SENOJA VS PEOPLE SECOND DIVISION 2. Subsequently, Leon walked out of Crisantos hut followed by petitioner.

Suddenly, about ten meters from the hut, petitioner stabbed Leon at the back. When Leon turned around, petitioner continued stabbing him until he fell to the ground. Then, petitioner ran towards the barangay road and threw away the kolonial knife he used in stabbing Leon. The latter died on the spot (pp. 2-6, TSN, November 22, 2000; p. 5, TSN, August 30, 2002; p. 3, CA Decision). 3. Dr. Pura Deveza Valenzuela-Uy, San Luis Municipal Health Officer, examined the cadaver of Leon and found multiple lesions on his body and five fatal wounds on his chest. Dr. Uy issued a medico-legal report and death certificate (Exhibits A and B, pp. 13-14, Records; pp. 3-5, TSN, [3] November 20, 1997). On August 13, 1997, an Information was filed charging petitioner Exequiel Senoja with homicide, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on April 16, 1997 at around 11 oclock in the morning in Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault, and use personal violence upon the person of one Leon Lumasac by then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon locally known as kolonyal at the different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter. CONTRARY TO LAW.
[4]

EXEQUIEL SENOJA, Petitioner, Present:

G.R. No. 160341

- versus CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

PUNO, J., Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and

Promulgated: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. October 19, 2004 x------------------------------------ --------------x DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.:
[1]

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People v. Exequiel Senoja, docketed as CA-G.R. [2] CR No. 26564, affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96, in Criminal Case No. 2259, for homicide. The Case For the People As culled by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its comment on the petition, the case stemmed from the following: 1. On April 16, 1997, petitioner Exequiel Senoja, Fidel Senoja, Jose Calica, and Miguel Lumasac were drinking gin in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal in Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora. An angry Leon Lumasac suddenly arrived at the said place, holding a bolo in his right hand and looking for his brother Miguel. Petitioner and Jose tried to pacify Leon. But when petitioner approached Leon, the latter tried to hack him so he embraced Leon and Jose took Leons bolo. Then, Leon and petitioner talked things out and later reconciled (pp. 2-4, TSN, November 16, 1998; pp. 2-4, TSN, August 30, 2002; p. 2, TSN, April 21, 1998; p. 5, TSN, March 14, 2001; p. 2, CA Decision).

The petitioner admitted killing the victim but invoked the affirmative defense of self-defense. His version of the fatal incident is set forth in his petition at bar: 1. On April 16, 1997 at about 11 oclock in the morning, Crisanto Reguyal, Fidel Senoja, Jose Calica, Miguel Lumasac, and Exequiel Senoja were in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal in Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora, drinking gin; 2. Leon Lumasac suddenly arrived holding a bolo and hacked the doorpost of Crisantos hut, angrily demanding for his brother, Miguel Lumasac, whom he suspected of drying up the ricefield he was plowing; 3. At this time, Miguel Lumasac was no longer inside the hut but fetching water;

4. To prevent Leon Lumasac from entering the hut, Exequiel Senoja (appellant) and Jose Calica stood by the door while simultaneously trying to pacify Leon Lumasac; 5. Exequiel Senoja with a knife then went outside and tried to pacify Leon Lumasac but the latter angered by the gestures of the former tried to hack Exequiel Senoja; 6. To avoid any injury, Exequiel Senoja embraced Leon which gave an opportunity to disarm the duo. Jose Calica got the bolo of Leon and threw it away while Fidel Senoja took the colonial knife of Exequiel; 7. Jose Calica and Fidel Senoja were able to pacify Leon Lumasac so they invited him to get inside the hut. Inside the hut, Leon Lumasac tried to box Fidel Senoja for siding with his brother, Miguel, but was prevented by Exequiel Senoja who held Leons hands; 8. After a while, Leon Lumasac left but returned and angrily demanded for his bolo. Jose Calica gave his own bolo with a sabbard to replace the bolo of Leon which he threw away; 9. With Jose Calicas bolo in him, Leon Lumasac left but only after leaving a threat that something will happen to Exequiel Senoja for siding with his brother; 10. After walking for about 10 meters away from the hut, Leon Lumasac turned around and saw Exequiel Senoja on his way home following him; 11. Leon Lumasac walked back to meet Exequiel Senoja and upon reaching him, the former suddenly and treacherously hacked the latter at the left side of his head and right thigh; 12. Unable to evade the treacherous attack by Leon Lumasac who persisted in his criminal design, Exequiel Senoja drew his colonial knife and stabbed Leon Lumasac in self-defense, inflicting upon him multiple [5] wounds which caused his death. On June 7, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment against the petitioner, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Exequiel Senoja GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the death of victim Leon Lumasac and hereby sentences him, applying Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of the

Indeterminate Sentence Law, (a) to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum; (b) to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifteen (sic) Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity; and (c) to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.
[6]

In due course, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment affirming, with modification, the decision of the RTC. The petitioner now seeks relief from this Court, contending that: The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to appreciate vital facts which, if considered, would probably alter the result of this case on appeal finding [7] appellants plea of self-defense credible. The petitioner faults the CA for its analysis of his testimony, as follows: The injuries suffered by the petitioner at the left side of his head and right thigh was confirmed by Dr. Rodolfo Eligio in open court. The relative positions of the wounds clearly show that the drunken Leon Lumasac brandished and executed several hacking blows against Exequiel Senoja before he was stabbed, neutralized and finished by the latter. It would be physically and highly improbable for the victim if he was treacherously hit at the left buttock and as he turned around to face the petitioner, the latter stabbed him successively and without let-up hitting him 9 times resulting in 9 fatal wounds. This did not give a chance to the victim to retaliate and inflict those wounds upon the aggressor. The victim used Mr. Jose Calicas bolo which was secured by its scabbard. Unless earlier drawn, it would be impossible for the victim to use it in defending himself from the surprise attack and stabbing at a lightning fashion inflicting nine (9) fatal wounds. Time element was the essence of this encounter which, as narrated by the Honorable Court, after the assailant poked the victim at the left side of the buttock with the use of the colonial knife he stabbed him successively until he fell down dead. Under these circumstances, how could Exequiel Senoja suffered (sic) those hacking (sic) wounds inflicted by the victim using Calicas bolo? In all indications, it was Leon Lumasac who attacked his adversary first but lost in the duel considering that he was older than Exequiel Senoja and drunk. Clearly, therefore, it was Leon Lumasac who was the aggressor both in the first and second phases of the incident and Exequiel Senoja was compelled to defend himself. A closer scrutiny of the attending circumstances which resulted in this stabbing incident shows that Exequiel Senoja has no compelling reasons to kill his godfather. On that same occasion, Mr. Exequiel Senoja was with the

brother of the victim, Miguel Lumasac, which only shows that there was no pre-existing grudge between these families. And still, what titillates our imagination is the fact that Miguel Lumasac, who was then with the group drinking gin at the hut of Crisanto Reguyal did not clearly impute this crime to petitioner. On the contrary, when he was presented to the witness stand, he was very evasive in answering the questions profounded by the prosecutors if he wanted the petitioner to be imprisoned. Miguel Lumasac [8] could have told the real truth that Senoja murdered his brother. The CA declared that, based on the evidence on record: As seen from appellants testimony, Leon Lumasacs actions can be divided into two (2) phases: the first phase, when Leon entered Crisanto Reguyals hut, up to the time he and the appellant reconciled. The second phase was when Leon left to go home. In phase one where Leon entered Reguyals hut, Leon was the aggressor but his aggression was mostly directed to his brother Miguel who was not inside the hut anymore, although it was also partly directed at the appellant and even at Fidel Soneja ( sic). But Leons aggression against the appellant and Fidel Senoja ceased since, as appellant testified, when Leon tried to box Fidel Senoja and he (appellant) told Leon Huwag po, Huwag po, Leon was pacified. In the second phase, when Leon left the hut to go home, his aggression had already ceased. It is uncontroverted that the appellant followed the victim when the latter went out of the hut to go home. Appellants testimony is that when he was two meters outside the hut, Leon turned around to face him saying if youre not only my godson in a threatening way, then approached and hacked him (with Calicas bolo) inflicting wounds on the left side of his head and his right thigh, thus, he (appellant) attacked the victim with the kolonial knife he was holding. That appellant suffered such injuries was corroborated by the [9] testimony of Dr. Rodolfo Eligio.

First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The affirmative defense of self-defense may be complete or incomplete. It is complete when all the three essential requisites are present; it is incomplete if only unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and any of the two essential requisites were present. In fine, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a conditionsine qua non to self-defense, complete or incomplete. Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense is a question of fact. Like alibi, the affirmative defense of self-defense is inherently weak because, as experience has demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate and difficult [10] to disprove.

The right of self-defense proceeds from necessity and limited by it. The right [11] begins where necessity does, and ends where it ends. There is, however, a perceptible difference between necessity and self-defense, which is that, self-defense excuses the repulse of a wrong; necessity justifies the invasion of a right. Hence, it is essential to self-defense that it should be [12] a defense against a present unlawful attack. Life can be taken under the plea of necessity, when necessary for the preservation of the life on the party setting up the plea. Self-defense is an [13] act to save life; hence, it is right and not a crime. There is a need for one, indeed, for it is a natural right for one to defend oneself when confronted by an unlawful aggression by another. It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Absent such an actual or imminent peril to ones life or limb, there is nothing to repel; there is no necessity to take the life or inflict [14] injuries on another. But then what is the standard to use to determine whether the person defending himself is confronted by a real and imminent peril to his life or limb? We rule that the test should be: does the person invoking the defense believe, in due exercise of his reason, his life or limb is in danger? After all, the rule of law founded on justice and reason: Actus no facit remin, nisi mens sit rea. Hence, the guilt of the accused must depend upon the [15] circumstances as they reasonably appear to him.

The petition is denied. Paragraph 1, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code provides: ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;

Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating [16] attitude. Hence, when an inceptual/unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the former [17] aggressor. After the danger has passed, one is not justified in following up his adversary to take his life. The conflict for blood should be avoided if [18] possible. An assault on his person, he cannot punish when the danger or peril is over. When the danger is over, the right of self-defense ceases. His [19] right is defense, not retribution. When the accused offers the affirmative defense of self-defense, he thereby admits killing the victim or inflicting injuries on him. The burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that he killed the victim or inflicted injuries on him to defend himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution because if the evidence of the [20] prosecution were weak, the accused can no longer be acquitted. We agree with the CA that, as gleaned, even from the testimony of the petitioner, there were two separate but interrelated incidents that culminated in the petitioners stabbing and killing of the victim Leon Lumasac. The first was the arrival of the victim, who was armed with a bolo, in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal, looking for his brother Miguel Lumasac, whom he was angry at. The victim hacked the wall of the house in anger. The petitioner, who was armed with a knife, tried to pacify the victim. The victim attempted to hack the petitioner; nevertheless, the latter embraced and managed to pacify the victim. Forthwith, Jose Calica took the bolo of the victim and threw it away. For his part, Fidel Senoja took the petitioners knife. As it was, the victim was already pacified. He and the petitioner were already [21] reconciled. Fidel even gave back the knife to the petitioner. The second incident took place when the victim demanded that Calica return his bolo as he wanted to go home already. Because he had thrown away the victims bolo, Calica was, thus, impelled to give his own. The victim then warned the petitioner three times, May mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas, and left the hut. When the victim had already gone about ten meters from the hut, the petitioner followed the victim. The victim turned around and told the petitioner, Kung hindi lang kita inaanak. The victim then hacked the petitioner, hitting the latter on the left side of his head and thigh. Believing that the victim would attack him anew, the petitioner [22] stabbed the victim frontally several times. He also stabbed the victim on the left buttock. The petitioner could not recall how many times he stabbed the victim and what parts of the latters body had been hit.

The first episode inside the hut had been completed with the protagonist, the victim, and the petitioner reconciled. The second episode commenced inside the hut and continued outside, and ended with the petitioner stabbing the victim several times. The trial and the appellate courts gave no credence and probative weight to the testimony of the petitioner. So do we. First. The findings of fact of the trial court and its conclusions based on the said findings are accorded by this Court high respect, if not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court of having been able to observe, at close range, the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses as they testify. This rule, however, is inapplicable if the trial court ignored, overlooked, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will alter or reverse the outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records and found no justification for a reversal of the findings of the trial court and its conclusions based thereon. Second. The victim sustained six hack wounds and one lacerated wound. This is gleaned from the Necropsy Report of Dr. Pura Uy, to wit: FINDINGS: The victim lies in supine position, stocky in built; his clothing completely soaked with fresh blood. CHEST: (+) stab wound 2 inches below the L nipple 4 inches deep running medially to the anterior median line. (+) stab wound 2 inches to the L of the anterior median line at the level of the L nipple 5 inches deep running posteriorly. (+) stab wound 1 inch above the L nipple 4 inches deep running inferomedially. (+) stab wound 2 inches to the left of the anterior median line 4 inches deep running inferoposteriorly. (+) stab wound 1 inch to the right of the anterior median line at the level of the second right intercostal space 0.5 inch in depth. (+) stab wound inch to the right of the anterior median line at the level of the xyphoid process 3 inches deep running superiorly. (+) stab wound at the level of the L nipple L anterior axillary line 4 inches in depth running superiorly to the left armpit. (+) hack wound at the left armpit 3 inches long injuring the muscles and the blood vessels. (+) lacerated wound on the left palm almost cutting off the proximal phalanx [23] of the left thumb.

Five of the wounds of the victim on his chest were fatal. The victim also sustained a stab wound on the left buttock. According to the doctor, it was [25] unlikely for the victim to have survived even with medical attention. After the doctor made her initial autopsy and submitted her report, she noted that the victim sustained a stab wound of about two inches deep at the left buttock, thus: Q In this medico-legal report, you indicated that the cause of death of the victim is Hypovolemic shock 2 to multiple stab wounds, chest. Will you please explain this? A Ito pong nakalagay o dahilan ng pagkamatay ng biktima sa sobrang natapon na dugo gawa ng maraming saksak na tinamo ng biktima sa kanyang dibdib ang nagbigay ng daan sa kanyang kamatayan . Q Will you please tell us, Dr. Uy, if there is one amont ( sic) these lesions that is located at the back of the victim? A I forgot to tell you that a day after I submitted the report, the funeral parlor which attended the victim has called my attention because of the wound at the back of the victim and I attended immediately to see these lesions at the home of the victim. I reviewed for (sic) these lesions and I saw one lesion located at the left buttock of the victim. Q A Q A What is the nature of the injury? Stab wound, about two inches deep. By the nature of the lesion, is it not fatal? It is not that fatal.

[24]

A Q A Q A Q A

That is not true, Sir. But you are admitting that you stabbed him several times frontally? Yes, Sir, because I am (sic) defending myself. You also stabbed him in his left armpit? I dont know, Sir. But you knew that you stabbed him in his buttock? No, Sir.

Q After stabbing him several times and felt that he was already dead, you already left the place? [28] A Yes, Sir.

The testimony of the petitioner is belied by the physical evidence on record. The settled rule is that physical evidence is evidence of the highest [29] order; it speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses. Third. The petitioner threw away his knife and failed to surrender it to the policemen; neither did he inform the policemen that he killed the victim in self-defense. The petitioners claim that the victim was armed with a bolo is [30] hard to believe because he even failed to surrender the bolo. Fourth. The petitioners version of the events that transpired immediately before he stabbed the victim does not inspire belief. He claims that when he saw the victim emerged from the hut, the victim walked towards the petitioner saying, Kung hindi lang kita inaanak, but hit and hacked the latter [31] on the left buttock. As gleaned from his statement, the victim was not disposed, much less determined to assault the petitioner. And yet, the petitioner insists that without much ado, the victim, nevertheless, hit him on the head and on the thigh with his bolo. Fifth. According to the petitioner, the victim warned him three times before leaving the hut, May mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas. The petitioner testified that shortly before the victim uttered these words, the [32] latter even touched the blade of the bolo to see if it was sharp. The petitioner was, thus, aware of the peril to his life if he followed the victim. The petitioner, nevertheless, followed the victim and left the hut after the victim had gone barely ten meters. He should have waited until after the victim had already gone far from the hut before going home to avoid any untoward incident.

Q In your expert opinion, by the nature of the wound sustained by the victim, what could have been the relative position of the victim in relation to his assailant? A Based on my examination, I think the victim and the assailant were facing each other. Masyadong malapit. Q A How many fatal wounds have (sic) the victim sustained in his chest? [26] Five fatal stab wounds on the chest.

Considering the number, nature and location of the wounds sustained by the [27] victim, the petitioners plea of self-defense is incredible. It bears stressing that the petitioner resolutely denied stabbing the victim at the buttock and insisted that he stabbed the victim frontally: Q As a matter of fact, he sustained an injury at the back of his buttock (pigi) and when he faced you, you stabbed him again several times?

Sixth. The petitioner presented his brother-in-law Ruben Dulay to corroborate his testimony that the victim stabbed the petitioner and that this impelled the latter to stab the former. But the testimony of Dulay contradicted the testimony of the petitioner: Q When Exequiel Senoja stabbed Leon Lumasac several times, he immediately fell to the ground and was fatal[ly] wounded, immediately died because of several stabs and lay (sic) down? A I did not see that scene because Exequiel Senoja stabbed Leon Lumasac, I turn (sic) back upon seeing Leon Lumasac hack Exequiel Senoja, I turn (sic) back because I was afraid then. When I turn (sic) back I saw them embracing each other, Sir. Q And that is the time when Exequiel Senoja stabbed Leon Lumasac? A I did not see the stabbing. What I only saw was that they were embracing each other, Sir. Q So you are now changing your answer, you actually saw Exequiel Senoja stabbing Leon Lumasac several times, after he was hack[ed] by Leon Lumasac? [33] A I did not see that Exequiel Senoja stab Leon Lumasac, Sir. Seventh. The bare fact that the petitioner sustained a five-centimeter wound at the left temporal region and an eight-centimeter hack wound on the anterior portion of his right thigh does not preclude the fact that he was the unlawful aggressor; nor buttress his plea that he acted in selfdefense. The petitioner failed to inform the doctor that he sustained the wounds to defend himself. Moreover, the doctor testified that the wounds the petitioner sustained were slight: Pros. Ronquillo: Q Does (sic) the wound at the right anterior thigh vertical, diagonal or what? A I did not place it, Sir. Q So, you dont know? A It is vertical, Sir, but I did not place it on the record. And the hack wound on the temporal region is oblique. Q A Q A Were the injuries only slight? Yes, Sir. So, it is (sic) possible that these injuries were self-inflicted? Probably, Sir, but I cannot comment on that.

Q You said that the patient was under the influence of alcohol? Would you say that the patient was then so drunk at that time? [34] A When I saw him at that time, he was moderately drunk. The doctor gave the petitioner due medications for 30 minutes and the petitioner then went home: Q How did it happen that you were able to kill the victim in this case Mr. Leon Lumasac? A Because when I went out, he hacked me, Sir. Q A Q A Were you hit by the hack made by the victim in this case? Yes, Sir. Where? Here, Sir. And Witness is pointing to his left head. Q A Q A Q A Where else? (His) right thigh. In what place did this incident happen? In the hut of Tata Santos, Sir. What is his real name? [35] Crisanto Reguyal, Sir.

If, as claimed by the petitioner, the victim stabbed him frontally, it is incredible that the victim was able to hack the anterior part of his right thigh. Eighth. The testimony of the petitioner that the victim stabbed him outside the hut on the left side of his head and the anterior portion of his right thigh is belied by his testimony on direct examination that the victim stabbed him while still inside the hut of Reguyal: Q How did it happen that you were able to kill the victim in this case Mr. Leon Lumasac? A Because when I went out, he hacked me, Sir. Q A Were you hit by the hack made by the victim in this case? Yes, Sir.

Q A

Where? Here, Sir. And Witness is pointing to his left head.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Q A Q A Q A

Where else? (His) right thigh. SR. In what place did this incident happen? In the hut of Tata Santos, Sir. What is his real name? [36] Crisanto Reguyal, Sir.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, Associate Justice

But then, after the said incident, the petitioner and the victim had reconciled. We agree with the following findings of the appellate court: The question that must be resolved is whether or not the victim was the unlawful aggressor as the appellants testimony pictures him to be. The Court rules in the negative. The victim had already left the hut and was ten (10) meters away from it. There is no showing that the victim, who was drunk, was aware that appellant was following him, or that the appellant called out to him so that he (the victim) had to turn around and notice him. It is clear that at that point in time, the victim was simply walking toward his home; he had stopped being an aggressor. It was the appellant who, smarting from the earlier incident in the hut where Leon told him hindi ka tatagal, sa loob ng tatlong araw mayroong mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas repeated three times, wanted a confrontation. Appellant stabbed or poked the victim in the left buttock resulting in the non-fatal wound, and when the latter turned around, successively stabbed and hacked the victim in the armpit and chest until he fell. In all, the victim suffered nine (9) wounds. It is the well-considered finding of this Court that while Leon Lumasac had ceased being the aggressor after he left the hut to go home, accused Exequiel Senoja was now the unlawful aggressor in this second phase of their confrontation. It bears mentioning that appellant contradicted himself with respect for (sic) the reason why he left the hut. First, it was to pacify Leon and the second reason was that he was going home. As for appellants injuries, it is clear that they were sustained in the course of the victims attempt to defend himself as shown by the lacerated wound on [37] the victims left palm, a defensive wound.

FIRST DIVISION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, G.R. No. 140985 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, AZCUNA and GARCIA, JJ.

the first player who garners 61 points wins the game. A P40 bet was on the line. Ramon Villo stood as spotter for them. Accused-appellant was ahead with 59 points when he pocketed the number 3 ball. Ramon erroneously scored it for Rogelio. Aggrieved, accused-appellant protested. Matters got worse when Rogelio suddenly rearranged the balls on the table and the game turned into a shouting match between Rogelio and accused-appellant. Ramon tried to mediate but accused-appellant vented his ire on him, sparking a heated argument. Ramon decided to leave and proceeded to go out of the hall. However, Rodel, accused-appellants brother, pursued him and caught up with him in front of Andoks lechon manok store a few meters away. A fistfight between the two ensued. While the two were trading blows, accused-appellant ran to a Ford Fiera[2] parked nearby and got a foot-long butchers knife. He then rushed to where Ramon and Rodel were fighting. He stabbed Ramon in the back. The victim turned around to face accused-appellant but Rodel grabbed his hands and held them from behind. Accused-appellant then stabbed Ramon two more times, one in the upper right portion of the chest and another in the lower left portion of the chest. Thereafter, accused-appellant and Rodel boarded the Ford Fiera and drove away. Greatly weakened by the mortal wounds inflicted on him, Ramon managed to take a few steps before slumping on the pavement. His mother[3]and brother[4] soon arrived. He was brought to the University of Sto. Tomas Hospital but his wounds were fatal and he was declared dead on arrival. Dr. Manuel Lagonera[5] performed an autopsy on Ramons cadaver. His report stated:

- versus -

VICTORIANO M. ABESAMIS, Appellant. Promulgated: August 28, 2007 x------------------------------------------x DECISION CORONA, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision[1] dated July 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 21860 finding accusedappellant Victoriano M. Abesamis guilty of murder and meting out the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to him. This is a story of a game of billiards with a tragic ending. At around 6:00 p.m. of September 18, 1994, accused-appellant and his brother, Rodel Abesamis, were in the billiard hall located at Cruz corner Pepin Streets in Sampaloc, Manila. Accused-appellant played a game of billiards with Rogelio Mercado, Jr. called rotation where

EXTERNAL FINDINGS: 1. Stab wound, right anterior thorax, 51 inches from heel, 5 cms. from anterior midline, measuring 20x6 cms., directed slightly downwards backwards towards right lateral, transecting the sternum at the level of 1st intercostal space, incising the upper lobe of the right lung, transecting the right sub-clavian artery and ascending aorta. Depth 11 cms. 2. Stab wound, left lower anterior thorax, 43 inches from heel, 17 cms. from anterior midline, measuring 5x2 cms., directed upwards, backwards towards midline, lacerating the diaphragm, and spleen. Depth 13 cms. 3. Stab wound, left lower posterior thorax, 41 inches from heel[,] 10 cms. from posterior midline, incising the lower lobe of the left lung. Depth 10 cms. INTERNAL FINDINGS 1. Injuries to organs and tissues as indicated in the internal extensions of the stab wounds, with massive bleeding in the thoracic and abdominal cavities. 2. About one glassful of partially digested meaty materials with slight alcoholic odor was recovered from the stomach. CAUSE OF DEATH STAB WOUNDS.[6]

An information[7] for murder was filed against the brothers accusedappellant and Rodel in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41. It read: That on or about September 18, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederatingand helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one RAMON VILLO y MANGALINDAN thrice with a butchers knife, hitting him on the different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.[8]

However, accused-appellant and his brother remained at-large. Thus, the case was temporarily archived. It was reactivated when accused-appellant was arrested on March 26, 1996. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned. During the trial, he admitted stabbing Ramon with a butchers knife but claimed that he did so only to defend himself. He claimed that when he questioned the victim why ball number 3 was credited to Rogelio, he suddenly cussed him and threatened to kill him. When he tried to leave the billiards hall, Ramon blocked his way and tried to stab him with a balisong. He evaded the thrust and ran outside to get a butchers knife from the Ford Fiera. Ramon pursued him but he stood his ground. The victim tried to stab him again, this time hitting him in the left arm. He fought back and stabbed Ramon several times. He then boarded the Ford Fiera and drove towards Espaa Street in Manila. He encountered heavy traffic along the way and abandoned the vehicle somewhere in Forbes Street, Manila. He wanted to

surrender to the police but was advised by his relatives not to do so because Ramons relatives might kill him. He then went to his hometown in Calamba, Laguna. He managed to elude arrest until March 26, 1996. On April 1, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision.[9] It ruled that, while it was established that accused-appellant killed Ramon, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of either evident premeditation or treachery. Thus, the trial court found accusedappellant guilty of homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. It also ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as indemnity and P100,000 for other damages: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty of Homicide and[,] with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law[,] sentencing him to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years[,] eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum and maximum respectively and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 for the latters life and P100,000.00 for other damages, with legal interest from the time this decision has become final until the same is fully paid. SO ORDERED.[10]

completely unaware and caught off-guard when he suffered the first stab. He was defenseless when he was stabbed again. Thus, the appellate court found accused-appellant guilty of murder, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and certified the case to this Court for review:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the Appellant is hereby found guilty of Murder qualified by treachery defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. However, considering the penalty imposed on the Appellant, the Court hereby certifies this case to the Supreme Court for appropriate review. The Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to elevate all records of this case, including documentary and testimonial evidence, to the Supreme Court for appropriate review. SO ORDERED.[12]

Accused-appellant faults the appellate court for (1) disregarding his claim that he was only acting in self-defense when he inflicted the mortal wounds on Ramon and (2) finding that the killing was attended by treachery. In a letter dated June 12, 2007, Julio Arciaga, assistant director for prisons and security of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that accused-appellant was granted parole by the Board of Pardons and Parole (Board) on March 5, 2003 and released from the custody of the Bureau of Corrections on March 20, 2003.[13] We are thus confronted with the following issues:

On appeal, accused-appellants conviction was affirmed with modification by the CA.[11] It ruled that the evidence sufficiently established that Ramon was killed with treachery: he was first stabbed in the back while he was engaged in a fistfight with Rodel, then twice in front when he turned around to face accusedappellant, with his hands held behind him by Rodel. He was

1. 2. 3.

whether the grant of parole rendered this case moot; whether accused-appellant only acted in self-defense and whether the victim was killed with treachery.

The appeal has no merit.

article,[20] the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon commutation of sentence or any other reason. (emphasis supplied)

ACCUSED-APPELLANTS RELEASE ON PAROLE DID NOT RENDER THE CASE MOOT

Thus, accused-appellants civil liability subsists despite his release on parole. Moreover, the grant of parole would be improvident if the CA decision finding accused-appellant guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua were to be affirmed by this Court. In such a case, the determination of the Board that accused-appellant would have already served the minimum penalty imposed on him would turn out to be erroneous. Worse, in basing its determination of accused-appellants eligibility for parole on the penalty imposed in the RTC decision, the Board effectively ignored the decision of the CA. Furthermore, the Board violated its own rules disqualifying from parole those convicted of an offense punished with reclusion perpetua.[21] Thus, the Board should be warned in no uncertain terms for acting ultra vires, carelessly disregarding the CA decision and improvidently granting parole to accused-appellant. We will now proceed to consider the merits of the appeal.

The appeal was not mooted by accused-appellants release on parole. His release only meant that, according to the Board, he had already served the minimum penalty imposed on him[14] and that he was fitted by his training for release, that there [was] reasonable probability that [he would] live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that such release [would] not be incompatible with the welfare of society.[15] Should he violate the conditions of his parole, accused-appellant may be ordered rearrested, to serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence.[16] Parole refers to the conditional release of an offender from a correctional institution after he serves the minimum term of his prison sentence.[17] The grant thereof does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender. Parole is not one of the modes of totally extinguishing criminal liability under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.[18] Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. Similarly, accused-appellants release on parole did not extinguish his civil liability.[19] Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding

ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE

He who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of selfdefense bears the burden of proving: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of his victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the accused to prove the elements thereof clearly and convincingly.[22] While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.[23] If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded.[24] Here, both the trial and appellate courts found that there was no unlawful aggression on Ramons part and that, in fact, it was accused-appellant who was the unlawful aggressor. Thus, accused-appellants claim of self-defense cannot stand. The nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove accused-appellants claim of self-defense.[25] On this account, the appellate court correctly ruled that the accusedappellants version that he fought face to face with the victim was inconsistent with the fatal stab wound at the victims back. Moreover, the wounds inflicted by accused-appellant on the victim indicated a determined effort to kill and not merely to defend.[26] Accused-appellants failure to surrender, his escape to Laguna and hiding for more than a year until his eventual capture and arrest also contradicted his claim that he acted in self-defense. Flight is indicative of guilt. Furthermore, whether or not accused-appellant acted in selfdefense is a question of fact. It is a matter that is properly addressed to the trial court, not to this Court. In fact, the trial and appellate courts amply evaluated and carefully considered the issue.

Their identical conclusions were based on competent evidence. There is therefore no reason to disturb their findings.

TREACHERY ATTENDED THE KILLING OF THE VICTIM

According to the CA, Ramon was defenseless when accusedappellant stabbed him in the back. And he was completely at the mercy of accused-appellant when he was repeatedly stabbed in front while Rodel was holding his hands from behind. Thus, the CA ruled that Ramon was killed with treachery. We agree. Accused-appellant perpetrated the killing in such a manner that there was absolutely no risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might have made. Ramon was unarmed, had his back turned to accused-appellant and was fighting with another person when stabbed in different parts of the body. He was caught totally by surprise and did not even have a chinamans chance to survive the attack. As we ruled in People v. Fabrigas, Jr.:[27]

Treachery is present where the assailant stabbed the victim while the latter was grappling with another thus, rendering him practically helpless and unable to put up any defense. (emphasis supplied)

THE AWARD OF OTHER

DAMAGES WAS IMPROPER

for the mental anguish and distress she suffered for the death of her son.[36] Exemplary damages are not warranted because no aggravating circumstance attended the crime. Accordingly, the decision dated July 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21860 finding accused-appellant Victoriano M. Abesamis guilty of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand affirming the trial courts order for him to pay the heirs of Ramon VilloP50,000 as civil indemnity is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that he is ordered to pay said heirs P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as temperate damages. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the costs of suit. The grant of parole to accused-appellant by the Board of Pardons and Parole is hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of legal and factual basis. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to be REARRESTED immediately to forthwith serve the remaining period of his sentence. The members of the Board of Pardons and Parole are herebyWARNED to never again disregard its rules and the decision of the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED. RENATO C. CORONA

The trial court correctly awarded P50,000 to the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity for his death. This did not need any evidence or proof of damages. However, the award of P100,000 for other damages was wrong. Under the law, there are various kinds of damages.[28] They differ as to the necessity of proof of pecuniary loss, the purpose of and grounds for their award and the need for stipulation. Thus, the rule is that, in every case, trial courts must specify the award of each item of damages and make a finding thereon in the body of the decision.[29] Nonetheless, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[30] Hence, this Court may go through the records to determine the civil liability of accused-appellant. Moreover, an appeal in a criminal proceeding opens the entire case for review.[31] This includes a review of the indemnity and damages involved.[32] The award of actual damages is proper only if the actual amount of loss was proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.[33] It should be supported by receipts.[34] While the victims mother, Lolita Villo, testified that she incurred expenses in connection with the victims death (e.g., funeral and burial expenses), she failed to substantiate her claim. Thus, actual or compensatory damages cannot be awarded. Current jurisprudence, however, allows the grant of P25,000 as temperate damages when it appears that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss but the award thereof cannot be established with certainty.[35]Thus, Lolita may be given P25,000 as temperate damages. She is also entitled to an award of P50,000 moral damages

Associate Justice

PHILIPPINES VS. PAULINO FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 148810. November 18, 2003] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HEVER PAULINO y BIYAYA, appellant. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of DumagueteCity, Branch 34, in Criminal Case No. 12720 finding appellant Hever Paulino yBiyaya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00. For the death of the Leonarda Paulino, appellant was charged with murder in an Information that reads: That on 18 August 1996 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon in Sitio Tubod, Tamao, Tayasan,Negros Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation and without regard of the respect due to the offended party on account of her sex did then and there willfully, feloniously and unlawfully attack, assault and stone one Leonarda Paulino with a large rock thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal injury at her head which caused her death soon thereafter. [2] CONTRARY TO ART. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter trial on the merits ensued. The facts of the case are as follows: On August 18, 1996, at about 5:00 p.m., the victim and her daughters, Joy andMylene, were at their house when appellant passed by and asked for water to drink. Since he was the nephew of the victim, appellant was welcomed into the house and was given a glass of water by Mylene. He stayed at their porch while Mylene left for the house of her grandmother, Vivenciana Cantero, approximately 40 meters away. Moments later, the victim advised appellant to go home as his father might be looking for him. Appellant left the house angry at the victim for telling him to leave. Then, as the victim and Joy walked towards the house of Vivenciana Cantero to fetch Mylene, Joy saw appellant, who was only about 2 meters behind them, throw a rock at them hitting the head of the victim. The victim slumped to the ground with her face down while appellant ran away. Vivenciana heard the cries of Joy for help, and rushed to the scene. Her husband, Timoteo Cantero and Leonila Onayan, Joys aunt,
[1]

helped Vivenciana bring the victim to Bindoy District Hospital where she was treated. She was then transferred to the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital later that [3] night. The victim died the following day. Dr. Fe Herrera, a resident physician of Bindoy District Hospital, testified that the victim was unconscious when she was brought by the relatives to the hospital. The victim sustained two lacerated wounds, one on the left temporal region, about three centimeters long and the other one on the right parietal region, about six centimeters long. She referred the victim to [4] the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital for further treatment. Dr. Virgilio de Guzman, the government physician at the Negros OrientalProvincial Hospital who attended to the victim, testified that the injuries sustained by the victim were fatal and no amount of surgical intervention could have saved her. The victim died on August 19, 1996 at 8:30 a.m. due to cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary [5] to uncal herniation secondary to severe traumatic injury. For his part, appellant admits that he threw a stone at the victim but claims that he did so in self-defense. According to him, in the afternoon of August 18, 1996, he passed by the house of the victim and asked for water to drink. After Mylene Paulinogave him a glass of water, he asked her if she already had a boyfriend. Mylene did not reply but kicked him instead. She then went into the kitchen. Suddenly, the victim came out of the kitchen holding a scythe in her hand and shouted at him, I will kill you! I will chop you finely with the use of this scythe! Appellant ran away and the victim chased him. When the victim was about 3 meters away from him, he picked a stone and threw it at her to defend himself. After that, he ran towards their house. He did not see whether the victim was hit or not. That same night, he told his father what happened. The following morning, he went to the house of policeman RemegioTorres to surrender. He was accompanied to the police station of Tayasan, NegrosOriental, where he was investigated [6] and detained. After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, accused HEVER PAULINO is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, and the Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused is likewise directed to indemnify the heirs of victim Leonarda Paulino the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00). In line with Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, accusedHever Paulino is hereby ordered to be immediately detained at the New Bilibid Prison inMuntinlupa City, Metro Manila. The accused is, however, hereby given full credit for the entire period of his

preventive detention, provided that he has submitted himself to and observed the rules and regulations imposed by the detention center. No pronouncement as to costs. [7] SO ORDERED. Hence, this appeal, based on the following assignment of errors: I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER. II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. III. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING [8] CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. Appellants claim of self-defense is unavailing. Settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has [9] the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused. However, where the accused admits commission of the crime but invokes self-defense, the basic rule that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies on the prosecution is reversed, and the burden of proof is shifted to the accused to [10] prove the elements of his defense. It then becomes incumbent upon him to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it could not be [11] disbelieved after he had admitted the killing. Hence, if the accused fails to discharge the burden of proof, his conviction must ensue as a matter of [12] consequence. By invoking self-defense, appellant must prove: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the [13] person defending himself. Although all the three elements must concur, self-defense must rest firstly on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression has been proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. In other words in [14] self-defense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element. The question whether appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a [15] question of fact. In convicting appellant, the trial court succinctly held that:

In the case at bar, the court is not persuaded to believe the assertion of accused Hever Paulinothat he acted in self-defense when he threw a big stone at the head of victim Leornarda Paulino, which led to her death. As admitted by the accused on the witness stand, he had no previous quarrel or misunderstanding with victim Leonarda Paulino, nor with eyewitness Joy Paulino, or with any members of their family. There is no reason, therefore, why Leonarda would chase him with a scythe. There is also no reason at all why Joy Paulino would impute to the accused the heinous crime of Murder, if he did not commit the crime as charged. This is especially so, taking into account the fact that the accused, the victim and the eyewitness are relatives. Leonarda is the wife of the uncle of the accused, while Joy is the first cousin of the accused. Well-settled is the rule that where there is no showing that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by any improper motive, the presumption is that they are not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. Mere relationship of a witness to the victim does not impair her credibility as to render her testimony unworthy of credence where no improper motive can be ascribed to her for so testifying. The assertion of the accused that the victim chased him with a scythe is unworthy of belief as it is unnatural, coupled by the fact that it runs counter to the credible and straightforward testimony of eyewitness Joy Paulino xxx xxx xxx The fact that victim Leonarda Paulino advised the accused, who is the nephew of her husband, to go home because he has his own house and his father might be looking for him, does not constitute an unlawful aggression in contemplation of law. The victim simply showed concern for the accused [16] and his father. (Citations omitted) We have consistently held that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. The trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results [17] of the case. No such fact or circumstance obtains in the case at bar. Appellant failed to prove with satisfactory and convincing evidence that the victim was guilty of unlawful aggression. Self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by competent evidence but is seriously doubtful. Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense, [18] which is so easy to concoct but very difficult to verify. Appellants invocation of self-defense therefore deserves scant consideration.

Appellant next argues that if he were to be held criminally liable, it should only be for homicide. According to him, treachery was not alleged in the Information with specificity as to qualify the killing to murder. He cites as [19] bases for his argument the cases of People v. Alba and People [20] v. Manlansing, wherein the Court disregarded the qualifying circumstance of treachery for the reason that it failed to specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing to murder. In said cases, treachery was considered only a generic aggravating circumstance; thus, the crime committed was only homicide and not murder. We do not agree. [21] In the subsequent case of People v. Aquino, the Court clarified its ruling in the cases of Alba and Manlansing by holding that: [T]he Court has repeatedly held, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, that qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense. xxx xxx xxx Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that thex x x qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know x x x (the) qualifying and aggravating circumstances x x x. Thus, even the attendant circumstance itself, which is the essential element that raises the crime to a higher category, need not be stated in the language of the law. With more reason, the words aggravating/qualifying circumstances as used in the law need not appear in the Information, especially since these words are merely descriptive of the attendant circumstances and do not constitute an essential element of the crime. These words are also not necessary in informing the accused that he is charged of a qualified crime. What properly informs the accused of the nature of the crime charged is the specific allegation of the circumstances mentioned in the law that raise the crime to a higher category. The rules require the qualifying circumstances to be specifically alleged in the Information in order to comply with the constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is to allow the accused to prepare fully for his defense to prevent surprises during the trial. xxx xxx xxx Section 8 of Rule 110 requires that the Information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. (Emphasis supplied). Section 8 merely requires the Information to specify the circumstances. Section 8 does not require the use of the words qualifying or qualified by to refer to the circumstances which

raise the category of an offense. It is not the use of the words qualifying or qualified by that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher category. xxx xxx xxx We therefore reiterate that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the Information allege, specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law to qualify the offense. These circumstances need not be preceded by the words aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, or qualified by to be considered as qualifying circumstances. It is sufficient that these circumstances be specified in the Information to apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises during the trial. When the prosecution specifically alleges in the Information the circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving them beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher penalty mandated by law. This includes the death penalty in proper cases. In the case at bar, the Information clearly passes the test as it specified treachery as an attending circumstance in the commission of the crime. The allegation, although not preceded by the words aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, or qualified by, is sufficient to apprise appellant of the charge against him as to enable him to prepare fully his defense. The trial court correctly found the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the instant case. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation [22] on his part. In the case at bar, it was established that the victim had no reason to expect that she will be assaulted by appellant. She and her daughter Joy were just walking towards the house of Vivenciana to fetch her other daughter Mylene. The unexpected and sudden attack on Leonarda constitutes treachery because said assault rendered her unable and unprepared to defend herself. Appellants act of throwing a stone at the victim from behind shows that he deliberately adopted a mode of attack that would deprive the victim of an opportunity to defend herself. As to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, we agree with appellant that the same should be considered in his favor. The evidence shows that appellant surrendered to a person in authority a day after the

incident. This fact was not contested by the prosecution. Notwithstanding this, the presence of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance will not affect the penalty to be imposed upon appellant. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the same code states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties and the crime is attended by a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, the [23] lesser penalty shall be imposed. Consequently, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court. Finally, the trial court correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim. Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the [24] commission of murder or homicide. Likewise, the trial court was correct in not awarding actual, moral and exemplary damages because the prosecution failed to present competent evidence to prove the same. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the [25] actual amount of loss. Further, in murder cases, moral damages cannot [26] be granted in the absence of proof therefor and exemplary damages [27] without any aggravating circumstance. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 34, in Criminal Case No. 12720 finding appellant HeverPaulino y Biyaya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur,

PHILIPPINES V CLEMENTE CASTA SECOND DIVISION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, G.R. No. 172871

warning attack and stab DANILO CAMBA with a knife, inflicting upon the victim the following injuries to wit: stab wound, 3 inches in length, 4 inches in depth, located at the back, left side, 5 inches (level) below the armpit; Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairman, which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the CARPIO MORALES, heirs of Danilo Camba. TINGA, [3] VELASCO, JR., and CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. BRION, JJ. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge upon arraignment. The prosecution presented the following witnesses in the trial on the merits that [4] followed: Marlyn Cister; Modesto Cardona; Domingo Camba; Dionisia September 16, 2008 Camba; and Dr. Prudencio C. de Perio. The appellant took the witness stand for the defense. Marlyn Cister (Marlyn) testified that in the afternoon of August 20, 1989, while seated on the steps of the stairs of their house, she saw Danilo Camba (Danilo) and Modesto Cardona (Modesto) standing by the [5] roadside. Suddenly, the appellant appeared from behind Danilo and [6] stabbed him(Danilo). Danilo fell and died on the spot. Thereafter, the [7] appellant fled. Modesto narrated that at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon ofAugust 20, 1989, he was walking along the road at Sitio Makber, Goyoden, Bolinao, Pangasinan when Danilo emerged from a small road and joined him. Along the way, they met Marcos Gumangan (Marcos) and Angel Gatchalian (Angel) with whom they exchanged greetings; it was Danilos first time to visit Goyoden after several years. They all walked towards the west with Marcos and Angel walking behind them. Suddenly, the appellant appeared from behind Danilo and stabbed him using a double-bladed [8] knife. Danilo turned around and then fell; the appellant fled still holding the [9] knife he used in stabbing Danilo. On cross-examination, he testified that he was at about two (2) arms length away from Danilo when he was stabbed, while their other [10] companions were behind them. Senior Police Officer I Domingo Camba (SPO1 Camba), a member of the Bolinao Police Station, narrated that on August 20, 1989, Barangay stab wound at the left forearm, 3 cm. length and 1 inch depth.

versus

CLEMENTE CASTA yCAROLINO, Accused-Appellant.

Promulgated:

x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION BRION, J.: This is an appeal from the March 10, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01217. The CA affirmed the [2] August 18, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55, Alaminos, Pangasinan, finding the appellant Clemente Casta y Carolino (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
[1]

ANTECEDENT FACTS The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of murder under an Information that states: That on or about the 20 day of August, 1989 in the afternoon, at barangay Goyoden, municipality of Bolinao, province of Pangasinan, New[sic]Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and by means of treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, suddenly and without
th

Captain Igmedio Gatchalian went to the Bolinao Police Station to report the stabbing of Danilo by the appellant; the incident was entered in the police [11] blotter as Entry No. 4300. He and other police officers promptly went to Barangay Goyoden and conducted an on-the-spot investigation at the crime [12] scene. The next day (August 21, 1989), the appellants uncle came and told him that the appellant was at his (the appellants) house. He went with the appellants uncle to the appellants house where the appellant gave himself up. He forthwith brought the appellant to the police station for [13] investigation. At the police station, the appellant confessed to the killing of Danilo after being informed of his constitutional rights and in the presence of counsel, a [14] certain Atty. Antonio V. Tiong, The confession was reduced to writing and [15] was signed by the appellant and Atty. Tiong. Dionisia Camba (Dionisia), Danilos widow, testified that her husband was an employee of the Office of the Register of Deeds, Lingayen, Pangasinan at the time of his death, earning more than P3,000.00 a [16] month. They have four (4) children and that her husband was the sole breadwinner of the family. According to her, she spent a total of P13,500.00 [17] for the funeral and burial expenses of her husband but the receipts for [18] these expenses have all been lost. Dr. Prudencio C. de Perio (Dr. de Perio), the Municipal Health Officer of Bolinao, Pangasinan, narrated that he conducted an autopsy on the [19] remains of Danilo at the request of the police, and made the following findings: AUTOPSY REPORT xxxx III. Findings A male cadaver undergoing rigor mortis, around 56 in height, and around 145 lbs. in weight. - Stab wound, 3 inches in length, 4 inches in depth, located at the back, left side, 5 inches (level) below the armpit. - Left lung injured and also the heart, causing massive hemorrhages. - Stab wound at the left forearm, 3 cm. length and 1 inch depth. [20] Wound is horizontal.

According to Dr. de Perio, the victims cause of death was shock, due to [21] massive hemorrhage brought about by the stab wounds. He added that the stab wounds were caused by a sharp-pointed instrument such as a [22] dagger. The appellant gave a different version of the events which the RTC summarized as follows x x x that on August 20, 1989 in the afternoon, he went to Sitio Matber, Goyoden, Bolinao, to buy fish; that before reaching the place where he will [23] buy fish, he met a person whom he did not know. This person called him by waving his hand and pointing to him. He responded to the call of this person by approaching him but when he was near him, this person boxed him but he was not hit. They grappled with each other and he did not notice if there were other persons around them; that he then noticed that his knife was already bloody so he ran away; that there was no person around that he noticed when he saw his knife bloody; that at that time, he did not know the identity of the person with whom he grappled; that when he was already [24] detained, he learned that the person was Danilo Camba. The accused also declared that he was not arrested by the Police, but he surrendered to Pat. Domingo Camba on August 21, 1989 to whom his uncle relayed the information that he wanted to surrender and Pat. Camba fetched him. While under Police custody, he was investigated by Pat. Camba and said investigation was in writing and signed by him (Exhibit D, D-1 and D-2), but he said that the document was not his statement although it bears his [25] signature. He was forced to sign the investigation because he was afraid of the investigator who bears the same family name as the victim but he [26] does not know if they are related; x x x x On cross-examination, he declared that he did not plan to kill the victim and [27] his killing was accidental. He gave his affidavit in the Bolinao dialect in questions and answers (Exhibits D and series); that all the signatures bearing his name are his (Exhibit D-4, D-5, D-6); that this document has an English translation (Exhibit F); x x x that he admitted on direct examination that he stabbed Danilo Camba and he threw the knife into the sea when he rode on a motorboat and was confused; that he knew that the date when he stabbed Danilo Camba was August 20, 1989 and in the afternoon but he did [28] no know the time. On re-direct examination, the accused declared that the reason for his stabbing Danilo Camba was that when they met on the road and Camba was drunk, without any provocation on his part, Camba positioned to box him so he drew his knife and stabbed him; that he did not know the reason why Camba wanted to box him; that at that time, Camba was with one

Fedelino Gatchalian; that he had no previous grudge with Camba because he did not know him; that he did not see the victim with any weapon and he did not know if he was armed or not; and that he is bigger than [29] Camba. [Footnotes referring to the pertinent parts of the record supplied ] The RTC convicted the appellant of the crime of murder in its decision of August 18, 1999 as follows: Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby renders judgment, finding the accused Clemente Casta y Carolino, of Barangay Goyoden, Bolinao, Pangasinan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of Danilo Camba, of the same place, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensation for the death of the victim, P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and P13,000.00 as actual damages. With costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
[30]

by the CA. Despite the enhanced persuasive effect of the initial RTC factual ruling and the results of the CAs appellate factual r eview, we nevertheless fully scrutinized the records of this case as the penalty of reclusion perpetua that the lower courts imposed on the accused demands no less [34] than this kind of scrutiny. A striking feature of this case is that the appellant did not deny that he stabbed Danilo. He expressly made this admission in his testimony of January 18, 1995: ATTY. ROMIE V. BRAGA: Q: In your direct-examination, you admitted having stabbed the deceased Danilo Camba, will you tell the Court where was that knife which you used in stabbing Danilo Camba? CLEMENTE CASTA: A: Q: I left it in the sea, sir. You mean you threw it into the sea? Yes, sir.

The records of this case were originally transmitted to this Court on [31] appeal. Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, we endorsed the case [32] and its records to the CA for appropriate action and disposition. The CA, in a decision dated March 10, 2006, affirmed the RTC decision in toto. In his brief, 1. 2.
[33]

A:

Q: Will you tell the Court why you threw the knife which you used in stabbing Danilo Camba into the sea? A: Because I rode in a motor boat and then I threw it into the sea, sir. And will you tell the Court why you threw or drop it into the sea? Because I was confused, sir.

the appellant argues that the RTC erred Q:

in convicting him of the crime of murder; and in imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

A:

THE COURTS RULING We resolve to deny the appeal but we modify the penalty imposed and the amount of the awarded indemnities. Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence An established rule in appellate review is that the trial courts factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. These actual findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed

Q: Now will you tell us what time was it more or less when you stabbedDanilo Camba? A: Q: A: I do not know the time, sir. But it was in the afternoon of August 20, 1989, is that correct? Yes, sir. x x x
[35]

[Emphasis ours]

This in-court admission confirms the separate admission he made at the Bolinao police station on August 22, 1989 in the presence of counsel, Atty. Antonio V. Tiong. The petitioner sought to exculpate himself by claiming that the stabbing was an act of self-defense. In his testimony of May 3, 1994, he claimed: ATTY. TEOFILO A. HUMILDE: Q: After Gumangan left and you continued walking, were you able to reach the place where you were to buy fish? CLEMENTE CASTA: xxx A: Q: A: No, sir. Why? I met the person whom I dont know, sir. xxx Q: What did you do when you saw that person by the roadside after you have seen Gumangan? A: None, sir, he called me. xxx Q: you? A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Will you tell us what you heard when you said that person called

xxx Q: When you grappled with each other, who was the first who grappled against whom? A: He, sir.

Q: What happened when he grappled with you and you grappled with him, what happened next? A: I did not notice that my knife has already blood so I ran away.

Q: Did you come to know him later, that person whom you grappled with? A: Q: A: When I was in prison, sir. Who was that? Danilo Camba, sir.
[36]

[Emphasis ours]

Like the RTC, we do not believe that the appellant acted in self-defense. As a rule, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, when the accused admits the killing and, by way of justification, pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts; he must then show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense. For that purpose, he must rely on the strength [37] of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions case. Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code spells out the elements that the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence to successfully plead self-defense. The Article provides: Art. 11. Justifying Circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur: First. Unlawful aggression;

He called me by waving his hand and then he pointed me [sic]. After that, did you respond to his hand-waving by getting near? When I got near him, he boxed me, sir. Were you hit when he boxed you? No, sir. What happened next after that person boxed you? We fought each other by grappling, sir.

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. xxx There is unlawful aggression when the peril to ones life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement to establish selfdefense that unlawful aggression must be present. It is a condition sine qua non; there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim [38] commits unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. We find that the appellant miserably failed to prove that he had to defend himself against an unlawful aggression. Aside from his own claim (which we find under the circumstances to be self-serving), the appellant did not present any other evidence to corroborate his claim that the victim boxed him when they met on the road in Sitio Makber, Barangay Goyoden, Bolinao, Pangasinan. As against his bald claim, two eye-witnesses - Marlyn andModesto saw no unlawful aggression by the victim against the appellant. Marlyn testified that at the time he was stabbed, Danilo was merely standing near the roadside fronting her (Marlyns) house. Modesto, on the other hand, narrated that, he, Danilo and several others were simply walking slowly along the Sitio Makber, Goyoden road towards the west when the appellant suddenly approached from behind and stabbed Danilo. We find no reason to disbelieve these straightforward narration of the events surrounding the stabbing that led to Danilos death. Nor do we see anything on the record showing any improper motive that would lead the witnesses to testify as they did. In fact, the appellant never imputed any such motive on Marlyn and Modesto. The established rule, laid down in an already long line of cases, is that in the absence of evidence showing any reason or motive for the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify, their testimony can be given [39] full faith and credit. Thus, no actual or imminent threat to the appellants life or limb existed when he stabbed Danilo to death. The Crime Committed Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of murder as follows:

Article 248. Murder. Any person who not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery x x x x
[40]

Treachery, the qualifying circumstance alleged against the appellant, exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the [41] offended party might make. This definition sets out what must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate, the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime [42] without risk to the aggressor. The evidence in the case shows that Danilo was by the roadside when the appellant, wielding a deadly weapon - a double-bladed knife - suddenly appeared from behind and stabbed him. The unsuspecting victim was hit at the back below the left armpit, puncturing his heart and lungs. As the witnesses testified, the attack was sudden and while the victim was in an unguarded position: from his rear so that the unsuspecting victim had practically no chance to defend himself. The location of the thrust at the left side, below the armpit shows that the heart was the targeted organ to immediately incapacitate the victim and render him unable to defend against or respond to the attack. As the evidence shows, the victim simply fell immediately after being stabbed, in the way that a raging bull immediately crumbles to its knees, spent and harmless, upon being hit by the matadors sword thrust, delivered from above, between its shoulder blades, targeting the heart. These mode, manner and execution of the attack, to our mind, bespeak of treachery. Voluntary Surrender Voluntary surrender, properly undertaken, is a mitigating circumstance that lowers the imposable penalty. It is present when the following elements concur: a) the offender has not been actually arrested; b) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent; and c) the surrender is voluntary. To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous

and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense attendant to the [43] efforts of searching for and capturing him. We find all the requisites present in this case. The appellant testified that he had asked his uncle, Ediom Casta, to go to the police to signify his intention to surrender. At around 7:00 oclock in the morning of August 21, 1989, SPO1 (then Patrolman) Camba came to his house to bring him back to the Bolinao Police Station for investigation. The appellants testimony that he voluntarily surrendered was corroborated by the November 21, 1991testimony of SPO1 Camba, which we quote: ATTY. ROMIE V. BRAGA Q: Now, as police investigator, will you inform the Court if Clemente Casta, the accused herein, ever presented himself to your office? DOMINGO CAMBA A: Yes, sir.

Based on these considerations, we hold that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in appellants favor. The Proper Penalty The Information in this case indicates that the crime of murder was committed by the appellant on August 20, 1989 which was before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 on December 31, 1993 amending Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code on murder, raising the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death. Prior to its amendment the penalty for the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. In light of the greater penalty that attaches under the amendment, the previous penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death will have to be imposed in order not to run afoul of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Under Section 22 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. An ex post facto law, among others, is one that changes the penalty and inflicts a greater punishment than what the law annexed to the crime when [46] committed - the situation that would obtain if the amendment under Republic Act No. 7659 would be applied. Considering that the appellant has in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender with no aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, i.e., reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Under the Indeterminate Sentence [47] Law, the maximum sentence shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years) and the minimum shall be taken from the next lower penalty, which is prision mayor maximum toreclusion temporal medium (10 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Civil Liability The RTC awarded the amount of P13,000.00 to the victims heirs as actual damages in light of established jurisprudence that allows only [48] expenses duly supported by receipts as proof of actual damages. This RTC ruling has however been overtaken by our rulings in the landmark [49] cases of People v. Abrazaldo and People v. [50] Villanueva. In Abrazaldo, we ruled thatwhere the amount of the actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of supporting and duly presented receipts but evidence confirming the heirs entitlement to actual damages, temperate damages in the amount ofP25,000.00 may be

Q: And in relation with this incident and that appearance of Clemente Casta in your office, was it reflected and entered in your police blotter? A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, will you go over your police blotter and read into the record the fact of the appearance of Clemente in your office in relation with this incident? A: On entry 4302 21 August, 1989 07 hundred hours Clemente Casta y Carolino, 21 years old, single, fisherman, resident of Goyuden Bolinao, Pangasinan was brought into this station for investigation following his voluntary surrender to have allegedly killed Danilo Camba on or about [44] 1500 hundred hours 20 August 1989 in Goyuden this municipality. That the appellant surrendered only in the morning of August 21, 1989(or a day after the stabbing incident) does not diminish nor affect the voluntariness of his surrender. For voluntary surrender to mitigate an offense, it is not required that the accused surrender at the first [45] opportunity. Here, the appellant went voluntarily went with SPO1 Camba to the police station within a day after the killing to own up to the killing. Thus, the police did not devote time and effort to the investigation of the killing and to the search and capture of the assailant.

awarded. This ruling was reiterated, with slight modification in Villanueva, where we held that when the actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, we can nevertheless award temperate damages of P25,000.00. Thus, the heirs entitlement is P25,000.00 of temperate damages. We also modify the award of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages which the RTC lumped together. Moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder and homicide without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. We find the award of P50,000.00 as moral [51] damages in order in accordance with established jurisprudence. The award of exemplary damages is justified by the duly proven qualifying circumstance of treachery; when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the [52] New Civil Code. We cannot award loss of earning capacity to the victims heirs since no documentary evidence was presented to substantiate this claim. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. While there are exceptions to the rule, these exceptions do not apply as the victim, Danilo, was an employee of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan when he died; he was not a worker earning less than the minimum wage under the [53] prevailing labor laws. We affirm the P50,000.00 death indemnity awarded to the victims [54] heirs, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM theMarch 10, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 01217 with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years four (4) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal maximum, as maximum; (2) moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000.00; (3) exemplary damages is REDUCED to P25,000.00; (4) the award of actual damages is DELETED; and

(5) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY the victims heirs the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages. Costs against the appellant Clemente Casta. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. NO. 173824 : August 28, 2008] PETER TARAPEN y CHONGOY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 26636, dated 31 January 2006, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting petitioner Peter Chongoy Tarapen of the crime of Homicide. On 9 June 2000, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Baguio City with Frustrated Homicide for attacking and assaulting James Lacbao Pangoden.3 The day after, the victim died from the injuries he sustained. As a consequence, an amended information was filed on 13 June 2000 charging petitioner with Homicide allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 8th day of June, 2000, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, and assault JAMES LACBAO PANGODEN, by hitting his head twice with a steel shovel, thereby inflicting upon the latter: Cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cranio-cerebral injury, which directly caused his death.4 The case was raffled to Branch 3. When arraigned on 15 June 2000, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.5

On 10 October 2000, the pre-trial conference of the case was terminated with the trial court issuing its pre-trial order.6 The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Patricia S. Pangoden7; (2) Molly J. Linglingen8; (3) Silmana Linglingen9; (4) Virginia Costales10; (5) Dr. Lindo Mensalvas11; (6) Dr. Rizal Leo Cala12; and (7) Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Juanito Meneses II.13 The collective testimonies of the witnesses revealed: At around 7:00 to 7:30 in the morning of 8 June 2000, a dump truck driven by Jimmy Pugoy arrived at Zandueta St., Baguio City, to collect garbage. He was accompanied by petitioner and Edmond Ferrer. The garbage truck came from lower Zandueta St. and proceeded to upper Zandueta St. Upon reaching the Hilltop Market, the truck turned around. During this time, vendors, including the victim James Pangoden, Molly J. Linglingen, Silmana Linglingen and Virginia Costales were peddling their wares along said street. Petitioner alighted from the truck and signaled to the driver to move slowly. Despite guiding the truck, said vehicle ran over the eggplants being sold by Virginia Costales. Petitioner picked up the vegetables and threw them towards the place where James was. This angered James because the flowers he was selling were soiled. An exchange of words ensued between petitioner and James.14Petitioner went to the back of the dump truck and got a shovel. He then moved in front of the truck where James was. While James was facing downwards, petitioner, coming from behind and holding the shovel with two hands, struck James on the head with the same, causing him to fall to the ground in a squatting position. As soon as James raised his head, petitioner hit the former's head again with the shovel.15 Petitioner then ran away. James was brought to the Baguio General Hospital & Medical Center (BGHMC) in a taxi. The wife of James, Patricia Pangoden, arrived at the BGHMC and saw her husband in the Emergency Room. Dr. Rizal Leo Cala refused to operate on her husband, saying that it was already hopeless. She then requested for the transfer of her husband to the Saint Louis University (SLU) Hospital. The request was approved, and her husband was transferred to SLU Hospital at

1:30 p.m. James was operated on, and Patricia was told that her husband had no more chance to live. She was advised to bring home James; otherwise, they would just be spending so much. Patricia brought her husband to his hometown in Namatugan, Sudipen, La Union, where he expired on 10 June 2000.16 Patricia S. Pangoden testified on the events that happened to her husband from the time he was bought to the hospital until the time he died. She also testified on the expenses she incurred as a result of the incident.17 Molly J. Linglingen and Silmana Linglingen, mother and daughter, and co-vendors of James at Zandueta St., testified that they saw petitioner get a shovel from the rear of the garbage truck, approach James from behind, and hit him with it twice on the head. Virginia Costales recounted the events prior to her seeing James already slumped on the ground. She narrated that when the garbage truck was going down Zandueta St., petitioner got off from the truck and guided it. The truck ran over the eggplants she was selling. Petitioner picked them up and threw them to where James was. James, she said, got angry because the flowers he was selling were soiled. Petitioner and James exchanged words. While the two were exchanging words, she transferred her sack of eggplants to a nearby place. It was then that she heard people shouting. When she turned around, she saw James already slumped on the ground oozing with blood. Dr. Lindo Mensalvas and Dr. Rizal Leo Cala, physicians at the SLU Hospital and BGHMC, respectively, attended to the victim. They respectively issued a medico-legal certificate containing the injuries sustained by the victim.18 SPO2 Juanito Meneses II, assigned at Police Community Precinct 1, Baguio City, was the investigator to whom the case of petitioner was turned over. At around 10:00 a.m. of 8 June 2000, the Division Chief of the General Services Office of Baguio City turned the petitioner over to him. SPO2 Meneses disclosed that petitioner admitted to having inflicted injuries on the victim. The police officer disclosed that he did not notice any injury on Peter's body

or face. He added that Peter did not request any medical treatment that morning. He brought Peter to the BGHMC for possible identification, but the victim was still unconscious. Upon going back to the police station, he took the statement of the victim's wife. He likewise identified the steel shovel 19 allegedly used in killing the victim. The prosecution formally offered Exhibits "A" to "H," inclusive, with sub-markings which the trial court admitted.20 For the defense, the following took the witness stand: (1) Jimmy Pugoy,21 (2) petitioner Peter Tarapen,22 (3) Edmond Ferrer,23 and (4) Dr. Maryjane Tipayno.24 The version of the defense as culled from these witnesses is as follows: Jimmy Pugoy, petitioner Peter Tarapen and Edmond Ferrer are garbage collectors employed by the General Services Office of the City of Baguio. At around 3:00 a.m. of 8 June 2000, they started collecting garbage. At around 7:00 a.m., they arrived at Zandueta St. Half of said street was almost occupied by vendors who were selling various goods. In order to collect garbage piled on said street, the truck driven by Jimmy Pugoy had to go up the street then go down. While going down the street, Pugoy kept on honking the truck's horn, causing the vendors selling near the garbage pile to move away, but some of their goods were left behind. Ferrer alighted and started filling up the garbage basket with the use of a shovel. Peter saw a sack of eggplants pinned under the truck being removed by its owner. Peter helped the old woman carry the sack to the side of the road when, all of a sudden, James punched him hard on the right ear, causing him to fall and roll down the street. Peter ended up sitting on the ground. As he was getting up with his hands raised, James punched him again. Peter protested, saying he did not do anything wrong. James answered: "You people from the government are showoff[s]." Peter, still dizzy while getting up and still with hands raised, was kicked by James on the left side of the body. Peter fell on the road and rolled anew.25Feeling very dizzy, Peter tried to pick up something to throw at James to stop him, because he (Peter) thought James would kill him. At this moment, Edmond

was coming to the aid of Peter, who was in front of the truck. Edmond carried with him the shovel he used to collect garbage. Edmond tried to help Peter stand. He put down the shovel on the ground. While in a sitting position, Peter was able to get hold of the shovel and swing it, hitting James who was approaching him and about to strike with a clenched fist. With the help of the shovel, Peter stood up and tried to leave. When James followed Peter, the latter hit him again with the shovel. Peter saw James boarding a taxi. After feeling a little better, Peter walked to his office and reported the matter to his supervisor. Peter, accompanied by his supervisor, voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities. Per his request, he was brought to the hospital where he met James's wife who hit him on the back. To avoid trouble, he was brought to the City Jail. Upon posting bail, he went to the hospital for treatment. Jimmy Pugoy testified on what he allegedly saw that fateful morning. He recounted that while he was maneuvering the garbage truck he was driving at Zandueta St., he saw petitioner Peter Tarapen go down the truck and help an old woman, who was in front of the truck, carry a sack of eggplants. At that moment, a person (James) went near Peter and suddenly punched him on the face, causing him to fall and roll down the street. When Peter stood up with his hands raised, James punched him again on the face, making the latter fall and roll again. Peter stood up a second time with his hands up. This time, he said, James delivered a flying kick, which hit Peter on the stomach. Peter fell and rolled once more. After this, Jimmy no longer saw what happened, because the people had gathered, and he parked the truck. After parking the vehicle, what he saw was a man lying on the ground. He went back to the office and gave a report. Edmond Ferrer narrated that at around 7:00 a.m. of 8 July 2000, he was with Jimmy Pugoy and Peter Tarapen at Zandueta St. collecting garbage. He was with Peter hanging at the back of the truck. When the vehicle stopped, Peter alighted and went in front of the vehicle. Jimmy also went down, taking with him the shovel and the garbage basket. While Peter was settling some things in front, he placed the garbage inside the basket. After filling up the basket and before he could load it into the truck, he heard people

shouting in front of the vehicle. As there was a commotion, he proceeded to the front of the vehicle carrying the shovel he was using. He saw Peter sitting on the ground shaking his head. He went near Peter, put down the shovel and tried to help him stand up. A person approached and was about to hit Peter, when the latter got hold of the shovel, swung it and hit this person. The person remained standing. Peter was able to stand and was turning around to leave, but the person whom he hit with the shovel was about to follow him in order to punch him. Peter hit this person one more time, causing the latter to fall down. Seeing Peter leave, he also left. Petitioner testified that at the time the incident subject of this case happened, he was in Zandueta St. to collect garbage. He was riding the garbage truck driven by Jimmy Pugoy. Since the driver was continuously blowing the horn of the vehicle, he went down the truck and saw a sack of eggplants under the vehicle. The owner of the sack of eggplants approached him and asked him to help her. He helped the old woman remove the sack under the truck and carry it to the side of the road. After that, he said someone (James) punched him at the right side of the head, which caused him to fall and sit on the road. As he was getting up with his hands raised, James said, "Nalastog kayo nga taga-gobierno," and then punched him for the second time. He was a little dizzy and was again getting up when he was kicked on the left side of his body. Feeling very dizzy, he tried to pick up something to throw at James. While sitting, he got hold of a shovel which he swung, hitting James. Peter said he got up to run away, but James followed him. It was then that Peter hit him again with the shovel. He went to their office and he was accompanied by his supervisor in surrendering to the police. He added that he asked the policemen to bring him to the hospital, because his ear was aching. It was on 16 July 2000 that he was able to have a medical examination of his ears. Dr. Maryjane Tipayno, physician at the BGHMC, testified that she performed an audio logic test on petitioner on 16 June 2000. She found out that petitioner had mild hearing loss on the left ear and severe hearing loss on the right ear.26 She said that the hearing condition of petitioner could not have been self-inflicted. She explained that the hearing loss in both ears could have started years before. She added that it was Dr. Vinluan who interviewed

the petitioner, and that it was petitioner who told him that the hearing loss in his right ear was due to a blunt trauma. After formally offering Exhibits "1" and "2" and with the admission thereof by the trial court, the defense rested its case.27 As rebuttal witnesses, the prosecution presented Molly Linglingen, who said that petitioner was standing up when he hit James twice on the head with a shovel. He explained that James was standing with his back turned, when Peter came from behind and hit him.28 On 20 June 2002, the trial court convicted petitioner of Homicide in a decision the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Peter Tarapen GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Homicide and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City from Fourteen (14) Years as Minimum to Twenty (20) Years as Maximum. Peter Tarapen shall also indemnify private complainant Patricia Pangoden the following amounts: One Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Eighty Pesos and 05/100 (P195,080.05), representing the expenses for hospitalization, funeral and burial; Moral Damages to Patricia Pangoden in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) and Death Indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and Loss of Earning Capacity in the amount of Three Million One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Pesos (P3,680,800.05), plus costs of suit against the accused.29 The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Molly J. Linglingen, Silmana Linglingen and Virginia Costales as against the testimonies of defense witnesses Jimmy Pugoy, petitioner Peter Tarapen and Edmond Ferrer. The trial court found the prosecution's version of the incident credible. The trial court said Virginia Costales saw the first part of the incident, which was the heated argument between petitioner and the victim involving the victim's soiled goods, while Molly J. Linglingen and Silmana Linglingen witnessed the second part of the incident when petitioner went to the back portion of the garbage truck and got a shovel with which he hit the victim from the back, twice on the head, resulting in his death. Having had the opportunity to observe

them, it was convinced that they were telling the truth vis - -vis the defense witnesses who were lying, as can be seen from their hesitant answers and evasive looks when they testified for the petitioner who was a co-employee. The trial court likewise did not appreciate self-defense in favor of petitioner, who struck the unarmed victim from the back, twice on the head. On 8 July 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,30 which the trial court denied on 16 July 2002.31 On 23 July 2002, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.32 In an Order33 dated 29 July 2002, the trial court, finding the notice of appeal to have been seasonably filed, forwarded the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. On 31 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court convicting petitioner Peter Chongoy Tarapen of the crime of Homicide, the decretal portion reading: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision dated June 20, 2002 of Branch 3 of the Regional trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 17792-R finding accused-appellant Peter Tarapen y Chongoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is AFFIRMED with modification. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, AS MINIMUM, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, AS MAXIMUM, and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim James Lacbao Pangoden the following amounts: P51,549.25 in actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the sum of P1,960,200.00 representing lost earnings.34 On 8 March 2006, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,35 on which the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment.36 On 6 July 2006, the Court of Appeals denied said motion.37

On 31 August 2006, petitioner, via registered mail, filed a Petition for Review with this Court, seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.38 In our Resolution39 dated 2 October 2006, respondent People of the Philippines, through the OSG, was required to file its Comment on the petition. After three motions for extension to file comment on the petition, which were granted by this Court, the OSG filed its Comment on 5 February 2007.40 On 12 March 2007, petitioner was required to file a Reply to the Comment, which he did on 11 December 2007.41 On 18 February 2008, the Court resolved to give due course to the Petition for Review on Certiorari and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. Petitioner and respondent filed their respective memoranda on 2 May 2008 and 10 April 2008.42 Petitioner assails his conviction, arguing that both trial courts: I. Erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses, despite the grave inconsistencies in their testimonies and not considering the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense showing manifest bias against the accused. II. Erred in not acquitting the accused when the defense had sufficiently proved the existence of facts proving that indeed the accused was defending himself from James Pangoden. III. Erred in not acquitting the accused based on reasonable doubt.43 On the first assigned error, petitioner contends that the testimonies of Molly and Silmana Linglingen that there was no prior quarrel or exchange of words between petitioner and James before the former hit the latter with a shovel, are contrary to human experience, because petitioner could not have taken the life of James, whom he did not personally know, for no reason at all.

This contention is untenable. A review of the testimonies of both Molly and Silmana Linglingen shows they never said that petitioner and the victim did not have any prior quarrel or exchange of words before Peter hit James with the shovel. What they said was that they never witnessed any quarrel or exchange of words between Peter and James. They, however, declared in unison that they saw petitioner get a shovel from the back of the garbage truck and, coming from behind, twice struck James on the head with it. Both Molly and Silmana Linglingen never witnessed the events prior to Peter's act of getting the shovel. This void was substantially filled up by the testimony of Virginia Costales, who actually witnessed the altercation between the petitioner and the victim. Through the testimony of Mrs. Costales, it became clear why petitioner got the shovel, which he used in striking James twice on the head. By combining the testimonies of the three ladies, a picture of the incident has been wholly painted. The rage that Peter had in him was brought about by his squabble with James. The defense cannot, therefore, claim that Peter took the life of James for no reason at all. Petitioner brands Molly and Silmana Linglingen as biased witnesses, thus, unreliable, because they were town mates and covendors of the victim. The fact that these two witnesses were the victim's town mates and co-vendors did not necessarily make them biased witnesses. It is well-settled that the mere relationship of a witness to the victim does not impair the witness' credibility. On the contrary, a witness' relationship to a victim of a crime would even make his or her testimony more credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative, or a friend as in this case, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.44 A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false.45 To warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.46

The friendship of Molly and Silmana Linglingen with the victim, per se, did not impair their credibility. We, like both lower courts, are convinced that they were telling the truth. Moreover, the defense failed to show any evidence that prosecution witnesses Molly and Silmana Linglingen had improper or evil motives to testify falsely against petitioner. This being the case, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. The defense accuses the prosecution witnesses of deliberately suppressing material evidence favorable to the petitioner. It thus argues that it may be safely presumed that such evidence, having been willfully suppressed, would be adverse if produced. We do not find any suppression of evidence by the prosecution. The defense failed to specify which evidence was suppressed. It simply made a general statement that the prosecution witnesses allegedly did not tell the truth and thus deliberately suppressed material evidence favorable to the petitioner. The adverse presumption of suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.47 In the case at bar, the prosecution witnesses who allegedly suppressed material evidence were presented in court and were cross-examined by the defense counsel. How then can the defense claim there was suppression? The defense counsel was able to question these witnesses, but failed to elicit the answer he wanted or needed to hear for the exoneration of his client. The defense attacks the credibility of Virginia Costales by pointing out that her testimony in court, that she did not see petitioner and the victim engage in a fistfight, contradicts her declaration in her sworn statement that that two engaged in a fistfight. Such inconsistency will not discredit her. It is settled that certain discrepancies between declarations made in an affidavit and those made on the witness stand seldom could discredit the declarant. Sworn statements, being takenex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for various reasons, sometimes from partial suggestion or for want of suggestion and inquiries.

They are generally inferior to the testimony of the witness given in open court. Our case law is unequivocal in saying that the testimony of a witness prevails over an affidavit. In short, affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open-court declarations; or, more bluntly stated, whenever there is inconsistency between an affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight.48 The Court has consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects that would justify the reversal of a judgment of conviction.49 In this case, when Mrs. Costales was confronted with this contradiction, she explained that she never told the police that the petitioner and the victim had a fistfight. What she said was they had a quarrel; that is, they faced each other and exchanged words. The defense tries to destroy the version of Molly and Silmana Linglingen that the victim was hit from behind by arguing that same is not corroborated by medical findings. Molly and Silmana Linglingen's claim that James was hit on the right side of the head was, according to the defense, negated by the findings of Dr. Mensalvas that James suffered injuries on the "left frontoparietal and left frontotemporo parietal" areas of his head. The findings of Dr. Mensalvas mean that James was facing Peter when hit by the shovel contrary to the prosecution's claim that James was hit by Peter from behind. We do not agree. The defense relies too much on the findings made by Dr. Lindo Mensalvas and completely omits the findings made by Dr. Rizal Leo Cala. It must not be forgotten that the victim was brought to two hospitals where the attending doctors issued separate medicolegal certificates. The medico-legal certificate50 issued by Dr. Cala of the BGHMC was marked Exh. "D." The one issued by Dr. Mensalvas was marked Exh. "C." On the witness stand, Dr. Cala read his findings as follows: "Skull Fracture" meaning there is a break in the skull bone, "Linear" which is a straight line fracture, "parietal" area on the

right side of the head, then we have "Epidural hematoma" it is a blood clot at the right side of the head.51 When cross-examined, he explained his findings as follows: q Both injuries you found were on the front parietal area? a Yes, Sir. q Will you please demonstrate to us?
cra lawlib rary cra lawlib ra ry

Dr. Mensalvas, on the other hand, testified that the victim sustained four injuries, three of which were on the left side of the head and one on the right side. The medical certificate he issued states that the victim was confined for the following injuries: 1. ACCI; CEREBRAL CONTUSSION 2. EPIDURAL HEMATOMA, LEFT FRONTOPARIETAL AREA 3. SUTURED SCALP LACERATION, RIGHT TEMPOROPARIETAL AREA 4. SCALP CONTUSSION, LEFT FRONTOTEMPORO PARIETAL AREA WITH UNDERLYING LINEAR FRACTURE OF THE SKULL EXTENDING FROM THE LEFT FRONTAL TO THE LEFT TEMPORAL BONE.53 The question now is: which medical findings should this Court believe?
cra lawlib rary

a (Witness demonstrating by pointing to the right side of his head.) q Doctor, while you were demonstrating, the linear fracture, is it perpendicular to the head?
cra lawlibra ry

a I am sorry but it was injury to the right side of the head, Sir. q Only part of the right ear? a Yes, sir. q If I am facing you, it is on your? a Right, Sir. q Right side on your part. Did you find any injury on the left side? a No, Sir.52 From the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Cala and with his testimony in court, it is clear that the victim suffered injuries on the right side of his head. Thus, the claim of Molly and Silmana Linglingen that the victim was struck from behind on the right side of his head is consistent with the findings of Dr. Cala.
cra lawlibrary c ra lawl ibra ry cra lawli bra ry

This Court believes in the findings made by Dr. Cala as contained in the medico-legal certificate he issued showing that the victim suffered injuries on the right side of his head, consistent with the declarations of prosecution witnesses that the victim was, from behind, struck with a shovel twice on the right side of the head. We give more weight to this medical certificate, because the same was issued by a government doctor. By actual practice, only government physicians, by virtue of their oaths as civil service officials, are competent to examine persons and issue medical certificates which will be used by the government.54 As such, the medical certificate carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his functions and duties. Moreover, under Section 44, Rule 130,55 Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Dr. Cala's findings that the victim sustained injuries on the right side of his head are, therefore, conclusive in the absence of evidence proving the contrary, as in this case. We cannot consider the contents of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas sufficient to controvert the findings of Dr. Cala. As held by this Court, an unverified medical certificate not issued by a government physician is unreliable.56

Even assuming arguendo that we give more weight to the medical certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas, this does not mean that the testimonies of Molly and Silmana Linglingen shall be disbelieved. It is noted that Dr. Mensalvas testified that the victim sustained a wound on the right side of his head, possibly caused by a steel shovel.57 Such a finding is consistent with the claim of Molly and Silmana Linglingen that the victim was hit on the right side of the head. Though there can be inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses with Dr. Mensalvas's other findings (i.e., injuries on the left portion of the head) this does not mean that we should totally doubt and discard the other portions of their testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in another, depending on the corroborative evidence or the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. Where a part of the testimony of a witness runs counter to the medical evidence submitted, it is within the sound discretion of the court to determine which portions of the testimony to reject as false and which to consider worthy of belief.58 From the two medical certificates issued, what cannot be doubted is the fact that the victim sustained head injuries, whether on the left or the right, which caused his demise. We find the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses more credible and convincing than those of the defense eyewitnesses. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.59 The Court of Appeals further affirmed the findings of the RTC. In this regard, it is settled that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. We find no compelling reason to deviate from their findings.

Petitioner claims that the trial court judge was not able to observe the demeanor of the prosecution witnesses, because they were looking at the court interpreter when they were testifying. We find this untenable. The trial court judge was emphatic in saying that he had the chance to see the face of the witness while she testified.60 On the second and third assigned errors, petitioner admits killing James but invokes self-defense. He claims that the victim was the unlawful aggressor and that he (petitioner) did not provoke the victim. Article 11, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, provides for the elements and/or requisites in order that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from criminal liability, viz: ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur; First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Having admitted that he killed James, the burden of evidence that one acted in self-defense shifted to petitioner. Like an alibi, selfdefense is inherently weak, for it is easy to fabricate.61 It is textbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was justified, and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of

responsibility for the killing. Hence, he must prove the essential requisites of self-defense as aforementioned.62 Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.63 Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.64 There must be actual physical force or a threat to inflict physical injury. In case of a threat, it must be offensive and positively strong so as to display a real, not imagined, intent to cause injury.65 We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to clearly and convincingly prove self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. We confirm the observation of the trial court. A circumspect scrutiny of accused-appellant's version of what happened likewise leaves this Court unconvinced that he killed the victim James Pangoden in self-defense. First, accused-appellant's claim that the victim James Pangoden, suddenly and without provocation, boxed him on his right ear is simply unbelievable. By his own account, he (accused-appellant) was at that moment helping a road vendor carry her sack of eggplants away from the path of the truck. If this is true, then his testimony that James Pangoden attacked and boxed him for no reason at all loses credibility. Testimonies to be believed must not only come from the mouth of credible witnesses but should by themselves be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience. Second, it is likewise inconceivable how accused-appellant could have hit the victim James Pangoden twice in the head while he (accused-appellant) was allegedly in a sitting position and holding the shovel by the middle part of its shaft. Interestingly also, while accused-appellant and his witness testified that he was in a "sitting" position when he hit James Pangoden with the shovel, accused-appellant portrayed a different account when asked during cross-examination to demonstrate how he hit the victim, viz:

Q: Now, how did you hit Pangoden with the shovel, demonstrate it to the Court. All right you can step down from the witness stand (Witness demonstrating.) For the record, witness was in a kneeling position when he got the shovel. A: I was down on the ground, and I was groping (sic) to somebody and I was able to get hold of the shovel, that was the time I swang (sic) it towards him. Q: You have not demonstrated how you hit Pangoden with the shovel?
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For the record, witness is in a kneeling position when he allegedly picked up the shovel holding it in the middle part. With his two hands and swang (sic) it upwards towards his left. For the record, accused held the shovel on the middle part of the shaft, your Honor, not on the handle. Third, it simply goes against the grain of human experience for the victim James Pangoden to persist in his attack against accusedappellant after getting hit in the head with a steel shovel, considering that he is unarmed and had nothing to match accusedappellant's weapon on hand. That James Pangoden still had the resolution and power for a second assault on accusedappellant, after getting hit with a steel shovel in the head, flouts ordinary human capacity and nature. In contrast, accusedappellant would claim that he "fell down" and "felt dizzy" after getting boxed on the right side of his head by James Pangoden with his bare fist. Fourth, accused-appellant himself admitted walking away from the crime scene immediately after the incident. As we see it, this actuation on his part is contrary to his assertion of self-defense. Flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the existence of a guilty conscience, for a righteous individual will not cower in fear and unabashedly admit the killing at the earliest possible opportunity if he were morally justified in doing so.

Finally, the nature and number of the fatal injuries inflicted upon James Pangoden negate accused-appellant's claim of self-defense. Said victim suffered cerebral contusion, epidural hematoma, scalp laceration and skull fracture, which directly caused his death. If accused-appellant hit the victim just to defend himself, it certainly defies reason why he had to aim for the head and do it twice. Indeed, the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim belie the assertion of self-defense since the gravity of said wounds is indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just to defend. xxx But even assuming arguendo that accused-appellant was able to establish the element of unlawful aggression, still, this Court will rule out self-defense. It is undisputed that James Pangoden was unarmed while accusedappellant was armed with a steel shovel. There was no reasonable necessity for accused-appellant to use a steel shovel to repel the attack of an unarmed man. Moreover, the eyewitnesses' account of how accused-appellant uncaringly threw the soiled eggplants towards the direction of James Pangoden's goods would negate the absence of sufficient provocation on the part of accused-appellant. Thus, the second and third requisites for self-defense to be successfully invoked, namely, reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the attack and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused, are not present in this case.66 We now go to the imposition of the penalty. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it appreciated in favor of the petitioner the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. It was established that a few hours after the incident, petitioner submitted himself to his supervisors, who, in turn, surrendered him to the police authorities. Petitioner is guilty of Homicide for having killed James Pangoden. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. However, considering that there is one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty, following Article

64(2) of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal in its minimum period or within the range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the minimum period of reclusion temporal, while the minimum shall be taken from within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor or from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. The Court of Appeals sentenced petitioner to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. We find this to be in order. With respect to award of damages, the trial court awarded to the heirs of the victim the following amounts:P195,080.05 as actual damages; P300,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as death indemnity; andP3,135,720.00 for loss of earning capacity. The Court of Appeals, except for the award of death indemnity, reduced the awards given by the trial court as follows: P51,549.25 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages and P1,960,200.00 for lost income. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.67 Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.68 Under prevailing jurisprudence,69 the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity is in order.70 As to actual damages, the heirs of the victim are entitled thereto, because said damages amounting to P51,549.25 were duly proved by receipts. It is necessary for a party seeking actual damages to produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts, to justify an award therefor.71

Moral damages must also be awarded because these are mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. 72 The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is in order. The award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.73 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not proved.74 In the case on hand, temperate damages cannot be awarded, because evidence of expenses for burial and funeral has been presented for which actual damages have been awarded. As regards exemplary damages, Article 2230 of the Civil Code allows the award thereof as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.75 There being no aggravating circumstance that accompanied the commission of the crime, exemplary damages cannot be awarded. The computation of the Court of Appeals with respect to lost earning capacity is correct. At the time of his death, the victim was 31 years old. His gross annual income was P120,000.00 because he was earning P10,000.00 monthly. Living expenses are estimated at 50% of the gross annual income. Loss of earning capacity is computed by applying the following formula:76

= = Net Earning = Capacity of the victim

[98/3] [32.67] P1,960,200.00

x x

[P60,000] [P60,000]

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26636, dated 31 January 2006, is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Ynares-Santiago, J., Chairperson, Carpio*, Austria-Martinez, Reyes, JJ., concur.

Net Earning = Capacity

life expectancy x [2/3(80-age at death)]

[Gross Annual Income (GAI) [(GAI)

'

living expenses (50% of GAI)]

= =

[2/3(80-31)] 2 3 (49)

x x

'

(50% of GAI)]

[P120,000 - P60,000]

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

not constitute unlawful aggression does not automatically negate the attendant circumstance of sufficient provocation. The Case

SECOND DIVISION

NEMROD GOTIS, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 157201 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] under Rule 45 seeks the annulment of the August 30, 2002 Decision[3] and February 12, 2003 Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22536 entitled People of the Philippines v. Nemrod Gotis. The assailed Decision affirmed the October 29, 1997 Decision[5] of the Irosin, Sorsogon Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55, convicting petitioner Nemrod of the crime of homicide. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts On October 21, 1990, at around six oclock in the evening, petitioner, Nemrod Gotis, and his brother, Nahom, arrived at Eddie Bautistas coconut plantation in Barangay Bonga, Bulan, Sorsogon looking for Serafin Gotis. Serafins wife, Carmen, and daughter, Nilda, were then at the plantation. Petitioner and Nahom, who were both armed with bolos, angrily approached Carmen and Nilda and asked them where Serafin was. Not being able to find Serafin, Nahom pointed his bolo at Nilda and said, We will kill your father![6] After petitioner and Nahom had left, Carmen and Nilda went to the house of Adolfo Malinao to wait for Serafin. When Serafin arrived, Carmen told him what had happened at the plantation and prevented him from going home. Serafin, however, disregarded Carmens warning and insisted on going home.[7] On their way home, Serafin and his family had to pass by Nahoms house. Upon reaching the gate of Nahoms house, Serafin called for

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

September 14, 2007 x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: In order to determine the sufficiency of a provocation for the purpose of mitigating a crime, one must look into the act constituting the provocation, the social standing of the person provoked, and the place and time when the provocation is made.[1] In the present case, a finding that the act of the victim did

Nahom and asked him to come out. When Nahom heard the shouts of Serafin, he immediately called petitioner for help. Petitioner came over and advised Serafin to go home, but he refused to leave. Instead, Serafin attempted to hack petitioner and tried to enter the gate of Nahoms house.[8] Thereafter, Nahom struck Serafin on the head with a bolo.[9] Meanwhile, petitioner entered his brothers house to look for a bolo.[10] After being hit, Serafin ran away. Petitioner, however, pursued him, and hit him several times on the back and arm.[11] Carmen, who was then following Serafin, saw the incident and cried for help. Serafins brother, Jose, responded, but before he could extend any help, petitioner poked a Batangas knife on his neck. Jose, however, was able to parry the blow with his arm. Thereafter, petitioner ran away.[12] Serafin was brought to a hospital in Irosin, Sorsogon, but he eventually died during treatment. On January 16, 1991, the following Information was submitted before the trial court: That on or about the 21st day of October, 1990 at about [seven] oclock in the evening at Barangay Bonga, Municipality of Bulan, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with bolos and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and hack one Serafin Gotis in the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.[13]

Petitioner admitted having killed Serafin. He, however, interposed the justifying circumstance of self-defense. He claimed that he hit Serafin merely to defend himself against the latters attack. After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment in Crim. Case No. 676 finding the accused Nahom Gotis and Nemrod Gotis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined in Article 249, of the Revised Penal Code. With respect to Nahom Gotis[,] the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and defense of relative should be appreciated in his favor. Applying the provisions of Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code[,] the court hereby sentences the accused Nahom Gotis to suffer imprisonment of an indeterminate [s]entence of six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum as the minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as the maximum. The accused Nemrod Gotis is to be credited the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and voluntary surrender and applying the provisions of Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code[,] the said accused is to suffer imprisonment for an [i]ndeterminate [s]entence of [f]our (4) years [and] two (2) months of prision correccional medium as the minimum to [t]en (10) years of prision mayor medium as the maximum. The accused Nahom Gotis shall jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Serafin Gotis the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the cost. xxxx SO ORDERED.[14]

Nahom applied for probation which was granted by the trial court. Petitioner, on the other hand, appealed to the CA. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The appellate court held that petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove the elements of self-defense. Particularly, the CA held that unlawful aggression did not exist at the time that petitioner attacked the victim. It observed that the unlawful aggression against petitioners life had already ceased when petitioner went inside his brothers house and the victim ran away. Thus, [petitioners] coming out of the house with a bolo is indicative of a determination to kill Serafin Gotis and not merely to defend himself.[15] However, the CA ruled that petitioner is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation because this circumstance is anchored on [petitioners] plea for self-defense which stands discredited by the trial court x x x.[16] Also, on the award of damages, the CA granted actual damages in the amount of PhP 3,000, observing that expenses for the embalmment of the deceased x x x [were] duly documented by a receipt.[17] The fallo of the August 30, 2002 Decision of the CA reads: WHEREFORE, the Decision finding [petitioner] Nemrod Gotis guilty of Homicide is AFFIRMED with the modification that he is hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the heirs of Serafin Gotis the amount of P3,000.00 as actual damages in addition to the P50,000.00 [as] civil indemnity awarded by the trial court.[18]

Hence, we have this petition. The Issue Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court disregarding petitioners plea of self-defense.[19]

The Courts Ruling The petition is partly meritorious.

Factual Questions Not Reviewable The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is a settled doctrine that petitions of this nature should only raise questions of law.[20] Moreover, the general rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable, subject only to certain exceptions as when the judgment is not supported by sufficient evidence or is premised on a misapprehension of facts.[21] In the present case, petitioner maintains that the CA failed to appreciate that he had acted in self-defense, and thus, he should not be held liable for Serafins death. However, petitioner failed to show that the CAs findings of fact should be disregarded. The factual findings are borne out by the records and are supported by substantial evidence. Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides the elements of self-defense as a justifying circumstance, thus:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur: First. Unlawful Aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression by the victim is a primordial element of selfdefense; without it, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.[22]To be appreciated, the unlawful aggression must be a continuing circumstance or must have been existing at the time the defense is made.[23] A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased.[24] In this case, the trial and appellate courts correctly held that while Serafin initially attacked petitioner with a bolo, the unlawful aggression already ceased when the latter was able to go inside his brothers house and the former ran away. At this point, there was no longer any danger on his life; thus, there was also no necessity to defend himself by pursuing and attacking Serafin. Sufficient Provocation as a Mitigating Circumstance The trial court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation. However, the appellate court reversed the trial courts ruling explaining that sufficient provocation is not compatible with the finding that petitioner did not act in self-defense. By faulting petitioner for inflicting injuries on the victim after the latter had run away, the CA likened sufficient provocation with unlawful aggression. The CA erred.

As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger of the attack, from the victim.[25] On the other hand, as a mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity.[26] Notably, while an act cannot be considered an unlawful aggression for the purpose of self-defense, the same act can be considered as sufficient provocation for the purpose of mitigating the crime. In Pepito v. CA,[27] the victim, before the killing, had challenged the accuseds family with a bolo and an indian pana. After this attack, the victim went home. The accused thereafter grabbed a bolo, pursued the victim, and killed him. The Court did not consider the victims act as an unlawful aggression for the purpose of selfdefense. However, such was considered a provocation sufficient to mitigate the crime. People v. Ubaldo[28] had likewise disregarded the violent act of the victim before the shooting incident as an unlawful aggression, but appreciated it as a mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation. Moreover, the retaliation of the accused in Romero v. People,[29]although not considered an unlawful aggression, was nevertheless deemed as sufficient provocation. The Court explained, Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger.[30] In the present case, petitioner was merely pacifying Serafin when the latter suddenly attempted to hack the former. Although

petitioner evaded the attack, Serafins act was enough provocation to anger petitioner and cause him to strike back. Thus, we find that sufficient provocation attended the crime. The prison term imposed by the trial court in its October 29, 1997 Decision is hereby REINSTATED.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 30, 2002 Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 22536 is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION on the penalty, as follows: Petitioner is hereby found GUILTY of Homicide, and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months ofprisin correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prisin mayor as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Serafin Gotis PhP 50,000 as indemnity for his death and PhP 3,000 as actual damages. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 153287 June 30, 2008

attack and stab one WINNIE ALON y BILLANES, hitting the latter and inflicting multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which injuries caused his death shortly thereafter. That due to the untimely death of Winnie Alon y Billanes[,] his heirs are entitled to death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and other damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
6

NOEL GUILLERMO y BASILIANO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION BRION, J.: For our review is the petition filed by the petitioner Noel Guillermo y 2 Basiliano (petitioner) against the decision dated November 15, 2001 and the 3 resolution dated April 5, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR 4 No. 24181. The challenged decision affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Roxas City convicting and penalizing the petitioner for the crime of homicide with an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years ofprision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. BACKGROUND For the death of one Winnie Alon (Winnie), the prosecution charged Arnaldo 5 Socias, Joemar Palma, and the petitioner with the crime of homicide under an Information that states: xxx That at or about 5:40 oclock in the afternoon, on or about July 21, 1996, at Brgy. Poblacion Takas, Municipality of Cuartero, Province of Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating[,] and mutually helping one another, armed with knives and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
1

The petitioner and his co-accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged with the assistance of their counsel de parte. The prosecution presented Vicente Alon (Vicente) and Eddie Roque (Eddie) as witnesses in the trial that followed; Dr. Ricardo Betita, Jr. (Dr. Betita), Baby Lou Felipe (Baby Lou), and the three accused the petitioner, Arnaldo Socias, and Joemar Palma took the witness stand for the defense. The material points in the testimony of Vicente were summarized by the trial 7 court in its decision as follows: Vicente Alon averred that at 5:40 in the afternoon of July 21, 1996, Winnie Alon, Wilfredo Cabison, Eddie Roque, and him [sic] were at the public market of Cuartero, at [sic] the restaurant of Melecio 8 Heyres to eat. Noel Guillermo, Arnel Socias, and Joemar Palma were at the restaurant drinking beer. Noel Guillermo and Arnel Socias are known to him since childhood since they come from the 9 same barangay. Joemar Palma is known to him only recently in 10 that incident. While sitting at the table inside the restaurant, an altercation between Arnel Socias and Winnie Alon regarding the cutting of wood by a chain saw [sic] transpired. Noel Guillermo suddenly took hold of Winnie Alon and stabbed the latter at the neck three (3) 11 times. Joemar Palma went to the kitchen and got a knife. Arnel Socias hit him with a bottle of beer by [sic] the head. He fell down 12 and lost consciousness. [Footnotes referring to the pertinent parts of the record supplied] Significantly, Vicente admitted on cross-examination that he and Winnie were already drunk even before they went to the restaurant where the 13 stabbing took place.

Eddie corroborated the testimony of Vicente on material points, particularly on the state of their intoxication even before going to the scene of the stabbing. His testimony on what transpired at the restaurant was 14 summarized in the RTC decision as follows: Eddie Roque alleged that at around 5:40 oclock in the afternoon of July 21, 1996, he, together with Winnie Alon, Vicente Alon and Wilfredo Cabison, were [sic] inside the restaurant of Mrs. Heyres at Cuartero Public Market to leave their tools of the chain saw [sic] 15 and to eat and drink. Noel Guillermo, Arnel Socias, and Joemer Palma were ahead of them to [sic] the restaurant and were drinking 16 beer. They invited them and they joined them. Before each of them could fully consume a bottle served upon each of them, Winnie Alon and Arnel Socias argued about the cutting of wood by means of a chain saw [sic]. The argument was so heated that each of the protagonists stood up and Arnel Socias took 2 bottles which 17 were thrown to Vicente Alon who was hit on the forehead. Noel Guillermo hugged or embraced Winnie Alon and stabbed him three times (3) on [sic] the neck with a Batangueo knife. Arnel Socias went around, then behind, and stabbed Winnie Alon once, on the left side of his body, just below his left armpit, with a pointed object, but he could not determine what weapon was used. Joemar Palma also helped in stabbing Winnie Alon once, hitting him at the 18 right side of his body. Winnie Alon resisted trying to struggle [sic], but could not move 19 because he was ganged up by the three. [Footnotes referring to the pertinent parts of the record supplied] Dr. Betita, rural health physician of Cuartero, Capiz, declared on the witness stand that he conducted on July 22, 1996 a postmortem examination on the 20 body of Winnie and made the following findings: POSTMORTEM EXAMINATION The postmortem examination is done on the remains of Winnie Alon, 31 years old, single, from Malagab-i, Cuartero, Capiz, was stab [sic] to death at about 5:40 P.M. at Pob. Takas, Public Market, Cuartero, Capiz sustaining the following injuries:

1. Stab wound 1.5 x 3 cm with 6-8 cm depth [L]eft anterior th chest at level of 5 rib mid clavicular area. 2. Stab wound 2 x 3 cm with 5 cm depth anterior neck just above the sternum. 3. Stab wound 2 x 3 cm with 3-5 cm depth at epigastric area. The most probable cause of death was massive [H]emorrhage 21 secondary to multiple stab wounds. According to Dr. Betita, the cause of death was massive hemorrhage due to 22 multiple stab wounds. He added that the three (3) stab wounds were 23 probably caused by a sharp-bladed instrument like a knife. The petitioner gave a different version of the events, summarized in the RTC decision as follows: Noel Guillermo testified that at 5:30 in the afternoon of July 21, 1996, he was in Cuartero at the restaurant of Melecio Heyres, husband of Gertrudes Heyres, together with Arnel Socias and Joemar Palma drinking beer, consuming only about half a bottle, when Winnie Alon, Eddie Roque, Vicente Alon, and Wilfredo Cabison arrived and ordered beer from Babylou Felipe. Winnie Alon came to him and requested to join them in their table which he affirmatively answered. Winnie Alon then had an altercation with Arnel Socias regarding "labtik" (string used in marking wood to be 24 cut). Winnie Alon challenged Arnel Socias to a contest on clean or straight cutting of wood. Arnel declined the challenge claiming that he is only an assistant to his brother-in-law. Winnie Alon got angry and told him that he has long been in [the] chain saw [sic] business but "youre stupid" ("gago ka!"). Arnel responded: "If the wood is 25 crooked and you would deviate from line, youre stupid." Winnie Alon suddenly stood up and said to Arnel: "Dont ever call me stupid," pointing his finger to Arnel. He told them to settle the matter peacefully as they are friend [sic], but Winnie Alon was so furious and grabbed Arnel Socias by the collar. Arnel tried to release the hold of Winnie from his collar. While he was pacifying

the two telling them to settle the matter peacefully, Winnie Alon turned to him and said: "you also," then struck him with a beer bottle. He was hit at the right top of his head thrice. He stood up and boxed Winnie who again picked up a bottle break [sic] it against the wall, and struck him with the broken bottle. He stepped back, pulled his knife, and stabbed him three (3) times but cannot 26 remember what part of his body was hit by his successive stabs. x x x [Footnotes referring to the pertinent parts of the record supplied] Baby Lou, a waitress at the restaurant of Melecio Heyres, narrated that in the afternoon of July 21, 1996, the petitioner, together with Arnaldo and 27 Joemar, arrived at the restaurant and ordered beer. A few minutes later, Vicente, Eddie, Winnie, and Wilfredo Cabison arrived and also ordered beer. She then saw the group of Winnie transfer to the table occupied by the petitioner and his companions. Thereafter, the group had a heated argument 28 among themselves regarding "labtik." In the course of the exchange, she saw Winnie strike the petitioner on the head with a bottle. Winnie and the petitioner then grappled with each other. At that point, she hid behind the refrigerator and did not see what happened next. Afterwards, she saw the 29 bloodied body of Winnie lying outside the restaurant. She likewise saw the 30 petitioner outside the restaurant; his shirt was splattered with blood. Dr. Betita, this time testifying as defense witness, stated, among others, that the contusion hematoma suffered by the petitioner could have been caused by a hard object like a beer bottle, while the linear abrasion could have been 31 caused by a fingernail. Arnaldo Socias testified that on July 21 1996, he, together with the petitioner 32 and Joemar, was drinking beer at the restaurant of Melecio Heyres when Winnie stood up and asked if they (Winnies group) could join them at their table. Arnaldo and his companions agreed. Winnies group then transferred 33 to the table of Arnaldos group. The discussion took a bad turn when the matter of cutting by chainsaw was raised. Winnie challenged Arnaldo to a contest to determine who could do the cleanest cut. He declined and claimed he does not know how to operate a chainsaw. To this, Winnie retorted, "You are already old in that business, but your finished product is still crooked. You are all dumb." He countered, "If the wood itself is crooked, you cannot have a straight lumber. You are dumb if you insist you can." At that point, Winnie stood up and grabbed him by the collar. The petitioner intervened and told them to settle their differences peacefully. Winnie then grabbed a bottle and struck the petitioner 34 on the head three times. Arnaldo added that he did not see who stabbed

Winnie, because while the petitioner and Winnie were grappling, he was 35 busy fighting with Vicente. Joemar Palma testified that in the afternoon of July 21, 1996, the petitioner, Arnaldo, and he were drinking beer at the restaurant of Mr. Heyres when four persons, who appeared to be drunk (later identified as Vicente, Eddie, Winnie, and Wilfredo Cabison), entered the restaurant and ordered 36 beer. After the latter group joined them at their table, Winnie and Arnaldo had a heated discussion regarding expertise in operating a chainsaw. Winnie grabbed the shirt collar of Arnaldo in the course of the heated 37 exchange. The petitioner advised them to calm down, but Winnie struck him (petitioner) on the head with a beer bottle three times. Vicente also tried to strike Arnaldo, but the latter managed to duck and so he (Joemar) took 38 the hit instead. Thereafter, he and Arnaldo engaged Vicente. The RTC, in its decision of January 8, 2000, convicted the petitioner of the crime of homicide, but acquitted Arnaldo and Joemar. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the evidence on record having established the guilt of Noel Guillermo as principal in the crime of homicide for stabbing three (3) times Winnie Alon which caused the latters death, attended by a special or privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete justification, and without any aggravating or mitigating circumstances attendant, he is imposed an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay death indemnity of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Winnie Alon, in the service of his sentence he shall be credited the period that he undergone [sic] preventive imprisonment, conformably with Art. 29 of the Code. Costs against the accused. For insufficiency of evidence, the accused Arnaldo Socias and Joemar Palma are acquitted of the crime charged. The bail bond for their provisional liberty is CANCELLED AND DISCHARGED. SO ORDERED.
39

[Emphasis in the original]

The petitioner appealed to the CA whose decision is now assailed in the present petition. The petitioner essentially claims that the RTC and the CA erred in failing to recognize the existence of all the elements of self-defense. THE COURTS RULING We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit. Plea of Self-Defense We note at the outset that the petitioner does not deny that he killed Winnie. He expressly made this admission in his testimony of July 15, 1999: ATTY. VILLAREAL: Q: And what did you do when he struck you with the bottle? NOEL GUILLERMO: A: I was able to move backward and I realized that I have a knife on [sic] the back of my waist. Q: And what did you do with your knife? A: I then stabbed him. Q: How many times? A: About three times as far as I can remember. supplied] The petitioner justifies the stabbing as an act of self-defense. As the lower courts did, we do not recognize that the petitioner fully acted in self-defense. As a rule, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, when the accused admits the killing and, by way of justification, pleads self-defense, the burden of
40

evidence shifts; he must then show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense. For that purpose, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions 41 evidence. The elements that the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence to successfully plead self-defense are enumerated under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code: ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur; First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. As a justifying circumstance, self-defense may be complete or incomplete. It is complete when all the three essential requisites are present; it is incomplete when the mandatory element of unlawful aggression by the 42 victim is present, plus any one of the two essential requisites. In the present case, we find it beyond dispute that the victim Winnie started the fight that ended in his death; he struck the petitioner on the head when the latter intervened to pacify the quarrel between Winnie and Arnaldo. In short, the victim was the unlawful aggressor while the petitioner was in the lawful act of pacifying the quarreling parties; thus, the latter has in his favor the element of unlawful aggression by the victim. We consider it also established that the petitioner did not provoke the fight that ensued; he was a third party to the quarrel between the original protagonists Winnie and Arnaldo and did not at all initiate any provocation to ignite the quarrel. Thus, the petitioner also has the element of lack of sufficient provocation in his favor.

[Emphasis

The third element the reasonableness of the means to repel the aggression is the critical element that the lower courts found lacking in the petitioners case. Generally, reasonableness is a function of the nature or severity of the attack or aggression confronting the accused, the means employed to repel this attack, the surrounding circumstances of the attack such as its place and occasion, the weapons used, and the physical condition of the parties which, when viewed as material considerations, must show rational equivalence between the attack and the 43 44 defense. In People v. Escarlos, this Court held that the means employed by a person invoking self-defense must be reasonably commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted. In Sienes v. 45 People, we considered the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim as important indicia material to a plea for self-defense. In the present case, the attack on the petitioner came as he intervened in a quarrel between the victim and another party. As we concluded above, we deem it established that the victim was the unlawful aggressor who attacked the petitioner. Physical evidence shows that indeed the petitioner suffered the following injuries: 1. Contusion Hematoma 2 x 3 left parital area just above the left ear. 2. Linear abrasion 3 4 cm left hand medial side. 3. Linear abrasion 2 3 cm left head ulnar side.
46

Several reasons militate against our acceptance of the petitioners version and interpretation of events. First, there is intrinsic disproportion between a Batangas knife and a broken beer bottle. Although this disproportion is not conclusive and may yield a contrary conclusion depending on the circumstances, we mention this disproportionality because we do not believe that the circumstances of the case dictate a contrary conclusion. Second, physical evidence shows that the petitioner suffered only one contusion hematoma at the parietal area above the left ear. Unless the three (3) beer bottle blows that the petitioner alleged all landed on the same site a situation that could have incapacitated the petitioner the more plausible conclusion from the physical evidence is that the petitioner received only one blow, not three as he claimed. Contrary to what the petitioner wishes to imply, he could not have been a defender reeling from successive head blows inflicted by the victim. Third, the victim, Vicente, and Eddie, were already drunk when they arrived at the restaurant before the fatal fight. This state of intoxication, while not critically material to the stabbing that transpired, is still material for purposes of defining its surrounding circumstances, particularly the fact that a broken beer bottle might not have been a potent weapon in the hands of a drunk wielder. Fourth, and as the CA aptly observed as well, the knife wounds were all aimed at vital parts of the body, thus pointing against a conclusion that the petitioner was simply warding off broken beer bottle thrusts and used his knife as a means commensurate to the thrusts he avoided. To be precise, the petitioner inflicted on the victim:one stab wound at the chest, 6-8 cms. th deep, at the 5 rib clavicular area, or in plainer terms, in the area of the victims heart; another was at the neck, 5 cms. deep, just above the breastbone; and a last one was in the abdominal area, 3-5 cms. deep. The depth of these wounds shows the force exerted in the petitioners thrusts while the locations are indicative that the thrusts were all meant to kill, not merely to disable the victim and thereby avoid his drunken thrusts. Fifth, in appreciating the facts, the RTC and the CA were one in the conclusion to disbelieve the petitioners allegation of complete self -defense, as reflected in the CAs further cogent observations that: (b) If, indeed the deceased picked up another bottle of beer, hit the same against the wall, resulting in the breakage of the bottle, and

The weapons that caused these injuries were a beer bottle and, quite possibly, fingernails as the victim and the appellant grappled with each 47 other. In contrast, the victim suffered three stab wounds: at the neck, at the abdomen and in the chest. The weapon used was a Batangas knife that admittedly belonged to the petitioner. Thus, the physical evidence in the case stands. The petitioner claims self-defense on the position that Winnie, after hitting him on the head three times with an empty bottle, grabbed another bottle, broke it against the wall, and thrust it towards him. It was at this point that the petitioner used his knife to inflict Winnies fatal wounds. Clearly, the petitioner wants to impress upon us that his response to Winnies attack was reasonable; he used a knife to repel an attacker armed with a broken beer bottle.

with it, hit the Appellant anew, it behooved the Appellant to have rushed posthaste to the police station and report the stabbing, with the request that a policeman be dispatched to the locus criminis and confirm the presence of broken pieces of beer bottle in the restaurant. The Appellant did not. He and his companions, Arnaldo and Joemar, fled from the scene, via the back door, and escaped on board a motorcycle. (c) Neither Arnaldo, Joemar, or Babylou corroborated the claim of the Appellant that, after the Appellant boxed Winnie, who lost his hold of the bottle of beer, he picked up another bottle and struck the bottle of beer against the wall and hit the Appellant with the bottle. The appellant relied solely on is own testimony to buttress his defense. (d) The Municipal Trial Court conducted a preliminary investigation of the "Criminal Complaint" filed against the Appellant, Arnaldo, and Joemar. However, the Appellant did not submit any "CounterAffidavit" claiming that he was impelled to stab Winnie three (3) successive times on mortal parts of his body and killing [sic] him because Winnie picked up a bottle, hit the same against a wall and 48 hit the Appellant anew with the broken bottle. [Underscoring in the original] We see no reason to disturb these findings as they are based on existing evidence, and the conclusions drawn therefrom are patently reasonable. We have time and again held that the findings of facts of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on the these factual findings are to be given the highest respect; the trial court enjoys the unique advantage of being able to observe, at close range, the conduct and deportment of witnesses as they testify. These factual findings, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and need not be reviewed on the appeal to us. We are not a trier of facts; as a rule, we do not weigh anew the evidence already passed on by the trial court and affirmed by the 49 CA. Only after a showing that the courts below ignored, overlooked, misinterpreted, or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance that would alter the outcome of the case, are we justified in undertaking a factual review. No such exceptional grounds obtain in this case.

In sum, we rule that there was no rational equivalence between the means of the attack and the means of defense sufficient to characterize the latter as reasonable. The Proper Penalty The imposable penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal 50 Code is reclusion temporal in its full range. Article 69 of the Code however provides that: ART. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking. Since the petitioners plea of self-defense lacks only the element of "reasonable means," the petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Consequently, the penalty for homicide may be lowered by one or two degrees, at the discretion of the court. The penalty which the RTC imposed and which the CA affirmed lowered the penalty of reclusion temporal by one degree, which yields the penalty of prision mayor. From this penalty, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is determined by taking into account the attendant modifying 51 circumstances, applying Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. Since no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance intervened, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be prision mayor in its medium period whose range is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision mayor has to be reduced by one degree without taking into account the attendant modifying circumstances. The penalty lower by one degree is prision correccional whose range is from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The trial court is given the widest discretion to fix the minimum of the indeterminate penalty provided that such penalty is within the range of prision correccional.

The CA affirmed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years ofprision mayor, as maximum, as imposed by the RTC on petitioner. We affirm this to be the legally correct and proper penalty to be imposed upon petitioner. We also affirm the P50,000.00 death indemnity awarded to Winnies heirs, in 52 accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. We add that moral damages should be awarded as they are mandatory in murder and homicide cases without need of allegation and proof other than 53 the death of the victim. The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is, therefore, in order. WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition. The assailed decision and resolution of the CA dated November 15, 2001 and April 5, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24181 are AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that the petitioner is ordered to pay the heirs of Winnie Alon the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice