Emotion 2003, Vol. 3, No.

4, 361377

Copyright 2003 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 1528-3542/03/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/1528-3542.3.4.361

Is Attention to Feelings Beneficial or Detrimental to Affective Well-Being? Mood Regulation as a Moderator Variable
Tanja Lischetzke and Michael Eid
University of Koblenz-Landau This research examined the functionality of attention to feelings for affective wellbeing. The authors found that mood regulation, but not clarity of feelings, moderated the attentionwell-being relationship. For individuals with high mood regulation scores, attention was beneficial to affective well-being, whereas for individuals with low mood regulation scores, attention was detrimental to affective well-being. This finding was corroborated by self- and peer reports in Study 1 and replicated in Study 2. The validity of the scales was established by the convergence of selfand peer ratings. Moreover, Study 2 showed that dysfunctional and functional self-consciousness scales suppressed variance in attention to feelings, thereby revealing that attention incorporates both adaptive and maladaptive aspects.

The question of whether frequently attending to private aspects of the self, such as feelings, thoughts, motives, or bodily sensations, has positive or negative consequences for subjective well-being and mental health has stimulated a large amount of research. On the one hand, individual differences in dispositional self-focused attention to ones inner selftermed private self-consciousness by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975)play a crucial role in selfregulatory processes. According to Carver and Scheier (e.g., 1981, 1982, 1998), self-focused attention assists individuals in the pursuit of goals, as it makes discrepancies between their current standing and a particular standard salient, which in turn motivates attempts to meet the standard. Empirically, heightened private self-consciousness has been linked to better self-knowledge (e.g., Nasby, 1989) and more effective self-regulation (e.g., Mullen & Suls, 1982; Suls & Fletcher, 1985). On the other hand, higher private self-consciousness scores have been consis-

Tanja Lischetzke and Michael Eid, Institute for Psychology, University of Koblenz-Landau, Landau, Germany. Michael Eid is now at the Faculty of Psychology and Education, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland. Study 1 was funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Grant Ei 379/51. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Tanja Lischetzke, who is now at the Faculty of Psychology and Education, University of Geneva, 40, Bd. du Pont dArve, CH-1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland. E-mail: tanja.lischetzke@pse.unige.ch

tently associated with higher levels of psychological distress, chronic negative affect, and depression (e.g., Ingram, 1990). The results of a recent meta-analysis by Mor and Winquist (2002) indicated that self-focus carries differential affective implications, depending on the specific self-aspect that is attended to, the type of self-focus (e.g., ruminative vs. nonruminative), and the context in which self-focus takes place (e.g., after success vs. failure). Consistent with the authors view that self-focused attention should be construed as a multifaceted construct, the present research aims to analyze the functionality of a specific aspect of selffocused attention for affective well-being (i.e., the affective component of subjective well-being; see Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999): the attention that is allocated to ones affective states. Attention to feelings has been conceptualized as a meta-mood construct indicating the frequency with which an individual directs attention to his or her affective states, which has been shown to be distinct from the clarity of feelings, that is, the ability to identify and label ones affective states, and the ability to regulate moods (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995; Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995).1 In re-

1 Throughout this article, we use the terms attention to feelings and clarity of feelings that Salovey et al. (1995) used to denote two subscales of their Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS). Swinkels and Giuliano (1995) named the two dimensions of their Mood Awareness Scale (MAS) Mood Monitoring and Mood Labeling, which are similar to

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cent years, interest in the self-regulation of mood states has grown considerably. Drawing on principles of cybernetic control theory, models of mood regulation have been developed (e.g., Larsen, 2000; Parkinson, Totterdell, Briner, & Reynolds, 1996) that delineate the points in the mood regulation process where individual differences arise and may contribute to differential affective outcomes. Among other variables (e.g., temperamental affective reactivity), the dispositional degree of attention directed at ones affective state, the ability to clearly perceive ones current state, and the ability to implement effective mood regulation strategies represent relevant individual-differences characteristics. Whereas the results of empirical studies point to the adaptive function of affective clarity (e.g., Gohm & Clore, 2002; Salovey et al., 1995; Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995) and mood regulation competencies (e.g., Kirsch, Mearns, & Catanzaro, 1990; Mearns, 1991), the role heightened attention to feelings plays in the self-regulation of affective states is less clear. Therefore, the aim of the present research was to shed more light on the functionality of attention to feelings for affective well-being. In particular, we wanted to examine under which conditions attention to feelings may be beneficial or detrimental to affective well-being (cf. Mor & Winquist, 2002). The present studies focused on the interplay between attention to feelings, clarity of feelings, and mood regulation, which has been largely neglected to date.

Theoretical and Empirical Links Between Attention to Feelings and Affective Well-Being
From a process perspective of mood regulation, attention focused at ones momentary affective state plays an important role in the self-regulation of affect. In a given situation, a minimum of attention to feelings is necessary to become clear about ones affective state, to evaluate its relevance for current concerns, and to decide whether one should do something about it (Parkinson et al., 1996). For example, attention directed at a positive mood may lead to heightened awareness and enjoyment of the mood and at-

attention and clarity. Results from factor analysis and cluster analysis (Gohm & Clore, 2000, 2002) revealed that Attention and Mood Monitoring, and Clarity and Mood Labeling, respectively, overlap to a great extent. Thus, these subscales of the TMMS and the MAS can be considered as measuring the same traits.

tempts to maintain that state, or in the case of a negative mood, attention may prompt attempts to improve the mood (if the condition is appraised as unwanted). Thus, in terms of a dispositional tendency, paying attention to ones feelings is required for the perception and effective regulation of affects. In this sense, dispositional attention to feelings may indirectly enhance affective well-being. On the other hand, heightened dispositional attention to feelings has been considered as detrimental to affective well-being. For example, Swinkels and Giuliano (1995) argued that monitoring ones mood states implies a certain degree of vigilance, which may lead to a greater involvement and absorption in the affective state and, in the case of negative moods, to intensified and prolonged unpleasant affect. The act of self-attention itself may worsen current mood by enhancing perception of existing discrepancies between actual and ideal self (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972). What do empirical studies suggest as to the relation between attention to feelings and affective wellbeing? At best, empirical evidence is mixed. In two studies, the tendency to focus on ones affective states was positively related to indicators of negative affect and depression (Salovey et al., 1995, Study 2; Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995), whereas in other studies, there was no relation between attention to feelings and indicators of affective well-being (Gohm & Clore, 2002; Salovey et al., 1995, Study 1; Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002). That is, attention to feelings seems to be neither beneficial nor consistently detrimental to affective well-being. How can these mixed results be explained? With respect to the broader construct of private self-consciousness, researchers have tried to resolve the paradox that habitual selfattending is associated with greater self-knowledge yet poorer psychological adjustment by distinguishing between functional and dysfunctional components. Trapnell and Campbell (1999) proposed two motivationally distinct dispositions confounded in private self-consciousness, rumination and reflection. Rumination refers to self-focus motivated by perceived threats, losses, or injuries to the self. This neurotic form of private self-consciousness is characterized by recurrent past-oriented, negative thinking about the self (e.g., Long after an argument or disagreement is over with, my thoughts keep going back to what happened). Reflection, an intellective form of private self-consciousness, refers to self-focus motivated by curiosity or epistemic interest in the self (e.g., I love exploring my inner self). Both facets were corre-

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lated with private self-consciousness, but rumination was strongly associated with neuroticism, and reflection was strongly associated with openness to experience (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Similarly, Hoyer (2000) identified rumination as a dysfunctional form of private self-consciousness, which is marked by sustained, rigid self-attending. Functional self-consciousness, on the other hand, was conceptualized as perceived self-efficacy in solving personal problems through the use of flexible attention deployment. Hoyer (2000) demonstrated that dysfunctional and functional self-consciousness were inversely related with well-being indicators and discriminated between healthy individuals and psychotherapy patients. Hence, research on private self-consciousness has shown that heightened self-focus may not generally be good or bad, but that private self-consciousness contains both beneficial and detrimental aspects. These results suggest that the ambiguous relationship between attention to feelings and well-being could be explained by the fact that attention to feelings may also comprise both adaptive and maladaptive aspects, which offset each others influence on affective wellbeing. In contrast to private self-consciousness, however, these two facets of attention to feelings have not been sufficiently scrutinized up to now. In general, there are at least two ways to explore whether attention to feelings comprises both beneficial and detrimental aspects. The first strategy is based on the idea that the adaptive aspect of the attention construct should be revealed when dysfunctional self-focus is controlled for, and the maladaptive aspect of the attention construct should be revealed when functional self-focus is controlled for in the prediction of well-being. In other words, scales measuring dysfunctional and functional aspects of self-focus may suppress specific variance in attention to feelings, thereby uncovering the two aspects of the attention construct. These suppressor hypotheses, however, have not been tested up to now. The second strategy to examine the issue of functionality is to ask under which circumstances (e.g., personal conditions) directing attention to ones feelings may be beneficial or detrimental to affective well-being (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Such an approach may be especially valuable from a process perspective of mood regulation (e.g., Parkinson et al., 1996), because it may tell us why some people end up passively ruminating about their mood when they direct attention at their momentary state, whereas others who allocate attention to their momentary state use

the information to guide their regulatory actions. In the present studies, we focused on two possible moderators of the attentionwell-being relationship: the ability to clearly identify ones affective states and the ability to effectively regulate ones moods. To our knowledge, no study has addressed this issue. To place our moderator hypotheses more firmly in the theoretical context of mood regulation processes, we take a closer look at the interplay between attention, clarity, and mood regulation.

Interplay Between Attention, Clarity, and Mood Regulation

To clearly recognize a momentary affective state, an individual has to allocate some attention to her or his affective state and subsequently identify the state that has been brought into consciousness. That is, situationally, attention to and clarity of feelings together constitute a core perceptual process. However, the habitual tendency to attend to ones feelings at frequent intervals does not guarantee high levels of clarity, which is empirically reflected in positive, but only low correlations between trait attention and clarity (Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; Gohm & Clore, 2000, 2002; Salovey et al., 1995; Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995). The labeling of ones affective state allows one to turn ones attention to other concerns (e.g., evaluation of the affective state with respect to current goals, feasible regulation strategies, or external demands). Thus, clarity should facilitate mood regulation and enhance affective well-being (Parkinson et al., 1996; Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995). Accordingly, Salovey et al. (1995) found that individuals who reported high habitual clarity about their feelings (compared with low-clarity individuals) were more likely to rebound from induced negative mood and showed a stronger decline in ruminative thought over time after they had watched a distressing film. Hence, frequently directing attention to ones feelings should have positive benefits for affective well-being if individuals possess the ability to clearly recognize and label their feelings because they can make use of the information carried by their affective state to guide their regulatory actions. For individuals low in clarity, however, this effect should be reversed, because frequently attending to confusing affective states may lead to passive rumination in an attempt to gain more insight into the affective state. Research on depression has shown that the tendency to ruminate over a depressed mood prolongs and intensifies this state (e.g., Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema

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& Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993). Mood regulation refers to the ability to modify or maintain ones mood states. Regulation strategies typically aim to repair negative affective states or maintain positive ones (e.g., Isen, 1984). However, situational influences (e.g., social constraints, utility, and appropriateness of certain affects) may prompt individuals to deliberately attempt to neutralize their moods (Erber, 1996), maintain their negative affects, or even transform their positive moods into bad ones (Parrott, 1993). Nonetheless, the two hedonic types of regulation (negative mood repair and positive mood maintenance) may be most common in everyday life (Larsen, 2000). In any case, before individuals can decide whether regulatory attempts are required and subsequently engage in effective mood regulation, they have to allocate some attention to their current affective state and be able to identify it with some accuracy (Thayer, 1996; Watson, 2000). Ways to modify or maintain a mood state cover a wide range of cognitive and behavioral strategies such as thinking of pleasant things, exercising, or talking to someone (for classifications of mood regulation strategies, see Morris & Reilly, 1987; Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999; Thayer, Newman, & McClain, 1994). When a mood regulation strategy has been implemented, attention to ones current mood is needed to evaluate whether the current strategy is working effectively and is still necessary (Larsen, 2000; Parkinson et al., 1996). Some mood regulation strategies may be generally more effective than others, but more important to the prediction of habitual affective well-being, individuals differ considerably in their usage of types of strategies and their ability to effectively regulate mood (e.g., Salovey et al., 1995; Thayer et al., 1994). That is, some individuals who habitually attend to their feelings at frequent intervals may lack the ability to regulate their moods, whereas other high-attention individuals may be good at regulating their mood. For the former group of individuals, we expected that high attention would be rather detrimental to well-being, as it may involve recurrent thinking about a negative mood without being able to change it and promote mood-congruent information processing. If they feel good, these individuals may not be able to take advantage of attending to their positive mood to prolong this state. However, the group of high-mood regulation individuals could avail themselves of their heightened awareness of affective states to effectively improve bad moods at an early stage and to actively

maintain positive moods before they fade, thus experiencing higher levels of habitual pleasant affect. In summary, we propose that clarity and mood regulation moderate the attentionwell-being relationship and that such an interactive approach could shed more light on the ambiguous association between attention and well-being. Indirect evidence for these moderator hypotheses comes from a study on the moodmemory link by McFarland and Buehler (1998, Experiment 2). After a negative or neutral mood induction, participants in this study were either encouraged to focus on their mood or distracted from their mood. In addition to these two experimental factors (mood negativity and mood focus), individual differences in ruminative tendencies were assessed via selfreport (whereby participants were classified as either ruminators or nonruminators). As the dependent variable, the positivity of reported high school memories was measured. The results revealed a three-way interaction between mood negativity, mood focus, and rumination level. Ruminators who had been focused on their mood recruited less positive memories after the negative mood induction than after the neutral mood induction (i.e., they showed mood-congruent recall). In contrast, nonruminators who had been focused on their mood recruited more positive memories after the negative mood induction than after the neutral mood induction (i.e., they showed moodincongruent recall). Note that ruminators and nonruminators did not differ in the positivity of their recollections when they had been distracted from their mood. If one assumes that recruiting positive memories can improve current mood (which has not been examined in this study, though), one might conclude that nonruminators were able to take advantage of attending to their negative mood to improve their mood, whereas for ruminators, directing attention toward their negative mood may have had a moodsustaining or even mood-worsening effect. That is, ruminative tendencies moderated the impact of attention on autobiographical memory, and possibly on state mood, too. Because the actual intraindividual change in state mood was not assessed in this study, the latter interpretation is rather speculative, of course. Also, it is unclear whether moderating effects of ruminative tendencies would generalize to predict habitual affective well-being. Nonetheless, the results indirectly support our assumptions regarding the moderating role of clarity and mood regulation, as ruminative tendencies bear a resemblance to a pattern of low clarity and low mood regulation abilities (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).

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Overview of the Present Studies

We conducted two studies to explore the functionality of attention to feelings for affective well-being. To move beyond bivariate analyses of the constructs relation with well-being, which largely dominate the field, we wanted to test moderator and suppressor hypotheses. First, we sought to determine whether clarity and mood regulation moderate the attention well-being relationship. We expected that high attention would be beneficial to well-being for individuals who are very clear about their feelings and detrimental to well-being for individuals who are unclear about their feelings. For mood regulation, we assumed the same kind of interaction effect; that is, for individuals high in mood regulation, attention to feelings should be positively related to well-being, whereas for individuals low in mood regulation, attention should be negatively related to well-being. As an important strength of the present analyses, we applied a multimethod assessment strategy and used both self- and peer reports to test our moderator hypotheses. Second, to test the assumption that attention to feelings incorporates both positive and negative aspects of selffocus, we sought to determine whether scales measuring dysfunctional and functional self-consciousness would suppress the maladaptive and adaptive part of attentions variance, respectively, in the prediction of affective well-being, thereby uncovering the respective opposite aspect. To establish validity of the scales measuring attention, clarity, mood regulation, and affective well-being, we examined self-peer convergence before testing these hypotheses. Until now, validation studies examining the convergence between self- and peer reports, common in other areas of personality assessment (e.g., McCrae, 1982; Watson & Clark, 1991), appear not to have been conducted with respect to attention, clarity, and mood regulation (cf. Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001, p. 201). Finally, we wanted to control for measurement error in all analyses by applying structural equation modeling. In Study 1, we analyzed self-peer convergence and tested the moderator hypotheses by using both selfand peer reports. In Study 2, we sought to replicate the findings from Study 1 in a different sample of selfreports and test the suppressor hypotheses.

ing this strategy, however, one has to bear in mind that these traits have rather low visibility. Compared with a more observable trait-like extraversion, for instance, these affect-related traits have less clear and less frequent behavioral manifestations and, thus, are more difficult to judge for outside observers. Generally, more visible traits yield better selfother agreement (e.g., Funder & Colvin, 1988, 1997). Hence, we expected a moderate level of self-other convergence for attention, clarity, mood regulation, and affective well-being. The second and major aim of Study 1 was to test the hypotheses that clarity of feelings and mood regulation moderate the attentionwell-being relationship. These hypotheses were tested using both self- and peer reports.

Method Participants and Procedure

The analyses presented here are part of a comprehensive multitraitmultimethod (MTMM) study examining self- and peer-rated emotional experience. All of the measures reported were completed by the self-raters (i.e., targets) in the self-report form and by the peer raters in the peer report form (i.e., they rated the targets). Five hundred students at the University of Trier and the Trier University of Applied Sciences, Trier, Germany, were recruited to participate in the study. To participate and to receive financial compensation, targets were required to bring 2 peer raters with them at a designated time to complete the questionnaires, and each group received 60 German marks (approximately $30 U.S.). Thus, each group (of 3 individuals) participated at the same time, although we separated them while they filled out the questionnaires to prevent the sharing of information. We also informed all participants that they would not be able to view the other questionnaires from their group to prevent possible data manipulation (e.g., impression management, socially desirable response behavior). The analyses presented here are based on 477 complete data sets (1,431 participants). Sixty-three percent of the participants were women, and the mean age was 23.3 years (SD 3.6). According to the targets, 9% of the peer raters were partners (i.e., significant others), 2% were relatives, 69% were classified as friends, and 20% were considered acquaintances. The mean length of relationship was 35 months (range 1311 months). When targets were asked to rate how well they knew the peer raters on a scale between 1 (briefly acquainted) and 10 (there are no

Study 1
The first aim of Study 1 was to analyze the convergence of self- and other reported attention, clarity, mood regulation, and affective well-being. In apply-

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secrets between us), the mean response was 6.5 (SD 2.3). To counteract the irrelevant specificity of 1 rater, the 2 peer raters were aggregated (i.e., averaged) in all analyses (cf. Spain, Eaton, & Funder, 2000; Watson & Clark, 1991).

Measures
Attention to and clarity of feelings. A German 12-item scale was used to assess the attention to and the clarity of ones own feelings (Lischetzke, Eid, Wittig, & Trierweiler, 2001). The wording of the German items and their English translations can be found in the Appendix. The items were rated on 4-point frequency scales (ranging from almost never to almost always). Mood regulation. A German 10-item scale measuring perceived effectiveness in regulation of moods was constructed. The items tap negative mood repair and positive mood maintenance (e.g., It is easy for me to get out of a bad mood, When I am in a good mood, I am able to stay that way for a long time). The items were answered on 4-point frequency scales (ranging from almost never to almost always). Because of further scale development and refinement, this mood regulation scale was a precursor to the final version used in Study 2. Thus, we present only the full item list for the final version (which can be found in the Appendix). Pleasant-unpleasant trait mood. As an indicator of affective well-being, the Pleasant-Unpleasant Scale of the Multidimensional Mood Questionnaire (MMQ; Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz, & Eid, 1997) in the trait version (Eid, Schneider, & Schwenkmezger, 1999) was used. The scale consists of eight adjectives assessing pleasant-unpleasant mood. Participants rated how they habitually feel on 5-point intensity scales (ranging from not at all to very much so).

Models and Methods of Data Analysis

To control for measurement error, the convergence of self- and peer reports was analyzed with structural equation models using the statistical software package Mplus (Version 2.1; Muthe n & Muthe n, 1998). An MTMM model for multiple indicators was applied (Eid, Lischetzke, Nussbeck, & Trierweiler, 2003). To separate trait effects, method effects, and error effects in this model, it is necessary to have at least two indicators (i.e., observed variables) for each trait method combination. Accordingly, the scales for measuring attention, clarity, mood regulation, and affective well-being were split into two test halves. The

two peer ratings were combined, that is, a peer-rated test half represents the aggregated test half of the two peer ratings. In this MTMM model, it is assumed that for each construct (attention, clarity, mood regulation, and affective well-being) the self- and peer ratings are indicators of the same common trait. Additionally, the peer ratings are indicators of a traitspecific method factor. For each trait, these method factors measure the deviation of the peer ratings from the values expected on the basis of the selfratings (Eid, 2000; Eid et al., 2003). We report the estimated latent correlations between the self-ratings and the combined peer ratings for the total scales. The calculation of these latent correlations is explained in detail by Eid et al. (2003) and is therefore not presented here. The relations among attention, clarity, mood regulation, and affective well-being were also analyzed by structural equation modeling using the program Mplus (Version 2.1; Muthe n & Muthe n, 1998). To estimate bivariate correlation coefficients, we specified two models (one for the self-ratings and one for the combined peer ratings) with latent variables measured by two indicators each. Accordingly, each scale was split into two test halves. No double loadings or correlated error variables were allowed. The fit of the models was assessed by the maximum-likelihood chisquare test, the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the comparative fit index (CFI). To analyze moderator effects, it is necessary to include interaction terms (i.e., product terms of the predictor variables) in the regression equation. Because interactions between latent variables cannot be analyzed with Mplus (Version 2.1; Muthe n & Muthe n, 1998), we applied the latent moderated structural equations (LMS) program (Klein, 2000; Klein & Moosbrugger, 2000), which is based on a new estimation method for latent moderator effects. The authors have demonstrated that this method is one of the best currently available estimation procedures for latent moderator analysis. Again, each latent variable was measured by two indicators (test halves), and no double loadings or correlated error variables were allowed. To minimize multicollinearity problems (because of high correlations between predictors and their interaction terms), indicators were centered before the analyses (see Aiken & West, 1991). The fit of the two moderator models (one for the self-ratings and one for the combined peer ratings) was assessed by the chi-square statistic alone, because LMS does not report other fit coefficients.

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Results Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities

Descriptive statistics and internal consistencies for the self- and combined peer ratings are presented in Table 1. Paired samples t tests revealed significant mean differences between self- and peer ratings for attention to feelings, t(476) 3.13, p < .01, and mood regulation, t(476) 3.89, p < .01. However, these mean differences were rather small (d 0.17 and 0.22, respectively). For both self- and combined peer reports, Cronbachs coefficient alphas were high for all scales.

SelfOther Convergence
The MTMM model for four traits (attention, clarity, mood regulation, and pleasant-unpleasant trait mood) and two methods (self-ratings and combined peer ratings) demonstrated an acceptable fit to the data, 2(72, N 477) 121.40, p .00 (RMSEA .04, p .96; CFI .99). The estimated latent correlations between self- and peer ratings were .30 for attention, .32 for clarity, .34 for mood regulation, and .30 for pleasant-unpleasant trait mood.

slightly worse fit for the combined peer report model. The estimated latent correlations between the scales are depicted in the upper part of Table 1. Attention and clarity were only moderately correlated, thus confirming their status as separable constructs. In the self-report, attention was unrelated to both mood regulation and pleasant-unpleasant trait mood, whereas in the peer report, attention was moderately negatively correlated with mood regulation and showed a low negative correlation with trait mood. Both clarity and mood regulation were positively linked to pleasant-unpleasant trait mood; that is, individuals who were very clear about their feelings and individuals who were very adept at regulating their mood reported better habitual mood compared with their less clear and less adept counterparts.

Moderator Effects
Finally, we tested our hypotheses that clarity and mood regulation would moderate the relation between attention to feelings and pleasant-unpleasant trait mood. The results of the latent moderator analyses are presented in Table 2. The fit information for the two models (self-ratings and combined peer ratings) can be found in the Note to Table 2. In the self-report, the nonsignificant chi-square value demonstrated good model fit. In the combined peer report, the model fit was slightly worse, but the 2:df ratio of less than 2 demonstrated acceptable fit (e.g., Kline, 1998). (Note that LMS does not report other fit coefficients.) As expected, the Attention Mood Regulation interaction was significant in both self- and peer ratings. Figure 1 illustrates this effect, showing the attention

Scale Intercorrelations
Next, we analyzed the bivariate relations between attention, clarity, mood regulation, and trait mood in the sample of self-ratings and in the sample of combined peer ratings. The fit information for the two models estimating latent correlations can be found in the Note to Table 1. The coefficients demonstrated good fit to the data for the self-report model and a

Table 1 Latent Correlations Between the Scales, Descriptive Statistics, and Internal Consistencies for the Self-Ratings and the Combined Peer Ratings in Study 1 Self-rating Scale 1. Attention to feelings 2. Clarity of feelingsa 3. Mood regulationa 4. Pleasant-unpleasant trait moodb M SD
a

Combined peer rating 3 4 1 .33** .28** .11* 2.83 0.46 .90 2 .22** .29** 3.10 0.43 .86 3 4

1 .23** .05 .02 2.92 0.59 .86

2 .25** .36** 3.13 0.64 .89

.53** 2.52 0.55 .86

3.89 0.67 .91

.60** 2.62 0.36 .83

3.83 0.55 .93

Note. Self-rating n 477. Combined peer rating n 477. Latent variables were measured by two test halves each. To avoid improper estimates (negative residuals), loadings of the attention indicators were constrained to be equal in the self-rating model. Model fit information: 2 Self-rating, 2 15 28.11, p .02; RMSEA .04, p .66; CFI .99; Combined peer rating, 14 52.44, p .00; RMSEA .08, p .02; CFI .98. RMSEA root-mean-square error of approximation (significance test refers to the null hypothesis: RMSEA 0.05); CFI comparative fit index. a Possible range of scale scores: 14. b Possible range of scale scores: 15. * p < .05. ** p < .01.

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Table 2 Latent Regression Analyses With Interaction Terms Predicting Pleasant-Unpleasant Trait Mood for the Self-Ratings and the Combined Peer Ratings in Study 1 Rating-predictor Self-rating Attention to feelings Clarity of feelings Mood regulation Attention Clarity Attention Mood Regulation Clarity Mood Regulation Combined peer rating Attention to feelings Clarity of feelings Mood regulation Attention Clarity Attention Mood Regulation Clarity Mood Regulation R .58 R2 .34 .03 .22 .55 .12 .22 .18 .63 .39 .03 .25 .76 .02 .54 .12 .06 .06 .08 .13 .15 .17 .02 .19** .52** .01 .16** .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .10 .09 .03 .23** .46** .08 .11* .09* B SE B

who are good at regulating their mood. For individuals with low scores on mood regulation, attention was negatively related to mood. In the self-ratings, this moderator effect explained 1% of the variance in trait mood, and in the peer ratings, it explained 3% of the variance in trait mood. Contrary to our hypothesis, the Attention to Feelings Clarity interaction did not reach significance in either rater group. Unexpectedly, the Clarity Mood Regulation interaction attained significance in the self-report. Both clarity and mood regulation positively predicted trait mood, but their beneficial influence was not additive. At low levels of mood regulation abilities, clarity was more strongly related to pleasant trait mood than at high levels of mood regulation abilities. The estimated effect size for this moderator effect was 1%. In the peer ratings, the Clarity Mood Regulation interaction did not attain significance.

Discussion
This study provided evidence for the reliability and convergent validity of scales assessing attention to feelings, clarity of feelings, mood regulation, and affective well-being. In the overall sample of selfratings and combined peer ratings, self-peer convergence was moderate (ranging from .30 to .34), which represents a level of convergence typically found for affect-related traits (e.g., Stanton, Kirk, Cameron, & Danoff-Burg, 2000; Watson & Clark, 1991; Watson, Hubbard, & Wiese, 2000).

Note. Self-rating n 477. Combined peer rating n 477. Latent variables were measured by two test halves each. Model fit information: Self-rating, 2 54 59.02, p .30; Combined peer rating, 2 54 98.60, p .00. * p < .05. ** p < .01.

trait mood relationship for mood regulation levels that represent the mean and 1 standard deviation below and above that mean. In both rater groups, attention had a positive relation to trait mood for individuals

Figure 1. Attention to Feelings Mood Regulation (MR) interaction on Pleasant-Unpleasant Trait Mood for self-ratings and combined peer ratings in Study 1. Variables are standardized. Regression lines represent selected values of the moderator variable.

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The correlational analyses demonstrated that attention to feelings was unrelated to affective well-being (self-ratings), or only weakly negatively associated with affective well-being (peer ratings). This means that attention per se seems neither beneficial nor detrimental to affective well-being. However, the utility of heightened attention to feelings can be evaluated within the specific personal context: Latent moderator analysis confirmed our hypothesis that the relationship between attention to feelings and affective wellbeing would be moderated by mood regulation. For individuals high in mood regulation, attention was positively related to affective well-being, whereas for individuals low in mood regulation, attention was negatively related to affective well-being. More important, this result was replicated across self- and peer ratings. The moderator analysis uncovered differential relations of attention to trait mood for different groups of individuals, which in their sum resulted in the nonsignificant (or very low) bivariate correlation in the total sample of self- and peer reports. Our hypothesis that clarity would moderate the attentiontrait mood relationship was not supported by the data. The clarity of affective states does not seem to be powerful enough to make a difference in attentions functionality for affective well-being.2 In the self-report, the moderator analysis also yielded a significant Clarity Mood Regulation interaction that we had not expected. On all levels of mood regulation, clarity was associated with higher affective wellbeing, but this positive effect was most pronounced among individuals low in mood regulation. Among good mood regulators, clarity was not as important for affective well-being. This nonadditive effect suggests that clarity and mood regulation could partly compensate each other at low levels. However, this unexpected effect was not confirmed in the peer ratings. To gain more confidence in the present results and to clarify the status of the unexpected interaction, we sought to replicate the moderator analyses in another sample.

(effective problem solving by flexible attention deployment). Moreover, we tested whether functional and dysfunctional self-consciousness would improve the prediction of affective well-being by suppressing variance of the Attention to Feelings scale. If attention to feelings contains both beneficial and detrimental aspects of self-focus, functional self-consciousness should be able to uncover the negative part of attentions variance by suppressing the positive part, whereas dysfunctional self-consciousness should be able to uncover the positive part of attentions variance by suppressing the negative part.

Method Participants
Two hundred forty-one students from the University of Trier and the University of Magdeburg, Germany, completed questionnaires in large group sessions (following a lecture). Of the participants, 1 was excluded from the data set because of missing values on the scales relevant for the present analyses. Out of the final sample of 240 students, 57% were women, and the mean age was 21.0 years (SD 2.2).

Measures
To measure attention to and clarity of feelings, the same scales were used as in Study 1. To assess mood regulation, we further refined the scale used in Study 1. The final version of the Mood Regulation scale is presented in the Appendix. Affective well-being was again measured by the Pleasant-Unpleasant Trait Mood Scale from the MMQ (Steyer et al., 1997). Additionally, the Questionnaire of Dysfunctional and Functional Self-Consciousness was administered

Study 2
Using a different sample of self-reports, the first aim of Study 2 was to confirm the results of the moderator analyses. The second aim was to shed more light on the ambiguous nature of the attention-tofeelings construct. We analyzed whether attention would correlate positively with both dysfunctional aspects of self-consciousness (ruminating over problems) and functional aspects of self-consciousness

2 One might speculate that clarity could contribute nonadditively to the interaction between attention and mood regulation to form a three-way interaction: For individuals who are high in both clarity and mood regulation, the positive relation between attention and emotional well-being may be stronger than demonstrated by the Attention Mood Regulation interaction, and for individuals low in both clarity and mood regulation, the detrimental effect of attention may be even greater. In a secondary analysis, we tested this three-way interaction on the manifest level (because LMS does not estimate higher order interactions), but the interaction term did not attain significance beyond the other effects.

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(Hoyer, 2000), which is a 22-item instrument assessing maladaptive and adaptive aspects of selfconsciousness. Dysfunctional self-consciousness measures the tendency to ruminate over problems (e.g., It happens that certain thoughts keep going round in my head), and functional self-consciousness taps perceived self-efficacy with respect to solving personal problems (e.g., I am confident that I can solve a personal problem even if there seems to be no solution at first). The items were rated on 5-point rating scales ranging from not at all to very much so.

correlation coefficient). As Smith, Ager, and Williams (1992) pointed out, this definition of suppression is completely reciprocal: If the usefulness of one variable exceeds its validity, the usefulness of the other will also exceed its validity.

Results Descriptive Statistics, Reliabilities, and Intercorrelations

Descriptive statistics and Cronbachs coefficient alphas for the scales are displayed in the lower part of Table 3. Means and standard deviations of attention, clarity, mood regulation, and trait mood were similar to the values obtained in Study 1. Internal consistencies were high for all scales. Latent correlations among the scales can be found in the upper part of Table 3. The model fit information is located in the Note to Table 3. The coefficients demonstrated acceptable fit to the data. The interrelations between the attention, clarity, mood regulation, and pleasant-unpleasant trait mood were very similar to the pattern found for the self-ratings in Study 1. In particular, attention was unrelated to mood regulation and trait mood. With respect to the two self-consciousness scales, our hypothesis that attention to feelings would be positively related to both the Dysfunctional and the Functional subscale was confirmed. With r .25 and r .21, both correlations were moderate. Unlike attention, clarity and mood regulation demonstrated an inverse pattern of corre-

Models and Methods of Data Analysis

To analyze latent bivariate correlations and moderator effects, the same strategies as those described in Study 1 were applied. Suppressor effects were also analyzed on the latent level by structural equation modeling using the program Mplus (Muthe n & Muthe n, 1998). To test whether the self-consciousness scales would suppress variance of the Attention to Feelings scale in the prediction of trait mood, the scales bivariate relations to mood were compared with the results of multiple regression analyses (using attention as the first predictor and functional or dysfunctional self-consciousness as the second predictor, respectively). According to Velicer (1978), a suppressor situation is present when the usefulness of a variable (i.e., the increment in explained variance resulting from its addition to the regression equation) exceeds its squared validity (i.e., the squared bivariate

Table 3 Latent Correlations Between the Scales, Descriptive Statistics, and Internal Consistencies in Study 2 Scale 1. 2. 3. 4. Attention to feelings Clarity of feelingsa Mood regulationa Dysfunctional selfconsciousnessb 5. Functional selfconsciousnessb 6. Pleasant-unpleasant trait moodb M SD
a

1 .24** .09 .25** .21* .05 2.91 0.61 .88

2 .30** .20** .40** .19* 3.04 0.57 .82

.59** .69** .64** 2.98 0.52 .87 .46** .49** 3.09 0.62 .88 .56** 3.59 0.55 .74 3.89 0.61 .90

Note. N 240. Latent variables were measured by two test halves each. Model fit information: 2 39 76.16, p .00; RMSEA .06, p .15; CFI .98. RMSEA root-mean-square error of approximation; CFI comparative fit index. a Possible range of scale scores: 14. b Possible range of scale scores: 15. * p < .05. ** p < .01.

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lations with the two self-consciousness scales, as they were negatively related to dysfunctional selfconsciousness and positively related to functional self-consciousness.

Moderator Effects
The results of the latent moderator analysis predicting pleasant-unpleasant trait mood are presented in Table 4. The nonsignificant chi-square value demonstrated good model fit. In this multiple regression analysis, attention had a significant negative regression weight, whereas the bivariate relation had been nonsignificant. This indicates a suppressor structure of the kind we had expected for attention and functional self-consciousness. A secondary analysis revealed that mood regulation was responsible for this effect. Although the bivariate correlation between attention and mood regulation was rather low and nonsignificant, a multiple regression analysis predicting pleasant-unpleasant trait mood by attention and mood regulation demonstrated that mood regulation suppressed a part of attentions functional variance, thereby increasing attentions negative regression weight. As expected, mood regulation significantly moderated the relation between attention to feelings and trait mood, and this moderator effect explained 3% in trait moods variance. Figure 2 displays the form of the interaction effect for mood regulation levels that represent the mean and 1 standard deviation below and above that mean. Attention was negatively related to trait mood for individuals low in mood regulation and positively related to trait mood for individuals high in mood regulation. The only difference between this interaction effect and the results from Study 1 is that
Table 4 Latent Regression Analyses With Interaction Terms Predicting Pleasant-Unpleasant Trait Mood in Study 2 Predictor Attention to feelings Clarity of feelings Mood regulation Attention Clarity Attention Mood Regulation Clarity Mood Regulation R .66 R2 .43 .13 .03 .68 .13 .31 .14 .06 .07 .07 .13 .13 .13 .13* .03 .63** .07 .16** .06 B SE B

Figure 2. Attention to Feelings Mood Regulation (MR) interaction on Pleasant-Unpleasant Trait Mood in Study 2. Variables are standardized. Regression lines represent selected values of the moderator variable.

in the present study, the negative effect of attention at a low mood regulation level was more pronounced, and the positive effect for a high mood regulation level was less pronounced. This is the case because the different slopes for the different mood regulation levels also reflect attentions main effect, which was negative in this study (because of suppression). The Attention Clarity interaction and the Clarity Mood Regulation interaction did not attain significance.

Suppressor Effects
To test whether functional and dysfunctional selfconsciousness suppressed variance in attention to feelings, we conducted two separate multiple regression analyses. In Model 1, pleasant-unpleasant trait mood was regressed on attention and functional selfconsciousness, and in Model 2, pleasant-unpleasant trait mood was regressed on attention and dysfunctional self-consciousness. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 5. The fit coefficients for the regression models (see the Note to Table 5) demonstrated adequate fit to the data. To provide a direct comparison to the bivariate correlations, the correlation coefficients from Table 3 are again displayed. In Model 1, attention to feelings demonstrated a significant negative regression weight, although the bivariate correlation between attention and trait mood was not significant. The standardized regression weight of functional self-consciousness was higher than its correlation coefficient. A suppressor effect was present as the usefulness of functional self-consciousness

Note. N 240. Latent variables were measured by two test halves each. Model fit information: 2 54 54.53, p .45. * p < .05. ** p < .01.

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LISCHETZKE AND EID Table 5 Latent Regression Analyses Predicting Pleasant-Unpleasant Trait Mood by Attention to Feelings and Functional and Dysfunctional Self-Consciousness Scales: Suppressor Effects in Study 2 Multiple regression Model-predictor Model 1 Attention to feelings Functional self-consciousness Model 2 Attention to feelings Dysfunctional self-consciousness .19** .59** .26 .10 .53** .05 .49** .00 .24 R2 .33 .05 .56** .00 .31 Bivariate correlationa r r2

Note. N 240. Latent variables were measured by two test halves each. Loadings of the two indicators were constrained to be equal for each trait. Model fit information for the multiple regression analyses: 2 Model 1, 2 9 18.93, p .03; RMSEA .07, p .22; CFI .99; Model 2, 9 15.77, p .07; RMSEA .06, p .37; CFI .99. RMSEA root-mean-square error of approximation; CFI comparative fit index; latent standardized multiple regression weight; r latent bivariate correlation coefficient with pleasant-unpleasant trait mood. a Coefficients are taken from the correlational model presented in Table 3. **p < .01.

(i.e., its increment in explained variance, which was .33) exceeded its squared validity (r2 .31). In Model 2, the negative regression weight of dysfunctional self-consciousness increased compared with the corresponding zero-order correlation. Attention received a positive regression weight (i.e., the sign changed from negative to positive), but it did not reach significance ( p < .08, one-tailed). According to the criterion that usefulness has to exceed squared validity, however, this result would also qualify as a suppressor effect.

creased its own predictive power and led to a positive (yet only marginally significant) regression weight of attention. Functional self-consciousness, however, increased its own and attentions predictive power by suppressing beneficial variance in attention, resulting in a significant negative regression weight of attention. These results confirmed our expectation that attention to feelings incorporates both adaptive and maladaptive aspects, which could be revealed through suppression effects.

General Discussion Discussion

Study 2 confirmed that attention to feelings and affective well-being are uncorrelated when the bivariate relationship between the two constructs is examined. Moreover, the Attention Mood Regulation interaction that was found in Study 1 was replicated in this study. The fact that the moderator effect largely assumed the same form promotes confidence in its reliability. Also consistent with Study 1, the hypothesized Attention Clarity interaction was not borne out in the data. However, the interaction between clarity and mood regulation that had unexpectedly reached significance in the self-ratings of Study 1 was not replicated in this study. The results of the suppressor analyses demonstrated that attentions influence on affective well-being depends on the second predictor that is controlled for. Dysfunctional self-consciousness suppressed detrimental variance in attention to feelings, which inTaken together, the two studies provided evidence for the reliability and validity of scales measuring attention to feelings, clarity of feelings, mood regulation, and affective well-being. Study 1 demonstrated medium-sized correlations between self- and peer ratings of attention, clarity, mood regulation, and trait mood, thereby establishing convergent validity. In both studies, the correlational analyses demonstrated that attention to and clarity of feelings represented clearly separable constructs, which were distinct from mood regulation. Most important, this research contributed to our understanding of the functionality of attention to feelings for affective well-being. Across two studies and methods (self- and peer ratings), attention to feelings was unrelated to affective well-being. Hence, the notion that habitually paying much attention to ones feelings would generally be detrimental to well-being (e.g., Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995) is not supported by

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our results. The present findings suggest that attention per se is neither beneficial nor detrimental to affective well-being. Rather, attention to feelings seems to comprise both positive and negative aspects. This view is supported by the findings of Study 2 that attention correlated positively with both functional and dysfunctional self-consciousness, that is, attention shares variance with perceived self-efficacy in solving personal problems as well as with ruminative tendencies. The suppressor effects found in Study 2 further corroborated the notion that attention to feelings incorporates adaptive and maladaptive characteristics of self-focus. Attention predicted pleasantunpleasant trait mood either negatively or positively, depending on whether functional or dysfunctional self-consciousness was controlled for. Thus, attention can be conceived of as ambivalent with respect to affective well-being. In contrast, clarity of feelings and mood regulation demonstrated a clearly adaptive pattern in their relations with trait mood, functional self-consciousness, and dysfunctional selfconsciousness. The finding that individuals who are clear about their feelings and individuals who are good at regulating their moods reported less ruminative tendencies (compared with low-clarity and lowmood regulation individuals) is in line with a response styles theory of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), in particular with the notion that people engaging in ruminative responses may worry about the causes and consequences of their depression, but they do not take action to change their situation (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993, p. 20). Maybe tendencies to ruminate over a depressed mood reflect heightened attention to ones mood, low clarity about this state, and low mood regulation competencies. When in a negative mood, individuals high in attention and low in clarity and mood regulation might end up in a kind of vicious cycle of thinking about how badly they feel in order to gain more insight and to find out how to improve their mood, thereby perpetuating their negative state. From an applied perspective, it is particularly interesting to determine under which conditions directing attention to ones feelings may be beneficial or detrimental to well-being (cf. Mor & Winquist, 2002). The present research suggests that the functionality of attention to feelings depends on a personal conditionthe ability to regulate moods. Across two studies and different methods (self- and peer ratings), mood regulation moderated the attentionwell-being relationship. For individuals high in mood regulation, attention was beneficial to affective well-being, and for individuals low in mood regulation, attention was

detrimental to affective well-being. The estimated effect size for this moderator effect was between 1% and 3%, which is in the range that can be expected for interaction effects. Champoux and Peters (1987), for instance, state a typical effect size of 3% for moderator effects in psychological research. The moderating effect of mood regulation also helps to explain why different studies might yield differing results with respect to the functionality of attention to feelings. If low-mood regulation individuals are overrepresented in a sample (e.g., a clinical sample), attention might demonstrate a negative relation to indicators of wellbeing, whereas if high-mood regulation individuals are overrepresented in a sample, attention might be positively associated with well-being. Being good at regulating their moods, individuals can avail themselves of the information gained by paying attention to their momentary affective states: If desired, attempts to improve a bad mood can be implemented at an early stage, and a good mood can be enjoyed and actively prolonged before it fades away. In contrast, for individuals who have poor mood regulation abilities, directing attention to a (relatively unchangeable) negative state may promote mood-congruent information processing and prompt rumination over ones negative mood, thereby perpetuating or even worsening the negative mood. This may lead to a cycle of continued heightened awareness of an unwanted state and unsuccessful regulatory attempts. This means that as long as individuals do not have sufficient mood regulation competencies, it may be better to distract them from their negative mood states. This interpretation is consistent with empirical findings on responses to depression: Distracting dysphoric individuals from their depressed mood alleviates the depressive symptoms (e.g., Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993). Similarly, cognitive behavioral therapy for depressed people involves active behavioral distraction to get their minds off their ruminations for a while (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). As the present findings highlight, however, this clinical aspect is only one side of the coin. When individuals are adept at regulating their moods, focusing more frequently on their (negative and positive) affective states may even enhance the effectiveness of their regulation strategies and promote affective wellbeing. Thus, teaching people to distract themselves from their affective states may not be the best guideline for all. Nonetheless, improving mood regulation abilities should have priority in the promotion of affective well-being. As Nolen-Hoeksema (1998,

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p. 218) notes, one predictor of the effectiveness of cognitivebehavioral therapy is the extent to which patients are willing to learn more active strategies for coping with their periods of depression. In interventions that aim to promote well-being in healthy individuals (e.g., Fordyce, 1977, 1983), raising attention to feelings may be especially helpful to tailor mood regulation strategies to the current state and make them more effective. Contrary to our expectation, attention to and clarity of feelings did not interact in predicting overall affective well-being. One possible reason for this may be that the Clarity scale we used assessed the ability to perceive affective states in a very general sense, that is, not necessarily with respect to difficult situations, such as instances in which affective experience may be mixed. However, one might assume that clarity is particularly relevant to the attentionwell-being link in affectively complex situations. In the levels of emotional awareness approach (Lane & Schwartz, 1987), for instance, the perception of blends of feelings is construed as indicating a higher ability level than the perception of bodily sensations or individual feelings. Hence, future studies should examine whether a moderator effect might be revealed when a measure of dispositional clarity that focuses more on affectively complex situations is used. Alternatively, clarity could be measured as a state variable in an experimental setting that induces mixed emotional states. To conclude, the present studies have provided some more insight into the functionality of attention to feelings for affective well-being. Although we have concentrated exclusively on trait assessments, the fact that the moderating effect of mood regulation replicated across two studies and different methods (selfand peer reports) suggests that this finding is robust. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to further examine the variables interplay in specific situations by the use of momentary assessment (e.g., in experiencesampling studies or experimental settings). Future research might also explore the role other individualdifferences variables play in attending to, clearly perceiving, and regulating affective states. For example, individual differences in affect intensity may have an impact on the degree of attention directed at feelings and the ability to perceive them. Interestingly, affect intensity demonstrates a similarly ambiguous relationship to indicators of affective wellbeing as attention to feelings (e.g., Larsen & Diener, 1987). With respect to visceral self-perception, Blascovich et al. (1992) have provided evidence that individuals high in affect intensity were less able to

perceive their own cardiac arousal. However, more research is needed to determine whether this finding also applies to the perception of momentary affect. Another individual-differences variable that may be important to attention and mood regulations associations with well-being is self-esteem. Individuals with high self-esteem have been shown to have a greater motivation to repair negative moods than individuals with low self-esteem (e.g., Heimpel, Wood, Marshall, & Brown, 2002; Smith & Petty, 1995). Examination of the interplay between attention to feelings, the ability to regulate moods, and the motivation to do so could further contribute to our understanding of the role meta-mood variables play in adaptive psychological functioning.

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Appendix Items of the Attention to Feelings, Clarity of Feelings, and Mood Regulation Scales
Scale/German items Attention to Feelings Ich denke u ber meine Gefu hle nach. Ich schenke meinen Gefu hlen Aufmerksamkeit. Ich bescha ftige mich mit meinen Gefu hlen. Ich denke daru ber nach, wie ich mich fu hle. Ich beobachte meine Gefu hle. Ich achte darauf, wie ich mich fu hle. Clarity of Feelings Ich kann meine Gefu hle benennen. Ich bin mir im unklaren daru ber, was ich fu hle. (r) Ich habe Schwierigkeiten, meine Gefu hle zu beschreiben. (r) Ich wei, was ich fu hle. Ich habe Schwierigkeiten, meinen Gefu hlen einen Namen zu geben. (r) Ich bin mir unsicher, was ich eigentlich fu hle. (r) Mood Regulation Mir gelingt es gut, meine gedru ckte Stimmung zu verbessern. Ich bin meiner schlechten Laune ausgeliefert. (r) Wenn es mir schlecht geht, kann ich etwas tun, um mich abzulenken. Meine schlechte Laune ha lt lange an. (r) Ich habe Probleme, meine schlechte Stimmung in den Griff zu kriegen. (r) Wenn ich schlecht gelaunt bin, finde ich einen Weg, mich wieder besser drauf zu bringen. Mir fa llt es leicht, meine gute Stimmung lange zu bewahren. Wenn ich mich u ber etwas gefreut habe, dann kann ich dieses Gefu hl noch lange auskosten. Wenn ich gut gelaunt bin, kann ich diesen Zustand lange aufrechterhalten. Wenn ich verliebt bin, kann ich diesen Zustand richtig genieen. Wenn ich mich sehr wohl fu hle, dann kann ich mich diesem Wohlgefu hl richtig hingeben. Note. I I I I I I I I I I I I English translations think about my feelings. pay attention to my feelings. am preoccupied with my feelings. think about how I feel. notice my feelings. focus on how I feel. can name my feelings. am confused about what I feel. (r) have a hard time describing my feelings. (r) know what I feel. have a hard time naming my feelings. (r) am not sure of what I actually feel. (r)

It is easy for me to improve my bad mood. I am at the mercy of my bad moods. (r) When I feel bad, I can do something to distract myself. My bad mood lasts for a long time. (r) It is difficult for me to control my bad mood. (r) When I am in a bad mood, I can find a way to get myself into a better mood. It is easy for me to maintain my good mood for a long time. When I am happy about something, I can savor this feeling for a long time. When I am in a good mood, I am able to stay that way for a long time. When I am in love, I can really relish this feeling. When I feel very good, I can allow myself to really surrender to this feeling.

Response categories: 1 almost never, 2 sometimes, 3 often, 4 almost always. (r) items were reverse scored.

Received January 27, 2003 Revision received July 1, 2003 Accepted July 7, 2003 I