French Strategy in 1914: Joffreis Own

Doughty, Robert A.

The Journal of Military History, Volume 67, Number 2, April 2003, pp. 427-454 (Article) Published by Society for Military History DOI: 10.1353/jmh.2003.0112

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French Strategy in 1914: Joffres Own

Robert A. Doughty

Abstract In August 1914, General Joseph Joffre controlled the design and execution of French strategy. After concentrating the French army on the northeast frontier in the opening days of the war, he waited until after the Germans began their advance to complete the design of his strategy and did not fully inform his political superiors or his military subordinates until he published General Instructions No. 1 on 8 August. As Joffre implemented his strategy, he complied with the provisions of the Franco-Russian alliance by attacking into Alsace and Lorraine, but he sent his main thrust through central Belgium toward Neufchteau and Arlon where he hoped to avoid the powerful enemy force driving toward his left and strike the enemys less dense, more vulnerable center. French strategy in 1914 was Joffres own.

ISTORIANS have long misunderstood French strategy in August 1914 and General Joseph Joffres role in shaping it. Many authors especially British and Americanhave viewed Plan XVII as the embodiment of French strategy in 1914 and have routinely described the French as doing little more than charging blindly into Alsace and Lorraine.1 Even those who have studied French strategy carefully have con1. See Holger Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 19141918 (London: Arnold, 1997), 67; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 254; Spencer C. Tucker, The Great War, 19141918 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 2224; John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 3639; Michael J. Lyons, World War I: A Short History (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2000), 6871, 7779.

Robert A. Doughty is a colonel in the U.S. Army. He has served as the Head of the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy for seventeen years and has published several books, including Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 19191939. He currently is working on a history of French strategy and operations in World War I.
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sidered Plan XVII the virtual incarnation of the offensive outrance.2 Othersespecially the Frenchhave recognized that Plan XVII was a concentration plan with operational alternatives,3 but most have paid little attention to Joffres relative freedom of action and his power to determine strategy once his forces were deployed.4 In fact, Joffre played a decisive role in shaping French strategy. After July 1911 he revised French concentration plans so he could assemble forces close to the German frontier and then deploy them for an attack north or south of German fortications between Metz and Thionville or north into Belgium toward Neufchteau and Arlon. Once the war began, he marshaled his forces carefully so they would act in concert with the Russians, but he did not complete the design of his strategy until after the Germans began their advance and he thought he discerned their scheme of maneuver. Moreover, he did not inform his subordinates until he published General Instructions No. 1 on 8 August. As Joffre implemented his strategy, he aimed to avoid the powerful enemy force driving toward his left through central Belgium and strike the enemys less dense, more vulnerable center in eastern Belgium. Thus, French strategy in August 1914 was neither a blind-charge into Alsace-Lorraine nor an incarnation of the offensive outrance. French strategy in 1914 was Joffres own. The confusion over French strategy has persisted for more than eighty years even though Joffre and key members of his staff explained to an investigative commission of the Chamber of Deputies in May 1919 that Joffre personally shaped French strategy. The commission met shortly after the war to determine why the French had abandoned the crucial Briey basin near Metz in the early weeks of the war. As Frances senior generals paraded in front of the commission, Joffre and several of his prewar subordinates explicitly and clearly denied Plan XVII dictated French strategy or operations.5 General douard de Castelnau, the First
2. Samuel R. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 19041914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), 220. See also Douglas Porch, The March to the Marne: The French Army, 18711914 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 22831. 3. See Henry Contamine, La victoire de la Marne, 9 septembre 1914 (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), 6970, 122; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, La Grande Guerre des Franais, 19141918 (Paris: Perrin, 1994), 7077. 4. For examples of French-language sources emphasizing Joffres role, see Antonin de Selliers de Moranville, Du Haut de la Tour de Babel (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1925), 7894, 1069; F. Gambiez and M. Suire, Histoire de la Premire Guerre Mondiale, vol. 1, Crpuscule sur lEurope (Paris: Fayard, 1968), 17275. 5. The testimony of Joffre and his staff makes the evidence about French strategy substantially different from the evidence cited by Terence Zuber when he denied there was a Schlieffen Plan. See Terence Zuber, The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered, War in History 6 (July 1999): 262305.

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Deputy Chief of the General Staff from January 1912 to December 1913, stated, I do not believe the French general staff ever had an operations plan. We spoke of a concentration plan.6 When Joffre appeared before the Commission, he explained the difference between a concentration and an operations plan. He explained further that Plan XVII resulted in units assembling on the frontier ready for combat, and that he made subsequent decisions about objectives and maneuver only after receiving intelligence about the enemys disposition and actions.7 Before the Commission, as well as in his memoirs, Joffre acknowledged his having kept secret his intentions from his political superiors, his subordinate commanders, and his staff. He defended having done so by arguing it was impossible to x a denite maneuver for execution a long time in advance.8 Since a wide variety of information, as much diplomatic and political as military in Joffres words, would arrive incrementally after mobilization, any plan completed in peacetime would require modication.9 Hence, the nal decisions about strategy and operations could not be made until the military and political situation became apparent in the opening days of the war. Moreover, establishing a plan of operations in peacetime, he suggested, would permit meddling of the government in military operations.10 Not drafting an operations plan and refusing to divulge his intentions, he concluded, still appears to me today to be justied.11 In previous decades, Joffres obstinance and secretiveness would have made little difference, but on the eve of the Great War French political leaders gave him more power over the French army than anyone had possessed since the time of Napoleon. During the late 1880s, the French had improved the efficiency of their army by organizing a general staff, but political leaders, fearing a coup against the Third Republic, had refused to appoint a general officer as head of the army during peacetime. Instead, they appointed one general officer as Chief of the General Staff and another as the Vice President of the Superior Council of War, a body which had the Minister of War as its president and included
6. Dposition de M. le gnral Castelnau, in France, Assemble Nationale, Chambre des Dputs, Onzime Lgislature, Session de 1919, no. 6026, Procs-verbaux de la Commission dEnqute sur le rle et la situation de la mtallurgie en France (Dfense du Bassin de Briey1re Partie) (Paris: Imprimerie de la Chambre des Dputs, 1919), 343, 331, 346. 7. Dposition de M. le marchal Joffre, Procs-verbaux de la Commission dEnqute, 2e Partie, 142, 163. 8. Joseph Joffre, Mmoires du marchal Joffre, 19101917, 2 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1932), 1:143. 9. Joseph Joffre, 19141915: La prparation de la guerre & la conduite des oprations (Paris: Chiron, 1920), 2425; Joffre, Mmoires, 1:144. 10. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:145. 11. Ibid., 1:190.
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Frances senior generals. The former worked closely with the Minister of War and administered the day-to-day activities of the army. The latter had no command authority but was the designated commander of French forces in the event of war and had responsibilities associated with preparing the army for war. Though the Superior Council included the generals who would command Frances forces in war, neither the Council nor the Vice President could make decisions; they could only provide advice to the Minister of War.12 Efforts to increase the effectiveness of the High Command increased amidst the increasingly tense international environment engendered by the second Moroccan crisis. After the Minister of War, General Franois Goiran, provided an unsatisfactory explanation in June 1911 of the relationship between the government and its senior generals, the government fell,13 and Adolphe Messimy became the new Minister of War in the Joseph Caillaux government two days prior to the appearance of the German gunboat, Panther, off the Moroccan port of Agadir. Energized by the ensuing crisis and armed with a mandate to reorganize the High Command, Messimy dismissed General Victor Michel, the Vice President of the Superior Council of War, appointed Joffre as his successor, and ended the duality of the High Command by uniting the functions of the Vice President of the Superior Council and the Chief of Staff.14 After the Caillaux government fell in the middle of January 1912 and the Raymond Poincar government assumed power, Alexandre Millerand followed Messimy as the Minister of War and soon increased Joffres authority over the French army. On the day Millerand entered office, he met with Joffre and expressed his reservations, according to Joffre, about the Chief of Staff of the Army working for the Minister of War rather than the Chief of the General Staff. Shortly thereafter, Millerand used a presidential decree to abolish the functions of Chief of Staff of the Army and create instead the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, who worked for Joffre.15 As Joffre noted in his memoirs, this action completely ended the duality of the High Command and gave him enormous powers over the
12. David B. Ralston, The Army of the Republic: The Place of the Military in the Political Evolution of France, 18711914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967), 19093, 32729, 331, 33537; Porch, The March to the Marne, 17076. 13. See Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy, 12829; Paul-Marie de la Gorce, The French Army: A Military Political History, trans. Kenneth Douglas (New York: Braziller, 1963), 1089; Ralston, Army of the Republic, 32829; Journal Officiel de la Rpublique franaise (Ch. Db.), 30 juin 1911, 254041. 14. Adolphe Messimy, Mes souvenirs (Paris: Plon, 1937), 72, 75, 82; Dposition de M. le gnral Messimy, Procs-verbaux de la Commission dEnqute, 1re Partie, 13032; Journal Officiel de la Rpublique franaise (29 Juillet 1911), 644445. 15. Journal Officiel de la Rpublique franaise (21 Janvier 1912), 71112.

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army by shifting powers from the Minister of War and Chief of Staff of the Army to the Chief of the General Staff. It was the rst time, said Joffre,
that such powers were conded to a single man; I had authority over the training of the army, its doctrine, its regulations, its mobilization, its concentration. For questions of promotion, the new minister told me it was his intention to consult me. For the rst time . . . , the leader [who would be] responsible [for the army] in wartime would have the authority in peacetime to prepare for war.16

Though the government and the Minister of War could have circumscribed Joffres powers,17 French political leaders did not demand before August 1914 that he reveal his strategic or operational intentions. Instead, they abided by the relationship between political and military authorities spelled out in the October 1913 regulations on the operations of large units. Approved by a presidential decree and based on a report submitted by the Minister of War, the rst paragraph of the regulations said:
The government, which has responsibility for the vital interests of the country, alone has the authority to x the political objective of a war. If the struggle extends to several frontiers, it designates the principal adversary against which should be directed the greater part of the national forces. It consequently distributes the means of action and all types of resources and places them entirely at the disposition of the generals charged with being commanders-in-chief of the various theaters of operation.18

On the very day that France ordered mobilization, Messimywho again served as Minister of War during the rst Ren Viviani government from 13 June until 26 August 1914met with Joffre and discussed their relationship. They agreed, The political direction of the war belongs properly to the government. The conduct of operations belongs exclusively to the commander-in-chief.19 Like the ministers who had preceded him, Messimy made no attempt to place strategy under the umbrella of the political direction of the war and instead left it with Joffre. To his substantial authority over the French army Joffre added considerable experience in dealing with political leaders. Unlike most French officers, he often had dealt with civilian authorities as he climbed the ladder of success. After demonstrating in the colonies strong engineering and leadership skills, he returned to France and had an unusual
16. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:28. For a sharp criticism of Poincar and Millerands yielding to the military technicians, see Joseph Caillaux, Mes mmoires (Paris: Plon, 1943), 209, 21112. 17. Porch, The March to the Marne, 237. 18. France, Ministre de la Guerre, Dcret du 28 octobre 1913 portant rglement sur la conduite des grandes units (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1913), 4. 19. Messimy, Mes souvenirs, 232.
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sequence of assignments that enabled him to work smoothly with political leaders and avoid interference from them. One of the most signicant of these was his service as Director of Engineers from 1904 to 1906, but he also commanded 6th Division (which had its headquarters in Paris) and then II Corps (located in Amiens, one hundred kilometers north of Paris). After being appointed Director of Rear Services in January 1910, he gained an especially sophisticated understanding of logistics and railway transportation, an understanding that served him well in his victory on the Marne. He also gained a seat on the Superior Council of War and became the youngest member of that body.20 Much like general officers in other countries who have served in national capitals and been responsible for important engineering, logistical, and transportation activities, he developed skills and methods for working with political leaders that other senior officers did not possess. French politicians, including those on the left, had a relatively high degree of condence in him. Unlike general officers such as Castelnau, Ferdinand Foch, or Paul Pau, who were known for their conservative or Catholic views, he was known for his republican views, something he did little to affirm and nothing to disavow. Some officers referred to him as the crab not only because of his thick girth but also because he never moved to the right politically.21 Yet, he was never as vocal or open about his views as officers such as Maurice Sarrail, and he avoided public disagreements with political leaders. As he dealt with the leaders of the Third Republic, he rarely made unreasonable demands on them or ignored them, and he shrewdly avoided placing them in embarrassing circumstances by giving them impossible choices. This tactic reduced the chance of anyone interfering with or intruding upon his prerogatives. Only after the heavy losses and failed offensives of 191416 did the political leaders who had misread him recognize his strong will and independence, and some eventually became his strongest critics. Messimy in particular regretted having elevated him to such a powerful position.22 Armed with considerably more power than his predecessors and a crafty understanding of French politics, Joffre took advantage of the increasingly tense international situation and shaped French strategy to his liking. As he considered alternatives, he preferred an offensive strategy rather than a defensive one followed by an offensive. This preference stemmed partially from his personal faith in the offensive, a faith he would demonstrate again and again in the twenty-nine months he com20. Plaque, Caserne de la Ppinire, Cercle militaire, Paris; Ren Alexandre, Avec Joffre dAgadir Verdun (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1932), passim. 21. Yves Gras, Castelnau ou lArt de Commander, 18511944 (Paris: ditions Denoel, 1990), 137. 22. Dposition de M. le gnral Messimy, Procs-verbaux de la Commission dEnqute, 1re Partie, 14243.

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manded French forces in the Great War, but it also accorded with the sentiments of Frances political leaders. At one key meeting, for example, in January 1912, the President of the Third Republic welcomed Joffres emphasis on the offensive and said, We are henceforth resolved to march straight at the enemy without any hesitation. The offense, which suits the temperament of our soldiers, shall assure us victory.23 Joffres preference for the offensive also came from his recognition of the strategic advantages of the Franco-Russian alliance. He remained condent in the benets of a two-front war against Germany, and the strategy he pursued in the opening days of the warmost notably the attack into Alsace-Lorraineclearly t within the context of coordinated offensives by French and Russian forces. France, long recognizing the advantages of forcing Germany to ght on two or more fronts, had completed an agreement in 1891 with the Russians and a military convention almost two years later.24 Staff talks between the French and Russians ensured both countries understood and implemented the provisions of the military convention. Although the poor performance of the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War and their strong interest in the Balkans created doubts in France about the wisdom of an alliance with Russia, staff talks, as required by the convention, occurred in 1900, 1901, 1906, 1907, and 1908. In 1910, the two powers affirmed the discussions of previous meetings and emphasized, Defeat of the German armies remains, no matter what the circumstances, the rst and principal objective of the allied armies. At this meeting the French representative, General Laffon de Ladbat, described Frances intention to launch an all-out and immediate offensive against Germany at the beginning of a war.25 Subsequent discussions with the Russians emphasized the importance of both powers attacking simultaneously. One participant in the discussions concluded, Even if beaten the French army will have opened the way for the Russian offensive and assured the nal success [of the two allies].26 Subsequent staff talks in 1911, 1912, and 1913 conrmed Germanys defeat as the rst
23. Procs-verbal, Conseil suprieur de la Dfense nationale, Sance du 9 janvier 1912, 2, carton 2N1, Service Historique de lArme de Terre, Paris (hereafter S.H.A.T.). 24. A copy of the Military Convention of 17 August 1892 is included in Messimy, Mes souvenirs, 4078; Joffre, Mmoires, 1:12829; and Raymond Poincar, Au service de la France, 10 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1926), 1:29192. 25. Procs-verbal de lentretien entre les Chefs dtat-major gnraux des armes franaises et russes, 7/20 et 8/21 septembre 1910, Documents Diplomatiques Franaise (D.D.F)., 2e srie, vol. XII, annexe no. 573, pp. 91113. 26. Le lieutenant-colonel Pell, Attach militaire de France Berlin, au gnral Brun, Ministre de la Guerre, 24 mars 1910, D.D.F., 2e srie, vol. XII, annexe no. 467, p. 717.
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and principal objective of France and Russia and the defeat of Germanys allies as subordinate objectives. Staff talks and constant pressure on Russia to launch an offensive against Germany, if war came, encouraged Frances political and military leaders to abide by the military convention and launch an offensive as soon as possible.27 When Joffre participated in the staff talks in 1912 and 1913, he clearly communicated his intention to attack from northeastern France. He and the Russian representative agreed in July 1912 that in the event of war Germany probably would direct the principal part of its forces rst toward France and would leave only minimal forces facing Russia. Recent improvements of German railroads in the Eifel, a German region northeast of Luxembourg, conrmed in Joffres mind the Germans intention to attack France rst. According to the minutes of the meeting, Joffre insisted, The allied plan . . . should strive for simultaneous attacks on the two sides [of Germany] to achieve the maximum combined effort. He assured the Russian representative that France would abide by article three of the military convention which required France to have 1,300,000 soldiers participate in a vigorous and determined offensive against Germany.28 A year later, in August 1913, Joffre was even more explicit. The minutes of the meeting state:
General Joffre declared that France will engage on its northeastern frontier nearly all its forces, of which the number will exceed by more than 210,000 men the number required by the text of the Convention, that the concentration of combat elements on this frontier will be accomplished, for the most part, by the tenth day of mobilization, and that offensive operations by this group of forces will commence on the morning of the eleventh day.29

Joffre and the Russian representative also agreed:

With regard to the conduct of operations, it is especially necessary that the allied armies obtain a decisive success as rapidly as possible. A check of the French armies at the beginning of a war will permit Germany to transfer to the Eastern Front part of its forces which already have fought against France. If, on the contrary, French armies obtain a success rapidly against the forces concentrated by Germany before them, this success will equally facilitate operations by the Russian armies since the forces concentrated by Germany on
27. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:130. 28. Procs-verbal de lentretien du 13 juillet 1912, entres les Chefs dtat-major des armes franaises et russes, 13 juillet 1912, D.D.F., 3e srie, vol. III, annexe no. 200, p. 260. 29. Procs-verbal des entretiens du mois daot 1913 entre les Chefs dtatmajor des armes franaises et russes, 24 aot 1913, D.D.F., 3e srie, vol. VIII, annexe no. 79, p. 88.

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the Western Front cannot possibly be transferred toward the east. Thus, it is essential that French armies have numerical superiority over German forces in the west. This condition will be realized easily if Germany has to guard its eastern frontier with large forces.30

Simply stated, Joffre believed, The military value of the alliance resides above all in the possibility of obtaining simultaneous attacks in the east and the west.31 The direction of Frances attack, however, remained uncertain. A vigorous and determined offensive from northeastern France could send forces into either Alsace-Lorraine or Belgium or both. As part of the effort to coordinate simultaneous attacks, France and Russia worked diligently to establish reliable wireless contact. As early as 1909, the two allies had two wireless telegraph routes, one connecting Bobruisk to Paris directly and the other connecting Bobruisk to Sebastopol and then to Bizerta.32 Another link evidently connected Bizerta with Paris. By July 1913 wireless communications between Paris and Bobruisk were open each day between 0600 and 0800 and 2000 and 2400 hours. As a backup, the links between Sebastopol and Bizerta were open each night between midnight and 0200 hours.33 By August 1914, the framework of French strategyin the sense of its being part of an alliance strategywas rmly in place, as were the communications to ensure continued coordination. Within this alliance strategy, the French depended more on the Russians than on the British, but Paris courted London for years before the Great War. As early as December 1906, Georges Clemenceau had noted in a meeting of the Superior Council of National Defense: In the current political situation, it is impossible to imagine France entering a conict with Germany without having the support of England.34 Despite this strategic reality, British authorities made two points very clear from the
30. Procs-verbal des entretiens du mois daot 1913 entre les Chefs dtatmajor des armes franaise et russe, 24 aot 1913, D.D.F., 3e srie, vol. VIII, annexe no. 79, p. 90. 31. Note sur laction militaire de la Russie en Europe (n.d.). According to a handwritten note attached to the document, the note was given to the President of the Council of Ministers on 3 August 1912, probably by Joffre, on the occasion of the ministers departure for Russia. Carton 7N1538, S.H.A.T. 32. Ambassade de France, LAttach Militaire, no. 13, Le Lieutenant-Colonel Matton, attach militaire, lambassade de la Rpublique franaise en Russie, au ministre de la Guerre (tat-Major de larme, 2e Bureau), 21 fvrier/6 mars 1909, carton 7N1535, S.H.A.T. 33. tat-Major de lArme, 2me Bureau, Section Russe, Communications entre la Russie & la France (Traduction de la Note Russe), Mars 1911; Communications Franco-Russe, juillet 1913; and Communications Franco-Russes, juillet 1913; all are in carton 7N1538, S.H.A.T. 34. Projet de Procs-verbal, Sance du Conseil suprieur de la Dfense nationale du 31 dcembre 1906, tenue au Palais de llyse sous la prsidence de M. Fallires, Prsident de la Rpublique, p. 10, 2N1, S.H.A.T.
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earliest moment in the negotiations between the two military staffs. First, France should violate Belgian neutrality only after Germany had done so. Second, the military discussions and arrangements were, as one paper stated, not binding on the [British] Government.35 In 1906 efforts to arrange the participation of British forces in a campaign against Germany accelerated.36 By July 1911 the French expected the British to send six infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and two mounted brigades, totaling some 150,000 men and 67,000 horses.37 The value of this small force was explained in an intelligence assessment in 1912: In the event English troops participate in operations with ours, the active forces placed in the line by France and England clearly will be superior to the German forces.38 In his August 1913 meeting with the Russians Joffre had emphasized the importance of having numerical superiority over the Germans in the west,39 but the participation of the British remained uncertain, since the British, as the French recognized, could be delayed for political or naval reasons.40 In 1919 Joffre acknowledged, Personally, I was convinced that they would come, but in the end there was no formal commitment on their part. There were only studies on embarking and debarking and on the positions that would be reserved for their troops.41 With the broad outlines of French strategy shaped by Joffres own preference for the offensive and by the requirement to launch a massive offensive simultaneously with Russia, he carefully considered the Germans capability to advance through neutral Belgium. Concern about such a move had long percolated through the High Command. As early
35. See Demandes formuls par le Colonel Sir George Clarke, Secrtaire Permanent du Comit de dfense de lEmpire britannique, n.d.; Letter from Major General N. G. Lyttelton, Chief of the General Staff, 26 July 1907; both in carton 7N1782, S.H.A.T. 36. Rsum des questions examins par les tat-majors franais et anglais, Note remise par le Gnral Brun aux Affaires trangres, 10 mai 1906, carton 7N1782, S.H.A.T.; Le lieutenant-colonel Huguet, Attach militaire lAmbassade de la Rpublique Franaise en Angleterre, Note sur la composition de larme anglaise destine oprer sur le continent dans le cas dune guerre entre la France et lAllemagne, 22 janvier 1906, carton 7N1782, S.H.A.T. 37. Memorandum de la Confrence du 20 juillet 1911, carton 7N1782, S.H.A.T. 38. 2e Bureau, Comparison des forces qui pourraient se trouver en prsence sur le thatre du Nord-Est en cas de conit avec lAllemagne, 19 octobre 1912, carton 2N1, S.H.A.T. 39. Procs-verbal des entretiens du mois daot 1913 entre les Chefs dtatmajor des armes franaises et russes, 24 aot 1913, D.D.F., 3e srie, vol. VIII, annexe no. 79, p. 90. 40. Ministre de la Guerre, .-M.-A., 4e Bureau, Note pour ltat-Major de lArme (3e Bureau), 4 mars 1913, carton 7N1782, S.H.A.T. 41. Dposition de M. le marchal Joffre, Procs-verbaux de la Commission dEnqute, 2e Partie, p. 159.

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as February 1892 Plan XII included a contingency for the Germans violating Belgian neutrality.42 Intelligence about a German war game in 1906, as well as a meticulous study of the role German fortications at Metz-Thionville could play in a drive across Belgium, increased Frances concern about such a maneuver.43 In February 1908, General Henri de Lacroix, Vice President of the Superior Council of War at the time, presented an analysis to the Council which emphasized the Germans tradition of enveloping their opponents anks and which foresaw their passing through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium, sending two armies around the ank of French fortications, and driving south along the Moselle and Meuse valleys.44 When completed in March 1909, Plan XVI placed more emphasis than previous plans on the possibility of the Germans moving through Luxembourg or Belgium. When Michel became Vice President of the Superior Council of War in 1910, he had reservations about Plan XVI and much greater concerns than de Lacroix about a German move through Belgium. To respond to this threat, Michel suggested a new strategy: defend on the right from Belfort to Mzires and launch a vigorous offensive on the left toward Antwerp, Brussels, and Namur.45 Since French forces could not occupy such a vast front without the full and complete integration of the reserves, Michel also proposed a reorganization of the army, primarily through the adoption of what he called the demi-brigade, a formation used during the wars of the French Revolution to integrate active and reserve forces. In essence, an active regiment and a reserve regiment would form a demi-brigade, thereby doubling the size of each brigade, division, and corps.46 Michel presented his ideas on reorganizing the army to the Superior Council of War on 19 July 1911,47 and the attitude

42. A. Marchand, Plans de concentration de 1871 1914 (Paris: BergerLevrault, 1926), 108. 43. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:11617. 44. Note lue par le gnral de Lacroix, la sance du conseil suprieur de la guerre, du 15 fvrier 1908, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 2, pp. 67. 45. Conseil suprieur de la guerre, Concentration et plan doprations, rapport au ministre au sujet de ltude dun projet doprations, fvrier 1911, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 3, pp. 711. Michels report is also reproduced in Dposition de M. le gnral Michel, Procs-verbaux de la Commission dEnqute, 1re Partie, pp. 97102. 46. Note du 15 juin 1911, rdige par le gnral Michel, vice-prsident du conseil suprieur de la guerre, et soumise aux dliberations du conseil suprieur de la guerre le 19 juillet 1911, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 4, pp. 1216. 47. Conseil suprieur de la guerre, Procs-verbal de la sance du Mercredi, 19 juillet 1911, pp. 2045, carton 1N10, S.H.A.T.
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of Frances most senior general officers toward his proposal is apparent in one officers reference to him as loony.48 One of the generals told Messimy, the newly appointed Minister of War who had a mandate to reorganize the High Command, Michel is a national danger.49 Unimpressed by Michel or his proposal, Messimy replaced the unfortunate general with Joffre. Shortly after becoming Chief of the General Staff and Vice President of the Superior Council of War, Joffre reconsidered French strategy. Dismissing Michels concept for defending along the entire Belgian frontier but remaining attentive to the likelihood of the Germans advancing through Belgium, he modied Plan XVI to cover more of the frontier. To increase the number of divisions immediately available, a prerequisite for covering a longer front, he shifted forces from the second line and the Italian border. In his memoirs, Joffre claimed to have increased the number of divisions available immediately from thirty-eight to fty-eight. He then arranged to shift Fifth Army farther to the left, as far west as Mzires, and push Sixth Army closer to Verdun and the Belgian frontier west of Luxembourg.50 These changes placed two French armies (seven corps) near the Belgian border and provided some protection against the possibility of the Germans attempting to envelop the French ank by driving around Verdun or as deep as Sedan or Mzires. Joffre also placed greater emphasis on an immediate offensive; he intended to attack as soon as possible. He published the new variation of Plan XVI on 6 September, only six weeks after becoming Chief of the General Staff.51 During the next several months, Joffre continued to contemplate the possibility of a German advance into Belgium. After carefully considering French and German alternatives, he sought permission in a meeting of the Superior Council of National Defense in January 1912 to advance into Belgium at the rst news of a German attack.52 Composed of the President of the Republic, President of the Council of Ministers (Premier), Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Chief of the General Staff, the Superior Council was not a decision-making body, but the Premier, Joseph Caillaux, made it clear that French forces could not enter Belgium until after the Germans had violated its neutrality. Cail-

48. Dposition de M. le gnral Michel, Procs-verbaux de la Commission dEnqute, 1re Partie, p. 103. 49. Messimy, Mes souvenirs, 72, 75; Dposition de M. le gnral Messimy, Procs-verbaux de la Commission dEnqute, 1re Partie, p. 132. 50. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:2224. 51. Ministre de la Guerre, Modications apporter au plan XVI, 6 septembre 1911, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 5, pp. 1718. 52. Procs-verbal, Conseil suprieur de la Dfense nationale, Sance du 9 janvier 1912, carton 2N1, S.H.A.T.

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Huy

Chimay

Neufchteau

Stenay

Baccarat Charmes

Forts along the France-German frontier, mid-1914. laux emphasized, Not one French soldier will put a foot on the soil of Belgium if the Germans respect the treaties [of neutrality].53 After the Caillaux government fell a few days later and Poincar became Premier, Joffre again sought permission to enter Belgium. At a late-night meeting in February 1912 of the Superior Council of National Defense, Joffre reviewed military agreements with Russia and Britain and offered a detailed assessment of alternatives for offensive operations
53. Caillaux, Mmoires, 21314.
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on the northeastern frontier. By striking in Belgium, the French, he argued, could avoid the enemys fortifications at Metz-Thionville, threaten their lines of communication, and use the British more effectively. He also explained that enemy fortications and natural obstacles severely limited the opportunity to attack into Alsace and Lorraine. He concluded, The situation will be innitely more advantageous if we are permitted to extend our left beyond our frontier into the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and onto Belgian territory.54 Despite the attractiveness of Joffres appeal, Poincarlike his predecessor, Caillauxrefused to let French forces enter Belgium prior to German violation of its neutrality. The Premier insisted that Belgium never would agree to Frances violating its neutrality and that a violation would probably result in Belgium joining Germany. More importantly, such a violation could cause Britain to withdraw from its commitment to France, since the possibility of Germanys invading Belgium had been an important reason for British acceptance of military agreements with France. Poincars only concession was his willingness to accept a violation of Belgiums neutrality if a certain menace of German invasion existed.55 Two premiers, Caillaux and Poincar, had adamantly opposed violating Belgiums neutrality, and Joffre had no choice but to accept their decision. Still believing French forces had to advance into Belgium, Joffre knew better than to disobey his political superiors and initiate preparations for an advance. Consequently, as he acknowledged in his memoirs, he concealed his intentions.
Officially, in a document distributed to a large number of people, I could take into account only those operations that would take place outside Belgium. Since I was obliged to consider the possibility of a violation of Belgian neutrality, I preferred to say nothing [about an advance into Belgium] in an operations plan, contenting myself with a concentration [plan] with various alternatives. And I conned myself to announcing my intention to attack in the general direction of the northeast as soon as all French forces were assembled.56

In other words, the alternatives in Plan XVII provided sufficient guidelines for French forces to plan and prepare, but Joffre provided no details on his intentions, especially those concerning the violation of Belgian neutrality. As he confessed in his memoirs, however, he always con-

54. Confrence tenue au Ministre des Affaires trangres, 21 fvrier 1912, C.S.D.N., pp. 56, carton 2N1, S.H.A.T.; Joffre, Mmoires, 1:11921. 55. Confrence tenue au Ministre des Affaires trangres, 21 fvrier 1912, C.S.D.N., p. 6, carton 2N1, S.H.A.T.; Poincar, Au service de la France, 1:22325; Joffre, Mmoires, 1:12224. 56. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:190.

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sidered the maneuver into Belgium Frances most desirable course of action.57 As for the Germans marching across Belgium, the key indicator was the number of active enemy corps. By August 1914, the German army according to French calculationshad twenty-six active corps. If the Germans defended East Prussia against the Russians and defended Lorraine against the French, they did not have enough corps, the French believed, to concentrate sufficient forces for a drive deep across central Belgium, west of the Meuse-Sambre rivers through Lige, Namur, Charleroi, and Maubeuge. Joffres staff assured him that if the Germans tried to go beyond the Lige-Namur line, they would dangerously overextend their front and have an insufficient density for a vigorous action.58 The Germans could extend their forces and amass a large force for an advance west of the Meuse-Sambre rivers only by integrating reserve units in the front line and using them the same way they used active units. As Joffre noted in his memoirs, the French expected the Germans not to integrate their active and reserve units and instead to use their reserves the same way the French expected to use their obviously inferior troopsin the second line.59 Thus, Joffre accepted the likelihood of Germanys violating Belgian neutrality and advancing around the ank of the Verdun-Toul-pinal-Belfort fortications, but he did not think the Germans had sufficient forces to advance beyond the Lige-Namur-Charleroi-Maubeuge line. The Germans could drive deep into Belgium, Joffre believed, only if they weakened their center in eastern Belgium and Luxembourg.60 After publishing modications to Plan XVI in September 1911, Joffre and his staff spent more than a year and a half revising French plans for concentrating forces on the frontier in the event of war. Finally, on 18 April 1913, Joffre presented his new concept to the Superior Council of War which supported it unanimously. Even though the July 1911 and January 1912 decrees on the High Command required Joffre to consult the Superior Council on the establishment of new strategies, Joffre discussed only the concentration plan and provided the Council no clear outline of his strategy.61 When the Minister of War approved the proposed concept, Joffre proceeded with completing and publishing the

57. Ibid., 1:241. 58. Ibid., 1:139. 59. Ibid., 1:135. 60. Ibid., 1:278. 61. Journal Officiel de la Rpublique franaise (29 Juillet 1911), 6444; Journal Officiel de la Rpublique franaise (21 Janvier 1912), 711; Conseil suprieur de la guerre, Procs-verbal de la sance du Vendredi 18 avril 1913, p. 66, carton 1N10, S.H.A.T.
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concentration plan. On 7 February 1914, Joffres staff nished the main parts of Plan XVII and issued copies to each designated army commander; the staff nally completed all annexes in the plan on 1 May.62 Plan XVII envisaged Frances concentrating ve armies in the northeast and clearly stated, The intention of the commander-in-chief is to deliver, with all forces assembled, an attack against the German armies.63 Other than this expression of offensive intentions, however, the plan had no clear statement of Joffres strategy and included only instructions for concentrating the eld armies and options for attacks. From right to left, Joffre placed First, Second, Third, and Fifth armies along the German, Luxembourg, and Belgian frontiers. Fourth Army remained in reserve behind Second and Third armies. Fifth Army, which had ve infantry corps and a cavalry corps, occupied a broad front beginning east of the point where the eastern border of Luxembourg touched France and extending west beyond Mzires to Hirson. Joffre also had four Reserve Division Groups, each with three divisions. After positioning the First Group on the right of First Army and the Fourth Group on the left of Fifth Army, he placed the Second and Third groups behind Second and Third armies.64 Thus, Plan XVII had about the same forces along the Luxembourg and Belgian frontier as Joffres modied version of Plan XVI had had. Joffre placed his forces, he later explained, so they occupied a strategic central position, permitting an offensive or defensive toward the east . . . , toward the north in the left ank of the enemy if he marched toward Paris across Belgium, or toward the south, in his right ank, if he passed through Switzerland.65 To provide this exibility, each army commander received specic instructions in Plan XVII which included the mission of the armies on his ank and provided options for possible attacks. First and Second armies were ordered to prepare to attack south of Metz-Thionville. While First Army would prepare for an attack north from Baccarat toward Sarrebourg and then Sarreguemines, Second Army would prepare for an attack northeast from Nancy toward Saarbrcken. Third Army served as the connecting link between Joffres right and left and focused on Metz-Thionville; it would either invest Metz or throw back any enemy forces coming from the Metz-Thionville fortications. Focusing on Luxembourg and Belgium, Fifth Army prepared to attack north of Metz-Thionville into Luxembourg or into Belgium. Since Fifth Army had the mission of preparing to attack the right wing of the main enemy force, the direction of its attack depended on
62. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:16980, 18889. 63. E.M.A., Plan XVII, Directives pour la concentration, 7 fvrier 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 8, pp. 2122. 64. E.M.A., Plan XVII, Directives pour la concentration, pp. 2135. 65. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:14647.

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whether the Germans entered neutral Luxembourg and Belgium. If the Germans did not violate the territory of Luxembourg or Belgium, Fifth Army would attack north of Thionville into Lorraine but would retain sufficient forces along the Belgian frontier to protect against a subsequent German drive deep into Belgium. If the Germans entered Belgium, Fifth Army would advance north into Belgium toward Florenville and then Neufchteau. In this latter case, Fourth Army would enter the line between Fifth and Third armies and march into Belgium toward Arlon. If the Germans did not violate the territory of Luxembourg or Belgium, Fourth Army would enter the line between Second and Third armies and participate in the Lorraine attack. These offensive options provided the eld armies sufficient information to complete much of their planning even if they did not know Joffres overall strategy. A secret annex to Plan XVII dealt with the British, known as Army W.66 As explained earlier, the value of the British assistance came less from their offensive capability than from their enabling the Allies to achieve numerical superiority over the Germans in the west. If the British arrived on time, Joffre expected them to move into position on the left of Fifth Army in the vicinity of Hirson (fty kilometers west of Mzires).67 Since the time required to transport the British to the continent corresponded with the time required to mobilize the entire French army, Joffre could expect assistance, but given the possibility of a delay in the British decision to mobilize or problems in transportation, he knew the British might not participate in initial operations. Additionally, the secrecy and sensitivity of the conversations between France and Britain prevented any open mention of British assistance. The assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne, in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, unleashed a chain of events which drew most of Europe into war, compelled France to mobilize its forces, and led Joffre to complete his strategy. As the international crisis worsened, France took the precautionary step of directing all general officers on Saturday, 25 July, to report to their posts and on the next day recalled all officers from leave and cancelled all scheduled movements of troops.68 On Monday, as Joffre explained in his memoirs, My rst thought was to strengthen liaison with our [Russian] allies. Shortly thereafter, the French ambassador and military attach approached the Russian general staff to emphasize the importance of a combined offensive and asked if France could count on them.69 When
66. W, Prvisions de ltat-major de larme (4e bureau) relative la dure de la concentration W, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 7, p. 20. 67. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:14849. 68. Ibid., 1:2089. 69. Ibid., 1:211.
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Austria declared war on Serbia on Tuesday, 28 July, the French ordered all troops on pass or leave to report to their units.70 After learning on 29 July that the Germans had strengthened their covering forces on the Franco-German border, the Viviani government on the following day approved placing part of Frances covering forces along the border but keeping them ten kilometers from the frontier. To avoid escalating the crisis, only those troops who were close enough to march to the frontier, rather than ride, moved forward.71 When Austria and Russia began full mobilization on 3031 July, Joffre demanded permission on 31 July to place the entire covering force along the border. After citing German steps toward mobilization, he insisted that further delays could result in Frances having to abandon part of its territory.72 That afternoon, after a meeting of the Council of Ministers, the Premier, Ren Viviani, approved sending the entire covering force to the border but ordered it to remain ten kilometers from the frontier.73 On Saturday, 1 August, the Council of Ministers decided it could not delay mobilization any longer and authorized the Minister of War to issue the order that afternoon.74 At 1530 hours Messimy signed the mobilization order and twenty-ve minutes later the news ashed via telegram across France.75 That same day, Germany declared war on Russia, and the next day, 2 August, the day prior to the German declaration of war on France, small groups of German troops crossed the French border at several points. Though the Minister of War had emphasized earlier the importance of not having anyone enter Germany, he immediately reversed himself and informed Joffre that he had absolute liberty of movement for executing his plans even if this results in the crossing of the German frontier.76 But he did not permit French forces to enter Belgium. At 1730 hours, Joffre sent an order to the commanders of the six corps in the covering force which said, The intention of the commander-in-chief is not to launch a general offensive until his forces are assembled. That warning order gave specic missions to each of the corps in the covering force; of these corps, VII Corps prepared to advance toward Mulhouse, which was on Joffres far right, twenty-ve
70. Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, p. 74. 71. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:21415, 21721; Messimy, Mes souvenirs, 13942; Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, p. 76. 72. Joffre, Note, 31 juillet 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 17, p. 58. 73. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:22123; Messimy, Mes souvenirs, 14446. 74. Poincar, Au service de la France, 4:47980. 75. Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, pp. 8081. 76. Ministre de la Guerre, Communication tlphonique du ministre de la Guerre au gnral Belin, 2 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 27, p. 67.

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kilometers forward of the French frontier in Alsace, while XX Corps prepared to advance toward Nancy, which lay in France twenty kilometers forward of the Charmes gap between the Toul and pinal fortications.77 Later that evening, as indications of Germanys having violated Belgiums neutrality mounted, Joffre ordered Fourth Army, which was assembling to the rear of Second and Third armies, to enter the line between Third and Fifth armies and prepare to attack north. He also informed Fifth Army of the change.78 Joffre refused, however, either to reveal his concept of operations to his political superiors and his subordinate commanders or to commit himself to a course of action. Since the enemys strategy and operations remained uncertain, It was still too early, as Joffre explained in his memoirs, to announce formally my intention to operate in Belgium.79 He nonetheless did meet with his army commander on the afternoon of 3 August and partially revealed his intention to launch two attacks, one on his right and the other on his left. When General Yvon Dubail, commander of First Army and a participant in the staff talks with Russia, asked for additional troops for an attack into Alsace, Joffre refused to provide more information and opaquely responded, Thats your plan, not mine.80 On the morning of 4 August, Messimy wired Joffre that Germany had declared war on France and Italy had declared its neutrality. Notwithstanding the declaration of war, the minister rigorously and formally forbade any move into Belgium even by cavalrymen and aviators.81 By the time this telegram had arrived, however, the Germans had entered Belgium in force. The Belgians immediately appealed for help and informed Paris and London that French and British troops could enter Belgium.82 The next day, 5 August, Joffre sent aircraft and dirigibles over

77. Ministre de la Guerre, Groupe dArmes du Nord-Est, Instruction gnrale secrte pour la couverture, 2 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 31, pp. 6970. 78. G.Q.G., IVe arme, Variante la concentration, 2 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 33, pp. 7273; G.Q.G., Ve arme, Variante la concentration, 2 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 32, pp. 7172. 79. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:236. 80. Charles Lanrezac, Le plan de campagne franais et le premier mois de la guerre (2 aot3 septembre 1914) (Paris: Payot, 1921), 6061. Dubail does not mention the incident in his memoirs. Yvon Dubail, Quatre Annes de Commandement, 19141918 (Paris: L. Fournier, 1920), 1:1213. 81. Messimy, La guerre est dclare, 4 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 40, p. 78. 82. Bruxelles, Klobukowski, 4 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 44, p. 80.
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Belgium and authorized cavalry to enter Belgium.83 He also formally assumed command of the French army and sent a message to all soldiers saying, I am counting on everyone doing his duty, all his duty.84 On 6 August, with Frances covering force in place and its armies assembling on the northeast frontier, the stage was set for Joffre to complete the design of his strategy, which depended on simultaneous attacks from France and Russia. Though Joffre continued to have doubts about the British, Grand Duke Nicholas, the Russian commander, soon dispelled fears of Russian timidity when he said on 5 August, I am resolved to launch an offensive as soon as possible, and I will make an all-out attack.85 After subsequent messages from the French ambassador in Russia indicated that Nicholas would begin his offensive on 14 August,86 Joffre resolved to launch a large offensive into Alsace-Lorraine on the same day. He also insisted on unleashing on 7 August a smaller attack into Alsace which would occur prior to his main attack and which would demonstrate to the Russians, as well as to the French, the readiness and willingness of the French army to ght. Although the commander of VII Corps, which had responsibility for the attack into Alsace, reported a large concentration of enemy troops in the area, Joffre refused to delay the attack and ordered the corps forward.87 VII Corps offensive, which was little more than a large-scale raid, encountered no strong resistance during the twenty-ve kilometer advance toward Mulhouse, and French soldiers entered the city without opposition at 1500 hours on 8 August.88 Despite the initial wave of joy throughout France at the news of the victory, indications of future difficulties appeared when the small force failed to make further gains and the Germans drove it back on 10 August. Meanwhile, Joffre learned that the British, who had begun mobilization on 5 August, probably could be in France ready to advance on 21 August.89 This information inuenced

83. Ministre de la Guerre, Instruction commune au corps de cavalerie et au 2e corps, 5 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 54, p. 86. 84. Grand tat-Major Gnral, Ordre gnral no. 2, 5 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 53, p. 86. 85. Ptersbourg, Palologue, Offensive de larme russe, 5 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 52, p. 85. 86. Ptersbourg, Palologue, Arme Russe, 6 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 70, p. 96; Messimy, Mes souvenirs, 18889. 87. 7e C.A., Compte rendu supplmentaire, 5 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 66, p. 94; G.Q.G., Commandant en chef commandant arme pinal, 6 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 73, p. 98. 88. Dubail, Quatre annes de commandement, 1:20. 89. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:243.

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his decision to sequence his attacks with the drive into Lorraine on his right being followed by the drive into eastern Belgium on his left. On 8 August, Joffre issued General Instruction No. 1, which nally revealed his strategy and his concept of operations, the goal of which was the destruction of enemy forces, not occupation of territory. Not surprisingly, he intended to send the First and Second armies on his right into Lorraine, south of the Metz-Thionville fortications, and the Third, Fourth, and Fifth armies on his left into Belgium and Luxembourg, north of the fortications.90 A few days later Joffre formally scheduled the attack on the right for 14 August (the same date as the Russian attack), and he soon settled on 21 August for the attack on his left. He intended for the attack on the right to be a supporting attack and the attack on the left to be the main attack. Aware of the possibility of a deep envelopment by the Germans, Joffre also ordered the Fourth Reserve Division Group to occupy a fortied position near Hirson on his extreme left and guard against an attack from the north or east.91 This order enabled the French to watch the Chimay Gap and provided insurance against a German sweep as deep as the eastern bank of the Meuse-Sambre rivers. Although intelligence provided important information about the location and activity of German forces, the enemys strategic scheme remained uncertain.92 Despite reports of the Germans attacking Lige, Joffre continued thinking the Germans would not make their main attack any deeper than Sedan or Mzires. When Joffre learned that British forces would arrive late and perhaps not be ready for action until 26 August and that they would consist of four rather than six infantry divisions, he decided not to wait for them.93 Fifth Army appeared strong enough on his left to deal with a German drive deep across Belgium. A more pressing concern emerged when Castelnau, the Second Army commander, said he could not advance into Lorraine until 17 August, three days later than the date coordinated with the Russians for the synchro-

90. G.Q.G., Instruction gnrale no 1, 8 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 103, pp. 12426. 91. Ibid., p. 126; Armes de lEst, Ordre particulier pour le 4e groupe de divisions de rserve, 8 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 105, p. 127. 92. The report stated that seventeen enemy corps faced France, but its list of possible corps raised the number to eighteen. G.Q.G., Groupement connu des forces allemandes actives, 9 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 125, pp. 14243. 93. Ministre de la Guerre, Transport des troupes anglaises, 9 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 122, p. 140; G.Q.G., Le gnral commandant en chef M. le prsident de la Rpublique, no. 297, 9 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 124, pp. 14142; Joffre, Mmoires, 1:243.
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nized offensives. Not surprisingly, Joffre refused to change the date, and Castelnau soon agreed to attack on 14 August.94 With the date of the attack on his right xed, Joffre issued nal orders to his subordinate commanders. In essence he sent two armies forward between Toul and pinal through the gap separating the VerdunToul and pinal-Belfort fortications. First Army would make the main attack on the right with its four corps. To support First Armys attack, Joffre ordered Second Army to advance with two corps on First Armys left95 and, with its other units arrayed in echelon farther on the left, to guard against the possibility of a German thrust from Metz.96 Though simple in concept Joffres attack into Alsace-Lorraine was extremely difcult to execute; as the two armies advanced their fronts became progressively larger. First Armys task was particularly difficult, for it had to attack in divergent directions (northeast toward Sarrebourg and east toward Donon, thirty-ve kilometers west of Strasbourg) across a front that stretched more than eighty kilometers over rugged terrain. Though in less difficult terrain, Second Armys front eventually extended seventy kilometers. That Joffre would even consider such a complex operation is an indication of his inexperience. At this point, however, peacetime maneuvers shaped Joffres thinking more than wartime experience. Also in preparation for the attack, Joffre reorganized the units on his extreme right. After relieving the VII Corps commander, Joffre placed that corps, two additional infantry divisions, a cavalry division, and First Reserve Division Group in the newly formed Army of Alsace and made General Pau its commander.97 He gave Pau the mission of securing the French right ank, thereby freeing First Army to concentrate on its attack into Lorraine. With the formation of the Army of Alsace, the French had (from south to north) the Army of Alsace, First Army, and Second Army. In an indication of his priorities, Joffre pulled two corps out of Second Army (Castelnau originally had ve plus a reserve division group) and kept them under his own control for possible use on the Bel94. IIe Arme, Le gnral de Castelnau, commandant la IIe arme, au gnral commandant en chef, 8 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 115, p. 133; G.Q.G., Le commandant en chef au gnral commandant larme Neufchteau, 9 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 128, pp. 14546; IIe Arme, Le gnral commandant la IIe arme au gnral commandant en chef, 10 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 166, p. 177. 95. G.Q.G., Le commandant en chef au gnral commandant la Ire arme, 11 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 178, p. 189; G.Q.G., Le commandant en chef au gnral commandant la IIe arme, 11 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 179, pp. 18990. 96. IIe Arme, Instruction gnrale et secrte no 1, 12 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 207, pp. 21314. 97. Les armes franaises, Tome 10, vol. 1, pp. 52829, 672.

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gian frontier.98 One of these corps, IX Corps, would participate in the rst phase of the upcoming offensive and then be transferred north. On the morning of the fourteenth Joffres offensive on his right began. The previous day the French ambassador in St. Petersburg had veried that the Russians would begin their offensive at dawn on the fourteenth,99 and as Joffre noted in his memoirs, [S]urpassing all our hopes, Russia entered the battle at the same time as us.100 First Army sent two corps east into the Vosges and two corps northeast toward Sarrebourg while Second Army had two corps advance on First Armys left. The remainder of Second Army (one corps and a division reserve group) advanced more slowly, moving in echelon and guarding against a German thrust from Metz into the left ank of the advancing French forces. As the battle unfolded on the right, Joffres intentionas he nally explained to Dubail and Castelnau on 21 Augustwas for First and Second armies to retain and draw toward them an important part of the opposing forces,101 since the main French effort consisted of a maneuver farther north into eastern Belgium and Luxembourg.102 Just prior to the First and Second armies attack into Alsace-Lorraine on 14 August, several factors, including the German cavalrys attempt to seize bridges across the Meuse River south of Namur, led to a fresh assessment by the French High Command and the realization that the Germans intended to strike deeper into Belgium than previously thought possible.103 Joffre informed his subordinate commanders on 15 August and the British commander the following day that the enemy would make his main effort with his right wing and strike north of Givet, which lay along the Meuse River forty kilometers north of Mzires.104
98. Gras, Castelnau, 149; G.Q.G., Le commandant en chef au gnral commandant la IIe arme, 11 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 179, pp. 18990. 99. Messimy, Mes souvenirs, 190; Palologue, Ptersbourg, Message tlphon par 2e bureau, 13 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 225, p. 235. 100. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:265. 101. G.Q.G., Instruction particulire no 18 pour: larme dAlsace, la Ire arme, la IIe arme, 21 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 816, p. 693. 102. IIe arme, Message tlphonique, 21 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 707, p. 604. 103. Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, pp. 32829; Ier C.A., Engagement Dinant, 14 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 292, pp. 29899. 104. G.Q.G., Instruction particulire no 10 aux commandants des IVe et Ve armes et du corps de cavalerie, 15 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 307, pp. 3078; G.Q.G., Note pour le commandant en chef des forces anglaises, 16 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 349, pp. 34142.
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While such an attack would take advantage of the road network running generally from northeast to southwest and could place Germans deep in the French rear, Joffre still did not expect signicant German forces to cross the Meuse. To placate General Charles Lanrezac, the Fifth Army Commander who was increasingly concerned about enemy forces to his front, Joffre moved three divisions to his extreme left and authorized Lanrezac to march forward between the Sambre and the Meuse rivers.105 At a meeting on 16 August with Sir John French, commander of the British Expeditionary Force, Joffre learned the British would not be completely ready until the twenty-fourth, but he remained condent of Allied success. Over the next few days, as additional reports arrived about a sizeable German force crossing the Meuse, Joffre saw opportunity, not danger. [The enemys] shift toward the north, he later explained, could be accomplished only by weakening the German center in Luxembourg.106 On the morning of 18 August, three days prior to the French drive into eastern Belgium, Joffre issued additional instructions to the three armies on his left and adjusted their mission and composition to correspond with his latest understanding of the enemys location.107 He aimed the Third and Fourth armies at enemy forces in eastern Belgium between Bastogne and Thionville. By attacking and defeating this group, which he believed had less density108 than the group heading toward Givet, he hoped to strike what he later identied as the most sensitive point in the German disposition, unhinge the main enemy force,109 and halt the German advance. He also modied the composition and mission of Fifth Army and aimed it toward the main German force which the French expected to move north of Givet. After Third and Fourth armies defeated the enemy forces between Bastogne and Thionville, Joffre expected Fourth Army to turn northwest and strike the enemys main force in the left ank.110 Defeat or victory thus rested in the hands of Third and, especially, Fourth armies. To ensure their success, Joffre

105. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:26768. 106. Ibid., 1:278. 107. G.Q.G., Instruction particulire no 13, aux commandants des IIIe, IVe et Ve armes, 18 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 450, p. 424; G.Q.G., Bulletin de Renseignements, 18 aot, 6 heures, 18 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 447, p. 422. 108. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:283. 109. G.Q.G., Situation gnrale, 23 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 1044, p. 842. 110. G.Q.G., Instruction particulire no 13, aux commandants des IIIe, IVe et Ve armes, 18 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 450, p. 425.

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transferred XI Corps from Fifth Army to Fourth Army and IX Corps from Third Army to Fourth Army,111 thereby giving Fourth Army six corps. After issuing the attack order on 18 August Joffre held Third and Fourth armies in place for the next two days. On the nineteenth, cavalry reconnaissance and aerial observers reported few enemy forces to the immediate front of the two armies but found more enemy advancing toward the northwest, forty to fty kilometers forward of French outposts.112 An intelligence report from Joffres headquarters that day included a Belgian report of important enemy forces, probably General Karl von Blows Second Army, crossing the Meuse just south of Lige.113 In mid-morning Joffre gave Fourth Army permission to secure passages across the Semois River, which meandered through the difficult terrain of the Ardennes just over the frontier north of Sedan. Joffre, however, warned the army commander, I draw your attention to the necessity of not revealing our maneuver prior to the moment when it is unleashed.114 As the day progressed and reports of enemy forces moving across the front of Third and Fourth armies increased, the Fourth Army commander requested permission to advance into Belgium,115 but Joffre said no and asked his army commanders to be patient. Intelligence reports indicated, Joffre explained, that the Germans had not yet made important movements across the Meuse between Huy (twenty-ve kilometers southwest of Lige) and Givet (seventy kilometers southwest of Lige and forty kilometers north of Mzires) and that enemy forces in the Huy-Givet region seemed to be marching toward the Belgian army. He explained that the Germans wanted to bait the French into attacking prematurely and that he wanted to avoid this trap.116 Finally, at 2030 hours on 20 August, the day the Germans unleashed their counterattack against First and Second armies on the French right, Joffre ordered Third and Fourth armies to attack on the following day. Convinced that he understood the German scheme of maneuver, Joffre
111. G.Q.G., Instruction particulire no 10 aux commandants des IVe et Ve armes et du corps de cavalerie, 15 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 307, p. 308; G.Q.G., Gnral commandant en chef gnral commandant arme Varennes, 18 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 459, p. 429. 112. Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, pp. 35455. 113. G.Q.G., Bulletin de renseignements du 19 aot, 19 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 513, pp. 47374. 114. G.Q.G., Commandant en chef commandant arme Stenay, 20 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 586, p. 529. 115. IVe Arme, Message tlphon par le gnral Maistre au commandant Bel, 20 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 635, p. 556. 116. G.Q.G., Commandant en chef commandant de larme de Stenay, 20 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 589, p. 530.
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ordered Fourth Army to cross the Semois River and advance northeast toward Neufchteau and Third Army to advance toward Arlon and protect the right ank of Fourth Army against a German counterattack.117 He subsequently informed the two army commanders, The enemy will be attacked wherever he is encountered.118 To facilitate the task of Third Army, Joffre split it into two armies, Third Army and Army of Lorraine. The latter army consisted of that portion of Third Army south of Verdun; it had the mission of guarding against an enemy incursion from the vicinity of Metz.119 By forming the Army of Lorraine, Joffre simplied the task of the Third Army commander and left him free to concentrate on his mission in Belgium. That same day, he also told the commanders of First and Second armies and the Army of Alsace that they had accomplished the rst part of their mission by holding and drawing to them an important part of the opposing forces.120 As Third and Fourth armies charged into Belgium on 21 August, the French expected to outnumber the enemy. This expectation soon proved false. While Fourth Army sent six corps into Belgium (including IX Corps which advanced only a short distance), plus a cavalry corps, Third Army sent three corps, plus a cavalry division. The Germans, however, had their Fourth and Fifth armies between Metz and the northern tip of Luxembourg; these armies included ten corps, two cavalry divisions, six reserve brigades, and the garrison of Metz. The Germans thus had ten infantry corps while the French had nine. Since the German Fourth and Fifth armies were near the center of the gigantic Schlieffen sweep through Belgium, they had moved more slowly than the First, Second, and Third armies which were farther to the west, but they had learned of the French march into Belgium and Luxembourg on 21 August and prepared themselves for a signicant encounter. In contrast the French knew little about the enemy to their front, had inadequate maps, and remained overly optimistic about their chances of success. As the French rushed forward on the rst day of the offensive, Third Army encountered the Germans rst, but the initial enemy positions consisted

117. G.Q.G., Ordre au commandant de la IVe arme, 20 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 593, p. 532.; G.Q.G., Le commandant en chef au commandant de la IIIe arme, 20 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 592, p. 531. 118. G.Q.G., Le commandant en chef au commandant de larme de Stenay, 21 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 696, p. 599. 119. G.Q.G., Ordre particulier no 14, 21 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 700, pp. 6012. 120. G.Q.G., Instruction particulire no 18 pour: larme dAlsace, la Ire arme, la IIe arme, 21 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 816, p. 693.

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only of small detachments.121 Condent of success, Joffre told the Minister of War, [T]he moment of decisive action is near.122 Evidence that the moment might not favor France appeared only a few hours later when the Second Army commander, Castelnau, reported a deteriorating situation in Lorraine and a possible retreat and warned, The situation appears very grave to me.123 Although troubled by this report, Joffre remained optimistic. He believed the Germans could launch a strong attack on his right only by shifting forces from their center in eastern Belgium and Luxembourg. Such a shift, he thought, would make the enemys center even more vulnerable to the attack by Third and Fourth armies.124 Subsequent events proved him disastrously wrong. In conclusion, while Plan XVII moved French forces to the FrancoBelgian and Franco-German border, Joffre did not reveal his wartime strategy and the operations to support that strategy until after his forces were located along the border and hostilities began. Moreover, he did not inform his subordinate commanders until 8 August when he published General Instruction No. 1. Though he sent some French forces into Alsace-Lorraine on 7 and 14 August, he restricted the size of those forces and delayed sending even larger forces into Belgium until 21 August when more information about German movements became available. Thus, Plan XVII provided for the concentration of French forces in August 1914 and identied several operational alternatives, but Joffre personally shaped Frances strategy and operations after the campaign began. Since he designed Plan XVII and determined French strategy and operations after the war began, Frances strategy in 1914 was clearly his own. And that strategy aimed to comply with the provisions of the Franco-Russian Alliance by delivering an early offensive into Alsace-Lorraine and then striking a decisive blow against the supposedly vulnerable German center in eastern Belgium and Luxembourg. In the nal analysis, Joffres strategy suffered from several aws, the most serious of which stemmed from assumptions that the Germans would not drive across Belgium deep into the French rear, and that they would not integrate reserve units into their leading forces. Joffre and his staff expected the enemy to advance through Luxembourg and Belgium, but they expected the Germans to weaken their center as they pushed toward Lige, Namur, and Givet and the French Third and Fourth armies
121. Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, pp. 36869. 122. Armes de lEst, Gnral commandant en chef ministre de la Guerre, 21 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 2, annexes, vol. 1, annexe no. 103, p. 93. 123. IIe Arme, Compte rendu, 21 aot 1914, Les armes franaises, Tome 1, vol. 1, annexes, annexe no. 727, p. 620. 124. Joffre, Mmoires, 1:283.
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to encounter weak resistance in the enemys center. Instead of encountering a weakened center in eastern Belgium, however, French forces struck large enemy units in strong defensive positions. To make matters worse, Joffre failed to concentrate his forces and instead sent them off in two distinctly different directions, one east into Alsace-Lorraine and the other northeast into Belgium toward Neufchteau and Arlon. To comply with the provisions of the Franco-Russian Alliance, he sent signicant forces into Alsace-Lorraine even though he had emphasized the difficulties and futility of such an advance when he sought to convince Caillaux and Poincar to let French forces violate Belgiums neutrality. While Joffre could and, in fact, did adjust the composition and objectives of the forces he eventually sent into Alsace-Lorraine in the opening days of the war, his splitting of his forces caused him to violate the fundamental precept expressed in Plan XVII: to deliver, with all forces assembled, an attack against the German armies.125 Tragically for France, Joffres strategy was hardly better than the simplistic strategya blind charge into central Germanyusually associated with Plan XVII.

125. E.M.A., Plan XVII, Directives pour la concentration, p. 21.

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