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In this spotlight, we discuss how Plexus establishes a "strike price" and present some ideas on how to set more representative strike prices. The financial management industry assigns great prominence to markei prrces. But any historical price is no more than a snapshot or a flicker of a volatile, dynamic process.
In this spotlight, we discuss how Plexus establishes a "strike price" and present some ideas on how to set more representative strike prices. The financial management industry assigns great prominence to markei prrces. But any historical price is no more than a snapshot or a flicker of a volatile, dynamic process.
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In this spotlight, we discuss how Plexus establishes a "strike price" and present some ideas on how to set more representative strike prices. The financial management industry assigns great prominence to markei prrces. But any historical price is no more than a snapshot or a flicker of a volatile, dynamic process.
Copyright:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Formatos disponibles
Descargue como PDF, TXT o lea en línea desde Scribd
At the heart of Plexus Group's transaction cost measurement is the comparison of the "strike price" at the time when the trade order became actionable to the transaction prices received in the marketplace. The difference is the cost of implementing the order. In this spotlight, we discuss how Plexus establishes a strike price, and present some ideas on how to set more representative strike prices.
preponderance of buyers and sellers in the
Strike Prices market: When buyers were dominant, the volume weighted price would likely be above the mid- The financial management industry assigns great spread price. prominence to markei prrces. Yet we all realize that 3. Averaging dampens the pafticularly unstable any historical price is no more than a snapshot or a opening and closing prices. flicker of a volatile, dynamic process. 4. The recording of time stamps into the order management systems is often subject to small Suppose a portfolio manager forwards an order to random delays. his trade desk on February 13th at forty seconds 5. Most investment managers base their selections after 1:30 in the afternoon. The implementation on a threshold price, not on a specific momentary shortfall methodology requires comparing price orice. movements between this point of initiation (the strike 6. Organizing our databases on a ten minute time price) and the ultimate execution prices. Should we slice vastly accelerates data retrieval and reduces accept the bid, the ask, or the last print (13:30:40 on storage requirements. 2113102) as the best benchmark? Did the portfolio manager really focus all of his intellectual power on While ten minutes felt "about right," not everybody that particular instant? ln contrast, would some buys into this logic. Some argue that ten minutes is appropriate sample of the concurrent stream of too long an intervalwhen markets are moving rapidly. prices result in a more representative strike price? So we decided to re-examine our assumptions in the light of new data capabilities at Plexus. Years ago Plexus adopted a solution for this strike price question that applied a "representative time We looked into our new daily-updated databases of frame" approach. We knew - or could infer - the tick data on the 8000+ most widely traded stocks on time at which the order was presented to the buyside the planet. We examined the dis-tribution of number trade desk, but we were concerned about the of trades per day across all companies. We then representativeness of these flicker prices. Our expanded our investigation to focus on non-retail solution was to average prices surrounding the trades greater than 1000 shares or 5000 shares per moment of order release. Somewhat arbitrarily, we trade. chose a ten minute clock period during which the order was received on the trade desk. Our loqic was The table shows the compiled information for the last as follows: trading day in June, 2001. Any of the first three columns can be read as a category. To illustrate, 1 . By using an averagewe minimize the effects of the consider the last line in the table. One company bouncing of prices between bid and asked. (Cisco) recorded 52,455 trades that day, 874+ per 2. We selected the volume weighted price for this minute, or on average one every seven-hundredths short time interval instead of the mid-spread price of a minute. because itwould tend toweigh the Suppose we were to rebuild our average price databases to include higher frequency data Elimi nating Retail Tradi ng "buckets." Instead of ten minute buckets, we could form one minute intervals on, say, every stock with One of the bothersome aspects of counting each more than '1000 trades per day. In the table, this and every trade is we overstate the liquidity on standard applies to the line describing the 1001-5000 companies such as the NASDAQ-Iisted Trades Per Day. 1000 trades per day implies a trade companies that command a great deal of retail every 5 seconds on average, or 12.5 per minute. interest but little trading in institutional size. To analyze the depth of institutional interest, we Responsible statistical averaging requires a performed the same analysis, this time eliminating respectable sample size. Plexus distrusts any trading all trades less than 1000 shares. statistic based on less than ten observations. Thus twelve samples per minute, 5000 trades or more per day, corresponds to this lower time interval to build The results clearly indicate how rapidly market reasonable samples. liquidity thins out. Only nine stocks make the twelve trades/min. lfraximum Average cutoff: NYSE, six Traeies three NASDAQ, and per Trades min:sec #of Cum NYSE NASDAQ NON.US Day per Between Stocks Pct zero non-US. The Minute Trades names are Honey- 0.01 80:00 541 6.6 91 407 well (story stock of 6-1 0 1'1-50 0.03 0.13 40:00 8:00 Cqt rsia,+ r o.g 2e.ri 65 328 1 2s3 005 the day), Exxon 5'l-100 0.25 4:00 934 +t.C 188 Mobil, Citigroup, No- 557 10'1-500 1.25 0;48 ittt 79.6 873 't280 kia, Global Crossing 501 -1 000 2.50 0:24 870 go.e 365 231 (story stock) AOL 1 001 -5000 12.50 0:05 odo 9S.3 297 199 Time Warner, Intel, 5001 -1 0000 25.00 0:2.4 se.s 36 12' 56 Oracle, and Cisco.) qi gs.gs 1 0001 -50000 cz4c3 (max) 125.00 874.25 0:0.48 0:0.068 100.0 38 2 0 The number of stocks with at 1 1 least The table shows us that exactly 99 stocks, I NYSE, 1000 trades drops from 785 stocks to 190. 75 NASDAQ, and 15 non-US had 5000 trades or more per day. Only 12% of the institutional universe Our conclusion is thus even stronger than before. has more than 5000 trades per day. Focusing on only institutional sized trades over Companies with lower trading frequencies require a 1000 shares, there are only a handful of com- longer time interval (e.9. ten minutes or more) to panies with sufficient daia to justify shoi-ter gather enough data for averaging. However, averaging intervals. lf we set a standard of at least suppose that instead of cutting off at 5000 trades per 5000 trades per day to form rea-sonable day, we cut off at 1000 trades. In this sample there averages, 10 minute or longer trade intervals are are 785 stocks with more than 1000 trades per day; preferable for 99.9% of all stocks in our universe. 199 NYSE, 372 NASDAQ, and 214 non-US stocks. Against a standard of 1000 institutional trades per Even by this loosened standard, 90% of the stocks day, a minimum of a 10 minute interval is required trade so infrequently as to make an averaging for 9B.B% of the trading universe. interval less than ten minutes questionable.
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Plexus News Plexus Group has been acquired by JPMorgan lnvestor Servlces. This relationship helps us to rapidly strengthen 9rorrp existing services and introduce new products, while maintaining our confidentiality, objectivity and trustworthiness. ''Iexug 1 11 50 W. OUmpic Blvd., i1900 Los Angeles, CA 90064 PH : 31 0. 31 2. 550 5 F AX : 3 1 0. 31 2. 5506 vwvw ple xusg roup.@m @ 2002 Plexus Group. lnc.