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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No.

49549 August 30, 1990 EVELYN CHUA-QUA, Petitioner, vs. HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG HIGH SCHOOL, INC., Respondents.

REGALADO, J.: This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner had been employed therein as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in the sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to extend remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted such instructions in school by petitioner. 1In the course thereof, the couple fell in love and on December 24, 1975, they got married in a civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of Iloilo. 2 Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age but Bobby Qua being sixteen (16) years old, consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs. Concepcion Ong. 3Their marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a church wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City on January 10, 1976. 4 chanrobles virtual law library On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at Bacolod City an application for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the following ground: "For abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral values, of the school." 5 chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976. 6 Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. of the National Labor Relations Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was certified for resolution, required the parties to submit their position papers and supporting evidence. Affidavits 7 were submitted by private respondent to bolster its contention that petitioner, "defying all standards of decency, recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy under her advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation." 8More specifically, private respondent raised issues on the fact that petitioner stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom after school hours when everybody had gone home, with one door allegedly locked and the other slightly open.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting any formal hearing, rendered an "Award" in NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private respondent granting the clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner. It was held therein that The affidavits . . . although self-serving but were never disputed by the respondent pointed out that before the marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua, fourteen (14) years her junior and during her employment with petitioner, an amorous relationship existed between them. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the undisputed written testimonies of several witnesses convincingly picture the circumstances under which such amorous relationship was manifested within the premises of the school, inside the classroom, and within the sight of some employees. While no direct evidences have been introduced to show that immoral acts were committed during these times, it is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired and took place during these times. . . . 9 chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of the affidavits referred to. 10 chanrobles virtual law library On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission claiming denial of due process for not having been furnished copies of the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter. She further contended that there was nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into lawful wedlock with her student. 11chanrobles virtual law library On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and ordered petitioner's reinstatement with backwages, with the following specific findings: Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on the student desk inside a classroom after classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and Chin are of the same tenor. No statements whatever were sworn by them that they were eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous acts. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to accommodate the conclusion of the Arbiter, we could not deduce anything immoral or scandalous about a girl and a boy talking inside a room after classes with lights on and with the door open. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance application was precipitated by immoral acts which did not lend dignity to the position of appellant. Aside from such gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or conduct by herein appellant, no evidence to support such claims was introduced by petitioner-appellee. We reviewed the the sequence of events from the beginning of the relationship between appellant Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua up to the date of the filing of the present application for clearance in search of evidence that could have proved detrimental to the image and dignity of the school but none has come to our attention. . . . 12 chanrobles virtual law library

The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on March 30, 1977, reversed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6) months salary as financial assistance. 13 chanrobles virtual law library On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of the Philippines. 14After the corresponding exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision. Private respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with full back wages from the time she was not allowed to work until the date of her actual reinstatement. 15 chanrobles virtual law library Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case with alternating reversals, one would think that this decision of public respondent wrote finis to petitioner's calvary. However, in a resolution dated December 6, 1978, public respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration 16 of herein private respondent and despite opposition thereto, 17 reconsidered and modified the aforesaid decision, this time giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services of petitioner as classroom teacher but giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary. 18 chanrobles virtual law library In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent reasoned out in his manifestation/comment filed on August 14, 1979 in this Court in the present case: That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues involved in the case, but went further to view the matter from the standpoint of policy which involves the delicate task of rearing and educating of children whose interest must be held paramount in the school community, and on this basis, this Office deemed it wise to uphold the judgment and action of the school authorities in terminating the services of a teacher whose actuations and behavior, in the belief of the school authorities, had spawned ugly rumors that had cast serious doubts on her integrity, a situation which was considered by them as not healthy for a school campus, believing that a school teacher should at all times act with utmost circumspection and conduct herself beyond reproach and above suspicion; 19 chanrobles virtual law library In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the reversal of the aforesaid resolution of public respondent,viz.: 1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay Tung's claim to the contrary, was actually based on her marriage with her pupil and is, therefore, illegal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. Petitioner's right to due process under the Constitution was violated when the hearsay affidavits of Laddy Maselliones, Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong Lee Bing, were admitted and considered in evidence without presenting the affiants as witnesses and affording the petitioner the right to confront and cross-examine them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed serious misconduct or breached the trust reposed on her by her employer or committed any of the other grounds enumerated in Article 283 (Now Article 282) of the Labor Code which will justify the termination of her employment. 20 chanrobles virtual law library

We first dispose of petitioner's claim that her right to due process was violated. We do not agree. There is no denial of due process where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure by which issues are resolved based on position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have insisted on a hearing to confront and cross-examine the affiants but she did not do so, obviously because she was convinced that the case involves a question of law. Besides, said affidavits were also cited and discussed by her in the proceedings before the Ministry of Labor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the community toward the teachers and to strengthen the educational system, private respondent submits that petitioner's actuations as a teacher constitute serious misconduct, if not an immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services. It argues that as a school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school campus, petitioner had moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority and respect extended to her. Furthermore, it charged petitioner with having allegedly violated the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states that a "school official or teacher should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or student." 21 chanrobles virtual law library On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate her services as there is nothing wrong with a teacher falling in love with her pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage with him. She argued that she was dismissed because of her marriage with Bobby Qua This contention was sustained in the aforesaid decision of the National Labor Relations Commission thus: . . . One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application for clearance was filed only after more than one month elapsed from the date of appellant's marriage to Bobby Qua Certainly, such belated application for clearance weakens instead of strengthening the cause of petitioner-appellee. The alleged immoral acts transpired before the marriage and if it is these alleged undignified conduct that triggered the intended separation, then why was the present application for clearance not filed at that time when the alleged demoralizing effect was still fresh and abrasive? 22 chanrobles virtual law library After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that the determination of the legality of the dismissal hinges on the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and/or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of conduct and the applicable law. Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is before us is a factual question, the resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to review the factual conclusions arrived at by public respondent, and to nullify his decision through the extraordinary writ of certiorari if the same is tainted by absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not bound thereby. 23 chanrobles virtual law library

We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly and forcefully observed by him in his original decision: Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the records referred to are the affidavits attached as Annexes "A" to "D" of the position paper dated August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at the arbitration proceedings) in arriving at his decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit, leaving many question unanswered by a rational mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain times of the day during off school hours when appellant and her student were found together in one of the classrooms of the school. But the records of the case present a ready answer: appellant was giving remedial instruction to her student and the school was the most convenient place to serve the purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete absence of specific immoral acts allegedly committed by appellant and her student. For another, and very important at that, the alleged acts complained of invariably happened from September to December, 1975, but the disciplinenary action imposed by appellee was sought only in February, 1976, and what is more, the affidavits were executed only in August, 1976 and from all indications, were prepared by appellee or its counsel. The affidavits heavily relied upon by appellee are clearly the product of after-thought. . . . The action pursued by appellee in dismissing appellant over one month after her marriage, allegedly based on immoral acts committed even much earlier, is open to basis of the action sought seriously doubted; on the question. The basis of the action sought is seriously doubted; on the contrary, we are more inclined to believe that appellee had certain selfish, ulterior and undisclosed motives known only to itself. 24 chanrobles virtual law library As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to show that immoral acts were committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he concluded that "it is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired during those times." 25 In reversing his decision, the National Labor Relations Commission observed that the assertions of immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct evidence to support such claim, 26 a finding which herein public respondent himself shared.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt the volte-face in the questioned resolution, which we hereby reject, despite his prior trenchant observations hereinbefore quoted. What is revealing however, is that the reversal of his original decision is inexplicably based on unsubstantiated surmises and non sequiturs which he incorporated in his assailed resolution in this wise: . . . While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing immoral acts inside the classroom it seems obvious and this Office is convinced that such a happening indeed transpired within the solitude of the classrom after regular class hours. The marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua is the best proof which confirms the suspicion that the two indulged in amorous relations in that place during those times of the day. . . . 27 chanrobles virtual law library With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be

so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is being unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner. This policy, however, is not at odds with and should not be capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure granted by the Constitution to labor. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent has been inevitably and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent, dated December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of service.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Sarmiento, J., is on leave. chanrobles virtual law library

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-33345 November 20, 1978 MARCELA M. BAGAJO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch 11, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

BARREDO, J.: Petition for certiorari to review, under Republic Act 5440, the decision of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental in Criminal Case No. OZ-95 affirming the judgment of conviction rendered against petitioner by the Municipal Court of Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental and imposing upon her the penalty to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs, for the crime of slight physical injuries.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The background facts as found by the trial court as follows: chanrobles virtual law library In the afternoon of April 1, 1970, at about 2 o'clock, petitioner who was a teacher, left her classroom to go to the principal's office. While the teacher was thus out of the room, complainant Wilma Alcantara, one of her pupils, left her desk and went to chat with Lilibeth Purlas, a classmate, while leaning over the desk of Ponciano Navarro, another classmate. At that juncture, a fourth classmate, Benedicta Guirigay passed near Wilma, who suddenly raised her leg causing the former to stumble on it and fall down, her head hitting the edge of the desk, her stomach a sharp pointed umbrella and her knee a nail of the desk. She fainted. At that precise moment, petitioner was entering the room. She asked Wilma what happened but the latter denied having anything to do with what had just taken place. Petitioner thereupon became angry and, with a piece of "bamboo stick" which she was using as a pointer whipped Wilma behind her legs and her thigh, thereby causing the following injuries, according to the medical certificate presented in evidence: 1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both legs. it is about four inches in length and 1/4 centimeter in width. There are three on the right leg and two on the left leg.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the dorsal surface of the right thigh.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The above lessions, if without complication, may heal in four to six days. (Pages 26-27, Record.)

Upon the foregoing facts, petitioner claims in her appeal that respondent Judge erred in convicting her of the crime of slight physical injuries. She maintains that as the teacher, she was just trying to discipline her pupil Wilma for tripping her classmate and for denying that she did so. She contends she was not actuated by any criminal intent. And she is joined in this pose by the Solicitor General, who recommends her acquittal, coupled with the observation that although "petitioner is not criminally liable for her conduct, she may still be held accountable for her conduct administratively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We agree with the Solicitor General.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the school premises and during school activities and affairs, the teacher exercises substitute parental authority over the students. (Article 349, Civil Code.) More specifically, according to Article 352, "The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student." And pursuant to this provision, Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual enjoins: The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing pupils about), imposing manual work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel and unusual punishments of any nature, reducing scholarship rating for bad conduct, holding up a pupil to unnecessary ridicule, the use of epithets and expressions tending to destroy the pupil's selfrespect, and the permanent confiscation of personal effects of pupils are forbidden. In other words, under the foregoing Civil Code and administrative injunctions, no teacher may impose corporal punishment upon any student in any case. But We are not concerned in this appeal with the possible administrative liability of petitioner. Neither are we called upon here to pass on her civil liability other than what could be ex-delicto, arising from her conviction, if that should be the outcome hereof. The sole question for Our resolution in this appeal relates exclusively to her criminal responsibility for the alleged crime of slight physical injuries as defined in Article 266, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to which she was prosecuted and convicted in the courts below.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In this respect, it is Our considered opinion, and so We Hold that as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stickpointer, in the circumstances proven in the record. Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility for such act she might be found to have incurred by the proper authorities, We are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent. That she meant to punish Wilma and somehow make her feel such punishment may be true, but We are convinced that the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. The nature of the injuries actually suffered by Wilma, a few linear bruises (at most 4 inches long and cm. wide) and the fact that petitioner whipped her only behind the legs and thigh, show, to Our mind, that indeed she intended merely to discipline her. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve to be discipline. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of petitioner to commit any criminal offense. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. Nothing said above is intended to mean that this Court sanctions generally the use of corporal punishment by teachers on their pupils. All that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case before Us, there is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in

the evidence before the trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries suffered by complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief as a teacher exercising authority over her pupil in loco parentis, she was within her rights to punish her moderately for purposes of discipline. Whether or not she exceeded the degree of moderation permitted by the laws and rules governing the performance of her functions is not for Us, at this moment and in this case, to determine.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Absent any applicable precedent indicative of the concept of the disciplinary measures that may be employed by teachers under Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted above, We feel it is wiser to leave such determination first to the administrative authorities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library After several deliberations, the Court has remained divided, such that the necessary eight (8) votes necessary for conviction has not been obtained. Accordingly, the petitioner -accused is entitled to acquittal. , chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to her being dealt with administratively or in a civil case for damages not resulting exdelicto. Castro, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Santos, JJ., concurs in the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar. chanrobles virtual law library

Separate Opinions

ANTONIO, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library The effectiveness of a teacher to exercise authority over her pupil in loco parentis depends on her ability to enforce discipline. Petitioner had authority to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil, if the punishment is moderate, not prompted by bad motive, and is of such a nature that the parent of the child might expect the child would receive if she did wrong. AQUINO, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library The teacher, who inflicted corporal punishment, should be disciplined administratively. In People vs. Javier, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 150, the Court of Appeals, per Melencio, J., Briones, Montemayor and Enage, JJ., concurring, held that a teacher, who inflicted moderate corporal punishment, was not criminally liable because he had no criminal intent, citing Mansell vs. Griffin, I K. B. 160. (Justice Torres dissented.) FERNANDO, J, dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library I find myself in sympathy with the approach taken in the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar not only in view of the humanity that should permeate the law but also in accordance with the tendency much more manifest of late in international law to accord greater and greater protection to the welfare of the young, as an aspect of human rights. Moreover, it is well-settled that the doctrine parens patriaecalls for the state exercising the utmost vigilance to assure that teachers and educators should refrain from the infliction of corporal punishment which for me at least is a relic of the past. This is not to lose sight of the significance of the view stressed in the opinion of Justice Barredo that criminal intent must be shown to justify a finding of guilt. Nonetheless, considering the nature and extent of the physical injuries sustained, as shown in the dissenting opinion of Justice Muoz Palma, the protestation of good faith on the part of appellant had, for me, lost its persuasiveness. 'The leading case of People v. Cagoco, 1 where the accused approached the victim from behind and suddenly struck him with his fist on the back part of his head causing him to fall backwards, his head striking the asphalt pavement as a result of which he died a few hours later comes to mind. It was the ruling of this Court that murder was committed as there was alevosia, although appellant was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so great a wrong as that inflicted. 2 chanrobles virtual law library Thus I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the acquittal of the accused. TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library I concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Muoz Palma and vote for affirmance of the judgment of conviction which liberally imposed a mere fine of P50.00 notwithstanding the physical injuries requiring four to six days' healing time inflicted upon the victim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library I only wish to stress that Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code expressly penalizes the offense of slight physical injuries and maltreatment, while Article 352 of the Civil Code explicitly provides

that "(T)he relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government, regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the Heart and mind of the pupil or student," even as Article 349 recognizes teachers and professors as among those who exercise substitute parental authority. Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual further categorically forbids "the use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing pupils about)." chanrobles virtual law library It cannot be contended then that teachers in the exercise of their authority in loco parentis may, without incurring criminal liability inflict moderate corporal punishment. The power to inflict moderate punishment on children is vested by Article 316 of the Civil Codeexclusively, in the parents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The petitioner might be entitled to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances in her favor such as having acted with obfuscation, but in the face of the express provisions of law she may not be absolved of the proven charge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The statement in the main opinion (at page 4) that "wheather or not (petitioner) exceeded the degree of moderation permitted by the laws and rules governing the performance of her functions is not for Us, at this moment and in this case, to determine" (but that "We feel it wiser to leave such determination first to the administrative authorities") appears to be contrary to the laws and rules which do not permit the infliction of corporal punishment, moderate or otherwise, by teachers on their pupils but provide for criminal, civil and administrative sanctions, and contrary to the proven facts, which as pointed out by Justice Muoz Palma, show that the physical injuries inflicted by petitioner on her pupil could by no means be described as "moderate" (even assuming that teachers had the authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment). MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library The facts in this case are as follows.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Inside a classroom while the teacher was away, an eleven year old girl-pupil tripped a girlclassmate, causing slight physical injuries to the latter. Upon being questioned by the teacher in charge who just then came back, the erring child denied authorship of the misdeed. The teacher became angry and, with a bamboo stick, whipped the erring child on the buttocks, thighs, and legs with such violence as to leave on the punished limbs, not welts, but bruises requiring some four to six days to heal. The medical certificate described the injuries thus: 1. Linear bruises at the middle of the dorsal surface of both legs. It is about four inches in length and 1/4 centimeters in width. There are three on the right leg and 2 on the left leg.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the dorsal surface of the right thigh.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The above lesions, if without complications, may heal in four to six days (page 2. Brief of Solicitor General).

Convicted by the municipal court for slight physical injuries, the accused appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction. Hence, this appeal direct to this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Solicitor General recommends the reversal of the decision of the court below. Accordingly, the majority returns a judgment of acquittal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WE dissent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library I chanrobles virtual law library Criminal intent is presumed in every criminal act. But the Solicitor General practically argues that a good motive negatives criminal intent. Motive may mitigate, but does not totally exculpate, criminal liability.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Motive, in criminal law, consists of the special or personal reason which may prompt or induce a person to perform the act constituting a crime (Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, 9th ed., 1964, p. 41). It is the moving power which impels one to act for a definite result, as distinguished from "intent" which is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result (People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193). The foregoing distinction has gained wide acceptance among our criminal law commentators (see Francisco, The Revised Penal Code, Annotated and Commented, 2nd ed., 1954, Book One, p. 38; Reyes, the Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, 6th ed., 1965, Book One, p. 60; Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 3rd ed., 1971, p. 16). In relation to the "particular means" employed - the overt acts committed by a person - motive, unlike intent, is quite materially removed. One motive can give rise to one of several possible courses of action, lawful or unlawful, as one act could have been actuated by one of several possible motives, good or bad. That is why in our law on evidence, no unlawful motive is presumed from the proof of commission of an unlawful act. Nor would such presumption, if there was, be of any use, for materially unrelated as motive is to the prohibited overt act, it is not essential to the determination of a crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Since acts are equivocal as to motive, it is often impossible to ascertain the reasons which moved a person to commit an act. This finds excellent example in the case at bar. While the accused stoutly asserts that her motive was to discipline the child, The trial court and the lower appellate court hold differently. Their unanimous finding is that the accused committed the act in the heat of anger - a state of mind which could hardly harbor a good motive. The Court of First Instance expresses its findings thus It appears that ... (a)t this precise moment, the accused entered the room and asked Wilma what had happened. Wilma answered that she had nothing to do with the failing down of Benedicta. Ponciano reported to the accused that Wilma purposely blocked Benedicta with her legs and she fell to the floor. The accused became angry and whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick (at pages 1 and 2).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library From the evidence it has been duly proved that while Benedicta Guirigay was passing near Wilma Alcantara, the latter suddenly raised her leg and Benedicta stumbled on it and fell to the

floor. She fainted and suffered some injuries. The accused became very angry got her piece of bamboo stick which she was using as a pointer stick and with it whipped Wilma several times, thereby causing on Wilma the physical injuries described by Dr. Ozarraga in his medical certificate (at page 4; Emphasis supplied). In the same manner, the municipal court finds that - chanrobles virtual law library ... (I)n the instant case, it would appear that the accused Marcela M. Bagajo, was carried away by her passion or anger in whipping to such an extreme Wilma Alcantara with a bamboo stick not really apt for the purpose. The victim of Wilma Alcantara's mischief or naughtiness was Benedicta Guirigay a working pupil actually living with her(the accused)for some years. ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The motive of the accused was to avenge the injury to the victim who, as found by the trial court, has been living with (and working for) the accused teacher. Will vengeance justify the act? chanrobles virtual law library But assuming that the motive of the accused was really good, does this mean that criminal intent on her part is thus completely ruled out? WE do not believe so. A good motive, as we have earlier intimated, is not incompatible with an unlawful intent. One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive appears to be good or bad or even though no motive is proven. A good motive does not prevent an act from being a crime. (People ex rel Hegeman v. Corrigan 87 N.E. 792, 796; 195 N.Y. 1, quoting People v. Molineux supra; Clark, Cr. Law, sec. 14; People v. Weiss 300 N.Y.S. 249, 255; 252 App. Div. 463). A classic example is euthanasia or mercy killing. It is condemned by law although the motive may be to spare a hopeless patient prolonged suffering. And if a father drowns his child who is five years of age to save it from starving, he is guilty of parricide though he was actuated by a good motive - love for the child (People v.Kirby 2 Parker Cr. R., N.Y., 28. See also U.S. v. Marmon 45 Fed. 414. Both are cited in The Revised Penal Code, Francisco, supra). The father or brother of a rape victim, who kills the rapist long after the commission of the rape. to avenge the victim's defloration, is not exempt from penal liability. A son killing his sleeping father, who used to beat up his hardworking mother, to relieve his good mother from so much misery, does not justify the parricide. So also, if a person cuts off the foot of a mischievous child to prevent if from doing further mischief with its foot, and thus save it from possible criminal liability, that person stands liable for physical injuries. True enough, the act involved in the instant case, which is the beating of a child, is less serious than those involved in the above-cited cases, but the fact that an act is less serious than another does not mean that it is not criminal. Other examples can be catalogued ad infinitum. Thus, our penal code provides specific penalties for specific crimes, depending, generally, on their seriousness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library II chanrobles virtual law library The Solicitor General further maintains that the act committed by the accused is not unlawful. "Administering moderate corporal punishment," he says, "is not so defined as felony by the Revised Penal Code." chanrobles virtual law library But "administering corporal punishment" is a felony, although the Code categorized it under the more graphic term "slight physical injuries". The pertinent provision is stated as follows:

Art. 266. Slight physical injuries ... - The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished: chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library 2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library (Emphasis supplied). In fact, even if no visible injury were caused by the act of administering punishment, it would still be punished as an illtreatment by deed under paragraph 3 of the same Article 266.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library From the facts found by the trial court, the following material points appear: (1) the teacher beat the child with a bamboo stick, and (2) the beating caused physical injuries on the child, consisting of linear bruises requiring some four to six days to heal. The act of the accused, no doubt, constitutes the very offense penalized by the cited provision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Commission of a prohibited act having been indubitably shown, no proof of criminal intent is necessary. For, "from the felonious acts (of the accused), freely and deliberately executed, the moral and injurious intent arises conclusively and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to the contrary" (People v. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52, 53. See also U.S. v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92; People v. Abando, 2 CA Rep. 205; paragraph [b], section 5 of Rule 13, Rules of Court; 16 C.J. 81).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In claiming that she merely acted within the limits of her authority in punishing the child as the latter's teacher and substitute parent, the accused in effect invokes the defense of having acted in the lawful exercise of a right under paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The "right" or authority claimed by the teacher is that which supposedly flows from the civil law concept of "substitute parental authority" exercised by teachers over their pupils. The argument is that since under Article 349 of the Civil Code, teachers exercise substitute parental authority, and under Article 316, parents have the power to correct their children and punish them moderately, it follows logically that teachers can likewise punish the pupils under their charge. And if parents, in the exercise of their authority, can inflict corporal punishment on their children, so can teachers on their pupils.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The right of parents to chastise their troublesome, mischievous or disobedient children must be conceded as it is necessary to the government of families, and to the good order of society. However, this right was not meant to be a license for manhandling or physically chastising a misbehaving child. At the same time that the law has created and preserved this right, in its regard for the safety of the child, it has prescribed bounds beyond which it shall not be carried (Johnson v. State, 2 Hump Tenn 283; 36 Am. Dec. 332). Thus, Dean Francisco, commenting on Article 316 of the Civil Code, observes: "It is to be noted that the law provides for 'moderate'

punishment.Since modern educational system forbids the use of corporal or physical punishment, this would be a good test in determining the limitation of the power of parents to correct and punish their children moderately. Parents should never exceed the limits of prudence and human sentiments in proceeding against their children" (Francisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated and Commented, 1953 ed., Book One, pp. 846-857; citing 2 Manresa 22-23; 5 Sanchez Roman 1140; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, November 26, 1901).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This observation is shared by Professors Garcia and Alba, who maintain that: "The power to correct and to punish children moderately should be understood as not including corporal or physical punishment, for otherwise it will be against modern trends in education and a violation of the provision of the Revised Penal Code. Prudence and moderation should be the rule" (Civil Code of the Philippines, 1950 ed., Vol. 1, p. 535).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The abiding love which reigns over families, the native respect which children bear towards their parents, and the moral ascendancy which parents have over their children, should give parents enough force to maintain the prestige of their parental authority. Even if these fail, the law affords parents recourse to the courts under Act 4002. Under said law, minor children guilty of disrespect or disobedience may be held criminally liable upon the complaint of parents. This law is a strong suggestion that parents are not to take the law in their hands. In our republican setup, even the government of families is not beyond the pale of the rule of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Indeed sanctions are provided in Article 332 of the Civil Code when parents, hiding behind the cloak of the parental privilege, "treat their children with excessive harshness" which is a cause for deprivation or suspension of their parental authority (see Perez v. Samson, CA, 48 O.G. No. 12, p. 5368). The procedure therefor is laid down by Rule 99, section 7 of the Rules of Court, which includes as grounds for such deprivation or suspension when the parents "unlawfully beat or otherwise habitually maltreat" the child.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Moreover, abusive parents may be proceeded against criminally. It must be observed that our general law on physical injuries does not exempt parents (much less teachers) from criminal liability for bodily harm inflicted on children or pupils as punishment for misconduct. The only concession given to the parents by law, under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, is that, in case of serious physical injuries inflicted in the course of a filial correction, the circumstance of relationship shall not be considered for the purpose of imposing the greater penalty. This means that parents shall suffer only the ordinary penalty provided for assailants who are not related to the offended party within the specified degrees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Needless to emphasize, the authority delegated to teachers cannot be greater than that conferred on parents. Truly, the power exercised by teachers over pupils is more restrictively, if not more clearly, defined in law. The very chapter which gives teachers and professors substitute parental authority explicitly denies them the power to administer corporal punishment, The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is of the following tenor: Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal

punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student (emphasis supplied). Said admonition is felicitously incorporated in the government regulations promulgated pursuant to law, namely, the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual, the pertinent provision of which reads as follows: Sec. 150. The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing pupils about), imposing manual work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel and unusual punishments of any nature ... are forbidden (Third Revision, 1959 ed.). Under the aforecited rule, the teacher cannot even require the erring pupil to clean the room or mow the lawn in the campus to discipline him, although these penalties do not involve physical injury. Neither can the teacher order the child to stand at the corner of the classroom as it would degrade or humiliate the child. He cannot even push the pupil about to remind him that his conduct is reproachable. By what twist of reasoning can we then uphold the power to apply corporal punishment as a legitimate means of correction? chanrobles virtual law library In the case at bar, the teacher clearly overdid herself. In whipping the child several times with a bamboo stick, an instrument liable to cause, as in fact it caused, physical injuries, the accused could not have meant to give expression to a feeling of nobility. More than inflicting bodily injuries, the punishment humiliated the child in front of her classmates. In its execution, it was plainly and simply excessive and brutal. The most that the teacher could have done under the circumstances was to admonish the child, if she was certain of her guilt. She could have reported her to her parents and to the parents of the pupil who was tripped, and in turn, the parents to the injured child could have reported the tripping incident to the police authorities for the institution of the proper criminal charges or could have sued the parents of the erring pupil for civil liability. The teacher pursued none of these available courses of action. Instead, she chose to take the law in her hands and, in the process, arrogated unto herself the prerogatives of a prosecutor, judge and executioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library From the facts of the case, we therefore cannot find any justification for the acts of the teacher. The acts committed are not only unauthorized even under the concept of the substitute parental authority behind which the accused seeks refuge, but they are precisely the acts teachers are expressly forbidden to do. The accused acted not to discharge the function of a teacher, but rather, acted forgetting that she was a teacher.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Parenthetically, the Solicitor General noted that the beating was administered on "parts of the body which are not vulnerable to any serious injury." But precisely, the teacher stands accused only of slight physical injuries. The doctrine enunciated by a division of the Court of Appeals in the 1940 case of People versus Javier (citing the 1908 case of Mansell v. Griffin 1 K.B. 160) that "a teacher in a public elementary school has authority to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil" (40 OG 18th Supp. 150), has been expressly revoked by Article 352 of the New Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950 and Article 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public Schools aforequoted. Moreover, in the Javier case, the main reason of the Court of Appeals in acquitting the appellant therein was because the Court of Appeals

cannot positively conclude that it was appellant's blow that caused the serious injury. An equally strong probability is that it was caused by the other boys during their boxing game. As a matter of fact, the physician who treated Bravo, testifying for the prosecution, stated that the injuries suffered by Bravo 'must have been caused by a hard and blunt instrument.' We are constrained, therefore, to doubt appellant's guilt, We are inclined to believe appellant's theory that the incident was magnified in order to find cause for removing him from the teaching staff of Quinalabasa for reasons appearing uncontradicted in the record. He was disliked by the residents in the barrio because he had been requiring his pupils to do plenty of extracurricular work in school, ... . There was also the desire of Alejandro Payoyo, a sponsor in the marriage of Hilaria Bagaoisan, mother of Bravo, to put his niece, Joaquina Payoyo, a temporary teacher in another place, in appellant's stead. That the barrio People desired to appellant dismissed as a school teacher was also testified to by Elpidio Doloctero (Vol. 40 O.G., 18th Supp. p. 152, Emphasis supplied). It is clear, therefore, that the main ground for acquitting the appellant Javier was that guilt was not demonstrated beyond moral certainty. Consequently, the additional reason that the teacher has the authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment was purelyobiter dictum, as it was not necessary to a finding of acquittal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Furthermore, in the Javier case, the appellate court laid down limitations on the exercise of such authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment, namely, the teacher must not inflict any bodily harm and that he is not dictated by any bad motive (Vol. 40 O.G. 18th Supp. pp. 153-154). In the case at bar, appellant caused bodily harm (slight physical injuries) on the pupil to give vent to her anger as a measure of revenge for the injury caused by the erring pupil on another pupil, appellant's ward and househelper.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in the Javier case is further weakened by the dissenting opinion of Justice Torres, which dissent proclaims most accurately the present policy. "The age when corporal punishment was the basic factor of discipline in the schools has passed, and a teacher who has to resort to violence to enforce discipline among his pupils, not only forfeits his right to be their mentor, but practically confesses his inability and utter failure to act as such, in which case he should choose another profession or activity" (40 O.G. 18th Supp. 159).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Court of Appeals in the 1952 case of People vs. Padua (Vol. 49, O.G. No. 1, pp. 156, 161, citing the 1940 case of People versus Javier,supra) in further stating that the authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment without causing any bodily harm "seems to be inherent in the position of a teacher, especially in the grade schools, is a competent of that old adage - 'spare the rod and spoil the child', not only failed to consider the prohibition against the infliction of such corporal punishment of any degree whatsoever by a teacher on his or her pupil, correctly expressed in Article 352 of the New Civil Code, and re-enforced by Article 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public Schools but also is obiter dictum ;because the said case involves assault by the appellant Padua against the teacher for allegedly slapping the head of her niece with a notebook, for which reason appellant Padua was prosecuted for assault upon a person in authority and was accordingly convicted by the court of first instance, which conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is worthy to note that in said case, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals found in the Padua case that the appellant was infuriated by the act of the teacher in slapping her niece, it did not consider said anger of the appellant as a mitigating circumstance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It should be stressed that the Javier and Padua cases were decided by the Court of Appeals, whose opinion on questions of law is not binding on the Supreme Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The authority of the parent under paragraph 2 of Article 316 of the Civil Code "to correct and punish moderately" an erring child, does not include the infliction of corporal punishment. Neither does the power "to discipline the child as may be necessary for the formation of his good character" under Article 45 of the Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Youth Welfare Code. Moderate punishment must be short of corporal punishment. If the law intended to authorize the parent to inflict such moderate corporal punishment it would have provided so expressly as is done in the statutes of Michigan and Virginia invoked by the Solicitor General, quoting Time Magazine (July 12, 1972 issue) and relied on by the majority opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The substitute parental authority granted to the teacher over the pupil, does not include all the rights comprehended in the patria potestas of the natural parent over the child. For one thing, certainly the teacher cannot demand support and inheritance from the pupil in the same manner that the teacher is not under obligation to support the pupil or to recognize the right of the pupil to inherit from him or even to educate the child at his own expense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The third paragraph of paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code affirms the liability of the parent for serious physical injuries, and only exempts the parent from the special aggravating circumstances mentioned in the second paragraph of said paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revise Penal Code. The parent "who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement," does not incur the graver penalties imposed in the penultimate paragraph of Article 263 by reason of the special aggravating circumstances. But such parent remains liable for the penalties imposed in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said Article 263 for serious physical injuries.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library No such leniency is provided for slight physical injuries and maltreatment inflicted by the parent on the child under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The use of corporal punishment in the halls of learning is condemned. Flogging, even of the most hardened criminals, has long been abandoned as a form of punishment in penal institutions. So must it be in schools. Respect for human personality cannot be instilled in the minds of the children when teachers choose to defile the human body by whipping it. Beating a child to make him remember his lesson well is reminiscent of the days when slavery was fashionable and instruments of torture were symbols of authority. The inhumane dictum of eras past "Spare the rod and spoil the child" had been deposed by the compassionate precept expressed in Article 352 of the Civil Code and Section 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public Schools.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Hence, the conviction should be affirmed. MUOZ PALMA, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner Marcela M. Bagajo seeks a review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental convicting her of slight physical injuries and imposing upon her a fine of Fifty (P50.00) Pesos.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is not disputed that petitioner, a classroom teacher in a public school, whipped with a piece of bamboo stick a pupil by the name of Wilma Alcantara inflicting upon her the following injuries: 1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both legs. It is about four inches in length and centimeter in width. There are three on the right leg and two on the left leg.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the dorsal surface of the right thigh.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The above lesions, if without complication, may heal in four to six days. (page 2, Majority Opinion) Petitioner claims that she is not criminally liable as her act was without any criminal intent because she was simply trying to discipline her pupil Wilma who tripped a classmate Benedicta Guirigay causing the latter to stumble and fall down.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Majority Opinion following the recommendations of the Solicitor General sets aside the conviction and acquits petitioner, holding,inter alia: . . . All that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case before Us, there is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries suffered by complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief that as a teacher exercising authority over her pupil in loco parentis, she was within her rights to punish her moderately for purposes of discipline. ... (pp. 3-4, Majority Opinion) I am constrained to dissent from the majority, briefly for the following reasons: chanrobles virtual law library The act of inflicting physical injuries upon another is a felony, as it is punishable by law. 1 Every felonious act is in turn presumed to be voluntary with all three elements present, to wit: freedom, intelligence, intent (dolus) or fault (culpa). 2 Freedom is overcome by evidence of force or threat; 3intelligence, by insanity or infancy; 4 intent, by proof of mistake of fact, performance of duty, or the like. 5 chanrobles virtual law library The issue now is: was there malice or criminal intent in the infliction of the physical injuries on Wilma? chanrobles virtual law library

The Majority Opinion discounts the presence of criminal intent and justifies the act of petitioner as one committed by a teacher exercising authority in loco parentis under Art. 349 of the Civil Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Admittedly, Art. 349 includes a teacher among the persons exercising substitute parental authority while Art. 350 states that the latter shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of a child. However, by the very provisions of Art. 352 of the same Code it is a condition that as to the relations between teacher and pupil, in no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The act of petitioner contravenes not only Art. 352 of the Civil Code but also Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted in pages 2 and 3 of the Opinion under which the use of corporal punishment by teachers is forbidden. It is contended in the Opinion that the above provisions are applicable in so far as the civil and administrative liabilities of petitioner are concerned, thereby overlooking the fact that the law on substitute parental authority under which the infliction of the "moderate penalty" is justified, expressly prohibits the use of corporal punishment by teachers in their relations with their pupils.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library But a more basic reason for this dissent is that the legal presumption of malice is not overthrown by protestation of good faith and honest belief of petitioner that she was merely imposing discipline, for the findings of the trial courts, viz: the Municipal Court and the Court of First Instance, attest that petitioner herein whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick in the "heat of anger" 6 because Benedicta Guirigay the victim of Wilma's naughtiness or mischief, was "a working pupil living in the house of the accused (petitioner now) for several years." 7 chanrobles virtual law library In truth, therefore, anger, a desire to avenge the mischief done on her protege Benedicta, motivated petitioner in striking Wilma with her bamboo stick.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Moreover, I simply cannot agree with the Majority that all that petitioner did was to impose a "moderate penalty" on Wilma.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner did not whip or strike at Wilma once or twice, but several times with such vehemence and force as to produce not one or two but seven linear bruises on different parts of both legs and right thigh which according to the doctor would heal barring complications from four to six days. Inflicting physical injuries, to my mind, is not a "moderately penalty". If an exercise of discipline was necessary, petitioner could have employed methods short of bodily punishment which would leave injuries on the person of the recalcitrant pupil.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Wherefore, I vote for the affirmance of the decision of the trial court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Separate Opinions ANTONIO, J., concurring: The effectiveness of a teacher to exercise authority over her pupil in loco parentis depends on her ability to enforce discipline. Petitioner had authority to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil, if the punishment is moderate, not prompted by bad motive, and is of such a nature that the parent of the child might expect the child would receive if she did wrong. AQUINO, J., concurring: The teacher, who inflicted corporal punishment, should be disciplined administratively. In People vs. Javier, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 150, the Court of Appeals, per Melencio, J., Briones, Montemayor and Enage, JJ., concurring, held that a teacher, who inflicted moderate corporal punishment, was not criminally liable because he had no criminal intent, citing Mansell vs. Griffin, I K. B. 160. (Justice Torres dissented.) FERNANDO, J, dissenting: I find myself in sympathy with the approach taken in the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar not only in view of the humanity that should permeate the law but also in accordance with the tendency much more manifest of late in international law to accord greater and greater protection to the welfare of the young, as an aspect of human rights. Moreover, it is well-settled that the doctrine parens patriaecalls for the state exercising the utmost vigilance to assure that teachers and educators should refrain from the infliction of corporal punishment which for me at least is a relic of the past. This is not to lose sight of the significance of the view stressed in the opinion of Justice Barredo that criminal intent must be shown to justify a finding of guilt. Nonetheless, considering the nature and extent of the physical injuries sustained, as shown in the dissenting opinion of Justice Muoz Palma, the protestation of good faith on the part of appellant had, for me, lost its persuasiveness. 'The leading case of People v. Cagoco, 1 where the accused approached the victim from behind and suddenly struck him with his fist on the back part of his head causing him to fall backwards, his head striking the asphalt pavement as a result of which he died a few hours later comes to mind. It was the ruling of this Court that murder was committed as there was alevosia, although appellant was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so great a wrong as that inflicted. 2 Thus I find myself unable to yield concurrence to the acquittal of the accused. TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Muoz Palma and vote for affirmance of the judgment of conviction which liberally imposed a mere fine of P50.00 notwithstanding the physical injuries requiring four to six days' healing time inflicted upon the victim.chanrobles virtual law library I only wish to stress that Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code expressly penalizes the offense of slight physical injuries and maltreatment, while Article 352 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "(T)he relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government, regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of

the Heart and mind of the pupil or student," even as Article 349 recognizes teachers and professors as among those who exercise substitute parental authority. Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual further categorically forbids "the use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing pupils about)." It cannot be contended then that teachers in the exercise of their authority in loco parentis may, without incurring criminal liability inflict moderate corporal punishment. The power to inflict moderate punishment on children is vested by Article 316 of the Civil Codeexclusively, in the parents.chanrobles virtual law library The petitioner might be entitled to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances in her favor such as having acted with obfuscation, but in the face of the express provisions of law she may not be absolved of the proven charge.chanrobles virtual law library The statement in the main opinion (at page 4) that "wheather or not (petitioner) exceeded the degree of moderation permitted by the laws and rules governing the performance of her functions is not for Us, at this moment and in this case, to determine" (but that "We feel it wiser to leave such determination first to the administrative authorities") appears to be contrary to the laws and rules which do not permit the infliction of corporal punishment, moderate or otherwise, by teachers on their pupils but provide for criminal, civil and administrative sanctions, and contrary to the proven facts, which as pointed out by Justice Muoz Palma, show that the physical injuries inflicted by petitioner on her pupil could by no means be described as "moderate" (even assuming that teachers had the authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment). MAKASIAR, J., dissenting: The facts in this case are as follows.chanrobles virtual law library Inside a classroom while the teacher was away, an eleven year old girl-pupil tripped a girlclassmate, causing slight physical injuries to the latter. Upon being questioned by the teacher in charge who just then came back, the erring child denied authorship of the misdeed. The teacher became angry and, with a bamboo stick, whipped the erring child on the buttocks, thighs, and legs with such violence as to leave on the punished limbs, not welts, but bruises requiring some four to six days to heal. The medical certificate described the injuries thus: 1. Linear bruises at the middle of the dorsal surface of both legs. It is about four inches in length and 1/4 centimeters in width. There are three on the right leg and 2 on the left leg.chanrobles virtual law library 2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the dorsal surface of the right thigh.chanrobles virtual law library The above lesions, if without complications, may heal in four to six days (page 2. Brief of Solicitor General). Convicted by the municipal court for slight physical injuries, the accused appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction. Hence, this appeal direct to this Court.chanrobles virtual law library

The Solicitor General recommends the reversal of the decision of the court below. Accordingly, the majority returns a judgment of acquittal.chanrobles virtual law library WE dissent. I Criminal intent is presumed in every criminal act. But the Solicitor General practically argues that a good motive negatives criminal intent. Motive may mitigate, but does not totally exculpate, criminal liability.chanrobles virtual law library Motive, in criminal law, consists of the special or personal reason which may prompt or induce a person to perform the act constituting a crime (Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, 9th ed., 1964, p. 41). It is the moving power which impels one to act for a definite result, as distinguished from "intent" which is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result (People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 297; 61 N.E. 286, 296; 62 L.R.A. 193). The foregoing distinction has gained wide acceptance among our criminal law commentators (see Francisco, The Revised Penal Code, Annotated and Commented, 2nd ed., 1954, Book One, p. 38; Reyes, the Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, 6th ed., 1965, Book One, p. 60; Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 3rd ed., 1971, p. 16). In relation to the "particular means" employed - the overt acts committed by a person - motive, unlike intent, is quite materially removed. One motive can give rise to one of several possible courses of action, lawful or unlawful, as one act could have been actuated by one of several possible motives, good or bad. That is why in our law on evidence, no unlawful motive is presumed from the proof of commission of an unlawful act. Nor would such presumption, if there was, be of any use, for materially unrelated as motive is to the prohibited overt act, it is not essential to the determination of a crime.chanrobles virtual law library Since acts are equivocal as to motive, it is often impossible to ascertain the reasons which moved a person to commit an act. This finds excellent example in the case at bar. While the accused stoutly asserts that her motive was to discipline the child, The trial court and the lower appellate court hold differently. Their unanimous finding is that the accused committed the act in the heat of anger - a state of mind which could hardly harbor a good motive. The Court of First Instance expresses its findings thus It appears that ... (a)t this precise moment, the accused entered the room and asked Wilma what had happened. Wilma answered that she had nothing to do with the failing down of Benedicta. Ponciano reported to the accused that Wilma purposely blocked Benedicta with her legs and she fell to the floor. The accused became angry and whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick (at pages 1 and 2). xxx xxx xxx From the evidence it has been duly proved that while Benedicta Guirigay was passing near Wilma Alcantara, the latter suddenly raised her leg and Benedicta stumbled on it and fell to the floor. She fainted and suffered some injuries. The accused became very angry got her piece of bamboo stick which she was using as a pointer stick and with it whipped Wilma several times, thereby causing on Wilma the physical injuries described by Dr. Ozarraga in his medical certificate (at page 4; Emphasis supplied).

In the same manner, the municipal court finds that ... (I)n the instant case, it would appear that the accused Marcela M. Bagajo, was carried away by her passion or anger in whipping to such an extreme Wilma Alcantara with a bamboo stick not really apt for the purpose. The victim of Wilma Alcantara's mischief or naughtiness was Benedicta Guirigay a working pupil actually living with her(the accused)for some years. ...chanrobles virtual law library The motive of the accused was to avenge the injury to the victim who, as found by the trial court, has been living with (and working for) the accused teacher. Will vengeance justify the act? But assuming that the motive of the accused was really good, does this mean that criminal intent on her part is thus completely ruled out? WE do not believe so. A good motive, as we have earlier intimated, is not incompatible with an unlawful intent. One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive appears to be good or bad or even though no motive is proven. A good motive does not prevent an act from being a crime. (People ex rel Hegeman v. Corrigan 87 N.E. 792, 796; 195 N.Y. 1, quoting People v. Molineux supra; Clark, Cr. Law, sec. 14; People v. Weiss 300 N.Y.S. 249, 255; 252 App. Div. 463). A classic example is euthanasia or mercy killing. It is condemned by law although the motive may be to spare a hopeless patient prolonged suffering. And if a father drowns his child who is five years of age to save it from starving, he is guilty of parricide though he was actuated by a good motive - love for the child (People v.Kirby 2 Parker Cr. R., N.Y., 28. See also U.S. v. Marmon 45 Fed. 414. Both are cited in The Revised Penal Code, Francisco, supra). The father or brother of a rape victim, who kills the rapist long after the commission of the rape. to avenge the victim's defloration, is not exempt from penal liability. A son killing his sleeping father, who used to beat up his hardworking mother, to relieve his good mother from so much misery, does not justify the parricide. So also, if a person cuts off the foot of a mischievous child to prevent if from doing further mischief with its foot, and thus save it from possible criminal liability, that person stands liable for physical injuries. True enough, the act involved in the instant case, which is the beating of a child, is less serious than those involved in the above-cited cases, but the fact that an act is less serious than another does not mean that it is not criminal. Other examples can be catalogued ad infinitum. Thus, our penal code provides specific penalties for specific crimes, depending, generally, on their seriousness. II The Solicitor General further maintains that the act committed by the accused is not unlawful. "Administering moderate corporal punishment," he says, "is not so defined as felony by the Revised Penal Code." But "administering corporal punishment" is a felony, although the Code categorized it under the more graphic term "slight physical injuries". The pertinent provision is stated as follows: Art. 266. Slight physical injuries ... - The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished: xxx xxx xxx

2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied). In fact, even if no visible injury were caused by the act of administering punishment, it would still be punished as an illtreatment by deed under paragraph 3 of the same Article 266.chanrobles virtual law library From the facts found by the trial court, the following material points appear: (1) the teacher beat the child with a bamboo stick, and (2) the beating caused physical injuries on the child, consisting of linear bruises requiring some four to six days to heal. The act of the accused, no doubt, constitutes the very offense penalized by the cited provision.chanrobles virtual law library Commission of a prohibited act having been indubitably shown, no proof of criminal intent is necessary. For, "from the felonious acts (of the accused), freely and deliberately executed, the moral and injurious intent arises conclusively and indisputably, in the absence of evidence to the contrary" (People v. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52, 53. See also U.S. v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92; People v. Abando, 2 CA Rep. 205; paragraph [b], section 5 of Rule 13, Rules of Court; 16 C.J. 81).chanrobles virtual law library In claiming that she merely acted within the limits of her authority in punishing the child as the latter's teacher and substitute parent, the accused in effect invokes the defense of having acted in the lawful exercise of a right under paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.chanrobles virtual law library The "right" or authority claimed by the teacher is that which supposedly flows from the civil law concept of "substitute parental authority" exercised by teachers over their pupils. The argument is that since under Article 349 of the Civil Code, teachers exercise substitute parental authority, and under Article 316, parents have the power to correct their children and punish them moderately, it follows logically that teachers can likewise punish the pupils under their charge. And if parents, in the exercise of their authority, can inflict corporal punishment on their children, so can teachers on their pupils.chanrobles virtual law library The right of parents to chastise their troublesome, mischievous or disobedient children must be conceded as it is necessary to the government of families, and to the good order of society. However, this right was not meant to be a license for manhandling or physically chastising a misbehaving child. At the same time that the law has created and preserved this right, in its regard for the safety of the child, it has prescribed bounds beyond which it shall not be carried (Johnson v. State, 2 Hump Tenn 283; 36 Am. Dec. 332). Thus, Dean Francisco, commenting on Article 316 of the Civil Code, observes: "It is to be noted that the law provides for 'moderate' punishment.Since modern educational system forbids the use of corporal or physical punishment, this would be a good test in determining the limitation of the power of parents to correct and punish their children moderately. Parents should never exceed the limits of prudence and human sentiments in proceeding against their children" (Francisco, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated and Commented, 1953 ed., Book One, pp. 846-857; citing 2 Manresa

22-23; 5 Sanchez Roman 1140; Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, November 26, 1901).chanrobles virtual law library This observation is shared by Professors Garcia and Alba, who maintain that: "The power to correct and to punish children moderately should be understood as not including corporal or physical punishment, for otherwise it will be against modern trends in education and a violation of the provision of the Revised Penal Code. Prudence and moderation should be the rule" (Civil Code of the Philippines, 1950 ed., Vol. 1, p. 535).chanrobles virtual law library The abiding love which reigns over families, the native respect which children bear towards their parents, and the moral ascendancy which parents have over their children, should give parents enough force to maintain the prestige of their parental authority. Even if these fail, the law affords parents recourse to the courts under Act 4002. Under said law, minor children guilty of disrespect or disobedience may be held criminally liable upon the complaint of parents. This law is a strong suggestion that parents are not to take the law in their hands. In our republican setup, even the government of families is not beyond the pale of the rule of law.chanrobles virtual law library Indeed sanctions are provided in Article 332 of the Civil Code when parents, hiding behind the cloak of the parental privilege, "treat their children with excessive harshness" which is a cause for deprivation or suspension of their parental authority (see Perez v. Samson, CA, 48 O.G. No. 12, p. 5368). The procedure therefor is laid down by Rule 99, section 7 of the Rules of Court, which includes as grounds for such deprivation or suspension when the parents "unlawfully beat or otherwise habitually maltreat" the child.chanrobles virtual law library Moreover, abusive parents may be proceeded against criminally. It must be observed that our general law on physical injuries does not exempt parents (much less teachers) from criminal liability for bodily harm inflicted on children or pupils as punishment for misconduct. The only concession given to the parents by law, under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, is that, in case of serious physical injuries inflicted in the course of a filial correction, the circumstance of relationship shall not be considered for the purpose of imposing the greater penalty. This means that parents shall suffer only the ordinary penalty provided for assailants who are not related to the offended party within the specified degrees.chanrobles virtual law library Needless to emphasize, the authority delegated to teachers cannot be greater than that conferred on parents. Truly, the power exercised by teachers over pupils is more restrictively, if not more clearly, defined in law. The very chapter which gives teachers and professors substitute parental authority explicitly denies them the power to administer corporal punishment, The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is of the following tenor: Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil professor and student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student (emphasis supplied). Said admonition is felicitously incorporated in the government regulations promulgated pursuant to law, namely, the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual, the pertinent provision of which reads as follows:

Sec. 150. The use of corporal punishment by teachers (slapping, jerking, or pushing pupils about), imposing manual work or degrading tasks as penalty, meting out cruel and unusual punishments of any nature ... are forbidden (Third Revision, 1959 ed.). Under the aforecited rule, the teacher cannot even require the erring pupil to clean the room or mow the lawn in the campus to discipline him, although these penalties do not involve physical injury. Neither can the teacher order the child to stand at the corner of the classroom as it would degrade or humiliate the child. He cannot even push the pupil about to remind him that his conduct is reproachable. By what twist of reasoning can we then uphold the power to apply corporal punishment as a legitimate means of correction? In the case at bar, the teacher clearly overdid herself. In whipping the child several times with a bamboo stick, an instrument liable to cause, as in fact it caused, physical injuries, the accused could not have meant to give expression to a feeling of nobility. More than inflicting bodily injuries, the punishment humiliated the child in front of her classmates. In its execution, it was plainly and simply excessive and brutal. The most that the teacher could have done under the circumstances was to admonish the child, if she was certain of her guilt. She could have reported her to her parents and to the parents of the pupil who was tripped, and in turn, the parents to the injured child could have reported the tripping incident to the police authorities for the institution of the proper criminal charges or could have sued the parents of the erring pupil for civil liability. The teacher pursued none of these available courses of action. Instead, she chose to take the law in her hands and, in the process, arrogated unto herself the prerogatives of a prosecutor, judge and executioner.chanrobles virtual law library From the facts of the case, we therefore cannot find any justification for the acts of the teacher. The acts committed are not only unauthorized even under the concept of the substitute parental authority behind which the accused seeks refuge, but they are precisely the acts teachers are expressly forbidden to do. The accused acted not to discharge the function of a teacher, but rather, acted forgetting that she was a teacher.chanrobles virtual law library Parenthetically, the Solicitor General noted that the beating was administered on "parts of the body which are not vulnerable to any serious injury." But precisely, the teacher stands accused only of slight physical injuries. The doctrine enunciated by a division of the Court of Appeals in the 1940 case of People versus Javier (citing the 1908 case of Mansell v. Griffin 1 K.B. 160) that "a teacher in a public elementary school has authority to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil" (40 OG 18th Supp. 150), has been expressly revoked by Article 352 of the New Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950 and Article 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public Schools aforequoted. Moreover, in the Javier case, the main reason of the Court of Appeals in acquitting the appellant therein was because the Court of Appeals cannot positively conclude that it was appellant's blow that caused the serious injury. An equally strong probability is that it was caused by the other boys during their boxing game. As a matter of fact, the physician who treated Bravo, testifying for the prosecution, stated that the injuries suffered by Bravo 'must have been caused by a hard and blunt instrument.' We are constrained, therefore, to doubt appellant's guilt, We are inclined to believe appellant's theory that the incident was magnified in order to find cause for removing him from the teaching staff of Quinalabasa for reasons appearing

uncontradicted in the record. He was disliked by the residents in the barrio because he had been requiring his pupils to do plenty of extracurricular work in school, ... . There was also the desire of Alejandro Payoyo, a sponsor in the marriage of Hilaria Bagaoisan, mother of Bravo, to put his niece, Joaquina Payoyo, a temporary teacher in another place, in appellant's stead. That the barrio People desired to appellant dismissed as a school teacher was also testified to by Elpidio Doloctero (Vol. 40 O.G., 18th Supp. p. 152, Emphasis supplied). It is clear, therefore, that the main ground for acquitting the appellant Javier was that guilt was not demonstrated beyond moral certainty. Consequently, the additional reason that the teacher has the authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment was purelyobiter dictum, as it was not necessary to a finding of acquittal.chanrobles virtual law library Furthermore, in the Javier case, the appellate court laid down limitations on the exercise of such authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment, namely, the teacher must not inflict any bodily harm and that he is not dictated by any bad motive (Vol. 40 O.G. 18th Supp. pp. 153-154). In the case at bar, appellant caused bodily harm (slight physical injuries) on the pupil to give vent to her anger as a measure of revenge for the injury caused by the erring pupil on another pupil, appellant's ward and househelper.chanrobles virtual law library The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in the Javier case is further weakened by the dissenting opinion of Justice Torres, which dissent proclaims most accurately the present policy. "The age when corporal punishment was the basic factor of discipline in the schools has passed, and a teacher who has to resort to violence to enforce discipline among his pupils, not only forfeits his right to be their mentor, but practically confesses his inability and utter failure to act as such, in which case he should choose another profession or activity" (40 O.G. 18th Supp. 159).chanrobles virtual law library The Court of Appeals in the 1952 case of People vs. Padua (Vol. 49, O.G. No. 1, pp. 156, 161, citing the 1940 case of People versus Javier,supra) in further stating that the authority to inflict moderate corporal punishment without causing any bodily harm "seems to be inherent in the position of a teacher, especially in the grade schools, is a competent of that old adage - 'spare the rod and spoil the child', not only failed to consider the prohibition against the infliction of such corporal punishment of any degree whatsoever by a teacher on his or her pupil, correctly expressed in Article 352 of the New Civil Code, and re-enforced by Article 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public Schools but also is obiter dictum ;because the said case involves assault by the appellant Padua against the teacher for allegedly slapping the head of her niece with a notebook, for which reason appellant Padua was prosecuted for assault upon a person in authority and was accordingly convicted by the court of first instance, which conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is worthy to note that in said case, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals found in the Padua case that the appellant was infuriated by the act of the teacher in slapping her niece, it did not consider said anger of the appellant as a mitigating circumstance.chanrobles virtual law library It should be stressed that the Javier and Padua cases were decided by the Court of Appeals, whose opinion on questions of law is not binding on the Supreme Court.chanrobles virtual law library The authority of the parent under paragraph 2 of Article 316 of the Civil Code "to correct and punish moderately" an erring child, does not include the infliction of corporal punishment. Neither does the power "to discipline the child as may be necessary for the formation of his

good character" under Article 45 of the Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Youth Welfare Code. Moderate punishment must be short of corporal punishment. If the law intended to authorize the parent to inflict such moderate corporal punishment it would have provided so expressly as is done in the statutes of Michigan and Virginia invoked by the Solicitor General, quoting Time Magazine (July 12, 1972 issue) and relied on by the majority opinion.chanrobles virtual law library The substitute parental authority granted to the teacher over the pupil, does not include all the rights comprehended in the patria potestas of the natural parent over the child. For one thing, certainly the teacher cannot demand support and inheritance from the pupil in the same manner that the teacher is not under obligation to support the pupil or to recognize the right of the pupil to inherit from him or even to educate the child at his own expense.chanrobles virtual law library The third paragraph of paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code affirms the liability of the parent for serious physical injuries, and only exempts the parent from the special aggravating circumstances mentioned in the second paragraph of said paragraph 4 of Article 263 of the Revise Penal Code. The parent "who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement," does not incur the graver penalties imposed in the penultimate paragraph of Article 263 by reason of the special aggravating circumstances. But such parent remains liable for the penalties imposed in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said Article 263 for serious physical injuries.chanrobles virtual law library No such leniency is provided for slight physical injuries and maltreatment inflicted by the parent on the child under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.chanrobles virtual law library The use of corporal punishment in the halls of learning is condemned. Flogging, even of the most hardened criminals, has long been abandoned as a form of punishment in penal institutions. So must it be in schools. Respect for human personality cannot be instilled in the minds of the children when teachers choose to defile the human body by whipping it. Beating a child to make him remember his lesson well is reminiscent of the days when slavery was fashionable and instruments of torture were symbols of authority. The inhumane dictum of eras past "Spare the rod and spoil the child" had been deposed by the compassionate precept expressed in Article 352 of the Civil Code and Section 150 of the Revised Service Manual of the Bureau of Public Schools.chanrobles virtual law library Hence, the conviction should be affirmed. MUOZ PALMA, J., dissenting: Petitioner Marcela M. Bagajo seeks a review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental convicting her of slight physical injuries and imposing upon her a fine of Fifty (P50.00) Pesos.chanrobles virtual law library It is not disputed that petitioner, a classroom teacher in a public school, whipped with a piece of bamboo stick a pupil by the name of Wilma Alcantara inflicting upon her the following injuries: 1. Linear bruises at the middle half of the dorsal surface of both legs. It is about four inches in length and centimeter in width. There are three on the right leg and two on the left leg.chanrobles virtual law library

2. Two linear bruises of the same width and length as above at the lower third of the dorsal surface of the right thigh.chanrobles virtual law library The above lesions, if without complication, may heal in four to six days. (page 2, Majority Opinion) Petitioner claims that she is not criminally liable as her act was without any criminal intent because she was simply trying to discipline her pupil Wilma who tripped a classmate Benedicta Guirigay causing the latter to stumble and fall down.chanrobles virtual law library The Majority Opinion following the recommendations of the Solicitor General sets aside the conviction and acquits petitioner, holding,inter alia: . . . All that We hold here is that in the peculiar circumstances of the instant case before Us, there is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the trial court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the injuries suffered by complainant as a result of her being whipped by petitioner. What appears is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief that as a teacher exercising authority over her pupil in loco parentis, she was within her rights to punish her moderately for purposes of discipline. ... (pp. 3-4, Majority Opinion) I am constrained to dissent from the majority, briefly for the following reasons: The act of inflicting physical injuries upon another is a felony, as it is punishable by law. 1 Every felonious act is in turn presumed to be voluntary with all three elements present, to wit: freedom, intelligence, intent (dolus) or fault (culpa). 2 Freedom is overcome by evidence of force or threat; 3intelligence, by insanity or infancy; 4 intent, by proof of mistake of fact, performance of duty, or the like. 5 The issue now is: was there malice or criminal intent in the infliction of the physical injuries on Wilma? The Majority Opinion discounts the presence of criminal intent and justifies the act of petitioner as one committed by a teacher exercising authority in loco parentis under Art. 349 of the Civil Code.chanrobles virtual law library Admittedly, Art. 349 includes a teacher among the persons exercising substitute parental authority while Art. 350 states that the latter shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of a child. However, by the very provisions of Art. 352 of the same Code it is a condition that as to the relations between teacher and pupil, in no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced The act of petitioner contravenes not only Art. 352 of the Civil Code but also Section 150 of the Bureau of Public Schools Service Manual quoted in pages 2 and 3 of the Opinion under which the use of corporal punishment by teachers is forbidden. It is contended in the Opinion that the above provisions are applicable in so far as the civil and administrative liabilities of petitioner are concerned, thereby overlooking the fact that the law on substitute parental authority under which the infliction of the "moderate penalty" is justified, expressly prohibits the use of corporal punishment by teachers in their relations with their pupils.chanrobles virtual law library

But a more basic reason for this dissent is that the legal presumption of malice is not overthrown by protestation of good faith and honest belief of petitioner that she was merely imposing discipline, for the findings of the trial courts, viz: the Municipal Court and the Court of First Instance, attest that petitioner herein whipped Wilma with a bamboo stick in the "heat of anger" 6 because Benedicta Guirigay the victim of Wilma's naughtiness or mischief, was "a working pupil living in the house of the accused (petitioner now) for several years." 7 In truth, therefore, anger, a desire to avenge the mischief done on her protege Benedicta, motivated petitioner in striking Wilma with her bamboo stick.chanrobles virtual law library Moreover, I simply cannot agree with the Majority that all that petitioner did was to impose a "moderate penalty" on Wilma.chanrobles virtual law library Petitioner did not whip or strike at Wilma once or twice, but several times with such vehemence and force as to produce not one or two but seven linear bruises on different parts of both legs and right thigh which according to the doctor would heal barring complications from four to six days. Inflicting physical injuries, to my mind, is not a "moderately penalty". If an exercise of discipline was necessary, petitioner could have employed methods short of bodily punishment which would leave injuries on the person of the recalcitrant pupil.chanrobles virtual law library Wherefore, I vote for the affirmance of the decision of the trial court.

1 58 Phil. 524.chanrobles virtual law library 2 Article 13, par. 3.chanrobles virtual law library Muoz-Palma, J.: 1 Art. 3, Revised Penal Code; Bk. 11, Title VIII, Chap 2, Ibid ., on Physical Inquiries.chanrobles virtual law library 2 Guevara, Penal Sciences and Philippine Criminal Law, 1974, at 42; Rule 131, Rules of Court. Sec. 5. Disputable Presumptions The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent.chanrobles virtual law library 3 Art. 12, pars. 5 and 6, Revised Penal Code.chanrobles virtual law library 4 Art. 12, pars. 1, 2 and 3, Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library

5 U. S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488; People vs. Mamasalaya et al. 92 Phil. 639. Art. 11, pars. 5 and 6, Revised Penal Code.chanrobles virtual law library 6 p. 28, rollo; emphasis supplied.chanrobles virtual law library 7 p. 11, Ibid.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999] UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, CHANCELLOR ROGER POSADAS, DR. EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR. ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO, DR. OLIVIA CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO, and MARICHU LAMBINO, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE, Respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.:

For review before the Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals[1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42788, dated December 16, 1997, which granted private respondents application for a writ of mandatory injunction, and its resolution, dated July 13, 1998, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The antecedent facts are as follows: Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a Philippine visitors visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City. After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondent went on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the International Right to Life Federation in Rome. She returned to the Philippines in July 1991 to work on her dissertation entitled, Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. On December 22, 1992, Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate Program Director, certifying that private respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for her oral defense. Dr. Rolda suggested that the oral defense be held on January 6, 1993 but, in a letter, dated February 2, 1993, Dr. Serena Diokno rescheduled it on February 5, 1993. Named as members of the dissertation panel were Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included as the deans representative. After going over private respondents dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondents dissertation that was lifted, without proper acknowledgment, from Balfours Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967), volume I, pp. 392-401 (3 v., Edward Balfour 1885 reprint) and from John Edyes article entitled Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal, volume I, pp. 1-14 (1833).[2 Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation on February 5, 1993. Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by affixing their signatures on the approval form. These were Drs. Manuel, Quiason, Skandarajah, and Teodoro. Dr. Quiason added the following qualification to his signature: Ms. Arokiaswamy must incorporate the suggestions I made during the successful defense of her Ph.D. thesis.[3 Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form but added the following comment: Pipirmahan ko ang pagsang-ayon/di pagsang-ayon kapag nakita ko na ang mga revisions ng dissertation.[4 Dr. Teodoro added the following note to his signature:

Kailangang isagawa ang mga mahahalagang pagbabago at ipakita sa panel ang bound copies.[5 In a letter, dated March 5, 1993 and addressed to her thesis adviser, Dr. Manuel, private respondent requested a meeting with the panel members, especially Dr. Medina, to discuss the amendments suggested by the panel members during the oral defense. The meeting was held at the deans office with Dean Paz, private respondent, and a majority of the defense panel present.[6 During the meeting, Dean Paz remarked that a majority vote of the panel members was sufficient for a student to pass, notwithstanding the failure to obtain the consent of the Deans representative. On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondents graduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation. In April 1993, private respondent submitted copies of her supposedly revised dissertation to Drs. Manuel, Skandarajah, and Quiason, who expressed their assent to the dissertation. Petitioners maintain, however, that private respondent did not incorporate the revisions suggested by the panel members in the final copies of her dissertation. Private respondent left a copy of her dissertation in Dr. Teodoros office on April 15, 1993 and proceeded to submit her dissertation to the CSSP without the approvals of Dr. Medina and Dr. Teodoro, relying on Dean Pazs March 5, 1993 statement. Dr. Teodoro later indicated his disapproval, while Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form.[7 Dean Paz then accepted private respondents dissertation in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the doctorate degree in Anthropology. In a letter to Dean Paz, dated April 17, 1993, private respondent expressed concern over matters related to her dissertation. She sought to explain why the signature of Dr. Medina was not affixed to the revision approval form. Private respondent said that since she already had the approval of a majority of the panel members, she no longer showed her dissertation to Dr. Medina nor tried to obtain the latters signature on the revision approval form. She likewise expressed her disappointment over the CSSP administration and charged Drs. Diokno and Medina with maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation, and further warned Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious acts against her. On April 17, 1993, the University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the second semester of school year 1992-1993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval, included private respondents name. On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondents name from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation. Her letter reads:[8 Abril 21, 1993 Dr. Milagros Ibe Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs Unibersidad ng Pilipinas

Quezon Hall, Diliman, Q.C. Mahal na Dr. Ibe, Mahigpit ko pong hinihiling na hwag munang isama ang pangalan ni Ms. Arokiaswam[y] William Margaret Celine sa listahan ng mga bibigyan ng degri na Ph.D. (Anthropology) ngayon[g] semester, dahil sa mga malubhang bintang nya sa ilang myembro ng panel para sa oral defense ng disertasyon nya at sa mga akusasyon ng ilan sa mga ito sa kanya. Naniniwala po kami na dapat mailinaw muna ang ilang bagay bago makonfer ang degri kay Ms. Arokiaswam[y]. Kelangan po ito para mapangalagaan ang istandard ng pinakamataas na degree ng Unibersidad. (Sgd.) CONSUELO JOAQUIN-PAZ, Ph.D. Dekano Apparently, however, Dean Pazs letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because the next day, April 22, 1993, the Board approved the University Councils recommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including private respondent. Two days later, on April 24, 1993, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology. On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a letter to private respondent, dated April 21, 1993, that she would not be granted an academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations contained in her letter dated April 17, 1993. In her letter, dated April 27, 1993, private respondent claimed that Dr. Medinas unfavorable attitude towards her dissertation was a reaction to her failure to include him and Dr. Francisco in the list of panel members; that she made the revisions proposed by Drs. Medina and Teodoro in the revised draft of her dissertation; and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment. In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, dated May 1, 1993, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.[9 On May 13, 1993, Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee, composed of faculty members from various disciplines and chaired by Dr. Eva Duka-Ventura, to investigate the plagiarism charge against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be withdrawn.[10 In a letter, dated June 7, 1993, Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.[11 On June 15, 1993, the Ventura Committee submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at least ninety (90) instances or portions in private respondents thesis which were lifted from sources without proper or due acknowledgment.

On July 28, 1993, the CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondents doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the University Council. The University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents on August 16, 1993. On September 6, 1993, the Board of Regents deferred action on the recommendation to study the legal implications of its approval.[12 Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 23, 1993, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman summoned private respondent to a meeting on the same day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her. During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges and provided her a copy of the findings of the investigating committee.[13 Private respondent, on the other hand, submitted her written explanation in a letter dated September 25, 1993. Another meeting was held on October 8, 1993 between Chancellor Roman and private respondent to discuss her answer to the charges. A third meeting was scheduled on October 27, 1993 but private respondent did not attend it, alleging that the Board of Regents had already decided her case before she could be fully heard. On October 11, 1993, private respondent wrote to Dr. Emil Q. Javier, U.P. President, alleging that some members of the U.P. administration were playing politics in her case.[14 She sent another letter, dated December 14, 1993, to Dr. Armand Fabella, Chairman of the Board of Regents, complaining that she had not been afforded due process and claiming that U.P. could no longer withdraw her degree since her dissertation had already been accepted by the CSSP.[15 Meanwhile, the U.P. Office of Legal Services justified the position of the University Council in its report to the Board of Regents. The Board of Regents, in its February 1, 1994 and March 24, 1994 meetings, further deferred action thereon. On July 11, 1994, private respondent sent a letter to the Board of Regents requesting a reinvestigation of her case. She stressed that under the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, it was the student disciplinary tribunal which had jurisdiction to decide cases of dishonesty and that the withdrawal of a degree already conferred was not one of the authorized penalties which the student disciplinary tribunal could impose. On July 28, 1994, the Board of Regents decided to release private respondents transcript of grades without annotation although it showed that private respondent passed her dissertation with 12 units of credit. On August 17, 1994, Chancellor Roger Posadas issued Administrative Order No. 94-94 constituting a special committee composed of senior faculty members from the U.P. units outside Diliman to review the University Councils recommendation to withdraw private respondents degree. With the approval of the Board of Regents and the U.P. Diliman Executive Committee, Posadas created a five-man committee, chaired by Dr. Paulino B. Zafaralla, with members selected from a list of nominees screened by Dr. Emerenciana Arcellana, then a member of the Board of Regents. On August 31, 1994, the members of the Zafaralla committee and private respondent met at U.P. Los Baos.

Meanwhile, on August 23, 1994, the U.P. Diliman Registrar released to private respondent a copy of her transcript of grades and certificate of graduation. In a letter to Chancellor Posadas, dated September 1, 1994, private respondent requested that the Zafaralla committee be provided with copies of the U.P. Charter (Act No. 1870), the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, her letter-response to Chancellor Roman, dated September 25, 1993, as well as all her other communications. On September 19, 1994, Chancellor Posadas obtained the Zafaralla Committees report, signed by its chairman, recommending the withdrawal of private respondents doctorate degree. The report stated:[16 After going through all the pertinent documents of the case and interviewing Ms. Arokiaswamy William, the following facts were established: 1. There is overwhelming evidence of massive lifting from a published source word for word and, at times, paragraph by paragraph without any acknowledgment of the source, even by a mere quotation mark. At least 22 counts of such documented liftings were identified by the Committee. These form part of the approximately ninety (90) instances found by the Committee created by the Dean of the College and subsequently verified as correct by the Special Committee. These instances involved the following forms of intellectual dishonesty: direct lifting/copying without acknowledgment, full/partial lifting with improper documentation and substitution of terms or words (e.g., Tamil in place of Sanskrit, Tamilization in place of Indianization) from an acknowledged source in support of her thesis (attached herewith is a copy of the documents for reference); and 2. Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of being guilty of the allegation of plagiarism. Fact is, she informed the Special Committee that she had been admitting having lifted several portions in her dissertation from various sources since the beginning. In view of the overwhelming proof of massive lifting and also on the admission of Ms. Arokiaswamy William that she indeed plagiarized, the Committee strongly supports the recommendation of the U.P. Diliman Council to withdraw the doctoral degree of Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William. On the basis of the report, the University Council, on September 24, 1994, recommended to the Board of Regents that private respondent be barred in the future from admission to the University either as a student or as an employee. On January 4, 1995, the secretary of the Board of Regents sent private respondent the following letter:[17 4 January 1995 Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William Department of Anthropology College of Social Sciences and Philosophy U.P. Diliman, Quezon City Dear Ms. Arokiaswamy William:

This is to officially inform you about the action taken by the Board of Regents at its 1081st and 1082nd meetings held last 17 November and 16 December 1994 regarding your case, the excerpts from the minutes of which are attached herewith. Please be informed that the members present at the 1081st BOR meeting on 17 November 1994 resolved, by a majority decision, to withdraw your Ph.D. degree as recommended by the U.P. Diliman University Council and as concurred with by the External Review Panel composed of senior faculty from U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila. These faculty members were chosen by lot from names submitted by the University Councils of U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila. In reply to your 14 December 1994 letter requesting that you be given a good lawyer by the Board, the Board, at its 1082nd meeting on 16 December 1994, suggested that you direct your request to the Office of Legal Aid, College of Law, U.P. Diliman. Sincerely yours, (Sgd.) VIVENCIO R. JOSE Secretary of the University and of the Board of Regents On January 18, 1995, private respondent wrote a letter to Commissioner Sedfrey Ordoez, Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, asking the commissions intervention.[18 In a letter, dated February 14, 1995, to Secretary Ricardo Gloria, Chairman of the Board of Regents, she asked for a reinvestigation of her case. She also sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by President Javier, in a letter dated June 2, 1995. On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q95-24690 and assigned to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.[19 She alleged that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay her P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and P1,500,000.00 as compensation for lost earnings. On August 6, 1996, the trial court, Branch 227, rendered a decision dismissing the petition for mandamus for lack of merit.[20 Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on December 16, 1997, reversed the lower court. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:[21 WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed and set aside. Respondents are ordered to restore to petitioner her degree of Ph.D. in Anthropology. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend: I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RESTORE RESPONDENTS DOCTORAL DEGREE. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTORAL DEGREE GIVEN RESPONDENT BY U.P. CANNOT BE RECALLED WITHOUT VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO ENJOYMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TO JUSTICE AND EQUITY. III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.[22 Petitioners argue that private respondent failed to show that she had been unlawfully excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which she is entitled so as to justify the issuance of the writ of mandamus. They also contend that she failed to prove that the restoration of her degree is a ministerial duty of U.P. or that the withdrawal of the degree violated her right to the enjoyment of intellectual property. On the other hand, private respondent, unassisted by counsel, argue that petitioners acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion in withdrawing her degree even prior to verifying the truth of the plagiarism charge against her; and that as her answer to the charges had not been forwarded to the members of the investigating committees, she was deprived of the opportunity to comment or refute their findings. In addition, private respondent maintains that petitioners are estopped from withdrawing her doctorate degree; that petitioners acted contrary to 9 of the U.P. Charter and the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of the University, which according to her, does not authorize the withdrawal of a degree as a penalty for erring students; and that only the college committee or the student disciplinary tribunal may decide disciplinary cases, whose report must be signed by a majority of its members. We find petitioners contention to be meritorious. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[23 In University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. LigotTelan,[24 this Court ruled that the writ was not available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of its academic freedom. In that case, a student who was found guilty of dishonesty and ordered suspended for one year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition

formandamus and obtained from the lower court a temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from carrying out the order of suspension. In setting aside the TRO and ordering the lower court to dismiss the students petition, this Court said: [T]he lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower courts finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job. Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances, clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning. From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.[25 In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondents petition precisely on grounds of academic freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied due process. It said: It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly culminating in its recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal of petitioners Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitioners subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing.[26 As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[27 A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.[28 In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her[29 and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded on September 25, 1993.[30 Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her

case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.[31 It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice.[32 It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.[33 Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla committee as part of her right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,[34 we held: Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. . . In this case, in granting the writ of mandamus, the Court of Appeals held: First. Petitioner graduated from the U.P. with a doctorate degree in Anthropology. After graduation, the contact between U.P. and petitioner ceased. Petitioner is no longer within the ambit of the disciplinary powers of the U.P. As a graduate, she is entitled to the right and enjoyment of the degree she has earned. To recall the degree, after conferment, is not only arbitrary, unreasonable, and an act of abuse, but a flagrant violation of petitioners right of enjoyment to intellectual property. Second. Respondents aver that petitioners graduation was a mistake. Unfortunately this mistake was arrived at after almost a year after graduation. Considering that the members of the thesis panel, the College Faculty Assembly, and the U.P. Council are all men and women of the highest intellectual acumen and integrity, as respondents themselves aver, suspicion is aroused that the alleged mistake might not be the cause of withdrawal but some other hidden agenda which respondents do not wish to reveal. At any rate, We cannot countenance the plight the petitioner finds herself enmeshed in as a consequence of the acts complained of. Justice and equity demand that this be rectified by restoring the degree conferred to her after her compliance with the academic and other related requirements. Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that [a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution[35 and the 1973 Constitution[36 likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of

Theology,[37 it is a freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students. If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the graduation of a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the graduation of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondents case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate. Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines.[38 It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council.[39 It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a students rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a universitys highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the universitys concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity. While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.[40 In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted by a committee composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that private respondent committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. The Board of Regents decision to withdraw private respondents doctorate was based on documents on record including her admission that she committed the offense.[41 On the other hand, private respondent was afforded the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her. Her only claim is that her responses to the charges against her were not considered by the Board of Regents before it rendered its decision. However, this claim was not proven. Accordingly, we must presume regularity in the performance of official duties in the absence of proof to the contrary.[42

Very much the opposite of the position of the Court of Appeals that, since private respondent was no longer a student of the U.P., the latter was no longer within the ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P., is private respondents contention that it is the Student Disciplinary Tribunal which had jurisdiction over her case because the charge is dishonesty. Private respondent invokes 5 of the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline which provides: Jurisdiction. All cases involving discipline of students under these rules shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal, except the following cases which shall fall under the jurisdiction of the appropriate college or unit; (a) Violation of college or unit rules and regulations by students of the college, or (b) Misconduct committed by students of the college or unit within its classrooms or premises or in the course of an official activity; Provided, that regional units of the University shall have original jurisdiction over all cases involving students of such units. Private respondent argues that under 25 (a) of the said Rules and Regulations, dishonesty in relation to ones studies (i.e., plagiarism) may be punished only with suspension for at least one (1) year. As the above-quoted provision of 5 of the Rules and Regulations indicates, the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal extends only to disciplinary actions. In this case, U.P. does not seek to discipline private respondent. Indeed, as the appellate court observed, private respondent is no longer within the ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P. Private respondent cannot even be punished since, as she claims, the penalty for acts of dishonesty in administrative disciplinary proceedings is suspension from the University for at least one year. What U.P., through the Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its academic integrity by withdrawing from private respondent an academic degree she obtained through fraud. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 151258 : February 01, 2012] ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. [G.R. NO. 154954] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, AND RONAN DE GUZMAN, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 155101] FIDELITO DIZON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. [G.R. NOS. 178057 & 178080] GERARDA H. VILLA, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., AND ANSELMO ADRIANO, RESPONDENTS. DECISION SERENO, J.: The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa - the victim in this case - on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.[1] Due in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of the law was to discourage members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.[3]Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of "consent" and "initial innocent act" in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4] Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.[5] Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged - those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City.[6] Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general

condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system - "[N]o act constitutes a crime... unless it is made so by law."[7] Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence. Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona). Facts The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and the trial court,[9] are as follows: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes). On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo's Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation. Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies' Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation. On the morning of their second day - 9 February 1991 - the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity's principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the

same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended. After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport. After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny's shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans: In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) 1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) 2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal) 3. Efren de Leon (De Leon) 4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson) 5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama) 6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda) 7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug) 8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino) 9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban) 10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo) 11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero) 12. Michael Musngi (Musngi) 13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez) 14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos) 15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman) 16. Antonio General (General) 17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores) 18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim) 19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo) 20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada) 21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza) 22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero) 23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima) 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez) 25. Adel Abas (Abas) 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona) Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca) Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos) Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion) Florentino Ampil (Ampil) Enrico de Vera III (De Vera) Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez) Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.[11] On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.[12] On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.[14] On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz: 1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants - Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 2. Four of the accused-appellants - Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) - were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ?30,000 as indemnity. 3. Two of the accused-appellants - Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal - were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of P50,000 and to pay the additional amount of P1,000,000 by way of moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.[16] Meanwhile, on

different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17] On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial court's Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.[19] From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before this Court. G.R. No. 151258 - Villareal v. People The instant case refers to accused Villareal's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 - first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.[20] While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the accused. G.R. No. 155101 - Dizon v. People Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CA's Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues - first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial court's forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused."[22] As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizon's right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date. Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives.[23] He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites "decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling...."[24] Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that "the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lenny's death."[25] The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, "on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim."[26] Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that Lenny's father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizon's father, since the latter did not

have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the "psychological initiation." He then cites the testimony of Lenny's co-neophyte - witness Marquez - who admitted knowing "it was not true and that he was just making it up...."[27] Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latter's chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the victim's well-being. G.R. No. 154954 - People v. Court of Appeals This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CA's Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorinoet al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries.[28] According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died. In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victim's death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said article provides: "Criminal liability shall be incurred... [b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial court's finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime. G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 - Villa v. Escalona Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CA's Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For "various reasons," the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.

Petitioner Villa assails the CA's dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court. We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five. ISSUES

1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizon's right to present evidence constitutes denial of due process; 2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial; 3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual participation; 4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and 5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.

DISCUSSION Resolution on Preliminary Matters

G.R. No. 151258 - Villareal v. People In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioner's Notice of Death of Party. According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term "pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33] However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.[34] Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case

against him deemed closed and terminated. G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People) In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated that "it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence."[36] However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his client - Antonio General - would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.[37] Because of this development and pursuant to the trial court's Order that the parties "should be ready at all times down the line," the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date - 25 August 1993 - instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.[40] Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.[41] Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt. The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution itself.[42]Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel..." This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in one's defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44] In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defense's presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to "lack of quorum in the regular membership" of the Sandiganbayan's Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because of his nonappearance at "yesterday's and today's scheduled hearings." In ruling against the Order, we held thus:

Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court,Crisostomo's non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates... xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, Crisostomo's absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel. In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, thecourt is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing. Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.[46] (Emphasis supplied) The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused General - had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizon's testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process. Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.[48] We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any "procedural unfairness or irregularity" that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the

hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that "all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites," and that "the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity."[49] He even argues that "Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned."[50] For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice to another - at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it. G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that "the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals."[51] The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.[53] The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.[55] The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.[57] We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.[58] As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.[59] As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.[62] We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA's dismissal of the case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus: An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:

xxx

xxx

xxx

5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the prosecution's failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the same. xxx xxx xxx

While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x. xxx xxx xxx

[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecution's failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x. xxx xxx xxx

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Saruca's motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon,the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied) This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66] As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases - a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases.[67] Thus, we held: The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found thedelay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the

Ombudsman, where the Court held that thedelay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already.[68] (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.'s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals) The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated - either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused - the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.[71] It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,[72] viz: Article III - Bill of Rights Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right, provides as follows:[73] SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. -- When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.[74] The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendant's express consent.[75]

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty."[76] We further stressed that "an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal."[77] This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court's acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80] The third instance refers to this Court's judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.[83] In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.[84] The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, "the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioner's Comment x x x."[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[86] The Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villa's consent to hazing.[87] In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.[88] In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.[89] Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. - the 19 acquitted fraternity members. We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug - the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.

Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.[91] We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion. In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus: Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied and citations included) The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required."[95] The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victim's injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His injuries were not even serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable. On the contrary, the CA's ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa."[99] It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officer's findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villa's death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites.[100] Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,"[101] it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony. Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.

The CA's application of the legal framework governing physical injuries - punished under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies - is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.[102] Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon - as if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa - is contrary to the CA's own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, [103] the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954. Resolution on Ultimate Findings According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.[104] The CA modified the trial court's finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al. - were acquitted; 4 of them - Tecson et al. - were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2 - Dizon and Villareal - were found guilty of homicide. The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own desire to join a society of men - pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely known as hazing. Intentional Felony and Conspiracy Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.[105] The classical theory

posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and evil.[106] It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.[107] The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing the crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of the actor. [110] The identity of mens rea - defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent - is the predominant consideration.[111] Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or "malice."[113] The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, andintent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things.[115] The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.[116]The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.[117] The element of intent - on which this Court shall focus - is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act.[120] While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.[121] On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence ofdolus malus - that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought." [123] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.[124] As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[125] In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code - which provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it" - is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase "coming to an agreement" connotes the existence of a prefaced "intent" to cause injury to another, an element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.[128] The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.[131] Intent to kill - or animus interficendi - cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such

intent.[132] Furthermore, the victim's death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence - the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.[134] Hazing and other forms of initiation rites The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.[135] It is said that, throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.[136] Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,[138] where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these values of ancient Greek civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a "tradition" or "ritual" whereby prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing.[141] Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.[143] During the "program," neophytes are required to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to participate in the organization's activities; and to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members.[144] Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.[145] Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the "recruit," "pledge," "neophyte," "initiate," "applicant" - or any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person - is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the organization.[148] These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.[149] The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago, our national hero - Andres Bonifacio - organized a secret society named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.[151] The Katipunan's ideology was brought home to each member through the society's initiation ritual.[152] It is said that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series of questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. [153] They were made to go through vigorous trials such as "pagsuot sa isang lungga" or "[pagtalon] sa balon." [154] It would seem that they were also made to withstand the blow of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi" and to endure a "matalas na punyal." [155] As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership papers with the his own blood. [156]

It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa. Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second year at West Point.[158] In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured during the shriner's hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership.[159] The ritual involved what was known as the "mattress-rotating barrel trick."[160] It required each candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb.[161] Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the barrel.[162] In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers' chests.[163] The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.[164] In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.[165] The fraternity members subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and "body slamming," an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground.[166] The fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle of physical abuse.[167] In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.[168] The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and "yerks" (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings," during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) "running the gauntlet," during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs.[169] In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim - Sylvester Lloyd - was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170] He participated in initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion and embarrassment.[171]

In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternity's initiation rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times.[173] In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones - a university student in Florida - sought initiation into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.[174] The pledge's efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks.[175] In these rituals described as "preliminaries," which lasted for two evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.[176] During the last two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several other candidates passed out.[179] The purported raison d'tre behind hazing practices is the proverbial "birth by fire," through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.[180] Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit d'corpassociated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.[182] Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S. The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct "whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom."[185] However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187] Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs.[189] Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.[190] In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three years.[191] Indiana criminal law provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.[192] The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.[193] As an element of a Class C felony - criminal recklessness - resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of "serious bodily injury."[194] A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years.[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the

act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C felony.[196]A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.[197] In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.[198] An individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or not less than 180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.[201] West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor. [202] In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another.[203] A Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both.[204] In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballou's family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994.[206] The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt The presence of an ex ante situation - in this case, fraternity initiation rites - does not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind - whether or not there is a contextual background or factual premise - they are still criminally liable for intentional felony. The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that - with the exception of Villareal and Dizon - accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus interficendior intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding. As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his father's parking space had been stolen by the victim's father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareal's brother.[208]The CA then ruled as follows: The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied) We cannot subscribe to this conclusion. The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed

utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquez's testimony: Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngi's] room and we were briefed as to what to expect during the next three days and we were told the members of the fraternity and their batch and we were also told about the fraternity song, sir. xxxxxxxxx We were escorted out of [Michael Musngi's] house and we were made to ride a van and we were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the place of Mariano Almeda, sir. xxxxxxxxx Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and then the driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside the van, sir. xxxxxxxxx We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion Patay ka" and the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir. Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these remarks uttered upon your arrival? Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices, sir. xxxxxxxxx During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what were the voices or utterances that you heard? "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion patay ka," "Recinto patay ka sa amin," etc., sir. And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking of the van which lasted for 5 minutes? xxxxxxxxx Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir. xxxxxxxxx During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was there any utterances by anybody? Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were encouraging others who were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir. Do you recall what were those voices that you heard? One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether "matigas pa yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan." Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote? I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could not really pin point who uttered those words, sir. xxxxxxxxx Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol Express? Yes, sir I heard utterances. Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you remember? For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would say that and I quote "ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung

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kapatid ko," so that would in turn sort of justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and then after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that "this guy, his father stole the parking space of my father," sir. So, that's why he inflicted more pain on Villa and that went on, sir. And you were referring to which particular accused? Boyet Dizon, sir. When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your family have his brother killed, what was your response? Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir. So he said that I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he kept on uttering those words/statements so that it would in turn justify him and to give me harder blows, sir. xxxxxxxxx You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villa's father stole the parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were within hearing distance when that utterance was made? Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir. xxxxxxxxx There were different times made this accusation so there were different people who heard from time to time, sir. xxxxxxxxx Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny Villa's father was made? When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when Lenny Villa's turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir. What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villa's father? He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa. How were those blows inflicted? There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villa's thighs and sometime he stand up and he kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir. xxxxxxxxx We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also that accusations made by Dizon "you or your family had his brother killed," can you inform this Honorable Court what exactly were the accusations that were charged against you while inflicting blows upon you in particular? While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his family who had his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story that he made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And another incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota court and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and I quote: "Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin," sir. What else? That's all, sir. And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came around as promised to you earlier? No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus: tr valign="TOP"> Judge When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that Purisima there was a briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards to what to expect during the initiation, did I hear you right? Witness Yes, sir. Judge Who did the briefing? Purisima Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino. Judge Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during the Purisima initiation? They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be Witness mocked at, sir. So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes? Judge Purisima Yes, sir. Witness Judge You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact? Purisima Witness Yes, sir at the briefing. xxxxxxxxx Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All the bruises would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms like long sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face would be slapped, sir. Judge So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your body Purisima but that will be covered? Witness Yes, sir. JudgePurisimaSo, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would create bruises to your body? Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir. xxxxxxxxx Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is Judge psychological in nature? Purisima Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied) Witness xxxxxxxxx Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation, meaning body contact, is that correct? Witness Yes, sir. Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct? Yes, sir. Witness Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you, scare you, correct? Yes, sir. Witness Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct? Sometimes sir, yes. Witness Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was

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supposed to have said according to you that your family were responsible for the killing of his brother who was an NPA, do you remember saying that? Yes, sir. You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon thatyou did not believe him because that is not true, correct? Yes, sir. In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I have mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into quitting the initiation, this is correct? No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those things was because he wanted to inflict injury. He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct? No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me. But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of initiation by all the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right? Yes, sir. Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said something similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon? No, sir. But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would run on your thighs, right? Yes, sir. This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not only on you but also on the other neophytes? Yes, sir. In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was administered by one master, was also administered by one master on a neophyte, was also administered by another master on the other neophyte, this is correct? Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)

According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal were "baseless,"[213] since the statements of the accused were "just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "[t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of `tradition' concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites."[214] We agree with the Solicitor General. The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion on the part of the CA - it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CA's primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquez's testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both "accusations" against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was "Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquez's] thigh"; and who told witness Marquez, "[I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko." It was also Dizon who jumped on Villa's thighs while saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father." With the testimony clarified, we find that

the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon. As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, "Patay ka, Recinto," "Yari ka, Recinto," "Villa, akin ka," "Asuncion, gulpi ka," "Putang ina mo, Asuncion," "Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin," or some other words to that effect.[215] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the former's purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villa's father for stealing the parking space of Dizon's father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.[216] Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizon's way of inflicting psychological pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could "justify" giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up. The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows: Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of interpellations on why we included the phrase "or psychological pain and suffering." xxx xxx xxx

So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but therecruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several times but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the building - these are the mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to prevent.[217] (Emphasis supplied) Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon's behavior must not be automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternity's psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizon's threats. The testimony of Lenny's coneophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he "knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up...."[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity

initiation rites x x x."[219] The Solicitor General shares the same view. Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221] The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code. In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that ismala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer - iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.[223] Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial court's finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: "Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility ... [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent ... the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent." Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that "as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil." In People v. Carmen,[226] the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima - under the guise of a "ritual or treatment" - plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of "nervous breakdown" by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial court's finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof. Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accused's initial acts of inflicting physical pain on

the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused.[227]What persons do is the best index of their intention.[228] We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa. Lenny died during Aquila's fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to "traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run," "Bicol Express," "Rounds," and the "Auxies' Privilege Round." The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes' arms and legs. In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity's principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to "traditional" initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another "traditional" ritual - paddling by the fraternity. During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their legs in order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or "round"; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed. These rituals were performed with Lenny's consent.[231] A few days before the "rites," he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.[232] His father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found as follows: It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that "after a week, you can already play basketball." Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit "in the arms and legs," that a wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs.... Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied) Even after going through Aquila's grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.

Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional "rounds" on the second night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other "weapon" was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of "traditional" initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration. The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may also be determined by Lenny's continued participation in the initiation and consent to the method used even after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 AntiHazing Law is enlightening: SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal Code. Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President. SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be murder or homicide. Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President. SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries. SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President. SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness. SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President. SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of the crime of hazing? SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted

in these specific acts or results, Mr. President. That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without being held criminally liable. xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes. The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code. That is my difficulty, Mr. President. SENATOR LINA. x x x Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of hazing. To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called "hazing."Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President. So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magrerecruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo." xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind.We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is

one of the basic elements of any crime. If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President. SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged. If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill or maim." This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they are separate offenses. xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore? SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not? SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill. SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder. SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr. President. [236] (Emphasis supplied) During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus: SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be committed by two persons with or without consent.

To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into another individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase "without consent" for purposes of this section. SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that it is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing. This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend initiation which may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing or whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is important is that there is an infliction of physical pain. The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators of the crime,regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of the victim. xxx xxx xxx

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and practices. In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not something that the State should prohibit. But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself. If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites. But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal nature of the act. So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is

committed without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse. SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President. SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much. The President. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.[237] (Emphasis supplied) Realizing the implication of removing the state's burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said: I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to. If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President.[238](Emphasis supplied) Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against typical crimes - cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lenny's parents would not have consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternity's initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se. Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our nation's very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of ... hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal."[240] Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing - or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering - has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial court's finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing. The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.[241] In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence or negligencecomprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. [244] The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.[246] As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. [247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort."[250] The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.[251] There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa. According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In the present case, the victim's heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the "channeling" of the blood supply from the entire circulatory system - including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,[256] indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.[257] Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so markedly diminished as to produce death. [258] The officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.[259]It was concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.[260] The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villa's arms and thighs, resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his

eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.[261] They were also "paddled" at the back of their thighs or legs;[262] and slapped on their faces.[263] They were made to play rough basketball.[264] Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya sa spine."[265] The NBI medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter.[266] The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows: Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations of defense counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny Villa previously marked as Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14" individually by themselves would not cause the death of the victim. The question I am going to propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked from Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14"? Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for us to isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the same manner that as a car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole and not in part.[267]

There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking during the initiation rites.[268] Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.[269] With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victim's death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries. It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity - accused Dizon and Villareal - restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end, as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites - having in mind the concept of "seniority" in fraternities - the implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lenny's initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties. It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly - or unwittingly -impose the misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish "kinship." A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice.[271]Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were

barbaric as they were reckless. Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.'s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson. The accused liable to pay damages The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and P1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of P30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson. Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the CA's award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000. The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible documents.[276]Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for actual damages.[277] The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of the victim's death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."[279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the CA's award of moral damages in the amount of ?1,000,000. WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 - finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries - is also MODIFIED and set aside in part. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two

(2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of ?50,000, and moral damages in the amount of ?1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.[280] Costsde oficio. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed closed and TERMINATED. Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties. SO ORDERED. Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993 ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S. J., DEAN CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS HERRAS, FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE CLARO TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON ERENETA. petitioners, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTC-Makati, Br. 134, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO AMADO SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM JR., MANUEL ESCONA and JUDE FERNANDEZ, Respondents. ROMERO, J.: In 1975, the Court was confronted with a mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, a religious seminary which has a working arrangement with the Ateneo de Manila University regarding accreditation of common students, to allow petitioner who had taken some courses therein for credit during summer, to continue her studies. 1 Squarely meeting the issue, we dismissed the petition on the ground that students in the position of petitioner possess, not a right, but a privilege, to be admitted to the institution. Not having satisfied the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding since there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of the respondent to admit the petitioner, the petition did not prosper.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, as recognized by the Constitution, the concept encompassing the right of a school to choose its students.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to refuse admittance to its students, this time in Ateneo de Manila University proper, is again challenged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the opening paragraph, the individual concerned was not a regular student, the respondents in the case at bar, having been previously enrolled in the University, seek re-admission. Moreover, in the earlier case, the petitioner was refused admittance, not on such considerations as personality traits and character orientation, or even inability to meet the institution's academic or intellectual standards, but because of her behavior in the classroom. The school pointedly informed her that ". . . it would seem to be in your best interest to work with a Faculty that is more compatible with your orientations." chanrobles virtual law library On the other hand, students who are now being refused admission into petitioner University have been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The case attracted much publicity due to the death of one of the neophytes and serious physical injuries inflicted on another.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add another dimension to the concept of academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, this time a case fraught with social and emotional overtones.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The facts which gave rise to this case which is far from novel, are as follows: chanrobles virtual law library As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in joining its ranks. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of petitioner university, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital on February 10, 1991. He was not the lone victim, though, for another freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee 2 which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. 3 Through their respective counsels, they requested copies of the charges and pertinent documents or affidavits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." 4 chanrobles virtual law library

Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge on or before February 18, 1991; otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defenses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board composed of petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio Escolin, Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges against respondent students.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent students were informed that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The complaint/charge against you arose from initiations held on February 8-10, 1991. The evidence against you consist of testimonies of students, showing your participation in acts prohibited by the School regulations." Finally, it ordered respondent students to file their written answers to the above charge on or before February 22 1991, otherwise they would be deemed to have waived their defenses. 5 chanrobles virtual law library In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students, through counsel, requested that the investigation against them be held in abeyance, pending action on their request for copies of the evidence against them. 6 chanrobles virtual law library Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear before it at a hearing on February 28, 1991 to clarify their answer with regard to the charges filed by the investigating committee for violation of Rule No. 3. However, in a letter to a petitioners dated February 27, 1991, counsel for respondent students moved to postpone the hearing from February 28, 1991 to March 1, 1991. 7 chanrobles virtual law library Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on March 2, 1991 for clarificatory questions. 8 They were also informed that: a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in accordance with the rules laid down in the case of Guzman vs. National University; 9 b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the affiants-neophytes; chanrobles virtual law library c) Hazing which is not defined in the School catalogue shall be defined in accordance with the proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No. 3815; chanrobles virtual law library d) The Board will take into consideration the degree of participation of the petitioners in the alleged hazing incident in imposing the penalty; chanrobles virtual law library e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to the President of the University, i. e., Respondent Joaquin Bernas S. J. On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean Castillo that, "in cases where the Disciplinary Board is not prepared to impose the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that the Board leave the decision on the penalty to the Administration so that this case be decided not just on the Law School level but also on the University level." 10 chanrobles virtual law library

In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The Board found that respondent students acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege," which allows them to participate in the physical hazing. Although respondent students claim that they were there to assist and attend to the needs of the neophytes, actually they were assigned a definite supportive role to play in the organized activity. Their guilt was heightened by the fact that they made no effort to prevent the infliction of further physical punishment on the neophytes under their care. The Board considered respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of hazing. In conclusion, the Board pronounced respondents guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through acquiescence. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. 11 Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the President of the University the decision of whether to expel respondents or not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10, 1991, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus: "that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that even assuming they did not lay hands on the neophytes," respondents students are still guilty in accordance with the principle that "where two or more persons act together in the commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is responsible for the whole." Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which led to the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the "offense of the respondents can be characterized as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian education and contrary to civilized behavior." Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. 12 chanrobles virtual law library In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and concurred in by petitioner Fr. Bernas, 13 the Board excluded respondent students Abas and Mendoza from the coverage of the resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch as at the time the latter resolution was promulgated, neither had as yet submitted their case to the Board. Said resolution also set the investigation of the two students on March 21, 1991.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamuswith prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 14 alleging that they were currently enrolled as students for the second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order is issued, they would be prevented from taking their examinations. The petition principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order the enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent students and stopping the former from conducting hearings relative to the hazing incident. 15 chanrobles virtual law library Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary restraining order were then held. On April 7, 1991, the temporary restraining order were issued on March 18, 1991 lapsed. Consequently, a day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon

Ereeta to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, to include the aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional respondents to the original petition. 16 chanrobles virtual law library Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement Petition arguing that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process in the conduct of investigations by the Disciplinary Board against respondent students; that a supplemental petition cannot be admitted without the same being set for hearing and that the supplemental petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in effect, extend the previous restraining order beyond its mandatory 20-day lifetime. 17Acting on the urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondents Judge Capulong, granted respondent students' prayer on April 10, 1991. 18 chanrobles virtual law library On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent students. Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to conduct special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the students were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final determination of the issue of the instant case. Lastly, it directed respondent students to file a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. 19 chanrobles virtual law library On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza and directed the dropping of their names from its roll of students. 20 chanrobles virtual law library The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by respondents of a bond dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of respondent judge. 21 chanrobles virtual law library In the case at bar, we come to grips with two relevant issues on academic freedom, namely: (1) whether a school is within its rights in expelling students from its academic community pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (2) whether or not the penalty imposed by the school administration is proper under the circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library We grant the petition and reverse the order of respondent judge ordering readmission of respondent students. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he ruled that respondent students had been denied due process in the investigation of the charges against them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them was arrived at

without affording them their right to procedural due process. We are constrained to disagree as we find no indication that such right has been violated. On the contrary, respondent students' rights in a school disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National University, 22 Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C. Branch 23 and Non v. Dames II 24 have been meticulously respected by petitioners in the various investigative proceedings held before they were expelled.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their argument that it is Ang Tibay case 25 and not the Guzman case which is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the Guzman case is more aproposto the instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. 26 chanrobles virtual law library It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident, 27 the records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. 28 While of the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their statements. 29 chanrobles virtual law library Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991.30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. 31Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer

examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no right to examine affiantsneophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz. 32 chanrobles virtual law library Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses. 33 Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault petitioners for not explicitly defining the word "hazing" and allege that there is no proof that they were furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of students who aspire to be future members of the Bar. It cannot be overemphasized that the charge filed before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved. As we have had occasion to declare in previous cases a similar nature, due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. 34 Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal information or complaint. Having given prior notice to the students involved that "hazing" which is not defined in the School Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be said. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation under scrutiny.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a students, to the extent of dismissal or expulsion, finds its raison d' etre in the increasing frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the neophytes by their insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes the test of reasonableness and absence of malice on the part of the school authorities. Far from fostering comradeship and esprit d' corps, it has merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of those who aspire to eventual leadership in our country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. 35 chanrobles virtual law library It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, 36as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from petitioner university.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a Temporary Restraining Order since petitioners do not stand to suffer irreperable damage in the event that private respondents are allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and found by the Disciplinary Board to have

violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitutions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 37 thus: (1) who may teach: (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4)who may be admitted to study.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of the State" has deservedly earned for himself a respected place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of his was the "best, the most sensible, and the most sensible, and the most just man of his age." In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of hemlock as punishment for alleged "corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own words how this charge of "corruption," the forerunner of the concept of academic freedom, came about: Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord: they like to heart the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and examine others themselves; there are plenty of person, as they soon discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me. This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth. And then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has been detected - which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. 38 chanrobles virtual law library Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have similarly defied the stifling strictures of authority, whether State, Church, or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein to their ideas. Particularly odious were the insidious and blatant attempts at thought control during the time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval universities, renowned as intellectual centers in Europe, gradually lost their autonomy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the way, were gradually crystallized in the cluster of freedoms which awaited the champions and martyrs of the dawning modern age. This was exemplified by the professors of the new German universities in the 16th and 17th centuries such as the Universities of Leiden (1554), Helmstatdt (1574) and Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to freedom of inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental human rights of the 19th and 20th centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words, with the

right of individuals in university communities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external interference or pressure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have been stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. The components of this aspect of academic freedom have been categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is to be realized that this individual aspects of academic freedom could have developed only pari passu with its institutional counterpart. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In the Philippines, the Acts which are passed with the change of sovereignty from the Spanish to the American government, namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made no mention of the rights now subsumed under the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most especially true with respect to the institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting of the Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal protection.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which stated: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." The only State University at that time, being the University of the Philippines, the Charter was perceived by some as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said institution at the expense of the rest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973 Constitution provided in its Section 8(2): "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his interpretation of the provision, former U.P. President Vicente G. Sinco, who was also a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, declared that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the University as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." 39 chanrobles virtual law library Has the right been carried over the to the present Constitution? In an attempt to give an explicit definition with an expanded coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of the 1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none too different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom." 40 chanrobles virtual law library

More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . . . " Gascon finished off the broken thought,- "the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes." chanrobles virtual law library Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 41 we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. 42 chanrobles virtual law library "For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools." 43 chanrobles virtual law library Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." 44 Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the ponoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in Holfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their own a Christian school that includes Theology as part of its curriculum and assidously strives to turn out individuals of unimpeachable morals and integrity in the mold of the founder of the order of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their barbaric and ruthless acts are the more reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In essence, education must ultimately be religious - not in the sense that the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is "an education which inculcates duty and reverence." 45 It appears that the particular brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila has been lost on the respondent students.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on

the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student body." 46 Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such a congruence between the offense committed and the sanction imposed was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento. 47 chanrobles virtual law library Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by petitioner university, we see no reason to reverse its decision founded on the following undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing activities; that respondent students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a result of the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious physical injuries, while Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of respondent students upon those whom ironically they would claim as "brothers" after the initiation rites, how can we countenance the imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even suspension? We, therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon respondent students. This finds authority and justification in Section 146 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. 48 chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of respondent Judge dated May 17, 1991 reinstating respondents students into petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of Ateneo de Manila University dated March 1991, is REINSTATED and the decision of the Special Board DISMISSING respondent students ADEL ABAS and ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May 20, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave. chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library I concur in the result. I do not join in the statement in the ponencia which seem to me to be a prejudgment of the criminal cases against the private respondents for the death of Lenny Villa.

Separate Opinions CRUZ, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library I concur in the result. I do not join in the statement in the ponencia which seem to me to be a prejudgment of the criminal cases against the private respondents for the death of Lenny Villa.

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 127980 : December 19, 2007 DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES YAP, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES, JR., Respondents. DECISION REYES, R.T., J.: NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante na nasangkot sa away ng dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isang pamantasan. PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the controversy before Us pitting private respondents' right to education vis-a-vis the University's right to academic freedom.

ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996 dismissing DLSU's petition for certiorari against respondent Judge and private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration;3 (3) Order dated January 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction;4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) exonerating private respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private respondents from expulsion to exclusion.5 Factual Antecedents Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two violent incidents on March 29, 1995 involving private respondents occurred: x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that one week prior to March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang's Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang's. Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to Manang's and confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then. After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology. "Kailangan ng apology" in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made. Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino Lux Fraternity in the campus. Among them were respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Papio. They were looking for a person whose description matched James Yap. According to them, this person supposedly "nambastos ng brod." As they could not find Mr. Yap, one of them remarked "Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang." Came March 29, 1995 and the following events. Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of the campus using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands - "parang knuckles." Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left. Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said "hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya." What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the group.

Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was at the Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap to the university clinic; reported the incident to the Discipline Office; and informed his fraternity brods at their tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the Domino Lux Fraternity said: "Walang gagalaw. Uwian na lang." Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him under the clock in Miguel Building. However, they did not proceed directly for home. With a certain Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of Dagonoy Street because Mr. Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his friend from another friend who lives somewhere in the area. As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several guys inside the restaurant. He said not to mind them and just keep on walking. However, the group got out of the restaurant, among them respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng gulo." But, respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without provocation. Respondent Reverente kicked Mr. Pascual and respondent Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez managed to run from the mauling and they were chased by respondent Lee and two others. Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual was ganged-upon by the rest. He was able to run, but the group was able to catch up with him. His shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of his head with a lead pipe. Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, then returned to Mr. Pascual. Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hit him. Although Mr. Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he identified respondent Valdez (sic) as also one of the members of the group. In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near the corner of Leon Guinto and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managed to run was stopped at the end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdes shouted: "Mga putang-ina niyo." Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the last time. Apparently being satisfied with their handiwork, the group left. The victims, Cano, Perez and Pascual proceeded to a friend's house and waited for almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the evening before they returned to the campus to have their wounds treated. Apparently, there were three cars roaming the vicinity.6 The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino Lux Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of "Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity," a rival fraternity. The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint7 with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents with "direct assault." Similar complaints8 were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.9 cra As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB10 were involved in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board11 was formed to investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent notices of hearing12 to private respondents on April 12, 1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows: Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano. You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses. On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed testimony. Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act complained of. For your strict compliance.13 During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board as follows: First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the few instances when he was picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time, respondent Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But on this particular date, respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his permission to use the car and thus, his dad instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not a family driver, but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Philippine Ports Authority where the elder Bungubung is also employed. Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that he arrived at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas Blvd. route towards respondent's house in BF Paraaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran); and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent Bungubung was dropped-off in his house, and taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at the South Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority is located at the South Harbor.14 xxx Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonald's Taft just before 6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together to get some medicine at the university clinic for his throat irritation. He said that he was at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, all within a span of 3 or even 4 minutes.

Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a certain Jorgette Aquino, attempted to corroborate Valdez' alibi.15 xxx Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home at 5:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he was given the responsibility to be the paymaster of the construction workers who were doing some works in the apartment of his parents. Although he had classes in the evening, the workers according to him would wait for him sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes. The workers get paid everyday. Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listed there, supposedly attesting to the fact that he paid the workers at the date and time in question.16 xxx Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp Crame for a meeting with some of the officers that we were preparing."17 On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution18 finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,19 pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.20 The dispositive part of the resolution reads: WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion. In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge. SO ORDERED.21 Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration22 before the Office of the Senior VicePresident for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a LetterResolution23 dated June 1, 1995. On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs. The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.

Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petition to correct an allegation in paragraph 3.2125 of his original petition. Respondent Judge amended the TRO26 to conform to the correction made in the amended petition.27 cra On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,28 in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS). On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-intervention29 in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private Respondents. On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss30 in behalf of all petitioners, except James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss31 the petitions-in-intervention. On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order32 denying petitioners' (respondents there) motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents' (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The pertinent part of the Order reads: For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other persons acting for and in its behalf is/are restrained and enjoined from 1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention from the De La Salle University and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995, affirming the Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and 2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at respondent De La Salle University and to immediately allow them to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat in accordance with the standards set by the latter. WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents, representatives, or any and all persons acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and enjoyed from: 1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention and the Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and 2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at respondent (De La Salle University) and to forthwith allow all said petitioner and petitioners-inintervention to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention posting an injunctive bond in the amount of P15,000.00 executed in favor of respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention will pay to respondent all damages that the latter may suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court will finally decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not entitled thereto.

The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of merit. Respondents are directed to file their Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. SO ORDERED.33 Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court.34 Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge's Order dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of which reads: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA that until further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as your subordinates, agents, representatives, employees and any other person assisting or acting for or on your behalf, to immediately desist from implementing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU, and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution of May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrolment of petitioner and intervenors in the courses offered at DLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation from said school.36 On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari 37 (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995. On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction. On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private Respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.38 The Resolution states: RESOLUTION 181-96 RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED. RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.39 Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters40 to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco

requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996 which states: Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy remedy available, considering the set deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU, through the proper school authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by DLSU. SO ORDERED.41 Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner DLSU.42 cra Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and academic. On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss of private respondent Aguilar, disposing thus: THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is hereby directed. SO ORDERED.44 On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, as follows: It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory in character, the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding. After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied. SO ORDERED.45 On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS. On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.47 cra On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its

questioned order granting private respondent Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of the order reads: In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents' motion to dismiss is denied. The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force and effect. Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Court's sheriff upon the respondents at petitioners' expense. SO ORDERED.48 Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122. On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition. On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the urgent motion for the issuance of a TRO50 dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge from implementing the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case No. 95-74122, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court. On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation51 stating that he has long completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for the second trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated in his transcript of records52 issued by DLSU. However, despite having completed all the academic requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of completion/graduation in his favor. Issues We are tasked to resolve the following issues: 1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating disciplinary rules. 2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private Respondents. 2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?cralaw 2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?cralaw 2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence? 3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their misdeed.

Our Ruling Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners53 that while CHED Resolution No. 18196 disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge - CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation. This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction.54 This is in consonance with our case law now accorded near-religious reverence that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court has the duty to suspend their operation.55 cra I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review over disciplinary cases decided by institutions of higher learning. Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga desisyong pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral. Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even those involving students in secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In support of their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4,56 15(2) & (3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the "Education Act of 1982." According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. They say that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the right and duty of learning institutions to develop moral character and instill discipline among its students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was academic, i.e., the formulation, recommendation, setting, and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of CHED's powers and functions under Section 8 does not include supervisory/review powers in student disciplinary cases. The reference in Section 3 to CHED's "coverage" of institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and functions specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which the CHED has replaced and whose functions and responsibilities it has taken over, never had any authority over student disciplinary cases. We cannot agree. On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes." Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:

Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. - In pursuance of the abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as Commission. The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degreegranting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and private. The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following: Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. - The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: xxx n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for the continued enhancement of growth or development of higher education. Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers to the DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that the authority and supervision over all public and private institutions of higher education, as well as degreegranting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS. Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is "both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and private." That would be absurd. It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which offers tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority. Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of students, the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middlelevel professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.

It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to academic freedom. Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact, the responsibilities of other government entities having functions similar to those of the CHED were transferred to the CHED.62 cra Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student discipline cases should therefore be read in conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722. Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that "[j]urisdiction over DECSsupervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On Higher Education]." This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what petitioners would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter. IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law. Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas. The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history.64 The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible.65 cra In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, "[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case."66 cra Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings.68 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.69 So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.70 cra A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process - it is enough that the parties are

given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court - one may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.72 cra Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121. Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v. National University73 where this Court held that "x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof." IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which includes determination of who to admit for study. Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay ng kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint.74According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.75 cra It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,"77 such right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school. IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial evidence.

Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay napatunayan ng ebidensiyang substansyal. As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. However, in order that alibi may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime."78 cra On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the assailant has been established by witnesses.79 Positive identification of accused where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.80 Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended parties.81 cra Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify the accused.82 Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with caution because one can easily fabricate an alibi.83 Jurisprudence holds that denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that accused were at the scene of the crime and were the victim's assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring of truth on one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former must prevail.84 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of accused by the witnesses.85 cra The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,86 it means "such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and Reverente. They were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims. We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several students found guilty of hazing: No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do. More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.87 Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to claim a venerable institution as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them.88 It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.89cra As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibi that he was at Camp Crame in Quezon City at the time of the incident in

question on March 29, 1995. This claim was amply corroborated by the certification that he submitted before the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, to wit: CERTIFICATION TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN: We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of this Certification that sometime on March 29, 1995, at about and between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at Kiangan Hall, inside Camp Crame, Quezon City, meeting in connection with an affair of our class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of the Philippine Constabulary discussing on the proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA PHI from said Batch '89 affair. That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar had asked our permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp Crame, in his car with the driver. April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90 The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC, NCR), PO3 Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses.91 It is true that alibi is a weak defense which an accused can easily fabricate to escape criminal liability. But where the prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack of credibility as to the identification of defendant, alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused.92 cra Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no other possible defense for what could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his favor.93 cra III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed. Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindi angkop sa kanilang pagkakasala. It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival."94 This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question.95 cra We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must be

anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure.96cra Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not expulsion,98 imposed on them by the CHED. As such, pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 18196 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued. SO ORDERED. Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Quisumbing *, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. ** , JJ., concur.

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