Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property January to June 2006 RECOVERY OF POSSESSION Danilo Parel v.

Prudencio 487 SCRA 405

Facts: Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner(Parel) alleging that: 1)he is the owner of a two-storey residential house at Forbes Park National Reservation (Baguio City); 2) that the property was constructed solely from his own funds and declared in his name under tax declarations; 3) that he allowed petitioners parents, Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to move therein and occupy the second floor while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials;4) that he allowed petitioner and children to temporarily reside thereat out of sheer magnanimity since respondents wife is the older sister of Florentino, petitioners father. In November 1985, Prudencio wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the former was due for retirement and he needed the place to which petitioners parents heeded when they migrated to U.S. in 1986. However, without his knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of Prudencios house. The refusal to vacate compelled him to file an action for recovery of possession as well as payment for monthly rental until the petitioner vacates the premises. On the other hand, petitioner says that his parents are the co-owners of the said residential house, i.e., the upper story belongs to respondent while the ground floor pertains to petitioners parents. He said he is occupying the ground floor upon the instruction of his father, Florentino, with Prudencios full knowledge and that the formers parents spent their own resources in improving and constructing the said two-storey house as coowners thereof. Basically the counterclaim is that Florentino, the father of petitioner was an awardee of the land on which the house stands, and as co-owner of the house, he occupied the ground floor thereof. RTC: there was co-ownership CA: Prudencio is the sole owner Issue: whether petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his father was a coowner of the subject two-storey residential house. Held: NO. Petitioners father was not a co-owner of the two storey-residential house. We agree with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint for recovery of possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof. Respondent presented the affidavit dated executed by Florentino and sworn to before the

Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property January to June 2006 Assistant City Assessor of Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca, which reads: I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age, employee, and residing at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, after having been sworn to according to law depose and say: That he is the occupant of a residential building located at Forbes Park, Reservation No. 1, Baguio City which is the subject of an advicement addressed to him emanating from the Office of the City Assessor, Baguio City, for assessment and declaration for taxation purposes; That I am not the owner of the building in question; That the building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently residing at 55 Hyacinth, Roxas District, Quezon City. It has not been shown that Florentino revoked this affidavit before he died in 1989. We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The house which petitioner claims to be co-owned by his late father had been consistently declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent, and this fact, taken with the other circumstances above-mentioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that respondent is the sole owner of the house subject matter of the litigation. DECISION OF CA AFFIRMED.

UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property January to June 2006

Spouses Valdez Jr. v. CA 489 SCRA 369 FACTS: The case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the MTC of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs are the registered owners of a residential lot at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which they acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. by virtue of Sales Contract. It is alleged also that defendants, without any color of title, occupied the said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession thereof; that they were asked several times to peacefully surrender the premises to the plaintiffs but the defendants refused and likewise did not want to amicably settle before the Barangay. On the other hand, the defendants claim that petitioners failed to state grounds for unlawful detainer (prior physical possession of the property or that they were the lessors thereof). In the alternative, private respondents claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection report from the DENR. MTC: ruled in favor of the plaintiffs RTC: affirmed MTC CA: reversed RTC and said that plaintiffs failed to allege prior material possession which is mandatory in forcible entry nor was their tolerance on the part of the owner to make out a case for unlawful detainer ISSUES: whether petitioners have made a clear case of unlawful detainer/ whether MTC had jurisdiction HELD/RATIO:NO. The case was actually one for forcible entry and not unlawful detainer. MTC had no jurisdiction. Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. To justify an

Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property January to June 2006 action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, their mother . Clearly, defendants entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Petition denied and CA decision affirmed.

Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property January to June 2006 RECOVERY OF POSSESSION/WRIT OF DEMOLITION Purok Bagong Silang Association Inc. v. Hon Evangeline Yuipco 489 SCRA 382 FACTS: Plaintiffs, all surnamed Kaimo, and their siblings, Henedina Kaimo Bringas and Florida Kaimo Clerego, were the co-owners of three parcels of land located in Kaskag, Surigao City, However, about 400 private individuals constructed their houses and other improvements on the property. In 1982, the occupants formed an association known as the Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. (PBSAI). The Kaimos filed a Complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 3203 ) in the RTC of Surigao City for the recovery of possession of real property, damages and attorneys fees against 64 occupants. In their answer to the complaint, most of the defendants declared that the subject property was classified as timberland and, as such, part of the public domain; thus, the plaintiffs had no cause of action against them. MTC ruled in favour of the Kaimos but the defendants still refused to vacate. A writ of demolition was thereafter issued by respondent judge. ISSUE: whether the Judge committed GAD in issuing the writ of demolition on May 25, 1998 and June 22, 1998 HELD/RATIO: No GAD, as to May 25 writ of demolition but Yes as to June 22 writ. Petitioner failed to establish that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of her discretion in issuing the May 25, 1998 Writ of Demolition. Under the decision of the respondent Judge, the defendants therein were directed to be evicted from the property of the respondents and ordered to return possession of the property to the latter. The respondent Judge neither ordered the eviction of any other person occupying the property of the respondents other than the defendants, nor ordered the Ex-Officio Sheriff to demolish the houses or structures of any person other than the defendants. However, the subsequent writ of demolition given on June 22, 1998 deviated from the previous writ such that it declared that the houses and improvements of the defendants, as well as the houses and structures of persons occupying and/or squatting in the property of the respondents, would be demolished. Clearly, the June 22, 1995 Order of the respondent Judge and the Notice of Demolition of the Ex-Officio Sheriff cannot be enforced against the 309 members of the petitioner who were not parties in Civil Case No. 3203 because only the parties in said case are bound by the decision and the concomitant orders therein. Strangers to the case are not bound by the decision in Civil Case No. 3203 or the proceedings taken therein. (Although the 309 members of the association had a right to file for prohibition, Supreme Court said there was no urgency to file the case before it because the CA had already filed a TRO against the demolition of their property).

UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property January to June 2006 Lumbuan v. Ronquillo 489 SCRA 650 Facts: Petitioner Milagros G. Lumbuan is the registered owner of a lot in Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila. On February 20, 1995, she leased it to respondent Alfredo A. Ronquillo for a period of three years. They agreed that the leased premises will be used exclusively for the respondents fastfood business, unless any other use is given, with the petitioners prior written consent. While the respondent at the start operated a fastfood business, he later used the premises as residence without the petitioners prior written consent. He also failed to pay the 10% annual increase in rent of P500/month starting 1996 and P1,000/month in 1997 to the present. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, the respondent refused to pay the arrears and vacate the leased premises. Petitioner filed against the respondent an action for Unlawful Detainer. Before the MeTC could receive the respondents Answer, the petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Acting upon this motion, the MeTC rendered a decision asking respondent to vacate the premises. Upon elevation, RTC directed the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further proceedings and to comply strictly with the condition that should the parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, the entire records of the case will be remanded to MeTC of Manila for it to decide the case anew. On petition for review with the CA, it ruled that when a complaint is prematurely instituted, as when the mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangay level had not been complied with, the court should dismiss the case and not just remand the records to the court of origin so that the parties may go through the prerequisite proceedings.

Issue: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE BARANGAY LEVEL Held/Ratio: YES. CA erred and it should proceed with the appeal. The primordial objective of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules, is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in court. Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary signed the Certificate to File Action stating that no settlement was reached by the parties. While admittedly no pangkat was constituted, it was not denied that the parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman

Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property January to June 2006 for possible settlement. The efforts of the Barangay Chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was formed, in our mind, there was substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court. This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410(b) of the same law that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case.

QUIETING OF TITLE Heirs of Florentino Remetio v. Villaruel 490 SCRA 43 Facts: The case commenced with the filing by the Heirs of Florentino Remetio, represented by Pepito Remetio Sioco of a Complaint for Quieting of Title, alleging that their late grandfather left a 6,076 square meter land in Magpag-ong, Batan, Aklan, declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 4706; that during the cadastral survey in the Municipality of Batan, Aklan, the said parcel of land was surveyed in the name of appellees mother, Basilisa Remetio Villaruel, and on the basis of such cadastral survey, appellees (villaruel) have asserted rights over subject land, casting a cloud over their (appellants) title of the same. Appellants (heirs of remetio) then prayed that they be adjudged as the rightful owners of subject land, that appellees be ordered to execute the necessary document for the cancellation of their mothers name in the Bureau of Lands, as claimant over said land, Appellees averred that the parcel of land surveyed in the name of their late mother is Lot No. 4862, with an area of 9,896 square meters; that the parcel of land described by appellants in their Complaint is not Lot No. 4864, as therein alleged, but Lot No. 4863; that the appellants have no cause of action against them as they(appellees) are claiming neither Lot No. 4863 nor Lot No. 4864 because the lot they own is Lot No. 4862 with an area of 9,896 square meters, which lot is separate and distinct from the land claimed by appellants as Lot No. 4863 has an area of 2,494 square meters only. (appellant-petitioner; appellee-private respondent) Issue: whether petitioners have proven exclusive possession and ownership of the land Held: NO. Private respondents are the rightful owners.

Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property January to June 2006 Petitioners filed this petition insisting that they have been in continuous, open, adverse, public and uninterrupted possession of the subject property as proven by the fact that they have constructed structures thereon without objection from private respondents. The trial courts ruling that private respondents possession of the property has spanned more than 50 years is allegedly erroneous since the latter have not presented any tax declaration prior to 1974. Petitioners insist that the fact that the cadastral survey of the property was in the name of private respondents mother does not warrant the conclusion that the property is owned by the latter. One witness, a certain Simplicia Abayon, contradicted the testimonies of three (3) co-witnesses for the petitioner and testified that private respondents predecessors also occupied the property in question. It is sufficient to cast a cloud on petitioners title and claim of exclusive ownership. On the other hand, private respondents presented four (4) witnesses who collectively testified that the subject property was previously owned and possessed by Eleuterio Remetio, was inherited by Basilisa Remetio Villaruel, and finally by private respondents. This continued possession covered a period of more than 50 years. The construction by petitioners of structures in the subject property is insufficient to establish their claim of ownership. We are persuaded by the trial courts finding, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that private respondents tolerated the construction of these structures because petitioners are their relatives. At any rate, there is no other fact or circumstance to indicate that private respondents relinquished their possession and ownership of the property in question.

WRIT OF POSSESSION/EXECUTION Sps. Espiridion v. CA 490 SCRA 273 Facts: Petitioners, spouses Constantino Espiridion and Remedios Espiridion and spouses Renato Ramos and Erlinda Ramos, mortgaged the subject property to Second Bulacan Development Bank (SBDB) as security for a P4,200,000 loan. They failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the mortgage, hence, SBDB extrajudicially foreclosed the property. SBDB subsequently acquired the property as the lone bidder in the public auction held on August 26, 1997. Petitioners failed to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period. As a consequence, ownership of the property was consolidated in the name of SBDB. On the other hand, petitioners allege that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale is null and void. They claimed that SBDB failed to comply with several requirements of extrajudicial foreclosure: no application for extrajudicial foreclosure was filed with the office of the clerk of court of the RTC of Makati City; the docket fees were not paid and no raffle of the publication of the notice of foreclosure sale was made.

Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property January to June 2006 TC only ruled upon the right of SBDB to a writ of possession/execution because it was the purchaser in a foreclosure sale and that it was ministerial on its part to grant the ex parte petition by the purchaser. CA granted the application for writ of possession/execution Issue: Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred or gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of execution/possession pending appeal on two grounds: (a) the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was void and (b) no justifiable basis was shown and no bond was posted. Held: No. There was no GAD on the part of the CA. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in the buyers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. Hence, there was no issue on exercise of discretion. In this case, since the issuance of the writ of possession did not involve an exercise of discretion, no abuse of discretion could have been committed by the trial court. Likewise, the issue of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was of no moment. It could not bar the issuance of the writ of possession. As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure is not a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of execution/writ of possession. As to the requirement of posting a bond, it is not a ground for denial when the 1 year redemption period has already lapsed. The purchaser, who has a right to possession that extends after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. Thus, the posting of a bond is no longer needed. ACCION PUBLICIANA/UNLAWFUL DETAINER Germelina Racaza v. Ernesto Gozum 490 SCRA 302 Facts: The plaintiffs are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land with 3-door apartment. The property was formerly owned by the father of the plaintiffs, the late Carlos Torres. In 1981, defendant Ernesto Gozum occupied the back portion of the property on a P3,500.00 monthly rental and continued to occupy the same even after the death of Carlos Torres on December 26, 1993. On July 1, 1995, plaintiffs sent Gozum a letter of demand to vacate the premises. After a failed barangay conciliation, on November 24, 1995, plaintiffs commenced an ejectment case which was dismissed due to a technicality. Two years after, the plaintiffs again sent a letter of demand to vacate and said that the verbal contract to lease has already expired and that the defendant already discontinued payment of monthly rentals. An accion publiciana was filed with the RTC. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging that unlawful detainer must be filed, which was however denied because RTC said that an unlawful detainer must be filed within one (1) year from the notice to vacate given as early as July 1, 1995 and since over two (2) years had

Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property January to June 2006 passed when the case was filed, the proper action is accion publiciana and no longer unlawful detainer. Defendant thereafter filed his answer asseverating that he has a 10-year contract of lease over the premises executed between him and plaintiffs late father on October 1, 1989 to expire on September 30, 1999 and so, the notice to vacate and the present case were all prematurely done. Defendant likewise denied the allegation that he has not been paying rentals. When it was elevated to the CA, the appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the case, holding that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana considering that it had been filed before the lapse of one (1) year from the date the last letter of demand to respondent had been made. The CA ruled that the proper remedy of petitioners should have been an action for unlawful detainer filed with the municipal or metropolitan trial court Issue: whether the proper action is unlawful detainer or accion publiciana Held: It should be accion publiciana. To summarize, petitioners claim that (1) they are the owners of the property, being the successors-in-interest of the original owners; (2) their predecessors-in-interest entered into a verbal lease agreement with respondent on a month-to-month basis; (3) they decided to terminate the verbal lease contract upon the expiration of the last monthly term sometime in 1995; and (4) on July 1, 1995, they demanded that respondent leave the property, but respondent refused to do so. Undeniably, the foregoing averments constitute a cause of action that is based primarily on unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. Petitioners seek the recovery of the possession of the leased premises following the lapse of the term of the verbal lease contract entered into by petitioners predecessors-in-interest with respondent. The allegation that the contract is on a month-to-month basis becomes material in this sense because it signifies that the lease contract is terminable at the end of every month. Thus, petitioners may exercise their right to terminate the contract at the end of any month even if none of the conditions of the contract had been violated, and such right cannot be defeated by the lessee's timely payment of the rent or by his willingness to continue doing so. Moreover, even if the month-to-month agreement is only on a verbal basis, if it is shown that the property is needed for the lessors own use or for the use of an immediate member of the family or for any of the other statutory grounds to eject, then the lease is considered terminated as of the end of the month, after proper notice or demand to vacate has been given. At this juncture, it must be pointed out that notice or demand to vacate had been properly served upon respondent through the letter dated July 1, 1995. Defendants day that the date should be reckoned from May 27, 1997 and not July 1, 1995. To reiterate, the allegation that the lease was on a month-to-month basis is tantamount to saying that the lease expired every month. Since the lease already expired mid-year in 1995 as communicated in petitioners letter dated July 1, 1995, it was at that time that respondents occupancy became unlawful. Moreover, a perusal of the May 27, 1997 letter shows that it merely reiterated their original demand for respondent to vacate on the basis of the expiration of the verbal lease contract mentioned in the first letter. In sum, more than one year has lapsed from the letter to vacate and hence, the proper remedy would be accion publiciana and not a case

Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property January to June 2006 for unlawful detainer.

REPLEVIN Twin Ace Holding Corporation v. Rufina and Company 490 SCRA 368 Facts: Twin Ace is a private domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of rhum, wines and liquor under the name and style "Tanduay Distillers." It has registered its mark of ownership of its bottles with the Bureau of Patent, Trademarks and Technology Transfer under Republic Act No. 623. In the conduct of its business, it sells its products to the public excluding the bottles. It makes substantial investments in brand new bottles which it buys from glass factories and which they use for about five times in order to recover the cost of acquisition. Twin Ace thus retrieves its used empty bottles, washes and uses them over and over again as containers for its products. On the other hand, Rufina is engaged in the production, extraction, fermentation and manufacture of patis and other food seasonings and is engaged in the buying and selling of all kinds of foods, merchandise and products for domestic use or for export to other countries. In producing patis and other food seasonings, Rufina uses as containers bottles owned by Twin Ace without any authority or permission from the latter. In the process, Rufina is unduly benefited from the use of the bottles. Twin Ace filed for recovery of possession of personal property, permanent injunction and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin, TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction against Rufina and Company. Rufina interposed that they bought it from a junk dealer and that they are owners thereof. RTC granted and CA affirmed. Issue: whether sec. 6 of R.A. 5700 (An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers) which exempts those who use the bottles, etc. as containers for "sisi," "bagoong," "patis," and similar native products is applicable to Rufina 2) whether this exemption applies to small-scale businesses only HELD: YES it is applicable to Rufina. No, it applies not only to small-scale but even to large scale businesses such as the defendant. We find and so hold that the exemption contained in Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 623 as amended by RA 5700, applies to all manufacturers of sisi, bagoong, patis and similar native products without distinction or qualification as to whether they are small, medium or large scale. In the case of Twin Ace v. Lorenzana Food Corp., it is worth noting that Lorenzana Food Corporation which prevailed is certainly not a small scale industry. Just like Rufina, Lorenzana Food Corporation also manufactures and exports processed foods and other related products, e.g., patis, toyo, bagoong, vinegar and other food seasonings. As to the issue on recovery of

Civil Law Review Case Digests: Property January to June 2006 possession, wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued. In this case, Twin Ace has not shown that it is entitled to the possession of the bottles in question and consequently there is thus no basis for the demand by it of due compensation. Petition DENIED.