East Asia (2008) 25:293316 DOI 10.

1007/s12140-008-9046-z

North Koreas Resurgence and Chinas Rise: Implications for the Future of Northeast Asian Security
Chan Yul Yoo

Received: 8 February 2008 / Accepted: 14 May 2008 / Published online: 1 July 2008 # Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

Abstract Today, Northeast Asias security situation is changing rapidly. North Korea is reviving and Chinas power is growing at an alarming rate. While the U.S. continues to suffer diplomatically and militarily in the Middle East and from international terrorism, Chinas and North Koreas power is likely to futher increase, polarizing the Northeast Asian security structure, with South Korea, Japan (and Taiwan) all allied with the U.S. versus North Korea allied with China. The liberal democracies should pursue peace with North Korea and China to preclude the situation from aggravating, but should be ready in the longer term to meet, in diverse ways including strengthening their alliances, the challenges posed by rising powers. Keywords Northeast Asia . North Koreas resurgence . Nuclear development . Diplomatic normalization . Chinas rise . Aircraft carrier . Overseas energy . Liberal democracies . Alliances For more than ten years since the end of the Cold War, the international security structure in Northeast Asia has been characterized by U.S. global primacy. However, since the mid-2000s the security situation in Northeast Asia has undergone a significant transformation. While the U.S. cannot seem to break away from the plight of Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and international terrorism, North Korea is reviving and China is rising as a great power. North Korea has already conducted a nuclear experiment and currently pursues diplomatic normalization with the U.S. and Japan. China is developing at an alarming speed. When taking into account its purchasing power, China has grown to become the second-largest world economy. Chinas military build-up is an object of grave concern, and its diplomacy is shrewd. This article discusses how Northeast Asian security is likely to unfold, focusing on North Korea and China whose futures are yet undetermined, from a perspective of realism
C. Y. Yoo (*) Political Science, Duksung Womens University, Ssang-mun-dong 419, Tobong-ku, Seoul 132-714, Korea e-mail: chanyoo@duksung.ac.kr

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considering foreign policy, military affairs, and some important domestic variables, within the international environment of anarchy and the built-in structures of competition. North Koreas Nuclear Armament and Political Resurgence Amelioration of Security Environment In the 1990s North Korea languished in a tremendous foreign relations crisis. The demise of communism as a dogma imposed on North Korea the stress of having to defend the legitimacy of Juche ideology by attempting to block competing sets of ideas from infiltrating. The Soviet collapse raised the status of the U.S. as the only world superpower, and under American primacy, the Norths future was unpredictable at best. By the Agreed Framework in 1994 and the implementation of South Koreas Sunshine Policy since 1997, U.S.-DPRK relations had progressed a bit, but George W. Bushs presidency put Pyongyangs security in danger. Washingtons continuous pressure has rendered Pyongyang unable to foresee its future. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) ordered the mainstay of U.S. overseas troops to transfer from Europe to the Asia-Pacific; the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which advocated new lightweight nuclear weapons to destroy deeply buried enemy military facilities, labeled North Korea as a potential target along with Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya; the National Security Councils (NSCs) new strategy of preemptive strike envisioned surprise attack against terrorist groups and enemy states deemed determined to be and on the verge of using nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Finally, references to regime change (in the context of what happened to Saddam Hussein) together with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) loomed as unprecedented direct challenge for Pyongyang. However, todays North Korea is placed in a far more stable security situation than before. This is primarily because the U.S., while waging a war in the Middle East, can no longer wield power to control the state of affairs in Northeast Asia, and it is difficult to forecast when the U.S. can bail out of the dilemma. Osama bin Laden in hiding continues to conduct jihad. American legal, diplomatic, military, and financial responses reveal considerable caveats in strategy. No one knows when the Iraq war, which transformed into civil strife between the Sunnis and the Shiites will end; meanwhile al Qaeda is in resurgence. As the number of soldiers dead in the Iraq war amount almost to four thousand and the war expenses to 8.7 billion dollars per month, anti-war public opinion escalates. The Amadinejad regime of Iran is prolonging the Iraq war in support of the Shiite faction, refusing to forsake its ambition to become a Middle East hegemon. If North Korea is relatively free from any direct threat from the U.S., then it is under some level of protection from the newly rising great power, China. Though China had maintained a fairly sparse relationship with the North since diplomatic normalization with South Korea, it has always upheld the position that it did not want the status quo on the Korean peninsula to change. When the first nuclear crisis broke out around 199394, Jiang Zemin made it clear that Beijing was opposed to Norths collapse and the expansion of influence of liberal states, by announcing that

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China would not be responsible for whatever tragedy happening on the peninsula as a consequence of sanctions by the U.S. and South Korea. Lee Peng revealed a similar standpoint. He said Beijing was interested in keeping two separate Koreas, maintaining a status quo on the peninsula excluding any support for the Northern aggression, and minimizing the spread of liberal influences. China favors its relationship with South Korea, but simultaneously does not want its relationship with the North to be ruined; China supports denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, while opposing any import of nuclear weapons by any foreign countries; China supports N-S Korean dialogue and peaceful unification; China does not provide any advanced military weapons for the North, but nor should any other country supply any up-to-date weaponry to the South. The rather awkward PRC-DPRK relationship was restored though to one of previous cordiality after Kim Young-nams visit of China in 1999. In the summit meetings that Kim Jong-il had with Jiang Zemin in 2000 and Hu Jintao later, many agreements have been made regarding exchanges of high-level personnel, deepening of cooperation, collaboration in international affairs, and intimate economic and trade relationships. Based on this, high-ranking political and military representatives have been paying mutual visits, and in this the process, China naturally promised economic support. China still regards the North as a buffer state against the U.S. and a politically useful ally for future foreign relations. Though the U.S. is Chinas most important partner in economic exchanges and investments, Beijing would not tolerate the US Forces in Korea (USFK) to be stationed at the Chinese border either by Norths collapse or unification by a liberal democracy. This is at the root of why China opposes resolving Norths nuclear problem by coercive measures. China signed the UN Security Council resolutions when the North test-fired long-range missiles in July 2006 and conducted a nuclear experiment in October, but strongly opposed any meaningful sanctions from passing, which drastically reduced the real impact. Obviously, China does not see its relationship with Pyongyang in terms of lips and teeth of the Cold War days. In a way, the North is regarded as a liability, and its nuclear armament is very inconvenient because it could cause U.S. military intervention, a regional arms race, US-Japanese theater missile defense (TMD), slowing of Chinese economic growth, and an uncomfortable relationship for China with the international community [66]. China could be dragged into a war if there were a U.S.-DPRK military confrontation, and the North could even be tempted to threaten China with its nuclear weapons. In fact, Beijing is considerably dissatisfied with Pyongyang: the dynastic succession, personal dictatorship, refusal to reform and open, and a certain degree of affiliation with international terrorism. When the North conducted nuclear experiment, thus, China officially announced that it was resolutely opposed and stipulated it as a brazen act. One step further, China imposed its own economic sanctions momentarily ceasing all financial transactions among PRC-DPRK banks, companies, and individuals. Nevertheless, the North is an ally that at the bottom line needs to be protected. Economic nexus with the U.S. and international community is important, but security relations count more. Beijing thus prefers Pyongyangs reform and peaceful power transition to regime collapse, continues providing food and oil, and encourages Chinese business groups to invest in the North. [44, 58]

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Russia is affirmative to the North as well. During Yeltins era, the Russo-DPRK relationship had been rather sporadic due to Russo-ROK diplomatic normalization, but after Vladimir Putin came into power, the relationship has become normal. They concluded a new treaty in 2000, which resembled an alliance though it is not, providing that they mutually consult when security emergency occurs. Moscow and Pyongyang concurred on many things - mutual confidence, multi-dimensional linkages, cooperation in the international arena, and the resolution of political questions by international law - making Kim Jong-il comment that the bilateral relationship could not be better. Under Putins reign, Moscow has been mostly supportive of the North. When the uranium enrichment incident happened in October 2002, Moscow advocated dialogue; at the IAEA special session in February 2003 held in Vienna, Russia along with Cuba abstained from voting, in favor of the North. When Pyongyang conducted nuclear experiment, Moscow simply admitted that the North had become a nuclear power. Moscow did sign the UN Security Council resolution 1718 in October 2006, but did not believe it was a probable solution. Moscow favors managing Norths nuclear dilemma by means of multilateral security mechanism and negotiations like the case of Iran, and does not want a Korean peninsula controlled by the U.S. [61] Japan cannot be fully aggressive alone toward North Korea. Since 1991, Japan had 12 official diplomatic contacts and two summit meetings with the North to discuss diplomatic normalization, but the two countries were not able to narrow their discrepancies in the issues of abduction of Japanese, missile and nuclear development, and reparations for colonialism. Among the DPRKs neighbors, for the last several years, Japan has countenanced the most hostile measures against its development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) because, of course, North Korean nuclear missiles would be a relentless threat. Nevertheless, unilateral Japanese bellicosity cannot collect substantial effect when the U.S. capability in Northeast Asia is limited. It is difficult for Japan to be determined to solve the nuclear problem through means other than the Six Party Talks. Even though Japan was most instrumental in passing the UN Security Council resolutions and unilaterally imposed powerful economic sanctions - prohibiting North Korean ships from entering Japanese ports and pro-DPRK organizations in Japan from remitting hard cash to the North in 2006- there is a limit in Japans ability to solve Norths WMD problem. The Norths relations with other countries could be much worse. Thanks to the Sunshine Policy of South Korea, the North normalized its relations with all Western European countries except France and Ireland. Since the new Russo-North Korean treaty in 2000, Eastern European countries including Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary concluded many treaties with the North for investment, prevention of double taxation, air transportation, and fisheries. The North expanded its relationship with Southeast Asian countries including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia focusing on economic cooperation, and participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meetings. DPRK diplomats and military personnel persistently visit Middle Eastern and African countries expanding foreign relations. The Norths military representatives visited Syria in April 2000, and discussed the expansion of military cooperation. With Iran, the North has had talks on mutual friendship and military and economic cooperation. As nonaligned countries tending to

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pursue individual national interests rather than ideological advantages, the North has tried to establish a relationship centering around the expansion of trade and economic cooperation. Political and Social Stability When Kim Jong-il took over in 1994 following Kim Il-sungs death, there existed considerable doubt about whether he would be able to stay in power. Posters were put up and leaflets circulated demanding Kim to be ousted. Some segments of the military seemed dissatisfied about their state of affairs and many officers complained about excessively long service terms and severe political surveillance. Some figures deserted to the South. However, todays North Korean society has regained its political order pivoting around Kim Jong-il, and does not show any significant physiological symptoms of regime collapse. Kim firmly controls the affairs of the party, state, and military. His command over the party has become more solid since he took the position of Secretary General. The domination of the military, which was deemed most important, was promoted by various means. Kim monopolized all the rights over the military by taking up overlapping positions of Supreme Commander, Supreme General, and the Chairman of National Defense Committee. Party cells are dispatched to every level of the military such as corps, division, brigade, and battalion, and the political surveillance unit within the military itself constantly checks the possibility of an army conspiracy. Pyongyang has constantly emphasized that the Military-First Politics was most crucial for overcoming North Koreas crisis. Military-First Politics signified the logic that externally the reinforcement of national defense capability was the most immediate mission, and that internally the military should play the role of leader, advancing the socialist revolution. On the part of Kim Jong-il, this, in fact, meant that strengthening the military power and controlling the military were most important in preventing possible U.S. physical invasion and all probable domestic challenges. Pyongyangs policy of valuing the military has been expressed in diverse ways. Kim allocated the greatest part of his schedule for visiting military units and joining military events; seven hundred generals were promoted at once; soldiers were given priority in food distribution; faithful generals or officers were given special material incentives such as cars and foreign guns. Through it, the military has arisen as the most influential organization in society, and the peoples army has transformed into a loyal beloved leader s army. To induce popular patriotism and deter dissidents, Pyongyang defined Kim Jongil as the sole leader and stressed that only unity around him would save the country. The theory of organic society which was asserted during the Kim Il-sung era was reemphasized, and the ideas of Juche, Torturous March, and the Red Flag have been repetitively injected. For the sake of regime stability, threats from abroad are stressed incessantly. During Bushs presidency, denunciation of the U.S. has profoundly increased. The North continuously abetted anti-American sentiment by staging large demonstrations during Anti-American Struggle Day (June 25) and Anti-American Struggle Month (June 25-July 27). The North also advocated Fifties Spirit, meaning inheriting the ardor of the post-Korean War rehabilitation. Mass media

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including broadcasts and newspapers reiterate Military-First Politics and the Strong and Flourishing Great State, ceaselessly condemning the U.S. Since Bushs remark about the axis of evil in 2002, the anti-American campaign has accelerated. The spokesman of the foreign ministry defined Bushs comment as a declaration of war. The North labels any U.S.-ROK joint military exercise as a prelude to invasion. All the labor organizations including Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth Group have played a big role in conducting brainwashing campaigns. In 2002, Pyongyang brought up the ideas of the Four Best to Cherish - our beloved leader, our ideology, our military, and our institution. Due to Pyongyangs active instigation and close supervision, North Korean society has been placed under complete control of the state. No dissident groups or organizations could survive the horrifying dictatorship. Mass media and religion are under relentless government surveillance, and there remains no room for the labor class or student groups to wage an antigovernment movement. [68] While society has been reclaiming stability, the economy has recovered somewhat. Pyongyang has consistently pursued a self-reliant national economy prioritizing heavy industry and the concomitant development of light industry and agriculture. The Norths economy has recorded three consecutive years of plus growth since 1999. By 2002, industrial production encompassing electricity, railways, and metal manufacturing had been partially restored and this trend has sustained until the mid-2000s. Though food is still short 500,000 tons per year, peoples food life has ameliorated. This has been enabled by several different measures; diversification of farm stock to include rabbits, goats, and chickens, permission to grow food in peoples yards, and foreign aid from international organizations and the international community. Of course, the economy has not fully recovered to the level of the late 1980s when the Soviet communism was still alive, but there is no chance for the North to collapse due to economic difficulties. North Koreas economic self-reliance, economic profit through development of nuclear weapons, Chinas special assistance, and international communitys humanitarian help all function as factors preventing the Norths collapse. In 2006, numerous mass parties and performances were held in many cities and counties to celebrate the Norths acquisition of nuclear weapons, bolstering national pride. The Pyongyang regime reiterated the legitimacy of its nuclear experiment, continuously stressing that it was an active countermeasure to safeguard national sovereignty and the well-being of the people. North Korean society, which had been showing signs of breakdown, now exhibits unity around the beloved leader, the state, and the military. The North has revived from the political malaise which once blocked any vision of the future [71]. Military-first Politics and the Development of Nuclear Weapons The absolute need for strong national defense has encouraged North Koreans to concentrate every effort to enhance military capability. To expedite conventional forces development, more than one thousand artillery units including 170 mm and 240 mm guns and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) have been added, while some outdated whiskey-class submarines, fighters, tanks, and armored vehicles were dismantled to rationalize management. In 1998, the North imported TNT explosives

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and tank engines from China worth 3 million dollars, and the next year ammunition and weapons amounting to 10 million dollars. The North imported uranium from Congo Republic in exchange for providing military training. With Nigeria, the North has exchanged military personnel to promote military cooperation. [2, 70] To mobilize soldiers better, the volunteer pattern has been converted into a fully mandatory system through which all youth serve in the military. The service period has been shortened to ten years from 13 for men and to seven from ten for women. The age range for mandatory active-duty military service has shifted to be between 17 and 25. Military strategy has not changed overall, continuing the erstwhile surprise attack, quick-war-quick-finish, and simultaneous combat front and rear [69]. Nevertheless, the North Korean military has been unable to guarantee national defense with conventional forces because the communist economy was not capable of spending enough on defense. The Norths successful national defense so far has consisted of enormous numbers of troops, huge numbers of weapons although outdated, ten thousand long-range artilleries that hold Seoul as hostage, and the reinvestment of military profits into the defense sector. Now, however, without Soviet military support and with the new weapons developed every minute in other parts of the world, the North could no more lean on the conventional weapons. The only option has seemed to be nuclear WMD. As early as the late 1980s, Pyongyang had already solidified its intention to develop nuclear weapons, and through many vicissitudes it did become a nuclear power. As is well known, the course included the first nuclear crisis and DPRK brinkmanship, the Agreed Framework which exchanged political and economic assistance for a nuclear freeze, uranium enrichment in spite of ample support from the Agreed Framework and the Sunshine Policy, Bushs rise and the threat of regime change and PSI, the second nuclear crisis, the stalemate at the Six Party Talks, the Norths promise at the September 19th agreement, the missile test in July 2006 and UN Security Council resolution, and a nuclear test in October 2006 and UN Security Council resolution. Norths nuclear development contains many dangers. What is most worrisome in the global dimension is nuclear proliferation. Though there is no definite evidence that the North has transmitted the nuclear material, technology, and weapons, at least the possibility of nuclear cooperation with Syria is an object of serious suspicion. In light of the Norths spread of missile technology and export of conventional weapons, the possibility of its nuclear proliferation cannot be totally ruled out. The U.S. is extremely alert about the possibility for the nuclear technology to flow to terrorist groups and anti-Western countries. On the regional level, the Norths nuclear armament is a great threat to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and could well provide occasion for nuclear proliferation by provoking these countries fantasy for nuclear possession. Especially, in a competition with South Korea which shares a common goal of unification, the North occupies an enormously advantageous position because Pyongyang can threaten Seoul anytime with such a horrible weapon. The problem though is that there is no clear method to curb North Korean nuclear development. So far, the U.S. and South Korea have mobilized means including the Agreed Framework, Sunshine Policy, Peace and Prosperity Policy, threat of regime change, PSI, and the Six Party Talks, but the North did its nuclear experiment

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anyway, and became the ninth nuclear power in the world. Worried about the possibility that the North might collapse and thus Northeast Asian security destabilize, China tends to accept Norths nuclear armament as a reality rather than exerting economic pressure on to prevent it [10]. Though the North did shut down its nuclear facilities, it is not clear whether the nuclear situation will progress as the 2007 February 13 and October 3 agreements have stipulated. Despite some optimism regarding North Koreas abrogation of nuclear facilities, it might take a very long time before the final gate is passed. After the North makes its report to the IAEA about how much plutonium has been extracted and the facts of uranium enrichment activities, the IAEA may not believe it and a conflict result [28]. IAEA on-site inspections may yet be prevented. In the early 1990s, Pyongyang submitted a false report to the IAEA on the amount of plutonium extracted, with the purpose to make nuclear weapons, and rejected IAEA inspection on two unidentified facilities in Yongbyon saying they were military installations. On October 2002, when James Kelly, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, asked about uranium enrichment, Pyongyang initially admitted it but later denied. In light that the North is still not submitting the report which was promised more than a year ago at the February 13th agreement, the process could be very slow. Pyongyang might not be satisfied with the pace at which Washington releases the North from the two legal sanctions - the Terrorism-Supporting Countries List and the Enemy State Trading Law - and because of that, a series of agreements could be postponed or broken. Despite the September 19 agreement, Pyongyang test-fired long-range missiles and conducted a nuclear test because, it said, the U.S. had frozen 24 million dollars at the Banco Delta Asia (BDA). If the U.S. Congress postpones or rejects Bush administrations initiative to lift the aforementioned two legal sanctions on the ground of Norths missiles or human rights abuses, then the U.S.-DPRK agreement would be likely to face another big difficulty, and the North would resort to additional strong measures. If the economic subsidies promised including food, heavy fuel oil, light water reactors, and 2 million KW electricity are not delivered properly, then Pyongyang might delay or break the agreements. All this aside, for Pyongyang to abandon its existing nuclear weapons could also emerge as a new obstacle hindering eventual diplomatic normalization because Pyongyang is not likely to forsake easily its most valued international leverage cum security instrument - nuclear weapons. The North could well calculate that foregoing nuclear weapons is unacceptable in light of its chances of being exposed to the security threats from the U.S. and South Korea, loss of leverage in the N-S Korean competition, and the disadvantages failing to become a military great power. Eventual resolution of the Norths nuclear problem could be much more difficult than imagined. Tokyo-Pyongyang diplomatic normalization might take much longer as well due to the abduction issue; neither is the question of reparations ranging between 5 to 10 billion dollars likely to find any simple compromise. [60] Diplomatic Normalization and Political Consequences If diplomatic normalization fails between the U.S. and North Korea, even in the longer term, Pyongyang will be likely to return to its notorious patterns of behavior:

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diplomatic and military brinkmanship. On the pretext of international instability and national security, the North would rebuild disabled core parts of the nuclear facilities and do its utmost to add several more nuclear warheads. Even under severe warnings of sanction by the U.S., Pyongyang would import equipment and materials for uranium enrichment and accelerate the development and export of missiles of various ranges for the purpose of earning foreign currency. Already preoccupied with the Middle East situation, the United States would again face the dilemma of the policy choice of sanctions vs. compromise; Tokyos dissatisfaction would grow further even maybe to the degree of explosion, and Beijing and Moscow would continue to push Washington to take the road of compromise as they have always done. It would be difficult, however, for Seoul to implement a tough policy for extreme sensitivity to the possibility of war. This would mean the continuation of the delicate patterns of international relations as have been the rule to date, and Northeast Asian security would head toward greater tension and the exacerbation of nascent or current arms races. In particular, Japan would be most upset about North Koreas stockpiling of nuclear weapons, considering itself to be the country most vulnerable to Pyongyangs revisionist behavior, and would try to find a solution by more closely coordinating policies with the U.S. If the North continues brinkmanship, the U.S. would be forced to strike another political deal because it cannot well manage both the Middle East situation and North Korea simultaneously. At the worst, the U.S. might be tempted to contemplate the feasibility of accepting the second-best option of approving normalization as long as the North clears most of its nuclear suspicions as one way to stabilize the regional politics of Northeast Asia. If the U.S. and Japan decide for pragmatic reasons to move toward diplomatic normalization, North Koreas survival would be assured. When the political enmity with the U.S. is dissolved and the economic sanctions are lifted, North Korea will be able to overcome its economic crisis through importing required goods and facilities from the West. The fact that Pyongyangs greatest demand for the last several years has been the lifting of economic sanctions implies conversely how much benefit the North would get from this. The North might face some difficulties in receiving international loans from the Western commercial institutions due to stringent conditions, but low-interest loans from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), or Asia Development Bank (ADB), which feature several tens of years of repayment period, and Western special financial aid that considers long-term political purposes should be critically helpful for the North to create a solid basis for long-term economic development. Reparations from Japan for colonial compensation should also be helpful for the Norths economic recovery. The Pyongyang regime could take part of the reparation for its own purposes, but most of it, which would probably be paid in the form of project subsidies including plant construction, should be valuable for laying the infrastructure for future economic progress. Now within a totally new policy environment, Pyongyang would focus on strengthening its systems to move forward, and this in turn is likely to be linked to the following three actions: political and economic cooperation with Beijing and Moscow, economic development through tightly controlled, slow reform and

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liberalization, and a political offensive against Seoul. Reinforcing diplomatic relationship with China and Russia is the most significant and handy geopolitical measure that North Korea, still clinging to communism, can take; this is the same as cooperating with the U.S. and Japan is critical for South Korea. It is unimaginable for the North to coexist peacefully with the South because the two Koreas are destined to struggle for superiority in the process of unification; in light of several decades of North Koreas hawkish behavior, its adherence to Juche ideology, and the perception that the South is unable to exercise autonomy under heavy influence of the U.S., North-South Korean competition will be extremely difficult to avoid. First, China has protected North Korea for the last several decades through an alliance, and is basically well-disposed toward Pyongyang. Though the North possesses nuclear weapons defying Beijings will, there still exist many geopolitical common interests between the two countries; they still share common awareness regarding uncertainties in the future foreign relations, the need for alliance, and anxiety over the existence of USFK [9, 47]. Surely, Chinas view on North Korea is not always benign. Criticizing the Norths nuclear development and extreme poverty, many progressives, liberal analysts, and young, urban, middle-class Chinese including Wang Zhongwen of the Foreign Economics Research Institute, Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences, openly argue that China should cooperate with the U.S. However, greater numbers of higher echelons in the government, military, many academics and analysts, and average Chinese, support Pyongyang. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao personally are not particularly in favor of Kim Jong-il, but their policies take a conservative tendency [2]. All these inclinations presage that future SinoNorth Korean relations would be mutually favorable despite some disharmony. Russia made a major commitment to Pyongyang at the 6th Six Party Talks, whereby it agreed to rebate most of North Koreas Russian debt which amounted to 8 billion dollars. This could be interpreted as a Russian expression of its intention to upgrade the Russo-DPRK relations. To intervene once again in Northeast Asian regional politics and to find an ally, Moscow could provide Pyongyang considerable economic subsidies, discounted natural gas and oil in particular. From this position, Moscow could find a route to sell its weapons as well. Second, North Koreas economic reform and liberalization would proceed in a tightly controlled pattern. Despite its failure at Rajin-Sungbong and Shinuiju Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Pyongyang would try these again because otherwise peoples dissatisfaction over poor material life would grow, eventually exerting negative influence on regime security. When its adversarial relationships with Washington and Tokyo are cleared, Pyongyang could confidently assume that the adverse effects they exert could be minimized; it even might think that, in an emergency, Chinese-style suppression observed at the Tiananmen incident could be utilized. The format of reform and opening-up could be similar to the Chinese or Vietnamese model, both of which succeeded in maintaining a communist system while borrowing elements of the market economy [2]. This envisions pursuing a market economy within tightly controlled SEZs along the coastal areas, and incrementally accelerating their scope and tempo. Economic reform would require such measures as the dissolution of collective farming, privatization of the public enterprises, industrialization focusing on light rather than heavy industries,

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importation of foreign capital, technology, and managerial skills, and more than anything else encouraging private enterprise. For all this new adventure, the North would try to introduce more meaningful legal and institutional reforms in the fields of use of land, trade, foreign investment, and taxation. However, because of the risky nature of reform and liberalization, these measures would be conducted under extremely cautious government supervision. The North Korean economy would move in the direction of rehabilitation as such, though very slowly. Third, once its external relations with the U.S. are stabilized, North Korea would intensify its political offensive toward South Korea. It is quite possible that Pyongyang would demand that the USFK withdraw; Pyongyang could push Seoul with the argument that USFK has no reason to stay in the South when the Norths foreign relations are totally normalized and the U.S. and North Korea have officially concluded a peace treaty ending the 1950 Korean War. Currently, the USFK is in the process of being relocated to Osan and Pyungtaek in the south of the Han River. This was caused by several elements. The greatest purpose is to enhance the strategic flexibility of the USFK to respond positively to the war against terrorism and combat of asymmetric nature. The USFK, equipped with lightweight advanced weapons and supported by the improved sealift and airlift capabilities in the rear, would be able to freely assume a critical role of responding to a variety of contingencies of the Asia-Pacific. The realignment of the Second Infantry Division and the Yongsan Garrison to the south played a positive role in assuaging the anti-American sentiments of people in Seoul, who abhorred American soldiers crime and environmental pollution. To lessen the anxiety that the relocation incur a security vacuum by diminishing the tripwire role of the USFK between the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Seoul, the U.S. decided to make 11 billion dollar worth of military investment in South Korea by importing advanced weaponry such as Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missiles, surveillance attack Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and precisionguided bombs (JDAM, GBU-28/37 Bunker Busters). Pyongyang was worried about the possibility that the USFK attack the North preemptively escaping from Norths deterrence of long-range artillery deployed along the DMZ. This seemed very real in light that the 2002 National Security Strategy envisioned that in defending the United States, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country. [45] Pyongyang would also argue that the only way to unify Korea without war is to establish a N-S Confederation as it had previously introduced, again proposing the withdrawal of USFK and the repeal of alliances including its alliance with China. This would be a ploy. Pyongyang would calculate that it would win in any civil war once the Confederation was established, similar to what happened in Yemen. Pyongyang could also insist that the DMZ be opened up and the two Koreas be engaged in arms reduction to ease tensions. Pyongyangs arms control schemes are likely to repeat the old ones, that the two Koreas reduce their forces by equal numbers of conventional weapons, troops be cut to 100,000 in three stages, and in this process, the USFK withdraw. This is an old North Korean ploy: the North has twice the weaponry of the South, and can mobilize troops much more easily than the South.

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Pyongyang would also demand intense economic cooperation with Seoul. For the last ten years, Seoul has provided enormous economic assistance to Pyongyang including supplies of food, energy, and cash. At the Six Party Talks, Seoul has promised that it would provide electricity of 2 million KW every year before light water reactors it is to build there are completed. The logic legitimizing this economic support could include: to induce change on the part of the North through contact as in the case of East and West Germany, to prevent an attack by the North, and to lessen the economic shock at the time of eventual unification. Currently, the Lee Myung-bak administration stresses that there would be no economic aid as long as the North does not give up nuclear weapons, but a certain level of economic assistance would be difficult to exclude in light of the promise at the Six Party Talks, humanitarian needs, and a political consideration for the advance of N-S Korean relations. Once Pyongyang secures diplomatic normalization, it could stabilize and revive itself politically, militarily, and economically, and the two Koreas would be likely to get involved in a new, serious and systemic competition. The North would vie to win over the South through political and military means as it has always done, barring economic complications where it is inferior. This would be very different from the inter-Korean relations when Pyongyang was curbed by Washington and Tokyo because it will no longer be subject to the great-power balance. Pyongyang would be able to take on a far more offensive posture than before.

The Rise of China as a Great Power Shrewd Diplomacy China was a secondary power only a decade ago [51]. Barely graduating from economic sanctions from the West thanks to the good will of the Clinton administration, it was exerting great efforts to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO), and its international influence was so mediocre that its most serious international disputes involved territorial issues with Vietnam and Philippines in the South China Sea. Its military was assessed as 30 years behind that of the U.S. [52]. Recently, however, the rise of China is admitted as fact, worldwide [54, 74]. Compared to the 1990s, Chinas current international influence has notably increased. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, it does support various resolutions that the U.S. wishes to pass, but exercises its right of veto against the use of force in the name of the U.N. In addition, China now cooperates extensively with other countries. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), officially established in June 2001, is developing as a noteworthy security organization in the Asia-Pacific under the rubric of Sino-Russian cooperation [57]. The SCO holds annual summit meetings, and cooperates in most fields encompassing the prevention of intra-regional terrorism and separatism, promotion of confidence and friendship, security and military cooperation, and economic cooperation. Since its first joint military exercise in Kazakhstan in July 2003, the SCO conducted another grand-scale exercise in August 2007 near the Urals in Russia. China balanced American strategic interests through the SCO by demanding

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that the U.S. close its airbases in Uzbekistan, and the SCO shows a tendency to evolve into an anti-NATO block as it associates with anti-American countries including Iran, Sudan, and Venezuela. The increase in Sino-Russian cooperation is an object of considerable concern. These two countries have begun to collaborate again since the mid-1990s in the fields of security, military, technology, and economic cooperation. Their concert accelerated in the 2000s; between 2005 and 2007 they held seven summit meetings and signed many comprehensive treaties embracing joint space development, nuclear weapons, and cooperation over long-range missiles. On the occasion of Russia Year held in China in 2006, 15 joint treaties were signed in politics, military, economy, and science and technology, with Vladimir Putin emphasizing that the bilateral partnership has become a positive and stabilizing force in contemporary international politics. The atmosphere around China Year held in February 2007 in Russia was very amicable. Here, Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin announced a joint communiqu regarding peaceful resolutions to the North Korean and Iranian nuclear problems, security guarantees for Central Asia and Asia-Pacific through SinoRussian bonds, strengthening of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, and cooperation over nuclear power, aeronautics, space, energy, and the expansion of trade [49]. One reason why there exist doubts and worries over Sino-Russian coalition is that Moscow tends to show increased anti-American tendencies as its economy recovers. Moscow has expressed considerable dissatisfaction over U.S. foreign policy American global primacy, NATOs eastward advance, abrogation of the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the installation of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic [29, 30]. In June 2007, before traveling to Germany for the annual summit with President Bush and the other Group of Eight leaders, Putin assailed the White House plan to place a radar system in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in neighboring Poland, and warned that Moscow could take retaliatory steps including possibly aiming weapons at targets on the continent [13]. Sergei Ivanov, the Russian deputy prime minister, made similar remarks on the possibility of an attack on missile defense system installed in Eastern Europe, as well as Russias possible retreat from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty concluded in 1987. Nowadays Russia is preparing a new military doctrine far more aggressive than the one adopted in 2000. International terrorists and NATO are designated as possible enemies, and sending troops abroad is legitimized for the protection of its own nationals [67]. In the context of the recent energy boom, Moscow is eager to modernize strategic weapons and develop forces, spending more than 60 billion dollars in the annual defense budget. Since 2006, Moscow has deployed the advanced type of Topol M, the Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) which is known to be able to escape the ABM defense, and in 20072008 plans to deploy SS-NX-30 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), the Bulava missiles. Moscow further plans to purchase eight more strategic submarines of the Borey class. China seems to be promoting foreign relations with neighboring countries with greater confidence [53]. In 2003 Beijing agreed with New Delhi to cooperate for regional peace and stability, including cooperation on such issues as border disputes,

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and conducted joint naval rescue exercises both in 2003 and 2005. Along with Japan and South Korea, China participates in the ARF security dialogue, promoting favorable foreign relations. With the Philippines and Vietnam, with whom it has long experienced territorial disputes, China proposed to end these adversarial relationships, concluding treaties to jointly develop undersea resources. On the Korean Peninsula, China protects North Korea while trying to resolve the nuclear issues at the Six Party Talks. Force Development for Power Projection Chinas force development is an issue of great concern. China has steadily strengthened its military capabilities since Gulf War I. Beijings enormous investment in up-to-date advanced weaponry and the comprehensive modernization of weapons systems resulted in the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) designating China as the country most likely among the newly emerging countries to compete militarily with the U.S. [46, 63]. In 2002, China deployed the Dongfeng 31, the MIRVd ICBM, and in 2007 proved that it developed important space weapons technology by successfully shooting down its own obsolete Fen Yun- 1C weather satellite, orbiting earth at an altitude of approximately 850 Kms [7, 17]. In June 2006, Beijing launched an advanced type of Jin-class nuclear submarines (SSBNs) equipped with the JL-2, the MIRVd SLBM of 8,000 km range. Along with Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines carrying SS-N-27B/Sizzler anti-ship cruise missiles, these several modern J-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines are to play a crucial role in deterring U.S. military intervention, targeting U.S. regional military bases and carrier strike groups (CSGs), and securing the sea lines of communication needed for international commerce and overseas energy resources acquisition [38]. Between 1995 and 2005, the PLA-Navy had commissioned 31 new submarines, and just between 2002 and 2004, it launched 12 submarines [15]. By 2010, 20 more submarines are to be added. Numerous surface combat forces and 70 submarines which had previously operated in the vicinity of territorial waters have expanded their operational scopes to 1,000 km. The Peoples Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-Navy) is eager to develop aircraft carriers. China has already purchased four decommissioned aircraft carriers- the Australian HMAS Melbourne, the ex-Russian Minsk and Kiev, and the Kuznetzovclass Varyag from Ukraine- from abroad over the last 20 years as a preparatory step to develop its own [16]. The half-completed Russian-built ex-Varyag is likely to be the first aircraft carrier to be put into operation by the PLA-Navy. China has been repairing this 65,000 ton ex-Varyag for the last two years, and building a new propulsion plant. The 2006 Pentagons White Paper to Congress concluded that the possibility that China constructs its own aircraft carrier cannot be ruled out, and Chen Yungkang, a Taiwanese Defense Ministry official, warned that China had a plan to build two aircraft carriers by 2020 [27]. These views are supported by a report that China has decided to construct two new aircraft carriers: on March 16, 2007, right after the National Peoples Congress ended, Zhang Yunchan, the Minister of the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, officially announced

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that the 085 Project was proceeding so smoothly that China, by 2010, would be able to launch a 48,000 ton aircraft carrier, on which 20 to 30 SU-33 or J-10 fighters could be loaded. The Chinese Central Military Committee has also approved the 089 Project, which envisions the construction of a 93,000 ton aircraft carrier by the Jiangnan ship-building company, by 2020 [22, 33]. Chinese construction of aircraft carriers is likely to compel the world leading sea powers to be suspicious of Beijings intentions as Britain had doubt over Kaiser Wilhelm Germanys Tirpitz Plan a century ago. For the last ten years, the Chinese air force has imported a number of SU-27 and SU-30MKKs from Russia. The air-force has developed its own J-10, a fighter bomber comparable to the U.S. F-16 A/B in capacity, and deployed 65 of them in Hebei Shen, Zhejiang Shen, and Yunnan Shen. Beijing has a plan to deploy altogether 120 J-10s in the near future, expecting to improve air operational capabilities in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea [50, 21]. China has a production plan of the J-11 as well, a licensed version of the SU-27, and is working to develop new ones such as the J-13 and the J-14. As the air-force weapons system has modernized, the air operational concepts are revised to incorporate more offensive strategies; the improvement of air strike, missile defense, and early warning capabilities are increasingly emphasized. Chinese military capabilities are still weaker than those of the U.S., but they are expanding to a level posing a grave danger to neighboring countries. Along the coastline facing Taiwan, China has stationed 900 short-range missiles, attack fighters, surface ships, submarines, and amphibious landing crafts. Taipei is considerably threatened by the fact that Beijing frequently conducts military exercises near the Taiwan Strait, vowing that it would not refrain from the use of force if Taipei should ever declare independence. To counter Chinas military buildup, Taiwan has tried to bolster their PAC-3 defense missile capabilities, and Japan hopes to purchase the F-22, which the U.S. has recently displayed in Okinawa [14]. Quest for Overseas Energy Resources Chinas economic growth is an object of worldwide curiosity. The official GDP surpassed 2 trillion dollars in 2006, and if purchasing power is taken into account, it amounts almost to 5 trillion dollars, ranking second in the world after the U.S. This amounts to 16% of the whole world GDP [32]. Foreign currency reserves amounted to 1.2 trillion dollars in 2007, and the trade surplus with the U.S. is more than 200 billion dollars a year. What attract the greatest interest among Chinese economic activities are its overseas operations related to securing energy. China consumes 6.7 million tons of oil every year; this is second only to the U.S. which consumes 24 million tons, and 1.4 million tons more than the third biggest consumer, Japan, at 5.3 million tons. To sustain their industrial capacity, growing day by day, China endeavors to acquire energies from any countries or regions possible, including Russia, the Middle East, and Africa. Beijing has concluded several contracts with Moscow; their three major oil companies are endorsed to participate in the development of Russian oil fields. To safely acquire oil from the Middle East and Africa, Beijing ventures to secure sea lanes along the Asian rim from the South China Sea, via Cambodia, Thailand,

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Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Pakistan to these regions [31]. In Myanmar, Beijing agreed to provide services for repairing the naval bases to reciprocate the rights of constructing oil pipelines from Sittwe of Burma to Ruili and Kunming of Yunnan Shen of China. Beijings efforts to secure from Pakistan the rights to use Gwadar Port for a Chinese pipeline passing through the country did not materialize due to U.S. and Indian opposition. Chinas strengthening of diplomatic and economic relationships with the island republics including the Maldives, Mauritius, and Madagascar, located in the Indian Ocean in the vicinity of the Middle East and Africa, is considerable. In February 2007, Hu Jintao visited the Seychelles Republic, which is located at an important export route in the Indian Ocean and adjacent to British-owned Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia is an important U.S. strategic outpost for the Middle East and Africa, where U.S. fighter bombers took off and landed during Gulf War I and II. China has advanced into most of the 53 countries of Africa including Algeria, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia. Nearly half a million Chinese are attempting to secure oil and raw materials and markets for Chinese products all over Africa. In Angola, a major oil-producing country, Beijing secured oil by helping build government offices, hospitals, and roads worth two billion dollars. The amount of African-Chinese trade has increased from 10.6 billion dollars in 2000 to 55 billion dollars in 2006, and is expected to grow to 100 billion dollars by 2010.

Collision of the Two Competing Alliances Diplomatic Disputes The security dynamic in Northeast Asia is divided into two alliance structures, the ROK, Japan (and Taiwan) all allied with the U.S. versus the PRC-DPRK alliance. The fact that there still exist confronting alliances around the two great powers, the U.S. and China, signifies that the constituent states are suspicious about each other s political and military intentions [2]. This is totally different from the trustworthy U. S.-Western European security relations. The collision of the great powers and of the competing alliances is a pattern that has been observed throughout history. SpainHabsburg collided with France-Ottoman in the 16th Century; 17C English antiFrench alliance had constantly fought against rising France; the Anglo-German competition in late 19C developed into the two World Wars; right after W. W. II, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which halved the world, were engaged in a deadly competition for more than 40 years; after the demise of the Soviet Union, world peace has lasted just ten years with the current international order being shaken by the international terrorism and wars in the Middle East revolving around the implicit proWestern versus anti-Western coalitions. Though North Korea still suffers and China has a relatively small voice compared to U.S. influence, they could foster new desires as their powers grow, rejecting the current international equilibrium [19]. North Koreas nuclear armament and political resurgence and Chinas immense power expansion is likely to collide with the security interests with those of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, which comprise another axis of alliance [55]. Especially when Chinas power grows and the U.S. and

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Japan balance squarely against that, China and North Korea cannot but to earnestly cooperate; Beijing needs North Korea for political, psychological, and military reasons, and so does Pyongyang need China. Currently, China supports the North in a circumscribed, defensive manner, but once truly stern competition with the U.S. and Japan begins, Chinas protection is likely to turn offensive [2, 64]. The North would be difficult to find any other option than collaborating with China. Situations could be imagined whereby U.S., China, and Japan cooperate, but competition seems to be the greater probability. Future Northeast Asian international politics are not likely to differ much from what has happened in the past [40]. The member states of the two alliances might not be directly involved in largescale war due to the existence of the nuclear weapons, but their competition could be menacing; despite gestures and short periods of reconciliation, the explicit and implicit power struggle could continue. The U.S. and China are likely to clash over international primacy, spheres of influence, national pride, proliferation of WMD, the Taiwan question, natural resources, and trade practices deemed unfair. Between the U.S. and North Korea, apart from nuclear weapons, missiles, chemical and biological weapons, support for international terrorism, human rights, and questions originating from N-S Korean relations could be further causes of contention. China and Japan would wrangle over military balance, territorial ownership, and historical legacy. Japan and North Korea would struggle over WMD and historical antagonism. The two Koreas would compete for dominance in the process of unification. In these gloomy scenarios, alliances would be reinforced, the arms race would accelerate, and the security structure in Northeast Asia would polarize in two opposite extremes. Within such conflicting bipolar alliance structure, there have been more than sufficient precedents for future conflicts. During the Clinton administration, Washington and Beijing collided despite their benign relationship. When Washington allowed Taiwan President Lee Tunghuis visit to Cornell University, China poured an enormous deployment of missiles in the Taiwan Strait forcing the U.S. to dispatch two aircraft carriers, and continuously vowed that it would use force against Taiwan should it declare independence. When the U.S. bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by mistake, the entire Chinese population protested all over the country until Clinton publicly apologized. When the George W. Bush administration announced that China was no more a strategic partner but a competitor in international politics, Beijing seized a U.S. reconnaissance airplane near its territorial airspace on charges of international espionage. When Washington bestowed a working visit rather than a state visit for Hu Jintao despite some new cooperative tendencies since the September 11th incident, Hu ignored Bushs request for the resolution of the bilateral trade deficit, revaluation of the Yuan, and protection of American intellectual property rights. Concerning the U.S.-Japanese alliance, Beijing recognizes that it contains China and is being strengthened day by day [65, 72]. The 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto declaration, the expanded Japanese security role in the 1997 U.S.-Japanese Guide Lines for Defense Cooperation, and the 1999 bilateral Memorandum of Understanding regarding the installation of sea-based missile defense systems are all worries for China. Beijing calculates that U.S.-Japanese missile defense systems could weaken 80 percent of Chinese nuclear capabilities [62]. Beijing is concerned

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that Japan is leaning too much toward the extreme right and developing expansionist intentions: Japans efforts to revise its Peace Constitution to allow an outright military and have the right to go to war, Koizumis visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and Ishihara Shintaros A Japan That Can Say No, are examples of these disturbing tendencies [8]. Japan worries about the rise of China as does the United States. Chinas defense expenditure lacks transparency; the air-force and naval force development is massive; China does not abandon its ambition of unification with Taiwan. There is no guarantee that China would not aspire to its historic tributary status of the Middle Kingdom if the current power expansion continues. Japanese-North Korean relations are dotted with enormous mutual distrust. To Japan, North Korea has many identities - a terrorism-supporting country hiding plane-hijacking members of the Japanese Red Army and kidnapping more than ten Japanese to use as Japanese language instructors for their spies, a rogue state, and part of the axis of evil. When Pyongyang launched intermediate-range missiles into the Pacific Ocean over Japanese territory, Tokyo accepted the U.S. proposal to install its anti-missile system in the southern islands of Okinawa, planning to approve the U.S. deployment of altogether 11 US-developed PAC-3s by March 2011. In March 2007, Japan installed two of its domestically developed PAC-3 interceptors at Iruma Air Self-Defense Force base in suburban Tokyo. These are efforts aimed at intercepting North Korean missiles in case the sea-based missile system fails, proving how seriously Tokyo regards North Koreas WMD capabilities [5, 26]. North Koreas hatred of Japan is more serious; in a word, Japan is described as a historical offender. It is recognized as a neighboring great power which cannot be trusted. Domestic Differences The possibility for North Korea and China to transform into liberal democracies is assessed very low. Currently, China officially adheres to its one-party system and Chinese socialism, and Chinese political elites do not concede a multi-party liberal democracy plausible at all [20]. Around 1997, the Jiang Zemin regime quashed reformist eagerness to establish a new political party in Shanghai- the Democratic Party. The fourth generation leaders including Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao are the same in that they favor the socialist political system. This is obvious in Wens speech released at the time of the Peoples Congress through Xinhua Media in March 2007: Still remaining at the initial stage of socialism, China will stay in this stage for long in the future.... The nature of socialism resides in liberating and developing the productive power to finally extinguish exploitation and bipolarization in wealth to achieve socially common prosperity, and we take the route of our own way [rather than Western democracy] [24]. Chinas White Paper: Building of Political Democracy in China maintains the same tone: Through painstaking exploration and hard struggle, the Chinese people finally came to realize that mechanically copying the Western bourgeois political system and applying it to China would lead them nowhere.... Chinas socialist political democracy accords with the national conditions.... It must not copy any model of other countries.... At present and for a period of time to come, the CCP and the Chinese government will actively... stick to and improve the socialist democratic system [11].

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Obviously, Beijing has developed some democratic elements over the years [36, 42, 48]. As the authority of Peoples Congress has enlarged, the Chinese Communist Partys (CCPs) power to monopolize state policy is limited. As the role of the Judiciary has strengthened, people can now sue the CCP and its cadres for various reasons including abuse of power. Power has devolved to the provinces to the extent that CCP orders from Beijing are not necessarily carried out at the periphery. At the lowest local level, elections are conducted to select administrative officials. As China promotes opening-up and an international market economy, there circulates a joke that the CCP means the Chinese Capitalist Party. Nevertheless, it is improbable that the liberal democracy bloom and set in China in the foreseeable future. Sprouts of liberal democracy are not found in North Korea. Pyongyang maintains the most severe Stalinist socio-political system in the world. There are two hundred thousand political prisoners scattered in ten concentration camps, and no organizations that oppose the government orders can exist. The fact that Pyongyang officially acknowledges that the adversary stratum among the three strata has been reduced to ten percent from the previous 25 percent signifies how atrocious the state dictatorship has been against its people. Buddhism is nowadays slightly more tolerated in North Korea, but Christianity, which originated from the West, is not permitted at all; the Bong-soo-dong Church and Jang-choong-dong Cathedral are religious institutions for the sake of a democratic faade. Human rights are the worst in the world; farmers maintain lives similar to feudal slaves tied to the lands they farm.

A Realistic Appraisal Since the death of Kim Il-sung there has been ample debate over the future of North Korea. The theme has been diverse to include such questions as; would North Korea be able to survive under the leadership of Kim Jong-il; what is the purpose of nuclear development; what is proper policy toward North Korea; and what is the real nature of the Sino-North Korean alliance. Today, after 14 years have passed under Kim Jong-ils reign, the answers seem quite obvious. North Korea is moving into a stage of stability; there is little chance of North Koreas collapse; rather it is resurging armed with nuclear weapons; subduing the Norths nuclear development is a difficult task even for the U.S.; and China absolutely opposes the collapse of the North. These all prove that North Korea should not be under-evaluated, and that there should not be an easy expectation that Pyongyang would move easily as the liberal democracies would like. What about China? Many experts have argued that China is being democratized, and that its economic development will not sustain its rapid growth due to corruption, social stratification, the urban poor, demonstrations, and strikes. They say the military is very weak; China will eventually accept the international order that the U.S. and the West leads; China policy should take a moderate nature rather than pursuing containment. However, such views might not look very likely in the future [3, 25, 39, 41, 43] The Chinese economy, still growing, could further develop enormously. The modernization syndromes normally experienced by developing

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countries are minimized by the authoritarian rule that absorbs the socio-economic conflicts among differing interests. There seems to be no guarantee that China will move in the direction of multi-party liberal democracy. Rather, China could acquire military and economic capabilities first, and in that case may well remain as a socialist or authoritarian state controlled by a handful of power elites. Chinese military capabilities have not reached the levels of the U.S., but do approach those of other industrial democracies. This is because Beijing can purchase most of the advanced weapons and infrastructure needed on the international market with abundant funds accruing from their trade surplus. Especially, the most up-todate Russian technologies and weapons such as space science, missiles, and super computers are important sources of modernization for the Chinese military. International influences are expected to grow further in light of Russo-Chinese cooperation at the U.N. Security Council, cooperation with the neighboring countries, and infiltration into the Third World countries; this trend could be supported by their ever growing military and economic capabilities, while the U.S. is stuck in the Middle East. Regarding the possibility that China will accept the international order that the West currently leads, there seems to be as much chance that Beijing will reject it as condone it. Beijings current acceptance of Western leadership could have come from rational judgment as in the cases of rejection of international terrorism and the admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO), but it could also have originated from the lack of confidence caused by the U.S. international primacy as the case of Taiwan testifies. Like Kaiser Wilhelms Germany, China could develop an ambition to seek a higher position in the international pecking order as a lateblooming power emerging into a world already ordered strategically by earlier arrivals. Even though China has no intention of a direct challenge yet, and there is some truth in the logic that the U.S. and international actors have pacifying influences on China, it will not be good to over-estimate positive effects of globalization, interdependence, and political liberalization [4].

Future Policy Directions for the Liberal Democracies If the hypothesis that China and North Korea could aggregate more power is plausible, the liberal democracies should prepare for the future. Such preparations should be divided into short- and long-term policies. In the short term, the U.S., the leading democratic state, would have to be careful not to aggravate the problems in Northeast Asia since its priority is now on Iraq, Afghanistan, and international terrorism. Regarding the most immediate task to be solved, North Koreas nuclear dilemma, the U.S. has several options, as the rational actor model suggests, ranging from moderate to strong measures, among which the continuation of the current Six Party Talk is most reasonable. Doing nothing is impossible because the North would continue nuclear development. International diplomatic pressure is ineffective as has been true for the last 15 years. Threat of sanctions or real sanctions are not recommended in light of U.S. policy priority, Northern brinkmanship, and opposition from China. Bilateral meeting has been allowed in Berlin, but the U.S. prefers the multilateral context.

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At the Six Party Talks, Washington and Seoul should demand that the North submit an honest report, constantly reminding that the lifting of sanctions and diplomatic normalization would proceed only when Pyongyang abides by the previous agreements. If the U.S. decided to accept the Norths request to acknowledge only indirectly its uranium enrichment and the possibility of nuclear cooperation with Syria, at least the information on the numbers of nuclear warheads, amount of remaining plutonium, and the details of the operations of nuclear reactors and reprocessing facilities should be precise. Once the report is submitted, IAEA should evaluate its sincerity through on-site inspection, and the U.S. should exert copious efforts so that the North does not block a thorough IAEA examination. Once this phase is over, the U.S. and South Korea could bring up the issue of the abolition of pre-existing nuclear weapons according to the September 19th agreement (as was discussed). In all these processes, Washington should be able to mobilize all diplomatic skills including stick and carrot and policy of procrastination as long as the Six Party Talks or the U.S.-DPRK talks are not broken. If the North fulfills all its responsibilities, then the U.S. could consider normalization. Regarding China, in the short-term, the U.S. should implement a moderate policy. If the U.S.-China relations are aggravated, then there occurs an anomaly in U.S. war against international terrorism and in resolving North Koreas nuclear problem. The U.S. should keep trying to ameliorate mutual distrust with China, preserving all diplomatic channels and continuing with military exchanges including reciprocal visits of military vessels. To minimize bilateral conflicts, the Taiwan question should not be aggravated. The best policy regarding Taiwan is to stick to the One China policy and unification through dialogue, upholding the Shanghai Joint Declaration and the Taiwan Relations Act. Incidents like Lee Tunghuis visit to the U.S. early in 1995 are not desirable, and the unwise attempts at constitutional revision, national referendums, and moves toward national independence should be discouraged [12, 18, 23, 59, 73]. In the longer term, what kind of policies should the liberal democracies employ vis--vis China and North Korea? Among the moderate and strong measures, the former would be better because the status-quo powers favor peace. The U.S. could seek resolving the problems China presents - international primacy, force development, proliferation of WMD, Taiwan, human rights, and unfair trade through dialogue and negotiation, and if necessary some diplomatic pressure could be mobilized. In case of North Korea, the questions related to the missiles, chemical and biological weapons, human rights, and N-S Korean relations could initially be dealt with in a moderate manner. However, since there is a big possibility that the great powers and their corresponding alliances collide, the liberal democracies should be ready in the longer term to meet the daunting challenges. If China rejects U.S. political influence and shifts to aggression, the liberal democracies would need strong measures, which would begin from fortifying the U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-ROK alliances. Tripartite cooperation among the U.S., Japan and South Korea, all three of whom have compatible security goals and domestic structures, is essential in resolving the security problems of Northeast Asia and should definitely be strengthened. Suffering from numerous quandaries in the Middle East and Al Qaeda, the U.S. cannot solve all these global problems alone. Japan is the worlds second economic power, and

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her naval and air-force capabilities almost approach those of Britain and France [35, 37]). Japan would be able to achieve enormous force development quickly, any time it decides to do so. For the past several years, the U.S. and South Korea have experienced diplomatic disharmony over the legitimacy of the Sunshine Policy, but what counts more is the future. On the part of South Korea, excessive romantic nationalism and turning away from the U.S.-ROK relationship could be dangerous in the context of Pyongyangs development of nuclear weapons and showing zero indication of transformation into liberal democracy. An unbounded obsession with political autonomy, something Seoul has advocated for some time, could lead to irrevocable diplomatic isolation [1, 34]. President Lee Myung-bak, who just began his five year term in South Korea, declared his intention to form a 21st C global, strategic partnership departing from the previous ten years of U.S.-South Korean conflict. That seems quite wise. Cooperation with India would be very helpful in competing with China. For the last several years, the U.S. and Japan have exerted considerable efforts to develop a cooperative relationship with India, something in which China and Russia are also interested. While visiting New Delhi in March 2006, George W. Bush decided to provide nuclear technology to India [6]. In December 2006, when Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh visited Tokyo, Abe Shinzo, the former Japanese prime minister, promised large-scale investments in the field of Information Technology (IT), and Japan has consistently promoted negotiations to conclude treaties for an economic partnership aimed ultimately at a free-trade agreement. Abe has also promoted security dialogue among four major Asia-Pacific countries, the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India. New Delhi might find it more advantageous to side strategically with the U.S. and Japan than with China. The U.S. should try harder to re-establish a good relationship with Russia. The transfer of advanced technologies and the importation of weapons from Russia are the most important factors facilitating the Chinese military build-up [50, 56]. Since the rise of Putin, Washington has neglected its relationship with Moscow, expressing dissatisfaction with Russias retreat back to political authoritarianism. Washington needs more frequent, more intensive contacts with Moscow in order to facilitate a diplomatic rapprochement and resolve the problematic issue of missile defense. Washington should also pay more attention to the possibility of cooperation between China and Islamic anti-American countries. Chinese reinforcement of relationships with the Islamic countries in the Middle East and Africa in the name of energy diplomacy could be an occasion for the rapprochement of Confucian and Islamic civilizations as envisioned by Samuel P. Huntington.
Acknowledgements This paper was prepared while the author was serving as a visiting scholar at U.C. Berkeley from September 2006 to August 2007. The author appreciates the two anonymous referees of the East Asia: An International Quarterly for their thoughtful comments on the earlier draft.

References
1. Bandow, D. 2003. Ending the Anachronistic Korean Commitment. Parameters, 33 2, 15. 2. Beck, P. M. & Reader, N. (2006). China and North Korea. Korea and World Affairs, 30 (1), 6264, 209, 211, 225.

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Chan Yul Yoo is a professor of political science at Duksung Womens University. After receiving his Ph.D. in political science from Johns Hopkins University in 1990, he worked five years for the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA). He has been involved in diverse academic activities as a research director for the Korean Association of International Studies, a vice president of the Korean Association of Public Policy, a visiting scholar at U.C. Berkeley, and an honorary editorial writer for Seoul Daily. He is the author of Reason of State (in Korean), and has written extensively in various academic publications on the international politics of Northeast Asia.