light and darkness, concealment and disclosure, freedom and unfreedom. Boss examines the notions of psychodynamics and drives by pointing out that the mechanistic understanding of force or energy that motivates in pushing one from behind or below does not account for what in existence may be attractive and draw one toward engagement and caring. Here again he argues for the inadequacy of a causal approach as opposed to an attempt to understand the meaning-disclosing relationships of an explicitly human world. In addressing the domain of emotions, Boss distinguishes between affects such as anger and passions such as hate, and observes that their status is no less abstract than that of ideas unless we acknowledge that from an existential standpoint we cannot say they are objective things such that we have anger but that we are angry as a particular manner of being open to the world, a state of attunement or resonance with the world. Repression in Freuds sense does not exist at all according to Boss, and in the example of a young girl who had received a prudish upbringing and developed a hysterical paralysis upon being smitten with a young man, he argues that a repression of thoughts and emotions into an unconscious can be understood much more adequately as the inability of an existence to become engaged in an open, free, authentic, and responsible kind of relationship (1963:120). Transference is not the shifting of an entied affect from one person to another, but bespeaks a genuine and primary relationship between the analyst and patient, and if the adult neurotic treats the analyst like a father it is because his development remains so childlike that he is open to the perception only of the father-like aspects of all the adult men he encounters (Boss 1963:124). Likewise, a paranoid delusion is not the result of projection of an internal affect onto the outside world, but the consequence of a fundamentally immature existence that cannot handle its life-situation and really experiences it as threatening or poisonous; similar arguments can be made about introjection and identication (Boss 1963:126 27). Finally, Boss understands Freuds interpretation of dream images and symbolsand here I return to the ground covered by Binswangeras an attempt to undo or reverse the mechanisms of dream-work at the supercial level of the dreams immediately given content, judging dreams by the standards of the waking state as composed of isolated symbols in the form of mere pictures or images within a psyche. Instead, he asserts, dreams have their own mode of both being-in-the-world and being open to the world that is an equally autonomous and real way of existingi.e., of an understanding, meaning-disclosing relating to what is encountered (1963:12829).

Implications for Anthropology

My aim in this article has been to help prepare the ground for further discussion by tracing the conceptual outline of a relationship between psychoanalysis and phenomenology, and the roots of an earlier movement that placed the two schools of thought in direct dialogue. If in fact they are thoroughgoing, comprehensive, and complementary accounts of subjectivity, anthropological analyses of subjectivity can benet from each of them as well as from the dialogue between them. In the rst half of the article, for example, this premise led to

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juxtaposing the immediacy of phenomenology with the memory of psychoanalysis. As a result it was possible in the second half of the paper to see Binswangers understanding that one chooses mental illness emerging at this level of experiential immediacy in such a way as to deepen and problematize the concept of agency. Likewise it is possible to see in Bosss analysis of experiential immediacy the transcendence of the very categories of depth and surface as primary referents of subjectivity, broadening the existential repertoire to include oppositions such as openness and closedness, presence and absence, freedom and unfreedom. Such considerations do not do away with the psychoanalytic concern with depth but help to create a balance in the conceptual relation between psychoanalysis and phenomenology. At the beginning of this discussion I commented on the terminological asymmetry between psychoanalysis and cultural phenomenology. In closing I want to offer a similar brief reection on the phrases psychoanalytic anthropology and phenomenological anthropology. The former has unquestioned temporal and substantive depth within anthropology, evocative of scholars including Roheim, Devereux, Mead, La Barre, and Spiro along with the entire school of culture and personality, generating a body of scholarship summarized in extensive articles (Paul 1989; LeVine and Sharma 1997), and for a period (197887) even sustaining a Journal of Psychoanalytic Anthropology. The same cannot be said of phenomenological anthropology, where one is hard pressed in previous decades to nd more than Hallowells (1955) use of the term phenomenology for want of a better word, Geertzs (1966) somewhat strained application of Alfred Schutzs phenomenology to Balinese culture, and the seldom read work of Bidney (1973). At present, however, the relative retreat of psychoanalysis in the face of an aggressive neuroscience and the relative advance of phenomenology with the assertion that experience is a legitimate topic of analysis has resulted in a situation in which the two approaches are more equally matched as dialogical partners. This is evident in the tenor of recent anthropological work on both sides (Corin 2010; Fischer 2007; Heald and Deluz 1994; Jackson 1996; Katz and Csordas 2003; Molino 2004; Moore 2007), though as yet there has been little explicit dialogue or synthesis.9 For anthropology, psychoanalysis has always been put to use for interpretive rather than therapeutic ends regardless of whether the material being analyzed originates in the clinic, while phenomenology has found its appeal among those interested in the interpretation of experience as well as of symbol systems and culture analogized to text. The encounter between psychoanalysis and phenomenology per se has also largely been in an interpretive register, more precisely understood as the encounter between psychoanalysis and philosophy where phenomenology has been the most willing philosophical interlocutor for the Freudian discipline, creating a philosophy of psychoanlysis and a consideration of the implications of psychoanalysis for philosophy. From this perspective the dialogue about interpretation is at the same time a privileged instance of the relation between anthropology and philosophy. I would go so far as to say that it allows one to appreciate that the questions asked by anthropology and philosophy are the same. These are questions having to do with meaning and experience, subjectivity and intersubjectivity, embodiment and desire, language and self, emotion and imagination. The difference, and a critical one by all means, is that

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anthropology poses these questions in terms of the particular kind of empirical data produced by ethnography.10 In the present essay I have attempted, by demonstrating a conceptual complementarity between psychoanalysis and phenomenology, and by examining attempts to synthesize them in phenomenological psychiatry, to suggest that there is nothing to prevent their collaboration from taking place. Anthropology is an ideal locus for such an intellectual enterprise, and psychological anthropology in particular stands to benet from an alliance of two powerful methodologies as it turns increasingly toward analysis that transcends individual subjectivity to encompass larger social processes (Biehl et al. 2007; Good et al. 2008; Jenkins 2011). For a phenomenologically informed psychoanalytic anthropology this does not have to be restricted to reiteration of the culture and personality maxim that neurosis is to an individual what religion is to a culture, but can be extended to an analytic appreciation of the sometimes traumatic and sometimes imaginative consequences of repression and its imminent irruption into social reality. For a psychoanalytically informed phenomenological anthropology this does not have to be limited to an incremental extension of face-to-face intersubjectivity to wider social domains, but can enhance analytic appreciation of experiential immediacy and both its interpellation to action and its sedimentation into cultural forms. The diversity among contributors to this collection indicates that there is no one denitive form that this enterprise is obliged to take, but the eld is fertile for such a cross-pollinated mode of thinking to take root. THOMAS J. CSORDAS is Professor of Anthropology at the University of California, San Diego.

Notes
1. Spiegelberg observes the virtual simultaneity of these movements emergence in the Germanic cultural milieu, noting that Husserls Logical Investigations appeared in 190001 and Freuds Interpretation of Dreams in 1901 (1972:127). 2. See, for example, the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center (1988), Askay and Farquhar (2006). 3. Although he lectured on psychoanalysis and philosophy, Merleau-Ponty did not publish an extended analysis, but has left a number of intriguing comments worthy of repetition. In a preface to a book on Freud by his colleague Hesnard he writes, Phenomenology and psychoanalysis are not parallel; much better, they are both aiming toward the same latency (198283:67). In the working notes at the end of his posthumous The Visible and the Invisible he writes A philosophy of the esh is the condition without which psychoanalysis remains anthropology (1968:267) and Hence the philosophy of Freud is not a philosophy of the body but of the eshThe Id, the unconsciousand the Ego (correlative) to be understood on the basis of the esh (1968:270). These statements are pregnant with signicance. 4. In his comments at the Emory conference, Michael M. J. Fischer suggested that the term liberatory be substituted for descriptive on the phenomenological side. I would rather say that liberation is a shared existential goal underlying the descriptive and therapeutic methodological goals of the two intellectual styles, or perhaps that description and therapy represent different types of dispositif liberatoire. Certainly psychoanalysis attempts to liberate people from constraints and conicts that forestall maturity and perpetuate anxiety, while phenomenologys concern is nowhere

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more evident than in the trajectory of Merleau-Pontys (1962) Phenomenology of Perception toward its ultimate chapter on freedom. 5. In my view the consequence of pairing existence and unconscious instead of conscious and unconscious is that in the latter case one might more easily be led to the question of the degree to which conscious and unconscious overlap, whereas in the former one might be inclined to ask whether the unconscious determines existence or whether existence encompasses the unconscious. 6. This may not be adequate either, since one may argue that the idegosuperego trinity more aptly name the self than dasein, and that a closer approximation would be the subjects simultaneous engagement with what Lacan (1998) labeled the symbolic, imaginary, and real. 7. See also Throop (this issue). 8. Freuds 1900 Interpretation of Dreams (2010) could even today be a valuable primer for an anthropology applicable to dreams, ritual, myth, and culture in general from the standpoint of bodily experience, morality, symbolic process, memory and desire, and the relation of consciousness and the unconscious. 9. One exception is the explicit synthesis of psychoanalysis and phenomenology in the anthropological work on psychopathology of Ellen Corin (1998; Corin et al. 2004). 10. Anthropology shares equally important thresholds with other discplines, of course. History and ethnology, for example, can be characterized as asking the same questions about development and diversity with the former emphasizing time and the latter space.

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