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UDO DIEDRICHS University of Cologne


The considerable debate generated by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is testimony to its potential to transform not only the EU's external relations, but also the nature of transatlantic relations and the conditions under which NATO operates. If successful, the ESDP will represent the European pillar in security and be the mechanism through which European nations conduct most of their security dialogue with the U.S.: thus, in parallel with, instead of through, NATO. The Constitutional Treaty signed by the heads of state and government in Rome on October 29, 2004, will further contribute to strengthening the EU's security policy, and even though the Constitution has yet to be ratified, it contains a number of institutional 'offers' which the EU member states will be likely to implement and pursue in their quest to construct the ESDP. On the other hand, however, it is not altogether clear whether the ESDP can surmount all the current political and organizational challenges and emerge as a fully-fledged and coherent policy framework. The landscape of European security is still dominated by NATO as the prime organization for providing military protection. With the growing role of ESDP, the question of how to relate both the EU and the Alliance to each other becomes more virulent. The basic argument of this chapter is that the two domains - the internal EU arena and the EU-NATO relationship - are interrelated. This is not to say that it is a zero-sum game where the EU gains only if NATO loses. On the other hand, it would be premature to assert that the relation between ESDP and NATO is, by definition, harmonious. Both organizations are in a flux, (re)defming their tasks and roles in a changing international security environment, and both need to mobilize their member states' political as well military and economic resources in order to be successful. Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 3 (1) 2005, 55-70 55 ISSN 1479^012

Udo Diedrichs The overall assessment of EU-NATO relations will follow from the analysis of four ESDP dimensions: the institutional development; the issue of capability improvement; the emergence of a strategic vision for European security; and the question of political leadership in ESDP. Each of these dimensions bears a number of implications for NATO and transatlantic relations, which will be discussed in the concluding part of the chapter.

ESDP has grown out of a long-term historical process which started in the 1950s,' but the decisive ignition for creating military structures and capabilities that would be available to the European Union came from the meeting between French President Chirac and British Prime Minister Blair, at St. Malo, in December 1998. The Franco-British summit's famous formula, that the EU should possess a 'capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in response to intemational crises'^, was regarded as a breakthrough given British resistance to a military role for the European Union in previous years.^ However, considerable differences still remained between Paris and London concerning the precise nature, scope and design of the project. Whilst for France, ESDP represented a chance to render the EU more autonomous from NATO and the U.S. in terms of military operations, the British government viewed ESDP as a tool to keep NATO alive by increasing Europe's weight in military burden-sharing and by improving its military capabilities. Within this context of ambiguity, a new institutional set-up was established in the Brussels arena; to some observers, ESDP has been characterized by a process of 'Brusselization"* of actors who traditionally have not belonged to the framework of the EU. However, the institutional landscape still requires more clarity and rationalization, making it necessary to avoid an 'institutional overstretch',^ and to render the existing set-up more coherent and consistent. There is a widespread view in the EU that the institutional, political and military possibilities for shaping ESDP have so far not been fully exploited. As long as unanimity prevails in decision-making, it would be difficult to make it work efficiently, particularly in view of enlargement. Flexible modes of governance seem to provide an answer to this problem, as they would allow a group of countries to move ahead without waiting for the rest ofthe member states, but the inclusion of such provisions into the Treaties was blocked at the negotiations on the Treaty of Nice due to the resistance by some member countries.* On the other hand, flexibility within the Treaty could be a measure to prevent some EU countries from more closely cooperating outside the legal framework ofthe Union, totally out of reach for the other members. Against this background, it is of great interest to assess the recent reforms agreed upon in the context of the debate on the future of Europe. 56

The Development ofthe European Security and Defence Policy The ESDP has been a key issue in this debate which finally led to the conclusion of the signature of the 'Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe' by the heads of state and government in Rome, on October 29, 2004. The intense discussions within the Convention plenary, in its working groups and in the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), reflected the high degree of relevance of the issue, but also the controversy in which the traditional fault-lines in the European security debate lie.^ In detail, the major innovations introduced by the Constitutional Treaty include: A separate chapter on the European Union's 'Common Security and Defence Policy' (CSDP), which is anchored explicitly in the framework of CFSP by defining it as an 'integral part' ofthe latter.^ The creation of a foreign minister, combining the roles of the High Representative for CFSP (with enhanced functions), and of the Commissioner for extemal relations under a 'double hat', can be regarded as an institutional 'experiment' of which the outcome is still difficult to assess.' The introduction of different forms of flexibility (such as enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation), allowing a group of member countries to go ahead without waiting for the others,'" represents a remarkable step given the fact that under the Treaty of Nice it had been impossible to establish enhanced cooperation for military and defense questions due to the resistance shown by member states like Britain." The creation of a 'Defence Agency', which will be charged with identifying operational requirements, proposing measures to improve capabilities and taking a role in defining an armaments policy, would allow the member states to further streamline their efforts for improving their military records, pooling scarce resources and saving money. The scope of the Petersberg tasks has been expanded to include, inter alia, disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention, combat forces in crisis management and post-confiict stabilisation, as well as a general orientation for the fight against terrorism. A solidarity clause, which in case of a terrorist attack would ensure mutual support by the member states, refiects the will to address the new challenges of international security after September 11. As regards decision-making, no major improvement of the existing situation could be achieved. The possibilities for qualified majority voting in CFSP do not apply to 'decisions having military or defence implications', while 'constructive abstention' was confirmed as an option for member states to refrain from participating in a decision without hindering other countries in going ahead, but it cannot be regarded as a substantial opportunity for a more fiexible and efficient CFSP and ESDP The creation of a Minister for Foreign Affairs raises some doubts about the smooth and efficient functioning of such a post.'- Wearing a 'double hat', the

Udo Diedrichs Minister will be a member of the Commission and representative of the Council. In the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy, he will ensure the coordination of the civilian and military aspects in the implementation of the extended 'Petersberg tasks'.'^ This could make him a key player when it comes to combining EU instruments and national resources in missions with a civilian and military component, both of which are of great importance to ESDP. But the dual nature of the Foreign Ministers' tasks and responsibilities makes it particularly difficult to delineate his or her political identity between Council and Commission.''* The Foreign Minister will have to serve several masters and this might result in a personal and political overstretch. In that case, ESDP would suffer from a lack of initiative and impetus compared to the existing situation, where the High Representative has gained a key position in defining European security policy, as was demonstrated by the elaboration of the European Security Strategy. In procedural terms, the introduction of a number of mechanisms for facilitating flexibility has substantially widened the scope for action. In particular, 'permanent structured cooperation' can be regarded as the most important option,'^ designed for those member states 'whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions'. Structured cooperation was highly disputed within the EU, meeting initially with resolute rejection by the UK, which did not like the idea of group-building in ESDP in general (tasting too much of the French aspirations for forming avant-gardes), and which also feared that the implementation of crisis management operations could become monopolized by a group of countries.'^ Also the candidate countries were rather sceptical towards structured cooperation, expecting a two-class Union to emerge in which they would belong to the second rank. As new members they were highly interested in being regarded as equals by the other countries. The final wording of permanent structured cooperation represents a compromise between different aspirations. It will be clearly focused upon capability improvement, thus addressing a demand which the British government has always been eager to meet. Furthermore, there is, after close reading ofthe Constitutional Treaty, no possibility of ex-ante exclusion of a country willing to take part; i.e. those member states ready to enter will commit themselves from the start to fulfill a number of objectives.'^ This will leave structured cooperation sufficiently open to all interested countries, creating an 'inclusive' version of fiexibility.'* The Protocol more specifically spells out the criteria and objectives; key elements are the improvement of military capabilities through the European Defence Agency and the set-up, by 2007, of 'targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as combat formations, with support elements including transport and logistics', and capable of carrying out crisis management tasks within a period of 5 to 30 days. In support of these objectives, different forms of cooperation and coordination among the member states will be

The Development ofthe European Security and Defence Policy carried out, in particular by finding common objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment, the harmonization and identification of military needs, the pooling and specialization of defence means and capabilities, and the participation in equipment programmes in the framework of the Defence Agency. So far, the discussion about structured cooperation has triggered off some dynamics of its own even before formally entering into force. The Franco-British (-German) initiative for the creation of battle groups from February 2004 was designed not least for fulfilling the 2007 objective laid down in the Constitutional Treaty." In November 2004, the set up of thirteen battle groups was agreed by the EU countries, including even a non-EU state, Norway. Officially, the battle group concept is regarded as fully compatible with NATO, but in the background serious doubts remain. It could turn out as a rival to the NATO Response Force (NRF), and lay the foundation for a more autonomous role of the Union in carrying out military operations worldwide. Should the US lose interest in the NRF, this could lead even firmly convinced atlanticist EU countries to rethink their attitude and to place more emphasis on the battle groups as key components of the ERRF. Second, there is a close link between the agenda of structured cooperation and the activities of the future Defence Agency, in particular concerning the tasks described for enhancing military capabilities. Both elements will have to be streamlined in the future for efficiently working together. Furthermore, as a wide range of EU countries can be expected to enter structured cooperation, it will be necessary that at least France, Britain and possibly Germany try to take the lead in all major activities under structured cooperation, in order to deliver the necessary political and military impetus. Otherwise the danger exists that structured cooperation might turn out as a complex and bureaucratic exercise, lacking in concrete obligations and commitments, and too broad to be efficient and effective. Besides structured cooperation, the IGC has substantially changed another case of differentiation introduced by the Convention: the closer cooperation on mutual defence. Designed as a mutual assistance clause for those member countries willing to subscribe to it, it triggered off fervent discussions within the Union. In particular the 'Atlanticist' member states rejected the clause as it was regarded as a rival to the NATO Article 5 commitment, while the non-aligned countries feared that the EU would develop into a military alliance in the strict sense. In the end the clause was watered down, making reference to the pivotal role of NATO for the common defense of its members, and to the special status of some member states' foreign and security policy. Furthermore, the revised clause will apply to all EU states; i.e. there will be no 'avant-garde' of EU countries moving ahead in mutual defense. This issue was highly influenced by NATO members like Britain and also by the U.S. which tried to put pressure on the EU countries in order not to weaken the Alliance. Thus, in the end, NATO concerns have been largely considered and taken into account when drafting the final version of the Constitutional Treaty. 59

Vdo Diedrichs Compared to the Convention's version, the Intergovernmental Conference has substantially modified some of the most problematic provisions and thus reduced the degree of friction.

Capacity-building is crucial to the ESDP; to some observers it actually appears to be the Achilles' heel of the whole project.^ The EU countries have so far identified major gaps in military effectiveness, prohibiting or at least limiting, the EU's ability to implement the full range of Petersberg tasks. The deficiencies are further aggravated by the fact that during the last decade, defense budgets have shrunk in many European countries, increasing the gap compared to American capacities. Although some countries like Britain and France have recently stepped up their defense budgets, others - like Germany - lag behind and will probably not catch up in the foreseeable future. In May 2003, the Council of ministers stated that the 'EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls'.^' To meet the remaining shortfalls, in 2004 the military capability improvement process within the EU was redesigned, producing new documents and defining new objectives. The 'Headline Goal 2010' approved by the EU Council in May 2004, tries to better adjust the EU's military capabilities to the needs of 'rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty'." Among the objectives to be achieved are: the establishment, as early as possible in 2004, of a civil-military cell within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) for conducting autonomous EU operations; the establishment of the European Defence Agency; the development of battle groups including the appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets, and the availability of an aircraft carrier with associated air wing and escort by 2008; the development of compatibility and network linkage of all communication equipment, both terrestrial and space, by 2010; and the development of quantitative benchmarks and criteria that national forces will have to meet in the areas of deployability and multinational training. These initiatives are of a more concrete nature than many documents in the past, hinting at a more focused effort by the EU to address the deficiencies in military capabilities. At the same time, they refiect the turn from a quantitative to a more qualitative approach by the EU.^^ A key project mentioned in the new headline goals is the new European Defence Agency. In a Joint Action adopted by the Council on July 12, 2(X)4, the establishment of the Agency was approved and should be completed by the end of the year.^"* The Defence Agency will work in the fields of development of defense capabilities for crisis management, the promotion and enhancement of European armaments cooperation, the strengthening of the defence industrial base, and the 60

The Development ofthe European Security and Defence Policy creation of a competitive defense equipment market as well as the promotion of defence-related research and technology.^^ It represents the first institutional setup in the EU in which the defence ministers will be officially recognized, as they will be - as members of the Steering Board - politically responsible for the Agency. The Agency will be linked to other efforts for capability improvement; in particular it will coordinate and monitor the implementation of the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). Furthermore, participation in the Agency has been defined as one criterion for taking part in structured cooperation. Links to the Communities - via the Commission - have been foreseen, which could be of interest when it comes to combining financial resources from the EU and from member states. Finally, fiexibility will be possible within the Agency for specific ad hoc projects and programmes, so that differentiation among the participating member states can be expected to occur, while third countries will be allowed to join projects and programmes under the Agency. These developments in general seem to indicate that the Agency could turn out to be a central element in ESDP's capability improvement process, serving as a driving factor and a framework for ensuring consistency. It could also contribute to streamlining the different processes and mechanisms in military capability improvement within the EU. A more coherent capability-building process, including defense industrial relations as a key component, would most certainly strengthen the European position also in the transatlantic context, where competition with the U.S. is highly developed. So far there is no sign of a single EU procurement policy, but step by step the European countries could streamline their financial resources and decision-making structures, producing considerable economies of scale and savings resulting from trans-national synergy effects.

A key dimension of ESDP concerns the conceptual and strategic dimension of the project. In particular a link is needed between the military operational dimension and the underlying fundamental values and interests of the European Union. A number of procedural questions have already been tackled by the EU concerning the conduct of certain operations,-* but what is perceived as missing is a coherent approach to what the basic goals of the EU are to be. France has traditionally defended a rather autonomous role for the EU, being sceptical of NATO and fearing a devaluation of ESDP by the U.S.A.-^ On the other hand, Britain is clearly in favour of an Atlanticist approach, relying on close EUNATO cooperation and the Alliance's right of first refusal. Germany seems to favour an institutionally strong ESDP, but would like to keep a strong link to NATO.^^ A crucial problem lies in the deterioration of the political relationship between Berlin and Washington during the Iraq crisis, which has put the country's position in the EU and NATO under pressure. The positions ofthe neutral and non61

Udo Diedrichs aligned countries*' and the present Danish opt-out (i.e. that Denmark does not take part in the definition and implementation of a European defense policy) are only some of the additional problems facing a coherent strategic orientation. Despite the 'spirit of St. Malo', differences about the degree of autonomy of ESDP from NATO and the U.S., as well as divergences between more 'interventionist' and rather 'non-interventionist' approaches, still exist.^ Not least, different national 'strategic cultures'^' will have to be approximated, which entails a complex multilevel process. In December 2003, the adoption of the EU Security Strategy (ESS) can be regarded as an important step in promoting a strategic vision and mission of the European Union.^^ Drafted by Javier Solana, the ESS has been discussed and analysed by the political, diplomatic and academic expert communities - less by the broad public. The ESS is not only a declaratory exercise, but refiects the need for arriving at an understanding ofthe EU's strategic role in the world.^^ After the poor performance of the EU in the Iraq crisis, the member states were interested in defining a common ground for their foreign and security policy: 'The process to create a Security Concept is being used to heal wounds over Iraq and to provide direction for a multiple of security instruments that make up the EU's security "toolbox"' .''* The ESS of course, is not a precise operational document from which concrete steps can be derived for the EU's external action. It rather provides a conceptual framework and tries to point to basic principles and values which should guide the EU in pursuing its goals. As a guiding concept for addressing the new security threats, 'effective multilateralism' plays a key role. The ESS stresses the importance of international institutions like the U.N. in providing security and stability worldwide. It underlines that a broad and multiple set of instruments should be used, including civilian and military components also in a preventive way. A 'strategic culture' is regarded as necessary, 'that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention'.^' The strengthening of capabilities (including military ones), the promotion of internal coherence and the cooperation with international partners are among the guiding principles defined by the ESS. In comparison to the U.S. approach to international security, there are similarities as well as striking differences. In terms of threats and challenges, broad convergences between the EU and the U.S. can be observed: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, failed states, regional confiicts and organized crime.-'^ The most visible contrast concerns the principles for action and the importance attached to the underlying causes of insecurity. The emphasis of the ESS on multilateral embedment and on the role of international institutions is not easily compatible with the U.S. focus, relying on unilateral action if deemed necessary. In the end, the ESS could become the starting point for a European strategic debate and a reference document for further initiatives and more concrete 62

The Development ofthe European Security and Defence Policy expressions of the EU's approach to security. If all EU member states could agree to its basic principles and objectives, this should give hope for further progress to be achieved in shaping an EU strategic culture. As recent developments have revealed, the Atlanticist-Europeanist divide still plays a major role in the EU. The difficulty for ESDP will thus reside in finding a path which is regarded as acceptable for all different strategic visions within the EU, and in fostering a process of Europeanization of strategic views and ideas of security.

Recent developments in CFSP and ESDP have underlined that political leadership is still an unresolved issue. In particular in the case of a major crisis, coherence within the EU disappears, giving way to highly diverse patterns of coordination and consultation among the member states. The formation of leadership in CFSP and ESDP has thus so far been rather ad hoc and subject to instability. In this regard, the Iraq crisis is a telling example. As Christopher Hill bluntly puts it, 'throughout the Iraq crisis the CFSP was almost wholly silent'." Of key importance was the absence of a common position by the 'Big Three' (France, Germany and the UK), that had existed during the Afghanistan operation in October 2001. This fundamental disagreement prevented every attempt to produce a European view on the crisis and led to the formation of ad hoc coalitions, with the UK, Italy and Spain as key EU states on the side ofthe U.S., while France and Germany tried to organize the opposition to the Bush administration's stance on Iraq. The rift within the EU became widely apparent in February 2003 with the letter of eight heads of state or government in support of the U.S. position which led to political outrage in Paris and Berlin. A week before, at the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Franco-German friendship Treaty (Elisee Treaty), the governments in Paris and Berlin had stressed their determination to do all in their power to prevent a war in Iraq. It was at the height of the Iraq crisis, some weeks after the military operations had begun, that the four nations' summit by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in late April 2003 in Brussels, called for increased efforts to build up the institutional and military capabilities of the European Union which should enable it to act even without recourse to NATO assets.^* The delicate fact that these four countries all belonged to the 'U.S.-critics' in the Iraq debate conveyed the impression in Washington that they were trying to take steps in order to detach the EU from NATO, and that their position on Iraq was fed by a more general 'Europeanist' ambition. In particular the proposal of creating an autonomous EU military 'headquarters' - although the summit declaration did not use this term, speaking instead of a nucleus capacity for planning and conducting EU operations - became a major point of reference. The Atlanticist camp within the EU, led by the British, strongly rejected the proposal; so did most of the candidate countries 63

Udo Diedrichs from Central and Eastern Europe. The U.S. reacted with outrage and tried to keep the UK on alert. Some improvement to the political situation within the European Union came only after the fall of Saddam Hussein; the U.S. was faced with considerable problems of a military, political and economic nature, which increased the pressure to find a long-term solution to Iraq's future. There were at least signs of a more coherent approach by the EU in so far as the preference given to multilateral solutions was in principle shared by all European partners. The negotiations on a new U.N. resolution involved France, Britain and Germany, bringing them closer together in the U.N. than ever before during the Iraq crisis. The post-Iraq phase was also marked by increased efforts for consensus-seeking within the IGC on the Constitutional Treaty, where new attempts were undertaken to find solutions to the key problems. Surprisingly, progress was achieved rather quickly. The conclave of the Foreign Ministers in Naples in late November 2003 was able to agree in principle on the main disputed issues regarding the Constitutional Treaty (structured cooperation, closer cooperation on mutual defence), and in the following weeks the famous 'Tervuren'^^ headquarters question was also arranged. The key to these developments was a rapprochement between the governments in Paris, London and Berlin. It was in particular the German Chancellor who tried to engage the British in a dialogue over CFSP and ESDP, in order to overcome the recent disputes and restore 'normal' relations within the European Union and with the U.S. Germany's quest for 'normalization' met with Blair's efforts to stress his credentials as a 'European', able to take over a leadership role within the EU. For Chirac, it was an opportunity to push a number of issues through the IGC which would not be possible without the British. These developments hint at a number of relevant developments in ESDP. First of all, it seems that old leadership constellations no longer hold. The FrancoGerman tandem, which had driven the evolution of CFSP forward in the 1990s, no longer represents a broadly accepted leadership couple within the EU. Both countries are still of crucial importance and their cooperation can be considered as a source of dynamics, but it will simply not suffice for 'making the deal'. Instead of pre-formulating major European decisions, Franco-German initiatives were only able to organize impromptu coalitions (including mainly Belgium and Luxembourg), but evoked the pronounced resistance by other states, due to policy differences as well as to resistance to a domination by Paris and Berlin. This 'antihegemonic' effect has definitely been a factor in explaining the patterns of reaction within the EU. In contrast, trilateral consultations among France, Germany and the UK appear as much more promising in shaping constitutional decisions for ESDP. The antihegemonic reflex by some member states is still alive, but much less effective when Britain is included in the leading club. On the one hand, the British government is seen as an Atlanticist guarantor against an over-strong French style 64

The Development ofthe European Security and Defence Policy Europeanist drift. It is seen as a torchbearer of intergovernmentalism and, finally, it represents the leading military power in Europe. All this makes it particularly hard to oppose a deal among the big three, although criticism was still voiced. One problem, however, lies in the lack of reliability of such a 'concert' as a durable factor in EU foreign policy. The Iraq crisis has underlined the fundamental policy differences between Paris and Berlin on the one hand, and London on the other. Still, the French aspirations for 'Europe puissance' clash with the 'special relationship' between the UK and the U.S. Unless it is possible to find ways of more coherently coordinating the positions ofthe three 'big' EU countries, ESDP will continue to suffer from a political 'leadership gap'.

Relations with NATO have been crucial for ESDP from the very start."*" With the recent developments inside and outside the EU, the issue has even become more controversial. The institutional evolution of ESDP might lead to a more coherent and more effective European security policy, which will be easier to handle for the U.S. and NATO. In particular the foreign minister could turn out as an external representative and institutional 'engine' of the EU's security policy, but so far doubts remain as to the efficient functioning ofthe new post. Structured cooperation could tum out to become the major tool by which the Europeans try to substantially improve their capabilities, but that might also help them to grow more closely together in terms of institutional and political coherence. The success of the military objective of structured cooperation is also important from NATO's point of view, as capability improvement by the European countries is crucial for balancing the Alliance and improving interoperability between the U.S. and the other allies. On the other hand, any attempt to establish a kind of French-inspired 'avant-garde' will certainly create considerable problems for and with Washington. At the moment it rather seems that British influence and the weight of the new member states will avoid a drift towards 'Europe puissance' and prevent a move away from the Alliance. In particular after the Iraq crisis which was a European as well as a transatlantic quarrel- there seems to be an effort to calm down EU-U.S. disputes on security policy. As stated, the 'chocolatiers"^^ summit in April 2003 was widely received with criticism by the Atlanticist camp in the EU, and was heavily attacked by the U.S. In the months following the Brussels summit, the close consultations taking place between France, Britain and Germany led to the conclusion of a compromise (i.e. the creation of a military-civilian cell at the EUMS for planning and conducting autonomous EU operations), acceptable to the British interests of not endangering NATO, but also compatible with the French aspirations for enhancing the Union's autonomous capacity for action."*^ What reassured the British in particular was the 65

Udo Diedrichs presumptive order in the procedure for engaging in a nfiilitary crisis management operation, preserving a priority for NATC*' Additionally, the creation of an EU cell at Shape and of a NATO liaison arrangement at the EUMS should ensure that both the EU and NATO will better streamline and coordinate their military planning and preparation activities for crisis management missions in the future. Also, the solution ofthe mutual defense clause was very much to the taste ofthe Atlanticist camp, underlining the role of the Alliance for its member states and removing any remnant in the Constitutional Treaty of an operational mechanism that would prescribe a kind of automatism to be followed in case of an attack. The new provisions are clearly less binding in their wording, compared to the earlier version of the Convention. Thus, the outcome of the IGC has substantially contributed to ease the mood in NATO, and particularly that of the U.S., and it seems to have paved the way for further progress in relations with the EU. The Istanbul NATO summit in June 2004 agreed to the takeover of the NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia by the EU, whilst preserving a headquarters in Sarajevo responsible for some operational tasks in the fields of counter-terrorism, the pursuit of war criminals and intelligence sharing."*^ As regards military capabilities, the operational balance of ESDP is not as bad as many pessimists had assumed some years earlier, but it is clear that the EU will depend on NATO assets for a considerable time to come. The adoption of the EUNATO Declaration on December 16,2002, after consensus had been reached with Turkey, opened the way for carrying out military operations under the Berlin Plus arrangements.'*' In the late 2004, the mission in Bosnia passed to the Union's responsibility (falling under the Berlin Plus arrangement). This last operation will be a proof both of the efficiency and effectiveness of EU-NATO cooperation as well as of the Union's capacity in general to successfully carry out bigger and more comprehensive peacekeeping missions. The decision by the Prague NATO summit in December 2002, to set up a Response Force (NRF), represents a highly relevant and possibly problematic aspect of transatlantic security relations. So far, official declarations define the European Rapid Reaction Forces (ERRF) and the NRF as complementary and compatible but there is no clear picture yet as to the division of labor. Nor is the process of force generation, which has started for the NRF in 2003, sufficiently coordinated with the EU activities. This problem might get worse in the wake of building up the battle groups, stressing the need for cooperation in the fields of force generation, plannning, training and deployment of troops. The process of defense transformation, high on the NATO agenda, also deeply affects European military forces and their future design, but so far there is no regular and stable dialogue on this subject and its impact on both organisations. These uncertainties are further aggravated by the lack of a common strategic orientation in ESDP and within NATO; the European nations are actually cultivating different strategic ambitions on behalf of Europe - France foremost 66

The Development ofthe European Security and Defence Policy among them. They are unlikely to abandon the search for stronger European institutions but they may also find that the 'flexible option' within the EU is less flexible than it appears. In this case, the ESDP's political momentum could slow down because European nations simply agree to disagree, or because the search for political initiative moves outside the EU - to coalitions ofthe willing. Possibly the European Security Strategy could prevent this from happening by providing a more coherent conceptual framework (for example, in the shape of 'effective multilateralism') but it will take time to assess its de facto impact on the member states' security cultures. Furthermore, recent discussions within NATO reveal the lack of strategic orientation which also exists within the Alliance and which makes arrangements with ESDP rather difficult to achieve. Chancellor Schroder's surprising speech at the Munich security conference in February 2005 has highlighted divergent assessments of NATO's role and status, and emphasised the need for a strategic dialogue in the transatlantic context. It remains to be seen if this will lead to another reform of NATO, and how far it will influence relations with ESDP. In the end, it could lead to a strengthening of ESDP at the expense of NATO, if and when a majority of EU countries - including the UK, France and Germany - make a fresh start after Iraq, supported by a successful ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. The EU's ability to handle these highly complex and interwoven issues, reaching into the transatlantic and the European security spheres, depends to a high degree upon its capacity to mobilize sufficient political leadership. What is required therefore is a durable and reliable commitment - in particular by the large member states. Recent signs seem to hint at efforts for closer coordination by France, the UK and Germany. Such a 'trilateral concert', or 'directoire', might meet with problems of acceptance as the new member states would reject secondclass membership and countries like Spain, Italy and Poland would regard themselves as large enough to join the concert. But in the end it would provide the only powerful and effective tool for balancing the European and Atlantic ambitions in security policy and for compromising political and military differences among the member states. 'Effective trilateralism' could inject sufficient dynamics into ESDP and, at the same time, be a serious interlocutor to the U.S. in questions of European security and defense; it could contribute to a cooperative relationship with NATO and the U.S., and serve as a balancing factor in the transatlantic context.

See Anne Deighton, The European Security and Defence Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 40, 4 (2002), p. 720. British-French Summit 1998. 'Joint Declaration, St. Malo, December 3-4, 1998', in Maaitje Rutten (ed.). From St. Malo to Nice, European Defence: Core Documents, Paris, Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, Chaillot Paper 47 (2001), 67

Udo Diedrichs
pp. 8-9. See Jolyon Howorth, 'European defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?', Joumal of Common Market Studies, 39, 4 (2001), pp. 765-789; Deighton, 'The European Security and Defence Policy'. " * Elfriede Regelsberger, 'Die Gemeinsame AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach "Nizza" begrenzter Reformeifer und auBervertragliche Dynamik', in Mathias Jopp, Barbara Lippert und Heinrich Schneider (eds.), Das Vertragswerk von Nizza und die Zukunft der Europdischen Union. Berlin, 2001, pp. 112-122. ' Ibid; see also Mathias Jopp, Jan Reckmann and Elfriede Regelsberger, 'Ansatzpunkte und Optionen zur institutionellen Weiterentwicklung von GASP und ESVP', Integration, 3 (2002), pp. 230-237. * See Udo Diedrichs and Mathias Jopp, 'Flexibility in ESDP: From the Convention to the IGC and Beyond', CFSP Forum, 2 (2004), pp. 1-5. ' In the following, the Constitutional Treaty as signed by the Rome summit on October 29, 2004 will be taken as a reference. See the consolidated version of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CIG 87/2/04, Brussels, October 29,2004; and the consolidated version of the protocols and declarations annexed to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CIG 87/2/04 ADD 1 REV 1, and CIG 87/2/04 ADD 2 REV 2, Brussels October 29, 2004. * Art. 1-41 (1) of the Constitutional Treaty. ' See Hill, Ghristopher. 'A Foreign Minister without a Foreign Ministry - or with Too Many?', CFSP Forum, 1 (2003). ' See Udo Diedrichs and Mathias Jopp, 'Flexibility in the ESDP: From the Convention to the IGC and Beyond'. " See Elfriede Regelsberger, 'Die Gemeinsame AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik'. '" See Wolfgang Wessels, 'Eine institutionelle Architektur fur eine globale (Zivil-) Macht? Die Artikel zur Gemeinsamen AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik des Vertrags liber eine Verfassung fur Europa', Zeitsclirift fiir Staats- und Europawissetischaften, 3 (2003), p. 418-420; Christopher Hill, 'A Foreign Minister without a Foreign Ministry'. '^ The Petersberg tasks were expanded by Art. III-309 of the Constitutional Treaty, including henceforth also joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization; a reference to the fight against terrorism, to which these tasks may contribute, was also added. '"* See Christopher Hill, 'A Foreign Minister without a Foreign Ministry', p. 2. " See Art. 1-41 (6) and Art. I1I-312 of the Constitutional Treaty as well as Protocol (No. 23) on permanent, structured cooperation annexed to the Constitutional Treaty, op. cit (note 20). '* See Fitiancial Times, November 13, 2003. " See Javier Solana, 'Gemeinsame AuBen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der erweiterten EU', Europdische Sicherheit, 6 (2004). '* See Udo Diedrichs and Mathias Jopp, 'Flexibility in the ESDP: From the Convention to the IGC and Beyond', op.cit. '^ See Gerrard Quille, '"Battle Groups" to strengthen EU Military Crisis management?'. ISIS European Security Review, April 2004. -" See Julian Lindley-French, 'Combined and Joint? The Development of a Security and Operational Doctrine for the European Union', in Erich Reiter, Reinhard Rummel and Peter Schmidt (eds.), Europas feme Streitmacht, Chancen iind Schwierigkeiten der Europdischen Union beim Aufbau der ESVP, Hamburg, Berlin. Bonn, Forschungen zur Sicherheitspolitik, 6 (2002), pp. 86-118; Manfred Baumgartner, 'Eine Streitmacht fur mancherlei Zwecke - Konnen die Europaer das Headline Goal erfullen?', in Erich Reiter, Reinhard Rummel and Peter Schmidt (eds.), Europas feme Streitmacht, Chancen und


The Development of the European Security and Defence Policy

Schwierigkeiten der Europdischen Union beim Aufbau der ESVP, Hamburg. Berlin, Bonn. Forschungen zur Sicherheitspolitik, 6 (2002), pp. 11-42; Huber, Reiner K., 'Standards und Konvergenzkriterien fiir die Weiterentwicklung der europaischen Streitkrafte', Europdische Sicherheit,5\,4 (2002), pp. 45-50. ' See Declaration on EU Military Capabilities by the Council of the European Union, May 19-20, 2003, Council Document 9379/03 (Presse 138). - Council of the European Union, Headline Goal 2010, approved by General Affairs and External relations Council on May 17, 2004 endorsed by the European Council June 17 and 18.2004. p. 13. See Gerrard Quille, '"Battle Groups" to strengthen EU Military Crisis management?'. See Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of July 12, 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, OJ L 245, July 17, 2004. ' See ibid. * See Council of the European Union, Presidency Report on European Security and Defence Policy, Brussels, June 22, 2002, 10160/02 REV 2. See Yves Boyer, 'France and the European Security Defence Policy: A Leadership Role Among Equals', in Ehrhart, Hans-Georg (ed.). Die Europdische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Positionen, Perzeptionen, Probleme, Perspektiven, Baden-Baden. Nomos, 2001. Regelsberger, 'Die Gemeinsame AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach "Nizza"'. See Gunilla Herolf and Bo Huldt, 'The European Union and the Inclusion of a Collective Defence Clause', in Erich Reiter, Reinhard Rummel and Peter Schmidt (eds.), Europas feme Streitmacht, Chancen und Schwierigkeiten der Europdischen Union beim Aufbau der ESVP, Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn, Forschungen zur Sicherheitspolitik, 6 (2002), pp. 60-85. See Sten Rynning, 'A European Strategic Culture? The ESDP and 21st Century Geopolitics', paper presented at the ECPR workshop no. 12, Edinburgh, March 28 to April 2, 2003, p. 3; Jopp, 'Europaische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik', pp. 217226. ' Per M. Martinsen, 'The European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) _ a Strategic culture in the Making?', paper presented at the ECPR conference Section 17, Marburg, September 18-21, 2003; Sten Rynning, 'A European Strategic Culture?'; Howorth, 'European defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union', p. 784. See 'The European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World', Brussels, December 12,2003. See Jocelyn Mawdsley and Gerrard Quille, (with contributions from Malcolm Chalmers, Timothy Garden, Andrea Grazioso, Roland Kastner, Otfried Nassauer, Stephen Pullinger, Herbert Wulf), 'The EU Security Strategy: A New Framework for ESDP and Equipping the EU Rapid Reaction Force'. ISIS Europe, ISIS Report, December 2003; Quille, "'Battle Groups" to strengthen EU Military Crisis management?'. ^ Mawdsley and Quille, 'The EU Security Strategy: A New Framework for ESDP'. 'European Security Strategy 2003', p. 11. See Robert Hunter, 'The US and the European Union: Bridging the Strategic Gap?', The International Spectator, Vol. XXXIX, 1 (2004), p. 40. Christopher Hill, 'Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since September \l, 200V, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42, I (2003), p. 151. See the Conclusions of the Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium on European Defence, Egmont Palace, Brussels, April 29, 2003. The label of 'Tervuren' was added to the idea of creating a multinational EU headquarters submitted by the heads of state and government of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003, being discussed as the prospective location of such


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headquarters. Soon it became a catchword - mostly used by critics - for the whole concept of establishing autonomous EU capacities for conducting military operations without recourse to NATO. *" See Webber, Croft, Howorth, Terriff and Krahmann, The governance of European Security', p. 16. "" The title of 'chocolatiers' was given to the heads of state and government of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg after their Brussels summit on ESDP in April 2003, hinting at the Belgian art of manufacturing chocolates; the term was used by their critics in an attempt to expose their efforts to ridicule. *^ See Council of the European Union, European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations, Brussels, December 2003. See ibid. "^ See 'Istanbul Summit Communique', Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, June 28, 2004. "' The Berlin Plus arrangements ensure the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for planning and conducting military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged.