Fine Analysis of Objects of Cognition: Gelug and Non-Gelug Presentations in Alternating Order

1 Basic Distinctions among Cognitive Objects

Historical Introduction
The Buddhist teachings on cognition theory and logic derive from the works of the late fifth-century Indian master Dignaga and of Dharmakirti, the late-sixth century disciple of his disciple. Dignaga wrote An Anthology on Valid Cognition (Tshad-ma kun-btus, Skt. Pramanasamuccaya); Dharmakirti defended it against non-Buddhist Indian theories in his Commentary on Valid Cognition (Tshad-ma rnam-grel, Skt: Pramanavarttika). The various Indian schools of Buddhist tenets (grub-mtha) differ slightly in their explanations of cognition. Dignaga is the source of the Sautrantika position. Dharmakirti presented mostly the Sautrantika view, but frequently supplemented it with the Chittamatra explanation. Some later masters interpreted Dharmakirti in the light of Madhyamaka. The Tibetan traditions take the Sautrantika explanation as a basis and then refine it with the explanations of the more sophisticated tenet systems. Accordingly, we shall look here at some points regarding the Sautrantika system of cognition and supplement them with explanations from other systems when they significantly differ. At first, the Tibetans emphasized study of Dignagas works alone, under the influence of Atisha, the early eleventh-century Indian master from whom the Kadam tradition derives. In the late eleventh-century, the Kadam master Ngog Lotsawa (rNgogs Lotsa-ba Blo-ldan shes-rab) shifted the emphasis to the works of Dharmakirti, thus establishing the new epistemology system (tshad-ma gsar-ma). The thirteenth-century Kadam master Chapa (Phyva-pa Chos-kyi seng-ge), the founder of the Tibetan style of debate and the study of collected topics (bsdus-grwa, "dura"), elaborated on the new system. His interpretations are known as the Chapa-tradition (phyva-lugs). Chapas contemporary, the Sakya master Sakya Pandita (Sa-skya Pandi-ta), refuted many of Chapas interpretations of Dharmakirti, based on his study of Sanskrit and of the works of Dharmakirti in their original language, with the Indian master Shakya Shribhadra. His interpretations form the Sapan-tradition (sa-lugs). Although all four Tibetan traditions claim as their authority Sakya Panditas commentaries on cognition theory, the Gelug school follows more closely Chapas interpretations. The Nyingma and Kagyu schools follow closely the mainstream Sakya explanation of Sapans works. Therefore, we may roughly divide the Tibetan explanations of cognition theory into the Gelug and the non-Gelug presentations. Further, various Tibetan masters also explain differently many assertions of each of

the four Indian schools of tenets. Their explanations also fall broadly into the two divisions: Gelug and non-Gelug. Neither Gelug nor non-Gelug, however, presents a uniform explanation of cognition theory. Several masters within each camp have explained specific points slightly differently in their commentaries. Here, as a foundation for more advanced study, we shall present an overview of the two general positions regarding the main points. For each point, we shall present the assertions shared in common and then the two positions in an alternating fashion. We shall use the explanations given primarily by the late eighteenth-century master Akya Yongdzin (A-kya Yongs-dzin dByangs-can dga-bai blo-gros) to represent the Gelug position. This explanation accords with the monastic textbook (yig-cha) tradition of the sixteenth-century master Jetsun Chokyigyeltsen (rJe-btsun Chos-kyi rgyal-mtshan), followed by Sera Jey (Se-ra Byes) and Ganden Jangtsey (dGa-ldan Byang-rtse) Monasteries. To represent the non-Gelug position, we shall rely primarily on the explanations given by the fifteenth-century Sakya master Gorampa (Go-ram bSod-nams seng-ge).

Cognitive Objects and Sensibilia

Cognitions (shes-pa) have numerous cognitive objects (yul) objects known in some cognitive manner. Among them are sensibilia and commonsense objects. Sensibilia are the forms of physical phenomena (gzugs) that, in one moment, occupy an extended location (yul), and which are cognized by a sensory consciousness. As objects well known in the philosophical treatises (bstan-bcos-la grags-pa), sensibilia are thus the smallest spatial units of physical phenomena that are perceptible by the senses in one moment. Each "patch" of sensibilia occupies an extended location in the sense that it spatially extends over a collection of "molecules" (dus-pai rdul-phran) specific to its class of cognitive stimulator (skye-mched). Molecules, in turn, are aggregations of substantial particles (rdzas-kyi rdul-phran). There are four classes of sensibilia:

sights (patches of colored shapes), smells, tastes, tactile or physical sensations.

Since sounds do not have spatial extension over a collection of molecules of similar class (rigs-mthun), sounds are not included as sensibilia.

Commonsense Objects and Conventional Objects of Experience

What is a commonsense orange? Is it a sight that we see, a fragrance that we smell, a flavor that we taste, or a tactile sensation that we feel when we hold one in our hands?

As an object well known in the world (jig-rten-la grags-pa), a commonsense orange is an item that extends over the locations of all four classes of sensibilia. Moreover, although, as a nonstatic (mi-rtag-pa, impermanent) object, an orange changes from moment to moment, a commonsense orange does not exist for just an instant: it endures over time. Commonsense objects are equivalent to conventional objects of experience (thasnyad spyod-yul) objects of ordinary experience to which the conventions of words or concepts (rtog-pa) refer. Thus, commonsense objects have conventional identities (rang-gi ngo-bo dzin-pa) in that they are distinguishable from each other, such as a specific item being an orange and not a table. Since certain items, such as a liquid, may be experienced as water by humans, pus by clutching ghosts (hungry ghosts), and nectar by divine beings (gods), the qualification needs to be added that commonsense objects have conventional identities established as valid only in relation to certain groups of beings.

Knowable Phenomena and Comprehensible Objects

Knowable phenomena (shes-bya), also called comprehensible objects (gzhal-bya), are cognitive objects that can be known by valid cognition (tshad-ma). They include all existent objects or phenomena. More specifically, knowable phenomena include

objective entities (rang-mtshan, specifically characterized phenomena), metaphysical entities (spyi-mtshan, generally characterized phenomena).

Objective Entities and Metaphysical Entities General Characteristics

In the Sautrantika system, objective entities are truly existent (bden-par grub-pa, real). In this system of tenets, truly existent means knowable to valid nonconceptual cognition (rtog-med). Note that

sensory cognition (dbang-shes) is always nonconceptual; mental cognition (yid-shes) may be either nonconceptual or conceptual (rtogbcas); conceptual cognition is always mental.

Nonconceptual cognition may also be bare cognition of reflexive awareness (rang-rig mngon-sum) and yogic bare cognition (rnal-byor mngon-sum).

Reflexive awareness (rang-rig, self-awareness) accompanies each moment of cognition and takes the cognition that it accompanies as its object, allowing later recollection (dran-shes) of it. Yogic bare cognition is of subtle impermanence or of an individual beings lack of existing with an impossible identity (gang-zag-gi bdag-med, identitylessness of a person, selflessness of a person).

For the sake of simplicity, we shall restrict our discussion of nonconceptual cognition here to only its sensory form. Thus, objective entities can be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or physically sensed. Metaphysical entities are falsely existent (rdzun-par grub-pa, unreal), which means imputedly existent (rtog-pas btags-tsam-gyis grub-pa). In the Sautrantika system, imputedly existent means knowable to the valid conceptual cognition that imputes them on the basis of objective entities. They cannot be known by nonconceptual cognition. In other words, metaphysical entities cannot actually be seen or heard; they can only be thought or imagined. Thus, although metaphysical entities exist, they are not as "real" as objective entities are. Gelug Objective entities are truly existent because they are explicitly apprehensible (dngossu rtogs-pa) by nonconceptual cognition in other words, a mental aspect (rnam-pa) resembling them can appear in a nonconceptual cognition of them. The mental aspect that appears is simply a reflection of the object and of what it is.

This means that objective entities can be cognized without mental construction meaning without adding anything to the object beyond its being the sum of its parts and its holding its own essential nature as a "this" and not a "that" (rang-gi ngo-bo dzin-pa). The qualifier explicitly needs to be added because metaphysical entities can be implicitly apprehended (shugs-su rtogs-pa) by nonconceptual cognition.

Metaphysical entities are imputedly existent because they are explicitly apprehensible only to valid conceptual cognition. Explicit and implicit apprehension of an object will be explained in more detail below. Non-Gelug Truly existent objects are knowable only to valid nonconceptual cognition. Imputedly existent objects are knowable only to valid conceptual cognition.

Objective and Metaphysical Entities Specific Presentation

Gelug

Objective entities include all nonstatic phenomena namely, those phenomena that are capable of performing a function (don-byed nus-pa). Nonstatic phenomena include:

forms of physical phenomena (gzugs), ways of being aware of something (shes-pa), nonconcomitant affecting variables (ldan-min du-byed, nonassociated compositional factors), such as impermanence. Impermanence is the nonendurance of an item for a second moment.

Here, we shall deal primarily with forms of physical phenomena. They include:

commonsense objects, such as oranges and tables, their conventional identities as "this" and not "that," the sensibilia that comprise commonsense objects, the molecules and moments over which the commonsense objects and their sensibilia extend, the moments over which commonsense sounds extend.

Dharmakirti specified objective entities as those phenomena that are determinate (nges-pa) or unmixed (ma-dres-pa) in terms of spatial location (yul), temporal location (dus), and essential nature as an individual (ngo-bo).

Spatially determinate means that the western portion of an object does not exist in the east. Temporally determinate means that something that exists in the morning has a definite end, for instance when it ceases to exist in the evening. Being individual by essential nature means that something is distinguishable from other objects. Thus, being unmixed means being not mixed up with or indistinguishable from something else.

Since these three criteria can apply both to nonstatic and static (rtag-pa, permanent) phenomena, they cannot be intended as a strict definition of objective entities. Dharmakirti used them only as criteria for refuting the non-Buddhist Nyaya view of universals as indivisible entities inhering equally in all their instances. Metaphysical entities include all static phenomena phenomena that do not change from moment to moment namely, those phenomena that are incapable of performing functions. Static phenomena include:

the universals orange and table, of which all individual oranges and tables are instances, the absence of a vase imputed on a bare tabletop.

Non-Gelug Objective entities are specifically characterized phenomena. They include all individual items (bye-brag). Individual items, as Dharmakirti defined them, are those phenomena that are determinate or unmixed in terms of spatial location, temporal location, and essential nature as an individual.

Spatial location means situated in a specific perceptible unit of spatial location. Temporal location means situated in a specific unit (a moment) of temporal location. Being individual by essential nature means that the items do not require mental construction from the synthesis of other items, such as spatial units of different sensibilia, temporal parts, or other individual items resembling them. Thus, being unmixed means not being mentally constructed from the synthesis of other items.

Individual items include all nonstatic phenomena:

moments of forms of physical phenomena namely, moments of sensibilia and of sound, moments of ways of being aware of something, moments of nonconcomitant affecting variables, such as impermanence.

Here, we shall deal primarily with forms of physical phenomena. In this category, individual items, then, refer only to:

moments of collections of perceptible units of specific types of sensibilia, such as a collection of patches of colored shapes comprising a sight, moments of the collections of molecules over which specific types of sensibilia extend, moments of sounds.

These are the only things that we actually see, hear, smell, taste, or physically sense. Metaphysical entities are generally characterized phenomena. They include all universals (spyi).

Universals are those phenomena that are shared (thun-mong-ba) by other phenomena: they "go together" (rjes-gro) with them. They do not have determinate spatial locations, temporal locations, or essential natures as individual items. They are not simply collections of individual items. Universals are mentally (conceptually) constructed (spros-pa, fabricated) by a synthesis of individual items that are instances of them, or by a synthesis of the spatial, sensorial, and/or temporal parts on which they are imputed. Thus, universals include:

the universals orange and table, of which all individual oranges and tables are instances, a commonsense orange, as a mental synthesis of the individual sensibilia of sight, smell, taste, and physical sensation, the sight of a commonsense orange (and not simply just a sight), as a mental synthesis of a collection of patches of colored shapes, a commonsense orange, as a mental synthesis of a succession of individual moments of either of the above two universals, a conventional identity as "an orange" imputed on any of the above three universals.

Therefore, although commonsense objects exist, they are merely metaphysical entities, not objectively real. They can be validly known only by the conceptual cognition that mentally constructs and imputes them on the individual items of which they are a synthesis.

Involved Objects and Objects Existing as Cognitively Taken

The involved object (jug-yul, engaged object, object of application) of a cognition is the main object with which a particular cognition involves itself (jug-pa, engages, cognitively enters). The involved object is equivalent to the object existing as cognitively taken (dzinstangs-kyi yul). Gelug The involved object in either nonconceptual or conceptual cognition is a commonsense object, for example a table, and those nonstatic features (yon-tan, qualities) of the table with which the cognition is actually involved. It is not possible for some feature of a commonsense object, such as the shape of a table, to be the involved object of a cognition unless that cognition also takes as its involved object the commonsense object of which that feature is a quality. The nonstatic features may be:

sensibilia of the table, such as its sight or tactile sensation,

the impermanence of the table, the table as a table, the table as an instance of the universal table.

Thus, only objective entities are the involved objects of either nonconceptual or conceptual cognition. This statement, however, needs qualification.

Such metaphysical entities as the absence of a vase on the table are also involved objects when implicitly apprehended by a sensory nonconceptual cognition or a conceptual cognition that explicitly apprehends a bare tabletop. Such a metaphysical entity, however, is not the primary involved object of that sensory or conceptual cognition. Although such metaphysical entities as the universal table are not the involved objects (either explicitly or implicitly apprehended) of a conceptual cognition that takes a commonsense table as its involved object, nevertheless they are the involved objects of the nonconceptual bare cognition of reflexive awareness that accompanies that conceptual cognition.

Non-Gelug The involved object in nonconceptual cognition is:

a moment of sensibilia, or a moment of sound.

The involved objects in a conceptual cognition are:

a commonsense object, for example a table, such metaphysical features of the table as: the table as a table, the table as an instance of the universal table, the table as an instance of what the word table signifies.

Thus,

objective entities are the involved objects of only nonconceptual cognition, metaphysical entities are the involved objects of only conceptual cognition.

2 Distinctions in Terms of Ways of Cognizing

Decisive Determination and Apprehension of an Involved Object
Apprehension (rtogs-pa, understanding) decisively determines (nges-pa, ascertains) its involved object correctly by decisively cutting it from incorrect interpolations that it is "that" (sgro-dogs bcad-pa). Thus, in correctly identifying its involved object, it induces immediate certainty of that object, such that recollection of the involved object can later occur. Gelug Both valid nonconceptual and valid conceptual cognitions apprehend their involved objects, decisively determining them as "this." In other words, when we apprehend a commonsense table by either validly seeing or thinking of it, we experience the table (the involved object) as a table and we can correctly remember later that we experienced the table as a table. We do not experience the table as an orange; nor do we validly remember that we experienced the table as an orange. This assertion follows from the facts that

both nonconceptual and conceptual cognitions cognize commonsense objects, valid cognition experiences commonsense objects as having their valid conventional identities.

In an episode of nonconceptual cognition of an involved object, however, the last moment is a nondetermining cognition of what appears (snang-la ma-nges-pa, inattentive perception). An object still appears, but is no longer decisively determined as "this" and not "that." Except in the case of aryas total absorption (mnyam-bzhag) on voidness, any single moment of nonconceptual cognition, by itself, is a nondetermining cognition of what appears. This is because a single moment (one sixty-fifth of the time of a finger-snap) is too short for decisively determining what appears. A sequence of moments of nonconceptual cognition is required to establish apprehension and, thus, each moment within the context of the sequence is considered an apprehension. Decisive determination of an object does not entail cognition of a static universal imputed on the involved object, such as a word or name (sgra) or a significance (don), of which the object is an individual instance. Such imputation occurs exclusively in conceptual cognition of an object. Thus, when we bump into a table in the dark, although we experience the table as a table, and not as an orange, we may not necessarily think the word table or think that what we experienced is an instance of what the word table means. In other words, we experience the item as a table, but may not necessarily know that it is a table.

Non-Gelug Nonconceptual cognition does not apprehend (identify) its involved object. It merely cognitively takes hold of (dzin-pa) (reflects) its involved object. Decisive determination (ascertainment) of an involved object, that it is "this" and not "that," occurs only with a conceptual cognition that immediately follows. Consequently, nonconceptual mental cognition is a nondeterminating cognition of what appears (inattentive perception). Only conceptual cognition apprehends its involved object.

Obvious, Obscure, and Extremely Obscure Objects

An involved object is obvious (mngon-gyur-ba) if it can be cognized by valid sensory nonconceptual cognition (dbang-mngon tshad-ma). Obvious objects may be any objective entity, which is synonymous with any nonstatic phenomenon, any functional phenomenon, and any truly existent phenomenon. An involved object is obscure (lkog-pa) if it can only be cognized by a valid inferential cognition (rjes-dpag tshad-ma) that relies on a line of reasoning (rtags) or on renown (grags). All inferential cognition is conceptual. Obscure objects may be any validly knowable phenomena, which is synonymous with any objective or metaphysical entity, any nonstatic or static phenomenon, any functional or nonfunctional phenomenon, and any truly eixstent or imputedly existent phenomenon. An involved object is extremely obscure (shin-tu lkog-pa) if it can only be cognized by a valid inferential cognition that relies on conviction (yid-ches). Conviction, here, is that someone is a valid source of information (skyes-bu tshad-ma) and therefore that any information that this person gives is correct. Extremely obscure objects may also be any validly knowable phenomenon. Gelug For example, the presence of smoke (a commonsense object with spatial and temporal extension) rising from the chimney of a house on a mountain is obvious because it can be seen. The presence of fire in the house on the mountain is obscure: it is not visible. Nevertheless, it can be validly known inferentially by relying on the line of reasoning, "where there is smoke, there is fire." The name of the person living in the house on the mountain is extremely obscure: it cannot be known through either sensory cognition or reasoning. It can only be known by relying on someone who correctly knows this information or on a valid up-to-date data bank and inferring that if the source of the information is valid, the information must be correct. The smoke, the fire, and the name of the person are all objective entities. The only difference is that the smoke is obvious, the fire is obscure, and the name of the person is extremely obscure.

Non-Gelug For example, in what is conventionally considered seeing smoke rising from the chimney of a house on a mountain, moments of slightly different gray-colored shapes are obvious, because they can be seen. The presence of both smoke and fire is obscure: neither can be directly seen.

The presence of smoke can be validly known inferentially by relying on renown that the application of the universal smoke on a mental representation of smoke mentally constructed from a succession of slightly different gray shapes is a correct application of a term. The presence of fire can be validly known by relying on a valid line of reasoning, "where there is smoke, there is fire."

The name of the person living in the house is extremely obscure: it cannot be known through either sensory cognition or reasoning. It can only be known by relying on someone who correctly knows this information or on a valid up-to-date data bank and inferring that if the source of the information is valid, the information must be correct. Only the moments of slightly different gray-colored shapes are objective entities, and they are obvious. The smoke, the fire, and the name of the person are all metaphysical entities. The first two are obscure and the third is extremely obscure.

Clarity, Awareness, and Mental Activity (Mind)

In cognizing an involved object whether obvious, obscure, or extremely obscure a cognition gives rise (char-ba, shar-ba) to a cognitive appearance (snang-ba) of something simultaneously with cognitively engaging (jug-pa, cognitively involving itself) with it. Giving rise to a cognitive appearance of something simultaneously with cognitively engaging with it are, respectively, the defining characteristics of making something cognitively clear (gsal, cognitively revealing something, clarity) and making an awareness of something (rig, awareness). The mere making of something cognitively clear and the mere making an awareness of something (gsal-rig tsam) are, in turn, the defining characteristics of mental activity (sems, mind). The word mere indicates that mental activity occurs without a "me" or a "mind" existing as an independent entity, separate from the mental activity, and serving as the agent that is making the activity happen. In fact, in any action, mental or physical, there is no such thing as an agent existing as an unaffected (dus ma-byas, static, permanent), monolithic (gcig, one), separa y independently of the action, either making the action happen or observing it occur. Making something cognitively clear does not require it being clear in the sense of it being in focus. The appearance of a blur may also cognitively arise.

Making an awareness of something does not require the awareness being conscious. Nor does it necessarily entail knowing the identity of what becomes cognitively apparent. A cognition may be subconscious (bag-la nyal) and may lack cognitive certainty (nges-pa).

Explicit and Implicit Apprehension

Gelug Apprehension of an involved object, in either nonconceptual or conceptual cognition, may be

explicit apprehension (dngos-su rtogs-pa), implicit apprehension (shugs-su rtogs-pa)

In explicit apprehension of an involved object, a cognitive appearance of the involved object itself arises. Only obvious phenomena (nonstatic phenomena, objective entities) may be explicitly apprehended by valid bare nonconceptual cognition.

This is the case only with unenlightened beings. In the case of Buddhas, obscure and extremely obscure objective entities may also be explicitly apprehended nonconceptually by omniscient awareness (rnam-mkhyen).

Any phenomenon obvious, obscure, or extremely obscure; nonstatic or static; objective or metaphysical may be explicitly apprehended by valid inferential (conceptual) cognition. In implicit apprehension of an involved object, only a cognitive appearance of the basis for imputation (gdags-gzhi) of the involved object arises, but not a cognitive appearance of the involved object itself. Only metaphysical entities (static phenomena) may be implicitly apprehended by valid bare nonconceptual cognition.

In the case of ordinary beings, only some metaphysical entities may be implicitly apprehended by any specific type of valid bare nonconceptual cognition. In the case of Buddhas, all metaphysical entities may be implicitly apprehended nonconceptually by omniscient awareness.

Either metaphysical or objective entities may be implicitly apprehended by valid inferential cognition. Consider the case of visual nonconceptual cognition. When explicitly apprehending the sight of a bare tabletop, for example, the visual cognition simultaneously can implicitly apprehend the absence of a vase on the tabletop.

Both the tabletop and the absence of the vase are the involved objects of the visual cognition.

However, only the bare tabletop appears. The absence of a vase does not actually appear, but is decisively determined by cutting off interpolations, for instance that there is an absence of an orange there.

Non-Gelug There is no such thing as implicit apprehension, either in nonconceptual or conceptual cognition, in which a metaphysical entity is decisively determined without a cognitive appearance of it arising. In decisively determining (apprehending) a metaphysical entity as an involved object, a cognitive appearance of the involved object itself always arises.

This only occurs in conceptual cognition and does not bear the technical term explicit apprehension.

3 Objects in Nonconceptual Cognition

Mental Aspects in Nonconceptual Cognition
The cognitive appearance to which nonconceptual or conceptual cognition gives rise is called a mental aspect (rnam-pa). Let us initially restrict our examination to only the mental aspects that arise in nonconceptual cognition. We shall analyze the case of conceptual cognition in a later section. In sensory nonconceptual cognition, an external object (phyi-don) casts (gtod) a mental aspect of itself on the sensory consciousness that cognizes it.

An external object is one that exists prior to the cognition of it and functions as the natal source (rdzas) of the mental aspect that arises in its cognition. A natal source of something is what produces it, like the potters wheel for a clay pot or an oven for a baked bread.

The mental aspect may be the mental semblance of a sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, or a physical sensation. It is a mental semblance, however, of only the objective entities that the specific sense consciousness can cognize. Visual consciousness, for example, cannot take on the mental aspect of a sound or a taste. Moreover, in cognizing an external object, a cognition gives rise only to a mental aspect resembling the external object. It does not give rise to the external object itself. According to the Chittamatra (mind-only) tenet system, there are no such things as external objects. In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the mental aspect that arises comes from the same natal source as the sensory consciousness of it namely, both

come from the same karmic tendency (sa-bon, karmic seed) as their common natal source. According to the Vaibhashika system, sensory nonconceptual cognition directly contacts and cognizes external objects, without giving rise to a mental aspect resembling them. Gelug The external object that casts an impression on a sensory consciousness of it is a commonsense object as an objective entity.

Consider the example of sensory nonconceptual cognition of a table, such as seeing a table or feeling a table with our hands. Like a mental impression, the mental aspect of a table that appears in the sensory cognition resembles the external commonsense table in all the nonstatic features that are explicitly apprehensible by the sensory consciousness that assumes that mental aspect.

Sensory nonconceptual cognition can explicitly apprehend only forms of physical phenomena specific to it and nonconcomitant affecting variables, such as impermanence. Although sensory nonconceptual cognition can implicitly apprehend metaphysical entities such as the absence of a vase, it cannot assume the mental aspect of them.

For example, in seeing a table, the table casts a mental aspect on the visual consciousness that sees it. The mental aspect resembles not only the form and color of the table, and the table itself, but also its impermanence, because visual consciousness can also "see" the impermanence of a table when it collapses. Visual cognition of a collapsing table may decisively determine either the sight of the collapsing table or the impermanence of the table, depending on what it decisively determines concerning its mental aspect. Only what the cognition decisively determines of its mental aspect is the involved object of that cognition. Thus, not all the features or qualities of the mental aspect that appears in a sensory cognition are necessarily its involved objects. Only those qualities that the sensory cognition apprehends are its involved objects and only those qualities are decisively determined. Others may be indecisively determined, although they appear (snang-la ma-nges-pa). They are not involved objects and are not apprehended. A table without a vase on it casts on the visual consciousness that sees it the mental aspect not only of a table but also of a table without a vase on it. The visual cognition may explicitly apprehend the table and the colored shape of the table. It may see a table without a vase on it even if it does not decisively determine that there is no vase on it. If it decisively determines the absence of a vase on the table without a vase on it, it apprehends that absence of a vase on it only implicitly.

Non-Gelug

The external object that casts an impression (a mental aspect) on sensory consciousness of it is a moment of sensibilia, such as a moment of colored shapes, or a moment of sound. Only such individual items are objective external entities.

According to a minority position within the non-Gelug camp, as represented by the fifteenth-century Sakya master Shakya-chogden (gSer-mdog Pan-chen Sha-kya mchog-ldan), the external object that casts a mental aspect here is a moment merely of molecules. Only moments of molecules are objective entities, not moments of sensibilia. Sensibilia are metaphysical entities.

Since sensory nonconceptual cognition does not decisively determine anything about its object, the mental aspect that appears to sensory nonconceptual cognition cannot represent some nonstatic features that are its involved objects and some that are not its involved objects. The entire mental aspect that appears in sensory nonconceptual cognition represents the involved object.

The mental aspect (mental representation) in the cognition is the directly involved object. The external object (a moment of sensibilia or a moment of sound) is the indirectly involved object. The difference between the two will be explained below.

Level of Transparency of Mental Aspects

Gelug The mental aspect cast on a sensory consciousness by an external objective entity is cognitively transparent. In other words, when nonconceptually cognizing the mental aspect of an external objective entity such as a commonsense object, the mental aspect does not veil the commonsense object. Rather, the sensory nonconceptual cognition directly contacts the external commonsense object, albeit through the transparency of a mental aspect. Thus, in the sensory nonconceptual cognition of a commonsense object, the external commonsense object actually appears through the totally transparent mental aspect cast by it on the consciousness. Non-Gelug The mental aspect cast on a sensory consciousness by an external objective entity, such as a moment of an external patch of colored shape, is opaque. Only the mental aspect appears in sensory nonconceptual cognition.

The mental aspect is directly cognized (dngos-su shes-pa) by the cognition. The moment of the external patch of colored shape that casts a mental aspect on the sensory consciousness of it is indirectly cognized (shugs-su shes-pa) by that sensory cognition.

This distinction derives from the non-Gelug literal assertion of the momentariness of nonstatic phenomena. The moment of the external patch of colored shape that existed as the direct cause (dngos-rgyu) of the sensory cognition of it has ceased to exist the immediately following moment when the sensory cognition with the mental aspect cast by it occurs. In this sense, the moment of the external patch of colored shape is hidden (lkog na-mo) in the sensory cognition.

Being hidden in a cognition, however, is not equivalent to an involved object being obscure. Obscure phenomena can only be validly known inferentially by relying on a line of reasoning. The presence of a moment of an external patch of colored shape that is cognized by a sensory cognition, however, is not something that can only be inferred. The moment of an external patch of colored shape is cognized nonconceptually by the sensory cognition, but only indirectly. Nor is the indirect cognition of a moment of an external patch of colored shape a case of obscured cognition (lkog-gyur). Obscured cognition is cognition of an involved object, but with minimal attention (yid-la byed-pa) focused on it. Obscured cognition is obscured by a manifest cognition (mngon-gyur) that it underlies, which focuses with attention on another involved object. Consequently, there is only certainty that the manifest cognition has occurred, but no certainty that the obscured cognition has occurred. Here, however, the moment of an external patch of colored shape indirectly cognized by the sensory nonconceptual cognition of it no longer exists when the sensory nonconceptual cognition of it occurs the next moment. Therefore, the attention in the cognition is focused only on the mental aspect (the directly involved object of the cognition).

Focal Objects and Focal Aspects

The focal object (dmigs-yul) is the object on which a cognition focuses and which serves as the focal condition (dmigs-rkyen) of the cognition. Focal objects exist prior to the cognitions of them and have their own continuums different from those of the cognitions of them. They are the external objective entities that cast mental aspects of themselves on the consciousnesses that cognize them. According to the Chittamatra system, although sensory nonconceptual cognitions have involved objects, they do not have focal objects. They do not arise from the focal condition of external objects existing independently of mental activity (mind).

Instead, sensory cognitions have focal aspects (dmigs-rnam), which are the mental aspects that sensory consciousnesses assume in cognizing their involved objects. The focal aspect in a sensory cognition arises from (is produced by) the same natal source as the sensory consciousness of it namely, from the same karmic tendency (sa-bon, karmic seed). It does not arise from (it is not produced by) an external focal object as its natal source.

Gelug

Only those features of focal objects (commonsense objects) that are decisively determined by sensory nonconceptual cognitions of them are the involved objects of those cognitions. Non-Gelug In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the focal object of the cognition (a moment of sensibilia) is only indirectly cognized. Nevertheless, the focal object, in its entirety, is still an involved object of the cognition.

Appearing Objects and Cognitively Taken Objects in Nonconceptual Cognition

The appearing object (snang-yul) is the direct object (dngos-yul) that arises in a cognition, as if it were directly in front of the consciousness (blo-ngor). It is a mental reflection (gzugs-brnyen) of a cognitive object. In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the appearing object (mental reflection) is equivalent to the mental aspect that appears. It is a reflection of an external objective entity. Gelug The appearing object (the fully transparent mental aspect) in sensory nonconceptual cognition is equivalent to the cognitions cognitively taken object (gzung-yul, held object). It is a full transparency of an external commonsense object. The appearing object here is not necessary equivalent, however, to the cognitions involved object, which may be merely certain nonstatic features of the appearing (cognitively taken) object. Non-Gelug The cognitively taken object of a cognition is defined as the external objective entity that serves as the direct cause of the cognition.

Thus, in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the cognitively taken object is the moment of external sensibilia that the cognition indirectly cognizes. The appearing object (mental reflection) is only the directly cognized opaque mental aspect of the cognitively taken object, and not the cognitively taken external object itself.

Summary of Sensory Nonconceptual Cognition in Chart Form

Gelug External Object Mental Aspect Metaphysical Entities

Fully transparent reflection Commonsense object, Conventional identity, Spatial & temporal parts Appearing object Cognitively taken object Focal object

Partially transparent reflection

Commonsense object, An absence of Conventional identity, Spatial something & temporal parts Appearing object Assumes the full aspect of the cognitively taken object Does not appear

Involved object (within the Involved object (within the Involved object domain of the appearing, domain of the appearing, cognitively taken focal cognitively taken focal object) object) Explicitly apprehended Decisively determined as Decisively determined as "this" commonsense object "this" commonsense object Implicitly apprehended Decisively determined as an absence of "this"

Non-Gelug External Object Mental Aspect Opaque representation A moment of sensibilia A moment of sensibilia Commonsense object, Conventional identity, An absence of something Does not appear Metaphysical Entities

Does not appear Cognitively taken object Focal object Involved object Indirectly cognized (hidden) Merely held, Not decisively determined as either a commonsense object or "this" commonsense object

Appearing object Assumes the aspect of the cognitively taken object Involved object Directly cognized Merely held, Not decisively determined as either a commonsense object or "this" commonsense object

Not involved Not cognized Not decisively determined

4 Objects in Conceptual Cognition

Mental Aspects and Appearing, Involved, Focal, and Cognitively Taken Objects in Conceptual Cognition
Conceptual cognition imputes (mentally labels) a metaphysical entity on the object that the mental aspect it assumes resembles, and mixes and confuses the two. Therefore, conceptual cognition is deceptive cognition (khrul-shes).

Of the two items confused with each other, one is the appearing object. The other simply appears (snang).

Gelug For the sake of simplicity, we shall omit from the Gelug description of conceptual cognition in the remainder of this article the presentation of inferential cognition and other types of conceptual cognition in which a line of reasoning or some other metaphysical entity is explicitly apprehended. As in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the mental aspect of a conceptual cognition is a fully transparent semblance of the external objective entity (commonsense object) that serves as the focal object of the cognition.

Thus, both nonconceptual and conceptual cognitions have focal objects. In conceptual cognition, however, the focal object does not need to be present at the time and location of the cognition involving it, as in the case of a remembrance of seeing the bare tabletop yesterday.

As in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the nonstatic features of the focal object and of the fully transparent mental aspect resembling it in conceptual cognition are the explicitly apprehended involved objects.

Such static features (metaphysical entities) as the absence of a vase on the bare tabletop may be implicitly apprehended involved objects of the conceptual cognition of a bare tabletop, in which case the conceptual cognition does not assume the mental aspect of the absence of a vase there.

The fully transparent mental aspect of the external commonsense object that conceptual cognition about that commonsense object assumes is what appears in the conceptual cognition. The appearing object in a conceptual cognition is a metaphysical entity (a static phenomenon) namely, an idea (snang-ba, "mental image," concept) about something.

Ideas about objective entities are static universals imputed on the objective entities for instance, ideas about commonsense objects imputed on external commonsense objects. Ideas about commonsense objects are not only themselves static universals, they are mental reflections of static universals.

Mental reflections (ideas) about commonsense objects are semitransparent.

Thus, semitransparent mental reflections about commonsense objects, as the appearing objects of conceptual cognitions, are different from the fully transparent mental aspects of the commonsense objects that appear (arise) in the conceptual cognition.

What appears (arises) in a conceptual cognition may be the mental aspect of, for instance, any form of external physical phenomenon a sight, sound, smell, taste, or physical sensation.

Such forms do not appear vividly through the fully transparent mental aspect. They appear only in a partially veiled manner, because the appearing object is actually a semitransparent idea imputed on them and with which they are mixed and confused. For example, when visualizing an orange, the mental aspect of an external commonsense orange appears and is confused with the idea of the static universal orange that we imagine we are cognizing.

Thus, mental reflections and mental aspects are not equivalent terms.

Mental aspects are exclusively nonstatic phenomena and their contents are exclusively nonstatic external commonsense objects. Mental reflections may be either nonstatic or static, and their contents may be either nonstatic or static. In nonconceptual cognition, mental reflections are nonstatic and their contents are nonstatic external commonsense objects. Thus, they are equivalent to the mental aspects of the cognition. In conceptual cognition, mental reflections are static ideas and their contents are static ideas.

The appearing objects of conceptual cognitions (static ideas) are also their cognitively taken objects.

Thus, in both nonconceptual and conceptual cognitions, the appearing objects are equivalent to the cognitively taken objects. In sensory nonconceptual cognition, both are external commonsense objects (objective entities). In conceptual cognition, both are static ideas (metaphysical entities).

Non-Gelug The appearing object of a cognition, whether nonconceptual or conceptual, is equivalent to the mental aspect that a cognition assumes. Thus, mental aspect and mental reflection are equivalent terms. As in sensory nonconceptual cognition, the mental aspect that conceptual cognition assumes, and which is the appearing object of that cognition, is an opaque mental representation (reflection) of something.

In sensory nonconceptual cognition, the appearing object is an opaque mental representation of an objective entity (a moment of external sensibilia). In conceptual cognition, the appearing object is an opaque mental representation (reflection) of a metaphysical entity for example, a commonsense object. As a metaphysical entity, a commonsense object, then, is actually just an idea of a commonsense object.

Unlike sensory nonconceptual cognition, which indirectly cognizes external objective entities (moments of sensibilia), conceptual cognition does not cognize external objective entities at all.

Thus, conceptual cognition does not have a focal object. Conceptual cognition does not have indirect cognition of anything.

The opaque mental aspect (reflection, representation) of a metaphysical entity (a commonsense object) in a conceptual cognition is its focal aspect. The metaphysical entity that it reflects and represents is the involved object of the conceptual cognition. The idea of a commonsense object, reflected by an opaque mental aspect that represents the idea, is imputed on the mental representation, and both mixed and confused with it.

The mental aspect (reflection, representation) of the idea is the appearing object. The idea itself is not the appearing object; however, it is what appears (arises) in the conceptual cognition. The idea that appears partially veils the appearing object (the mental representation of the idea).

In conceptual cognition, then, ideas are not the appearing objects, although they appear. As static universals imputed on the mental aspects that reflect and represent them, ideas are merely confused with the aspects.

In imagining an orange, for example, a mental representation of a commonsense orange is confused with the idea of a commonsense orange. In our minds, we cognize a mental aspect that represents a commonsense orange and confuse it to be a commonsense orange, which is merely a concept.

Since mental aspects and mental reflections (representations) are equivalent terms,

Therefore, just as mental aspects are exclusively nonstatic phenomena, mental reflections are also exclusively nonstatic phenomena, whether in nonconceptual or conceptual cognition. Thus, mental representations in conceptual cognition are themselves nonstatic individual items, although they reflect and represent static universals as their contents.

Since cognitively taken objects are defined as the direct causes of the cognitions of them and since conceptual cognitions do not have external objective entities present as their direct causes, conceptual cognitions do not have cognitively taken objects.

Thus, appearing objects are not synonymous with cognitively taken objects.

Universals in Reference to Conventional Objects

In the most general terms, a universal (spyi) is a phenomenon shared in common by the individuals (bye-brag) on which it is imputed. Among universals, we may differentiate:

universals in reference to conventional objects, universals in reference to language.

In reference to conventional objects, there are three main types of universals: 1. collection universals (tshogs-spyi), 2. kind universals (rigs-spyi), 3. object universals (don-spyi). (1) Collection universals are wholes imputed on spatial, sensorial, and/or temporal parts. Consider the example of "a table." "A table," as a whole item, can be imputed on

a collection of patches of colored shapes, a collection of tactile sensations of variously shaped surfaces, a collection of the previous two collections, a collection of legs and a flat surface, a collection of molecules, a collection of moments of any or all of the previous collections.

A whole is a universal because it can be imputed on any of the above collections of parts. Because collection universals extend over time, they are also called vertical universals (gong-mai spyi). (2) Kind universals are the type of phenomenon that a specific individual item is an instance of, such as "a table" imputed on a specific instance of something having legs and a flat surface.

Similar items of varying design and individual items of the same design may be instances of the kind universal table. In other words, a kind universal specifies the conventional identity of something.

Because kind universals extend over instances of them, they are also called horizontal universals (thad-kai spyi). (3) Object universals are the concepts (ideas) of commonsense objects used when thinking of, imagining (visualizing), or remembering commonsense objects. Gelug A universal is defined as an individual set, category, or whole imputed on a collection of subsets, individual members of a set, individual instances of a category, or individual parts. There are two ontological types of universals: 1. universals that are functional phenomena (spyi dngos-po-ba), 2. universals that are nonfunctional phenomena (spyi dngos-po-ba ma-yin-pa). Functional phenomena (dngos-po) are synonymous with nonstatic phenomena. Nonfunctional phenomena (dngos-med) are synonymous with static phenomena. (1) Let us call universals that are functional phenomena "nonstatic universals" (nonstatic abstractions). They may be cognized either nonconceptually or conceptually. They include:

collection universals, kind universals.

Since collection and kind universals are nonstatic phenomena, they appear in sensory nonconceptual cognition as part of the focal objects (equivalent to the mental aspects, appearing objects, and cognitively taken objects). When ascertained, they may also be the involved objects explicitly apprehended by the sensory nonconceptual cognition of them.

Thus, when we see a collection of parts, we also see the whole that they comprise and the type of phenomenon that the whole is (its conventional identity). For example, when we see the legs and flat surface of a table or the shape and color of a table, these parts simultaneously also appear as a whole item and as a table. (2) We shall call universals that are nonfunctional phenomena "static universals" (static abstractions). They are cognized only conceptually. They include:

object universals.

Non-Gelug A universal is defined as a mentally constructed synthesis (spros-pa, mental fabrication) of individual items. All universals are nonfunctional (static) phenomena. Collection and kind universals are subcategories of object universals. Because collection universals and kind universals are static phenomena, they do not appear in sensory nonconceptual cognition. They appear only in conceptual cognition. This is consistent with the assertion that sensory nonconceptual cognition does not decisively determine its object as a "this" or a "that." Consider the example of seeing something.

In moment one (the moment immediately preceding the moment when the seeing of something actually takes place), a moment of an external patch of colored shape occurs. This external objective entity is the indirectly cognized focal object and cognitively taken object of the seeing. In moment two (the moment when the seeing actually occurs), a mental aspect representing the previous moment of the patch of colored shape arises. The previous moment of the patch of colored shape no longer exists. This "internal" objective entity is the directly cognized appearing object and the involved object. The mental representation appears merely as a patch of colored shape. It does not appear as a whole commonsense object, let alone one that is an instance of "this" or "that" for example as "a table." In moment three (the moment of conceptual cognition immediately following the nonconceptual seeing), a mental representation of a whole commonsense item with the conventional identity a table occurs, as a mental synthesis. The mental representation is the appearing object of the conceptual cognition of the table. The metaphysical entity table that it represents is the involved object.

Cognizing a sentence as a whole (based on hearing the sound of only one consonant or vowel at a time) and cognizing the motion of something (based on seeing some item in only one position and location at a time) are similarly conceptual processes.

Some non-Gelug scholars, such as Shakya-chogden, assert that the mental aspects that appear in visual nonconceptual cognition are mental representations of only a moment of a collection of molecules. The cognitive appearance of even shapes and colors occurs only in conceptual cognition.

Conceptual Cognition with Object Universals

Gelug Object universals are the semitransparent appearing objects in conceptual cognition that appear to be objects, but are merely superimposed on and confused with cognitive appearances of involved objects (external objective entities). Consider the example of the nonverbal conceptual cognition of a form of physical phenomenon, such as thinking of the sight, smell, taste, or physical sensation of an external commonsense object, such as an orange. An appearance arises of:

a specific set of sensibilia of the external commonsense object, the nonstatic collection universal of the sensibilia constituting a whole object, the nonstatic kind universal of the sense data constituting "this" kind of object, and not "that" kind an orange, not an apple.

The threefold appearance arises through the totally transparent mental aspect of the specific set of sensibilia, collection universal, and kind universal that the cognition assumes. The semitransparent appearing object (idea) with which the totally transparent mental aspect is mixed is an object universal, as in the case of imagining or remembering an orange, without associating the word orange with what mentally appears.

In the case of imagining an orange, an appearance of a specific commonsense orange arises through a transparent mental aspect of that orange and is mixed with the semitransparent object universal oranges in general, which the appearance is taken to represent. In the case of remembering a specific commonsense orange, an appearance of that orange arises through a transparent mental aspect of the orange and is mixed with the semitransparent object universal a specific "public" orange. A specific public orange is one that anyone could have seen from any angle when we saw that specific commonsense orange. The appearance of the specific commonsense orange may also be mixed with the semitransparent object universal the specific commonsense orange whether seen, smelled, tasted, or touched.

Non-Gelug

Object universals appear in conceptual cognitions in which the appearing objects are opaque mental representations of commonsense objects. They are superimposed on and confused with the involved objects (the metaphysical commonsense objects that are reflected as the contents of the mental representations). Consider once more the nonverbal conceptual cognition of the sight of an orange. This may occur immediately after seeing a moment of an external spherical patch of orange color, or later imagining or remembering a commonsense orange. An opaque mental aspect representing a commonsense orange appears. This mental representation is the appearing object. A moment of a specific external spherical patch of orange color is not even indirectly cognized. The mental aspect that appears is confused with the object universals imputed on it. The mentally fabricated and projected object universals with which the mental reflection (of a commonsense orange) is identified are:

a whole object with temporal continuity, a "real" commonsense orange, either oranges in general or a specific "public" orange visible to anyone.

Universals in Reference to Language

In reference to language, there are two main types of universals:

term universals (sgra-spyi, audio ideas), meaning universals (don-spyi, meaningful ideas).

Term universals are universals adopted as conventions (tha-snyad) in a particular language by the members of a specific society. As words themselves, such as "table," and not the sounds of words (which are kind universals), they are universals also in the sense that they are imputable on sounds made in a variety of voices, pitches, volumes, and pronunciations. Term universals by themselves do not have any meanings associated with them. Meaning universals are the meanings or significance of sounds or of written representations of sounds. Meanings do not exist inherently within sounds or within their written representations, but are merely conventions coined, assigned to sounds or to their written representations, and used as universals by the members of a specific society. The same sound can mean "to," "too," or "two" in English or "you" in mispronounced French. The same written representation of a sound, for instance "bear," can mean "a large furry mammal" or "to endure something." Moreover, each person in a particular society may assign a slightly different meaning to a specific word, but still use that meaning as a universal when thinking that word. Meaning universals are logical isolates (ldog-pa, distinguishers). The meaning "x" of a particular communicative sound (word) is what remains upon the logical isolation (elimination) of all "non-x" meanings. This formulation follows from the assertion that a meaning "x" does not exist inherently within a sound.

Further, the logical isolation of a meaning universal is not a deliberate mental procedure that directly excludes all "non-x" meanings. The conceptual process of thinking with logical isolates occurs naturally, based on holding the dualistic view that logically divides all phenomena into "x" and "non-x." Gelug In verbal conceptual cognition, a cognitive appearance of the sound of a conventional word (an objective entity) arises. The idea imputed on it and with which it is mixed may be:

merely a term universal, as in the case of thinking the word voidness without having any idea of what it means, both a term universal and a meaning universal, as in the case of thinking the word voidness together with a meaning associated with the word, even if that meaning is inaccurate.

In preverbal conceptual cognition, an appearance of a form of physical phenomenon, such as a mental sight, sound, smell, taste, or physical sensation, may arise. The idea with which it is mixed is:

merely a meaning universal, as in the case of a preverbal baby conceiving of someone as its mother when it misses her and cries. Although the baby does not yet know the word mother, it conceives of the meaning of the term universal mother. This meaning universal is fit (rung) to be applied to the term universal mother when the baby learns the word mother.

Non-Gelug In verbal conceptual thinking, a cognitive appearance of a conventional word (a metaphysical entity) arises. The idea imputed on it and with which it is mixed includes both:

a term universal and a meaning universal.

Conceptual thought related to language does not occur with only a term universal or only a meaning universal. It always occurs with a combination of the two.

Conceptual Cognition with Meaning Universals

Gelug Consider the example of verbally thinking orange. An appearance arises of:

the sounds of the vowels and consonants audible during the sequence of moments required to hear the sound of the entire word orange, the nonstatic collection universal of the sounds of the vowels and consonants constituting a whole word, the nonstatic kind universal of the sounds of the vowels and consonants constituting the sound of "this" word, and not "that" word the sound of "orange," not of "arrange."

The threefold appearance arises through the totally transparent mental aspect of the specific set of sounds, collection universal, and kind universal that the cognition assumes. The semitransparent appearing objects (ideas) imputed on the totally transparent mental aspect that appears and with which the mental aspect is mixed and confused are:

the term universal orange, as an actual word, the meaning universal of what the word orange signifies.

Non-Gelug In the example of verbally thinking orange, the appearing object is:

an opaque mental representation of the sound of the word orange (a metaphysical entity).

This appearing object is mixed and confused with the following universals (ideas) that are imputed on it and which appear:

the term universal orange, as an actual word, the meaning universal of what the word orange signifies, which is equivalent to the object universal a commonsense orange.

Conceptualized Objects
Conceptualized objects (zhen-yul, conceived objects, implied objects) are, literally, the objects on which concepts or ideas cling. They are phenomena exclusively of conceptual cognition. Nonconceptual cognition does not have conceptualized objects. Gelug Consider further the conceptual cognition that verbally thinks orange, analyzed in the previous section. If the conceptual cognition apprehends only the sound of the word orange, the external sound of the commonsense word orange is the involved object.

The appearing objects are the semitransparent ideas of the term universal orange and of the meaning universal of what the word orange signifies. The conceptualized object of the term universal is the external sound of the commonsense word orange (the involved object). The conceptualized object of the meaning universal is the external commonsense orange. In the case of the conceptual cognition that explicitly apprehends the bare tabletop and implicitly apprehends the absence of a vase there, both the external bare tabletop and the external absence of a vase there are the conceptualized objects. Non-Gelug In the conceptual cognition of verbally thinking orange, analyzed in the previous section, the appearing object is an opaque mental representation of the sound of the entire word orange. The term universal orange and the meaning/object universal of what the word orange signifies appear (arise in the cognition) as the involved objects. Since verbal conceptual cognition always involves both term and meaning/object universals, such cognition always has two conceptualized objects:

the object conceptualized as a signifier (zhen-pai brjod-byed), the conceptualized object signified (zhen-pai brjod-bya).

They must be differentiated from

the object that is the actual signifier (dngos-kyi brjod-byed), the object actually signified (dngos-kyi brjod-bya).

The object that is the actual signifier of the commonsense orange is the term universal orange (the involved object, a conventional word). The objects conceptualized as the signifiers of the commonsense orange are the external momentary sounds of vowels and consonants, as heard one by one. The object actually signified by the mental representation of a commonsense orange is the meaning/object universal of a commonsense orange (the involved object). The conceptualized object signified is a moment of external sensibilia, such as a spherical patch of orange color.

Summary of Conceptual Cognition in Chart Form

Gelug External Object Mental Aspect Metaphysical Entities

Fully transparent Commonsense object, Conventional identity, Spatial & temporal parts

Partially transparent reflection An absence of something

Commonsense object Term universals, Conventional identity, meaning and Spatial & temporal object universals parts

Appears, Partly veiled Appears, Partly veiled Appearing object Cognitively taken object Focal object Involved object Involved object

Does not appear

Involved object of Involved only the reflexive object awareness of the conceptual cognition Implicitly Implicitly apprehended only apprehended by reflexive awareness Decisively determined as an absence of "this"

Explicitly apprehended

Decisively determined Decisively determined Decisively as an instance of these as an instance of these determined universals universals implicitly by reflexive awareness as "these" universals Conceptualized object Mistaken for the conceptualized object

Non-Gelug External Object Mental Aspect (= Focal Aspect) Opaque A moment of sensibilia Nonstatic representation Commonsense object of a commonsense (as an object universal), object Term & meaning universals Appearing object, Partly veiled Appears Metaphysical Entities

Does not appear

No cognitively taken object No focal object Not involved Involved object Decisively determined as an instance of "these" universals Object conceptualized as the signifier and conceptualized object signified Object that is the actual signifier and object actually signified, mistaken for the object conceptualized as the signifier and the conceptualized object signified