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Regional Monarchies in the Context of the Arab Spring

Comprehensive Information on Complex Issues

June 2013 Eray Basar North Africa Desk Officer eray.basar@cimicweb.org

This report explores reasons why Arab Monarchies were able to maintain stability and avoid regime change as observed elsewhere in the region during the massive Arab Spring movements. In addition to highlighting general trends that may have contributed to such resilience, this report also discusses in detail the events in Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco three Arab monarchies where effects of the Arab Spring were felt more intensely. Related information is available at www.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text. A wave of revolutionary movements swept the Arab nations of North Africa and the Middle East over the past two years; however, monarchical regimes in the region maintained stability, according to the International Relations and Security Network (ISN). The Arab Spring cost several leaders such as Egypts Hosni Mubarak and Tunisias Zine El Abidine Ben Ali their positions of power or in Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafis case, his life. Meanwhile, kings or emirs in the region experienced relatively lower tensions within their borders. These facts may lead one to argue, in broad terms, that the Arab monarchies are simply more resilient to popular destabilising factors. However, the reality is more complex. The effects of the popular movements, as well as the authorities responses to such movements, varied greatly because of the individual social, political and economic conditions in each country. Of the eight regional monarchies, five Arab Gulf states, including Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), experienced less significant protests throughout the course of the Arab Spring. In Jordan and Morocco, where largely peaceful demonstrations challenged social, political and economic conditions, the kings responded to Arab Spring protest movements with reforms. Bahrain was the only Gulf monarchy that faced a more imminent threat from massive street protests. The Bahraini government, as an extension of the monarchy, retained control by resorting to repressive measures aided by a Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) force. This report will first present general trends that consider the potential factors that might have sustained the relative stability observed in the Arab monarchies through the Arab Spring. The report will then focus individually on the three most significantly affected states, namely, Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. General Trends Observed within Arab Monarchies Arab monarchs enjoy varying degrees of legitimacy rooted in religion or culture that their counterparts in nonmonarchical dictatorships in the region cannot claim. The Jordanian and Moroccan kings claims of direct descendancy from the Prophet Mohammad, or the Saudi kings self-portrayal as the protector of Islamic holy lands (Mecca and Medina), are elements contributing to their legitimacy. In addition, legitimacy may also be rooted in the tribal system in which the king is perceived as the guarantor of stability. One difference between the republican regimes toppled by their citizens and the Arab monarchies appears to lie in a form of social contract between the monarch and the people. To emphasise this difference in context, Jamal

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Regional Monarchies in the Context of the Arab Spring

Khashoggi, a newspaper columnist in Saudi Arabia, and the director of the Al Arab News Channel, says, In the Gulf, a monarchs covenant is between a population and a royal family. The population was never promised the right to vote or even to name ministers. Although the bond is unfair, it was always thus, never built on fraud and deceit, as in those republics where people were falsely promised the right to choose their ruler. Such unwritten social contracts between citizens and their monarchs have a stabilising effect for the countries. These conditions, as Dr. Christopher Davidson states in his New York Times article: [H]ave usually been enough to placate citizens, satisfy the needs of expatriates and guarantee some degree of political acquiescence from the population, thereby allowing the monarchies to avoid heavy-handed repression. Monarchical power, which enables efficiency in carrying out reforms, can be considered another reason for the relative calmness of Arab Spring protest movements; monarchies are able to implement reforms swiftly in a topdown manner, according to ISN. The most prominent regional examples of this are provided by Jordan and Morocco, which introduced reforms as soon as Arab Spring sentiments began within their borders, informs The Huffington Post. Although these reforms took little or no power away from the kings, they were enough to convince citizens that further reforms were possible by working within the existing system. However, Foreign Policy Magazine highlights an easily overlooked detail in this regard: having the institutional capacity to ease public anger by introducing liberal reforms does not necessarily mean they have the desire to implement them. According to Dr. Mokhtar Benabdallaoui of National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, D.C., The Gulf States [did not] hide their opposition to the largely cosmetic reforms proposed by the monarchs of Morocco and Jordan; rather, they have adamantly opposed even incremental changes to their political systems. Another explanation for the relative stability observed in the Arab monarchies is that kings and emirs have a significantly larger ability to avoid blame in the eyes of the population as they commonly scapegoat other administrative institutions within the state for problems in their countries. Dr. Benabdallaoui argues that the monarchs establish institutions with limited power, such as parliaments and government bureaucracies, as the first level of public affairs management, while preserving the depiction of themselves as the legitimate authority of the state. This system sets up a buffer-zone between the monarch and his citizens. In other words, these institutions have responsibility without power, while the monarchs ability to deflect popular discontent by scapegoating these intermediate bodies means that they enjoy power without responsibility. Among the most important pillars of monarchical resilience is the kings role as the distributor of wealth, argues Dr. Davidson. The wealth, in large part generated from the oil resources, is used to buy political acquiescence, while the largesse of the royal families contributes to their legitimacy. Effective distribution of petro-wealth was a main stabiliser in countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Since the start of the Arab Spring movements, oil-rich Gulf Arab states and for that matter, non-monarchical Algeria provided a range of economic programmes such as cash grants and development projects.1 Libya, where former leader Moammar Gaddafi sat on vast sources of hydrocarbons, may be pointed out as a case for rebuttal against the saviour effect of petro-wealth. However, Gaddafi resorted to repression rather than effectively using his countrys petro-wealth to mobilise public support and pacify opposition, states Foreign Policy Magazine. The Three Arab Monarchies in the Danger Zone Among the eight Arab monarchies, Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco had relatively more frequent, long lasting and more intense opposition protest movements, demanding deeper changes in their existing socio-political systems. Although these movements did not lead to a regime change in any of these three countries, they constituted major challenges to the authorities. The following sections will focus on these three monarchies individually, laying out the context of the Arab Spring movements as well as highlighting the major events over the course of popular unrests. These sections will also explore the responses of authorities to such movements and their motives in doing so, concluding with a brief overview of the current situation in each country.

For example, Kuwait gave USD 3,500 to every citizen and Saudi Arabia invested over USD 130 billion in job creation and salary increases.

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Bahrain Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy ruled by King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa since 1999. The country also has a parliament largely consisting of royal family members. Bahrains Arab Spring began in February 2011, following the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. Attempts at revolution in Bahrain are deeply rooted in sectarian sentiments. Shiite Muslims constitute about seventy per cent of the Bahraini population, and have long harbored deep political and economic grievances against the Sunni ruling family, according to CNN. Protests are nothing new to the tiny Persian Gulf island. Longstanding tensions between the oil-soaked regime of Sunni King Hamad ibn Isa Al Khalifa and the countrys poorer, marginalized Shiite population have resulted in intermittent riots says Karen Leigh writing for The Daily Beast. A report by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry noted that the first major demonstrations and political rallies started on 14 February 2011. Although there were no requirements by law to hold demonstrations, police were deployed in and around the capital Manama in anticipation of such events. The number of people participating in protests around the city varied; however, the total number was estimated at 6,000. The demonstrators shifted to an occupation of Pearl Roundabout in Manama, giving the revolution the name Pearl Revolution. The events sparked clashes with security forces although the protests were largely peaceful, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG). Karen Leigh reported that protesters demanded the release of all political prisoners, dismantling of the existing government and replacing it with an elected government, and establishment of a new body to revise the constitution giving all Bahrainis equal rights. The regime responded to international pressure, especially from the United States, to ease its crackdown on the protesters, reports ICG. For several weeks, peaceful protests were allowed to take place, while behind-thescenes discussions were held. However, these discussions failed to result in constructive approaches to resolve the turmoil. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates criticised the Manama government for its baby steps towards change. The political stalemate led to the GCC intervention of about 1,500 troops from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE on 14 March to support the Source: Daily Beast Bahraini regime. The entry of Saudi-led GCC forces to the country was followed by the announcement of a three month state of national safety by the king, including a partial curfew, a ban on rallies and broad powers for the military. In the following days, security forces across the country violently dispersed the protesters. Bahrains largest opposition group, al Wifaq, stated that it was subsequently impossible to conduct a peaceful and constructive dialogue while foreign troops remained in the country as a deterrent force. Iran, a majority Shiite country, criticised the intervention as an unacceptable interference in Bahrains internal affairs. Also, Iraqs most senior Shiite religious authority Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani gave his support to the Shiite protesters, which resulted in Shiite demonstrations in solidarity with Bahrainis in Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. ICG concluded that the Saudi-led military intervention and the crackdown by Bahraini security to suppress rising Shiite sentiments in the region backfired, resulting in stronger Shiite sentiments in the region. The violent repression of the protests in February and March 2011 left thirty people dead (mostly protesters and bystanders) and led to the imprisonment of prominent opposition leaders as well as hundreds of others. Detainees were reportedly tortured which resulted in at least four deaths. Impartial trials were held in special security courts. Over forty Shiite mosques and religious structures were destroyed. In addition, the main newspaper was transformed into a regime mouthpiece and a witch hunt started against protesters. In this equation, the United States, which has a strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia and maintains a navy base in the geostrategic Gulf island of Bahrain, did not support the Bahraini opposition as it supported popular movements elsewhere in the Arab World, according to The New York Times. A scholarly discussion organised by Carnegie Endowment concluded that the Bahraini government lost legitimacy to a great degree, especially from the Shiite perspective. Liberals in
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the country wanted a constitutional monarchy, while radicals called for the transformation of the country into a non-monarchical republic. Moreover, it was also noted during the discussion that the regime had lost its ability to effectively introduce reforms in a top-down manner. During the protests, and in the months that followed, Bahrain and other Gulf states continued to portray the unrest in the region as an Iranian Shiite sectarian plot in order to obscure the Bahraini movement's political message of justice and equality, according to Al Jazeera. The branding of the revolts as a Shiite plot in Bahrain, where a Sunni family rules a seventy per cent Shiite population, was relatively successful in creating an Iranian and Shia influence in the predominantly Sunni Arab World. So, the Arab Spring was not able to eliminate sectarian prejudices that impeded effective solidarity in the region. Al Jazeera further states that the Bahraini movement for change became partly a victim to the geopolitical contest between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the strategically located country. Two years later, opposition to the government persists; the military crackdown only eliminated the immediate challenges facing the regime, reports The Guardian. The mainstream opposition, al Wifaq, seeks to install a constitutional monarchy and to replace King Hamads uncle as prime minister who has held the position for 42 years; the opposition would like to see him replaced by an elected prime minister. The group also seeks to eliminate the discriminatory conditions faced by the Shiite population which sometimes borders on apartheid, according to BBCs Ian Black. The pressures from more radical groups, such as the February 14 Youth Coalition and al Haq, to overthrow the regime continues to concern other monarchies in the region. However, al Wifaqs leader Sheikh Ali Salman argues that his group now favour a political solution to the two year-old tensions in Bahrain, as long as the monarchy is preserved. Nevertheless, there are no significant changes for the country on the horizon, despite the resumption of national dialogues. Jordan Jordan is the second of the three Arab kingdoms where popular unrest posed a legitimate threat to the regime in 2011. However, unlike in Bahrain, Hashemite King Abdullah II chose to implement modest reforms to address the demands of the people. Civil unrest began in Jordan in January 2011, when approximately 5,000 people across the country took to the streets in a day of rage to protest soaring food prices and unemployment, reports The Guardian. University students and Baathist party supporters joined the protests, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Samir Rifai. Although the government had recently reduced the prices and taxes on certain foods and fuels, and allocated USD 214 million to the 2011 budget in order to subsidise bread, it was insufficient to address the poverty caused by inflation. Tawfiq al Batoush, a former head of Karak municipality said: We are protesting the policies of the government, high prices and repeated taxation that made the Jordanian people revolt.

Source: CIA World Factbook

Amid such pressure, King Abdullah II fired his government on 01 February 2011, replacing Prime Minister Rifai with Marouf al Bakhit2, who was largely perceived as corruption-free, reports The New York Times. Whereas Rifai was criticised for failing to consult with trade unions and the Muslim Brotherhood and to address the concerns of citizens, Bakhit stated his main objective was to take tangible steps to social, political and economic reform and give priority to dialogue with all segments of society. However, demonstrations continued into March as protesters demanded the transition of the regime to a constitutional monarchy, reports Agence France-Presse (AFP). Prime Minister Bakhit rejected the calls, but promised true and gradual reforms. Nationalist and independent Islamists sought a constitutional monarchy while the Muslim Brotherhood said they supported the groups working for reforms offered by the government. Zaki Bani Rusheid, a leading member of the Islamic Action Front (IAF),
2

In October 2011, King Abdullah II sacked Marouf al Bakhit. Three prime ministers held power in succession in 2012: Awn al-Khasawneh, Fayez alTarawneh, and the current leader, Abdullah Ensour.

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the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, said, [they] want a national framework engaging all national efforts to present a united front. Leftists, on the other hand, sought to reverse 29 amendments made to the 1952 constitution which empowered the monarch and then to readopt the 1952 constitution. King Abdullah ardently pushed for the advancement of the countrys reform process, according to The Washington Institute. The country amended the 1993 electoral law in June 2012, increasing the number of seats in parliament from 120 to 150. Voters would cast two votes for a district representative and for a closed national list of 27 seats (up from 17 seats in the previous law). Seats reserved for women also increased from twelve to fifteen. The amended constitution reserved 108 seats for the twelve governorates of the country. In addition, King Abdullah announced that the elections would be held before the end of the year. Public opposition, however, argued that the new law was very similar to the old one and did not provide the desired mixed electoral system; an electoral system in which half of the seats would be allocated to the national lists while the other half would be for electoral districts was desired. Moreover, the opposition also sought to strip the king of his ability to dissolve the parliament or appoint the government. Nevertheless, King Abdullah still retains such powers.3 In July 2012, the IAF threatened to boycott an election under this law unless further reforms improved it, reports BBC. The Muslim Brotherhood, as well as other opposition groups, argued that an increase of seats allocated for party candidates in the 140-strong lower house of parliament from 17 to 27 is not enough. Following the kings dissolution of parliament in October 2012, and his calls for early elections, Jordan held parliamentary elections in January 2013. On 09 March, Abdullah Ensour was reappointed as the prime minister, informs Reuters. Prior to the election, the king chose the prime minister without consulting parliament; however, this time Ensour was nominated by a majority of parliamentarians. Moreover, constitutional reforms transferred some of the kings powers to the parliament, restoring some executive powers from the palace. Ensour said that the king and the government decided to carry out reforms without public pressure, as everyone is on the same page regarding reform, both the opposition and government loyalists. Ensour acknowledged the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the national fabric, in political affairs and their position on the electoral law. The prime minister said he will work with the Brotherhood to meet their demands and asked them to recognise that that the legislative institution was elected on a correct, legal and clean basis. He sees Islamist recognition of the legitimacy of the legislative body as imperative, if Islamists are to participate in the next cabinet. Yet, the Brotherhood refuses to recognise the legitimacy of parliament because the current law limits the influence of political forces and parties. Today, the economic crisis which sparked the protests continues to strain the lives of many Jordanians. Prices and unemployment remain high, while the government cannot bring about significant change or maintain high subsidies. According to ANSAmed, the rapidly growing number of Syrian refugees may further strain the economy and resources of the kingdom, which already suffers from a financial crisis as well as a shortage of water and electricity. Moreover, the flow of jihadists through the Syria-Jordan border may cause the war in Syria to spill over into Jordan, thus, threatening the countrys security. Nevertheless, the frequent shuffling of prime ministers, an extremely disappointing new electoral law, and the Muslim Brotherhoods calls for a constitutional monarchy, do not appear to point to a major upheaval in Jordan in the near future, as fears of replicating Syrias bloody chaos deters protesters from further challenging the monarch, according to Foreign Policy. Morocco Morocco was also threatened by massive popular discontent, but has managed to preserve its monarchy thus far. King Mohammed VI4 avoided the fate of his presidential counterparts in the region and retained his rule. The disparity of power in the country contributed to popular dissatisfaction with the central authority. Prior to the Arab Spring, the king held near-absolute power, although the country had a constitution and a parliamentary system. The king was the
Source: BBC
3

For more information on Jordanian electoral system, see frequently asked questions. 4 King Mohammed VI acceded to the throne in July 1999 following the death of his father, King Hassan II.

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Supreme Representative of the Nation and the Defender of the Faith. He appointed the prime minister and cabinet members, presided over cabinet meetings, enacted laws, and issued royal decrees. Aside from extensive power over the legislative and executive bodies, the king appointed judges, granted pardons and exercised control over the Supreme Magistrate Council. He also commanded the armed forces. In addition to the near absolute power of the king, dire socio-economic conditions in pre-Arab Spring Morocco were major drivers for the popular demand for change. According to the 2010 issue of Best Countries for Business report by Forbes, the macroeconomic policies of King Mohammed VI in the first half of 2000s brought steady progression to the countrys services and industrial sectors. The National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), a USD two billion initiative by the king, led to improved social welfare conditions for many. Nevertheless, in 2011, the problems of high illiteracy and low education enrolment, urban youth employment as high as 30 per cent, a trade balance of negative 3.8 per cent, high income inequality and corruption plagued the Moroccan population. The global economic slowdown and the recession in Europe Moroccos main export market further strained the countrys economy, causing a decline in its two main foreign currency sources: remittances and the flow of foreign tourists. On the other hand, the kings wealth reportedly quintupled over the past decade to USD 2.5 billion as he is in control of the countrys phosphate mines making him even wealthier than Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain. These political, economic and social problems led to the Arab Spring protests in Morocco. The February 20 Movement, which took its name from the date of the first protest, demanded constitutional reform and curbing of the kings power in Morocco. About 37,000 people marched to the parliament building in the capital city Rabat, while many others protested in cities such as Casablanca and Marrakesh. However, unlike other protests in the region, Moroccan demonstrators were largely peaceful. Amid mounting public pressure, King Mohammed VI announced in a televised speech on 09 March 2011 his decision to implement constitutional reforms. He also set up a commission to which he himself appointed the members to advise on possible constitutional changes. Demonstrations continued on a periodic basis through the end of the year. Mounting pressure forced the monarch to introduce further changes around mid-year. On 17 June, King Mohammed VI introduced the constitutional reform proposal, to curb his powers and establish a constitutional monarchy, including a transfer of some of his authority to an elected parliament. The proposal also guaranteed independence to the judiciary and set a 01 July 2011 referendum date for the proposed changes. The kings swift response to the protests, as well as the Moroccan publics firm but peaceful stance, proved to be an effective alternative to the violence observed in the regional authoritarian republics. Despite the high frequency of demonstrations against the proposed constitutional changes, and the calls by the 20 February Movement to boycott the referendum, Moroccos more power to elected leaders approach appealed to the general public; a voter turnout of 73 per cent (fifteen million registered voters) was observed. Of the votes cast, 98.5 per cent were in favour of the reforms, passing the amendments. The vote was considered an initial success for Morocco on its path to democratic transition. Some of the key changes proposed within the amendments were: The authority to appoint the prime minister remains in the kings hands; however, he is to choose his prime minister from the party with the parliamentary majority; The prime minister is the head of the government instead of the king, and has the authority to form the cabinet of ministers. Appointed ministers are still required to be approved by the king; The prime minister presides over the legislative body called the Government Council, which is tasked to prepare policy and present it to the cabinet; Parliaments authority on oversight of civil rights, electoral and nationality issues are expanded; The old constitution referred to the king as sacred. This term was removed from the new constitution, but king remains inviolable; Women, who previously had only political equality, are now granted civil and social equality with men; and The Berber language became one of the official languages of the country, along with Arabic.

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Yet many Moroccans were critical of the amended constitution, arguing that the changes were only superficial and would not provide significant improvements in the day-to-day lives of ordinary Moroccans. The February 20 Movement vowed to continue weekly rallies against the referendum result, demanding deeper changes in the political environment of the country. On the other hand, the international community, including the European Union and especially the Arab League, expressed support for the overall amendment process and considered the move an important step towards democratisation. US Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton stated that the US welcomed the referendum and looked forward to to the full implementation of the new constitution as a step toward the fulfilment of the aspirations and rights of all Moroccans. Parliamentary elections were subsequently held on 25 November 2011. Parties competed for 395 seats in the parliament, 70 more than the previous elections. The number of seats reserved for women doubled to sixty, while thirty seats were reserved for candidates under the age of forty. Out of 13.5 million eligible voters, about 57 per cent were 35 years or under. The moderately Islamist former5 opposition party, Justice and Development Party (known by its French acronym PJD) won the election, winning 107 of the 395 seats. Following the transformation of Morocco over the past two years, with a new constitution and subsequent legislative elections, the opposition movement started to wane, reports Al Arabiya. There is still discontent with the government due to perception of continued corruption and nepotism. However, activism is mostly confined to the internet, and as witnessed on the second year anniversary of the February 20 movement in February 2013, where a relatively small amount of people turned out at protests around the country. Despite continued problems, popular dissent appears to have eased for the most part within Morocco. Conclusion By the second anniversary of the civil unrest that swept the Arab world, monarchies of the region appear to be relatively less affected by the protests. The Arab Spring resulted in many republican regimes leaders falling from power, yet not one of the monarchies toppled. However notable this trend may be, it cannot alone conclude that monarchical regimes are more resilient to popular discontent than republican regimes. Aside from many cultural elements inherent in Arab monarchies, the monarchical response to events of the past two years is an important factor in the stability equation. It is undeniable that the Arab Spring did not fully spare the monarchies, as Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco were subject to recurrent protests on their soil. However, Bahrains use of force, along with international assistance, and Jordan and Moroccos reforms proved strategic tools and strategies utilised by the monarchy to quell tensions.

Moroccos Justice and Development Party has long been the opposition party until their victory in the 2011 election.

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