r ~

d; e~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~

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~~

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~~

t (~ ou Lk&u~ 1 SLcMia . ~ l ALYSIS

*EPORT
C 1 ! I ~
4 ~ ~~

Ortu,

ED fl ~~
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1 ~~~

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MAR

1 1978

I
I

PREP

~~ c o ~~d 101 public releos. Distribution Unliznit.d

TRIBt~~ ON STATEMENT A

OASD ,

~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-. -.-

. L Y SIS REPORT SOU~~~ AST ASIA AN~ The Southeast Asia Analysis report is produced monthly by the SEA Programs Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense , Systems Analysis. The intent of the report is to nment , studies of update and disseminate , for information and cc~ interest to those in CSD and the Services who are responsible for decisionmaking or analysis related to the conflict in Southeast Asia.
The monthly analysis report is an experimental attempt to improve the quality of analysis on SEA problems and to thcreace the audience for interesting analytical work. Over time , it will be expanded to include a wider range of topics , synopses of interesting analyses performed by other offices and rebuttals and reanalyses of previously published reports. While it will draw heavily on data fran the OSD SEA Statistical Sunmiary, it will not duplicate the content or intent of that document . In order to improve future reports , any suggestions or conm~ nts as to the format , items covered , correctness of data and conclusions d would be drawn, additional dissemination , etc., are encouraged. ax~ highly appreciated. They should be addressed to the Office of the The SEA Prog.Dlv), Assistant Secretary c,~ Defense/Systen~ Analysis ( Pentagon Washington , D.C. 20301.

U I

urn NUPO~ItEI

1Wh 1 . d~~~~~~ Iufl kctbi fJ

~~

G~ tT1l$UTlON/flAILUILITT COL* mss. a an. au

_____________________________________________

4 P

TE1WALS DOWNGRADZD *7 ~ flAB 11~ 1 2 TZ & B S DECLASS 1?I~~ A7T~~ .10 DOD DIn 5*00 OASD/SA/SEA Pro~ azna Div. May 19, 1967

C)
i I , ___

___________

i~~I StFIEf1
_ _ _ _ _ _

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

. -

. , . .. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

_ -

__________

L
Ma y 1 9 6 7 SEA ANALYSIS REPORT

Table of Contents
P~~~

H IGH L IGHTS
DEPLOY) ~ NTS VC/NVA Role of the Southern Vietmirih Cadre in South Vietnani VC Incidents in II Corps VC Incidents in IV Corps Pacification and. VC Incident Patterns... Go Cong Prdvince
-

iii

1 1

14 9

FRI ENDLY FORCES

The Strategy of Attrition Force Effectiveness in II Corps ge US Army Ground Operations in II Corps La.* RVNAF Effectiveness ECONO~~C SVN Inflation in CY 67 s Impact of Vietnam War on Balance of Payment

1 3 1 6 19 22

214

32

AIR OPERATIONS n~ry of Airc raft I Si~m~ ~ sses Aircraft Destroyed on the Ground by Hostile Action Aircra ft Ordnance Consumption IL)GISTICS AND CONSTRUCTION Ocean Cargo Shipments to Southeast Asia Air Cargo Shipments to Southeast Asia Saigon Port Y Constructiofl SUfllflar
.

314
141

145 50

(3

ii

UNCLASSIFIED
--~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~ -- --

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

S ECRET
MAY 1 9 6 7 SEA ANALYSIS REPORT HI ( 2ILIC2iTS I~~~ Approved forces for SVN rIse 14 ,000 to 1483, 0 0 0. Thailand approved strength increases by 3,1 0 0 to 144,1400. A RAND study indicates that the unpleasant experience of the southern Vietznirih cadre with the Diem regime is likely to mak e the cadre cynical about fut ur e promises of amnesty. Thi s could lead them to disobey Hanoi s instructions at the time of a peace settlement , thus jeopardizing Hanoi s control over th VC movement . ~ Despite a greater increase in friendly maneuver battalion strength in II Corps , the VC/NVA incident rate thcrc has not reacted with the strong upward trend found in I Corps , nor has the II Corps shift of incidents from civilian to military targets been as strong. Military incidents in IV Corps increased nearly 30 9 6 7, % in early 1 possibly reflecting VC reaction to the first use of U.S. cc nbat ~ troops in that area. Non-military incidents continue at levels wefl below those experienced from mid-1964 to mid-1966 . VC incidents In Go Cong Province have decreased by 7 0 % as GVN pacification efforts succeed. A study of ground combat operations shows the VC/NVA have considerable control over the numbers of casua1tie they uffer. This ~ indicates that the military goal of attriting the ~enemy forces faster than he can replac e them may be unattainable . Pacification progress in II Corps was greater than in I Corps during CY 1 966. As in I Corp s , enemy KIA rat es in II Corps cannot be predicted on the basis of increases in either friendly strength or friendly activity. PA~~ 1

14

9
1 1

1 3

( ~ \f r t /) f ~
~~~~~~

1 6

FA}

U.S. Army search and destroy operation s in II CTZ have gotten larRer but the enemy killed per battalion day In these operation s has decreased. Short operations produced between two and three times as many enemy killed per battalion day as long operationa. 1 9 The discrepancies In effectiveness of the RVNAF in I , II , and III Corps are much greater than those of the U.S. in the same Corps. The better performance of the RVNAF in I CTZ than in II and III Corps supports the contention that the Marines are doIng a better job of su pport ing and encouraging the RVNAF than is the Army.

i~ ~

4,)). f?
hJl I

~~~~

22

SECRET

iii

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~--~~~~-~~

-~ --

~~~~~~~~~~~

. . ~

______________________

SECRET
SEA ANALYSIS REPORT HIGHLI GHTS
MAY 1 967

6 7 6%. Total CY 19 CY 19 6 7 inflation through April 30 has been 1 inflatIon can be held to 25% . Estimates of the impact of the Vietnam conflict on the U.S. balance of payments are grossly overstated. An end to the war will not end the deficit . OSD April Best Estimate of fighter and attack aircraft predicts 2333 losses through December 1969 , compared to 2770 predicted by the December Plan, a reduction of 1437 aircraft . Pr imary reason is lower attack loss rates in NVN. Fifty-one aircraft have been destroyed on the ground in SEA by enemy action from July 1965 through March 1967 . Thirty-five of the fifty-one los t were helicopters. April air ordnance consumption totaled 76, 7 0 0 tons. Level-off expenditures in SEA still predicted at 8i ,000 tons. h level as March. nc hi.i~ Ocean shipments to SEA maintained the s a~ Shipments to SVN increased by iO% hitting a new peak ; shipments to other SEA areas declined.

24

~ .

32

31~

141

43
145 146

3D( I&L ) has establishe d. Air shipments to SEA continue tc increase. A~ controls to eliminate unnecessary air shipments. AID/Con~nercia 1 cargo sector of Saigon Port 1; in best comdition in a year . Cargo backlog is equal to only one week s work. Construction in support of SEA operations is 51 % complete as of ~ for construction projects in The cost overrun March 30 , 1967. SVN dropped by $14 million in March, but still totals $14]. million .

50

SECRET

iv

4.

-- . -

~~~~~ -

&t_ ;. ns s ~~~~~~ ~~ a ~. ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~

- --

SECRET
DEPLOYMENTS TO S~ JT1~ AST ASIA
Program #11 End Strengths for SVN end ThaIland have increased 7100 spaces during the past month. The approved June 30, 1968 strength in 0 0; the approved Thailand strength South Vietnam rose from 1479, 100 to 1483, 1 from 141, 30 0 to 1i4 ,1400. The following table shows the South Vietnam increase by Service. PROGRAM #Z& STRENGTH FOR SVN Previously Approved Army Navy Marines Air Force Total 1 0 0 322 , 30,000 0 0 0 71, 56 ,000
-

JUNE 30, 1 968

J ~

Currently Approved 1400 322, 30,000 7 4, 5 00 56,200 0 0 4t33,1

/ ~

Increase 30 0
-

0 0 1179, 1

3,500 200 4,000

W / ~

Program # 4 through Change 25, 19 April 1967 Program #4 through Change 33, 17 May 1967

The increase in the approved SVN strengths was the result of two decisions:

a. On 12 April 1 967, the Secretary of Defense approved an increase of 350 0 for the Marine Corps in SVN to offset outof-country non-effective personnel and keep combat units near full strength. b. On 8 May 1967, the Secretary of Defense approved additional forces for PRACTICE NINE , of which 1478 personnel are authorized for SVN ( 336 Army and 1142 AIr Force). The table below shows the increase in approved strengths for Thailand by Service . PROGRAM #11 STRENGTH FOR THAILAND Approved Army USN , U SMC , CG
-

JUNE 30, 1 968 Increase 300 2, 8 0 0 1 0 0 3,

PrevIously
1 1 ,000 5 0 0

Currently Approved 11, 3 0 0 500 , / 32 ,600 ~ 114, 1400

Air Force

29,800

4 1, 30 0

Does not reflect temporary deployment of Navy SP-2 Squadron (331 personnel) from November 1967 to March 1968. 1

SECRE T
-. ~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SECRET
The Air Force strength increase is associated with the Secretary of Defense 8 May 196 7 decisIon on PRACTICE NINE and includes an EC-l21 W ing an d an F~14 Squadron. The Army increase includes 39 personnel associated with PRACTICE NINE . Other approve d Army increas e s are an ASA Detachment ( 77 personnel), a Personnel Services Company (73 personnel), and a Logistic Support Command Headquarters ( 57 personnel).
The preliminary MACV strength report for April indicates that the plan (Prog ram #4 through Change #33) was exceeded by approxImately 13,300 as shown below: APRIL 196 7 STRENGTH TN SVN Pla nne d Army Navy Marines Air Force 273.6 26 . 1 714. 0 14 55 . Actual 285.9 25.9 711.1 Difference +12.3 2 - . + .1 + 1.1 +13. 3

56.5

The Army overstrength of 12, 3 0 0 was the second successive month the Army exceeded Pro gra m #14 by a sizeable margin; Army Ma rch overstrength was 17, 800. MACVs explanation was that there had been a change In reporting procedures for handling transients and patients. There also had been an excess of approximately 8 ,600 In divI dual replacements over losses. Strength reports through Army channels , however , show a somewhat different picture . April Army reports show an overstrength of 5,6 0 0 (includi ng patients and TDY)as compared to the MACV reported overstrength of 12 , 3 0 0. Since 9 7. 2 per cent of the reported Army strength for SVN is in Army- units assigned to USARV , the reasons for such discrepencies are not apparent. The Department of the Army has tasked USARPAC to resolve the differences between the two reports. This matter will also be discussed at the CINCPAC Strength Accounting Conference to be held 22-25 May 1967.

SECRET

-p._

__ ~~~~~

- ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~

SECR ET
RAND recently publiahed* a study of the Vietzni.nh cadres who remained in the South after the ceasefire of 19514 . Based on intervi ews with 1 7 prisoners and 6 defectors , the study describes the treatment of these staybehinds by the Diem government , their relationship to the second resistence , and the implicat ions for our ability to negotiate a peace settlement with Hanoi. Some of the Vietminh cadres who remained in the South after 1 954 actively responded to the discipline and control of the Vietminh leaders in &.noi. These actives organized and propagaridized but did not terrorize. However , many other former Vietminh broke their connections with the Vietminh organization . Their sentiments ranged from loyalty to the Vletminh to hostility. To check the potential threat from former Vietminh , Diem began to identify and control Communist elements in 1955. The former Vietminh saw this program as a campaign of terror , particularly as enforced in the rural areas . Many former Vietminh and their families , whether active or inactive , were harassed and persecuted by local enforcement agents. While the campaign damaged the Communist apparatus and its excesses may not have been intended by the central authorities (they were not evident in Saigon), the Diem regime lost the trust of many potential supporters among the former Vietmirth . The surviving active cadres among the staybehinds , later reinforced by Vietminh returning from North Vietnam , -wer e able to recruit those previously inactive in a new revolutionary and inteliigence network. Their experience in the war against the French enabled them to make , to maintain and expand base areas for training, later serving as military jumping off points. The experience of the stayb ehinds from 1951460 will probably affect b oth VC and NVN views on a settlement of the war . They are like ly to be cynical about future promises of amnesty. Hanoi also may fear that the VC might disobey Hanois instructions because of the Diem experience. Thus , Hanoi may see a peace treaty as a threat to its control over the Viet Cong movement in the South.

ROlE OF T~~ SOU~~~RN VIE~~~NH CADRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

RM5163-IS A/ ARPA,March 1 9 6 7: OrigIns of the Insurgency in South Vietnam , 195141960: The role of the South Vietminh Cadres .

SE CRET

SECRET
VC/NVA INC~~ENTS IN II CORPS Despite a greater increase in friendly maneuver battalions in II Corps, the VC/NVA incident rate there has not reacted with the strong upward trend found in I Corps , nor has the II Corp s shift of incidents from civilian d to military targets been as strong . However , the pattern of II Corps a ~ 1 Corps incidents against hamlets and lines of communications ar e very similar . In I CTZ Table 1 and graph A show that incidents have steadily increased from l-1.36/mo since the entry of U.S. troops to five times their previous rate ( S. to 2180/mo). II CTZ incident rates , however , doubled after the entry of U. troops , dropped back to previous rates and then doubled again in JanuaryFebruary of this year (graph B ) . Graph C shows military incident s compared with growth in friendly battalion strength in II Corps . When U. S. forces entered II Corps , 28% or all II Corp s incidents were directed at military targets; this rose to 147% by January-February 1967. In I Corps, military incidents rose from 25% to 8 3% of the total . In II Corps , the shift to military incidents has been slower than the friendly force buildup. II Corp s maneuver battalion strength increased 2. 2 time s between the entry of U .S. forces and first quarter l967~ the proportion of military incidents increased only 1.7 times. In I Corps , 8 times ; the proportion of military incimaneuver battalions increased 1. dents increased 3. 3 times. TABLE 1 (Monthly Average by quarter ) 19 6 6 1 96 5 l1.th 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 3rd tr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr ~ I CORPS Military Incident s Other Incidents Total Mu as 126 321 14147 28 1 0 8 168 2147 328 1436~[1.1.15 25 140 800 282 B~~ 10k32 362 14141 145

3rd Qtr

~~~ Qtr

1967 Jan
-

Feb

of Total

714

1 11 4 11143 1 817 1 8 13 2614 2143 366 1 75 1 31 8 1 378 iO6~ 21 7 9

87

81

77

83

Maneuver Bns bJ II CORPS Military Incidents Other Incidents Total . as Mi] 79 29~ 3714 21

1 . 0 115.1 29. 8 35. 3 4 3 35. 814 3142 .1426 20 1 2 1 152 360 308 f 512 4 29 s 28 25.8 30 3214 ~1O 8314 39 1 68

52.8 1514 258 1412 37

52.8 114]. 215 35~ 140

514.0

333

501 311.

1419 1~7

368

787

of Total

Maneuver Bus Source : NMCC VCJSA Introduction of W Weighted: U.S. / Introduction of /

4. 0 49. 36.8 141,0 4 3 57. 7 7 57. 0.59, ROK 1 , ROK MC 1.5.

File III MAF 8 March. Army = 1, USMC = 1.5, ARVN U.S. Army in JtU.y.

L.

~~ r_ ~~~~~~~~~~

f l

. ~~~~~~~~~ ~~nr

st_

~~~~

-~~

i a

SECRET
GRAPH A
I CORPS

vA INCIDENTS vc/I~ (Monthly Average)

II CORPS

GRAFrI B

20 0 0 17 50
1 500

,
.
, .

20OO~~ l75O~~ ,

.
.

.
To a].

1 500 . 1 250 . 1000 . 750 . Tta .

1 250 1 00 0 750

I
,

/ 1

I
ar

\ 1~~ .
.

/ / 1 ~~ :
. p

MI

~~ ~~ 1 967

].Q 2Q 3Q 4Q ].Q 2~~3Q I#Q lQ

1 965 1 966

1967

l Q 2 ~~3Q~~~~i Q2 ~~3Q~~~~1 Q
1965 1 966

Incidents involving fixed and rotary wing aircraft in II Corps (Table 2) have fluctuated with the peaks and declines of the overall incident rate , with a sharp increase in January-February 1967. In contrast , I Corps incident s increased and remained at high levels throughout 1 966 , reaching an extremely high rate (2240 per month) in January-February 1967 . Reported incident s involving helicopters alone (excluding fixed wing) also fluctuated at low levels in II Corps instead of growing to the sustained high rates in I Corps . Helicopter incidents in II Corps peaked at 1 1% (173) of the total In JanuaryFebruary 1 967 in contrast to the I Corps rate of about 27% throughout 1 966.

no incidents against company size or larger military units were reported. In li th quarter 1965, 23 suc h incidents occurred per month and in 1st quarter 1 966

1 966 at 165 per month or 21% of the total. Before 14th quarter 196 5 virtuaLLy

Incidents against military units and personnel peaked in 1 st quarter

SECRET
5

-S~~

. ~~~ ~~t -

. : ,

. . . . . U

_h ~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- .~~

SECRET
they peaked at

February 196 7. i1 ~ I Corps incidents against company sized and larger units started at a rate of 27 per month, rose to 575 per month ( 3rd quarter 1 966) and declined to 1480 per month in January-February 1 967 .

88 per month and then declined to 36 per month in January--

1400

Graph c I I C~~ Military Incidents

-.

~~~~

Graph D II CFZ Nonmilitary Incidents vs. Battalions 4 0 0

360 320 2 8 0 2140 . . Mi . it . r ~ 1e (1 -ft sc ~ *

..9 0 I
I

80 . 70
.

: ~d n e ve I I B
t~
I
~

2 8 0 2140
.

70

~ / 1

60

160 1 2 0
80

(
di
.

/ ,
~ .

50

lar Ui r Bns rt sc l.~##

.6 0 . 50
.

~~~~~~~~~~~

40
30

;1 I
Mi . it r~ t l~ ~

16o

I .ifl. ts let c~~. e)

~ ,
80

/
,

/
~~~~

140 30

140

. ,

/4

20

c~ .e)

1 0

-.

. ~~~

~ 7 ~

~ ft ~

sc

le

20
1 0

~~

. ,

Q 1Q 2Q 3~~ 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 11.Q 1 1 966 1 967 1 965

4 lQ 2Q 3~~ 11.Q lQ lq ~ 2 Q 3 ~~ 1 1966 1 967 1965

SECRET
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

_ I
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

- -.-

- - -~~

-. - - ~~~~~~~ - -

- -

~~

SE CRET
Graph D shows two groups of non-military incidents (against hamlets and against lines of c ommunication ) compared with the growth in battalion strength. II Cor~ s activity against LOCs (roads , railroads , bri dges , et c . ) appears inversely related to the buildup and follows a pattern very similar to I Corps. LOC incidents peaked at 20% of all incidents ( 8 7 out of 1428) in the same quarter the U. S. buildup began (3rd quarter 19 6 5 ). By 1st quarter 196 7 these incidents had dropped to less than 1 % of all incidents ( 7 out of 7 8 7 ). The decrease is probably due to the fact that most of Highway 1 in II Corps and the railroad along the coast now lie within the Korean and U .S. coastal Tactical Areas of Operation. Exactly as in I Corps , the number of incidents against hamlets reached a sustained high level in 1964 , declined in 1965 by more than 50% and by the beginning of 196 6 had returned to 1963 levels .

7
.

SECRE T
___

, ~~

SECRET
TABLE 2

II CORPS INC~~ENTS (Monthly Average by Quarter)

19 6 3

1Q

2Q

3Q

I4Q

lQ

2Q

3Q
114 1 15 1 29 2214 2 1 ~ 14914

14Q

19 6 5 lQ

2Q

3Q

1 ~

INCIDENTS INVQLVING: 1 Military

Aircraft

Other .W

Subtotal

15 50 6 5 22

1 6

45

6 1 24

60

62

] . 3 ) 4 1 ~ 1 71 4 1 7 9 1 8 5 19 3 2 2 2 2 0 50 29 2 1 6 8

25 1 09 14 1 3

66

3 . 2 78

1 9 6 0

27

79 148

57 814

3.21

35 86

Non-Military Hamlets .rril

LOCs Obbtr Subtotal

~3

14 37

~6

5 37

85

6 36

143

266

63

35

1 7 9 36 2

1 66 1 7

57

132 1144 31411

68

1 3 7 1] . .1

296

75 ]7 ~ 3142
1426
20

no

146
3. 714 307

87

% Military
Source:

TOTAL

of Total

1 28 51

127 48

1147

11. 2

1477 39

1459

11. 2

1496

27

623

2 1

1422 1 8

375

2 ] .

1428

28

5]

/ ~ / ~ / ~

NMCC V~JSA File Includes helicopters. ~~ Includes outposts , facilitIes , camps, bIvouac units , personnel , , cosipany or larger and less than c~ npany. Includes NBL Hamlet , security fences , hamlets. Includes roads , all br idges , BR tracks and facilities , cctnmunication lines.

SECRET

________________
- .

-~~~

-- __

~~~~~

~ TS Quarter)
-

~~ - . ~~~~~

SECRET

14

lQ

2Q

3Q

IIQ

1 Q

2Q

3~

l#Q

1Q

2Q

3Q 87 67 25 27

~ eb

. i i 1714 185

1 7 9 19 3

1 4

1 09 1311.

25

1 4 115

1 29 1. 221 21 ~ 14914

12 66 78
132 11i.4

1 9 60 79
1 3 7 1 1 1

27 35 86 ~~ 121 614
1 10 1 5 7

152

68 814 47

159 167 146 1#9

3214

57 1 1 1 36 145

1 68

1511

~0 114 1.

91

278
366

~0

222 1 6 8 2 0 35 50 63 292 ~~~~

1 7 9

1 66 1 7

57

68

148

75

362 496
27

345

296

3142

1714

87

146

307

50 2614

361

4 i ~

510

252

333

2C~

258
141 2

~~6

1 67-

35 114

38 7 74 ~ ~ 4 19 787 147

477 39

1459 42

623

2 1

1422

1 8

375

2 1

426

20

1428

28

513

30

834 39

501 314

37

357

14i~

Lvouac , units , personnel , Imlets. m d facilities , c mninication lines. ~~

SECRET

~T

1 T -

--

T -~ --

-- -

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

S ECRET
ENEMY INC ThENTS IN IV CORPS The introduction of U.S. combat force s into IV Corps early thi s year may have sparked a sharp reaction by the Viet Cong . January and February 1 967 incident rates In IV CTZ were up nearly 30% over the levels of a year earlier and the last quarter of C? 19 6 6. Total military and civilian incidents per month almost matched the peak level of the final quarter of 1965 ( 8 6 6 vs 8 8 6 ) . The high rate in early 1967 Is due to a new peak in military incidents ( 7 1 40 vs 651); non-military incidents were below the levels of the past two years . Aircraft incidents account for most of the increase; the 272 Incidents were 1 0 ] .over the Oct-Dec 19 6 6 level and 193 over the level of a year ago. This increase in aircraft incidents continues the generally upward pattern of the -past 14 yecrs. The pattern has been one of sharp increases to new levels: a jump from 17 to 50 ( 19 4 % increase )in the 2nd quarter of 19614; an increase from 52 to 103 ( 9 8 % increase )in the 14th quarter of 1965; and a jump from 103 to 171 (66% increase)in the 14th quarter of 1966. A further increase of 59% took place during the first two months of this year . These increases reflect the increases in tactical air and helicoptt r ~ sorties that have occurred during this period . For example , helicopter flyirti hours in IV CTZ thereased from 11, 8 0 0 in the 14th quarter of 1 7 00 965 to 16, during the 2nd quarter of 1 96 6 and about 21,000 per quarter during the last half of i966. Other factors may be changes in VC tactics and availability of new weapons and ammunition . Among non-military targets in IV corp. t ~~ overall trend is downward: 1 2 6 per month in the 1st two months of this year compared to 2 0 0 per month during CY 196 5. Hamlets and villages were primary objects from April 1963 through June 19614. Beginning in Jul y 1 96 14 , the emphasis shifted to sabotage (against roads , brIdges , and railroad facilities), which suddenly and sharply increased ( 61 % increase over the previous quarter s sabotage a2 level) as incidents against hamlets and villages took a downward turn (from 52% to 32% of non-military incidents).

. -

SEC RE T

- _________________________________________ .-- ..-

-- - --- --------~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- --.. ,----.------- , , ~~

- - -

-.-- - ~ ~~ ~

-- --

- ---- .------.- - . - ------.-- . - - ------- . . . ~~ ~~~~ ~ ~~~~

SECRET
U
INCIDENTS IN IV CTZ ( Monthly Average by Quarter)

1 9 6 4 _1 Q Incidents Invo1ving~ Military 2Q

3Q

14Q

1 Q

2Q

3~

1 Q

2Q

Aircraft
Outposts

b J

3.1

6
72

1 2
1 36

1 0
230

17
1 1 6
61

50
1 70 51
2 7 3 .

711.
36 1 55
1490

36
914

37

38
144 7 77 562

37 146
91 4

385 397 93 515 527 32 ~~ 25

Personnel & Units Subtotal Non-Military Hamlet & VIllages

73 1 51

73 22].

94

331e 1914

LI

1 3 2

81 14

95

77 23 2 102

149 21 3 73

65
32 27 1214

69
1 1 8 28
21 5

55 91 28

143 1 15 53
2 1 1

Roads, Bridges & RB e/

Civilians Subtotal

1 6
12
_ ._

6
21

1 5
1 0 0
-

123

, -~~~~~~ -~~~~~~~

ii -1514 Jli _ __ .

% Military
Total
Source:

TOTAL

of

11 5

251 60

3111i

67 1436 2

395 69

705 70

669 701

773 73

82

61e

77

73

77

75

~ / ~ c/
( ~~

Includes helicopters Include s watchtaiuers

N)CC V~JSA Pile

j ~/ ~

Includes hamlets, NRL Hamlets and. facilities, secw ity fences. Includes vehicular and railroad brid~es, rai lroad trac ks and facilities Includes official s and Inhabitants.

SECRET

10

/
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

- - ~~~~~~~~~~~~

________

-~~

-~~-

-_,- -

fl--

i)

~~~~~

SECRET
1 9614
_ _ _ _ _

1 965 3Q
IeQ 1 Q

1 966 14Q 1Q Jan-Feb

2Q

1 2

1 0 230

1 7

50 170
5].
2 7 3 .

71 i

36

37

38

52

103

79 76

85 143o 1 1 8 633
29
1140

103 260 72 1435

1 7 76 27 1 20

1 71
275

136 73
2 21

1 1 6
6].

27 2
330

361 55
11 9 0

385 397 914

515

1447 77
562

328 6o 14140
28

li79 385 69
651 5140 141 214

94

93
527

93 539
21 87 27 1 35 . 671~

1 38 7~O
29 62 35 126

3311 1911.

95 i6
-

77

49 21
3
-

65

69

32

55

143

23
2

32
27 1 214

1 1 8
28 23.5
-

~~
25

9].
28

1 1 5
53
21 1

~O1~
37 169

1141 53
2~~

63 60
11 47

3.2
-

50 ~~~

123 _ 102

73

1 54 1714

Ji. 31 ~

64

67 36 2 77 73

395 69

705
70

669 701 77 75

773 73

609 72

886 687 73 79

852 74

555 78

866 85

80

ty fences. es , sectui ailroad track s and facilities

RET

1 . 0

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SEC RET
GO CONG PROVIN CE

PACIFICATION All]) VC ACTIV I TY

sharp increase their control. progress leads Province in IV

A number of logical theses on changes in patterns of VC incidents In an area undergo in g p ac ificat ion could be developed. One might be a

thesis .

in actions as the VC reacted to GVN efforts to increase An alternative hypothesis would be that pacification to an over-all drop in incident rates. Data on Go Cong Corps , a province making rapid progress , supports th is latter

When an area is pacified by t~~ GVN significant change s in incident pattern s should occur . The nature of the change probably differs depending on the str ength of the VC , the approach taken by the GVN , etc. As a preliminary study of how activity patterns change , Go Cong , a province In northeastern IV Corps , was examined. Go Cong Province was created in January 19614 when it was separated from Dinh Thong Province. GVN efforts have increased its control in Go Cong from essentially 0 % to about 50 % and progress is continuing. Therefore , Go Cong appears to be a good t e st of the changes in VC activity as an area is successfully pacified. Objects of VC Incidents Table 1 examines the objective of VC incidents since Go Cong was created in 1961+. Total numbers of actions have dropped sharply since Jan 1 966 , averaging 146 per quarter compared to 1 70 per quarter In 19614 and 132 in 1965. Incidents against military objects decreased until the f i n al quarter of 196 6 when a sharp jump occurred; the ~ lst quarter 1 967 level was even higher. The primary cause of this rise was an increase in Incidents against aircraft. This may merely reflect a large increase in aircraft sorties in the area or it may be indicative of changes in VC ta c tics and equipment . In any event aircraft incidents would appear to have little if any impact on the study. If these are excluded , the military incident level would be stable from early 196 6 to the present.
-

Incidents against civilian targets and transportatIon/communication s targets tended to increase in 19614 and early 1 96 5 and declined steadily since . One target that has been struck more frequently is waterborne craft. This may reflect the greater use of waterways since the province began to be secured or it may reflect greater activity by GVN/US forces (such as GAI WARDEN) which draw VC fire . The data are not adequate to provide any insight as to the reasons for this Increase. A d at~ file recently automated by the JCS Nation al MIlitary Command Center ( NM Cc) may provide a new tool to evaluat e pacification progress. This 966), file , based on a study of VC incidents by WSEG (Staff Study 122, May 1 permits detailed examination of VC incident patterns by province using two type of measures: 1) 36 categories of actions (e.g., attack , harrassin g and 2) 3 categories of the objective of the action (e.g., fire, sabotage) military un it , outpost ,~road). The data are very detailed and can be NIVICC file VCJSA ) sorted and viewed in Innumerable ways. (

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1 1

- *- r ~~~~~~ - ~~~~

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TABLE

1
______________

VIET CONG INCIDENTS - GO CONG H~ OVINCE

~~~~

:1

SECRET
1964 let 2nd Qtr 3 Military Watch Tower, Outposts AIrcraft Police , Military Personnel & Units Other Subtotal Civil Eamlete&VIllsges Civil Facilities Civl.l Officiala Other Subtotal. Trsaaportation/Cc ~~ in4caticas Roads & Bridies Lsrid Vebielea Wa t. rVebicles
_ _ _ _ _ _

3rd Qtr 106 13 1 6 1. 1 36 3 14 5 5 17 155

. ] ~~

14th tr Q~ 141. 6 11 0 58 1 2

1965 1st 2nd Qtr Qtr 43 3 26 14 76 23 4 14 5 30 5 21

3rd ~tr 9 1 8 1 1 9 2 14 ]. 3 10 142

4th Qtr 4 ~ 8 11 2 67 6 -

1 9 6 6 let 2nd Qtr Qtr 13 3 9 15 14 11

3rd Qtr 14 1

4th ~tr 5 10

let Q! ~~ 6 1 6 1 8

7 6 1 11

514 5
1 2

820

88

7]. 2 2 3 1+ 11

3
59 9

30 2 5 7 9

13 2

35 1 1 14

140 2 5 14

25 i 2 1 14 lIe

5
1 6 32 1 2

5
2 10

3
2 11 142

31 71

] .14 7 2

2
-

2 . . . . L

33
14 6

33 5
1

Other Sub total.

1.

79

1.

1 1

1 21

11,

25

lIe 2 14

12

Total

1.29

35

43 125

1 66 31 9

39
l(Y7

77
150

142 71

143

114

20

16

1 8 6

143

51

59

61

12

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- - -- -, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ *~

I
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.---- ~~

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SECRE T
TI ~ STRATEGY OF ATTRITION

MACV s brIefings and public statements emphasize the goal of attriting enemy forces faster than the enemy can recruit and infiltrate replacements. Is th is emphas is p ract ical or wise? Many sen ior off icers have noted that th e enemy fades into the jungle and refuses to fight when faced with superior forces. Some make the stronger statement that the enemy only fights at a time and place of his own choosIng. If these statements are largely true , and if the enemy s objective In fighting is to harrass and outlast us, he is unlikely to fight so hard as to allow us to deplete his forces.
Because the enemy s degree of control over the pace of the action determines how well he can control his attrition , we have analyzed the degree of the enemy s tactical initiative . We classified 56 platoon-sized and larger fire-fights in 1 9 6 6 according to how they developed. The data is base d on deta iled acc ounts in I , II , an d I I I CTZ , as compiled by S.L.A. Marshall and P.3. West , under Service sponsorship.

TABLE I
TYPE

OF ENGAGEMENT S DESCRIBED IN COMBA T NARRATIVE S

Nr. of Percent of Percent Engagements Total Subtotals

Category Description

battlefield .

1 . Hot landing Zone. Enemy attacks U. S. troops as they deploy onto the

7 17

1 2.5 30.14

2. Organized enemy attack against a U.S. static defense perimeter . 3. VC/NVA ambush or encircle and surprise a moving U.S. unit , using what is evidently a preconceived battle plan.
ii. A moving U. S. unit engages the enemy in a dug-in or fortifIed position: a. The main engagement comes as a virtual surprise to the American tactical commander because the enemy Is well concealed. and has been alerted eithe r by observations of our unit or by our engaging apparent stragglers near-by .

13

66.2

reasonably accurate knowledge of enemy posItions and strength bef ore comm itt ing his forces.

b. The U.S. tactical commander has

78.7

3 5 8.9
1 0 0 . 1

5. U.S. unit ambushes a moving enemy unit.

6. Chance engagement , both sides surprised. TOTAL

814.1

14

1 3

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SECR ET

The enemy willingly and knowing ly stood and fought a pitched battle in 147 (814% ) of the 56 battle s (Categories 1-14 in Table I). The enemy ambushed and assaulted our forces in 37 (66% ) of the cases; the enemy had the advantage of surprise in T other cases ( 1 2%)in which U.S. forces were moving against him.
-

The 10 cases in which a moving US unit engaged a dug-in enemy (Category 14) warrants further discussion. Typically , during the 7 engagements of Category Iea, American units pressed forward into combat after events made them aware of enemy presence . Our company and platoon commanders in these narratives often strived to take immediate advantage of what seemed to be an inviting situation without fully reconnoitering enemy forces and positions . The enemy appeared to be caught in an unaware or straggling condition that viewed in hindsight may have been a lure. Clearly, the enemy chose these occasions to fight. Usually he was badly beaten. In the future he may not be so willing, and. we may not be able to kill so many. The 3 cases in Category 14b were instances when the American commander engaged enemy positions while possessing accurate knowledge of both the enemy force and its position. Common to 144 of the 56 cases ( 7 8 . 7 % )in the first three categories and 14a is the element of enemy surprise with regard to time , position, or strength; the American tactical commander was put at an initial disadvantage by enemy initiative . The entire picture is not consistent with the successful prosecution of a strategy to force attrition upon the enemy against his will. After Action Reports. COMUSMACV requires that an After-Action Report be written by the responsible commander after every significant operation. These reports constitute the most comprehensive official source of information available on ground operations . Reports covering 7 7 U.S. operations terminating from January through October 19 o f1 8 6 total) 6 6 were reviewed ( KIA-body count plus captured) to determine what percentage of VC/NVA losses ( occurred in combat resulting from enemy initiative or active willingness to engage at the tactical level. Enemy mortar attacks , sniping, and attempts to over-run our perimeters are examples of the overt action which indicated that he sought combat . The pertinent portions of the reports are the narrative accounts, which vary in quality and detail. There was sufficient information to permit classification of only 38% ( 36 0 0 of 91458) of the enemy casualties; in the other cases the enemy casualties in the body count are unexplained by the nar rat ives , or are covered by narratives too vague to be interpreted in the present context. Table 2 shows that of the classifiable enemy casualties, 6 2% occurred In actions where the enemy sought the initial contact.

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TABLE 2 SSES ON ENE24Y INITIATIVE AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL DEPENDENCE OF ENEMY II) JANUARY THROUGH OCTOBER 1 966 Enemy KIA & Cpt informatively described as to occurrence Category I - Those enemy Casualties occurring when enemy sought initial contact . Cat egory II Subtotal Other
-

1 ,982 (62% )

Thos e en emy Casualties occurring when enemy did not seek initial contact . Category I plus Category II Those enemy Casualties resulting from air, arty, mines , etc., and not classifiable above.

1 ,233 ( 38 %)
215 ( 1 00 %) 3,

385
3, 600

ARCOV Stu dy Re sults

Independently, the Army Combat Operations - Vietnam study 1 which analyzed a different set of battles in late 1 6 6, found that 146% of the 96 5 and early 19 fights begin as enemy ambushes and that the enemy starts the fight in 88 ~ of the cases; moreover , it found that 63% of the infantry targets encountered were personnel in trenches or bunkers . Conclusion: During 1966 most of the enemy attrition depended upon his willingness to engage . His aggressive and offensive tactics were obvious in ambushes both at landing zones and as our units moved forward on sweeps . It~ ant i cipated our tactics , produced subst antial U .S. casualties , and decided the losses he was willing to taka While more effective U.S. techniques probably can increase enemy attrition , we must recognize that U.S. ground units do not have the tactical initiative in most encounters at present. Enemy attrition in 196 6 was largely the result of his seeking combat , not the result of combat forced upon him . Continued large-scale enemy attrition remains subject to his willingness to fight. Should the enemy f in d that h is attr it io n has re ached a rate unaccepta ble to h im , he can avoid combat use more mortar and rocket attacks , res ort t o smalle r guerrilla-life actions , or rely increasingly upon isolated acts of terrori sm. Givei such an enemy decision , and, without a change in the tactics employed by U.S. forces, a strategy of attrition cannot be prosecuted successfully.

15

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A ir

-~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ S

- a ~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~

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FORCE EPFECTI VEN~~S IN II CORPS

Pacification progress in II Corps was greater than in I Corps during CT 1 9 6 6. As in I Corps (s ee April SEA Analysis Report) enemy KIA rates in I I Corps cannot be predicted on the basis of increases in either friendly strength or fi iendly activity. ~
Population Control* Table 1 shows an increase of 3142 0 0 0 people in the II Corps secured , category in contrast to I Corps decrease of 8, 8 0 0. TA.BLE 1 CIVILIAN ~~RJLATION CONTROL IN II CORPS (thousands) i96 s 14th 3rd 1st ~tr 1 9 6 6 2nd 3rd Qtr Qtr 4th Qtr End 1966End 19 6 5

Qtr

Qtr

Secured 2 0 1 . 13 + 314 2 937 10 07 9 1 36 2 07 9 1 3 1 Undergoing Securing 1 1 2 U6 7 2 1 7 1 155 1 + 20 3 6 Undergoing Clearing 7 0 0 788 09 8 78 8 825 789 20 Uncontested 1 0 26 + 22 7 32 9 53 VC Control 2 7 7 9 678 6114 ~8 142 5 253 ~99 Total 2 613 26 514 27144 33 26 1 ] . + 1 ~5 2673 26 ~ In c~ irparing I Corps and II Corps in the VC control category, II Corps again was ahead--a decrease of 253, 0 0 0 persons under VC control versus 217, 0 0 0 persons for I Corps. Since II Corps had a slightly faster rate of increase in friendly maneuver battalion strength , the average reduction in the VC controlled population per battalion per month were essentially equal: 1 1, 0 0 0 in II Corps versus 1 0, 7 0 0 in I Corps.
-

Enemy KIA
II Corps data In Table 2 and graph A show no correlation between enemy KLk and increases in friendly battalion strength. Table 2 and graph B also indicate that we cannot predict future enemy KIA rates from previous trends in battalion days of operations and small unit actions with contact. Pacification progress in II Corps cannot be measured in terms of increases in the Tactical Areas of Responsibility ( TAOR). An Army TAOR Is a base area; the ene my main forces are outsi d e the TAORs . The USMC TPLOR is an area in which the Marines operate ; they raise security inside gradual ly expanding T&ORs.

i6

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- ~~~-

-~

______________________

,,_r. . , , , ,._ ~

, ~

_z r;__ . , r..,. ._ j ~~~~~~ ~ -

, , ,

_ ~~

-en a ~~~~~~~ . ~~~~ns ~ ._._

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SE CRET
The two peaks in enemy KIA are due to two large operat ions in each of the two quarbers. In 1st quarter 196 6 Operations VAIlBUREN and MASHER/ WRITE WING accounted for 1701 enemy 1(1k or 131 per week of the 401 weekly average for that quarter. Operations I and SAM HOUSTON killed ~~AYER I 2400 ene~~ in let quarter 1967, or 185 of the 4 4 ] . weekly average If the enemy had chosen to fight in thos e qua rters as he fought in the others , his losses would have been 270 and 256 per week , respectively. The average for the seven quarters would have been 300 per week , with a range of only 50 per week.

TABLE 2

3Q
Enemy 1(1k per week Battalion Days Operation Small Unit Ac~ j, on v/Contact Maneuver Bus ~1

1965

eq

lQ
1401

2Q
335

19 6 6

3Q

eQ
31e9

196 7 lQ 1441

T ~
~~

1 466 1817 276 2 28 87 31147 4097 14987 0]. 2146 207 / 3014 348 1413 2 2l1 ~ 25.8 36.8 141. 0 414. 0 49.3 57.7 57.7

29 0

317

276

Weighted: U.S. Army = 1 , ARVN .59, ROK 1, ROK MC 1.5. U.S. Army did not report Small Unit Actions w/Contact after Septeither

1 966.

SECRET

17

SECRE T
Graph A

Grap h B Enemy KIA vs Friendly

Enemy KIA vs Friendly

6c
-

Strength

Activity

Maneuver Battalions (left scale) 50

/
140~

/
1400

5000 -

Opn (left / scale) #-

Btn Dys

3O~

14ooo

J ~
/

\ 4 s al 300 ~ ~ V

3~~~ -

3Oo ~

AX
-coo
2 0 0 0
-

20.

(right scale) 10
-

Actions w/con

Small Unit

~~~

1 00

:2000

OC)

1k l~ 3~ 1e~ 1 ~ 3~ ~ 2 65 66 66 66 66 67 65

6~ ~

k% l ~ ~ 6566

66 66 66 67

2 ~

34

~~

18

SEC RET
_ _ _ _ _ _

, I

_ -~

~~-

__-_

,-

_ . _-_

- _ -___ _

__

- r ~~~

__

_ _ , ~_ ~

SECRET
The U. S. Army conducted 60 search and destroy operations in II Corps fran August 196 5 to March 196 7 , using over 75% of the battalion days of operation (the rest were used for security operations). The iearch and destroy operations killed (body count) 114, 5 2 6 VC/NVA in 7, 055 battalion days of operation - 2.1 K1A per battalion day. However , while the average number of battalion days per operation and the average number of battalions committed per operation has increased steadily, the enemy killed per battalion has decreased equally as sharply since the 1st quarter of 196 6 . (See Table i .) The lowest point occurr ed in the 3rd quarter of 196 6, the same quarter in which there was the highest average of battalions committed per operation. (See graphs) The lest two quarters of 196 5 seem to represent a period of learning for both the enemy and the U. S. In the subsequent period between January 1, 196 6 and April 5, 1 967 tl e U. S. Army started and completed 32 search and destroy operations ~in II Corps . Table 2 ~~ groups these operations according to size , both in terms of battalions committed and battalion days of operation . Shart operations produced between two and three times as many enemy killed per battalion day as long operations.
This number does n ot equal the one found on Table 1 because ( 1) long ~~ operations were not divided; (2) two operations included on Table 1 were not completed by April 5th; ( 3 ) four small operations totalling 214 battalion days with onl y one or two committed battalions were eliminated .

LARGE U. S. ARMY GR JND OPERA TI ONS _ IN II CORPS ~

II
1 9

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_ , __ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ - ~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~

- -_

~~~~~~~

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w

TABLE 1

U.S . ARMY SEARCH ARD DESTROY OPERATIONS IN II CORPS

3Q
No. Operations Avg Bns/Opn . AvgBn Days/Opn. Avg VC/NVA KIA/Opn A/Bn Day VC/NVA KI A/US KIA VC/NVA KI ~~ 7 1.6

1 965 I4Q 11 2.3

1Q
9

2Q 12

1966

114

1967 lQ

6
6.~
-

7
14.7 2 63. 9

8
4.5 2115.1 c, Q

3.5 7 1 .9 1 9 9. 0

3.3

1 0. 3

22.6
152.9

86.i
236.1 2. 7 4

146.7
4.54

7~ 2O7. 263.5 i . ~~

1470.6
1.78

377.3
1.54 ~~

6.76 5.53

2.77 5.83

13.63

8.614

10.13

9.89

6.38

Tperations are grouped by the quarter in which most of the operation took ~ place. However, 14 operations took place in two quarters e.g., Adams. , These were divided into two operations and the results divided between quarters in proportion to the days in each quarter.

4 -

Source: NNCS Computer File , After Act ion Report s , and FEPAC Susmiary. Every effort was made to obtain all operat ions , but a few may have been missed due to missing records early in the war. 28 C

1 1 1 1

1
I

2140 .
Avg . Bn Days/Opn . 200 16G . 120

/
I - IlQ )

t ~.
~

6~
~

/~~

Avg. Bn~~Opn.

14. .
-

:
I

\. ~j

3. 2
_/ ~

8c

VC/NVA KIA/Bu Day

3Q

1965

eq

2Q

1966

3Q

LeQ

1967

lQ

3Q

1965

eq

I I lQ

2Q

1966

3Q

[ eQ

I-

1967

lQ

C?
-l

SECRE T
20

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~~- i

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__ - -_-_ ~~~ - ~~~~~

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-- 1
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SECRET
TABLE 2 ARMY SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATION S IN II CORPS JAMJARY 1, 196 6 - APRIL 5, 1 966

~~~ge of Bn Days Bns Committed over 1 0 0

SIZE

14 or more
less than 4 14 or more less than

over 100 25-100

-

RESULTS No. Opera Bn Days VCJNVA KIA VC/NVA KIA/Bn Day~~~ 11 3900 7123 1.83

7 14 10

1260 252 4214

1 51 1 9146 11499
,

1.20 3.7 5

25-100

14

3.514

- ~

( _

21

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SECRET
RVNAI ~~FZCTIVENESS F The discrepanc ies in effect iveness of the RVNAF in .1, Il , and III Corps are much greater than those of the U.S. in the same Corps. The better performance of the RVNAF in I CTZ than in II and III Corps supports the contention that the Marines are doing a better job of supporting and encouraging the RVNAF than is the Ar my, although there may be other reasons. Search and Destroy Operations. RVNAF (AR VN , RF , PF and CIDG ) effectiveness per battalion day on search and destroy operations during August 1 9 6 6 through March 196 7 was less t han U.S. effectiveness , but only about 25% less when weighted by relative strengths. Table 1 al8o shows that RVNAF effectiveness is much higher in IV Corps and I Corps than in II and III Corps : e.g., enemy killed per battalion day of operation in I and IV Corps are ps and 3 times better than II Corps . 7 time s better than III Cor TABLE 2W SEARCH AND DESTR OY EFFECTIVE NESS CTZ) Corps Tactical Zones ( I II III IV RVNAP VC/NVA KIA per Bn Day Weapons Captured per Bn Day VC/NVA KIA per RVNAF KTh
-

Countrywide 1 . 27 .148

2. 142 .145

~~

5.65

6.143
1 . 5 6 . 5 0

.69 .25

14.5-2

.314 .16

10.85
-

2.140 1.27

6.93

U. S. VC/NVA KEA per Bn Day Weapons Captured per Bn Day vC/NVA KIA per US KIA
.

2 . 0 2 . 29

8.30

8.39

.55 7.76

1 . 6 2

1 . 6 9

.147 8. 1 3

Battalion days of operation are calculated by MACV on company days . The presentfor-duty strength of a standard U.S. Army company is 263, of a stan5 6 . Using the dard U.S. Marine company 29 7, and a standard ARVN company 1 U. S. Army company as the standard, the we ight in g factor s used t o deve lop Table 1 are 1.00 , 1.13 , and .59 respective ly. Small Unit Actions. RVNAF effectiveness in small unit actions also varies among the CTZ. Table 2 shows that RVNAF does the best in IV Corps . Unfortunately, the data available for the U.S. in the three northern CTZs are insufficient for comparison. TABLE 2 RVNA ~ EFFECTIVENESS ON SMALL UNI T ACTIO NE Corps Tactical Zones II ~II
-

(c~~)
IV 2.23 4.78

Countr ywide 2 . 0 0 3.73

0 0 0 Small Contac ts per 1 Unit Actions VC/NVA KLA per Contact

3 3e SEC ~~~~
22

1.97

2.05

1.59 3.36

--

~~~~~~~~~ -

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- -

- -- ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~

-~~~~~

--

S ECRET
-p

Corp s Ranking. Table 3 ranks the Corps ~n the basis of Tables 1 and 2. Assigning point s to eac h rank (low score is best )shows that the RVNAF is most effective in I V Corps followed by I, II , and II Corps . The U.S. is equally effect ive in all three Corps . (These measures , however , I gnor e RVNAF and U.S. effectiveness in the pac ification effort.)

vx Corpa ~VC/NVA ~ KM per

1st I IV IV IV IV I III II

2nd IV I II II I III II I

Rank 3rd II II I I III II I III

14th III III III III II IV I II : 1 1

Overall Rankings Corps Corps Corps Corps - 6 points 1 1 point s 114 points 19 points

Bn Day Weapons Captured per Bn Day VC/NVA KEA per RVNAP KM Contacts per 1 0 0 0 Small Unit Action VC/NVA 1cM per Contact

U.S. Corps VC/NVA 1~IA per Bn Day Weapons Captured per Bn Day VC/NVA KI A per U.S. KM
I

I Corps -6 points II Corps -6 points .i.I I Corps -6 points

23

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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

.- - - -

, _ .- - - -- _

~~~_

i-~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

--

,,2a - ~ ~~~

_ _ _ ~~~~~ ~~ &

~~a

__

r~

J TT~~~~ I ~~ ~~~~~~
SECRET
SVN INFlATION IN CY 67
CY 67 inflation can be held. to 20-25%, recognizing periods of uncertainty ( e . g., elections)and short-term shortage (e.g., rice). CY 67 inflation through 30 April has been 16%. A rate of inflation of 25% has the same effect on the incomes of GVN employees and members of the Armed Forces as cutting their salaries by 2 0%. The MACV additions to the approved deployment plan would not appreciaLl~ affect piaster spending or inflation in CY 67 but would affect spending and possibly inflation in CY 68 and CY 69. Plaster cost per year of 15,C troops is roughly P1 billion. The Dangers of Inflation
A modes t degr ee ci inflation in Vi L an could be helpful. Prt~~~~ : ~ ~ from rising prices forces rural and urban families to seek additional income through higher paying j obs and secondary employment. Labor rnob ilitj and total output are thereby increased. Also , several of the usual disadv antages of inflation are nct appli payment. cable to SVN . For example , inflation usually leads to balance difficulties as domestic and export priceo become relatively Lligher and import prices become relatively lower. But in SVN the US nilitary (w ho buy their piasters with dollars ) supplies foreign exchange a.i-i : . AID ~ through CIP supplies imp~ rts. In SVN , the US commitment thw~ ~ff~ets the balance of payments effect of inflation.
~~~~

Non e t hele s s , Vietnamese inflation in CY 66 was not modest: b~- ~ per .l1 effects year or 6% per month. Such large price rises produce several ~ N. in SV

In the first place , people on fixed income s (notab ly civ ~ 1 servants and members of the armed services) are made relatively worse off as the purchasing power of their Income drops. The government and the Army 1 ~~e their best people since other positions become financially more attra ct iv ~- . Second, inflation breeds corruption as people try to supplement their incom e by ot he r means if, like the military, they cannot change j Finally, popular support for the GVN is unkrmined if It i to effectively manage the country s economy . inab1~

Causes of SVN Inflat ion

Inflation in SVN is caused by too much demand for a limited amount of local resources. The US, the GVN , the private economy (and to some extent even the vc) are all competing for a small amount of local resources often made yet smaller by war damage .

SECRET

SECRET
The GVN pr ints money to meet its needs and those of the U . S . , since it does not collect enough in taxes. Financing war-generated demands through increasing the money supply instead of through taxation adds new demands to the economy without cutting priv at e demand . In flation results . Increases in the money supply will bring a proportionate increase in prices if a l else remains equal. The phrase if al]. else remains equal is important . Price increases can be less than the increase in money supply. A growing economy makes more goods available and this reduces the price rise associated with increases in money supply. Similarly, in countries like Vietnam , substitution of a money economy for barter arran gements allows f ~.r some increase in money supply without creating price rises. On the other hand , price rises can exceed increases in the money supply. Disproportionate price increases most often result from a loss of confidence in the currency. This loss of confidence , due to previous inflation or political-military factors , causes people to shift from holding money to holding goods . People are willing to pay higher prices for goods which they expect will cost even more in the near future. In SVN increases in prices have been less than increases ~n the money supp ly until quite recently. (See Table 1). The change occurred in cY 66 when the money supply increased by slightly less than 50% and prices increased by slightly more than that figure . Th e CY 66 trend appears to be continuing in CY 67, based on 1s t Quarter results. Price rises in SVN currently are exceeding money supply increases by a ratio of 1 .2 to 1, even allowing for the recent rice price increases resulting from a short-lived shor tage . The Outlook for CY 67
-

Prices in SVN w i l l rise 32% in CY 67 based on the P17 billion increase in money supply ( gap) estimated by the US mission and a 1.2 to 1 ratio . (See Tables 2 and 3 ) . However , several fact or s may change the gap projection. Most significant is a lower estimate of US military plaster spending. The Plaster Cei1in~ . On Ju ly 1, 1 966 , the Secretar y of Defense esatb lished a quarter ly plaster ceiling whereby JCS was directed to limit (through. CINCPAC and. COMIJSMACV) military and contractor pia ster spending. The ceiling for each of the first two quarters was P9 billion. MACV spent P8. 5 billion the first quarter and P9. 08 billion the second , a total of only P 17.6 billion against a forecast of P23. 1 billion if no ceiling had existed. Such savings were the result of more careful buying, increased offshore procure ment , greater efficiency in construction and a public campaign to induce troop s to spend fewer plasters . 25

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In November 1 966 , CINCPAC/MACV estimated their CY piaster needs to be P 44.5 billion. OSD at the same time estimated spendi ng to be P4 1.7 billion for the year. It now appears that both estimates are too high . The CINCPAC/M&CV Plaster Expenditure Reduction Program has been more effective more quickly than was anticipated. The latest OSD projectio n for Cy 67 is only P36.4 billion. (Table 4). Besides military piaster savings , two other factors may reduce the projected CY 67 gap. First , the P9 billion for subsidies (whereby rice and fertilizer are sold at a lower rat e than P118 to $1) may be overstated and may be only P4 billion. Second , credit expansion will probab ly be zero or negative instead of P1 billion.

COMUSMACV has requested an increase in the strength of the Vietnamese Armed Forces of 50, 0 0 0 men starting 1 July. If all 50,000 were on board. oz~ 1 July (which is unlikely ) GVN military spending would increase only P. 9 billion in CY 67. Second , salaries of Vietnamese citizens working for the US Government may be raised , increasing expenditures by P2 billion.

A l].of these changes could reduce the projected gap to P2.9 billion. But some programs may be revised. in a way that will increase it. First ,

Based on the above changes, CY 67 money supply increases would be only P5.8 billion. Using a ratio of increased prices to incre ases in money . 2 to 1, the inflation in SVN for CY 67 would be only 1 supply of 1 4 %. (See Table 2 . ) A i4 % rate of inflation in SVN would. be quite accept able for CY 67 considering the much higher rates that have prevailed recent ly . However , particular shortages ( e . g . , the recent rice crisis) can cause the price of certain commodities to rise , and once prices have gone up they neve r fall, back completely to their old levels. Also, several political periods of uneasiness (e.g., elections ) this year could. influence prices. Thus an inflation of 20 to 25% is- likely.
-

projections substantially . the end of CY 68.

There is still one large unknown factor which may alter the long run COMUSMPLCV has asked for additional forces by

~~~~~~~~~~ .

No troop buildup is likely to disrupt the stabilization effort ~~~ Not many of them will reach SVN in CY 67. Roughly P1 billion ~ riU buy 0 0 0 troops per year or 0 0 0 troops for 6 months, 15, so the CY 30, 67 ~

gap would probably not be increased by more than P1 or P2 billion.

But the long run implications of a large number of troops is more severe. Each 1 0 0 ,000 troops would cost more than P6.5 billion per year. While there are no gap projections beyond CY 67, economic stabilization is not likely to get much easier. Piasters spent for US troops are plasters that cannot be spent for other purposes. The contribution to the military effort of these additional troops must be weighed against the contribution to the political effort of such actions as raising GVN salaries and to the military effort of RVNA.F salary increases.

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26

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TABL E 1 END YEAR MONEY STJPPLY & RETAIL P RICE INDEX

..

Year 196 1 1962 1963 1964 1965

(

Money Supp ly (P billions ! 17.2 19. 5 22 . 3 27. 4 47. 6 67. 0

Sai gon Retail Price Index 79. 3 83. 0 86.0 93 . 4 128. 2 208. 9

1/

1966

1/

Mid -1965

100 .

j~

:::.

.23 . ~

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TABLE 2 CY 67 GAP 16 March Embassy Estimate (in P billions)
- -

Monetary Injection VN Military ~~ GVN Civil J S M ilita r y tJ S Civil Non-US Piaster Purchases Exports Credit Expansion Subsidies Total Monetary Withdrawals GVN Imports CI? Import s Food for Peace Special Rice Imports Customs , Austerity and Perequation Revenues Dome stic Revenues Invisibles Total GAP

P 44. 8 33. 0 44. 5 8. 0 3. 3 2.0 1.0 9.0 P145 .6

OSD Est . Poasible Gap P 457 33.0 36.4 10.0 3 .3 2.0

P13 4.4

P 31 . 8 18. 9 13. 6 8. 1 19. 6 26 . 0 10. 6 P128. 6 P 17.0

P 31.8 18.9 13.6 8 . 1 19.6 26.0 10.6 p128.6 P 5.8

May 15, 196 7

_ _ _ _ _ _ _

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TABLE 3 POSSIBLE CY 67 MONEY SUPPLY INCREASES AND PRICE RISES

CY 67 Gap 10 15 17 20 25 30

% Ch an ge 1/ in Money Supp ly
15. 8 23.7 26.8 31.5 39.4 47. 3

% Change in Prices 19. 0 28. 4 32 . 2 37.8 47. 3 56. 8

2/

1/ 2/

Changes as a percent of the end of CY 66 money supp ly net of MACV balances. Based on estimate that price rises will exceed money suppl y increases by a ratio of 1 . 2 to 1 .

29

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TABLE 4 DOD PLASTER SPENDING CY 67 let Q. Personal Spending Per man per month Piasters (billions) O&M Spending Per man per month Pia sters (billions) $24 P 3. 5 $43 P 4. 2 2nd Q. $24 P 3. 7 $43 P 4. 5 $40 P 1. 1 P 9. 3 3r d Q. $24 P 3. 8 $40 P 4. 2 $36 P 1. 1 P 9. 0 4th 0. $27 P 4. 3 ~40 P 4. 3 $27 P .7 P 9. 3

Construction Spending Wl . P per month (millions)$40 Piasters (billions) P 1. 1 Total Plasters (billions) P 8. 8

CY 67 Total: P36. 4 billion

c. ~~ DZCL~~.

i2 ~~~~~ DOD Dlfl ~2OO .lO

r ; ~ .

~~~~

~~

i - :~

30

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TABLE

REC~~ T SVN IIs~ FtATI 0N

H

USAID Saigon Price Index Including Rice Excluding Rice

1 Sep

-.

1 Aug

1 Oct

215

219

1 Nov l Dec l Feb l Mar l Apr

209
225 230 225 254 255 261 260

216
232 234

224

226

1 Jan

228 253 250 2116 247

. . 7

(3

31

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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _

- -~~~~~~ - - - -

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S ECRET
TI~ IMPACT OF OVERSEAS DOD EXPENDITURE S FOR THE VIETNAM WAR ON T1 US BALANCE 0F PAYMENTS ~ The adverse impact of Vietnam on the US Balance of Paflnents ~ has been grossly overstated. The actual impact of DOD ove rse as expenditures f or the war is only one-third of the figure usually
given. Termination of the war will not eliminate the Balance of Payments deficit. Overseas DOD expenditures for the war in Vietnam have been cited in several government publications as a major factor in the from $ $1.7 billion reduction ( 7 . 0 billion in CY 65 to $5. 3 billion in CY 66) in the net balance of goods and ser v ices , the trade balance. Net US military expenditures overseas last year increased by $.7 billion , in spite of substantially in-~ reased military equipment sales in Western Europe . Since overseas expenditures for the Vietnam war were $. 6, they would 9 billion in CV 6 appear to be responsible for about 50% of the decline in the US t rade balance and 20% of the $4.5 billion CY 66 deficit . However , onl y about one-third of the additional overseas expenditures , $ . 3 b illion in CY 66 , had an unfavorable impact on the US Balance of Payments. The remaining two-thirds are offset by increased US exports induced by raising the incomes and foreign exchange holdings of the recipient countries. The fraction of a dollar of additional DOD expenditures overseas for Vietnam returned as a purchase of US exports ranges from 1.00 for Japan to . 4 0 for t he P h i l i ppines . In Vietnam , where the largest expenditures occur , 6 6 cents out of every DOD dollar is returned to the US through the purchase of US goods and services. The following table shows by country the distribution of US military expenditures for Vietnam (based on the DOD Comptrollers estimates), the induced IS exports , and the net dollar drain for calt ndar 19 7, and 196 8. 66, 196

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32

- -s

-t

.- --_ ~ ~

.~~ .

~~~~~~~

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~~~~~~

--.

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~~~

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XPENDITURES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IMPACT ON OVERSEAS F~ ( $ millions)

I
( 1) ( 2)
CY 66 (3) US Exports Induced by DOD Expend itures 186.0 28.5 107.2 48.0 20.4 32.6 55.4 .8 26.8 6.0 28.3 75. 7 615. 7

Net Dollar Drain (2) -( 3) Vietnam Japan Korea Taiwan Philippines Thailand Australia Canada EEC Nations All Other POL (M.E.)

.DOD Addt ] Expenditures Due to Vietnam 281.9 28.5 107.2 614.0 40.8 81.5 108.7 1.5 36.7 12.1 56.6 126.1 9145.6

Net Dollar

(l)

Drain

(2)-( 3) 139. 3 --211.7 32.9 58.9 70.8 .7 12.9 8.5 11-2.4 57. 6 4 48 . 7

Addt l DOD Expenditures Due to Vietnam 4 09. 7 38.7 153.9 98.8 65. 7 98.2 1144.4 1.3 147.6 ] . 17. 814.8 1 4 4 . 0 1 ,3014.2

( 2)

CY 67

US Exports Induced by DOD Expenditures 270.4 38.7 153.9 714.1 32.8 39. 3 73.6 .6 34.7 8.6 4 2 .4 8 6 .4 855.5

(3)

Ryukyus

95.9 --16.0 20.4 148.9 53.3 .7 9.9 6.1 28.3 329.9

CY POL estimated fr FY POL avera ges for years involved.

33

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/
_ ~ -~~~_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ --

__

- -- - --- ---

i -

rk ~ SEA.S EXPENDITURES

~~~

~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

--

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~~~~~~

$.

/--

~~
(2)
CY 68

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

(3)

_ _ _ _ _ _

cports ed by ~ ~cpend. ares

Net Dollar Drain ( 2 ) -( 3 ) 139. 3 -211.7 32.9 58.9 7 0 . 8 . 7 12.9 42.4

( 1)

Addt l DOD Expenditures Due to Vietnam 4 09. 7 38.7 153.9 9 8 . 8 65.7 9 8 . 2 1 114.4 1.3 117.6 1 7 . 1 84.8 11 44 . 0 1, 4 . 2 30

(2)

CY 6 7

US ~ cports Induced by DOD Expenditures 2 7 0 . 4 38.7 153. 9 714.1 32.8 39. 3 73.6 . 6 314.7 8 . 6 4 2.4 86 . 4 855. 5

(3)

Net Dollar Drain (2) - (3) 9 1 . 6 -15.2 20.4 38.3 49. 1 . 1 7.5 . 9 21.2 36.6

( 1)

Addtl DOD Expenditures Due to Vietnam

2 8 . 5 7.2 8 .0 0 . 4 2 . 6 11~ 5. . 8 1 6.8 6.0 p8.3

6.0

US Exports Induced by DOD Expenditures

(3)

--

--

269.5
20.0 6 0 .7 4 0. 8 63.8 1 0 0 .3 . 2 27.6 1 . 8 11 4 2 . 9 1. 6 816.5

1 7 7 .9
2 0. 0 2 0. 4 25. 5 51.2 . 1 20.1 .9 2 1 . 2 55.0 535.6

97.8

9 7. 8 45.5

8.5

_ _ _ _

L5.7

4 48 . 7

28 0 .9

rs involved.

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S ECRET
AIRCRAFT LOSSES and the Budget Plan projection of 122 . We lost 1~O fighter and attack aircraft , compared to 45 in March and th e Budge t Plan estimate of 62.
Airc r aft losses in April totaled 9 18 in March 2, compared to the 1

Losses of one reconnaissance aircraft and 1 1 other fixed wing aircraft were both 6 below the plan; the 4 0 helicopter losses exceeded the plan by 4. The table below shows the excess of planned losses to actual losses from July 1965 through April 1967: Fighter/ Attack Actual Losses Planned Losses Excess Predicted Losses 8 1 8 Other Recce/ ECM Fixed Wing

Helicopters 6143 586 ( 5 7 )

Total 1 749 1 48

71 25
-

217 2 ~0 33

147

SEA Fighter and Attack Aircraft Losses

OSD April 196 7 Estimate

As the t~ ble above indicates , losses of fighter and attack aircraft have been well L low the December 1 966 Plan in recent months. For this reaso n a new OSD ~~ril Best Estimate has been prepared for financial and pr oduction planning . The old estimate will he redesignated as the Budget Plan and will appear as such in the OSD SEA Statistical Sunvnary . Based on the new Best Estimate , the US and VNAF will lose 1437 fewer fighter-attack aircraft in the July 1965-December 1969 period (2 333 versus ) than we thought last December (See Table 1) 2 7 70 . This 437 aircraft reduction consists of the 127 fewer aircraft actually lost than planned through March 1967 and 310 fewer projected losses during the period April 196 7 through December 1969 based on our new loss rate projections. Assuming that the attrition rates now projected are correct , the 95% stati stical confidence limits around the new estimate are 79 aircraft. The basis for the April Best Est imate is outlined below .
+

a. Methodology We use 7 loss rates for each aircraft model (e.g., F-l4 , Al 1-) to predict aircraft losses: loss rates for attack and non-attack sorties for each of three areas (Laos , NVN , SVN), and a rate for all other losses ( operational losses and losses on the ground).
-

We use 6 sortic rates for -each aircraft model; an attack and non-attack sortie rate for each of three areas. Finally , we have developed a weather cycle to apportion attack sorties between NVN , Laos and SVN in accordance with our observation s of the shifts in sortie patterns between areas. The total sorties and losses per year are not Influenced by the weather cycle . But , since month-by-month losses change sharply, the weather cycle aids in following seasonal changes. 314

S E CRET
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U.S. and
VNAF

SDru.s sad. Lou.s - Plsnnsd vs. Actual - T otal

F~~ tur sad Attack Aircraft Only

* ,SS* SSSS**SS**SSS***SS*S**SSS*S****SS F V

PLANNED SORTIES OE CEMBE ~ ATTAC K SVN NVN LAOt

T3TAL COMBAT PLANNED SORTIES CURRENT

PL* I

JUL

*1.6

SEP

OCT

LI13661
18691

NOV

DEC

1 9 6 6 JAN 11566 3985 4580

*SS**S SS*S s S** S~~~~~***S*S*SS ( FEll MAR APR MAY

3964 1S66 3878

OTHER

SUBTOTAL

18758 22645

11270 3988 3518 3590

20054

ATTAC K

OTH ER
ACTUAL

SUBTOTAL

NV4

SVN

PLA N

22569

23944

3590

20940

12432 3985 4580

24921

3981

21193

12715 3988 4580

12785 21 1 9 3

~~~ 4500

25253

4060

ap~ 25253

21193

12703 398$ 4508

11 4

25253

406 8

21
1

21

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

TOTAL COMBAT ~~~~ SORTIES/A pri l 1.967 ~~ t1 ATTAC K SVN VN SUBTOTAL

9907 14894

~ LAOS

3182

10958

1003

OTHER

TOTAL COMBAT

17381

3287

333 1 183 08

15177

3463 724

11094

16137

4002 1041

12090

3497 19634

3859 20353

16524

3468 966

12686

3443 20646

17203

3 125 1472

12763

347 1 2 1435

17964

21~ 8 311 3

11751 8800 19883

132

12930 2839
21021

5262

13153 4497

4326 24209

3852 24873

624 7 23897

4939 10836

5~~ 4 2IY l ~

1129 1 5485

4628 2736$

3I0 ~ 2137 $

11611 4467

11 7
2

5950 2435$

1 2S

PLANNE3 LOSSE S DECEMBER PLAN ON AT T A CK SOR IE S SVN SUBTOTAL ON OTHE R SORTIES AU. OTHER LOSSES
TOTAL

S..S**S**SSS* SSS*****$* SS*S*S**S*SS* SSSS** S****SS**S*$**SSS*S**S**SS*S*S*005SSS( I

NVN LAOS

~~

9.6 18.4

PLANN ED L OSSE S CURRENT PLAN ON ATTACK SORTIES SVN

LOSSES

28.7 1.9 6.8

~~~~~ -

).S 24.4

7.2 18.4

37.4

3 8.1

1.9 6.8

.9 ~ 31.2

7. 9 18.4 1.9 7.2

4.9 32.3 41.8

9. 0 18.4 1.9 7.6

9.0 18.4

32.3

4.9

48.3

41.9

1.9 7.7

32.3

9.0 10.4 4.9

9~ $ 15.4 4.9

41.9

1.9 7.7

32.3

41.9

1.9 7.7

1
4

NVN

SUB TOTAL ON OTHER SORTIES ALL OTHER LOSSES TOTA L. LOS SU I ACTUAL LOSSE /Apr11 .1967 ~~ti t ON ATTACK SORTI ES SVN NVN

LAOS

ON

3US TUTIL OTHER SORTIES ALL OT HER LOSSES TOTAL LOSSES

LAOS

9.3 3.0 11.3 2.3 8.3 27.3

5.1

18.0 5. 20.0 2.0 2.0 24.0

2.0

21.0 29.0 2.0 7.8 38.0

7.0

1.0

z5.0

17.0 ~.t 3.0 9 .0 37.0

7.8

16.0 0. 20. 0 3.0 6. 0 29.3

4 .0

9.0 13.0 1.0 23.0 2.8 10.0 35.0

10.0 2.0 6.0 15.0 0. 12.0 30.0

3.0 5.0 .0 10.0 2.0 4.5 24.0

11.0 17.0 0 ~. ~~.O 1.0 6.0 3T.0

4.8 23.0 6.0 33.8 3.0 12.0 30.0

5.0 15.0 7.8 38.8 1.0 11.0 42.0

1 2 1 3

LOSSES

ON ATTAC K

PER THOUSANO SORTIES

SORTIES

ON OTHER SORTIES
ALL

NVM LAOS

SVN

b ~

..ss.s. *.e...es.ss.s *..s.*ss... ***s.s... s .e..s ..sees.s sss ese*s*s$ss se*sss00 550*I
2.82$ 2.983 ,618 .463
.503

3. 193

.102

0.

OTHER LOSSES

.600 .105

3.247 .96 1 .372 .357

.631

4.902 1.835 .777 .442

.579

3.120 0. .871

.317

5.914 15.132

.705

.551

. 333

.291

.376

.467

0.

.730

1.911
.519 .161

1.780

.232

3.750

.726

.496

.~~O .282 .195

4.255

.354

1.080 .438

.593

4.030

.43 1

1.628 .231
.452

. .

es ~~~~~ S- 1 96 7. 969 Ls baseS ~~ .t . U t _ ~~~~~~ 965. ~~~ . totsl.s slak Jul.~~t 196 . .~~ l MIs. Proj.etias tta~~~ C! 1 5 = 1 4 La Pro$rsa 1 . a. ot 1 8 Ib~~~ ar 1966, sal fares 4upl.c~~ st. p 1 . ~~~ . totals ~ eSP ~~l 65-Oat 66 s1 1 ~~ a. ~~ Oat or ir 966. C . r 1969 t~~ loss rates ties1 s Is ~~~~ir 1966 ,loss pro3sotloasarebasil sa satsal sartla iI ~~ 1 $ats total~~~ at serbia., ~~ ~~~~ $5 1uI~t~~~~ by Sivi*1a tba siraraft lost ~~ La e~~~ a.t. ry by tta s, tss taws bass ~~ ,. ~~~~~~ bar ~~ 1 bi 51* ~~~~~~ oa 3 CTA at ba8.s Statics 1 reesat 1 5 1 serbia ~~~~~~~~ n ~~~~~~ 1966 projsstioas are bsssl ~~ ~ LI ~~~ ~-g I thr 2 1 .ortis sad lOSS rats. ties $ 6 5 Os ar serbia sal loss projestios. so. bss.d g Is AprIl 1967, ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~ LI IscI4~ Totalo as, sot add du. to r undiag .
f l. i ~~~~

?1

SECRET

35
~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
4, ._ ~ $IE L_

--

_ --- - ~~~~~~

_ _t - ~~~ ~~~ ~

~~~~~~~

_ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- - - - -

~~~~~~~~~~~~

-- -

-_

-_ ~~~~~~ ~~~

.-

- - , ---

ss. eeso.e.e*es JUN TOTAL 12705 3958 4500 21193 4060 25253 1438 45 45997 35302 225147 45$53 271008

*S****SSs0000S*SSssS*s009ss*ss*ss F v s ~ J UL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 13297 11297 13889 15505 3988 3988 39*8 39*5. 4500 45 (1 4 4500 ; 21785 21703 22~~ 23993 4061 4060 4060 4060 25845 25045 26437 20053 17282 3915 4500 25770 4268 29830 18002
43 12

6 7 SSS*S~ ess*S***.s.***ses..ss**sssee*ss*s*e JAN PEN MAR APR MAY JUN TOTAL 17252 3958 25770 4860 29830 14720 9690 29252 5531 34783
A1~ 4500

005So*Ss*$SSS4S5S*Si JUL ALiG SEP 17282 3988 450.3 25770 4063 29838 13959 10819 2792 27608 5125 32725 17252 3988 4510 25770 4060 29830 13909 10791 211s 27586 5151 32737 17282 3958

17282 3955 4500 25770 4 8 60 29830 14567 9579 28568 5488 34056
4422

17202 3958

25770 4060 29038

4311

17282 395$ -4500 25770 4060 29830 14101 9798 26630 5522 34152
47H

17282 17252 3955 3988 4500 4385 25770 25770 4060 4060 29830 29830 11701 10236 28244 5476 33720
4107

17282 3988 4~ 0l 25770 4060 29830 1434* 10746 28279 5111 3339 0
1183

194244 47136 54000 296101 48720 344820 167084 122509 331274 63281 394555
4558 1

25770 4060 29830 13989 10791 2515 27586 5151 32737

43 1 1

V 13809

14609 9725 29333 5516 34919

400,

14466 10111 28143 5416 33559

p355

I
12672 3442 .13902
7785

144876 44335 41506 230923

~~ 25379
9.0 18.4 4.9 32.3 1.9 7.7 41.9

~~ 276810

1 3A935 1 ,081 1 2798 . 1 1 9 10196 ) ~~ 2 1 31 , 600 ~~~ _ ~~~~~~~~~ zT2! . ~~ n.2 ao qa

Issa . ssssss000 90.7 212.2 35.9 341.8 24.2 451.2

83.2

0 5 5s0 0 0 0 s se4 0 0 0 s 0 0 0 s . s* ss s ess s s s . se. * s. . . s e ss s 4 1 s . s s . s* s. s0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 s . . . 5 0 0 0 s s . . . s. . . ... . . . s 9.6 18.4 4.9 32.9 1.9 7.9 42 . ~ 9.6 18.4 4.5 32.9 1.9 7.9 42.7 10.4 18.4 4.9 33. 7 1.9 8.2 43. 8 12.6 15. 4 4.9 35.9 1.9 8.6 46.4 15.0 18.4
4.9

1j 6 13601 1 1 2~67 1. 3 302k .~~~~ 1 U 7 1, 8 1 6 786 l ~~ A ~58 ~~860 6 ) . 6 p 1.1. 10 850e 72 86 5 7 6 72 ~ ~~~~ ~ ~ . 3 ~~~ ~6 1, 6 js8 027 7 7 26~2 2310 1, ~~ ~ ~~07 i5 23312 es &7It ~~ OLb ~~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ j 8 b~36 1, 1,95 1, 9 99k 1 ~~~~ 5 90 ~~ ~~~ 27866 ~55~ 29778 ~701 ~ 31608 ~~ 3 3136 ~~~ ~~I 33675 ~ p430 31W 72 8 2790.1. 33701. 31 35 ~ ~~~ ~~
~~~~~~~~~

27823 5454 33277

12 3 1 , 9 5 93 13555 1 1 ~ 7 l$53 12765 ~~

3l~~~ 301007 501sa*s*Ss,SSs*sssse 15.0 18.4 38.3 1. 9 9.2
49.4

15.0 18.4

i/al
I
I

49.4

38.3 1.9 9.2

49.4

35 .3 1 . 9 9.2

4.9

15.0 18.4

49.4

38.3 1.9 9.2

4.9

15.0 18.4

49.4

38.3 1.9 9.2 7.3 32.9

4.9

15.0 15.4
-

49.4

35.3 1 . 9 9.2

4 9

15.0 18.4

49.4

38.3 1. 9 9.2

4.9

15.8 18.4 38.3 1.9 9.2

4.9

15.0 18.4

49.4

49.4

38.3 1 . 9 9.2 6. 9 35.5

4.9

162.2 220.8 441.5 22.8 156.2 570.8 1 ~~. 380. 3

58.5

49

15.0 15.4

35.3 1.9 9.2

49.4

4.9

15.0 18.4

35.3 1.9 9.2

4 9 .4 -

4.4

6. 8 32.3 43.8 18.0 58. 5 5.0 15.0 3.! 23.0 2.0 3 3.0
4.7
~~~~~

I
6.0 18.0 73.0 177.0 tO.O $0.0 24.0 97.0 411.0

7.1 30.1 3. 2 42.4 9.8 56.7 7.0 iA.o

4.5

7.2 30.5 3.7 43.1 4.5 10.5 55.5 12.0 ,O

45.b 3.3 10.4 61.5

1 . 5

6 . 6 33.6
-

45.6 5.5 10.4 61.3

1.4

z 7 .l

3.0

35.1 0.
~~

7. 0
.0

1.0 10.0 38.0

5.8

34.0

3.0 30.0 1.0 3.0 16.0 53.0

S***S*S0550SS .473 .311 .872 .223 . 352 .504 3.974

ks.o 0000S*S5959050S00005S*SSS*SS*S**000SS * S S S* S . . S* S O S S* S0 8 5 0 0 9 S . 0 0 0 9 S0 0 0S*. S 0 9 0 0*. . . . . . $ . . . . . . 3.432 0. 968 .

53.2

6 . 0

33. 0 1.0 ta.0 31 8.0

8 . 0

17.0 1,..o 29.0

8.0

6.0

9 3. 0

yr.o

3. 0 5. 0

8 . 0

65.0 5.0 6.o 33.0

1. 0

~~~~~

~ 1.1 . 0 3 6 . 0

0 0. 9.0 23.0

~~~

o ~. O

5.0

U 6.9 8~ 0 a i . . o 23.8
1 3. 0
2.0 31 . 0 3.0 4.6

6 . 4 35.0 l.a 46.4 5.5 10.4 -62.3

6.8 34.8 4 . 3 46.1 5.4 10.3 61.8 6.3 27.6

-

46.0 3.3 10.3 62.4

4.1

618.2

5 0 7 4 55.0 1 1 5. 6
76.6

45.2

6 . 5 36.2 46.3 5.3 10.1 61.6 6.7 32.7 2.2 415 2.6 S~ 9 53.)
La

6 . 5 33.5 43 .7 4.5 9.5 57.7 7.2 33.2 1.7 4Z L 2.4 5..~ 53.4
3.7

6 . 5 33.5 43. 7 4.5 9.3 57.7 1.2

3 2 4

3.7

2.2 9.5 47.0

33. 1

6.4 11.0 3. 2 j . 5 38.~ 3 4O.~ 2.4 2.4 9. 5 9 . 5 50.1 52.4

2 69. 5
32.0 312.1 33.0 1 1 0 . 4 515.5

4 t o ~.

2.4

c.4 .S 53.2

. 3 8 9

. 9 6 3

. 1 6 9

. 510

. 3 0 9

. 213 2.340 1.220 .6 84 . 5( 3

2.694 . 793 . 619 .25 7

~~5

.681 1. 964

1.73 2
~~~
.1 82

2..366 .991
.453

.361,

0 ~~

2 . 09 8 .807 1 . 035

.508

.413 6 1 . ~~ .547

. 3 6 9

eses.s s*sss.eeo...s

~~
esl&.

~~~

Os

. 1 , 7 7 2 .1 , 7 3 . 7 7 5 . 1 , 1 0
. 7 30

37~

~~~ . totals ~~~~~~~~

Sttrspolotsl~~~~~~ St_~~
~~~~I

. I a s t telsi s~~ st sortias. stias. ~~ s.. tss far ~~~ OtaW Leusis a ~~ ssl atta* slrarstt. 1966 J~~ sh 1967 as~~~1.~~ s _. . I., pS 151 loss ~~~ ss, ) . ~~~~ ott,. totsi. ~~ 7( t1~~~ Ju ru~ 196 ~ sIaE ~~~ aslialatot trim Apr. ~

tivs ~~~ ,~1$S 1969tar s . . , . . . . ~. 1 9 1 5 . 0 s 9* a r 1966astasi OSti .

196 5

~~~~~~

19

-_

-- -~~--- ~

~-

~ ~

I
r

~~~~~~~ ~ . ,

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

->

-
~~ r

~~~~

.~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1

~~~~~~~~~~~~

0*SSS9S*S*ssssss,s. *s$*** F Y 1 9 6 5 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~..sss TOTAL MA N APR MAY JUN JAN F~~~ 1 . A G DEC SEP P OV OCT ~ ~ 3 I I P 9 P 17252 3988 4511 2 577 0 4061 29830 13989 10791 2515 27586 5151 32797 17282 3988
4351

P7 1969

TOTAL

07 1970 JULDEC 103692 2392 * 27111 154421 24360 178988 50 12 6 38468 21103 159777 19Cm

JUl. 65 DEC 69 856552 213493 224302 1294347 216373 1515720 7127 53 475483 15994? 1378183

JUL 65

17282 3988
4308

17282 3988 25770 29830

406 8 4338

25770 25770 406 1 4060 29830 29830 13989 18791 2506 a?586 5151 32737 13433 10964 2833 27230 5117 32347

17252 3988 4530 25770

4060

29830

17282 3988 4300 25770 4060 29830

17282 3988 4300 25170 -4060 29838 12725 9557 4964 27246 3454 32700

17282 3988 438 0 25770 4560 29830 12725 9363 4931 27239 5439 32678

17282 3q88 45(0 25770 4060 29830

17282 3958 4320 25770 4860 25830 13097 10853 27399 5453 33052

17282 3988 4501 25770 .061 29830 12861 11943 2824 2762 8 5327 3293 5

2073*4 47534 54000 309240 48720 357960 159750 125208 44103 325963 63708 392671

207384 47556 54000 309240 45720 357960 161117 124460 42672 327249

601069
~~~3 ~~ 330
1~

9 9 2 5 5

13542 10083 3533 27158 5111 32269 1 8995

13110 9876 4349 27333 5433 32788

132 18 9745 4154 27157 5474 32631

13 072 10223 4304 2 7599 3453 33(52

3649

3090*

31, 9 5 11,251 3 33555 1 785 30308 7 12953 12 3367 ~~~ ? ~ j 16 5 5 z1 ~6 8 860 3 4598 ~~ 30103 321,07 30565
1 ~~~~~~ 1 ~~~~~~~~

i*.***eses**s*e*se....**s.e**iS..s999S***ssSes**0*s***SSSS*SSS**955**SSS909**SSSS*5595 0 4 15.0 18.4 15.0 15.4 15.0 18.4 38.3 3.9 9.2 49.4 6.4 33.9 43.8 4.1 9.2
37.1 26. ! 37.~ 3.5 4.9

1 , 1 . 6 1 1 1, 8 1, 8 1 78 5 2 7980 5 6 2 ~1 ~ 2~~&~ 4 8 58 26 ~~ 7 2 ] . 86 09 86 8 7 8 31651 32896 97 ~~ 9 062 8 Q33

15.0 18.4 38.3 1.9 9.2 4s.4 31.5 4.2 42.1 4.1 9.3
5.5 24.~ 4 .2 2 .~ 8.~ 6.4 4.9

1 3 6 7 0 1 385 7 2 6 6 ~ 7753 6 09 6 3. ~~ 2 89 0 j 26561 1u675 86 59 31686 3162].

15.0 18. 4 38.3 1.9 9.2 49.4 5.9 13.0 18.4

1 31.1, 6 1281,9 9 1 7 5 10738 37 1, 1, ~~in 26~32 26~30 8 719 lrn9 31651 31653
15.0 18.4 15.5 18.4

16 3 76 0 12129 120585 ~~~~~~ 26 ~57 8630 733 5~ 31597 368018

i~~~i
15.0 16.4 38.3 1.9 9.2 49.4 6.0 39.4 45.6 t .7 9.? 63.0
30.0 39.4 3.2 4.9

160696
165060

.,98s.es.s..ee.s...sseesseessss. 180.5 221.8 90.1 110.4 229.8 11.4 35.2 246.4

20 .4

88 ~i 327201 5583 7 3606 30

78008 6 1800
1 5 1 34

73fl 5 ~9 1, 6 3 6 8 0
_ _

B 91, ~6 , T1 ~ 16 96 8 3

5 I ~ . 82 ~~ 19 2757 360965 7
712.9 985.0

555271 2 07. 9 . 8
1,~ 3

5ss

3 9 2 .4 .3 .2 .5 .3 .3 .0 .6 7 7 .2

.9

38.3 1.9 9.2 49.4 6.5 33. 5 3.7 43.7 4.3 9.5 57.7
33.2

4.9

35.3 1.9 9.2 49.4 6.5 33.5 43.7 4.5 9.5 57.7
3~~.4 44.~ L.A 5 3.~
L .A

4.9

15.0 18.4

38.3 1.9 9.2 49.4 6.2 29.7 5.8 40.9 3.5 9.1

4.9

13.8 18.4

38.3 1.9 9.2 49 .4 6.3 29.8 5.0 41.1 3.9 9.0

54.0

4.9

4.9

38.3 1.9 9.2 49.4 5.9 3 1.6 5.2 42.7 4.7 9.5

4.9

38.3 1.9 9.2 49.4 6.0 33.1

4.9

38.3 1.9 9.2 49.4 6.0 93.6

4.9

181.0 220. 5

459.6 22.8 110.4 592.8 74.6 398.2

35.5

439.6 22. 5 110.4 592.8 75.3 384.7

-

34.0

1932.6 104.0 461.4 2304.1 .S 133 ~~ 2073. 2(6.8

246.2

3.7

53.8

5.3 41.6 4.3 9.3

55.2

38.4

56.9 19.8 3.9 31.5

43.7 4.8 9.6

38.1

4.6

45.6 4.7 9.6

4. 0

59.9

523.8 33.4 113.3 690.3 87.0 307.0

31.0

502.6 31.3 109.3 663.4 83.8 302.0

7.5

33.4 192.3

3 3 2. 8

2 5 8. 0 lk.6 2. 9 07 1 30.0 3 5 8 .0 5 5. 0 3 7 1 . 0 77750 0 . 1 , 6 0 *. ~~ 0, 0. 6 1 , 1.

~~ sU ~~~ s0

249.7 23.1 54.0 326.8

25 .1

7.2 1.1

1.2

7.6

8. 1

s ~ 6
9 . ~

4 2. 1

3.

53 . 4

6. 9

2.4

. S

2.1

3L.2

... . . . e . .

sseseseiSiuSiuooo It ...s.*sSS*SsesS9sS*sss0*S*es**e*S**ess 9sssss.ss.ssessS*S ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ 1 s~~~ 1 Plim (8.1/2yr,) 1 / 2 r.) - Dma pasi ~8.

.d.S

k . ~~ .

. 7.1

7 .6 2 . 4 20.1 5 .1 4.5 3.3.5 32 .2 1. 8 1. 6 8 .7 a~~ 43.9 41.9

S.C

1 8 .6 5 .3 31.2 1.7 41.3

7.3

7.8

a . . a

1.7

23.0 4.2 34.2

7.0

~~~~ 41.6

.3 ~. 44.5

2.0

26.6 3.8 3 7. 0

6.7

6.6

2.1

2 2

4 3 s J
24 7 566.4

43.~

80.6
23

173. 2

~~~~~~

~~ 47.5

22ES.9 1 ~ .3

~~.6 16.]. 8 9. 9

8 6 9. 8 1 7 6 9 .9 3 6 0 . 8 1 222.6 i 7 %. 1
27.8 1
2333.1 1 7 ~4

~~

so.o

~~~~~~

58 7 .2

293.0

4319.2

2.6 37
.905

1 .091

. 6 0 2 . 8. 6 1 8 . 5 09

. 866 3. 6 5 3
3 .098 . 771

. 2 7 9

. 0 9 S

0~3D0

1 . 1pm A 1 0~~~as P A.t~~1

6 ? as~~1 ~~ s. Ily1965 p~~~ $

-

10 N . y 1967

-3
--

--

r
-~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~ &IL~

~ ~~

--. - --- - ~~~~ ~~~ -

b. Forces and Sorties - Sorties are a product of forces and sortie rates. We have used Program 14 forces through Change 25, plus an F-14 squadron for PRACTICE NINE . However , the forces were slightly changed when initial run s of th is attrit ion est imate showe d that we coul d reta in certa in a i rcraft longer than anticipated in Program 14. For instance , 1 F-105 squadron is not replaced by an F-14 squadron because of the lower P-l05 loss rate. Sortie rates are based on the 21 month period of July 1965-March 1967 instead of a 9month moving average used jn previous estimates . The reasons for the change are that variations have been random and the longer period gives a statistically better sample . We now predict 1.6 1 million sorties in the 1 July 1965-31 December 19 6 9 period instead of 1.614 million , about 2% less. c. Loss Rates Past estimates have used a 9month period for loss rateprojections. The new e~~t- -tn,ate uses 21 months (July 1965-March 1967) for all loss rates except in NVN . While loss rates have fluctuated sharply from month to month , they show no trends except in NVN . Since we are predirting losses for 26 aircraft models using 7 loss rates , the need for a large sample size dictates the use of the longest stable period possible . The NVN attack loss rate has not stablized , as is shown fo r the Ai r Force and the Navy on Charts 1 and 2. This r ate is critical since it determines about half of all losses. The table below compares projected losses using several reasonable NVN attack loss rates: Base Period Jul 65 - Mar 67 Apr 66 - Mar 67 Jul 66 - Mar 6 7 Oct 66 Mar 67
-

SEC 1~ ET

Loss Rate per 1 0 0 0 Sorties 2.914 2. 53 2.31 1.92

Projected Losses Apr 67 - Dec 69 1 0 05 8614 7 9 0 656

! /

i/Based on 3142 ,000 sorties in 33-month period . The choice of an NVN attack loss rate is a matter of j udgement . We Improve our equipment and tactics and so do the North Vietnamese . So far , we are improving faster than they are but this could change . Furthermore , if we increase the proportion of sorties in northern North Vietnam (Route Packages ) our loss rates on these sorties would increase by a factor of 3 to 5, 5 and 6 as the table below Indicates. Month Average Apr-Sep 6 6 Oct 66-Mar 67 Apr 66-Mar ~~ Sorties Rt. Pack . I-IV Rt. Pack V-VI Total Loss Rates Rt. Pack. I-IV Rt. Pack. V-VI Total 7686 86153 1.814 12.141 3.02 6221
~~~~~~~~~

6953
7921 1.68 8.60 2 .53

7159 1.14? 14.8 1 1. 9 2

SECRET
36

SECRET
If we used a 9 month moving average to estimate WIN loss rates , the lois rat e would be 2.31 aM losses in th e Apr 67-Dec 69 period would total 790 . This rate would perm i t about 25% of the NVN sorties to be flown in Route Pa ckages V and VI if the loss rates of the last 6 months continue , or it would allow a loss rat e of about 9.8 in Routes V and VI , if we continue to fly about 11 % of the NVN attack sorties in them and if the rat e in Route Packages I - IV doe s not exceed 1.5. The 9 month attack rat e , however , might prove too low if we fly an extended campaign against highly defended targets in the Hanoi - Haiphong areas. Loss rates of 1 0 to 20 aircraft per 1, 0 0 0 sorties are like ly in such strikes. It would also prove too low if the North Vietnamese receive SA-3 missile systems , R EYE/CHAPEBEL type infrared missile system , or if -they rapidly learn how ~~ to use better the equipment they now have . Therefore , to be on the safe side , we used the 2.53 rate of the last 12 months (Apr 66-Mar 67). Thus we project 8614 attack losses in WIN from April 196 7 through December 1969. The use of this loss rate provides a hedge against increased losses due to deployment of 3-14 more squadrons or a possible extensive campaign against heavily defended targets in the HanoiHaiphong area.
In brief, the NVN attack loss rate is the key factor , has a large range of variability, and is highly subject to targeting decisions which we do not know . The loss rate of 2. 53 used in the April estimate is unlikely to result in either a large over-estimate or under-estimate of losses , but some uncertainty Is unavoidable.

37

SECR ET

~
~ ~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~

- --~~~~

-- ~

L~
--

AiT i ATrAcIC I~ fiA TEs ~ NTh PIOHTER ~ LND ATTACK .hXRCRAfl - U.S. AIR F0R~E
1K

SECRET

: ~

: : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : : : : : : : : ::::::::: : : : ~ :
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

:
: : : : :i : : : : : :

.-

1 ~~~ Sortiesi:

::::: : : : : : : :: : : : : : : : :: :~ :: 1aesee pa~ -

_ : __ : _ : : _ : _

~~~~~~~~~~~~ :

: :: : : :: : : : : : : : : : : : : : :: :: : : : : : : : : : : :
-

- : :: : : :::::::::
:

y. 0v
S

: = = = : = : : : : : : : :

:: : : : : : :
-

: : : : : : : = :

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1 - -

r_ ._
\

: : : : : : : : : : : : : ~~~ :

-:

: : : : : ~~

: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : I I E t !

:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_______________________________________

Cwnulativ.
_

. b. Oi
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

3 .0$

Il

2.0 w _________________________________________

l.O L.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 6 6 i,

SECRET

i i

-~~~~~~~~~

- --~~

- ---- -

--

---

._ ~ __ ;_,_,:. - - - ~ - .~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- -

- - - ----- - - - -- - ---

~~~~~

--

-- - -

~~~

-- ---

--- .-

1 :

: : :::: : : : : : : : : : : : :: : : : :: Loeeea p~E : : : ~ : : :~: : :: : ::: : :: : : : : 1 0 00 = : ~: : : : : : : ~ : : : :: : :: : : : : : : : : : ::= : : : : : Sort iee~ : = = : = : = : = :

I

i i iEi II j _ II_ I!1I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~

TACK AIRCRArr PIGNTER AZ~ D A~

ATh CK LOSS RATES

CHABT 2

NVN U. S. NAVY

SECRET

~4i:

E E ~ ~

: = = = = : : :::
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

:::: :4 E: : : : :

7 . 0

::

~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~

_1 I ~~
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=

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ : : : :r : : : : : : : : : :
~~~~~

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~~~~~~~~
:= =

5 .0

=
-;

== = = = = K

= =

= =
-

= = = = = =

7--~- - 7 - c - -

Cumulative
-

O $ j_ _ _ 3.
I

-1
_ _ _ _ _

2 . 0 $

Jj__
_ _ _ _ _

1 . 0 :

19 65

1g M

SECRET
--

J
19 67

- ~~~ ~~

--

__ 1 _

__

~~~~-

SECRET
AIRCRAFT DESTROYED ON T1~ GROUND B Y HOSTILE ACTION
Of 1599 U.S. aircraft lost to all causes in SEA from July 19 6 5 through March 1 967, 51 or 3% were destroyed on tho ground by enemy action. Thirtyfive of the 51 lost were helicopters ; of these , 23 we re UH-ls . Thirty-one of the losses occurred during the f i r s t three quarters of

only one aircraft was destroyed in April 1967, 14 have been 1 t al r eady i n May ~~ ~n tne attack on Bien Boa. Losses on the ground are difficult to predict since they ace due to isolated, sporadic , and random enemy thrusts . Nevertheless , the OSD loss predictions include losses on the ground (and operational or non-combat Ls e ) ~~ in the All Other Losses category in the Tah1 ~ 330 oeries , OSD Statistical Summary .

1 occurred during the same period in FY 1967. While FY 1966 ; only 1

AIRCRAFT DESTROYED BY h OSTILE ACTION ON TI-fE GROUN D Fighter/Attack F-102-AF A-1-AF A-14-USMC SUB TOTAL Other Fixed Wing C-123-AF C-HC-130-AF 0-1-A CV-2-A u-S-A SUB TOTAL Helicopters 1Q FY 1 966 2~ 3Q

14ci

1Q

FY 1 96 7 2Q 3Q

TOTAL 3 2 7
1 2

3
3

2
2

1 3 -- - -

14

1 -

1 1 0

3 3 1 1 9 1 1 3 6 10 1 2 3~ 51

UH-1~~

UH-314-t4~ LJH-l-A OH-]3-A CH-37-A CH-l i7-A SUB TOTAL TOTAL U .S.

1 3 6

1 1~ 1

-19 6 21

1 1 214 3

1 -

6 7

-1 1

2 3

14

SECRET
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

140

---

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

-~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~

SECRET
ANALYSIS OF AIRCRAFT ORDNANCE CONSIJMPTIO1~
1 4

7 0 0 ton s in April , -d 7 6. Southeast Asia ordnance expenditures totei ~ primary reason for month. The for tht 0 0 tons predicted less than the 79, 8 ~ expect SEA consumption still -2 % kload factors. was low Bthe difference 0, 0 0 0 tons. to level at about 6
t

O/ 7 5( USAF-TAC loads may be constrained by the j ?~~ - . thy~ of 50 ~ GP bomb at 63.5 high i iative1y r -inain stocks. The USN/ USMC 500/75011 bomb stocks ~ ~~ page). on the next day s ( see table

0 0 tons for the next three The CINCPAC allocation is approximate ly 83 ,0 0 0 0 tons. about 91, CINCPAC requirement months and the
I

April Estimate Attack Sorties USN/USMC USAFTAC B-52 Tons/Attack Sortie USN/USMC USAFTAC B52 Thousands of Tons T.E N/US MC USAF-TAC B52 30.14 214.0 14. ~ 1 . 6
19.3

April Actual

6 9 90 1 6 0 0 7 8 0 0

1 0 3 0 9 1 71 03 8 23 1 . 83 1 . 8 3 25.5

1 .9 5 1 .9 0 30.0

Total Tons

Army

MAP

1 8 .9 30.9 2 1 . 0 14. 0

7&~7

SECRET

Iii.

_ _

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- - ~~

---

---- -------- -

-_

-----

. -------

--

-------,

SECRET
Tl0It ACTU1i./ ~~TDcATlD AI~~ lAPT OPD IMS~E 00IlS~l~

~/

ACTUAL
- -

PROJECTED
,I.y
Jun

Oct bI
Attack Soctiss 6840 ~~~!V~ IC PTA C 13594 152 406 To

CT~~966 bar bI Dec b/ 7132 531 1.38 1.34 20.0 11.3 20.9 10.6 4.1 1.0 47.9 7347 14769 659 1.01 1.60 20.6 13.3 23.7 13.6 4.0 1.2 35.8

Jan bJ 8247 15616 735 1.99 1.71 20.7 16.4 26.7 15.2 3.6 1.2 63.1 500.1 64.4 93.2 528.9

Fib bi

CT 1967 lOar bJ

Apr b/
10309

_________________________________

Jul

Ana

Sea

Oct

13362

8912 14713 706 1.95 1.77 28.0 17. 4 26.0 19.8 3.8 1.2 68.2 528.9 69.9 91.6 550.6

10070 17528 816 1.77 1.81 27.1 17.8 31.8 22.1 4.0 1.7 77.4 330.6 78.9 97.9 569.6

17103 823 1.83 1.83 25.5 18.9 30.9 21.0 4.0 1.9 76.7 569.6 79.7 95.0 584.9

15306 800

9151

9221 15306

800 1.95 1.95 30.0 18.0 29.8 24.0 4.2 1.9 78.9 600.9 80.9 94.9 614.9

9192 15460 000 1.95 2.00 30.0 17.9 30.9 2~~O 4.2 1.9 80.8 614.9 81.9 96.2 629.2

9186 16402 800 1.95 2.00 30.0 17.9 32.8 24.0 4.2 1.9 80.8 629.2 83.8 94.0 639.4

9191 16402 ii: 1.95 2.00 30.0 17.9 32.8 24.0 4.2 1.9 80.8 639.4 83.8 93.2 648.8

9282 16395 800 1 2 30 18 32 24 4 1 81 64$ $4 8

Pqr Sortia 1.59 ~~~/lI SC UlAPTAC 1.40 132 20.8 10.~ 19.0 0.3 3.0 1.1 42.5

1.95 1.90 28.0 17.8 31.2 22.4 4.2 1.9 77.5 584.9 80.5 99.1 600.9

1 ~~LII/UlNC OSAPTAC 152 Va..? Arty Total

Isridvids leasoLoT, (Tb.~~ . of Taos ) 44 1.9 471.7 Start I~ stb 410.0 45.3 49.1 37.5 Csss* 4Prod 78.9 83.9 774 1 sth 44l.$ 471.7 500.1 ~

500/750 .CP lock Stock. vs. Conm~~~ tiou Pates In SPA Xo,o.ber D.c b.r January Fsbrvary October 13.0 3.4 72.2 11 . 4 8.8 38.9 13.8 6.4 64.7 13.0 11.4 34.2 21.4 7.7 83.4 20.0 15.0 40.0 ~~~ 19.2 10.8 53.3 24.5 17.9 41.1 18.6 11.6 48.1 36.7 17.6 63.6 SEA Pibrusaw 416.6 103.5 120.0

~~~~~ 23.6 11.0 64.4 35.L 22.1 47.6 ~~~~~ 575.3 26.~ 12 7 63.5 27.4 21.3 30.6

$ (to..) Nsotbly Coos bat. (to ..) Patio Cloy.) I Stocks (toss) Nustbly Co.. late ( coca) Patio Cloy.)

~~ itock. (ito.. 000) Patio (Days) /

October
251.6 84.1 89.8

2.7 5 In Notars vs. bove.b.r 324.8 84.3 121.7

Coss lato. In ~~ tioe Dsc er J .ry

318.8 100.7 95.0 204.2 101.4 04.1

~~

) stbly Coos Pa ts (it o.. 000) ~

#4. Toss per ortis for USI/SEIIC aircraft are sli~~ t1y hI#er tho. tb s 1.8$ 1u,sl a.parl ssd *1 Sort ie. are those of Pro$r last thr.s usoths. Tb. Air Force tactical aircraft ton.per sort ie s e .s a $reds.1 twt -. to lb. Iso lsosl perlo.ss CT 1963 osd duri M J uary 1966 . Analysis of gensral purpos e bash stock. availible In A far testt. al ak ira ft pp. .ue ~ ~~
i /

136.t
t38.9

~~~.9 138.8 128.6

Actual data thou 30 April. losed om 30 day south. Iocl.dss 3000 toss par south trainIng sopenditurss projected for April osd s i b . . q . s . t

tho. Actual I1 ~~tos are loriduids

C)
- -

SECRET

-_

--

SECRET
-- -

ACTUAL

PROJECTED
__________________________________________________________________

~~r hi
11528 816
10070

~ L 1967

Apr b/ 10309 17103 823 1.83 1.83 25.5 18.9 30.9 21.0 4.0 1.9 76.7 569.6 79.7 95.0 584.9

kay

Jun

Jul

An.

Sep

Oct

So,

D.c

9151 15306 800 1.95 1.90 28.0 17.8 31.2 22.4 4.2 1.9 77.5 584.9 80.5 99.1 600.9

9221 13306 800 1.95 1.95 30.0 18.0 29.8 24.0 4.2 1.9 78.9 600.9 80.9 94.9 614.9

13460

9192

800 , 1.93 2.00 30.0 17.9 30.9 24.0 4.2 1.9 80.8

16402

9186 800 1.95 2.00 30.0 17.9 32.8 24.0 4.2 1,9 80.8 629.2 83.8 94.0 639.4

16402

9191 000 1.93 2.00 30.0 17.9 32.8 24.0 4.2 1.9 80.8 639.4 83.8 93.2 648.8

9282 16395 800 1.93 2.00 30.0 18.1 32.8 24.0 4.2 1.9 81.0 648.8 84.0 92.6 657.4

9403 1639 5 000 1.93 2.00 30.0 18.3 32.8 24.0 4.2 1.9 81.2 657.4 84.2 92.8 666.0

9165 16395 800 1.95 2.00 30.0 17.9 32.8 24.0 4.2 1.9 80.8 666.0 83.8 93.1 673.3

1.77 1.81 27.1 12.8 31.8 22.1 4.0 1.7 77.4 550.6 78.9 97.~ 369.6

614.9 81.9 96.2 629.2

$~~~~~~ Stocks vs Coos ~~~ tion iste. In SEA ~~ February ~~~~~ Pav... J.-tr ~~~~~~~~ January

13.8 6.4 64.7 1 3.0 1 1 . 4 34.2

21.4 7.7 83.4 20.0 13.0 40.0

19.2 10.8 53.3 24.3 17.9 41.1

18.6 11.6 40.1 36.7 17.6 63.6

23.6 11.0 64.4 33.1 22.1 47.6 ~~~~~ 575.3 126.1

26.9 12.7 63.5 27.4 21.3 38.6

b r . v,. ~ Coss~~~tton Pateu In SPA February Iav...Mr D.co.ber J~~~~rv 34.0 04.3 21.7 318. 8 100.7 9 3.0 284.2 101.4
$4.1

416.6 103.3
120.8

136.9

680.9 158.8 128.6

r Ull/IIIIC aircraft us .1i ~~ tly hi~ber the. the 1.85 level sipertasc ed da rius the toss per sortie s uas. a $redsal return to lb. Iso toe level soperiosced darius I purpose bosh stocks available In SEA for tactical aircraf t supports lbs above avera$s

. j . c t e d for ~

April and sob equsut

ssths. Actual Ii$utes

are Voridwid. c~~ .,~~~tj os.

SECRET

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~~~~-

j----~

r.

- --- ~~ ~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

, --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~~~~~~~~~ -~~- - - - ~~~ ~

--- -----

- - -

- ~~

--

--

SECRET
OCEA~ i CARGO SHIP ~~NTS FROM CONtJS TO SEA
-

The attached table summar i z e s the ocean cargo lift from CONUS to SEA for the period August , 1965 to April , 1 i&L) fore967, and presents the QASD( cast of shipments through December , 1967.

Total shipments fr om CONUS to SEA in April remained at the same high level as in March. However , shipments to SVN increased by 10 % to establish 7 6, an all-time high of 8 0 0 0 MIT. Within the SVTJ total , increases occurred in the ammunition and other categories. In view of the steady growth in ~~ the other category and other indicators , it appears that excessive stocks of material may be building-up in SVN. Total shipments to the non-SVN ports in SEA totaled 11. 09, 0 0 0 M/T which 1i , was a 8 0 0 0 M/T reduction from the March level. Detailed information as to the distribution among the ports is not yet available ; however , preliminary information indicates the majority of the reduction may have occurred in shipments to Okinawa. If the final data confirms this , it will be a significant reversal of the March , 1967 experience commented on in last months Southeast Asia Analysis Report (pp. 14 7) . I n view of the Secretary of Defense decision in December , 1966 to r s PACOM logistic system , continued restrict the role of Okinawa in the Arrn:, reductions in the tonnage shipped to Okinawa for the 2nd Logistic Command depot shoul d be expected. Information available indicates the following requisition cancellation request actions by the 2nd Logistic Command . Date of Cancellation Request March 8, 1967 March 30, 196 7 March 31, 196 7 No of Line Items 0 0 0 70, 14 , 6 0 0 0 0 0 17, 6 0 0 9 1,
$

Value

0 0 0 7 0 0, 192, 11, 6 0 0, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, 314, 0 0 0 236, 30 0,

If a significant portion of these cancellation requests are acted upon before shipment from CONUS , major savings in packing, in-land transportation , ocean shipping and replacement procurement costs should result.

1/

) t; ) ~~~ includes all material except unit equipment , ammunition and aircraft.

43

SECRET

.~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

S~~t r C ~~L X . ~~ C~~

i :a S . _-~~

-- -- - --- - --

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- --

. -

-~~~~~- ~~ ~~~ -,.

~~~~~~~

--- -~~~~~~~ - - ~~~~~~~ -

- - .- .

-- . .

- -~~~.- - ---

--- - -

SECRET
MSTS OCEAN CARGO SHI R1ENTS FRCII C ONU S TO

/ T) ( oOo i~

SEA

ALL S~ JTH VIETHAM PORTS MONTH

Unit Equ ip

Amino

Aircraft

Other

Total

Jan 67 Forecast

I1 ALL O~ ~~R SEA

Total
1 2 8

DESTINATIONS 6 7 Jan
Forecast

Aug

196 5 Sep
Oct

2 1 1

1 30

Nov Dec

12 9

147 28 1 9 21 28 7 57 43

23 44 1 0 8 50 1 3 51 35 86 76 46 92

83 14 214 147 1 3 1 6 10 25 6 20 21 42 1 4 1 7 1 8 2 8 29 1 0 25 1 6

171 2148
209 229

1488
1407 509

230 1402 376 1424 398 1404 1419 14 76

1412 260

353 2814
e6 8

1 63 211.3 316 3 0 8 2814

262

6 5 7

Mar
Apr

66 19 Jan Feb

3146

May

June July Aug

Sep

115

Nov Dec
Jan

Oct

210 1.39 1. 2 0 914 67 7~ 91

87

84

125

8 8 63 90 914

515 513 521 560 632 693

7~~2

339 352 363 3147 393

520

63 73 851 90 ~ i.21J 1 1 6 125 1 1 2 110

1 0

518 1491 5114 570 593 613 661

765

707

7141 759 . j ~6 797 7145 75 3 763

770

1439 1485 4 1 . 6 362 374 376 380 375 375 375 381 377 377 376 376 3 76

1 967

Mar Apr

Feb

May June
July Aug
Sep

86

93 93 68 113

876

382 3814 1493

1409

U1s ~ 116d
-

Oct Nov Dec . 8A~~( ?ore ~ast

. -

7814 7 9 6 810 825 835 853 850 8 7 0

SEA defined to include all. port s went of Haw*il. Actual data from xi
data from OABD(I&L ) .
: . ~~~~~ . ,_ : :- i

&j usted to include Air Force Special ~ rs .

l_ :

_ _ _ _ _ _

, . ~

SECRET

U
/
e~ _._ -.---- - ~

-fl--

- ~~~~ ~~~

_aa . r S f l ~ ~~~~~~~

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--~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~

_ _ 7__ __ ~ ~~
___

---

. -

~~~

SEA

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ALL OTHER SEA DESTINATIONS Total GRAND TOTAL SEA
Actua l.

SECREI
UNB0OIC~~ CARGO CONIJS TO ALL SEA DESTINATIONS

Total 4 8 8 4 0 7
509 2814 31 46 513

67 Forecast
Jan

Jan 6 7
Forecast

Forecast

Jan 67

353

1 28 163 243 316 308

2814 262 339 352

616 570 752

669
592

1468

53.5 521 560 632 693 765

722 707 7141

363
1e39

630 730 8 ~4 865 1213

907 10 25

347 393 520

1485

8814

45 3 . 6 84 235 213 298

1 62

2314

1 1 61

1416 362 745 7.53 763 7814

770

1250 1123 1103 374 376 380 375 375 375 381 377 376 376 376

66 63 87

7 5 9 776 7 9 7

876

382 3814 1493 1409

1 1 . 4 1 u60 1 2 8 9 1285

1 1 1 9

796
810

1 1 29 1143 1145 1159 1191 1202

1 2 1 2

1 33 23 29 22

1 1 7 1

825

835 853 850 870

377

1 229

3226

12146

Actual data fro m I~~ ( r S ad. j uated to include Air Force Special cpr eaa a o ahipmenta data furnished by ~ ~~

QAa)/SAJSZAPrograms

SECRET

N . y 35, 3 .96?

Div .

2
-

; ~~~~~ ~~~~~

- -

-- J ~

-M~~~~~~ t

j ---

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~ -

- -- --

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SECRET
AIR CARGO SHIPMENTS TO SOUTHEAST ASIA Th. following table illustrates the sharp incr ease in air cargo
Air Car g~~

shipments fro m CONUS to Southeast Asia.

Shipments from CONUS
(Short

to SVN and Qther Southeast Tons)

Asia

1/

Mo nthlv OctDee , 1965 Jan Mar , 1966 AprJun , 1966 JulSe p, 1966 Oc tDec , 1966 JanMa r , 3967 1/ 5 ,600 8,100 ~O , 400 14,600 17 ,300

Averag e

4, 200

Oth r

5,500 6 , 000 6 , 600 7 , 300 8 ,700 10, 600

FA

_ _ _ _ _

To tal SEA 9,700 11,600 1 4, 700 17.700 23 , 300 27 ,900

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Data e~~~OASi &L) . Other SEA defi ,~ cd to include Thailand , ~(T Philippines , Taiwan , Okinava , Japan and Guam .

ASD(I&L) recentl y instituted a mandator y pre shipping challenge procedure for all shipments of certain commodities exceed ing 1,000 pounds. This action resulted from the continued growth of air shipments to Southeast Asia , an OSD sample of air export cargo which indicated questionable priorit y assignments , and expenditures for commercial augmentation of MAC reachtn ~ the rate of $600 million a veer . The commodity groups placed under the mandatory procedure include: (a) (b) (c) (d) Ce) (f) construction materi als fuels , lubricants and gas print ed form s clothing rations office supp lies
generator s

and the Services each month identt fvtng

Under the procedure , deta il ed lists will be submitted to ASD (I&L) all shipments -made by air after challenge because of reaffirmat ion of the requirement for air shipment.

(S EAEX) . This will restore the SEAEX system to ite intended use of providing expedited ocean transport ation for high priority cargo. The effect of the two sets of actions should be significantly reduced air and Sea Express shipments and costs. As a direct result of the ASD(I&L) actions , CINCPAC has instituted similar procedures for IntraPACOM air and expedited ocean shipments . CINCPAC also reemphasized that control must be exercised on requisitions to prevent abuses of the prio rity system .

low priority shipments in the ocean cargo sy stem called Sea Express

In a par allel action , AST)(I &L) also directed an embargo on

SECRET
145

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SECRET
SAIGON PQRT
-

As the table and attached charts indicate , the AID /Comm ercial car go sec tor of the Saigon port is in its best condition in a year. Despite the highest rate of cargo arrivals in the port since October , 1966 , the April discharge of 296 , 000 short tons resulted in the lowest endofmonth backlog of undiacharged cargo experienced to date. The backlog on April 30, 1967 was equal to only 1 week s work. SAIGON PORT COMME RCIAL/AI D CARCO INPUT (000 Short Tons) 1966 Beginning Backlq ~ May * 101 Month Jun Jul 86 123 181 196 162 222 209 311 264 171 98
-

OUTPUT ANALYSIS

Arriv als during Total Avail . Ending n~ nth 1/ rg h - ~~~arg~ ~~~~ ~ ~~ ~~~~~~ 164 265 179 86 235 293 264 157 275 23] 704 220 106 211 260 321 416 445 353 437 453 413 531 370 38 2 358 198 235 249 191 235 244 102 267 199 28 4 296 123 181 196 162 222 209 3 11 264 171
98

Aug

Dec

Sep Oct Nov

1967

Jan Feb Mar Apr

62

1/

Arrivals are computed rather than reported . No backlog data availab le pri or Apr 11 , 1966 .

The overall progress in the port is due to the cumulative effects of improvements in facilities , equipment and management ; however , as the following table indicates , U.S. military cargo handling has made a major contribution. While CVN discharge rates have remained relatively constant (excluding the low performance in December , 1966 due to the strike and February , 1967 due to TET), th e U . S. military is handling about onethird of the car g o discharged (in addition to 200 , 000 S/T a month of U.S . military cargo).

--

~~~~..

~~~~~ -- -- -----.

- ? ~~~ . ;-

~~~~~~~~~

-_ --_ -- -

- - -

~~

k ana ~~~~~~

-~

~~~~~

-~

SECRET
1 C EI FIGVN AND U .S MILITARY MERCIA~LAID CARGO DISCHA] SAIGON PORT CO) ~ (00 0 Shor t Tons)
I

1966 Jul* Aug Sep Oct

h ! ~~~

Discharged VN ~~. ~cL 210 222 143 164 191 66

Discharged b U .S. ns.i

Total ~~~~~~~~~~ 235 24 9 191 215 244 102

2 Discharged 11 1 1 25 24 22 35

Nov Dec

25 27 48 Si 53 36

1967 Jan Mar

Feb Apr

194

134 189 204

73

65 95 92

2 67

199 284 296

27

33 34 31

U .S. military began discharging AID cargo in July , 1966 .

I L~

47

SECRE T

~~~~~~~~

--

-- -- . ~~~~

--

. -

-_ --

-~~

----- -- - - - -

-_

SAIGON PORT CARGO DISCHARGED AND BACKLOG

GVN COMML/AID CARGO DISC H U .S. M u . CARGO DISC H ~~~~~~ 1Q2 2 AID CARGO DISC H BY U.S. Mu ~~~ ~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~

GVN COMIV CPWCIP AIC U.S . MIt. . C

SHORT TONS
550 ( 0 0 0)

500 450

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SEP

OCT

NOV
1965
*

OEC

GVN BACKLOG FIGURES NOT AVAILABLE

48

JT[ 11
:
APR JAN FEB MAR

MAY

JUN

JUL

WG

966

~~~~~~~

/
-

--

--

--

- ------- -- ~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~ ~

- --~ ~~~ ~~~

ED AND BACKLOG
~- -

MIt.. CARGO DISCH CARGO DISC H BY U .S. MIt.

I COMMIJAID CARGO DISCH ~

GVN COMML/AID CARGO BACKLOG ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ CPA/CIP AID CARGO U. S . Mu BACKLOG U.S. MIL. CARGO BACKLOG

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN
966

JUL

~UG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC )

JAN 967

FEB

MAR

APR

U RES N OT

AVAILABLE

- - St ~.

~~ ~

~~~~

_____.__-_.___ a_ ___- ---

--

~~ - -

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~ -~~~~------ . -- -- -

-~ -

p.

SAIGON BARGE REPORT

(COMMERCIAL ONLY )

BARGES
2000
-

NO. OF

_________

1 600

I.. . ::~~~-~~: :~~-J DISCHARGED DURING WEEK ~ ? W/ / / / / / / / / / / DURING WEEK LOADED ~/ UNDER LOA D ( ) UNDER LOAD OVER 30 DAYS - 1423 I I
- 161 :

1879 1661

1579
_ _ _

~~~~~~~

1 200

400

______
_ _ _
_ _ _ _

1 337 1121 1061

1417
: : : . : -:: ~ . ~

~~~
_ _ _ _ _

144 1
227:
: ~~:

541 513 ::~~

~~~

: 1.:1.; ~
_
_

165P1 1631 16491 II ~

873

_
1 6 4 s

_
1 8 55 1
I

~~

Ic!i 1(537) 1 1(577) 1

10 Il 24

iF 1
7

L jJ ~ _

1729 1

l ~!9.
_ _

~~~~~~~

I(~ )1 1(452)1
21 31

(436)

F(1
_

81

1 (6 4 2 ) 1

1(635)11 5 I ~~
10

( ~~

_ _

_ _

DECEMBER
966

31

JANUARY

14

10

FEBRUARY
1967

20

28

20 3 MARCH

( a ) DATA NOT AVAILABLE

(a.) REPORTING PERIOD CHANGED TO 10 DAY PERIODS

49

/
-

- -

cr ~

~~~~~~~

--_-

- - -_ -

--

-~~~ -

-. ~~~~~~~~

ONLY )

REPORT

I /
___

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

-_ :- ~ ~~~ -

WEEK EK

30 DAYS
1417 . . 1337 1 1 T12J

1 I-t 1 1 222 1 1441 L VAJf 1 ii ~ I

1579
227
1 ~~~~~~~I547 I

J::Y~~ J 1401 1 1668

Fl

879 17 12

K,6 L I J r1 d L JI ~ J ~~ I ~
:.;. : . ~~~~~
_ _ _ _

I1

I378

I
1

1569
635

_ _ _ _

124

4 , 4 )

~~~~~~~~~~

__

________
I ~~~~~~~

496
_ _

18 1 ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~i~~~ I72oJ

t598

I ( * ) I ~~J

1(452)1

L i ~
10

1 (616)11(642)1 1(635)1 658)J ~ ~

ai~ 9) a5)Ik359)1 ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~

114
-

JANUARY

21

31

FEBRUARY
1967

20

28

10

20 31 MARCH

10

20 30 APRI L

TO 10 DAY PERIODS

49

- -

-.

-w

-i ~~~~~~~~~ ~~

- ~~

--

z.

___________

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

r~~~~~~_ I ~~~~~~ T ~~~~TI_ JTiI

-c
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

U ~

CLAS$fl ILU

CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM SU?6IARY AND PROGRESS The following table suau~~rizes the stat us of SEA MILCON funding , estimated coat , and work cox~~1eted as of March 30, 1967 .

( $ 0 0 0) SVN

FY l966 S AND PRIOR PROJECTS r unds e1eased ~urrent FY 19 6 6 8 Y l967~ $ ~ Y 19 o Field forking Est . Cai~~ 1etion Co~~letion & Prior 6 8 TOTAL ~ 1 ,089

FUNDING

474

Other f ~

TOTAL

28 1, 7

639

______

938

1,563 1, 0 8 8 W 1, lO~ _______ 2, 6 6 6 1, 6 72

i ,356W

1,947

59121

73l W

1 ,060

~2921

54

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

21
--

Include s $200 million DOD worldwide Contingency Fund . Re: 1 April 1 967 NAVFAC Construction Status Report, Vietnam, plus TURNKEY. Re: March 19 6 7 DD-6610 Reports .

During March contractor ( RMK-BRJ ) and troop work-in-place in SVN fell about 21% short of their planned output ( $85 million vs. $107 million). The apparent cost overrun (excess of planned scope cost over available funds) for SVN construction dropped by about $4 million during March. The table above shows that the current cost estimate for projects started exceeds the released funds by $268 million. When the $1 2 6 in FY 1 9675 overrun funds are applied to the current estimate of underfunding , there is still a deficit of $142 million. The Level of Effort ( L0E)system for control of contractor construction in SVN discussed in the April SEA Analysis Report was started on April 1. Under this concept the total contractor effort will be sized to live within funds available . In addition, a site-by-site reappraisal of construction plans is being conducted by MACV to make appropriate scope adj ustments and assign the remaining wor k to the contractor or troop units. The LOE concept is designed to get the maximum construction fr om the available construction dollars .

C
-

50

-:

. :

--

UNCLASSIFIED
~~~~~~~~~~~~

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--

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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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~~~~~~~~~~