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Title:Whatiscriticalincriticalethnography? Name:ChiaLingWang Ph.DstudentinInstituteofEducation Address:JohnAdamsHall,1523EndsleighStreet London,WC1H0DP


Introduction Whatiscritical incriticalethnography?Howdoesthiselementofthecriticalor ofcritique help us to enrich the thinking of critical ethnography? These questions have fascinated me since I read Stephen J. Ball InEducation reform:A critical and poststructural approach (1994), Ball integrates the methods of critical policy analysis,poststructuralismand criticalethnography intohisresearchoneducational policy and curriculum reform. He employs ethnography in order to generate critical perspectives upon the impact of policy in local settings. For Ball, ethnography provides access to situated discourses and specific tactics and precise and tenuous power relations operating in local settings (p. 2). On the one hand, it counters the trend of rational scientism or psychohumanism on the other hand, it opens up the possibility of considering diverse the participating voices of currently marginalizedoroppressedsocialgroups.Ballexplainsthatitstraditionwascentralto the US Chicago School. In the UK, it has become noticed as a result of1976 work Learning to Labour by Paulo Willis, in which educational ethnography has been oriented to the exploration of resistance and the interplay of domination and struggle. Ball sees a valuable connection between ethnography and Foucaults genealogy.Hepointsout:
Iseeapossibleroleforethnography(assetsofculturaltexts)inrelationtotheorization, similartotheroleplayedbyhistoricaltextsinFoucaultsgenealogicalmethod.Inother
1 words, there is a methodological affinity between ethnography and genealogy . There

arealsoimportantparallelsbetweencriticalpolicyresearchandFoucauldiansociology. (p.3)

BallconsidersthatFoucaultsgenealogicalapproachinterruptsthetakenforgranted and isolates the contingent power relations which make it possible for particular assertions to operate as absolute truths (ibid). In this sense, genealogy enables an insurrectionofsubjugatedknowledges.ForBall,thismeansthatthroughgenealogy, it is possible to provide a conduit for submerged voices that are obscured and marginalized by specific power/knowledge arrangements. Likewise, in Balls view,

TamboukouandBall(2003)developthese theoreticalaffinitiesmoreintheirlaterwork. They generalizetheminto7points:1.interrogatethevalidityanduniversalauthorityofscientificknowledge 2.adoptacontextboundcriticalperspective3.transgressclosedtheoreticalandmethodological systems4.pointtothelimitsofdominantpower/knowledgeregimes5.recoverexcludedsubjectsand silencedvoices6.highlightthecentralityofthebodyinsociohistoricalanalyses7.restorethepolitical dimensionofresearch. 2

ethnography isalso awayofengaging incritical interpretationsthat arerealized via local memories and marginalized voices. It is connected with the play of power/knowledgerelationsinlocalandspecificsettings,asarefound,forexample,in thecurriculum,management,leadership,choiceandcompetition. I agree with Balls assertion that it is possible to undertake genealogical research withincriticalethnographyandviceversa,wecanalsodoethnographicalresearchby means of a genealogical perspective. However, it is essential to clarify several conceptshere.First,doesthecriticalincriticalethnographyequatewiththenotion ofcritiqueinFoucaultsaccount?Second,bothgenealogyandcriticalethnography showtheiroppositiontothesystematic,universalknowledgeofscience.Nevertheless, Iquestion:Doestheinsurrectionofsubjugatedknowledgeinthesetwoapproaches manifest the same meaning? What kind of knowledge is subjugated after all? Is this onlyto be realized in local and marginalized voices, as in Balls thinking, or it could have another significance?Third, Ball refers tothe concept ofresistance in criticalethnography,whichinvolvesaconfrontationwiththedominantorderinorder tochangetheinequitablesituationofoppressedgroups.Ialsoquestionweatherthisis the only meaning that resistance can make. All of these questions actually derive from my reading of Foucault. I would argue that we cannot draw on Foucaults thinkingincriticalethnographywithoutreconsideringthesebasicconcepts.Otherwise, wewilllosetheopportunityoftransformingourstablepresuppositionswithincritical ethnography,andsoofthinkingthroughthismethodologyinafreshway.Toachieve this purpose I shall, first, delineate the conventional notion of critical ethnography. My discussion of this includes several aspects. For instance: what is critical ethnography for? Against what kinds of domination is it struggling? What kinds of resistance does it attempt to arouse? And what kinds of subjugated knowledge is it concernedwith?Throughtheexaminationofthesequestions,Ifindthatrecenttrends in critical ethnography have been governed in certain particular ways. This itself couldbeatargetofcritiqueinFoucaultsaccount.Second,IshallexpoundFoucaults conceptofcritique inordertothinkcriticalethnography inadifferentway,which will involve a different approach to the critical from the way that conventional critical ethnographers typically understand this term. But my concern is not only critique,Ishallarguethatbutalsotheconceptsof dominationandresistancealso standinneedofadifferentkindofdefinition.Followingtheconsiderationofthese,I shall consider a story of critical ethnography that can be regarded as a fiction in Foucaults terms. Instead of an illusionary story or piece of research intended to persuade its readers by truth, this fiction is a historicalphilosophical practice, a movement between rationalization and desubjugation. Through writing and reading

fiction, the purpose of critical ethnography is no longer an emancipating praxis for confronting existing mechanisms of oppression, but rather an ethical practice dedicated towards a critical ethnography of the self. I suggest that the self could also be an ethnographical field to be explored critically, with a view to achieving a newrelationinourknowledgeofourselvesandinorderto transformour subjectivity. Conventional notionsofcriticalethnography Criticalethnographyisinfactahybridideainmethodologicalterms,anditcannotbe tracedbacktoasingularorigin.IntheviewofPattiLather(2001),criticalpedagogy is rooted in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, the sociolinguistics of Basil Bernstein and British Cultural studies of the Birmingham School, which focus on local knowledge and on the illumination of the operation of power in culturally specific contexts linked to socially reproductive processes. Focusing on the perspectives of feminisms, postcolonialisms and critical race theories, Lather considers that critical ethnographyreworkstheMarxistproject,whichaimsatexposingtheconstructionof consent and the naturalization of inequities. By breaking with the limits of conventionalmethodologiesofsymbolicinteractionismandphenomenology(suchas: objectivism, empiricism and subjectivism), critical ethnography turns its interest, in Lathers view, towards and aligns itself with oppressed groups. Kincheloe and McLaren(2000) suggest what it is that is critical in critical research. For them, criticalresearchisembeddedinthecontextofempoweringindividuals.Thissenseof critical is thencombined withthe struggle against injustice in a particular society. Critical research shows its transformative endeavor unembarrassed by the label political and unafraid to consummate a relationship with emancipatory consciousness (p. 291). Drawing on Marxist traditions, they claim that, beyond questions of method, ethnography needs to be understood in terms of the critical assessmentofreadingandwritingpractices.Thispracticeisatransformativepraxis thatleadstothealleviationofsufferingandtheovercomingofoppression(p.303). Kincheloe and McLaren suggest that an insurgent research of this kind can ask questions such as: Whose interests are served through institutional arrangements? andWheredoourframesofreferencecomefrom?Thesubjugatedknowledgein criticalresearchis,therefore,aknowledgeofhowminoritygroupsaresubjugatedby the interests oftheir oppressors and how people are controlled by certain dominant ideologies. Since the1970s, critical ethnography has been greatly influenced by neoMarxism, Frankfurt school critical theory and feminism social theory. As Phil FrancisCarspecken(1996,p.7)putsit,thepurposesofdoingcriticalethnographyare always related to political struggles for inequality and injustice, for the exposure of

theoppression of disadvantagedgroups,andforculturalandsocialcriticism. Next,IshallexpoundFoucaultnotionofcritiqueandthenseewhetheritstandsin linewith thisorthodoxcriticalethnography. Whatiscritique(or whatisittobecritical)? Inalectureentitledwhatiscritique,Foucault(2007)elaborateswhathemeansby critique. He considers that critique is an attitude, a means and a virtue that is directed towards the truth. To develop this idea, Foucault uncovers a triple relationship to the truth in the salvationoriented operations of Christian pastoral. First, truth is understood as dogma second, it implies a special and individualizing knowledge of individuals and finally, it deploys a technique comprising general rules for example, particular forms of knowledge, methods of examination, and practicesof confessions.I thinkthattheideaofsubjugatedknowledgeinFoucaults account derives from these kinds of dogma, of knowledge of individuals and of techniquesofgovernance.Truthmaybegovernedincertainimmobilewaysbyvirtue of these kinds of knowledge, and this is the constraint that Foucault would like to break.Heholdstheopinionthattheartofgoverningmenstartedin the15thcentury, 2 before the Reformation. The process of governmentalization expanded not only to different objectschildren, families, armiesand to different fieldspedagogy, politics and economicsbut also deep into the individuals own body and mind. Nevertheless, the question that interests Foucault is not merely the process of governmentalization itself, but how not to be governed? (p. 44). For him, the criticalattitude,whichisvirtueaswell,islaunchedbyaskinganimportantquestion: hownottobegovernedlikethat,bythat,inthenameofthoseprinciples,withsuch andsuchanobjectiveinmindandbymeansofsuchprocedures,notlikethat,notfor that, not by them (ibid). This attitude is not a complete rejection of governmentalization.Rather,heexplains,itisanattitudethatoneisbothpartnerand adversarytotheartsofgoverning(ibid).Itisanactofdefiance,achallenge,away of limiting these arts of governing and of transforming them, a way to escape from themandtodisplacethem(p.45).Thus,Foucaultsfirstdefinitionofcritiquecanbe underlined with the words: the artof not being governed like that and atthat cost (ibid).

Governmentalization isrelatedtoanotherFoucaultstermgovernmentality.Itreferstoa processinwhichhumanbeingsgoverntheirownmentalitythroughthe exercise ofpower/knowledge. Itseffectissimilarto subjectification. 5

Foucault then examines three historical anchoring points of critique. The first anchoringpointisrelatedtoreligion.Inthis,critique,orthequestionofhownottobe governed,involvedseekingoutwhatwasauthenticinScriptureandquestioningwhat sortoftruthitwasthattheScripturesrepresented.Inthesecondanchoringpoint,the question of how notto be governed involves a not wanting to accept unjust laws or illegitimate sovereignty. Critique in this sense means putting forth universal and indefeasible rights to which every government (p. 46) must be committed. This is basically a legal issue. I consider that most concepts of critique in conventional critical ethnography fit this understanding of the term. The third anchoring point is thatcritiqueisaconfrontationwithauthority.ThisisthecritiquethatFoucaultwould like to underscorethe freedom to want notto be governed. He claims, critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effectsofpowerandquestionpoweronitsdiscoursesoftruth(p.47).Foucaultputs itlikethis:
critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability. Critiquewouldessentiallyinsurethedesubjugationofthesubjectinthecontextofwhat wecouldcall,inaword,thepoliticsoftruth (ibid).

Critique, for Foucault, is the politics of truth, or we may say that it is a political investigation into regimes of truth.It is an actthat daresto challenge and transform thelimitsofsubjugation ofthesubject. Acritiqueofcriticalethnographyandwithincriticalethnography Foucaults idea of critique prompts me to reconsider what is critical in critical ethnography and it also lets me rethink the nature of the alliance between critical ethnographyandFoucauldianphilosophy.Inthefirstplace,criticalethnographyitself could be a target of critique. According to those centralpoints of this methodology that I have addressed above, it is obvious that critical ethnography is governed in particular ways and by a dominant truth, which is validated in certain coherent systems of knowledge. Its critical gesture is made with the intention ofconfronting inequality and oppression. The purpose ofconsciousnessraising and transformative praxishasbecomethenorminthediscourseofthismethodology.Severaltermssuch as empowerment, liberation or autonomy have then been incorporated into its normative language. These emancipatory concepts are part of the subjugated knowledge and governmental rationality, and these constrain researchers from thinking outside these terms. In the name of emancipation, ironically, the invariable

assumption has been that there is a specific route to be taken, a takenforgranted orderthatcannotbeliberated.If,asBallputsit,thecritiqueofcriticalethnographyis the insurrection of subjugated knowledge, then the normative thinking of critical ethnography itself is a subjugated knowledge. It is this too that stands in need of insurrection. Sincecriticalethnographyisgovernedinitsregimeoftruth,IsuggestthatFoucaults notion of critique can be applied in order to rethink ethnography in a more critical way. This is the second aspect of the implication of this concept that I attempt to demonstrate. Following Foucault, what is critical in critical ethnography can be regardedintermsofhownottobegovernedlikethatandatthatcost.Itshouldbe seen as a virtuea desire3 of voluntary insubordination or of reflected intractability. Research then becomes the ethical possibility of transforming the limitsofsubjugationitbecomesaninvestmentinthedesubjugationofthesubject.As Butlers interpretation of Foucaults critique suggests, this practice offers a way of transferring the confinement of the epistemological field into the possibility of the ethicalfield(Butler,2002).Critiquethusisanethicalpracticecommittedtoraisinga critical attitude to those norms, to the established order, or to the limits of the epistemological horizon. Namely, it is an examination related to how knowledge forecloses the possibility of any alternative ordering and how power/knowledge confines the possibility of thinking otherwise. Domination, for conventional critical ethnography, mainlycomes fromthe unjust operation ofsovereign power and from ideological oppression, as in NeoMarxist terms or perhaps it is seen, as critical theorists suggest, as nothing other than the workings of instrumental rationality. In Foucaults view, however, domination refers to the limits of knowledgethe knowledgethat is confinedthroughcertaindominant formsofrationalityandthat is constituted through the manipulation of power/knowledge. Hence, a practice of resistance cannot be a matter of an unyielding attitude dedicated to breaking the advantages of privileged groups it must instead be a revolt against governmental demandsinordertoreleaseknowledgewithinaconcretestrategicfield,andinorder to liberate subjects fromtheir unwitting subjugation. On the one hand, our thinking andbehaviouraregovernedbynormalizingknowledgethedominantknowledgeof individuals on the other, we need another kind of knowledge to support resistance againstthis.Thisisknowledgeofwhatweare,anditistobeachievedbymeansof an investigation of a history and politics of the present, as this is evident in our particularethnographicfield.AsMasscheleinandSimonssuggest,knowledgecanbe seenasareflexiveethicalinstrument(MasscheleinandSimons,2007)thatismade

FromtheviewpointofButler,anethicalpracticeofcritiquecomesfromdesire. 7

notforunderstanding,butforcutting.Thiscuttingisarejectionoftheobedience of governmental obligation and also a rejection ofthe inertia ofpower which was maintaining itself indefinitely (Foucault, 2007, p. 54). Through the construction of this knowledge of cutting, we can see the limits of our history and thencutthrough theseeminglyinevitableways thatwehavecometolookatourselves.Itisthisthat makesthetransformationoftheselfpossible. Inthenextpart,Ishalltrytoconceiveofthewaythatthiskindofknowledgemight emerge in critical ethnography and shall suggest ways of drawing on Foucauldian critiquein thereadingandwritingof ethnographicalresearch. Writingandreadingcriticalethnographyasafiction With the purposes of critique in mind, I suggest that critical ethnography can be written and read as fiction. Fiction is the terms Foucault himself uses. For an example of this notion, I shall start with Foucaults critical viewpoint regarding the Enlightenment. In Kants eyes, Enlightenment requires that one has courage to recognizeandtobreakthelimitsofknowledge.Foucaultargues,however,thatKants formulationofthisthoughthasneverbeen far fromobediencetothesovereign.The sovereign in this sense is to be understood in terms ofstatetype powerorscientific reasonasthiswasmanifestinKantsage.Kantwasenmeshedinthegreatprocessof societysgovernmentalization, inwaysofwhichhewashimselfunaware.Positinga different approachfromKant, Foucault envisages thatthe conceptof Enlightenment can be seen as a historicalphilosophical practice. In this practice, one can fabricate onesownhistorythroughfiction(p.56).Thisfictionisnotthesameasuntruthor fantasy rather, it aims to show the structure of rationality and the mechanisms of subjugation.ThetruththatFoucaultsuggestsinthis fictiondisplaceswhat historians areconcernedwith.Itisnotthetruthconstitutedby auniversalprinciple.Thistruthis based on desubjectification, through attention to its history, and onthe liberation of historical contents, by examining the effect of power. Hence, we can see Enlightenmentasamatrixinwhichanetworkinvolvingpower,truthandthesubject inspireacertainpossibilityofselftransformation,anetworkinwhichaconfrontation exists between the art of being governed and that of not being governed. Foucault elucidates further how this historicalphilosophical practice is to be conducted. It is moreaphilosophicalethos,athinking,anattitude,thanafeasiblewayofbehaving.In Foucaults view, Kants critique of Enlightenment, of the understanding of the 18th 4 centuryphilosopher,israisedintermofknowledge(connaisance ),whichstartswith

Connaisance isaFrenchwordwhichmeans knowledgeinEnglish.Itistheknowledgetomultiply 8

what was the historical destiny of knowledge at the time of the constitution of modernscience(p.58).Kantianinvestigationlinkstothelegitimacyanddomination of historical modes of knowing. Foucault, however, claims that Enlightenment must berelatednottotheproblemofknowledge,buttothatofpower(p.59).Foucault callsthisasanexaminationofeventualization(ibid).TheeventofEnlightenment createsanopportunityforustoconsiderthecontentsofknowledge intermsoftheir diversity andheterogeneity,andtoviewthem inthecontextofeffectsofpowerthat are interwoven with a system of knowledgeinstead of finding out what is true or false, scientific or ideological, legitimate or abusive, as the study of conventional critical ethnographyattempts. What we can do is to examine the interplay between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge (savoir). And then there is the possibility of a breakthrough in the limits of our own savoir, which can take us beyondtheframeofourthinking. Foucaults thinking of Enlightenment is an example of his socalled fiction. However, not only Enlightenment but also any event in our own history or in our currentsituationintheethnographicalfieldcouldbethematerialofafiction.Writing andreadingafictionisaneventualization,throughwhichanexusamongpower,truth and subject is uncovered. Butler attempts to explainthe meaning ofthis fiction. For her, in terms of genealogy, fiction is constituted between power/knowledge and its fragility, between rationalization and desubjugation. There are double tasks here: in Butlersview,thefirstistoshowhowknowledgeandpowerconstitutethesystemof ordering this world. The second is to detect the breaking points, the contingent moments of this system. Therefore, through both the writing and reading of fiction, researchersandreadersmaygainacriticaldistanceonestablishedauthorityandalso instigateapracticethatrisksthesubjectatthelimitsofitsorder.Theselimitsmaybe limits of both epistemology and ontology. In this process, according to Butler, the subjectisbothcraftedandcrafting(Butler,2002,p.19).Inherview,theontology of the self is unstable in the reading and writing of fiction. She calls this an ontologicalsuspension(p.17)inwhichhumanbeingsarealwaysintheprocessof selftransformation. In the interpretation of Masschelein, fiction in Foucaults terms can be regarded as the articulation of the failure (or destruction) of the actual governmentthrough exposing its games of truth and power (Masschelain, 2006, p. 564).Forhim,truthinthisfictionisnotatruthinreality.Instead,itisatruthoutsidea

theknowableobjects,tomanifesttheirintelligibility,andto understandtheirrationality.Aninquiring subjectremainsfixedwhileheisintheprocessofit.AnotherFrenchtermsavoiruponwhich Foucaultmainly concentrates isdifferentfromthemeaningof Connaisance,thoughbothoftheir Englishtranslationsare knowledge.ForFoucault, savoir isaprocessthroughwhichonebothto modifythesubjectandtoconstructtheobject.SeeFoucault(2002),p.256. 9

regimeoftruth,soitismerelyafiction.Iconsiderthisfictionisalsoanironicfiction because its ironic gesture mocks at the collapse of governance and of dominant power/knowledge. In Masscheleins view, reading and writing a fiction is a limitexperience inFoucaultsterms.Itisanexperiencethatshowsthepossibilityof transgressingoneself,of detachingoneselffrombeinggoverned(p.572). Acriticalethnographyoftheself Iwantto trytoaddress thequestion:Howcananethnographerwriteafiction inher study?Itseemstomethatthereisnoinstructiontoguideusastohowtodothisstep by step. What we are concerned with is less a concrete research method than a philosophical ethos, an attitude or a historicalphilosophical practice, as Foucault claims. However, several ideas may contribute to the methodology of critical ethnography here. First, the aim of an ethnographer is not to engage in the direct pursuitof truthbut, onthecontrary,toconsidertheway of detachingherselffrom that truth(orauthority).Thetruthshowninherresearchisanotherdifferentkindoftruth, and this is not based on a specific rationality: its purpose is rather to delineate the orderofthisworldthrough theobservationof eacheventthathappensinthefield.On the strength of this the researcher can go further with a view to gaining a critical distance from that order, as Butler suggests. Second, while an ethnographer constitutesherfieldworkasaresearchobject,sheherselfisasubjectwhoknowsthat boththefieldandherrelationtoitaresoconstructed.Namely,sheconstitutesherself asasubjectthroughthisexploration.Hersubjectisnotfixedintheprocess,butrather, as Butler claims, is both crafted and crafting. We might say that doing critical ethnography creates the occasion for the ethnographer to change herself. This will involve a transformation of the relationship she has with her own knowledgea knowledgeofherpreviousself,aknowledgeof others,andaknowledgeofthisworld. Thisselftransformationmakespossibleacritique,adesubjectivationandanethicsof degovernmentalization(MasscheleinandSimons,2007).Itispossible,Ithink,to relateafamiliarattitudeofanthropologiststothisidea.Thisisthattheanthropologist shouldbringcuriositywithherinto thefieldinsuchawayastomakefamiliarmatters unfamiliar. The idea of the familiar suggests our unchanging habits and ways of thinking.Itcanbeseenasthelimitsofourknowledgeand,hence,ascruciallytoour wayofgoverningourselves.Theactionofmakingwhatis familiarunfamiliar might beseenasapracticeofcritique,apracticetopreventourselvesfrombeingthesame. Through this defamiliarization, a critical distance is made possible. Everything becomesnewforethnographerswithanewbeginningandanewselfmaking.Third, I would like to suggest that it is not only the field of study as constructed in

anthropological terms but also our selves and our knowledge that should be the concern of critical ethnography. This means that there are actually two fields in a criticalethnographicalstudy.Acriticalattitudeconcentratesbothontheeventsandon the self. In this respect, a critical ethnography is also a critical ethnography of the self. This critical ethnography of the self could also extend tothe readers of this fiction. Readingisanotheractionofresearch.Critiquethusbecomesacollectivepractice.For Foucault, not being governed can be both an individual and a collective attitude (Foucault, 2007, p. 67).Inthis critical ethnography of the self, this self may be a singular self or a collective self. In one of Foucaults interviews, he claims that his booksdonothaveparticularvalueinthemselves.Heseesthemratherasinvitationsor public gestures (Foucault, 2002, p. 245). Likewise, we may think, the purpose of writingafictionisnotfor toconvincereaders,butrathertoofferthemtheopportunity to reflect on themselves through this story. This reflection is related to their experience of both objectivation and subjectivation. Though this fiction might be a local and personal story, it can welcome the participation of others it can become public. Conclusion Instead of the confrontation to those forms ofoppression that arise fromhegemony andideology,Foucaultsideaofcritiquecontributesanalternativeapproachtocritical ethnography. Without presupposing truth or rationality, we may see that critical ethnographymightoffer,toborrowButlerswords,anonprescriptiveformofmoral inquiry (Butler, 2002, p. 6) that engenders a moral practice without prescription, withoutrulesandwithoutjuridicallaw.Ratherthanliberatingoppressedsocialgroups and individuals,critique isanethicalpracticeaimedat emancipatingourselves from thedominantformsof powerimposedonourownknowledge.Writingandreadingan ethnographicstorythus becomesthewritingandreadingofafiction in Foucaults terms, in such a way as to display the tension between governmentization and desubjugation, and to reveal the possibility of transgressing ones limits and of transforming oneself. Not only a local site, the self can but also be an ethnographicalfieldtobeexploredcritically within criticalethnography.


References Ball, S. J. (1994). Education reform: A critical and poststructural approach. Buckingham:OpenUniversityPress. Butler, J. (2002). What is critique? An essay on Foucaults virtue. Online at: tler.pdf (Accessedon20August2007). Carspecken, P. F. (1996). Critical ethnography in educational research. New York: Routledge. Foucault, M.(2002). Interview with Michel Foucault. In J. D. Faubion (ed.) Michel Foucault:Power(EssentialworksofFoucault19541984).London:Penguin. Foucault, M.(2007). What is critique? In L. Sylvre (ed.) The politics of truth. Los Angeles:Semiotext(e). Kincheloe, J. L. & McLaren, P. (2000). Rethinking critical theory and qualitative research.InN.K.Denzin&Y.S.Lincoln(ed.),Handbookofqualitativeresearch, 2ndedition.Chicago:Sage. Lather, P.(2001).Postmodernism, poststructuralism and post(Critical) ethnography: ofruins,aporiasandangels.InP.A.Atkinson,S.Delamont,A.J.CoffeyandJ. Lofland(ed.),HandbookofEthnography.London:Sage. Masschelein,J.&Simons,M.(2007).Degovernmentalisationofeducationandthe meaning of the public. Presented at K.U.LeuvenIoE Colloquium. Catholic UniversityofLeuven,2123May 2007.Belgium:Leuven. Masschelein, J. (2006). Experience and the limits of governmentality. Educational PhilosophyandTheory,vol.38,no.4,pp.561576. Tamboukou,M&Ball,S.J.(2003).Genealogyandethnography:Fruitfulencounters or dangerous liaisons? In M. Tamboukou & S. J. Ball (ed), Dangerous Endounters:GenealogyandEthnography.PeterLang:NewYork.