Stadtschlaining, Austria COLLAPSED STATEHOOD AND REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS: THE SOMALIA EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY COMPLEX

Thesis submitted by

KAWEGAH JNR. P. PAUL

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MA in Peace and Conflict Studies 2012

ADVISOR SECOND READER

DR. TILMAN EVERS DR. LASZLO FARKAS

ABSTRACT

This thesis gives a comprehensive account of the Somali state collapse and how the subsequent anarchy led to the emergence of extremist groups, particularly Al-Shabaab. The study then focuses on pertinent aspects of the Al-Shabaab, including: Ideological connotation, organizational structure, recruitment, financing, tactics and the strategies to win minds and hearts of the Somali people. Most importantly, the study establishes possible loopholes that Al-Shabaab has exploited to broaden its sphere of influence into the East African Community (EAC). The study then reveals that Al-Shabaabs extremism in Somalia and later infiltration into the EAC has negatively impacted on the regions fragile foreign direct investment, tourism sector and led to an influx of refugees, particularly in Kenya. Accordingly, the study focuses on the Al-Shabaab related military interventions. On the military front, the study assesses Kenyas led Operation Linda Nchi and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), seeking to establish whether the operation was based on unsubstantiated claims, or otherwise. Further, this research captures the publics reaction towards this operation and the eventual integration of the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) into AMISOM. The research finally proposes various avenues for countering Al-Shabaab in the context of emerging regionalism, but remains pragmatic that not all the possible solutions can be localised within Somalia without tackling the group's external support structures.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction and background to the Study...1 1.1 Statement of Problem and Scope of study...3 1.2 Literature Review.4 1.3 Significance of the Study...11 1.4 Research Methodology ..11 1.5 Constraints..12 1.6 CONCLUSION..13

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 SOMALIA- COLLAPSED STATEHOOD AND OUTCOMES 2.1 THE PATH TO STATE COLLAPSE.......14 2.1.1 Background.14 2.1.2 The Siad Barre Regime, Cold War factor, and Civil War break out....17 2.2 AL-SHABAAB: THE OUTCOME OF A STATE COLLAPSE 2.2.1 Chronology of the Al-Shabaab evolution21 2.2.2 Understanding the Al-Shabaab25 2.3 CONCLUSION..42

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CHAPTER THREE

3.0 AL-SHABAAB RELATED MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 3.1 OPERATION LINDA NCHI (OLN).44 3.2 AMISOM...58 3.3 ETHIOPIAN PERCIFICATION OF SOMALIA..65 3.4 CONCLUSION..66

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 FINDINGS: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 4.1 Overview68 4.2 Data Analysis.68 4.3 Nexus of the Somalia Collapsed Statehood, Emergence of the Al-Shabaab, and the recent terrorist activities in the EAC....71 4.4 Avenues for spill over of extremism and terrorist activities in Kenya and the EAC....80 4.5. Impacts of the Al-Shabaab Instigated insecurity within the EAC....95 4.6. Perceptions of the EAC citizens regarding the Operation Linda Nchi (OLN) and the Integration of the KDF into AMISOM.....96 4.7 Reasons for or against the integration of KDF into AMISOM.99 4.8. Mitigation: Addressing the Al-Shabaab threat in the context of the emerging regionalism ......101 4.9 CONCLUSION.......110

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CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE AREA FOR RESEARCH 5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS.112 5.2 FUTURE AREA FOR RESEARCH....119 5.3 CONCLUSION119 SOURCES..121

APENDIX

APENDIX A: ACRONYMS............132 APENDIX B: CODE BOOK...133 APENDIX C: DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS....139 APENDIX D: LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS....141 APENDIX E: MAP OF SOMALIA....143 APENDIX F: MAP OF THE EAST AFRICAN STATES..144 APENDIX G: MAP OF LAPSSET PROJECT145

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction and background to the Study Whereas the conflict in Somalia has become the centre of global debate on piracy, Muslim extremism and terrorism over the years, a lot of existing literature has equally focused on the instability, especially due to Al-Shabaab, but relative to the Horn of Africa. Not much has been written on the ramifications of this instability with regards to the EAC, even though the Al-Shabaab threat has become far too fraught for the EAC citizens to contemplate. The EAC with a population of 133.1 million1 comprises of Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya. Nevertheless, Kenya is the only EAC state sharing a border with Somalia (the border stretches 682 km from Mandera at the North to Ras Kamboni in the Indian Ocean).2 This expansive border and its corresponding porosity is at the core of the infiltration of terrorist activities into Kenya and conceivably, one of the most predictable avenues that has predisposed the entire EAC to Al-Shabaab related terror attacks. Even though Kenya, given its proximity to Somalia and the fact that it hosts a portion of a marginalised Somali group would easily face a backlash of extremism and terrorist acts from Somalia, the prognosis could not be as clear for the rest of the EAC states. However, the July

East African Community Facts and Figures 2011, EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY SECRETARIAT, October, 2011, p 12, http://www.statistics.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=133&tmpl=component&format=raw&It emid=153 (accessed on January 3, 2012) 2 CIA, Somalia, CIA World Fact Book, APRIL 12, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/so.html (accessed on January 3, 2012)

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11, 2010 Al-Shabaab masterminded grenade attacks in Kampala, Uganda that claimed at least 74 lives3 shifted the focus from the initial perception that the risk was predominantly Kenya's. Following the terrorist attacks in Uganda, it is pragmatic postulation that Burundi, another AMISOM troop contributor would gravely endure a similar fate. Arguably, this prediction is not farfetched following Al-Shabaab's recent warning to the Burundian government to consider withdrawing its troops, or face retribution attacks.4 With three of the EAC states having been attacked, or on the verge of it, the Al-Shabaab threat had ceased to be a Horn of Africa issue, but rather a concern for the EAC with Kenya as the buffer between Somalia and the rest of the EAC. In light of terrorist activities that Kenya has experienced over the past one year, the focus has shifted to the current state of affairs which prompted Kenyas first military mission in a foreign land since independence (1963). The incursion, code named Operation Linda Nchi (OLN) or Operation Protect the Nation/Country, has equally put Kenya on a collision path with Al-Shabaab. Notably, KDF has eventually joined their counterparts from Uganda and Burundi in AMISOM, making it three out of five EAC states on a mission to militarily wipe out Al-Shabaab from Somalia. Kenya is also a residence to almost half a million Somali refugees in addition to the population of its native Somali speaking citizens. Whereas Rwanda and Burundi do not have any statistically significant numbers of Somali nationals, Uganda and Tanzania have equally accommodated proportionate numbers of Somali refugees with others settling in the respective countries as citizens.

Xan Rice Uganda bomb blasts kill at least 74, The Guardian, July 12, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/12/uganda-kampala-bombs-explosions-attacks (accessed on January 17, 2012) 4 ABDULKADIR KHALIF, Al-Shabaab warns Burundi of revenge attack, Africa Review, March 2, 2011, http://www.africareview.com/News/Al+Shabaab+warns+Burundi+of+revenge+attack/-/979180/1117930/-/iuw2v2z//index.html (accessed on January 17, 2012)

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In this thesis therefore, the author would argue that there exists a nexus between the collapsed statehood of Somalia, and the emergence of Al-Shabaab related extremism or terrorist activities. Further, terror insecurity in Kenya is as a consequence of the spill over of violent extremism from Somalia and that the remaining EAC States are equally predisposed given the myriad of factors that have so far encouraged spill overs as would be discussed. 1.1 Statement of Problem and Scope of study This study seeks to explore the dynamics or fluidity of the EAC regional security relative to the Somalia collapsed statehood and the complexity of neighbourliness relationships following the current military interventions in the country. The scope of this study is to identify Al-Shabaab and their terrorist-related activities as a universal security gap among the EAC states vis--vis other transnational crimes arising from the collapsed statehood of Somalia. Accordingly, this study seeks to answer the following questions: i. What is the nexus between the Somalia collapsed statehood, emergence of AlShabaab, and the recent terrorist activities in the EAC? ii. What factors have made it feasible for Al-Shabaab related terrorist activities to spill over to Kenya and possibly the rest of the EAC? iii. What are the impacts of Al Shabaab related terrorist activities on the socioeconomic fronts of Kenya and the rest of the EAC States? iv. What is the perception of the EAC citizens regarding the Operation Linda Nchi (OLN) and the integration of the KDF into AMISOM? v. How can the Al-Shabaab threat be addressed in the context of the emerging regionalism?

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1.2 Literature Review The discourse of failed and collapsed statehood cannot be independently assessed without incorporating the element of a violent conflict.5 Notably, the violent nature of civil wars presents opportune avenues for state failure and eventual collapse. Bates posits that state failure encompasses an existing deterioration of the ability of the central authority to provide public goods for its citizens,6 and as Dearth suggests, a state is said to have failed if it does not fulfil the most basic obligations of statehood.7 This is in tandem with Carments observation that, the leadership of a failed state cannot provide sufficiently for the people to attract minimal sufficient domestic support.8 The level of hopelessness in terms of the functions of the government degenerates further as the state flips from the position of failure to total collapse, a concept which has characterised Somalia since 1991. Flotz attributes high risks of personal insecurity, lawlessness, and armed conflicts to state failure, and hence the eventual collapse. He denotes that under these circumstances, citizens develop a tendency to support virtually any group that can retain order.
9

Accordingly, the

inability of a state to assert its inherent monopoly of legitimate force opens the door for extremists to build their bases of political power.10 This argument puts an insight into the emergence and the initial positive reception that ICU (Islamic Courts Union) of Somalia received, even as its militant arm (Al-Shabaab) carried out terrorist related activities against the population. The power void created by the Somali state failure and collapse has consequently been filled by Al-Shabaab, an Islamist extremist group which has been thriving

Brennan M. Kraxberger, Failed States: Temporary Obstacles to Democratic Diffusion or Fundamental Holes in the World Political Map?, Third World Quarterly, 28 (2007) pp. 1055-71 6 Robert Bates, The Logic of State Failure: Learning from Late-Century, Conflict Management and Peace Science 25(2008) pp. 297-314 7 Carment David, Assessing state failure:Implications for theory and policy, Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 3(2003) pp. 407-427 8 Ibid 9 Zachary Devlin-Flotz, Africas Fragile States: Empowering Extremists, Exporting Terrorism, Africa Securi ty Brief, No 6, August (2010) p. 1 10 Ibid

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on the platform of standing in for the government, which essentially means rendering services to the people. Civil war is a key component of state failure and eventual collapse as it emerges side by side of the state disintegration.11This thesis would depart from the assumption that the Somalia civil war was a recipe for the emergence of Al-Shabaab extremist group. Transnational terrorism has historically been carried out by non-state actors who carry out terror related activities in a bid to compel the state to conform to their demands.12 Groups which exhibit terror tendencies like the Boko Haram of Borno state of Nigeria have employed the tact in their quest for Islamic rule across the country,13 similarly, the Somalia Al-Shabaab equally prescribe to the same ideology. Whereas the threat posed by Boko Haram is still confined to its national spheres and more particularly, the state of Borno, the converse is true for the Al-Shabaab which has so far enhanced its ambitions and extended its sphere of influence beyond the borders of Somalia into the EAC.The strategy adopted by the AlShabaab extremist group in achieving its objectives puts it at par with the existing terrorist groups. However, as Schmid puts it, arriving at an adequate definition of the phenomenon has become problematic.14 For the purposes of this thesis, the author adopts Hoffmans definition of terrorism, which identifies it as an act specifically designed to have far reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s). He further posits that terrorism is meant to instil fear within, and hence intimidates a wider target which in this case is the audience.15

11

Schneckene U., How Transnational Terrorists Profit from Fragile States, SWP Research Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Germany 2004 p 5. 12 William H. McRaven, SPEC OPS Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 1996,p 335. 13 Zachary Devlin-Flotz, Africas Fragile States: Empowering Extremists, Exporting Terrorism, Africa Security Brief, No 6, August (2010) p. 4 14 Alex Schmid, Terrorism-The Definitional Problem, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 36 (2-3) (2004), pp. 375-419 15 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2nd ed, New York, Columbia University Press, 2006, pp40-41

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According to Pape, 'weak' groups engage in terrorism because it is cost-effective in terms of fewer actors, finances and other resources. 16 Heinzen sums it up by postulating that the choice of terrorism as an instrument for achieving political objectives is necessitated by the depletion of any other political coercion avenues.17Al-Shabaabs resort to the use of terrorist activities as a means of widening its influence would be fundamental in this analysis. Particularly, it portrays the groups as a weak entity that cannot engage in a conventional warfare with its adversaries in an attempt to seek military redress to its grievances, assuming that peaceful mechanisms have been extensively exhausted. The advent of the Al-Shabaab in the Somalia conflict and its religious connotations highlights the sacralisation dimension of the conflict. According to Lorenzo Vildino:18 Sacralisation of a conflict is a process through which religion, or; in most cases, a militant interpretation of it evolves from being an irrelevant or secondary factor at the onset of a conflict to shaping the views, actions, and aims of one or more of the conflicts key actors. The infusion of militant religious undertones into a conflict is fundamental to the process of radicalisation, a concept which this author will explore in detail. The fundamental component of radicalisation is the existence of an ideology. An individual bearing this conviction therefore justly perceive violence as an avenue for achieving the objectives of the very conviction. As Picarelli aptly puts it, radicalisation occurs when recruits align their existing worldview with the ideology of a group and commit themselves to using violence to achieve the groups goals. According to Evans and Neumann, the success of this process

16 17

Robert A. Pape, Dying To Win: The Strategic of Suicide Terrorism, New York, Random House, 2005 Karl Heinzen, Murder in Walter Laqueur (ed.) The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology, (London: Wildwood House, 1979) pp. 53-64 (p.55) 18 Lorenzo Vidino , Raffaello Pantuccib, Evan Kohlmann, Bringing Global J ihad to the Horn of Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict, African Security, Volume 3, Issue 4, 2010 pp. 216 -238

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can be based on four core pillars, otherwise known as ingredients for the radicalisation process and includes; grievance, ideology, mobilisation, and tipping points.
19

Witktorowics

adds that grievance creates a sense of alienation or disenfranchisement that in turn gives rise to a cognitive opening20, or the realisation to seek other options for redress. One of those options could be extremism. Modern technology, especially the internet has remained a vital propaganda tool for extremists and terrorist groups. The groups use it as an avenue for radicalisation, fund raising, and recruitment. Cronin argues that the rapid information transmission to a significantly larger audience and that which has characteristically rendered terrorism repugnantly voyeuristic has been attributed to the existing technological advancements. 21Coll and Glasser concurs that, the internet has emerged as the critical new dimension of twenty-first century global terrorism with websites and electronic bulletin boards spreading ideological messages perpetuating terrorist networks providing links between operatives in cyber space and sharing violent images to demonstrate ruthlessness and incite followers to action 22 In this thesis, the author seeks to underscore the significance of technology in sustenance of the life line of Al-Shabaab on the fronts of radicalisation, recruitment of far flung potential members, raising funds, reaching out to allies, and perpetuating propaganda campaigns. The most intrepid and tactful operation among terrorists, however, is to carry out an attack in an unfamiliar territory. According to Cronin, terrorist groups are successful in carrying out operations in foreign land with passive support or active support from the

19

Ryan Evans and Peter Neumann, Islamist Militant Radicalisation in Europe: A Critical Assessment of the Literature, London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, April 2009),p 24 20 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 85135 21 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorists Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton , NJ,: Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 4 22 Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations, Washington Post, August 7, 2005

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indigenous population. Whereas passive support includes mild activities such as being uncooperative with the security institutions, active support is, on the other hand, very vivid and includes activities such as: raising revenues, creating a safe haven, and even hiding the group from the authorities. 23 This aspect would further be explored by the author in the assessment of the role of the Somali community in Somalia, Kenya, and the rest of the EAC in understanding the links between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. Peter Chalk and Glen Robinson posit that transnational terrorist attacks are expedited by the existence of franchise cells of one or two people in the targeted country. 24 The May 2003 Casablanca, Morocco bombing that claimed 45 lives is a typical example.25 Robinson further highlight that such bombings are carried out by local terrorist operatives in the diaspora communities. 26 On another front, Chalk argues that terrorists are always keen on taking advantage of unmanned borders. Many borders in the East African corridor are porous and subject to little if any control. 27 In supporting the argument, he cites the 2004 Al-Qaedas successful penetration into the Jebel Kurush mountain range northeast of Sudan that runs parallel to the Red Sea and managing to set up training camps due to lack of border control.28 Key to the discussion in this thesis is the poorly governed 424-mile Kenya-Somalia border that stretches from Mandera in the far north to Ras Kamboni which is right into the Indian Ocean.29

23 24

Cronin, How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups, 27. Glenn E. Robinson, Jihadi Information Strategy: Sources, Opportunities, and Vulnerabilities, in Information Strategy and Warfare: A guide to Theory and Practice, eds. John Arquilla and Douglas Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 9698. 25 Ibid 26 Ibid 27 Peter Chalk, Case Study: The East Africa Corridor, in Ungoverned Territories : Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 157, 28 Jamestown Foundation Briefs, Al-Shabaab Expands Operational Zone with Kampala Bombing-But to What End? Terrorism Monitor VIII, no. 28 (July 16, 2010): 2,
29

Ibid

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Menkhaus argues that contrary to the conventional wisdom that collapsed states are safe havens for international terrorists, the converse is true.30 He instead postulates that it is the quasi states that yield a working environment for terrorists due to the thriving corruption.31 Such countries include: Pakistan, Yemen, Kenya, Indonesia, Philippines and Guinea, among others.32 The author would use this theory to advance his arguments for the undetectable existence and flourishing of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab cells in Kenya and possibly other EAC states. According to A. Philips, foreign fighters in a terrorist group are essential for a strike beyond its regular boundaries,33 and the principal role played by foreign Jihadists in the Province of Anbar, Iraq in the year 2006 gives credence to this argument. Foreign fighters not only conducted martyrdom operations against the US and allied forces, but also worked as volunteers and guaranteed maximum control over the population.34 Foreign Jihadists remained critical for the agenda of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as they became the contact nodes for the newly arrived terrorist groups from Jordan and Syria.35 Philips denotes that it was not only the diminishing support of the Anbar Sunni Muslims that contributed to the 2007 loss of the Province from the grips of the AQI, but also the decline of the inflow of foreign fighters.36 In this thesis, the author will argue that Al-Shabaabs stability and profile have over the years been boosted by the strategic incorporation of foreign fighters within its ranks. A special report by the United States Institute for Peace posits that innate factors emanating from external policies or actors may determine the process by which terrorists

30 31

Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, p 71 Ibid, p 74 32 Ibid, p 71 33 Andrew Phillips, How AQI Lost Iraq, Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no.1 (March 2009): 6566, 34 Frederick W. Kagan, Al-Qaeda in Iraq- How to Understand it: How to Defeat it, The Weekly Standard 012, no. 48 (September 10, 2007): p 3 35 Kimberly Kagan, The Anbar Awakening: Displacing Al-Qaeda from its Stronghold in Western Iraq, The Institution for the Study of War and Weekly Standard, (March 2007), pp 25 36 Phillips, How AQI Lost Iraq, p 65.

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end.37Crenshaw weighs in by arguing that the decline of terrorism results from the governments response, the choices of the group, and the organisational resources. 38 Rapport nevertheless, is hesitant to predict an end to terrorism noting that the religious connotation synonymous with the modern wave of terrorism makes it complicated to make such a prediction.39 In this regard, the author would not only seek to explore some of the choices that Al-Shabaab has undertaken, how those choices have impacted on the groups image among the Somali populace, but also assess whether there is a declining trajectory in the authority and power once wielded by Al-Shabaab following external interventions by AMISOM, KDF and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). Even though the author would conclude this paper by vouching for the engagement of the Al-Shabaab in a peace process or deal, Fred Charles posits that governments have huge difficulties in trying to negotiate with organisations against which they are fighting in either a counter terrorism campaign or a traditional war.40 Further, Al-Shabaab, like any other group using terrorist acts, may equally not be keen on any negotiation arrangement which also conforms to Guelkes views. According to this perspective, negotiations may complicate a terrorist organisations effort to perpetrate its own absolutist perception in the justification of using terrorist violence.41

37

United States Institute of Peace, How Terrorism Ends, Special Report, No. 48 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 25, 1999),pp 2-4 38 Crenshaw, How Terrorism Declines, p. 80 39 David C. Rapoport, The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism, in Cronin and Ludes, Attacking Terroris m, pp. 46-73 40 Fred Charles like, Every War Must End, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 84-105. 41 Adrian Guelke, The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System (London: LB. Tauris, 1998), pp. 162-181.

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1.3 Significance of the Study This study is timely because the on-course EAC regional integration provides an opportunity for its member states to be involved in the fight against Al-Shabaab, in one way or another. Admittedly, the collective responsibility espoused in this thesis is for the security of all the EAC citizens regardless of their respective countrys proximity to Somalia.

The study therefore gives an insight into possible areas of collaboration among member states and further proposes mechanisms that can be employed on a state by state basis as well as by the international community in an effort to combat Al-Shabaab-related terror threats. 1.4 Research Methodology The findings presented in this thesis were based on an extensive desk research, interviews with key informants as well as analysis of survey questionnaires from a sample of respondents from the EAC states specifically Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

The desk research involved heavy reliance on books, journals, reports, online data sources, you tube clips, online news and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The author conducted an asynchronous online interview with eight key informants who were issued with the same questions thereby creating an opportunity for capturing divergent views on the same areas of concern.

Issuance of survey questionnaires to a representative population of the EAC was equally essential as it enabled the author to grasp citizenry perception on the terror threat posed by Al-Shabaab, the KDF military incursion in Somalia as well as gather proposals for possible
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solutions to the Al-Shabaab menace. It is however imperative to note that these questionnaires were issued through a snowball sampling procedure. The relevance of this sampling technique was its discriminative attribute in the sense that the questions could only be handled by well informed respondents who understood the developments and dynamics of the EAC regional security. The questionnaires were consequently, restricted to at least respondents with college education.

In total, the author received 102 questionnaires, with Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Kampala, Uganda sharing nine respondents each. The remaining 84 questionnaires were received from different Kenyan towns as follows: Kisii-11, Kisumu-11, Migori-8, Mombasa10, Nairobi-34, and Nakuru-10. The questionnaires were then analysed by the SPSS analysis software and results tabulated as shown in Chapter 4. 1.5 Constraints As already noted, a lot has been written about the Somalia conflict including the AlShabaab phenomenon. Nevertheless, the current transnational terrorism tendencies adopted by the group (Al-Shabaab), which is the core of this thesis is relatively modern. The shifting focus from Al-Shabaabs threat to stability in the Horn of Africa to EAC and the KDF military incursion in Somalia are even most recent and hence not well researched developments. Based on this limitation, the author overwhelmingly relied on online news reports some of which may not be feasible to authenticate.

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It was also impossible to track down all the key informants, while others responded at a time when some components of the interview had changed given the dynamics of the KDF orchestrated military incursion in Somalia. Finally, the number of respondents may not have been representative enough to capture the overall perception of the actual EAC population. Consequently, findings from this study should be interpreted with utmost caution. 1.6 CONCLUSION Having given a breakdown of the various components of this study ranging from the background, through literature review, to the research methodology, at this point, it is critical to delve into the Somalia state collapse and subsequent outcomes which Chapter 2 presents.

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CHAPTER TWO

2.0 SOMALIA- COLLAPSED STATEHOOD AND OUTCOMES 2.1 THE PATH TO STATE COLLAPSE 2.1.1 Background I. Elbadawi and N. Sambanis discount the notion that the principal drive behind African civil strife is the continents diverse ethnic divide.42 In their argument; the high prevalence of war in Africa is not due to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries, but rather to the high levels of poverty, failed political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources.43 Admittedly, focus on this 'narrow' aspect of ethnic diversity has entirely obscured the very fundamentals of the African civil wars. For Somalia, however, clan and sub-clan allegiances which are derivatives of negative ethnicity are central to what has become one of the continent's longest conflicts. In an era where the dynamics of global politics is almost entirely embedded in economic competition, Africa, given its vast natural resources, is at the epicentre of this abyss. This predicament which the continent is sucked into has metamorphosed to the effect that the larger society is incessantly predisposed to indecipherable consequences of war. It then makes sense that behind every African civil war there is a likelihood of an external mastermind. This analogy highlights the backdrop upon which the Somalia crisis was bred and how this instability has guided the country into becoming a theatre of proxy

42

Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing violent conflict, Journal of African Economies 9, no. 3 (2000): 244-269 43 Ibid.

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wars during and in the post-cold war era. The Somalia state collapse was therefore, an eventuality that was realistically inevitable.

The concept of intractability, according to Burgess and Burgess entails intolerable moral differences such as; culture, world view, religion, valuable essential resources for survival and domination.44 The Somalia community, however, experiences a minimal clash on culture, religion, and to some extent, world views. This, therefore, implies that the Burgess' criterion does not entirely apply to this context, yet it remains one of the most intractable conflicts in the modern world. Somalia is a rare example of an African State. In contrast to the rest in the continent, it is largely composed of one ethnic community that predominantly proclaims Islam as the main religion or faith. Despite her existence as a mono-ethnic African society, the Somali peoples identity is a composite of a more overarching element- the Clan families. This phenomenon is deeply rooted into the societal substratum and can be traced back to medieval times, long before Somalias civil war or even independence. The genealogic discourse has therefore taken precedence over any other facets of allegiance as it is the main premise for determining an individuals exact place in the society, 45 something that is quite symbolic for the population. Even though the Somali people share a common culture based on agro-pastoral customs, their traditions, socio-economic and political lives have customarily revolved around the clan structure. In essence, the clan and sub-clan families establish the foundation upon which the
44

Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess, Intractability and the Frontier of the Field, Conflict Resolution Quarterly 24, no. 2 (Winter 2006): 177-186
45

Peter J. Pham, State Collapse, Insurgency, and Famine in the Horn of Africa: Legitimacy and the Ongoing Somali Crisis, The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 2, no. 2 (2011): 153-187

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Somalia confederacy is founded, and hence governance is in accordance with the complex relations where loyalty is determined by genealogy. 46

Somali Clan families can be broadly divided into two distinct groups: i. ii. The nomadic pastoralists, The cultivators and agro-pastoralists.

The Darood (largest clan in Puntland), Dir, Hawiye, Isaq (from Somaliland), Digil and Rahanweyn were predominantly nomadic pastoralists, also known as noble (bilis) clans.47 The Digil and Rahanweyn (located in Mogadishu, among other places),48 collectively known as Digil Mirifle, were traditionally cultivators and agro-pastoralists. 49 However, a third tier also exists in the Somali social hierarchy and it consists of minority clans whose members are known as the Sab. This group had a historical occupation on metal work and tanning, something which rendered them ritually unclean in the eyes of the nomadic noble clans.50 To this extent, it is emergent that although the Somali people considered themselves bound together by a common language, an essentially nomadic pastoral culture and by the shared profession of Islam51, the clan structure remained the fundamental determinant of the people's way of life and hence political trajectory. Prior to independence, Somalia consisted of two territories, which were under Italian and British administration. The south and east coast were formerly under Italian administration
46

Meredith 2005: p. 465 Peter J. Pham, State Collapse, Insurgency, and Famine in the Horn of Africa: Legitimacy and the Ongoing Somali Crisis, The Journal of the Middle East and Africa 2, no. 2 (2011): 153-187 48 Kaplan 2008: p. 116 49 Supra at Footnote 47. 50 I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). 51 I. M. Lewis, Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox, Africa 74, no. 4 (November 2004): 489 -515
47

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with Mogadishu as its capital, while the area along the Gulf of Aden's coastline was the British colony otherwise known as the British Somaliland.52 Historically, the present day Djibouti was part of the French Somaliland. The British protectorate of Somaliland became the first of Somali territories to gain independence (June 26, 1960). A year later, the Somalia Italiana, a territory then administered by Italy as a United Nations Trust and which had been an Italian colony before the second World War attained its independence.53 The founding of Republic of Somalia through a merger of these two independent states was arguably a decision not so carefully thought through. Securing a unified Somalia may have been beneficial to the Somali people, but was equally a premature conception that disregarded critical considerations such as the respective leaderships failure to foresee the dangers that would possibly emanate from perceptible factors, including: The fact that these two states were under different colonial regimes, and hence their divergent experiences may not be instantly reconciled, and most importantly; none of them had a sense of what it was to be an independent and self-governing country,54 both were in a learning process. The conception of African Nationalism was strongly evidenced by the founding of the Republic of Somalia, which sought to highlight a strong sense of national identity. The expectations of establishing an identity revolving around a durable and unified statehood characterised the era that succeeded the attainment of independence.55 Nevertheless, the regimes advocacy for the right to self-determination of all the Somali people in the neighbouring countries of Kenya and Ethiopia was considered an affront to the concept of good neighbourliness.
52 53

Meredith 2005: pp. 464-465 Peter J. Pham, Supra.

54 55

Ibid Meredith 2005: pp. 464-465

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2.1.2 Siad Barre Regime, Cold War factor and Civil War break out Having attained its independence three years ahead of Kenya, Somalia had an upper hand in charting their future. The time for pan-Somalism (greater Somalia), a conception the regime inherently believed in was therefore ripe. The preamble of the approved 1961 Somalia constitution thus read: The Somali Republic promotes by legal and peaceful means, the union of the territories.56 Further, the constitution provided that all ethnic Somalis, no matter where they resided, were citizens of the Republic.57 It can then be argued that the regimes meticulous insertion of its philosophy into the constitution was to raise national awareness of the legal right' to pursue the dream of pan Somalism. Again, it could have also been a purposeful coercion of the neighbours (Kenya and Ethiopia) to cede territories occupied by the Somali speaking population since it had become a constitutional provision. In the authors opinion, this development was the beginning of what can be considered the bad neighbourliness phenomenon' between Somalia and its two neighbours. Siad Barres nationalistic tendencies took shape one year after seizing power following the assassination of President Shermarke in October, 1969. This was evidenced by his proclamation of "Somali Democratic Republic" as an officially Marxist state58 , and determination to stamp out clan identity as an anachronistic barrier to progress and that which had to be replaced by nationalism and Scientific Socialism. 59 He advocated for the concept of Soomaaliweyn- a greater Somalia, which comprised those regions in the Horn of Africa that had historically served as residences for ethnic Somali population. The Star in the Somali flag therefore bears a symbolic connotation with its individual points representing

56

Global Security, Somalia-Ethiopia, Kenya Conflict, Military, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia1.htm (accessed on March 30, 2012) 57 Ibid 58 Peter J. Pham, Supra
59

Ibid

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five historical regions inhabited by the Somali people: Italian Somaliland (Somalia), British Somaliland (Somalia), French Somaliland (Djibouti), the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Northern District Frontier of Kenya which Siad Barre sought to unite under a Greater Somalia. Notably, even as Siad Barre struggled to achieve his ambitious project, the volatility of Somalia and its strategic location relative to the Red Sea put it at the epicentre of Cold war. Whereas Ethiopia, a long-time adversary of Somalia had the United States of America as her ally, Somalia was an ardent client of the Soviet Union.60 The United States under President Jimmy Carter was later to sever links with the Ethiopian regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam over its repressive human rights record.61 The strained relationship between the US and Ethiopia earned Somalia army a momentary victory following her invasion of Ethiopia (1977-1978) in support of the self-determination seeking Somalis in Ogaden region. They successfully captured most parts of the territory with the initial backing of the Soviet Union.62 However, it was at this point that the theatrics of Cold War manifested itself as the Soviet Union deserted Somalia amidst the war and opted to shift allegiance to camp Ethiopia.63 According to this author, the Soviet Unions abrupt shift in support from the Somalis to Ethiopians put two theories into focus: It may have been unexpected by the Carter administration and hence a miscalculation on the possible effects of withdrawing support for Somalia. In this regard, the US not only granted Ethiopia a military triumph over Somalia, but equally guaranteed a Soviet Union win against her. The other theory focuses on the geopolitics of the two countries (Somalia and Ethiopia). Somalia's strategic position relative to Ethiopia may have prompted the US's decision to sever links with Ethiopia well aware that
60

Peter Woodward, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), 22 27.

61 62

Ibid Meredith 2005: pp. 464-465 63 Ibid p. 467

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the Soviet Union would take the bait (abandon the strategic Somalia and cross over to Ethiopias side), which it actually did. From this point of view, the US long term agenda carried the day. The switch in allegiance, though not morally justifiable (following the close association between Somalia and The Soviet Union) underscored an existing paradigm of weaker nations being a pawn in a more complex chess of global politics. In view of these developments, the US subsequently became the Barre regimes ardent supporter, providing both economic and military aid until 1989. As a Cold War proxy, Somalia navigated through a foreign funded hyper militarization spending with an average of 20.45% of its budget being channelled to the military agenda. 64In the 1980s, foreign aid was equivalent to half the gross domestic product. The US contributed 800 million dollar worth of aid, a quarter of which was in support of the military capacity of Somalia.65 Oscillating between the two powers at the centre of the Cold War, the Somalia military junta benefited immensely from the proceeds of this global dilemma. The end of Cold War and subsequent withdrawal of the initial massive financial support that sustained then one of Africa's largest military forces, attested to the fact that it was never about Somalia or Ethiopia, rather the main players in the Cold War. Soldiers from the Somali army, one of Africa's biggest and most well equipped, no longer received their salaries from the government, and as such were confined to selling their weapons in order to survive.66 The state's lack of capacity to protect its citizens encouraged reliance on the respective clans as the guardians and providers of security.67For a population that had endured years of nonexistence of basic human needs, regular organized clan-based militia and uncontrolled weapon proliferation, the advent of economic decline became the
64 65

Osman and Souar 2007: p. 13 Meredith 2005: p. 468 66 Osman and Souar 2007: p. 15 67 Ibid p. 10

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tipping point for an explosive outbreak of violence.68 As the central government finally collapsed, there subsequently existed a vacuum that was soon to be rapidly filled by rival political factional leaders turned warlords. The most catastrophic period in Somalia's path to political obscurity was the overthrow of Siad Barre's regime (1991) and the subsequent failure by the bickering clans to agree on the way forward in the appointment of a universally acceptable leader. 69 As Lyons and Samater put it, this departure marked the formal end of a difficult era, but did not usher in a new one,"70 instead, it was the beginning of the civil war. 2.2 AL-SHABAAB: THE OUTCOME OF A STATE COLLAPSE 2.2.1 Chronology of the Al-Shabaab evolution

It is significant to point that Al-Shabaab did not emerge at the ouster of Siad Barre. Nevertheless, circumstances that succeeded the coup, like the civil war outbreak laid down

68 69

Ibid p.14 Somalia profile, BBC, February 10, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world -africa-14094503 (accessed April 13, 2012) 70 Lyons and Samater: 1995. P.7

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the necessary infrastructure upon which the group was to be founded. This narrative, therefore, seeks to validate the presumed linkage between the emergence of Al-Shabaab and the lawlessness attributed to the absence of a functioning government in Somalia. Al Itihad al Islami (AlAI), an armed Islamist movement and an early prototype of an islamist group that is both a product of radicalisation process and a radicalising agent in its own right71 came into prominence to fill in the power void. This group subscribed to the Salafi Jihadi ideology and radicalisation within the Somali speaking region was critical to its agenda.72 Even though there is little evidence linking AIAI with radicalisation of other non-Somali populations beyond the country's borders, this may not have been entirely true for the neighbouring Kenya. The Crisis Group thus reports: 73
AIAI maintained a formidable clandestine support network in North Eastern Province throughout the 1990s and beyond. It actively recruited Jihadis, raised fund and kept a lowlevel presence along the border districts of Mandera and Garissa. It infiltrated the influential Wahhabi clerical establishment that controls most mosques in the province; gained control of charities and funnelled zakat (Islamic tax) money to support its activities and start commercial ventures for its members; and radicalised and recruited Kenyan Somalis.

Pan Somalism, the philosophy that defined Siad Barre's regime became a pillar of the AIAI brand of Salafi Jihadism in its quest for re-establishing the Islamic caliphate.74 Evidently, the tenacity of the AIAI's pursuit for this intention was strategically reinforced by two schemes:

71 72

Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 85, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization, 25 January 2012 Ibid 73 Ibid 74 Crisis Group Africa Report No 45, Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, 23 May 2002

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(a) Endear itself to the Somalia people. (b) Attempt to infiltrate the neighbouring countries with Somali populations. The second objective, though superficially ambitious, was easy to achieve in NEP of Kenya due to an existing disenfranchisement among the Kenyan-Somalis. Political and developmental marginalisation of NEP coupled with the inherent belief in Pan Somalism catalysed the process of radicalising the population.75 The AIAI expansion of influence from NEP to the Coast Province of Kenya, as well as the attempts to infiltrate the Ogaden region of Ethiopia could, in part, justify the Pan Somalisim philosophy. However, its links with Al-Qaeda East African franchise (that was responsible for the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania) was an affirmation of the group's subscription to a different, or at least more than one cause. The broader picture may have been to take advantage of the vulnerability of members of the ethnic Somali and Muslim community in these regions to entrench the ideology of Salafi Jihadism. In this respect, AIAI ceased to be a Somalia predicament, but a regional, if not global one. By the beginning of 2000, military pressure from Ethiopia, strategic miscalculation and internal dissent led AIAI to lose its influence and splinter into several groups.76 The ICG notes that:77
Military defeat did not lead to the demise of its (AIAI) extremist ideology. If anything, it added to its virulence, increased its force and inspired the emergence of the Al-Shabaab. Nor was the organisational disintegration total, as most accounts suggest. Key members scattered over the Somali-speaking Horn of Africa-Kenya included-and beyond, blending in and even

75 76

Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 85, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization, 25 January 2012 Lorenzo Vidino et al: p.220.Bringing global Jihad to the Horn of Africa 77 Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 85, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization, 25 January 2012

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regaining political and business influence. A year later, they formed the leadership of nucleus of the Union of Islamic Courts and later Al-Shabaab.

The rise of Islamic Courts Union (ICU) after the military defeat of AIAI highlighted the resilience of Islamic extremism in Somalia and the durability of an ideology underscored by unwavering resolve of the new actors to construct a Somalia State under Sharia. The ICU was mainly composed of a loose coalition of clerics and militia78 whose governance framework was informed by strict adherence to Sharia law. Their strict interpretation of Islam had little in common with the local traditional Sufi practices of most Somalis, yet the population was willing to tolerate ICUs zeal in exchange for some long desired security.79 For a citizenry helplessly watching their country degenerate into a war economy, security remained critical and it did not matter who could offer it. The groups popularity against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) therefore soared on the premise of its commitment to end banditry and reign on war lords. As the ICU expanded its influence, the fragility of the TFG increased proportionately, leading to further de-legitimisation. The ENDF invaded ICU strongholds, but this time at the invitation of the TFG. Notably, ENDF was once again instrumental in slowing down the momentum of another emerging extremist outfit it Somalia. The ENDF invasion achieved one vital objective, the dispersion of ICU and associated militia groups. Following its previous dismantling of AIAI and re-emergence of extremism through ICU, the prospects of an absolute eradication of the ideology by forceful means was realistically low. Even though the past ENDF interventions ostensibly uprooted AIAI outfit, the emergence of another group with the same ideology reveals otherwise. It is then reasonable to argue that the period of calm that succeeded the incursions created necessary
78 79

Lorenzo Vidino et al: p.220.Bringing global Jihad to the Horn of Africa Ibid

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platforms for the individual members to retreat, regroup, re-strategise and return to the fold in a different form as long as the structures for widening the ideological influence remained unparalleled. With the ICU dispersed, not necessarily sent into oblivion, there emerged a new group, the Al-Shabaab. 2.2.2 Understanding the Al-Shabaab Objective and Composition of the group Kenya is currently grappling with the challenges of Al-Shabaab related insecurity, but in the wake of East African regional integration, the growing influence of Al-Shabaab has consequently shifted the threat focus from frontline states (Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya) to the rest of the EAC. Al-Shabaab is not an entirely new group. As has been discussed, the ICU was a loose coalition between the clerics and militia. Al-Shabaab was therefore the militant wing of the ICU whose prominence can be traced back to the point of Ethiopian led invasion (2006-2009) of Somalia at the invitation by TFG. That Al-Shabaab is at the core of extremism in the EAC is no doubt, but the main concern is the resilience of the group amidst its current crisis. Whereas it can be argued that both AIAI and ICU had a primary aim of creating a stable Somalia state based on Islamic tenets, the same argument cannot be distinctively extrapolated for Al-Shabaabs discourse. The AlShabaab espouses a strict global Jihadist ideology, seeing itself simply as a regional foot soldier in a larger millenarian struggle between Islam and infidelity80 with the current socioeconomic and political landscape in Somalia providing the necessary impetus for achieving this objective. It is therefore plausible to reason that the stability of Somalia is not part of the

80

Ibid

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groups agenda as it would not only put their activities under scrutiny, but also shut down their life line. Still, other sources single out Al-Shabaabs primary objective as having to do with building of an army that places Islamic identity above clan loyalties.81 Importantly, AlShabaab has equally admitted to waging jihad against the West and other foreign interventions as part of the Al-Qaeda.82 Even at the emergent stages, the notion that Al-Shabaab was holistically a Somali challenge was disputable. However, the roots of the group have since ramified to cover the rest of the EAC at unprecedented rates with Kenya and Tanzania being easy targets for reasons which will be explained later in this thesis. To date, there is overwhelming evidence that Al-Shabaab is not only recruiting from its Somalia population, or among Kenyan Somalis, but also other Muslim communities in the neighbouring countries.83 Recruitment: Within and beyond The exact number of Al-Shabaabs membership may not be publicly known, but it is estimated that by the fall of ICU, the number was ranging between 3000 and 7000.84 Still, this might not be entirely true as other militants were fighting alongside the Al-Shabaab. For an extremist group struggling to establish itself amidst innumerable difficulties, it is logical to submit that Al-Shabaab has fared beyond expectations in driving its recruitment agenda. Since its inception in 2006, the group has proven that it has the capability of recruiting members from within Somalia and beyond. Despite this elaborate recruitment drive, the numbers have remained fairly low.

81 82

http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GroupProfiles/AlShabaab-18March10.pdf p5 Ibid 83 Al-Jazeera: Kenya blast suspect claims al-Shabab ties 84 http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2007-01-06-voa25-66764342.html

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Like many other extremist groups or militia in different conflicts across the globe, AlShabaab equally targets children as potential fighters. In the year 2010, approximately 2000 children had been abducted by Al-Shabaab and arraigned for military training in varied camps within Somalia.85 The recruitment was found to be systematic, widespread and aggressively executed in central and Southern Somalia. 86 Existing data is in line with the popular belief that local Somali community forms the backbone of the organisations recruitment platform. It is also notable that Al-Shabaab cuts across the clan substratum thereby defeating the historical inter clan animosities. In some quarters, the group may be seen as a unifying figure, perhaps on the premise of a fallacious perception that it is fighting for the sovereignty and dignity of Somalia. This narrative, if true, may explain in part why the outfit has progressively secured the services of Somali volunteer recruits. Key to Al-Shabaab recruitment drive is the Somalia diaspora, an achievement which puts the group at a prestigious position relative to other global extremist organisations. Using its stealth network among the Somali diaspora, Al-Shabaab has thus penetrated North America, East Africa, Europe and Middle East.87Through these structures, the group has recruited about 1000 diaspora members as well as 200-400 non Somali Muslims.88The highly publicised cases of the Minneapolis 20 and Toronto 6 are global case studies pointing to the recruitment of 20 Somalia-US citizens from Minneapolis and six Somali-Canadian citizens from Toronto and further attests to the overwhelming success attributed to its diaspora recruitment drive.89

85 86

http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/somalia.html Ibid 87 http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/christopher-anzalone/who-are-somalias Al-Shabaab? 88 Ibid 89 http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/RidgwayResearch/Issues/TerrorismExtremism/BackgroundersTer/tabid/558/ArticleId/639/AlShabaab.aspx

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The Majority investigative report on Al-Shabaab emphasised the reality of Al-Shabaabs active recruitment and radicalisation network inside the US targeting Muslim-American converts, such as a top Al- Shabaab Commander.90 It further reveals that:91
At least 40 or more Americans have joined Al-Shabaab; So many Americans have joined that at least 15 of them have been killed fighting with Al-Shabaab, as well as three Canadians; Three Americans who returned to the U.S. were prosecuted, and one awaits extradition from The Netherlands; At least 21 or more American Al-Shabaab members overseas remain unaccounted for and pose a direct threat to the U.S. homeland.

Shirwa Ahmed became the first known American suicide bomber to have blown up himself in Somaliland as part of the Al-Shabaab attack.92 This event may have been the clearest indicator of Al-Shabaabs infiltration of the country (US). Nevertheless, it is not only the US, Canada and Europe that have made contributions to Al-Shabaabs regiment, other countries including Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan and Kenya have had their share of subscriptions.93 According to Washiala of the Supreme Council of Muslims, Taita Taveta, Al-Shabaab recruitment drive runs deep into Kenya, citing various incidences where parents have disclosed that their children were recruited by the Al-Shabaab.94 Harper concurs with his

90

http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/384.pdf; also see http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=1Iw-Qi3Pf6c#!; http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=KoT8mM5F9vc (accessed on March 27, 2012) 91 http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/384.pdf; 92 http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/al-shabaab-and-domestic-radicalization_577660.html 93 http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/RidgwayResearch/Issues/TerrorismExtremism/BackgroundersTer/tabid/558/ArticleId/639/AlShabaab.aspx 94 Interview with Mohammed Washalla Abdi, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Taita Taveta Country Chariman, April 10, 2012

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observation identifying NEP of Kenya and the Somali-dominated parts of Eastleigh as areas prone to Al-Shabaab radicalisation and recruitment.95 As been noted, Al-Shabaabs ability to recruit within and beyond its borders puts it in a very admirable position relative to other extremist groups. The successful US recruitment programme inside the tight-knit and culturally isolated Somalia-American community, which Al-Qaeda Central based in Pakistan does not have inside the US96 is critical to the groups strategy for upgrading its profile. The number of recruits, though minimal, remains consequential as long as the message resonates across the globe. This capability, the author opines, could be why Al-Shabaab must be at the centre of the Al-Qaeda strategy. Funding and arming the Al-Shabaab The Al-Shabaabs continued existence is hinged on its ability to muster monetary resources that facilitate its running uninterrupted. However, given the groups incapability to penetrate the entire Somalia in addition to the countrys inordinate poverty levels, there is an overwhelming credibility to the existing evidence that points at its financial muscle as being constantly boosted by the diaspora.

95 96

Interview with Mary Harper, BBC Africa Editor and Author of Getting Somalia Wrong? March 3, 2012 http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/384.pdf

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According to the UN Monitoring Group report on Somalia and Eritrea, Al-Shabaab revenue stream can be divided into four distinct categories:97
Taxation and extortion Commerce, trade and contraband Diaspora support External assistance

Given the insecurity that has engulfed Somalia for over two decades, it is understandable that the population is constantly weary about the corresponding lawlessness. Al-Shabaab seeks to bridge this security gap by presenting itself as the alternative to insecurity while, in fact, it is a major composite of the very insecurity. This gesture of provision of security, however, does not come for free. The group consequently solicits monetary support from local mosques, imams, communities and even businesses in exchange for the much needed security.98 But, that is not the extent to which Al-Shabaab can go in consolidating its revenue base within Somalia as both taxation and extortionist tendencies are employed in equal measure. The report by Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) states that:99
Al-Shabab instructed aid agencies operating in Beletweyne to pay 10,000 USD within 15 days, in order to work for the next six months, after which agencies should pay an additional 6,000 USD for another six-month work permit, and transmitted similar instructions to all aid agencies operating in Middle and Lower Shabelle, Bay, Bakool, Middle and Lower Juba regions.

97 98

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/Somalia'sStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf 99 OCHA, Somalia, Humanitarian access August 2010, http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx? link=ocha&docId=1175515

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Commerce, on the other hand, is Al-Shabaabs greatest strategy in keeping its monetary stream afloat. The port of Kismayu, which the group took control of after a decisive battle against the Ras Kamboni forces in October 2009, together with the secondary ports of Marka and Baraawe constitute the most important sources of income for the group.100 Al-Shabaab generates between $35 million and $50 million per annum from port revenues, of which at least $15 million is based on trade in charcoal and sugar.101 Businesses involving contraband goods have been thriving in Somalia to the benefit of Al-Shabaab102 with ports under its control acting as the hub for both reception and dispatch. Al-Shabaab has built a business empire revolving around export of charcoal whose proceeds in turn finances the import of sugar, much of which is subsequently smuggled across borders as contraband into neighbouring countries, particularly Kenya.103 Beyond the Somalia borders, Al-Shabaab has developed a sophisticated money remittance regime through its diaspora networks. The role of the diaspora remittances is critical to the groups financial lifeline and is aided by a fully utilitarian infrastructure. While remittances to Somalia are estimated at USD 1 Billion per annum, it is uncertain if all the money is used for legitimate purposes.104 In the US (San Diegos Heights neighbourhood), federal prosecutors pointed an accusing finger at the al-Masjid Al-Ansar Mosque imam (Mohammed Mohamud) and three other Somali-Americans for sending cash to a top Al-Shabaab leader (late Aden Hashi Ayrow). According to the prosecutors, a co-defendant in a taped telephone contact with Ayrow instructed Mohamud to hold back 20 or 30 trusted people at the mosque to tell them to
100 101

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 p 28 Ibid 102 Interview with Dr. Kimani J, Free-Lance Consultant, Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in East Africa, March 21,2012 103 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 p 29 104 http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/RidgwayResearch/Issues/TerrorismExtremism/BackgroundersTer/tabid/558/ArticleId/639/Al -Shabaab.aspx

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contribute money.105 Other judicial proceedings against individuals suspected to have aided Al-Shabaab, either materially or financially have also been witnessed in other countries such as Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.106 There are insurmountable evidence and literature on Al-Shabaab's sources of funding, but it is also in the public domain that the group is highly militarised. The evolving debate is thus the presumed link between the funds at the group's disposal and the acquisition of weapons. Nevertheless, even in the absence of such a link, the group, which is not a conventional army, has had a regular supply of weapons over the years, the question then becomes: Where do they come from? The emanating situation in Somalia following the ouster of Siad Barre motivated the passage of the UNSC Resolution 751 (1992) which sought to impose an arms embargo on Somalia.107 However, the evolving situation called for the passage of other successive resolutions to keep pace with the latest developments. The 2006 partial lift on the Somalia arms' embargo pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) Resolution 1725 (2006) was not only to provide leeway for the regional forces to intervene in Somalia, but also to arm and train the TFG security forces.108 Even though one may be tempted to conclude that the arms' proliferation during the Somalia proxy cold war and post Barre's regime is to blame for arming the Al-Shabaab operatives, it is equally plausible that the necessary exemptions provided for by UNSC Resolution 1725 (2006) necessitated the vice. The United Nations (UN) report on Somalia and Eritrea unearths a worrying trend, but the evidence that AMISOMs ammunition were found in the hands of Al-Shabaab operatives,

105 106

http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/384.pdf http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 pp 31-32 107 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,RESOLUTION,SOM,,3b00f16a4,0.html 108 http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/somalia

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the very outfit being fought is even tragic.109 The discovery opens a new Pandoras Box and puts into perspective very dire concerns, which run deep into the Somalia war economy. The monitoring group identifies lack of international support to the TFG and corruption at the ministerial level as being the driving forces behind TFGs soldiers low wages which are in the range of USD (100-150).110 This insensitivity is seen as the impetus for the sales of arms and ammunition to Al-Shabaab and other militia groups as compensation for the low earnings. However, the challenge is not just confined to the TFG as other reports have come to a logical conclusion that Ethiopian and AMISOM personnel have equally sold weapons to non-state actors in the conflict.111 The blurred or absence of concrete evidence against Eritrea has done little to absolve the country from her alleged role in the Somalia conflict. The country has however responded to these accusations viciously and discredited them as mere allegations. Regardless of her assertion, the Monitoring Group reported in 2005 that Eritrea had supported and armed groups in Somalia fighting the TFG.112 The March 2010 report also states that Eritrea had provided significant and sustained support ranging from political to financial and material, as well as arms, ammunition and training to armed opposition groups in Somalia since at least 2007.113 Yemen has equally been repeatedly mentioned as a possible hub for the Somalia destined weapons, but the Monitoring Group was quick to add that the assertion is impossible to

109 110

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 p 44 Ibid pp 42 111 http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIBP1010b.pdf 112 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1639 (2005), annex to S/2006/229, 4 May 2006, pp. 1013. 113 Ibid pp 22-24

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quantify." Further, the government of Yemen denies that arms and ammunition are smuggled from its area of jurisdiction.114 Weapon infiltration in Somalia does not give a clear indication as to which militia group ends up being the beneficiary, but the distinct position held by Al-Shabaab as the main TFG antagonist and the fact that it controls the most strategic positions through which the same weapons may get into Somalia leaves little doubt that the group end up with a majority of the shipment if not all of it. Organisational Structure Al-Shabaab has evolved as a group that boasts hierarchical structure typical of any regular organisation. Whereas the exact dimensions of this structure are not fully known, hints from the group have led to identification of particular leaders being associated with specific positions. This has also been verified by various global intelligence agencies, but with the war on terror campaign being stepped up, many of these leaders have died under different circumstances, yet their replacements have never been hard to come by. Supreme to the Al-Shabaabs structure is the ten member shura council that determines all major objectives and operations.115It is led by an emir whom, despite his significance, does not exude independent authority.116 Politics, media and military operations are subdivisions falling under the council.117Al-Shabaab has also established a military branch (army of hardship) under shura council and a more judicial branch (army of morality) to help

114 115

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433 p 41 http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GroupProfiles/AlShabaab-18March10.pdf p 9 116 Ibid 117 Ibid

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uphold rule of law and order.118 These two armies are thus referred to as Jaysh Al-Usra and Jaysh Al-Hesbah respectively.119 A notable facet of the Al-Shabaabs governance structure is that the regions (matching the pre-existing districts) under its control are manned by the leaderships appointed governor (wali).120 Al-Shabaab administration at the district level comprises Sharia courts, offices of zakat and military units allied with either the movements Jaysh al-Usrah, or the Jaysh alHisbah.121 Mechanisms for winning hearts and minds of the Somali people After many years of civil war that resulted into the installation of 14 separate governments between 1991 and 2010122 (all of which have been unable to restore stability), there was an understandable sense of desperation among the Somali citizens. The advent of ICU on June 5, 2006 and consequent defeat of CIA backed Warlords led to the capture of Mogadishu, thereby instigating what for the first time became a period of relative peace.123 This would conceivably be the initial positive impression that the ICU and Al-Shabaab coalition had on the Somalia population, thus endearing itself to the people. As already been accounted for in this thesis, the Somali people are nationalistic with vested pride in both their country and religion. To this extent, even though Ethiopian invasion of Somalia at the invitation of the TFG led to the collapse of the ICU, it equally invoked undertones of nationalism among the population. The perceptions of Ethiopia being a historical enemy among the Somalis, coupled with the invasion arguably prompted the full
118 119

Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab, Institute of Security Studies Situation Report, 3 June 2009 Ibid 120 http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/christopher-anzalone/who-are-somalia%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98alshabab%E2%80%99 : also see Somalia: Understanding Al-Shabaab, Institute of Security Studies Situation Report, 3 June 2009 121 http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/christopher-anzalone/who-are-somalia%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98alshabab%E2%80%99 122 http://www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somalia/p9366 123 Ibid

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fledge formation of Al-Shabaab as a viable force to counter the enemy and ostensibly restore the lost glory. Whereas other militant groups within Somalia have been confined to their own backyard, the influence (negative or positive) of Al-Shabaab in South Central Somalia has remained unparalleled. Its ability to draw membership from across the population despite irreconcilable differences among individual clans enhances the perception that it ascribes to a broader irredentist vision of uniting Somalia-inhabited areas of East Africa under an Islamist caliphate.124 Prospects of an Al-Shabaab led pan Somalism, which was an original vision of the independent Somalia, revived the pride of nationalism, which, in effect, made the group more endearing to a section of the population. The Al-Shabaab also uses coercion to instil fear and authority among the population. The submission of the Somalia people to the groups leadership is not entirely on a willing basis and hence a confirmation to an existing sense of hopelessness. In 2009, the extremist group grabbed the headline for publicly amputating a hand and a foot from each of the four convicts suspected of stealing guns and mobile phones.125This harsh implementation of the Sharia has not only alienated Al-Shabaab from the population it purports to serve, but has also imbued fear which has enabled it to operate without boundaries. Warfare Tactic The Al-Shabaab does not necessarily engage in conventional warfare, instead, the group prefers to employ guerrilla tactic against formal armies. The remarkable success recorded by the group so far can be attributed to the opponents inability to distinguish between who AlShabaab is and who is not, a tactic that the group has greatly exploited to its advantage.
124 125

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41473.pdf p 6 http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-06-25-voa18-68818722.html

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However, the Al- Shabaabs current engagement in suicide bombings126 has been a fundamental shift to its approach to war and given credence to its political branding as a terrorist organisation. In a wider scheme to popularize this mode of operation, the AlShabaab has sought to exhibit its resolve to adversaries by targeting key facilities including a UN compound, the Ethiopian consulate, a presidential palace and two intelligence facilities in Puntland and Somalia.127Other tactics include bombings, grenade attacks, kidnappings and targeted assassinations, including those of the leading Sulufi clerics.128,129,130 Propaganda The most essential tool for the proliferation of Al-Shabaab's propaganda is the media. Aware of the power of this component, Al-Shabaab has extensively utilised multiple media sources, including radio, TV and the internet to propagate its ideals and propaganda.131, 132 The internet has predominantly worked to the advantage of Al-Shabaab as it is a means that has not only facilitated the groups interaction with the youth beyond the borders of Somalia at minimal costs, but has also been critical for their correspondences with the Al-Qaeda. As Lauren Ploch states, Al Shabaab uses the internet to emphasize its commitment to global Jihad and to pledge fealty to Al Qaeda, which serves both its fundraising and recruitment goals.133 Al-Shabaab-Pirates nexus So far, there exists no documented proof of a link between Al-Shabaab and Somali pirates, but this does not rule out such possibilities. According to Cole who is the programme
126 127

http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GroupProfiles/AlShabaab-18March10.pdf p 17 Ibid 128 http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/RidgwayResearch/Issues/TerrorismExtremism/BackgroundersTer/tabid/558/ArticleId/639/Al -Shabaab.aspx 129 http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GroupProfiles/AlShabaab-18March10.pdf p 17 130 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15317230 131 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41473.pdf p 9 132 http://mg.co.za/article/2011-02-05-somalias-alshabaab-launch-tv-channel 133 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41473.pdf p 9

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coordinator at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime- Counter Piracy Programme, interviews with Somali Pirates in custody reveal the existence of this nexus.134 His sentiments are echoed by Hon. Justice Gaswaga who is credited for trials of Piracy cases in the East Coast of Africa. Justice Gaswaga concurs that piracy related funds are channelled to AlShabaabs programmes.135It is agreeable that United Nations Office on Drugs and CrimeCounter Piracy Programme and the Hon. Justice Gaswaga courts have had numerous one on one interaction with the Somali pirates and consequently established a deeper understanding of the groups dynamics, operations and associations. This therefore gives credibility to the mentioned observations. Lt. Col. Ankunda, AMISOM spokesman suggests that: As Al-Shabaabs sources of income continue to shrink, they have looked to piracy as an alternative source of funds to finance their activities,136 an observation that Hon. Mulongo, Vice Chairman of the Defense and Security Committee in the Parliament of Uganda agrees with. According to Hon. Mulongo, the returns from Piracy are equally ploughed back to the Al-Shabaab course, an observation that is at par with that of Cole and that of Justice Gaswaga. 137Other experts however strike a cautious tone, and as E.B-Gaswaga, a legal officer, UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations notes: The nexus between these two groups is a possibility.therefore, more leaning towards reality.138 She argues that acts of terrorism require access to unlimited funds of which piracy could be a source in that regard.139

134

Interview with Alan Cole, UNODC-CPP Programme Coordinator, February 2, 2012. *The views presented by Mr. Cole are individual and does not depict the official position of the UN 135 Interview with Justice Duncan Gaswaga, Head of Criminal Division, Supreme Court of Seychelles, May 10, 2012. * The views presented here are of Justice Duncan Gaswaga and does not depict the official position of the Supreme Court of Seychelles. 136 Interview with Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda, AMISOM spokesman, April 20, 2012. 137 Interview with Hon. Simon Mulongo, Vice Chairman Defense and Security Committee, Parliament of Uganda, May 11, 2012 138 Interview with Elizabeth Bakibinga-Gaswaga, Legal Officer, UN Dept. of Peace Keeping Operations, Kosovo, February 24,2012 * The views presented by Ms E.G-Gaswaga does not depict the official position of the UN 139 Ibid

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Even though there is a common understanding among these experts on the possible relationship between Al-Shabaab and the Somali Pirates, others discount the notion. As Harper, a BBC Africa Senior editor and author of Getting Somalia Wrong? put it, the nexus is imaginary, noting that:140
Al-Shabaabs precursor, the Islamic Courts Union was the only power base that managed to effectively tackle Piracy , which decreased dramatically during the last six months of 2006 when the ICU was in power in South Central Somalia. Pirates and their lifestyle is considered haram by Islamist groups.

Her observations are supported by Hon. Ateenyi, Chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and security, Parliament of Uganda. According to Hon. Ateenyi, there is no direct connection between the two groups, arguing that pirates show no interest in having any ideological affiliation with the Jihadis.141 Further, while Al-Shabaab seeks to be less xenophobic and accept foreign fighters, so far, the pirates prioritise their clan above any other alliance. 142 In view of these positions, the author remains cautious of the presumed nexus, but does not disregard the possibilities. Even though Somali Piracy comes out as a purely economic oriented enterprise, it is observable that the lawlessness of the state provides room for its survival. However, the fact that Al-Shabaab is accountable for the larger part of Somalias insecurity may possibly facilitate a line of engagement that prompts the Pirates to acknowledge the role of Al-Shabaab in creating a business friendly environment.

140 141

Interview with Mary Harper, BBC Africa Editor and Author of Getting Somalia Wrong? March 3, 2012 Interview with Hon. Tinkasiimire Barnabas Ateenyi, Chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security, Parliament of Uganda, May 11, 2012. 142 Ibid

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Affiliations: Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsular (AQAP) and Al-Qaeda Central According to the US counter terrorism officials, proximity of Somalia and Yemen is very much to blame for the close working relationships between Al-Shabaab and the AQAP.143 Reports alluding to the possibility of the AQAP having shared chemical bomb making technology with Al-Shabaab144 can only act to reinforce the phobia for a close association of the two groups. The dynamics of this complexity is further compounded by the large numbers of disenfranchised Somali refugees in the unstable Yemen. Admittedly, this group could be an easy target for Al-Shabaab, AQAP, or Al-Qaeda central. The debate around Al-Shabaab is inconclusive without establishing its affiliations with Al-Qaeda central. Over the years, Al-Shabaab has been associated with Al-Qaeda for various reasons. Notably, the group has itself portrayed public display of reverence for the presumed association on numerous occasions. Speculations for the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda being a common entity have mostly been exaggerated, noting that it is the former that has been keen on confirming the existence of such an association. Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda have had a habitual understanding on a number of issues, nevertheless the allegations of Al-Qaeda aided operations in Somalia, if true, can only be to a limited extent. The link between the two groups can, however, be traced back to the era of ICU where it was alleged that the Al-Shabaab and the ruling ICU harboured Al-Qaeda operatives who were suspected of taking part in the black hawk down operation.145 Notably, one of the

143 144

Adam Entous and Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Weighs Expanded Strikes in Yemen , Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2010. Greg Miller, CIA Sees Increased Threat from al-Qaeda in Yemen, Washington Post, August 24, 2010 145 http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/384.pdf

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suspects was also allegedly involved in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.146 Before his killing in 2009, Al-Shabaab leader Saleh Ali Saleh Al-Nahban was an AlQaeda senior operative who masterminded the Mombasa attacks.147 It is then clear that the close association between the two groups has not been farfetched, but as noted earlier, there has not been any hard evidence indicating an elaborate Al-Qaeda/Al-Shabaabs association to the effect that they can be referred to as a single entity or involvement in Somalia since the establishment of Al-Shabaab in 2006. Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab has repeatedly pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda, which it recognises as the pinnacle of global jihad. The recent proclamation that Al-Shabaab finally joined the Al-Qaeda was therefore not a surprise. According to the SITE translation, Al-Zawahiri, while accepting Al-Shabaab into the fold said:148
Today, I have pleasing glad tidings for the Muslim Ummah that will please the believers and disturb the disbelievers, which is the joining of the Shabaab al Mujahideen Movement in Somalia to Qaedat al Jihad, to support the jihadi unity against the Zio[nist]-Crusader campaign and their assistants amongst the treacherous agent rulers who let the invading Crusader forces enter their countries.

With this proclamation, Al-Shabaab officially joined the Al-Qaeda. However, what remains unsubstantiated is why this moment was significant for the two groups to finally have a formal union. Lt Col. Ankunda opines that the decision to merge at this point was a critical mistake, arguing that the Somali people who are not known to have embraced a culture of radicalism would not find the merger appealing, but was quick to add that Al-

146 147

Ibid Ibid 148 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/02/shabaab_formally_joi.php#ixzz1r42UjHvA

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Shabaab had to join hands with Al-Qaeda for three reasons: Get a new lease of life as it was being weakened militarily, enhance its sources of funding and gain some visibility.149 Harper looks at the Al-Shabaab/Al-Qaeda merger differently arguing that this is not something new as the two groups have had a history of encouraging each other. She opines that the recent merger statements are a sign of weakness of both the groups.150

2.3 CONCLUSION Despite the existence of a common language and a shared religious belief, which, indeed are fundamental unifying elements in an African context, Somalia continues to remain volatile as the citizens pledge allegiance to a more overarching element, the Clan. The proliferation of arms (thanks to Cold War machinations), citizenry disenfranchisement, as well as insurmountable clan differences created enough incentive for the Somalia civil war break out. The fall of the repressive Siad Barres regime was, therefore the tipping point of the State collapse. The deteriorating security situation, dilapidated social amenities and infrastructure, coupled with intense inter-clan wars created an environment ripe for extremism and terroristrelated activities. The advent of radical groups like AIAI, ICU and the Al-Shabaab aggravated the conflict by infusing sacralisation as an additional component to the already existing complex. This new aspect to the conflict did not just entrench hard core extremism in Somalia, but also created a forum for its export in the neighbouring countries.

149 150

Interview with Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda, AMISOM spokesman, April 20, 2012. Interview with Mary Harper, BBC Africa Editor and Author of Getting Somalia Wrong? March 3, 2012

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Al-Shabaab, the latest prototype of Somalia extremism has not only destabilised the TFG, but equally extended its influence to the EAC particularly Kenya. Key to the outfits success is its vision which is founded on religious indoctrination, ability to recruit in Somalia and beyond, a well-coordinated organisational structure, established stream of funding, strategic mechanisms for winning hearts and minds of the population, propaganda machinery, a nonconventional warfare tactic, as well as its affiliations with the AQAP and Al-Qaeda central. An assembly of these features not only make Al-Shabaab a threat to TFG and Somalia citizens, but a regional, if not a global challenge. So far, there is overwhelming evidence linking the Al-Shabaab or its Al-Qaeda ally to bombings in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. Burundi (fourth EAC member) has equally been threatened by the Al-Shabaab on numerous occasions. From a community of five States, it is just Rwanda (sandwiched between Uganda and Burundi) which has not been earmarked by the Al-Shabaab or its allies. As the threat of Al-Shabaab orchestrated extremism escalates in the region, so are the military interventions. Distinctively, Ethiopia has been on the forefront in Somalia missions, but its exit in 2007 was followed by the entry of AMISOM. In the wake of a wave of attacks and kidnappings in Kenya, the government responded swiftly through a military incursion which was ostensibly to protect Kenyas integrity and sovereignty.

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CHAPTER THREE

3.0 AL-SHABAAB RELATED MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 3.1 OPERATION LINDA NCHI (OLN) OLN: What informed the incursion? Kenyas incursion into Somalia, dubbed the operation Linda Nchi a Swahili statement for Protect the Nation was informed by the increased governments perception that the AlShabaab extremism had encroached into the country to an extent that the sovereignty of Kenya was under disrepute. While addressing the executive session of the Commonwealth heads of states and Governments in Perth Australia (2011), President Kibaki of Kenya stated: The mission in Somalia is based on a legitimate right to protect Kenyas sovereignty and integrity;"151 a statement that was echoed by his minister for internal security who observed that Kenya had no intentions of annexing Somalia.152 Based on these accounts, the decision, notably Kenyas largest military operation since independence (1963) was arguably triggered by three key events: i. The October 2011 kidnappings of two Spanish Aid workers from the Daadab refugee camp;153 ii. The shooting of a British holiday maker and subsequently abducting his wife (Mrs. Judith Telbutt) from a Kenyan beach resort;154

151

Kenya Defence Forces capture key town, NTVKenya, October 28, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AYUGHE3B8cA (accessed on March 15, 2012) 152 Ibid 153 Spanish aid workers abducted from Kenyan refugee camp, AljazeeraEnglish, October 13, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=h9BYFHDLVjI#! (accessed on February 2, 2012) 154 Murdered Brit's Wife Taken Hostage In Kenya, Sky News, September 12, 2011,

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iii.

The kidnapping of an elderly French woman from a Kenyan resort of Lamu (near the location from which Judith Telbutt was abducted).155

For a country that is heavily dependent on tourism as a foreign exchange earner, the kidnappings, especially at the beach resorts presented Kenya on the international arena as a dangerous destination, a rationale that the government exploited to justify its military operation in Somalia. Arguably, these three incidents cannot entirely be the main causation for the intervention. Being a frontline state with Somalia, Kenya has borne the brunt of spill overs of violence and extremism emanating from Somalias State failure and collapse. A historical example would be the August 7, 1998 bomb attack of the US embassies in both Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which was responsible for the demise of 225 lives and a further 4,000 wounded ones.156,157 It has since been alleged that the attacks were masterminded by the Al-Qaeda East Africa cells, with Somalia being instrumental in their planning and execution.158 Yet, Somalia has not only become a security threat to Kenya or Tanzania, as the 7/11 Kampala bomb attack was planned and executed by a new Somalia extremism outfit, the AlShabaab. OLN can therefore be envisioned as a military incursion that was neither random nor informed by a single incidence observable as having breached the security of Kenya as a sovereign state, but rather it was triggered by a series of past extremist events which had

http://news.sky.com/home/uk-news/article/16067471 (accessed on February 2,2012) French woman kidnapped from north Kenyan coast, The Telegraph, October 1, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/8800728/French-woman-kidnapped-from-northKenyan-coast.html (accessed on February 2, 2012) 156 ICG, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, International Crisis Group African Report No 184, p 1, February 15, 2012 157 Attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/98emb.htm (accessed on April 5, 2012)
155 158

ICG, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, International Crisis Group African Report No 184, p 1, February 15, 2012

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constituted a dangerous pattern. Still, some observers argue that Kenyas initial agenda was not to pursue the Al-Shabaab into Somalia, citing that the whole idea was to create a buffer zone by leading a covert operation and subsequently installing a Kenyan controlled proxy government in Jubaland.159 Aims and progress of the Operation Linda Nchi Whereas the above accounts are presented as the legal and sometimes moral reasons for the incursion, the main goal for the operation has remained vague given the recurrent shift in positions by the military handlers. According to the Crisis Group:160
First came hot pursuit of kidnappers identified as Al-Shabaab. At the 21 October 2011 IGAD meeting, the stated goal shifted to destroying or weakening Al-Shabaab and establishing a buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia. Ten days later, the chief of the defence forces, General Julius Karangi, declared the operation had no time limit and would continue until Kenya was safe. Over time, it has come to appear that another aim is to capture the port city of Kismayo. Al-Shabaab earns substantial revenue there, the loss of which, it is argued, would break its economic back.

Even as the KDF set its eyes on Port Kismayu, another twist emerged with the minister for Defence insisting that the Kenyan forces would not capture the port city without the financial and logistical backing of the international community.161 This instability in determining the operations main goal was likely to increase public scrutiny both in Kenya and Somalia as the war against Al-Shabaabs continued. However, the fears seem to have been calmed by Augistine Mahiga, Head of the UN Political Office for Somalia who

159

Robert Young Pelton,Kenya Modified Invasions to Suit US concerns, Somalia report, November 14, 2011, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2028 (accessed January 3, 2012)

160

ICG, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, International Crisis Group African Report No 184, p 5, February 15, 2012 161 Fred Oluoch and Mwaura Kimani,Haji says no to Kismayu attack without back-up, The East African, January 15,2012,

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reiterated that KDFs primary mission was to capture Kismayu from Al-Shabaab and then continue north to the port city of Marka.162 Strategy and Achievements Whereas KDFs main goal in this war had been subjected to a series of discussions, the approach of the incursion pointed to the capture of port Kismayu as the priority. The KDF launched its assault from three fronts, namely: The Northern, Central, and Southern fronts.

162

Yara Bayoumy, INTERVIEW: AU, Kenya Forces Move to Squeeze Rebels Out of Somalia, Reuters, January 30, 2012, http://af.reuters.com/article/kenyaNews/idAFL5E8CU29J20120130?sp=true (accessed March 24, 2012)

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163

163

Kenyas Operation Linda Nchi Week One (16-22 October, 2011) , Critical Threats, http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/KEN_SOM_OP_20111022.pdf (accessed on January 5, 2012)

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Even though it appeared obvious that all the three axes of the Kenyan battalion were headed for Kismayu, Prof. David Anderson argues that KDF tactical objective was not to march straight to Kismayu, but rather circle the port city by first capturing Afmadow, which lies on River Juba, thereby sealing off any crossing by Al-Shabaab.164 He posits that this would be followed by the capture of Jibil on River Shibeli, before matching to Mogadishu. Port of Kismayu, as already discussed in this thesis is one of the key sources of the AlShabaab financial lifeline, it, therefore, makes more sense sealing off the region from the rest of the Al-Shabaab held regions as this would cause serious shortages to the group's supplies. As evidenced by the Crisis Group report, the government volunteered very little about which and how many forces were involved in Somalia. Nevertheless, Statfors African analyst, Mark Schoreder revealed that prior to January 2012; Kenya deployed 4,000 of its military personnel in Somalia.165 This figure sharply differs with the ICG estimates which were at 2,000 troops,166 but the discrepancy highlights how tight-lipped the government has remained about many aspects revolving around the operation. The KDF worked closely with the TFG forces (remnants of the 2,500), and 500 strong Ogaden forces it trained at the beginning of the Jubaland project in 2009 and the proxies such
164

Al Shabaab and Kenya's Somali invasion hjemmesidefilm, January 30, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=9B-AvoLNbvc#! (accessed on February 2, 2012) 165 Dispatch: Kenya's Military Engagement Against Al Shabaab, STRATFORvideo, October 31, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mIAlkMzjkKk&feature=related (accessed on February 2, 2012) 166 ICG, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, International Crisis Group African Report No 184, p 5, February 15, 2012

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as the Ras Kamboni brigade.167 This alliance remained critical to KDFs mission in Somalia given the unpredictability of Al-Shabaab and the unfamiliar terrain. Yet, as the ICG notes, lack of cohesion between these groups, especially the TFG (whose members loyalties are to individual commanders and not the institution) and the Ras Kamboni brigade jeopardized the entire mission.168 The ICG, therefore, attributes the slow progress of KDFs offensive along the Liboi-Afmadow-Kismayu road to these competing interests.169 The unfamiliar terrain, heavy downpours,170Al-Shabaab guerrilla tactic and fewer effective allies171 became the primary challenges that KDF was to encounter at the onset of the war making meaningful advances limited. Despite these constraints, KDF's Director of Military Operations Information, Col. Oguna exudes confidence, noting that KDF had made very significant achievements by liberating a total of 95,000 Km2 of Southern Somalia from the Al- Shabaab172 (in 126 days at the time of the press conference in February 2012.) On the March 18, 2012 press conference, Col. Oguna reiterated that after 154 days of the operation, the Kenyan troops had captured 22 towns173 from the Al-Shabaab extremist group and secured twice the size of both Rwanda and Burundi combined.174

167 168

Ibid Ibid 169 Ibid 170 Abdi Guled and Tom Odula, Heavy Rains Slow Kenyan Armys Hunt for Militants Inside Somalia, AP, October 18, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/heavy-rains-slow-kenyan-armys-hunt-for-militants-insidesomalia/2011/10/18/gIQAibRztL_story.html (accessed on March 24, 2012) 171 ICG, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, International Crisis Group African Report No 184, p 6, February 15, 2012 172 Ronald Njoroge and Chrispinus Omar, Kenya's military says making further advances in southern Somalia, Xinhua, February 19, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-02/19/c_122721398.htm (accessed on March 27, 2012)
173

Steve Mkawale, KDF to operate under Amisom in Mogadishu, The Standard, March 17, 2012, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000054249&cid=4& (accessed on April 22, 2012) 174 Press briefing: Operation Linda Nchi, Standard Group Kenya, March 18, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=sJe5zWmngYU#! (accessed on April 22, 2012)

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Safety of Kenya since the incursion Any person with rational thinking would come to a logical conclusion that that the decision to pursue Al-Shabaab beyond Kenyan borders had inherent repercussions both in Kenya and Somalia. The targets in Somalia (the Kenyan military personnel) were in a war zone, and hence prepared for eventualities. In the homeland, however, the security stakes were different with the population remaining highly vulnerable as a consequence of the factors identified in chapter 4 as the loopholes for spill over of extremism into Kenya and the rest of EAC. It is apparent that Al-Shabaab would not have wished to get into a massive military confrontation with Kenya; such an approach would have been a serious miscalculation for its long term agenda of expanding its influence and capabilities in the EAC region. Nevertheless, the incursion may have changed the groups approach to a more volatile mode as it basically had nothing to lose. The outcome of this confrontation may eventually lead to large scale retaliatory attacks on the Kenyan soil or the rest of the region. Indeed, Kenya has been synonymous with grenade attacks with North Eastern town of Garissa, Nairobi and Mombasa being the targeted areas so far. As already noted by this author, these are the three cardinal areas where the Muslim populations are most concentrated in Kenya. Still, there is negligible evidence tying the Al-Shabaab to some of these terrorist activities, thus the emergent school of thought that criminal gangs may as well take advantage of the existing security gap to carry out Al-Shabaab like terrorist acts and get away with it for two reasons: Al-Shabaab would take responsibility, or the security agencies will pin it on them (Al-Shabaab). Just a week after the military intervention in Somalia, a grenade attack rocked a Nairobi night club injuring 12 people and despite Al-Shabaabs earlier threats for reprisals attacks, the
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police chief said the investigations had not shown any links to Al-Shabaab.175 In just a matter of hours, there was another grenade attack at a crowded bus stop during the evening rush hour which claimed at least one life with over eight more injured.176 The confession of Elgiva Bwire Oliacha,177 put the case to rest when it was finally determined that Al-Shabaab had a link to the second grenade attack of that day. In that same span of time, two grenade attacks rocked Garissa town in the North Eastern part of Kenya killing five people and injuring scores of others.178 The random, but selective attacks on vulnerable Kenyans have not ceased so far. In early March 2012, a series of explosions rocked Machakos bus terminus killing four people instantly. The Red Cross further reported on its official twitter account that eight out of the 40 people admitted to the hospital were in critical condition.179 According to Dan Mutinda of Red Cross, doctors were not just responding to the victims of the blasts, there were equally many who were sprayed with bullets.180 The police were quick to conclude that the attacks were orchestrated by the Al-Shabaab, with the deputy police spokesman stating; this is a cowardly act by Al-Shabaab elements."181 The latest of the series of blasts took the perpetrators to the coastal city of Mombasa where two people were killed with at least 30 more injured on the March 31, 2012 Mtwapa grenade attack.182As expected, Al-Shabaab was quick to claim responsibility for these

175

Nairobi nightclub grenade attack injures 12, BBC, October 24, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa15425447 (accessed on January 15, 2012) 176 Second Grenade Attack Hits Kenyan Capital, Sky News, October 24, 2011, http://news.sky.com/home/worldnews/article/16094949 (accessed on January 15, 2012) 177 A Kenyan-non Somalia Al-shabaab operative arrested and confessed to being part of the extremist group in Kenya. 178 Two Grenade attacks kill five in Somalia, Somalia Report, November 24, 2011, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2118 (accessed on March 4, 2012) 179 Deadly grenade attack in Kenyan capital, Al Jazeera and agencies, March 11, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/201231017268935267.html (accessed on April 11, 2012) 180 Ibid 181 Ibid 182 Fred Indimuli, POLICE IDENTIFY KEY SUSPECT IN MOMBASA GRENADE ATTACKS, April 10, 2012, http://www.the-star.co.ke/classicnews/70753-police-identify-key-suspect-in-mombasa-grenade-attacks (accessed on April 11, 2012)

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attacks.183However, the most daring of all these attacks was launched in Wajir where the suspected extremist group raided a police post killing six people and abducting three others. As had been indicated, it is not definitive whether these attacks can credibly be linked to Al-Shabaab as there are incidences when they have taken responsibility and times when they have not. Nevertheless, the concern remains that Kenya has become more prone to these kinds of attacks since the incursion began. Worst still, it is not easy to establish who exactly is behind them, even on the face of claims for the same by the Al-Shabaab. This author is therefore convinced that grenade attacks would continue on the Kenyan soil for a long time. Sustainability of the War Like any other war, OLN was expected to incur both monetary and human costs; consequently, the Kenyan government had an obligation to visualise the magnitude of expenses it would incur once its forces were in Somalia. In part, this aspect justifies the theory that the war might have not just been precipitated by isolated incidences of the tourist and Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) workers abductions; rather, it was an operation that had been carefully planned over a long duration of time. The KDF, through its press conference sessions kept both the Kenyan public and international community abreast about the progress in Somalia. While this can be regarded as a splendid approach to handling matters of national interest, the reality of pursuing an enemy in a foreign territory overshadows some of the very pertinent concerns that the population would readily ask under ordinary circumstances. Consequently, KDF has progressively evaded issues such as; the actual number of casualties it has incurred, or its daily monetary expenditure on the war.
183

Maureen Mudi, Kenya: We Did It, Say Al Shabaab, The Star (Nairobi), April 1, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201204021446.html (accessed on April 11, 2012)

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The casualty figures presented by KDF appear skewed and can easily be discredited, but there were no actual or parallel statistics to draw comparison to. Admittedly, propaganda is part of any war reporting mechanism and as such, a reliable tool for winning the minds of an expectant population by enhancing a sense of safety amidst the unpredictability of war. Most importantly, it is fitting that framing of a war must be in favour of the party that controls the news outlet, in this case the KDF. Details of the monetary expenses are equally scanty. As of January, 2012, financial experts were estimating that the war was costing Kenya an average of Kenya shillings 7,000 (USD 84) per soldier in Somalia.184 The cost per soldier multiplied by just 1,000 soldiers is a hefty expenditure for a developing nation such as Kenya. It can well be concluded that KDF might have underestimated the costs of this incursion. This would in part explain the governments position of not capturing Kismayu unless the international community avails monetary and logistical support,185 but could also be the reason that prompted the idea of incorporating KDF into AMISOM. The TFG support for KDF incursion: Natural or coerced? Whereas the Somalia president had questioned Kenyas decision to pursue the AlShabaab into Somalia cautioning against doing anything that will harm the two countries' relationship,"186 his Prime Minister, on the other hand, took a dissimilar stand offering his support for the operation.187 Different schools of thought have attempted to explain this stance. According to Cole, President Sharifs statement may have been based on the belief
184

Is this war too costly?, Daily Nation, January 16, 2012, http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Editorial/Is+this+war+too+costly/-/440804/1308374/-/ykv98a/-/ (accessed on February 22, 2012) 185 Already pointed out by the author 186 Somali President Warns Against Kenya Raid, Voice of America News, October 24, 2011, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Somali-President-Warns-on-Kenya-Raid-132466998.html (accessed on February 22, 2012) 187 Gabe Joselow Your Questions: Kenya's Campaign Against Al-Shabab, Voice of America News, November 08, 2011, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Your-Questions-Kenyas-Campaign-Against-al-Shabab-133487408.html (accessed February 22, 2012)

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that Kenyas invasion went beyond what is allowed for national self -defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.188 Dr. Kimani, however looks at it differently arguing that President Sharifs relationship with the ICU as its former Chairman and the structure of the Somali community might have informed his utterances.189 E.B- Gaswaga, on the other hand looked at it from the perspective of national pride. She opines that there was need (by the president) to assert sovereignty and re-assure the international community of the TFGs ability to function as a government in control, regardless of the numerous challenges.190 Following the public spat between the President and his Prime Minister, the high level bilateral talks between the TFG and Kenyan government was necessary in shaping the narrative of KDFs pursuit of Al-Shabaab into Somalia territories, even though it only came two weeks after the inception of the offensive. President Sharif's absence in these highly publicised bilateral talks could be attributed to the divergent views taken by his prime minister. Most importantly, it underscored the apprehensions that Kenyas decision to intervene in Somalia at that time may not have been consultative,191 and as such, excluded international allies, regional bodies and neighbours including Somalia, which was the targeted country. The joint communique issued by the Prime Ministers Rt. Hon. Raila Odinga and H.E. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali of the Republic of Kenya and the TFG respectively embraced the

188 189

Interview with Alan Cole, UNODC-CPP Coordinator, February 7, 2012 Interview with Dr. Kimani J, Free-Lance Consultant, Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in East Africa, March 21, 2012
190

Interview with Eizabeth Bakibinga-Gaswaga, Legal Officer, UN Dept. of Peace Keeping Operations, Kosovo, February 24,2012
191

ICG, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, International Crisis Group African Report No 184, pg 3, February 15, 2012

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decision of a joint military engagement of KDF and the TFG of Somalia forces in the hunt for Al-Shabaab. The agreement therefore espoused the following:192 i. That Kenyas security operation inside Somalia is aimed at eliminating the threat posed by Al Shabaab to Kenyas national security and economic well -being, and is based on the legitimate right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter; ii. That Al Shabaab constitutes a threat to both Somalia and Kenya and is therefore a common enemy for the entire region and the world. This threat must be fought jointly by the two nations with support from the international community; iii. That the current operations are being led by the TFG of Somalia Forces with the support of the Kenyan Defence Forces in pursuit of legitimate Al Shabaab targets; iv. That the Somali Government supports the activities of the Kenyan forces, which are being fully coordinated with the TFG of Somalia and being carried out in the spirit of good neighbourliness and African unity. v. That there will be continuous sharing of intelligence and information on Al Shabaab activities and the military operation to flush them out. In this regard, a joint high level coordination committee has been established which will maintain regular ongoing contact including periodic meetings in Nairobi and Mogadishu. vi. To mount a joint diplomatic campaign by both countries to galvanize support for the operation beginning with a joint meeting with select members of the Diplomatic Corps in Nairobi on November 1, 2011 and followed by visits to several select capitals.
192

Raila Odinga and Abdiweli Mohamed, JOINT COMMUNIQUE, Ministry of foreign Affairs of Kenya, http://www.mfa.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=399:joint-communique&catid=35:news (accessed on March 4, 2012)

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vii.

That additional AMISOM troops be provided to move into the liberated areas in Southern Somalia to help safeguard peace and security and assist the establishment of local administration with the guidance of the TFG.

viii.

That the international community assists in providing immediate humanitarian assistance in the liberated areas and provide needed funding for other urgently needed services such as in health and education.

ix.

That the TFG will seek ICC assistance in beginning immediate investigations into crimes against humanity committed by individuals within the Al Shabaab movement with the aim of seeking their indictment.

x.

That the international community provides the necessary logistical and financial support for the blockade of the Port of Kismayu until Al Shabaab is removed;

xi.

That the Kenya Government shall not negotiate with Al Sahbaab but the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia is free to negotiate with all armed opposition groups within the instruments guiding this road map (i.e. The Djibouti Peace Process and the Kampala Accord as recommended by IGAD and the African Union) provided they renounce violence.

KDF joint AMISOM operation In the face of the reality of being bogged down in an operation that may take infinitely longer than anticipated, KDFs incorporation into AMISOM is in effect advantageous to the Kenyan military. In a sense, KDF has manoeuvred itself into AMISOM and as such presented itself with a unique opportunity for: (a) Avoiding the probable perception of being a unilateral occupational force in Somalia. (b) Doing away with extra monetary expenses at the

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behest of the Kenyan tax payer. (c) Finding an exit strategy that does not leave a void once the war is over. According to E.B-Gaswaga, the integration of KDF into AMISOM was a timely decision citing that additional troops were necessary to boost AMISOMs efforts in Somalia.193 Lt. Col. Ankunda concurs with this view stating that the move was welcome as many African countries had been reluctant to contribute troops.194 3.2 AMISOM Establishment The African Mission in Somalia was created by the UNSC Resolution 1744 (2007). The resolution took note of the communiqu of the African Union Peace and Security Council of January 19, 2007, which states that the:195
African Union shall deploy for a period of six months a mission to Somalia (AMISOM), aimed essentially at contributing to the initial stabilization phase in Somalia, and that the mission will evolve into a United Nations operation that will support the long-term stabilization and post-conflict restoration of Somalia.

With the establishment of AMISOM came the exit of ENDF that was deployed in Somalia at the request of the TFG. Consequently, AMISOM's immediate role was to fill the void being left by ENDF following a heated pursuit of the ICU beyond Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia.

193

Interview with Elizabeth Bakibinga -Gaswaga, Legal Officer, UN Dept. of Peace Keeping Operations, Kosovo, February 24,2012 194 Interview with Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda, AMISOM spokesman, April 20, 2012.
195

SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES SIX-MONTH AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA, Security Council, February 20, 2007, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8960.doc.htm (accessed April 18, 2012)

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Mandate AMISOM, according to UNSC resolution 1744 (2007) was mandated to support the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), implement a national-security plan, train Somali security forces and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.196The fact that the initial time frame has been renewed several times (latest being October 31,2012 as per Resolution 2010(2011)) should not only warrant an account of what the mission has achieved, but also give room for an assessment of its challenges. Further, it should be determined whether the continued renewal of its mandate is subject to creating room for a comprehensive achievement of the set objectives or an indication of lack of viable alternatives. Despite its mandate being confined to peacekeeping, the evolving situation in Somalia and beyond compelled the African Union (AU) foreign affairs' ministers to implore their respective heads of states and the UNSC to rethink this mandate.197 Coming in the wake of the Kampala grenade attacks of 7/11, it was definitive that Al-Shabaab had developed the capability and infrastructure to breach security apparatus of neighbouring states even after warning them of an imminent attack. The call for change of AMISOM's mandate to peace enforcement can therefore be seen as a reactionary measure that was to facilitate a direct engagement of Al-Shabaab in its own backyard. Even though the UNSC did not yield to an entire overhaul of this mandate, AMISOM gained leeway to carry out pre-emptive strikes against the Al Shabaab extremists.198

196 197

Ibid Charles Kazooba Somalia: AU Ministers Agree to 'Take On' Al Shabaab, The East African ,July 26, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201007250021.html (accessed on April 17, 2012) 198 Risdel Kasasira and Solomon Muyita Africa: United Nations Blocks Change of Amisom Mandate, The Monitor, July 28, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201007280079.html (accessed on April 17, 2012)

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Changing face Burundi and Uganda have been the face of AMISOM since its inception in 2007. As on September 13, 2011, AMISOM had 9,595 troops, mainly from the two countries. 199Even though this ceiling is slightly above the originally authorised troop strength by the UNSC (8,000), it is curious that it took four years to assemble this number, a development that raises serious apprehensions about the international communitys commitment to the success of AMISOM in stabilising Somalia. The October 14, 2011 intervention against Al-Shabaab is at the epicentre of AMISOM's gradual restructuring following Kenyas acceptance of the AU Peace and Security Councils request to integrate its troops as part of the greater AMISOM.200 This move has potentials for success in Somalia if fully backed beyond the regular rhetoric, but equally conceals challenges of comparable proportions if not carefully thought through. In line with the incorporation of the KDF into AMISOM, the UNSC through its resolution 2036 (2012) consequently, increased the AMISOM troop ceiling from 12,000 to 17,731,201,202 a move that would, in effect, create room for the Kenyan and Sierra Leonean troops. With this integration equally comes the internal reorganisation which AMISOM has so far handled with decorum and utmost speed to facilitate a sustained focus on defeating AlShabaab. Part of this restructuring saw the command of AMISOM headquarters remain with a Ugandan General to be deputised by two major generals from Kenya and Burundi

199

Military Component, AMISOM , http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/ (accessed on April 17, 2012) 200 Kenya send troops into S. Somalia, AMISOM Review, Issue 6, p5, January 2012 201 UN Agrees To Boost AU Troops In Somalia, Sky News, February 22, 2012, http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16175096 (accessed on March 13, 2012) 202 SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS AFRICAN UNION TO INCREASE TROOP LEVEL OF SOMALIA MISSION TO 17,700, ESTABLISH EXPANDED PRESENCE IN KEEPING WITH STRATEGIC CONCEPT, UNSC, February 22, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10550.doc.htm (accessed on March 30, 2012)

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respectively. The restructuring also saw Kenya claim the information and intelligence post among others.203 As the integration of the KDF into AMISOM gains more prominence, there are other notable consequential amendments to the initial UNSC Resolution 1772 (2007) which might have been obscured by the latest developments. Resolution 2036 (2012) thus read in part:204
the Mission should establish a presence in the four sectors set out in its own strategic concept of 5 January and be authorized to take all necessary measures in those sectors, in coordination with the Somali security forces, to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective governance country-wide.

The phrase and be authorized to take all necessary measures in those sectors is key to understanding the paradigm shift in AMISOMs mandate from peace keeping to peace enforcement. This, albeit late, sought to address some of the initial concerns that advanced reservations in contribution of the troops by African countries such as Nigeria.205 Opportunity to redeem Somalia amidst challenges AMISOM is the single alternative to Somalia stability that regional organizations like the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), AU and the International Community has a definite control over. Understandably, a political process in Somalia is significant, and to an extent, weighty than the military option. However, external players may not have an absolute control over it in comparison to AMISOM. In Somalia, the political
203

Laban Wanambisi, Kenya gets 16 plum posts in AMISOM, Capital FM News, March 12, 2012, http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2012/03/kenya-gets-16-plum-posts-in-amisom/ (accessed on March 23, 2012) 204 SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS AFRICAN UNION TO INCREASE TROOP LEVEL OF SOMALIA MISSION TO 17,700, ESTABLISH EXPANDED PRESENCE IN KEEPING WITH STRATEGIC CONCEPT, UNSC, February 22, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10550.doc.htm (accessed on March 30, 2012) 205 DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & SEUNGWON CHUNG, The African Union's beleaguered Somalia mission, The Long War Journal, July 20, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/07/the_african_unions_b.php (accessed on March 15, 2012)

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scope is further complicated by endless clan animosity which, as noted earlier by the author, was an actual ingredient for the civil war. Any mitigation on this platform obligates utmost caution which must manifest the absence of external control. To create a Somalia where political mitigation is feasible is to eliminate the threat which thrives through the instability, Al-Shabaab is that threat and AMISOM, so far appears to be the most valid and less controversial approach for a short term redress. In his recent visit to Mogadishu, the UN Secretary General commended AMISOM for doing a tremendous job in very difficult circumstances.206Even though this statement acknowledges the progress that AMISOM has made, especially with regards to safeguarding Mogadishu, it is also an admission to failure by the international community to advance the urgently required support that would in turn ease the work of this mission. With a troop capacity of just under 10,000, AMISOM in 2012 and against an extremist group that destabilises the entire region is way short of the troop strength of Unified Task Force (UNITAF) between (December 1992 and May 1993) and United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) between (March 1993 and May 1995). Both were deployed in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 794 (1992) and 814 (1993) respectively. Notably, as early as then, both UNITAF and UNOSOM II had troop strengths of 37,000 and 28,000 respectively.207 Still, it would be premature to conclude that failure of the previous missions in Somalia might have aggravated the international communitys pessimism over capabilities of AMISOM in a territory where no military operation has succeeded. In the past, the international communitys concern was realistically within the realms of containing the

206

Ban Ki Moon, Secretary-General's press conference, United Nations, December 9, 2011, http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/?nid=2127 (accessed on March 29, 2012) 207 J. Peter Pham, PhD, Somalia in Need of A New Approach Two Decades after State Collapse, World Defense Review, P 2, February 1, 2011

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Somalia situation, but that has since shifted with the internal dynamics that are constantly shaped by the Al-Shabaab extremist group. Apart from its negligible troop capacity, AMISOM is haunted by the limitations of the TFG forces. As a foreign mission, AMISOM is supposed to be led by the TFG forces, but the converse is true for Somalia. According to Maj. Gen. N. Mugisha, AMISOM has attempted to remedy this by training Somali soldiers.208 With limited support from the international community and the regional bodies, it is worrisome just how much AMISOM can do as far as training is concerned, language barrier notwithstanding. The infusion of forces from Djibouti would ease the communication situation as Somali is widely spoken in the country and hence Somali speaking persons among the contingent, KDF would also come in handy in this respect. The TFG has equally been a frustration to AMISOM efforts. Allegations of corruption among TFG officials in the face of catastrophe is not new and has been widely cited as a fundamental reason for the rise of ICU as well as its lack of popularity among the Somalia population. Corruption amidst the reality of limited resources has inadvertently led to situations of irregular pay and a dip in the Somali troop morale. Though Maj. Gen. N. Mugisha asserts that the situation significantly improved in 2011,209 it is a dangerous precedence that may make Al-Shabaabs extremist group advocacy for no corruption more appealing and therefore, more rewarding. The possibility of the TFG forces crossing over to Al-Shabaab or other militants would not be a new concept. According to Pham, at least three Western initiatives of the US, EU and France recruited, trained and armed more than 9,000 troops for the TFG and yet fewer than 1,000 had remained loyal to the regime.210 When these

208 209

Mugisha N., Learning on the job, AMISOM Review, Issue 6, p 14, January 2012 Ibid, p 14 210 J. Peter Pham, PhD, Somalia in Need of A New Approach Two Decades after State Collapse, World Defense Review, p1, February 1, 2011

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personnel cross over to Al-Shabaabs side, for example, they not only take with them the weapons, but also tactical skills that they have acquired so far.211 Despite the negative publicity that the TFG has attracted, there is still a significant level of confidence in its commitment to the fight against Al-Shabaab. In Harpers view, the TFG is too weak and unprofessional to be fully committed to anything, b ut she equally concurs that it would like to get rid of Al-Shabaab as it cannot exercise power in its presence.212 E.BGaswaga os on agreement, arguing that it is all in the interest of the TFG as the two entities (TFG and Al-Shabaab) cannot co-exist in a peaceful and democratically governed Somalia.213 Financing of AMISOM, if not checked would erode any meaningful gains that the mission has accomplished so far. The additional troop numbers would equally be meaningless if structural changes for funding are not made. As Maj. Gen. F.Mugisha points out, the current funding structure for AMISOM partly relies on voluntary donations. 214 As long as the funding for AMISOM is not consolidated and issued promptly, provisions for the same would remain unpredictable and would in turn jeopardize the planning process of the mission. He further postulates that countries would contribute their prized air and naval assets, but only by guaranteeing re-imbursement for contingent owned equipment.215 It would be foolhardy for a developing African nation to commit its military hardware to a cause that affects the entire globe, while equally aware of the unpredictability of the reimbursements.

211 212

Ibid Interview with Mary Harper, BBC Africa Editor and Author of Getting Somalia Wrong? March 3, 2012

213

Interview with Elizabeth Bakibinga- Gaswaga, Legal Officer, UN Dept. of Peace Keeping Operations, Kosovo, February 24,2012
214

215

Mugisha F., Beyond Mogadishu, AMISOM Review, Issue 6, p 15, January 2012

Ibid

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3.3 ETHIOPIAN PERCIFICATION OF SOMALIA ENDF is probably the only African military that is well versed with the Somalia military terrain as compared to the rest in the continent. Historically, Ethiopia has been involved militarily in Somalia in one way or another from independence, through the Cold War and into the era of post Siad Barre regime. The deep suspicion between the two countries has enshrouded any good intentions Ethiopia might have for its interventions in Somalia. It is in this regard that as the rest of the frontline states (Kenya and Djibouti) prepare to join AMISOM, Ethiopia is conspicuously missing in the pact. Nevertheless, the question is whether the situation in Somalia would have been better without Ethiopian involvement right from the onset. Following its intervention in the post Siad Barre era and prior to the establishment of AMISOM, Ethiopia went into Somalia at the request of the TFG. Curiously, the TFG (as observed earlier) was equally unpopular having been bogged down with allegations of corruption and failure to provide security to its citizens. The team work between the ENDF and the TFG forces was therefore an affront to Somalia nationalism and a reminder of the losses that Somalia incurred in the hands of Ethiopians during the Ogaden war. Still, it would be myopic to conclude that Ethiopias intervention in Somalia has been at the interest of the TFG and entirely for purposes of stability in Somalia. An unstable Somalia not only stand to benefit the disenfranchised Ogaden population (Somalis) in Ethiopia by necessitating infiltration of the Al-Shabaab extremist group into Ethiopia, but also creates a lucrative front where Eritrea can launch its proxy war against Ethiopia. As already noted in Chapter 2, the UN Working Group on Somalia and Eritrea widely mentioned Eritrea on the accounts of being supportive of militant groups (ICU and Al-Shabaab) against the TFG and possibly its ally (Ethiopia). Further, as noted earlier, Eritrea had been categorical in denying
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these involvements, but following the sour relationship between the two countries (Ethiopia and Eritrea), it is plausible that the reasons for Eritrea to support these groups against Ethiopia outweighs the reasons against. In the long run, Ethiopias tribulations would always be Eritreas joy and vice versa. In the wake of Kenyan military incursion in Somalia and an increased AMISOMs pressure against the Al-Shabaab, the ENDF weighed into the conflict one more time at the urging of the IGAD summit and the invitation of the TFG.216The ENDFs approach from the west helped the TFG liberate strategic towns such as Beletweyne and Baidoa from the extremists. 3.4 CONCLUSION Operation Linda Nchi, Kenyas first military adventure in a foreign territory since independence (1963) may not have been a wisely thought move given the countrys proximity to Somalia and a plethora of other factors that makes it predisposed to acts of extremism instigated by Al-Shabaab. Indeed, terrorist activities have increased in the country since the incursion. Even though the operation reportedly captured 22 towns and pacified an area of 95,000Km2 from Al-Shabaab in just 154 days, it initially faced numerous challenges, some of which should have been expected if a thorough intelligence reconnaissance were carried out before the incursion. The eventual decision to integrate KDF into AMISOM not only presented Kenya with an opportunity to continue its mission in Somalia without funding the incursion from her own

216

Amb. Boubacar Diarra, Message from the SRCC, AMISOM Review, Issue 6, p 2, January 2012

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budget, but also provided an exit strategy, as well as the avoidance of being perceived as an occupational force in a foreign territory. KDFs joining of AMISOM has set the latters troop ceiling to its highest point (17,731) since inception in 2007 and further given it a broader outlook. However, AMISOM is still perceptible as an EAC force with three (Burundi, Uganda and Kenya) out of the five EAC states being the main troop contributors to the mission. Despite its myriad challenges which were even recently acknowledged by the UN Sec. General, AMISOM has endeavoured to succeed where many well equipped missions had failed. It is notable that the TFG has survived this far because of AMISOM. As the war against Al-Shabaab intensifies, so is the knowledge about the group among the EACs citizens. Chapter four therefore reveals the relationship between the Somalia state collapse and the conducive environment such a tragedy has created for Al-Shabaab. It also presents the factors which have propelled Al-Shabaabs infiltration into EAC and its corresponding consequences. Whereas there is a general acceptance of the unbearable costs of the war against AlShabaab among the EAC citizens, Chapter four equally reveals that the populations reactionary instincts to extremism in the region is to the effect that the support for a military offensive remains broadly acceptable.

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CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 FINDINGS: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION 4.1 Overview This chapter examines the structure and nature of the collected data; it focuses on the presentation, analysis and interpretation of data collected from the respondents in an attempt to answer the five research questions. The interpretations are based on the responses from the questionnaires analysed on SPSS and are thereafter presented in the form of tables and bar charts for easier interpretation. The responses in the questionnaires are further supplemented by the asynchronous online interviews of key informants as well as emerging information acquired in the course of the desk research. 4.2 Data Analysis Response rate

Statistics Profession Gender of the respondent N Valid Missing 102 0 Location of the respondent 102 0 of the respondent 102 0

[Table 4.2.1] Table 4.2.1 outlines the three categories on which the authors respondents have been mapped, that is; gender, location and profession.

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Frequency Table

Gender of the respondent Cumulative Frequency Valid Male Female Total 64 38 102 Percent 62.7 37.3 100.0 Valid Percent 62.7 37.3 100.0 Percent 62.7 100.0

[Table 4.2.2] Table 4.2.2 above indicates that out of the 102 respondents, 64 of them (62.7%) were males, while the remaining 38 (37.3%) were females.

Location of the respondent Cumulative Frequency Valid Dar-Esalaam, Tanzania Kampala, Uganda Kisii, Kenya Kisumu, Kenya Migori, Kenya Mombasa, Kenya Nairobi, Kenya Nakuru, Kenya Total 9 9 11 11 8 10 34 10 102 Percent 8.8 8.8 10.8 10.8 7.8 9.8 33.3 9.8 100.0 Valid Percent 8.8 8.8 10.8 10.8 7.8 9.8 33.3 9.8 100.0 Percent 8.8 17.6 28.4 39.2 47.1 56.9 90.2 100.0

[Table 4.2.3]
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Table 4.2.3 maps the location of each respondent. Whereas the questionnaires were distributed in the three EAC States of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, Kenya had the largest percentage distribution across its towns of; Kisii 11 (10.8%), Kisumu 11 (10.8%), Migori 8 (7.8%), Mombasa 10 (9.8%), Nairobi 34 (33.3%), Nakuru 10 (9.8%). Dar-Esalaam, Tanzania and Kampala, Uganda both had 9 which translate into 8.8%.
Profession of the respondent Cumulative Frequency Valid Banker/ HR/Accountant/Marketer Business person Engineer/IT Teacher Prison officer/Police officer/ Military personnel Health Practitioner Lawyer Customer service/Public relations Other Total 20 102 19.6 100.0 19.6 100.0 100.0 5 3 14 4.9 2.9 13.7 4.9 2.9 13.7 63.7 66.7 80.4 7 11 13 7 6.9 10.8 12.7 6.9 6.9 10.8 12.7 6.9 28.4 39.2 52.0 58.8 22 Percent Valid Percent 21.6 21.6 Percent 21.6

[Table 4.2.4] Table 4.2.4 is indicative of the bias of the study. As already been noted by the author, key to this study was the identification of at least college educated people with potentials to follow and understand the evolving events in Somalia, and more specifically, since the Kenyan incursion began. The different professionals highlighted by this table as the respondents underscore this crucial component of data collection. Professions such as: Banking, Human Resource, Accounting, Marketing, and Business had the largest
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representation with 22 respondents (21.6%), while Law was the least represented with only three respondents (2.9%). It is also notable that there were assortments of many other professions which were not indicated on individual terms and was as such coded as other, this category had 20 (19.6%) of the total respondents.

4.3 Nexus of the Somalia Collapsed Statehood, Emergence of Al-Shabaab and the recent terrorist activities in the EAC To establish the possibility of a relationship between these three parameters of collapsed statehood, emergence of Al-Shabaab and the recent terrorist activities in the EAC, the author asked four questions (see below), whose findings are tabulated as follows:
Origin of the respondent * Is Somalia a Collapsed state? Crosstabulation Count Is Somalia a collapsed state? I don't Yes Origin of the respondent Kenyan of Somali background Somali citizen living in Kenya Kenyan of non-Somali background Ugandan Tanzanian Total 8 6 94 0 3 5 1 0 3 9 9 102 72 1 1 74 1 0 0 1 7 No 1 know 1 Total 9

[Table 4.3.1] In response to whether Somalia is a collapsed state or not, the author opted to enhance the understanding of the responses by doing a cross tabulation of the origin of the respondent against the actual response.
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Out of a total of nine Kenyan Somalis, seven of them agreed that Somalia is indeed a collapsed state, while only one disagreed and the remainder (one) did not know. The analysis is even more revealing on the response of Kenyans of non-Somali origin, whereby out of the 74 respondents (Kenyans of non-Somali origin), 72 agreed that Somalia is a collapsed state, just one either felt otherwise, or did not know at all. The same trend could be seen among the Ugandan and Tanzanian respondents who were both nine respectively. Eight out of nine Ugandans felt Somalia was a collapsed state, while six Tanzanians felt the same, but with three of them feeling that Somalia was not a collapsed state. Out of the 102 respondents, 94 of them felt Somalia was a collapsed state with a paltry number of just five disagreeing, while three did not know whether Somalia was a collapsed state or not.
Origin of the respondent * In your opinion, does Collapsed Statehood of Somalia encourage the influence of extremist groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia? Crosstabulation Count In your opinion, does collapsed statehood of Somalia encourage the influence of extremist groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia? Not Yes Origin of the respondent Kenyan of Somali background Somali citizen living in Kenya Kenyan of non-Somali background Ugandan Tanzanian Total 8 6 92 0 0 2 1 3 8 9 9 102 72 0 2 74 1 0 0 1 5 No 2 applicable 2 Total 9

[Table 4.3.2]

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In an attempt to establish the existence of a relationship between the collapsed Statehood of Somalia and the emergence of extremist groups like the Al-Shabaab, the author asked if collapsed Statehood had encouraged the influence of the Al-Shabaab extremist group. Out of the 92 respondents whose responses were affirmative, five of them were Kenyans of Somali origin; one was Somalia citizen living in Kenya, 72 Kenyans of non-Somali, eight Ugandans, and 6 Tanzanians. Of all the 102 respondents, only two (Kenyan Somalis) felt there was no relationship between the prominence of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the collapsed statehood. This implies that Al-Shabaab would have still been influential with or without State collapse.

Origin of the respondent * Does the security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Somalia spill over to Kenya? Crosstabulation Count Does the security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Somalia spill over to Kenya? Yes Origin of the respondent Kenyan of Somali background Somali citizen living in Kenya Kenyan of non-Somali background Ugandan Tanzanian Total 9 8 97 0 1 5 9 9 102 74 0 74 1 0 1 5 No 4 Total 9

[Table 4.3.3] The analysis of a spill over of Al-Shabaab-related extremism into Kenya was not answered any differently either, five Kenyan Somalis agreed that there was a spill over; while four disagreed.74 Kenyans of non-Somali origin agreed that there was a spill over of

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insecurity. The same situation was noticeable among the Ugandans who collectively (all nine of them) agreed there was indeed a spill over of insecurity into Kenya. Eight Tanzanians felt the same way, but with one exception. In total, 97 respondents felt Kenya was exposed to the spill over of Al-Shabaab-related insecurity, while just five disagreed.

Origin of the respondent * Does the Security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Kenya spill over to the rest of the East African Community States Crosstabulation Count Does the Security threat posed by the AlShabaab in Kenya spill over to the rest of the East African Community States I don't Yes Origin of the respondent Kenyan of Somali background Somali citizen living in Kenya Kenyan of non-Somali background Ugandan Tanzanian Total 7 6 82 0 3 11 2 0 9 9 9 102 67 2 5 74 1 0 0 1 1 No 6 know 2 Total 9

[Table 4.3.4] The authors intention was to establish if the supposed spill over in Kenya could extend to the rest of the EAC states. Out of the 82 respondents who agreed that the insecurity spills over to the rest of the EAC states, only one was a Kenyan of Somali background with a majority of them (six out of nine), disagreeing. 67 Kenyans of non-Somali background agreed. Curiously, despite Uganda having been subjected to an Al-Shabaab instigated attack
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in July 2010, two Ugandans did not know whether there was an Al-Shabaab spill over beyond Kenya or not. Graphical representation

Is Somalia a collapsed state? Cumulative Frequency Valid Yes No I don't know Total 94 5 3 102 Percent 92.2 4.9 2.9 100.0 Valid Percent 92.2 4.9 2.9 100.0 Percent 92.2 97.1 100.0

[Table 4.3.5]

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[Fig 4.3.1] According to Table 4.3.5 and the bar graph (Fig 4.3.1), 92.2% of the respondents agreed that Somalia is a Collapsed State, 4.9% did not agree, while a paltry 2.% did not know whether it is a collapsed State or not.

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In your opinion, does the collapsed statehood of Somalia encourage the influence of extremist groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia?

Frequency Valid Yes No Not applicable Total 92 2 8 102

Percent 90.2 2.0 7.8 100.0

Valid Percent 90.2 2.0 7.8 100.0

Cumulative Percent 90.2 92.2 100.0

[Table 4.3.6]

[Fig 4.3.2]

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According to Table 4.3.6 and Fig 4.3.2, none of the respondents chose the option I dont know, 90.2% of the respondents agreed that collapsed statehood of Somalia had encouraged the influence of Al-Shabaab in the country. 2 % did not agree, while the remaining 7.8% of the respondents did not have this question applicable to them following their responses to the preceding questions.

Does the security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Somalia spill over to Kenya?

Frequency Valid Yes No Total 97 5 102

Percent 95.1 4.9 100.0

Valid Percent 95.1 4.9 100.0

Cumulative Percent 95.1 100.0

[Table 4.3.7]

[Fig 4.3.3]
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As indicative of Table 4.3.7 and Fig 4.3.3, 95.1% of the respondents felt that the security threat posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia had actually spilled over to Kenya. An insignificant percentage of 4.9 felt otherwise.

Does the Security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Kenya spill over to the rest of the East African Community States

Frequency Valid Yes No I don't know Total 82 11 9 102

Percent 80.4 10.8 8.8 100.0

Valid Percent 80.4 10.8 8.8 100.0

Cumulative Percent 80.4 91.2 100.0

[Table 4.3.8]

[Fig 4.3.4]
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As for the spill over of Al-Shabaab threat to the rest of the EAC, the number agreeing went down in comparison to the spill over with regards to Kenya. The fact that Kenya has been on the receiving end of Al-Shabaab related terrorist activities than the rest of the EAC states may have influenced this view as the possible spill over to other countries is overshadowed by Kenyas predisposition. Consequently, 80.4% agree that spill over is to the rest of the EAC states, 10.8% disagree, while 8.8% do not know. 4.4 Avenues for spill over of extremism and terrorist activities in Kenya and the EAC That Al-Shabaab is already part of Kenyan and the entire EAC States complex is no longer the question, the urgent need is to identify loopholes that the group has exploited to entrench itself in these countries. The author put the respondents to task of identifying potential avenues which may have aided Al-Shabaabs infiltration into the EAC States and attained the results as outlined in tables; 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. The author also carried out further desk research to back up the respondents perception. The findings however outline key concerns which establish worrisome trends.

Case Summary Cases Valid N $Spillovera [Table 4.4.1] 96 Percent 94.1% N 6 Missing Percent 5.9% N 102 Total Percent 100.0%

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$Spillover Frequencies Responses N Spillover frequency of response

a

Percent 17.4%

Percent of Cases 82.3%

Vast and Porous KenyaSomalia border Inefficient policing and intelligence gathering by the Kenya Security agencies Accommodative ethnic Somalia community Presence of less secure Somali Refugee camps Corrupt Kenya police A large number of unemployed youth from the North Eastern Province (largely occupied by the Somalia Community) Radicalisation of the youth through exposure to extremist Islamic teachings

79

52

11.5%

54.2%

68

15.0%

70.8%

55

12.1%

57.3%

68 47

15.0% 10.4%

70.8% 49.0%

84

18.5%

87.5%

Total

453

100.0%

471.9%

[Table 4.4.2]

From the findings, radicalisation of the youth through extremist Islamic teachings had the highest percentage at 18.5, while the least avenue for spill over was youth unemployment at 10.4%. Many respondents disagreed with the perception that lack of employment opportunities could be an incentive for radicalisation. The percentage distribution for all the

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avenues blamed for spill over is as shown on table 4.4.2. The author extended the desk research to highlight these avenues while interlinking them with existing evidence. Proximity to Somalia, vast and Porous borders The Kenya-Somalia border remains a critical reference in the discussion of spill over of extremism into the EAC. Keeping the large and porous border under check has been Kenyas greatest challenge and to that extent, it has remained a necessary transit for small arms, contraband goods, as well as people with questionable characters. Movement of extremists and militants to and from Somalia has been attributed to Kenyas proximity to Somalia and is a phenomenon that dates back many years. The 1993 entrance of the Pakistani (Pashawar) Al-Qaeda operatives into Somalia via Kenya217 is just, but one of the many incidences. The status of Kenyas border with Somalia was further worsened by the outbreak of civil war and famine which forced a huge population of the Somali people into neighbouring countries as refugees. But, as the displaced population seek refuge in Kenya, so are the extremist group who disguise themselves as refugees. This new approach forced the government of Kenya to close its border with Southern Somalia (January 2007) in an effort to prevent Al-Shabaab extremists from crossing into the country.218 Incidentally, this is not just a Kenya-Somalia affair, the entire EAC equally grapples with these challenges and as Shinn points out, there is no capacity to track the movement in and out of the Somali Diaspora in Africa219

217 218

Shinn, Al Shabaabs Foreign Threat to Somalia, P 205 Ahmed Roble Muhyadin, Al-Shabaab Threats Panic Kenya as Fighting Erupts on the Somali Border, The Jamestown foundation Terrorism Monitor IX, no.11 (March 17, 2011): p 3, http://jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_009_04.pdf (accessed on March 30,2012) 219 Shinn, Al Shabaabs Foreign Threat to Somalia, P 213

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Alongside the physical security dimension, the other important aspect of border policing is that of immigration. Kenya, like the rest of the EAC is yet to employ the use of sophisticated technology that can facilitate management of an efficient immigration process at its borders. This school of thought justifies how extremist groups have been able to smuggle bomb devices across Kenya-Uganda border without being detected. On December 10, 2010, for example, the Uganda Revenue Authority terminal in Kampala seized explosive materials on a Kampala bound Gateway bus from Nairobi.220The December 12, 2010 explosion of the Kampala coach in a Nairobi terminus (just two days after the first explosives were seized by the Ugandan Authorities) attests to the existing loophole in the cross border movement of people and materiel within the EAC. The explosion killed three and injured 39 people221 leading to questions of whether the bomb was intended to go off in Kampala, Uganda or in Kenya. Assuming it was meant for Uganda, then, it brings forth the discourse on porosity of the borders to the effect that transport of these materiel and other illegal explosives within the EAC is not entirely impractical or impossible. Border permeability, especially in the context of infiltration by illegal Somali immigrants is even more of a worry to Tanzania. Mr Albert Kishe, the Head of immigration department in Namanga border acknowledges that a vibrant racket of Somalis ferrying all sorts of people and things across the Namanga border has been thriving in the area for years.222 The racket, allegedly facilitated by Kenyans and Tanzanians living along the borderline with other conduits based in Arusha and Nairobi cities have progressively dodged the authorities.223

220

Raymond Baguma, Bomb Materials Found on Bus, The New Vision, http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/740805 (accessed February 22, 2012) 221 Tabu Butagira and Betty Kyakuwa, Terrorist Strike Kampala Bound Bus, The Daily Monitor, December 12, 2010, (accessed on February 22, 2012)
222

Namanga border poses danger of Al- Shabaab infiltration, Tanzania news link, http://tanzanianewslink.com/news/politics/5911-namanga-border-poses-danger-of-al-shabaab- infiltration (accessed on April 13, 2012) 223 Ibid

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Kishe accounts that for every arrested Somali, there are about ten others who manage to cross undetected. This implies that more than 2000 illegal Somali immigrants pass through the Namanga border in a year.224 He then concludes that the possibility of having AlShabaab members crossing into the country is very high.225 The Eastleigh factor and the Receptive Somalia Community The Nairobi Eastleigh is a small district with its population largely comprising of the Somali people. It is referred in some quarters as the little Mogadishu because it is home to many Kenyan-Somalis, Somali immigrants, as well as refugees. 226 But, in the wake of the fight against Al-Shabaab, Eastleigh has once again become the focus of Al-Shabaabs infiltration into the country. While addressing parliament recently, the assistant Minister for internal security, Hon. Orwa Ojode said, Al-Shabaab is like a snake whose tail is in Somalia and head here in Eastleigh in Nairobi.227 The ministers statement underscores the very fears the entire Kenyan population harbours over the possibility of the group finding a safe haven in Kenya, but also warrants the question of whether it was an admission on the governments part that the threat is interminable, having acknowledged (through the statement) that it has all along been aware of the existence of Al-Shabaab in Eastleigh. Eastleigh, as it is known today is one of Nairobis most entrepreneurial estates. The Crisis Group traces the emergence of the regions vibrant business acumen to the remittance boom of the early 1990s228, but it also states that the economy of Eastleigh is also partly driven by

224 225

Ibid Ibid 226 OFEIBEA QUIST-ARCTON, Tension Runs High In Kenya's 'Little Mogadishu' npr November 19, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/11/19/142530740/tension-runs-high-in-kenyas-little-mogadishu (accessed on November 30, 2011) 227 IRIN, KENYA: Xenophobia, fear follow Nairobi blasts, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/94090/KENYA-Xenophobia-fear-follow-Nairobi-blasts (accessed on January 2, 2012) 228 International Crisis Group, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation Africa Briefing N85, Nairobi/Brussels, 25 January 2012 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/b085-kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation.aspx (accessed on February 2, 2012)

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a close knit community of Wahhabi entrepreneurs, linked to similar networks in Mogadishu, Dubai and the Gulf.229 This linkage is at the core of suspicion raised to the effect that the Eastleigh business returns could be part of the resources mobilised to advance Al-Shabaabs underworld programmes. The fact that Eastleigh has been home to Somalis of different background (locals, immigrants and refugees) is no justification for its contribution to the lifeline of Al-Shabaab fanned extremism, but it is logical to perceive it as a society that is both secretive and suspicious. These attributes have given some credibility to the popular belief that such an association exists and therefore what is unknown is how to quantify the level and form of allegiance. While being driven to Eastleigh, BBCs leading reporter and expert on Somalia, Mary Harpers taxi driver posited that: 230
Somalis are very bad people. They sell everything in Eastleigh, even weapons. They are corrupt and they are always fighting because they are, by nature, a very violent people. Somali pirates come here to Nairobi and buy expensive houses in the best districts. Kenyans hate Somalis, but they are very good at business.

Whereas the statement of the non-Somali taxi driver may pass as prejudicial and more generalised towards the entire Somalia community, it underlines the deep seated suspicion with which the Somali population in Eastleigh are perceived. The comments by the internal security assistant minister not only give credibility to these suspicions, but may also further reinforce the existing prejudice against the Somalis and possibly raise xenophobic fears among the Kenyan-Somali population.

229 230

Ibid Mary Harper, Somalis in Kenya: They call us ATM machines, Royal African Society November 24, 2011, http://www.royalafricansociety.org/country-profiles/710.html (accessed on March 15, 2012)

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It is not just Eastleigh which is overcrowded with the Somali populace. The NEP, as noted earlier, is basically a territory of the Kenyan-Somalia people, with many of its privileged citizens ending up in the Nairobis Eastleigh. As noted earlier, the isolated and close knit ties among the Somali people in comparison to the rest of the EAC population makes it cumbersome to get to the details of any real affiliations between Al-Shabaab and the Kenyan-Somali community. Less secure refugee camps The Daadab camp, the worlds largest refugee camp is home to more than 463,000 refugees.231 This is way above the originally intended capacity of the camps, 90,000.232 However, the concern today is the security gap that arose as a consequence of its existence, particularly in the era of Al-Shabaab. With approximately 1,300 people arriving into the camp every day233, it becomes a security challenge to verify whether the latest arrivals are victims or perpetrators of extremism. Failure by the security agencies to draw conclusive identification of those arriving at the camp makes the distinction even more complex as they (extremists) mingle easily with the rest, while their identity remains concealed. The widespread reports that Al-Shabaab extremists have infiltrated the Daadab refugee camp and are using it as a recruitment venue234 highlight the complexity of the balance that the government of Kenya has to make between keeping the refugee camp and saving Somali lives, or relocating them to Somalia in the hope that this might be a stop gap measure for curbing further Al-Shabaab infiltration. Still, the legal implications of such a move, most especially as they impact on the obligations of states towards refugees must also be kept in mind.
231

UNHCR, Dadaab: World's biggest refugee camp 20 years old, Briefing Notes, 21 February 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/4f437d839.html (accessed on February 28, 2012) 232 ibid 233 ibid 234 Mary Harper, Somalis in Kenya: They call us ATM machines, Royal African Society November 24, 2011, http://www.royalafricansociety.org/country-profiles/710.html (accessed on March 15, 2012)

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The shooting of Mr. Sanyare (the chairman of Hagadera security committee) at the Daadab refugee camp by a group of gunmen allegedly linked to Al-Shabaab is further proof of the insecurity at the camp. It is therefore rational to submit that Al-Shabaab has penetrated the camp and has a deeper understanding of its operations as well as loose security; otherwise the bold act would not have been worth the effort. The 1.15pm abduction of the two Spanish aid workers from the camp235 further sustains the fear of insecurity in this camp. It is however, not just Kenya which has to contend with the insecurity challenges posed by hosting the largest refugee camp in the world. The insecurity fears resonate across the entire EAC, with Uganda and Tanzania both having their share of Somalia refugees and hence equally bearing the brunt. The following table is formulated based on the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) draft report on the Somali refugee distribution between 2008 and 2010. EAC Member State Total Number of Refugees between (2008-2010) 353,208 1,488 18,263

Kenya Tanzania Uganda

236

[Table 4.4.3]

235

Xan Rice, Two aid workers kidnapped from Kenyan refugee camp, The guardian, October 13, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/13/aid-workers-kidnapped-kenyan-camp (accessed on April 4, 2012) 236 UNHCR, Somalia Refugees in the Region, UNHCR BO Somalia, January 18, 2011

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As the author had pointed out, the current standing of the Somalia refugees in Kenya exceeds the indicated figure on the table, a phenomenon that had been amplified by the outbreak of famine and war against Al-Shabaab in the country (Somalia). Whereas one cannot definitively conclude that Somalia refugees in Uganda and Tanzania could be the link to Al-Shabaabs infiltration into EAC, it is indisputable that the safe haven this extremist group has so far found in Kenya continues to necessitate the ramifications of its roots into the region. Brand of laxity and corruption in the police system The discourse around infiltration of Al-Shabaab extremism into Kenya cannot be entirely assessed independent of the role of the police. Even though there is no known research into those activities by the police that may have created a lucrative environment for the AlShabaab to operate in Kenya unchecked, the few available reports and public perception based on past experiences with the police depict a picture of corruption or laxity in the execution of their duties. The Police Commissioner, in his 2011 Christmas and New Year message to his team noted: It is not lost to me that as a country we have not done very well in fighting the greater malady of corruption from which police bribery is a symptom. 237 The commissioners message is an admission of the existence of a vice, probably far beyond his control and that is too well understood in the public domain to the extent that it could as well be treated as a norm. Whereas this kind of public rebuke may be interpreted as a step towards confronting the vice, it also raises the question of how much it can achieve in this moment of proven infiltration of extremism.

237

Mathew K. Iteere, CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR MESSAGE FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, Kenya Police, December 16th, 2011, http://www.kenyapolice.go.ke/News143.asp (accessed on January 5, 2012)

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As Prof. Menkhaus puts it: Bribes to police, border guards and airport officials allow the terrorists to circumvent law even while they enjoy a level of protection from it.238 He singles out Kenya as a country where even in the event of an arrest of terrorist suspects and their subsequent incarceration; the corrupt police still appear to be bribable. 239 The incidence in which two suspects in the Mombasa terrorist attack of September 2002 escaped from custody in March 2003 attests to this claim.240 Revelations following arrests of Uganda twin bomb blast suspects that killed at least 74 people on July 11, 2010 even put a section of the Kenyan police under scrutiny. While addressing the press following his arrest, Issa Luyima ( one of the architects of the attack) said: Kenyan policemen, especially those from the Somalia tribe, helped us to cross from Somalia to Kenya and from Kenya to Uganda our bosses communicated to them and they easily let us through.241 The invisible bosses referred to by Luyima could either be senior police officers within the Kenya police ranks, or more powerful people with the capacity to manipulate the police. But, the chilling account is that of Muhamood Mugisha (a Uganda 7/11 suspect) who details that, one of the Al-Shabaab leaders telephoned a senior Kenya police officer who in turn drove him (Mugisha) to the Kenya-Uganda border and even aided him to cross into Uganda.242 Even in the unimaginable absence of corruption allegations, laxity among Kenya police in combating extremism remains a critical subject for discussion both in the public domain and

238 239

Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, p 74 Ibid, p75 240 Ibid, p 75 241 Hartely, JTIC Country Briefing-Somalia, p 22 242 Ibid

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curiously, even within the circles of the police division. The police commissioner captured this aspect as follows: 243
The extreme criminality manifested by Al-shabaab should be a necessity that provokes the zeal of all officers to sharpen their instincts of detecting criminals to a level that cannot be outwitted. I call upon officers to put it their soul that Al-shabaab should never be given a chance.

Despite the caution of extreme vigilance, Al-Shabaab still staged a bold raid on January 11, 2012 at a Wajir police camp by employing grenade attacks that left seven Kenyan administration police and government officials dead, with others taken as prisoners.
244

The-

Star columnist, Hassan Ole Naado observes that: Kenyan police stations are some of the most poorly manned despite the country being on a high alert. 245 He observes that: The rest of the Kenya police stations, other than the headquarters (Vigilance House) are free go zones where people can easily enter, roam and pack vehicles without being checked.246

Youth disenfranchisement and radicalisation Kenya and the rest of the EAC have an uphill task of confronting un-employment among the youth just like other nations across the globe. The challenge for EAC, however, is the likelihood of these youth finding Al-Shabaabs extremist ideology as an alternative for lack of job opportunities. According to Washiala, money is a major motivation for youth radicalisation in Kenya, and possibly the rest of EAC, arguing that the youth are unemployed
243

Mathew K. Iteere, CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR MESSAGE FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, Kenya Police, December 16th, 2011, http://www.kenyapolice.go.ke/News143.asp (accessed on January 5, 2012)
244

Noor Ali, Al Shabaab attack Kenyan police camp, kill 7, Reuters, January 12, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/12/us-kenya-somalia-idUSTRE80B1IX20120112 (accessed on March 15, 2012) 245 Hassan Ole Naado, Laxity Is Undermining Our Homeland Security, The Star, January 18, 2012, http://www.the-star.co.ke/opinions/hassan-ole-naado-/58611-laxity-is-undermining-our-homeland-security (accessed on February 26, 2012) 246 ibid

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en masse and hence have no reasonable income.247 Dr. Kimani weighs in by citing disenfranchisement as a fundamental reason to radicalisation. He further argues that the youth are left idle, desperate and have nothing to lose in the face of no employment opportunities.248 However, he is quick to add that: The economic benefits accruing from joining Al-Shabaab are minimal and probably not enough incentive to join the movement.249 This new dimension raises the perception that youth radicalisation is a voluntary decision prompted by religious convictions, a conviction that both E.B-Gaswaga and Lt. Col Ankunda subscribe to. Whereas there is no evidence so far on the non-Muslim Kenyans being recruited into the Al-Shabaab ranks, the converse is true for the non-Somali Kenyans who have become Muslim converts, a trend that is increasingly becoming a challenge to the EAC. The historical marginalisation of NEP has further encouraged disenfranchisement with both the past administrations of Kenyatta and Moi doing very insignificant, if not nothing at all to uplift the situation in the province.250Education as a key development indicator has therefore not been synonymous with NEP leading to a high population of youth who not only reside in a highly marginalised area, but also lack the knowledge and skills to compete with the rest of the Kenyan youth for the scarce job opportunities. This idling of the Somali and by extension Muslim youth would in part explain why the Al-Shabaab outfit appeals to them. In one of its recent bulletins, the Al-Shabaab leadership called on the Kenyan youth to revolt against the government.251 However, in a quick rejoinder and as if these recruitments are

247

Interview with Mohammed Washalla Abdi, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Taita Taveta Country Chariman, April 10, 2012 248 Interview with Dr. Kimani J, Free-Lance Consultant, Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in East Africa, March 21, 2012 249 Ibid

250 251

ICG, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization, Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 85, pg 7, January 25, 2012 Mohammed Yusuf, Al-Shabab Calls on Kenyan Youths to Revolt, Voice of America, March 14, 2012,

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facilitated by the drive for unemployment on the premise of limited education, Sheikh Juma Ngao, the chairman of Kenya's Muslim National Advisory Council, said:252
I strongly [do] not support the call [of] Al-Shabaab that the Kenyan youths should involve themselves to fight the government. This call is totally out of sight. Majority of the Kenyan Muslim youths are not well educated but that is not the cause to tell our youths they must stand up and fight the government of Kenya. How can they fight the government of Kenya by killing innocent people?

The correlation between radicalisation and recruitment into the Al-Shabaab ranks is most vivid among Kenyan Somalis, but equally cuts across the non-Somali Kenyan Muslims as well. The arrest of Elgiva Bwire Oliacha and his confession for being an Al-Shabaab operative in Kenya253 justifies the idea that the group has penetrated the non-Somali Kenyans who have converted into Islam. The secretive and formidable Al-Shabaabs radicalisation infrastructure has paid off in boosting its recruitment standings in Kenya with mosques having been widely identified as venues for the indoctrination process. The Jihad training sessions conducted by Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali at the Maratib Islamic Centres mosque in Pumwani (close to Eastleigh, Nairobi)
254

can be seen as a credible avenue through which the Al-Shabaab has successfully

radicalised and recruited new Kenyan followers. Even though controversy continued to engulf the Maratib Islamic centre following reports of radicalisation and subsequent disappearances of young Kenyan Muslims with links to the

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/Al-Shabab-Calls-on-Kenyan-Youths-to-Revolt--142645356.html (accessed on April 1, 2012) 252 Ibid 253 Clar Ni Chonghaile, Deadly attack on bus near Kenya's border with Somalia, The guardian, October 27, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/27/kenya-bus-attack-somalia-al-shabaab (accessed on February 27, 2012) 254 David McKenzie, Kenyan teens groomed to fight for Somali terrorists, CNN, February 22, 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/22/world/africa/kenya-somalia-terror/index.html (accessed on March 17,2012)

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centre, its administrations stand appeared to express unwavering endorsement to the centres alleged activities as well as the effects of radicalisation. On the prospects of these recruits killing Kenyan soldiers currently fighting in Somalia, Kilumi (the centres administrator) was blunt that the idea was okay with him. He further argued that: Like every other Muslim, I would like the Sharia law to be implemented and that is what they (Al-Shabaab) want to do in that part of Somalia. Muslims first, Kenyans second.255 But, the most significant development following these recruitments is the naming of Sheikh Ahmed Iman ( the person in charge of Al-Shabaab radicalisation programme in the Pumwani mosque) as Al-Shabaabs leader and coordinator in Kenya and is allegations that he commands a force of some 200500 fighters, most of whom are Kenyans.256 The Crisis Group further reports that Al-Shaaab radicalisers and recruiters have shifted their focus beyond the Somalia community in line with the groups regional agenda.
257

In

this new approach of expanding the Jihadist catchment area, Kenyan and Tanzanian coastal Muslims have increasingly become viable targets.258 The radicalisation and recruitment of this targeted group is necessitated by the reality that, Swahili members are easily able to evade security by posing as locals and counting on outdated profiling by the Kenyan security officers that all Al-Shabaab members are Somali looking.259 The growing speculation that some of these recruits or the Jihadi veterans might have come back to the coastal region260is equally catastrophic for it can only lead to more radicalisation. The discoveries following investigations into the 7/11 Kampala twin bombings underscore the need to visualise Muslim radicalisation beyond Kenya as a frontline state with

255 256

Ibid ICG, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization, Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 85, p 7, January 25, 2012 257 Ibid 258 Ibid 259 Ibid 260 Ibid

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Somalia and the revelation that the 7/11 bombings were carried out with the aid of local Ugandan citizens 261should be a proof to this worrisome reality. The suspects accused of masterminding the attacks of Kabalagala and Kyadondo Rugby Club in Uganda or the 7/11 as it is now commonly known is a demonstration of the determination of Al-Shabaab to penetrate and radicalise the entire EAC. The extremist group of four consisted of three Ugandans and one Rwandese.262 With the aid of the local radicalised group of EAC, Al-Shabaab under the reincarnated
263

Saleh Nabhan Brigade

were able to execute what it would have possibly not accomplished were it to entirely involve its Somali operatives without injecting outsiders into its system.

261

Herbert Ssempogo, Tanzania Flies in Bomb Suspect, The New Vision, July 01,2011, http://newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/759085 (accessed April 5, 2012) 262 Hartely, JTIC Country Briefing-Somalia, p 21 263 The reincarnation is in the sense that the actual Saleh Nabhan who was an Al-Qaeda member was neutralised by the US Special Forces in a military raid on September 14, 2009.

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4.5 Impacts of Al-Shabaabs instigated insecurity within the EAC

Case Summary Cases Valid N $Impactsa 82 Percent 80.4% N 20 Missing Percent 19.6% N 102 Total Percent 100.0%

[Table 4.5.1]

$Impacts Frequencies Responses N Insecurity impacts frequency of response

a

Percent 29.8%

Percent of Cases 81.7%

Fear of and exposure to terror attacks Negative effect on foreign investment and the economy Negative effect on tourism Diversion of State resources to fund military and security programmes instead of more pressing ones like health and education Influx of Refugees and infiltration of illegal arms into the EAC

67

64

28.4%

78.0%

56 14

24.9% 6.2%

68.3% 17.1%

24

10.7%

29.3%

Total

225

100.0%

274.4%

[Table 4.5.2]

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Table 4.5.2 highlights the main concerns of the EAC citizens with regards to how AlShabaab impacts on their daily lives. The main concern for the citizens was fear and exposure to terror attacks at 29.8%, this can be attributed to the direct impacts these attack have on the society. The least concern was diversion of state resources to fund military and security programmes aimed at curtailing extremism. This was cited by 6.2% of the respondents, possibly highlighting that issues perceived as pressing are actually never the governments priority, implying that the diversion of those resources onto security matters is viewed as an act more noble and a mechanism of accounting for the same. Other notable impacts of Al-Shabaab related insecurity are felt on the economy, particularly on foreign direct investment which is just picking up within the EAC. Notably, foreign investment and tourism (major EAC economic pillars) constituted a combined 53.3% of what the respondents considered their worst fears. 4.6 Perceptions of the EAC citizens regarding Operation Linda Nchi (OLN) and the integration of KDF into AMISOM Core to this research has been the way EAC citizens view Kenyas incursion of Somalia and the idea of integrating KDF into AMISOM.

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Do you think Kenya was justified to pursue the Al-Shabaab extremist group into Somalia?

Frequency Valid Yes No I am not sure Not applicable Total 80 14 6 2 102

Percent 78.4 13.7 5.9 2.0 100.0

Valid Percent 78.4 13.7 5.9 2.0 100.0

Cumulative Percent 78.4 92.2 98.0 100.0

[Table 4.6.1] According to Table 4.6.1, 78.4% of the respondents feel Kenya was justified to pursue AlShabaab as compared 13.7% who disagreed.

After three months of war against the Al-Shabaab (OLN), how would you rate your support for the operation?

Frequency Valid Very supportive Supportive Not supportive Not applicable Total 50 36 10 6 102

Percent 49.0 35.3 9.8 5.9 100.0

Valid Percent 49.0 35.3 9.8 5.9 100.0

Cumulative Percent 49.0 84.3 94.1 100.0

[Table 4.6.2] By the third month after the beginning of the offensive, 49% and 35.3% of the respondents were still very supportive and supportive respectively. This had a combined support percentage of 84.3, while those who were not supportive of the war stood at 9.8%. This trend shows how the population had become weary of the Al-Shabaab to the point that
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the cost of waging a war in a foreign land was largely considered irrelevant as long as the outcome would eventually derail the influence of Al-Shabaab.

Since the beginning of the offensive against the Al-Shabaab in Somalia, do you think Kenya and by extension East African Community has become safer?

Frequency Valid Yes No I am not sure Not applicable Total 38 51 11 2 102

Percent 37.3 50.0 10.8 2.0 100.0

Valid Percent 37.3 50.0 10.8 2.0 100.0

Cumulative Percent 37.3 87.3 98.0 100.0

[Table 4.6.3] After the incursion, one would have expected people supportive of the war to have something they can show for it, particularly some noticeable level of improvement of security. However, support for the incursion notwithstanding, the respondents equally acknowledge that Kenya and the rest of EAC are still not safe. In fact, 50% of the respondents compared to 37.3% felt the country and region was not safe.

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Do you support the proposal that the Kenya Defence Forces should join AMISOM in Somalia?

Frequency Valid Yes No I am not sure Not applicable Total 71 25 5 1 102

Percent 69.6 24.5 4.9 1.0 100.0

Valid Percent 69.6 24.5 4.9 1.0 100.0

Cumulative Percent 69.6 94.1 99.0 100.0

[Table 4.6.4] The proposal that KDF joins AMISOM was however received well by the respondents. Even though the percentage was not as overwhelming as one would have expected, 69.6% of the respondents felt it was a great idea, while 24.5% disagreed and hoped that Kenya should have continued the pursuit of Al-Shabaab independently irrespective of the odds. 4.9% were not sure whether that was a right decision or not. 4.7 Reasons for or against the integration of KDF into AMISOM

Case Summary Cases Valid N $AMISOMa [Table 4.7.1] 87 Percent 85.3% N 15 Missing Percent 14.7% N 102 Total Percent 100.0%

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$AMISOM Frequencies Responses N KDF and AMISOM union freq. of response

a

Percent 35.6%

Percent of Cases 66.7%

Increased strength due to an increase in the troop numbers Reduction in the financial strain on the Kenyan tax payer Provision of a good exit strategy for the Kenya Defence Forces Kenya Defence Forces and AMISOM have different mandates - there will be a conflict It will put Kenya in more danger as the country shares a border with Somalia Kenya defence forces will be forced to take orders from AMISOM commanders

58

41

25.2%

47.1%

26

16.0%

29.9%

17

10.4%

19.5%

13

8.0%

14.9%

4.9%

9.2%

Total [Table 4.7.2]

163

100.0%

187.4%

Table 4.7.1 and 4.7.2 highlights the factors considered by the respondents in their decision to support or not support the integration of KDF into AMISOM. Even though the financial implications of the war are unquestionable, once again, it is not the main concern for the respondents. 35.6% of the respondents in support of the integration perceive the

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integration as a means of a boosted affront against Al-Shabaab due to increased troop numbers. For the 10.4% (highest percentage) of the respondents who are against the integration, their main concern emerged as the different mandates under which AMISOM and KDF were engaged in Somalia. Initially, AMISOM was not fully on an offensive mission against Al-Shabaab, while the converse was true for KDF. Curiously, 4.9% of the respondents were simply against the integration by virtue of the fact that the KDF would possibly lose their command to AMISOM commanders from other countries. This perception can however be attributed to the notion that once command changes, focus would most likely shift and attention redirected to immaterial issues including leadership tussles. 4.8 Mitigation: Addressing Al-Shabaab threat in the context of the emerging regionalism In an attempt to answer this question, the author presents key actors in the Al-Shabaab mitigation agenda and seek to understand the respondents perception regarding the role these actors have so far played in their bid to neutralise the group. These actors include; the TFG, EAC partner states (aggrieved by the Al-Shabaab) and the international community. The responses were as follows:

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Do you think the Somalia Transitional federal Government is fully committed to the fight against the Al-Shabaab? Cumulative Frequency Valid Yes, the government is committed to the fight against the Al-Shabaab No, the government is not committed to the fight against the Al-Shabaab I don't know Total 22 102 21.6 100.0 21.6 100.0 100.0 46 45.1 45.1 78.4 34 Percent 33.3 Valid Percent 33.3 Percent 33.3

[Table 4.8.1] According to table 4.8.1, 45.1% of the respondents felt the TFG was not fully committed to the fight against Al-Shabaab, 33.3% were satisfied with what it was doing to curb the challenge. However, an equally high percentage of 21.6 did not know whether the TFG was committed to the fight against Al-Shabaab or not. It is probable that those who doubt the commitment of the government in the fight against Al-Shabaab were partly influenced by the statement the TFG president made at the beginning of the KDF offensive in Somalia which influenced the popular belief that his government was not happy with the decision. This may have easily been conceived as a quiet support for extremism or utter lack of zeal to fight the same. Either way, even prior to the inception of the offensive, the TFG had evidently displayed inefficiency and a lack of capacity to pursue Al-Shabaab beyond Mogadishu.

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Do you think the EAC partner states are doing enough in the fight against the Al-Shabaab? Cumulative Frequency Valid Yes No I don't know Total 30 55 17 102 Percent 29.4 53.9 16.7 100.0 Valid Percent 29.4 53.9 16.7 100.0 Percent 29.4 83.3 100.0

[Table 4.8.2] 53.9% of the respondents felt the EAC states were not doing enough in the fight against Al-Shabaab, this conception might have been advanced by the 7/11 Kampala bombings and a series of Al-Shabaab related terror attacks in Kenya (according to the Kenya police assertions as already discussed). Still, 29.4% of the respondents felt otherwise, while another 16.7% did not know whether enough was being done or not. It is logical that most security apparatus and operations remain the respective governments top secrets; consequently, it is expected and understandable that some security measures put into place by these states remain as mysterious. This dimension could explain why a great percentage of the respondents (53.9%) were unable to single out structures that the governments have put in place to bolster the fight against Al-Shabaab. However, it should also be noted that this level of ignorance is in complete disregard of the respondents levels of exposure, knowledge and understanding of the existing security gap and may as well be an indicator for the actual unpreparedness or lack of concrete plans (by the respective governments) to counter a group that is increasingly becoming more assertive.

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Is the International Community doing enough to help East African Community States in the fight against the Al-Shabaab terror group? Valid Frequency Valid Yes No I am not sure Total 23 70 9 102 Percent 22.5 68.6 8.8 100.0 Percent 22.5 68.6 8.8 100.0 Cumulative Percent 22.5 91.2 100.0

[Table 4.8.3]

The international community is normally held accountable for global security lapses and the situation in Somalia is no different. In spite of the low frequency of respondents stating No for the other actors, a whole 68.6% of the respondents sensed a lack of commitment on the part of the international community with regards to the fight against Al-Shabaab. 22.5% however felt otherwise, while a paltry 8.8 % were not sure. It is important to highlight the fact that this judgement overlooked the International Community funded and supported operations like AMISOM.

Would you advice the EAC States to find local, international solutions or a blend of local and international solutions to the Al-shabaab crisis?

Cumulative Frequency Valid Local solutions International solutions A hybrid of local and international solutions Total 102 100.0 100.0 13 5 84 Percent 12.7 4.9 82.4 Valid Percent 12.7 4.9 82.4 Percent 12.7 17.6 100.0

[Table 4.8.4

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Interventions in Somalia have not been exclusively productive since the fall of Siad Barre, a situation which has possibly contributed to the lacklustre attitude of the international community. Nevertheless, African countries cannot mitigate on their own, more particularly the EAC. According to table 4.8.4, the respondents clearly understand the complexity of Somalia situation which would probably explain the 82.4% preference for a dualistic approach that incorporates both local and international mitigation procedures. On the contrary, 12.7% of the respondents take a hard stance against either a dual or international approaches; they instead prefer the local approach irrespective of its challenges (mostly financial and military). Curiously, 4.9% of the respondents do not seem to subscribe to the local or dual approaches. They strictly prefer international solutions which underscores their lack of trust for locally crafted mechanisms or mere expressions of pessimism over the effectiveness of a blend of the two mitigation approaches.

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Case Summary Cases Valid N $Mitigationa [Table 4.8.5] 95 Percent 93.1% N 7 Missing Percent 6.9% N 102 Total Percent 100.0%

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$Mitigation Frequencies Responses N Solutions frequency of response

a

Percent 26.2%

Percent of Cases 61.1%

Fight against the AlShabaab should be a team work Work towards securing the local Somali population support and isolate the AlShabaab Creation of Juba-Land as a buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia and relocation of Refugees into Somalia Seek dialogue with the AlShabaab Push for an increament of the AMISOM troops Fight corruption among the Kenyan police and immigration officials Build the capacity of the TFG and build capacity for infrastructural development

58

27

12.2%

28.4%

21

9.5%

22.1%

23

10.4%

24.2%

35

15.8%

36.8%

24

10.9%

25.3%

33

14.9%

34.7%

Total [Table 4.8.6]

221

100.0%

232.6%

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Table 4.8.5 and 4.8.6; highlight some of the mitigation avenues that can be considered in light of the war against extremism. The creation of Jubaland264 was cited by 9.5% of the respondents while the highest percentage of 26.2 was attributed to the fight against AlShabaab as a team. The team in this case implied a concerted effort by all the EAC states without anyone of them being perceived as more active in the fight than the other. In fact, AlShabaabs prior warning to Uganda long before the attack of 7/11 was due to the presence of the Ugandan troops being part of AMISOM. Burundi, another EAC state member with its troops in AMISOM was also warned of an attack in the near future. Team work therefore implies spreading risk across the entire region which would in effect leave no EAC State appearing to be more friendly to Al-Shabaab or in a more realistic sense, would enhance the psychology of isolation (them against everyone else). Other than the suggestions from EAC citizens, key informants equally weighed in and sometimes prompting similar issues. Hon. Wandera, a member of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) for example, proposes ideas which underscore inclusivity in confronting Al-Shabaab. He argues that the regional states should form a joint security organ that monitors insecurity arising from the Al-Shabaab instigated anarchy in Somalia.265 Accordingly, he proposes the establishment of a special court, or a division within the East African Courts of Justice to be tasked with handling of cases of Trans-boundary terrorism.266 Hon. Mulongo, however feel that there is need to build institutions that would enable the Somali political system to keep on running independent of any individual leader. 267 He further notes that: Somalis should be left to bring a national reconciliatory plan that is

264

a buffer between Kenya and Somalia to hold back the Al-Shabaab and prevent them from entering Kenya

265 266

Interview with Hon. Wandera Ogalo, member of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), May 11, 2012 Ibid 267 Interview with Hon. Simon Mulongo, Vice Chairman Defense and Security Committee, Parliament of Uganda, May 11, 2012

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holistic and brings everlasting peace to Somalia without the interference of external forces.268 Hon. Ateenyi, on his part believes that the external players involved in Somalia affairs should consult with the indigenous population in an attempt to address the root causes of extremism. Further, he suggests that they (Somali people) should be willing to own and implement an action plan designed by them, and that which seek to reconcile the warring parties.269 Cole, on the other hand sees the need for a sustained effort to supress illegal activities carried out by extremist groups like Al-Shabaab. He cites coordinated development as a fundamental programme that would aim at restoring Somalia.270 According to Hon. Justice Gaswaga, including Somalia in regional plans and strategies pertaining to insecurity could be necessary in stemming the instability and extremism emanating from the country.271 This suggestion seems to be in tandem with the recent request by the Somalia TFG that the country be allowed to join the EAC. Dr. Kimani is equally in an agreement with this proposal arguing that: Allowing Somalia to join the EAC will help in mitigating activities of criminal cartels as there will be minimum rules and regulations to adhere to.272 Hon. Wandera however expresses caution for this move noting that there is no need for the EAC regional heads to rush into admitting Somalia into the fold, he opines that: Just like Sudan who pushed for admission and was denied on the premise of not having met certain benchmarks, the same fate should be extended to Somalia.273

268 269

Ibid Interview with Hon. Tinkasiimire Barnabas Ateenyi, Chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security, Parliament of Uganda, May 11, 2012. 270 Interview with Alan Cole, UNODC-CPP coordinator, February 7, 2012 271 Interview with Hon. Justice Duncan Gaswaga, Supreme Court of Seychelles, May 11, 2012 272 Interview with Dr. Kimani, Free-Lance Consultant, Conflict Resolution and Peace building in Eastern Africa, March 21, 2012 273 Interview with Hon. Wandera Ogalo, member of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), May 11, 2012

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4.9 CONCLUSION According to the findings of this research, there exists a nexus of the Somalia collapsed Statehood, emergence of the Al-Shabaab extremist group and the recent terrorist activities in the EAC. The research further reveals that a number of factors such as; the vast and porous KenyaSomalia border, inefficient policing and intelligence gathering by the Kenya security agencies, accommodative ethnic Somalia population, presence of a less secure Somali refugee camp in Kenya (Daadab camp), corruption in the Kenya police ranks, a large number of unemployed youth from the NEP and radicalisation of the youth through exposure to extremist Islamic teachings are some of the fundamental avenues through which Al-Shabaab has managed to infiltrate Kenya and the EAC region. The findings equally show that through its acts of terrorism, Al-Shabaab has inflicted fear of attacks among the EAC citizens; it has impacted negatively on the tourism sector and equally discouraged foreign direct investment. On the other hand, the meagre governments resources have unconditionally been channelled towards beefing up security at the expense of vital amenities such as education and healthcare. The research also reveals that the growing influence of Al-Shabaab has made Somalia more insecure and as such a large number of refugees have crossed into Kenya, making the situation in the Daadab camp even worse. This is also compounded by the increased challenge of infiltration of small arms into the country and possibly beyond. On the avenues for addressing Al-Shabaab menace in the context of emerging regionalism, the research established that the TFG, EAC and the international community have not done enough to uproot the group. It is also established that a blend of local and
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international mitigation approaches to the Al-Shabaab quagmire is most likely to succeed than a single pronged approach of either local or international mechanisms. With regards to the OLN, the research shows that most respondents consider that Kenya was indeed justified to pursue Al-Shabaab into Somalia. Even though Kenya, and probably the rest of the EAC have remained unsafe ever since the incursion, the research reveals that support for military intervention remained overwhelmingly high at the time of the research. Regarding the integration of KDF into AMISOM, the research shows that the public perception is in support of the idea rather than Kenya pursuing Al-Shabaab as a single entity which in turn denies it a realistic exit strategy, the goodwill of not being seen as an occupation force and the financial coverage of its expenses which have so far been at the behest of the Kenyan tax payer. The thesis also depicts a number of mitigation areas presented by the respondents as shown in table 4.8.6., while the key informants equally voiced their opinion on the modalities of stabilising Somalia in the context of an emerging regionalism (EAC).

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CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE AREA FOR RESEARCH 5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS A complete eradication of Al-Shabaab is not entirely possible in the foreseeable future, still, the EAC and the international community have not yet run out of options for limiting what is now becoming a wave of regional extremism. Realistically, the EAC, IGAD, or AU may not be able to implement a multi-pronged approach to counter the menace without full engagement of the international community. In this light, the author seeks to: i. Assesses some of the already floated ideas, but from an angle which has so far not been explored. ii. Propose new recommendations that would mitigate the Al-Shabaab menace.

Monetary contribution from the non-troop contributing African states Somalia is first an African problem before it extends to the global scale. In line with the advocacy for African solutions to African problems, the African States which are not contributing troops to AMISOM should make their input in terms of monetary contributions to help expedite the work that is being done in Somalia. Even though the international community has the financial muscle that African countries do not have, the authors take is that the AU and other regional organizations must be seen to be in control of the developments in the country. Somalias politics require latent international intervention as opposed to the previous hastily considered military option that did not involve any political endorsements by the Somali people.
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Anti-Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation campaigns Al-Shabaab has been able to thrive in Somalia and other EAC states as a consequence of its strong radicalisation efforts, but most importantly the existence of avenues which make radicalisation even more plausible. Young Muslim converts, notably from Kenya and Uganda have found radicalisation and a possible entry into the Al-Shabaab ranks more appealing as it is a path to recognition and manifestation of self-worth. This call for the EAC to rethink their strategy on social welfare for the youth as continued isolation only predisposes them these outfits as the only appealing and viable options. Creation for opportunities for the youth especially from the Somali and Muslim dominated regions is a consequential effort in discouraging radicalisation. The EAC states with Somali speaking population should sensitise their populations against blanket condemnation and profiling of the Somalia populations which might lead to xenophobic fears and fan radicalisation. This, the governments can do through public debates which are either state or NGO sponsored. Engagement of the Somali and Muslim populations in a sense that there is a mutual relationship would enhance free communication, facilitate trust and most importantly foster a collective sense of ownership of the country and security for all. Engagement between the State and the Muslim clerics in assessing the content of madrassa teachings, though this may be politicised, if handled carefully can give the governments an upper hand in understanding the religious teachings administered to the younger generation. If the government of Kenya had this kind of oversight, the experience at Pumwani Youth centre which is blamed for radicalisation of teenagers would have probably been avoided.

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Chinas interests in the EAC cannot be secured in an Al-Shabaab infested environment. However, the country has uniquely remained insensitive to this challenge even as it poses threats to the entire region and her business interests. The EAC governments must use this leverage (Chinese business interests in the region) to prevail upon China and possibly compel her leadership to fund Anti and De-Radicalisation programmes. The idea here is to have a concerted effort in the fight against Al-Shabaab and extremism in general. Teaching of Somali and Arabic languages to the military and intelligence agencies A Somali willing to volunteer intelligence regarding a possible attack may fail to do so because of language barrier. Even though, KDF possibly has a Somali speaking contingent, the rest of AMISOM troops, other than those from Djibouti are incapacitated in this line. In the wake of an escalation of acts of terror in the region, the EAC governments must prioritise administering basic Arabic and Somali languages to certain intelligence and military personnel as this is a crucial component for intelligence gathering. Establishment of an EAC counter terrorism agency As the EAC states integrate to form a common front on economic issues, so should be on the threats to those interests. The cross border movement of the Al-Shabaab extremists that culminated into the 7/11 bombing would have possibly been thwarted had there existed a strong counter terrorism agency that has the leeway to operate across the EAC. A common agency would also avoid the bureaucratic hurdles that may hamper terror related investigations or instigating and implementing a swift operation aimed at curtailing AlShabaab activities.

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Engagement of Al-Shabaab in peace talks The non-negotiation stance taken against the Somalia extremist group is both myopic and counterproductive. Myopic in the sense that one becomes an Al-Shabaab convert through a radicalisation process, if the campaign to de-radicalise the group is to be taken seriously, then direct engagement in a negotiation forum is mandatory. Counterproductive as the approach of non-negotiation only seek to reinforce strict adherence to the ideology as there are limited exit options. Whereas Islamic fundamentalism is an essential component of the Al-Shabaabs ideology, settlement through dialogue is still possible within some ranks of its membership. This recommendation is informed based on the past incidences of Al-Shabaab defections to the TFGs side.274 Substantial defections are plausible as the military approach continue to inflict heavy casualties on Al-Shabaab, but most importantly, sustained stifling of revenue and logistical support avenues guarantees the outfit minimal chances of existence as it is. The extension of an olive branch at this point is therefore critical in winning the trust even if it is just for a section of the group. Recognition of Somaliland Balkanisation of Africa has not borne any significant peace and the Sudan sister states attests to this. However, as already noted by this author, Somalias unique situation is aggravated by its complex clan-based political alignment. Somaliland has so far managed to evade the storm and established herself as a model of an emerging African democracy. This progress withstanding, Somaliland is yet to be internationally recognised. According to Prof Anderson, the laxity to recognise Somaliland has been due to IGADs argument against a

274

Leila Aden, More Al-Shabaab fighters surrender to TFG, Somalia Report, January 15, 2012, http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2538 (accessed on April 1,2012)

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multiple Somalia solution.275 The authors recommendation is that Somalilands socioeconomic and political development as well as the ability to grow strong institutions stands a greater chance of success without the greater Somalia quagmire hovering over her head. The three greater components of Somalia that is: Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia have Al-Shabaab as a common challenge with South-Central being mostly affected, therefore, the idea of not recognising Somaliland is unfounded especially when it is based on the precinct that it would infuriate the Al-Shabaab and warrant retribution attacks. The Azenia Buffer The Azenia buffer (Jubaland project) is a plan that has been in the offing for slightly over two years. Kenyas interest in this project is to create a buffer between the country and the Al-Shabaab controlled region. According to the ICG, Kenya has so far trained 2,500

militiamen and established an administrative structure headed by Mohamed Abdi Mohamed Gandhi, a former TFG defence minister.276 The emergence of Ahmed Madobe of the Ras Kamboni brigade (fighting along the KDF forces) as a more effective force in comparison to that headed by Gadhi has consequently divided the Kenyan government.277The ICG reports that whereas Madobe is backed by many Kenyan-Somali army officers; Gandhi is reportedly closer to Kenyan intelligence bodies and politicians such as Defence Minister Mohamed Yusuf haji.278The popularity of Madobe among the Kenyan-Somali army officers can be attributed to the effectiveness manifested by the Ras Kamboni brigade under his leadership. Indeed, this effort greatly impacted on the KDF offensive against Al-Shabaab. Gandhis backing by the political elite may be attributed to a foreseeable non -confrontational approach that may come with his leadership. The author argues that Kenya would not wish to
275

Al Shabaab and Kenya's Somali invasion hjemmesidefilm, January 30, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=9B-AvoLNbvc#! (accessed on February 2, 2012) 276 The Kenya Military Intervention in Somalia, Crisis group Africa report No 184, P 2, February 15, 2012 277 Ibid 278 Ibid

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have independent leadership in the Azenia region, the weakness or non-effectiveness of the Gandhi led militia ( despite a formal training) is proof of his weak leadership credentials which makes him the best bet for the leadership of Azenia as he may be easily manipulated by the Kenyan regime. According to this author, effective and friendly Azenia would make Kenya less susceptible to the regular Al-Shabaab infiltration across the borders, and whereas that is possibly true, it does not eliminate the Al-Shabaab pockets in Kenya. Still, Kenya and Ethiopia must work together on this endeavour. It is notable that the region is largely inhabited by members of the Ogaden clan, the same community which is at the core of the contentious Ogaden region of Ethiopia. To empower the Ogaden community in Azenia translates into empowering those in Ethiopia, a development which Ethiopia cannot entertain. Despite the complexities surrounding the establishment of this administration, a political settlement involving the TFG, Ethiopia, Kenya and the actors in the region can be arrived at if the focus on defeating Al-Shabaab is sustained and overrides other sideshows. Halting Oil exploration in Puntland The destruction of Somalia was orchestrated by inter clan feuds among other factors, but these connotations still dominate the larger Somalia political discourse and has remained the focus of the instability. Exploration of oil in the shaky Puntland279, under these circumstances is the least of any wise economic undertakings that could be considered in this region at this time. The possibility of these projects being viewed as part of the western hegemonic dominance over weaker states is high and would not auger well with the militarised population.

279

Mark Townsend and Tariq Abdinasir, Britain leads dash to explore for oil in war -torn Somalia, The Guardian, February 25, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/25/britain-oil-dash-somalia (accessed on April 3, 2012)

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Puntland may superficially appear as a fairly stable semi-autonomous region of Somalia, but the recent revelations by the Somalia Prime Minister that Al-Shabaab top brass were fleeing to Puntland280 as the offensive by the Burundi, Uganda and Kenyan military forces intensified is indicative of what a safe haven Puntland is to the extremist group. Accordingly, this author, posits that any part of Somalia is not ready for a major complex economic activity, more particularly, oil related. Even in the event that it succeeds, it will shift the focus from stabilising Somalia to harvesting its resources, an act that would most likely trigger a violent reaction considering the negative perception the local population has towards Western States. This would only embolden Al-Shabaab and other like-minded extremists groups. Containment of the Yemeni situation Yemen has been directly or indirectly linked to the Al-Shabaab staged instability in Somalia. The proximity of Yemen and Somalia ports makes it both a destination for the fleeing Somalia refugees as well as the Al-Shabaab. However, to Al-Shabaab, Yemen is a conducive environment due to her instability and the existing structures of the AQAP as this author had already accounted for. According to the UNHCR January 2011, draft report, there were a total of 180,341 Somali refugees living in Yemen between 2008 and 2010.281 The plethora of factors such as; political instability in Yemen, thriving AQAP structures and the arrival of Al-Shabaab fleeing Somalia282, as well as extreme conditions that refugees are exposed to not only create an ideal environment for possible radicalisation, but also

280

ABDI GULED, AP Interview: Somalia's prime minister says al-Shabab leaders, fighters are fleeing north, Associated Press, April 11, 2012, http://www.therepublic.com/view/story/92adf32650bf4bb28a7590f75ae0dca3/AF--Somalia-PrimeMinister/ (accessed on April 13, 2012) 281 Somali Refugees in the Region,UNHCR, January 18, 2011 282 Joint terrorism Task Force, Somalia: 500 Al-Qaeda Linked Al-Shabab Militants Flee to Yemen, Maryland Coordination and Analysis centre, February 19, 2012, http://www.mcac.maryland.gov/newsroom/TerrorismNews/20120219_Somalia_500_AlQaeda_Linked_AlShabab_Militants _Flee_to_Yemen (accessed on April 17, 2012)

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provides the necessary incentives for further training and regrouping of the fleeing AlShabaab. The author consequently recommends that the international community makes a careful assessment of the Yemen political situation and take great caution by focusing on stabilisation of the country. If allowed to re-group, Al-Shabaab in Yemen would not only return to haunt the EAC, but also the Horn of Africa and Middle Eastern regions.

5.2 FUTURE AREA FOR RESEARCH This research has established the loopholes exploited by Al-Shabaab to infiltrate the EAC, thus impacting negatively on foreign direct investments and hence the economy. Accordingly, the author proposes future research on the viability of the ambitious LAPSSET project in the event that Al-Shabaab and, or extremism is not fully eradicated from Somalia and the situation remains fluid.

5.3 CONCLUSION The fight against Al-Shabaab requires a multi-pronged approach which incorporates military intervention as a stop gap measure, but also a political dimension as a long term solution. Even though extremist groups have risen and fallen in Somalia, a complete eradication has not been forthcoming which explains the resurrection of extremist outfits under different titles, but with the same theme. To curb an ideologically propagated extremism from an outfit with direct links to known terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda, there is need for more than a localised approach. Squashing Al-Shabaab militarily is therefore a quick fix to the problem, but extremism

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would soon re-emerge from another group exhibiting Al-Shabaab tendencies, and probably with Al-Shabaab leadership. A concerted campaign which targets every avenue of Al-Shabaabs lifeline and any other future extremist group must seek to dismantle both local and external infrastructures that aid the groups activities. This effort must however be as inclusive as possible. The EAC through its member states must seek to consolidate their partnership on the internal security concerns, particularly those emanating from terrorism and extremism through a universal approach that includes sharing of intelligence.

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APENDIX

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APENDIX A:

ACRONYMS

AIAI AMISOM AQAP AQI AU CIA EAC ENDF EU ICU IGAD

AL ITIHAD AL ISLAMI AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA AL-QAEDA IN THE ARAB PENINSULA AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ AFRICAN UNION CENTRAL ITELLIGENCE AGENCIES EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY ETHIOPIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES EUROPEAN UNION ISLAMIC COURTS UNION INTER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY AND DEVELOPMENT

KDF MSF NEP OCHA

KENYA DEFENSE FORCES MEDICINS SANS FRONTIERS NORTH EASTERN PROVINCE OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

OLN TFG TFIs UNHCR

OPERATION LINDA NCHI TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES

UNITAF UNOSOM UNSC

UNITED TASK FORCE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
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APENDIX B:

CODE BOOK

PERSONAL INFORMATION V1. Gender of the respondent //1.00= Male// 2.00= Female// V2. Origin of the respondent //1.00= Kenyan of Somali background // 2.00= Somali living in Kenya// //3.00=Kenyan of non-Somali background////4.00= Ugandan // //5.00= Tanzanian// V3. Location of the respondent //1.00= Dar es Salaam, Tanzania //2.00= Kampala, Uganda //3.00= Kisii, Kenya //4.00= Kisumu, Kenya// 5.00= Migori, Kenya //6.00= Mombasa, Kenya //7.00= Nairobi, Kenya //8.00= Nakuru, Kenya// V4. The profession of the respondent //1.00 = "Banker/ HR/Accountant/Marketer" 2.00 = "Business person"// //3.00 = "Engineer/IT" 4.00 = "Teacher"// //5.00 = "Prison officer/Police officer/ Military personnel"// // 6.00 = "Health Practitioner"// //7.00 = "Lawyer" 8.00 = "Customer service/Public relations" 9.00 = "Other"//

RQ1. What is the nexus between Somalia collapsed statehood, emergence of the Al-Shabaab extremist group and the recent terrorist activities in the EAC?

V5. Is Somalia a Collapsed State? //1.00= Yes// 2= No// 3.00= I dont know// V6. In your opinion, does collapsed Statehood of Somalia encourage the influence of extremist groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia? //1.00= Yes// 2.00=No// 3.00= I dont know// 99.00= Not applicable//
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V7. Does the security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Somalia spill over to Kenya? //1.00= Yes// 2.00= No// 3.00= I dont know// V8. Does the Security threat posed by the Al-Shabaab in Kenya spill over to the rest of the EAC States? //1.00= Yes// 2.00= No// 3.00= I dont know// V9. Do you think a complete eradication of the Al-Shabaab from Somalia would restore a lasting peace and stability? //1.00= Yes// 2.00= No// 3.00= I am not sure// RQ2. What factors have made it feasible for Al-Shabaab extremists to thrive in Kenya and possibly other East African Community States? V10. Do you agree with the Kenyan Assistant Minister for internal security that ''AlShabaab is like a snake whose tail is in Somalia, but head in the Nairobis Eastleigh?'' //1.00= Yes// 2.00= No// 3.00= I am not sure// V11. Vast and porous Kenya-Somalia border //1.00= Ticked// 2.00= Not ticked// 99= Not applicable// V12. Inefficient policing and intelligence gathering by the Kenya security agencies //1.00= Ticked// 2.00= Not ticked// 99= Not applicable// V13. Accommodative ethnic Somali population in Kenya //1.00= Ticked// 2.00= Not ticked// 99= Not applicable// V14. Presence of less secure Somali refugee camps in Kenya //1.00= Ticked// 2.00= Not ticked// 99= Not applicable// V15. Corrupt Kenya Police //1.00= Ticked// 2.00= Not ticked// 99= Not applicable//
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V16. A large number of unemployed youth from the North Eastern Province (largely dominated by the Kenyan-Somali citizen) //1.00= Ticked// 2.00= Not ticked// 99= Not applicable// V17. Radicalization of the youth through exposure to extremist Islamic teachings // 1.00= Ticked// 2.00= Not ticked// 99= Not applicable//

RQ3. What are the impacts of the activities of the Al-Shabaab extremist group on the Socio-Economic fronts of Kenya and the rest of the EAC states? Impacts of the Al-Shabaab insecurity spill over to the rest of the EAC states V18. Fear of and exposure to terror attacks //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// 99.00= Not applicable// V19. Negative effects on foreign investment/ economy //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// 99.00= Not applicable// V20. Negative effect on tourism //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// 99.00= Not applicable// V21. Diversion of state resources to fund military and security programmes instead of crucial ones like health and education. //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// 99.00= Not applicable// V22. Influx of refugees and infiltration of small arms into the EAC //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// 99.00= Not applicable// RQ4. What is the general perception of the public (EAC citizens) with regards Operation Linda Nchi military campaign in Somalia? V23. Are you aware that the Kenya Defence Forces are fighting Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia? //1.00= Yes// 2.00= No//

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V24. Do you think Kenya was justified to pursue the Al-Shabaab extremist group into Somalia? //1.00= Yes// 2.00= No// 3.00= Am not sure// 99.00= Not applicable// V25. After three months of war against the Al-Shabaab (Operation Linda Nchi), how would you rate your support for the operation? //1.0 = "Very supportive" // 2.00 = "Supportive"// //3.0 = "Not supportive" // 99.00 = "Not applicable"// V26. Since the beginning of the offensive against the Al-Shabaab in Somalia, do you think Kenya and by extension East African Community has become safer? //1.00= Yes// 2.00= No// 3.00= Am not sure// 99.00= Not applicable// Reasons for or against the proposed integration of KDF into AMISOM V27. Do you support the proposal that the Kenya Defence Forces should join AMISOM in Somalia? //1.00= Yes// 2.00= No// 3.00= Am not sure//99.00= Not applicable// V28. Increase in strength due to an increase in the troop numbers //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// V29. It would reduce the financial strain on the Kenyan tax payer //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// V30. Provides Kenya with a good exit strategy // 1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// V31. KDF and AMISOM have different mandates, there will be a conflict //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// V32. It will put Kenya in more danger as Kenya shares a border with Somalia //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned//

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V33. KDF will be forced to take orders from other AMISOM commanders //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// RQ5. How can the Al-Shabaab threat be addressed in the context of emerging Regionalism (East African Community)? V34. Do you think the Somalia Transitional federal Government is fully committed to the fight against the Al-Shabaab? //1.00 = "Yes, the government is committed to the fight against the Al-Shabaab"// //2.00 = "No, the government is not committed to the fight against the Al-Shabaab"// //3.00 = "I don't know"// V35. Do you think the EAC partner states are doing enough in the fight against the Al-Shabaab? //1.00= Yes// 2.00= No// 3.00= I dont know// V36. Is the International Community doing enough to help EAC States in the fight against the Al-Shabaab extremist group? //1.00= Yes// 2.00= No// 3.00= I am not sure// V37. Would you advice the EAC States to find local, international, or a blend of local, and international solutions to the Al-shabaab crisis? //1.00 = "Local solutions" //2.00 = "International solutions"// //3.00 = "A hybrid of local and international solutions"// Proposed Solutions to the East African Community States for the fight against AlShabaab? V38. They should fight the Al-Shabaab as a team // 1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// 99.00= Not applicable//

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V39. Work towards seeking the local Somali population support and isolate the Al-Shabaab //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// 99.00= Not applicable//

V40. They should agree on the creation of Jubaland as a buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// 99.00= Not applicable// V41. Seek dialogue with the Al-Shabaab //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// 99.00= Not applicable// V42. Push the UN to increase the number of AMISOM troops //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// 99.00= Not applicable// V43. Fight corruption among the police and immigration officials in Kenya //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// 99.00= Not applicable// V44. Build capacity of the TFG and allocate resources for infrastructural development //1.00= Mentioned//2.00= Not mentioned// 99.00= Not applicable//

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APENDIX C: Al-Shabaab

DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (more commonly known as Al-Shabaab) is a Somali militant Islamist group. It has documented links with the Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, and was formally recognised by the Al-Qaeda central in February 2012. Al Itihad al Islami (AIAI) AIAI was an armed Islamist movement and an early prototype of Islamic radicalisation and extremism in Somalia. Its sphere of influence stretched beyond Somalia into neighbouring countries like Kenya. Al-Qaeda Central Al-Qaeda is a global Jihadi organisation whose founder is the late Osama Bin Laden. It has been linked to the 9/11 World Trade Centre terror attack and the August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Kenyan-Somali Kenyan-Somalis are mostly inhabitants of the North Eastern Province of Kenya, a region which is at the centre of the centre of the idea of greater Somalia. They are an ethnic Somali population and are known for their business acumen in the District of Eastleigh, Nairobi. LAPSSET Project The Lamu Port - South Sudan Ethiopia Transport corridor (LAPSSET) is set to be Africas largest infrastructural undertaking. It is to begin in Lamu and will traverse through the NorthEastern part of Kenya and connect Southern Sudan and Ethiopia among other neighbours.

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Ogaden Ogaden is a region under historical dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. Just like the North Eastern Province of Kenya, Ogaden has the Somali speaking population. Pan Somalism Also known as Soomaliywen was a conception that sought to integrate all the Somali speaking people into one Somali nation, otherwise known as Greater Somalia. Historical wars between Somalia and Ethiopia or her Shifta war with Kenya can be traced back to this philosophy.

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APENDIX D:

LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS

Name

Designation and relevant experience

Alan Cole

United Nations Office on Drugs and CrimeCounter Piracy Programme Coordinator, Eastern Africa

Dr. Kimani M.J.

Freelance Consultant, conflict Resolution and Peace building in East Africa

Elizabeth Bakibinga-Gaswaga

Legal Officer, UN Dept. of peace keeping operations and VP of the Commonwealth Association of Legistiave Counsel conversant with the geo-politics of the Horn of Africa and EAC.

Hon. Justice Duncan Gaswaga

Head of Criminal Division, Supreme court of Seychelles. Justice Gaswaga presides over maritime piracy cases, predominantly involving accused from Somalia.

Hon. Simon Mulongo

Member of Parliament, Vice Chairman Defense and Security Committee, Parliament of Uganda

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Hon. Tinkasiimire Barnabas Ateenyi

Member of Parliament, Chairman Defense and Security Committee, Parliament of Uganda

Hon. Wandera Ogalo

Member of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA)

Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda

A Lieutenant Colonel in the Uganda People's Defence Force, currently the Spokesperson of AMISOM.

Mary Harper

BBC Africa Editor and Author of Getting Somalia wrong? Faith, War, and hope in a shattered State.

Mohammed Abdi Washala

Peace Researcher and Chairman of the Kenya Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Taita/Taveta County

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APENDIX E:

MAP OF SOMALIA

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APENDIX F:

MAP OF THE EAST AFRICAN STATES

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APENDIX G:

LAPSSET PROJECT

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DECLARATION I, KAWEGAH JNR. POPE PAUL do declare that the work presented here is my own. Any part of this work which has been obtained from other authors has been duly acknowledged. I also declare that this work has never been presented anywhere for the award of any degree.

KAWEGAH JNR. P. PAUL MAY 11, 2012

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