Case Digest PALE Soliman M. Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Francisco R. Llamas A.C. No.

4749 January 20, 2000 Misrepresentation and Non-payment of IBP Dues November 10, 2010 Facts: Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues. It appears that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that he is only engaged in a limited practice of law and under RA 7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption is the payment of membership dues. Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquents name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in limited practice of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent does not include exemption from payment of membership or association dues. In addition, by indicating IBP Rizal 259060 in his pleadings and thereby misprepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chpater, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR vs. ATTY.FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS FACTS: Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance)in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997. Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is a member of Rizal Chapter. Respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted

any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past due seven with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Defenses of the respondent:1. he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No.7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes,2. he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992. Respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engagein unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALLTIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY ANDDIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION,AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THEINTEGRATED BAR. CANON 10 A LAWYER OWESCANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITHTO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. HELD: In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues. Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merits the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Duty to Client/Accounting of Clients Money/Negligence

Teodulfo B. Basas vs. Atty. Miguel I. Icawat A.C. No. 4282. August 24, 2000 Facts: Atty. Miguel Icawat was the lawyer for Teodulfo Basas and some other laborers in their complaint against their employer. The NLRC rendered an adverse decision. Basas and his fellow workers, however, insisted that they appeal the decision. Atty. Icawat, however, failed to file the required memorandum of appeal. Basas filed an administrative complaint, also alleging that Atty. Icawat issued a receipt for an amount less than that which they had paid him. Held: GUILTY. Respondent's failure to file the memorandum of appeal required by the NLRC Rules of Procedure reveals his poor grasp of labor law. Respondent practically admitted that he did not file the memorandum. His failure to file the memorandum clearly prejudiced the interests of his clients. Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. For his failure to issue the proper receipt for the money he received from his clients, respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. The Court fined Atty. Icawat in the amount of PhP 500, with a warning that a repetition of the same offense or a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Duty of Lawyer to Client/Proper Conduct Teodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty. Sergio Angeles A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000 Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2 others in a civil case. Rivera and his 2 co-plaintiffs received a favorable decision. Atty. Angeles received almost PhP 50,000 from one of the defendants in the case as partial fulfillment of the judgement against the latter. Atty. Angeles, however, never told his clients of the amount he had received and never remitted the same to him, leaving them to discover such fact on their own. Rivera and his co-plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angeles.

Held: GUILTY.

Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act amounted to serious misconduct. The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession. For it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer. For deceit in dealing with his client, Atty. Angeles was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. GROSS IMMORAL CONDUCT Julieta B. Narag vs. Atty. Dominador M. Narag (291 SCRA 451) Facts: Atty. Narags spouse filed a petition for disbarment in the IBP alleging that her husband courted one of his students, later maintaining her as a mistress and having children by her. Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a possessive, jealous woman who abused him and filed the complaint out of spite. IBP disbarred him, hence, this petition. Held: Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the testimony given against him and it was proved that his actions were of public knowledge and brought disrepute and suffering to his wife and children. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Assisting in the Speedy Administration of Justice Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (293 SCRA 622)

Facts: Judgment was rendered against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey the cemetery to the rightful owners. Despite the final decision of the SC, petitioner was able to prevent the execution for 17 years, and thus render the judgment ineffectual. They filed several petitions and motions for reconsideration with the trial court and the CA despite the fact that it would never prosper as the trial courts decision had long become final before the said petitions were filed. Held: Petition denied. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of the client and zeal in the defense of their clients right, they are also officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. The facts and the law should advise them that a case such as this should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts. PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al. GR No. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, En Banc (Puno, J.) Matter is defined any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. The act of advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1 of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and others referred to as dummies of the Marcoses. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction seeking to, among others, nullify the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comments thereon, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper disposition. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of former President Marcos. The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendozas present appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in the case involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscribing former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. ISSUES:

Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD: The petition is denied. The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention made by the former government lawyer on the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. Beyond doubt, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylightin stressing that the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading; hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue diminution of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law. Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza.

Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 was not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. Tomas Cabulisan v. Judge Adrian N. Pagalilauan (297 SCRA 593) Good Moral Character November 10, 2010 Facts: Cabulisan filed an administrative complaint against respondent for grave misconduct committed as follows : (1) peeping into the bathroom where Marilyn C. Dumayas, a public health nurse, and daughter of the owner of the house where he was boarding, was then taking a bath; (2) having a mistress in the neighboring town; and (3) allowing local practitioners to write decisions for him. Held: Respondent filed for voyeurism, other charges dismissed for lack of evidence. People who run the judiciary, particularly justices and judges, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest degree on integrity and probity and an unquestionable moral uprightness both in their public and private lives. By committing the acts in question, respondent violated the trust reposed in him and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and rigid standards of morality required in the judicial profession. Corazon T. Reontoy v. Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit (302 SCRA 604) Negligence of Counsel Facts: On January 28, 1998 the SC found Ibadlit administratively liable and suspended him from the practice of law for 1 year for failing to appeal within thereglementary period the decision rendered against his client. His reason was, an appeal would only be futile. SC declared that it was highly improper for himto have adopted such opinion. SC said that a lawyer was without authority to waive his clients right to appeal and that his failure to appeal within thereglementary period constituted negligence and malpractice, proscribed by Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides(a) lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. This is a motion for reconsideration.Held: Suspension lowered to 2 months his arguments are partly persuasive, he believed in good faith that his clients case was weak and that sheaccepted his explanation that the adverse decision was not worth appealing anymore. Besides, it was only several years later that she complained when nomore relief was available to her. Also, complainant had reasonable opportunity to hire another counsel for a second opinion whether to appeal from the judgment or file a petition for relief, that he did not commit to handle his clients case on appeal and that the testimonies of complainant and her brother wereunpersuasive. This is also his first offense. Development Bank of the Philippines and Asset Privitization Trust v. Court of Appeals and Continental Cement Corporation

302 SCRA 362 Facts: CCC filed an injunction suit to prevent the DBP and APT from foreclosing on its mortgages. During trial, DBP & APT were unable to appear for cross-examining CCCs witnesses because the respective counsels were unprepared, unavailable or ill. The lower court decided this as a waiver, hence judgment was rendered for CCC. DBP & APT filed this petition alleging denial of due process. Held: Petition denied. There can be no denial of due process where a party had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings but did not do so. Counsel for APT was absent on several occasions because of withdrawal of previous counsel, unreadiness to conduct the cross-examinations and serious illness. The withdrawal of APTs previous counsel in the thick of the proceedings would be a reasonable ground to seek postponement of the hearing. However, such necessitates a duty on the part of the new counsel to prepare himself for the next scheduled hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former counsels failure to turn over the records of the case to APT, shows the negligence of the new counsel to actively recover the records of the case. Counsel should have taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest of his client, rather than pass the blame on the previous counsel. A motion to postpone trial on the ground that counsel is unprepared for trial demonstrates indifference and disregard of his clients interest. A new counsel who appears in a case in midstream is presumed and obliged to acquaint himself with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that have transpired prior to his takeover. Also, even if counsel had been ill with dengue, he chose not to notify his co-counsels who could have conducted the cross-examination. Ban Hua U. Flores v. Atty. Enrique S. Chua (306 SCRA 465) Falsehood/Forum-shopping/Dilatory Tactics Facts: Chua was charged with many offenses. The evidence was found to support the charges that he notarized a forged deed of sale, that he caused to be published an advertisement of a SEC decision in order to bring ridicule and shame upon a corporation, that he filed a civil case knowing that the reliefs he prayed for were probably granted in the SEC case thus belying his certification against forum shopping. He has also been previously reprimanded for bribing a judge and for consistently using dilatory tactics to prolong a litigation. Held: DISBARRED. He has thus violated Rules 10.01, 12.02, 12.04 (foisting or commission of falsehood, forum-shopping and causing in court proceedings), Canon 19 (failing to resort to lawful means in representing his client), 27, 3.01 and 13.02 (causing undue publication of a pending action). He had an active role in committing fraud since he falsely stated that the person making the deed of sale appeared before him and stated that the same was his free act and deed- when evidence shows the signature was forged; also, he prolonged a family dispute by using dilatory tactics and placing an advertisement in order to ridicule his opponents in violation of Rule 1.04 that lawyers should encourage their clients to end a controversy by

a fair settlement. A lawyer must uphold the integrity of the profession. He brings honor to it by honesty and fair dealing and by performing his duties to society, the bar, the courts and his clients. FLORES VS. CHUA 306 SCRA 465 FACTS: The complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Chua, a practicing lawyer and a notary public, for various offenses amounting to malpractice, gross misconduct, violation of his lawyers oath, the CPR as well as the provisions of the laws of the Philippines, to wit: (a) Fraud through falsification and forgery of public document; (b) foisting falsehood and fabricated public document to molest and harass parties; and (c) libel, misrepresentation and unlawful advertisement. ISSUE: Whether or not the charges against Atty. Chua sufficient to warrant disciplinary action against him. HELD: Yes. When a notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of legal profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients.

Rule 130 , Sec. 24(b) of the Rules of Court on Privilege Communication

Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity ABRAGAN vs. RODRIGUEZ Lawyers violate their oath of office when they represent conflicting interests. They taint not only their own professional practice, but the entire legal profession itself. FACTS: Petitioners hired the respondent lawyer in a case for forcibly entry. The case was won. A writ of execution was issued in favor of petitioners. Respondent however, surreptitiously sell some property

rights (land) to other persons without the consent of the petitioners herein, they decided to sever their client-lawyer relationship. In the meantime, an indirect contempt case was filed by petitioners against Sheriff Fernando Loncion, with respondent as counsel for Loncion. HELD: Rule 15.03 CPR- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. WHEREFORE, Maximo G. Rodriguez is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. ERLINDA ABRAGAN ET.AL. VS. ATTY MAXIMO RODRIGUEZ A.C. NO. 4346. APRIL 3, 2002 Facts: Sometime in 1986, complainants hired the services of the respondent to represent in a case before the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro City. The case was won by the complainants. Subsequently, when the lawyer allegedly surreptitiously dealt with the subject property with other persons, the petitioner severed the lawyer client relationship. On August 1991, complainants filed a case of indirect contempt against Sheriff Fernando Loncion et al. Much to their surprise, respondent represented the sheriff. Since the counsel employed by the complainants was a former student of respondent, said counsel, egged by the suggestions of respondent withdrew the case without the petitioners consent. That as a result of such withdrawal, subsequent events occurred to the prejudice of the complainants. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Rodriguez should be disbarred. Held: Yes. In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-19450 Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant. Paredes, J. :On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented bycounsel de officio

but later on replaced by counsel de parte . The complainant in the same case was representedby City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, aftersecuring the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that everytime he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that hewould not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor wasquestioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al. , L-1532, Nov.28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant ProvincialFiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice."Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is aviolation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of theappearance of City Attorney Fule.Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting asPrivate Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under thislimitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he(Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presidedby the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read: The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civilliability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had,therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest inthe civil liability of the accused.Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conducthis litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of theoffended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in aprofessional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever inthe prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the CityAttornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule asAssistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, asalready pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or afriend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justiceof the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of theoffended party.WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing theapprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,

without costs. The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding. The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which weconsider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employeeof the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as privateprosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of CityAttorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice ismore than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of thesame kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habituallyholding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan,4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the activeand continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for acompensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediatesuperior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in allrespects, with costs against appellant hqXv. *** The Supreme Court held that the isolate appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists of frequents or customary actions, a succession of facts of the same kind or frequent habitualexercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services. Themere appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. It is alsoworth noted that, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediatesuperior to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. PEOPLE V. VILLANUEVA FACTS: On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva with crime of Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of the the Secretary of Justice.

Counsel for the accused presented a Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private prosecutor in this case, this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. ISSUE: Whether of not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. RULING: The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. IN RE: LUIS B. TAGORDA 53 PHIL 37 FACTS: The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that in the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which in translation, read as follows: LUIS B. TAGORDA Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER, Province of Isabela. (NOTE.- as notaty public, he can execute for a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office, can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.) The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter reads as follow: I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some pe ople are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Iligan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague, I would request your kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meeting or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every registration.

HELD: Application is give to se. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act NO. 2828, providing The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or th rough paid agents or brokets, constitutes malpractice, and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar Association in 1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer. The law is a profession and not a business. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. 1. 2. Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice of law for 1 month. For advertising his services in the Sunday Tribune respondent attorney is reprimanded.

53 Phil 37 In re LUIS B. TAGORDA March 23, 1929 Nature of the case: The case is a suspension from the practice of law. Facts:The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, that he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows: LUIS B. TAGORDA Attorney Notary Public CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER Province of Isabela. Respondent also admitted having written a letter in Ilocano addressed to a lieutenant in his home municipality (Echague, Isabela) in which he stated his continued exercise of his profession as a lawer and a notary public, besides being a Member of the Board of the municipality of Ilagan, Isabela. He also stated that he would be willing to render his legal services to the people who have not contracted any other lawyers services. Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Luis B. Tagorda is meritorious. Held: Respondent Luis B. Tagorda was suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. (Canon 27 & 28, Code of Ethics) By Junelli Moreno. US VS. BUSTOS [37 PHIL. 731; G.R. L-12592; 8 MAR 1918] Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.

Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free press. Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. U.S. vs. Contreras, 23 Phil. 513 Limitations on the right to criticize policies or official acts. While people can criticize, the law does not permit them to falsely impeach the motives, attack honesty, blacken the virtue, or injure the reputation of that official. Men may argue, but they may not traduce. Man may differ, but hey may not, for that reason, falsely charge dishonesty. Men may look at policies from different points of view, and see them in different lights, but they may not, on that account falsely

charge criminally, lack virtue, bad notions, or corrupt heart and mind. Men may falsely charge that policies are bad, but they cannot falsely charge that men are bad. In In Re: Lozano vs. Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801, the Supreme Court said: The rule is well-established that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in the administration of justice in attending a suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the case is ended. IT is also regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to publish any matter which their policy requires should be kept private, as for example the secrets of the jury room, or proceedings in camera. (6 R.C.L., pp. 508-515).

The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and of the press. This constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. Respect for the judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the courts. (See also In Re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 575). 161 IN RE LOZANO FACTSThere was a complaint against a Judge of First Instance which was referred to the Atty General for investigation, reportand recommendation. There was an SC resolution which makes such proceedings condiential in nature-The investigation was conducted secretly. Notwithstanding, the editor of El Pueblo, Severino Lozano, printed an articlewritten by Anastacio Quevedo, indicating that the hearing was held behind closed doors, and that the info of the reporterwas obtained from outside the screen and from comments in social circles. The testimonies of the witnesses weremutilated and the report reflected upon the action of the complainant to his possible advantage ISSUE: WoN Lozano and Quevedo are quilty of contempt of court? HELD: YES. They are each required to pay the nominal sum of P20RATIO:1. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the SC. This power extends to administrative proceedings, as well as tosuits at law.2. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is themaintenance of the independence of the judiciary. In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)

, a lawyer was suspended indefinitely. A letter individually addressed to some justices of the Supreme Court is not covered by the constitutional right to privacy of communication when the same pertain to their exercise of judicial functions.

To subject the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful. (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).

To allow litigants to go beyond the Courts resolution and claim that the members acted with deliberate bad faith and rendered an unjust resolution in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes. Enrique Zaldivar vs Raul Gonzalez Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only

exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt. HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer. Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case. The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law. Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo Roxas Lopez and Roxas were the candidates for VP in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his lost before the PET. The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that There shall be on independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines. In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly

appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body. HELD: Pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be established by law This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but the judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively. Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law. The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the courts jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial.

PEOPLE V. GODOY - cited for contempt based on the latters article in the newspaper - (1) Theres a need to make a distinction between adverse criticism of the court's decision after the case is ended and "scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is personal and scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which case it shall be dealt with as a case of contempt. Contempt proceedings dismissed. Such comments may constitute a libel against the judge, but it cannot be treated as in contempt of the court's authority. (2) In case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances:

a. Where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; or

b. Where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be impeded. And this brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of expression usually resorted to as a defense in contempt proceedings. Thus, Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rule of the Court authorizes the courts to hold liable for criminal contempt a person guilty of conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority of the court, or of an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. (People vs. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64 (1995).

Respondents cannot justify his contemptuous statements asking the Court to dispel rumors that if would declare the Plunder law unconstitutional, and stating the a decision declaring it as such was basically wrong and would not be accepted by the people as utterances protected by his right to freedom of speech. It is respondents duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice (In Re: Sotto) and in the Supreme Court as the bulwark of justice and democracy. Respondents utterances as quoted above, while the case of Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan was pending consideration by the Court, belies his protestation of good faith but were clearly made to mobilized public opinion and bring pressure on the court. (Atty. Leonard de Vera, A.M. No. 01-2-03-SC, July 29, 2002).

In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said statements but denied to have uttered the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute. He explained that he was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.

The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed at influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent de Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.

Can this pronouncement be used to disqualify him from running for Governor in the IBP? No. In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing ones opinion on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor

cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law. Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of respondent De Veras alleged immorality. (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera, etc., Garcia, et al. vs. Atty. Leonard de Vera, et al., A. C. No. 6052, December 11, 2003). EN BANC [G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003]PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN[SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON.TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Facts: -Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that the respondent justices have violated Rule5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan politicalactivities. -Also, petitioner contended that the justices have prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the acttaken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452and356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing of his Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June 2003, thethree justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality againsthis client.-Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectfullanguage when she blurted out, Magmumukha naman kaming gago, (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice TeresitaLeonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could file itscomments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant Estradas motionwould result in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.)

Prompted by the alleged bias and partial attitude of theSandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification.-The petitioner also asked the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief JusticeDavide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:a) going to EDSA 2;b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of permanent disability even without proof of compliance with the correspondingconstitutional conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the President or majorityof his cabinet; andc) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanentdisability.-In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate JusticeArtemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for severaladvisory opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan.-Subsequently, the court ruled that the instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSEDfor gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no graveabuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. -In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, the Court strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinarysanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to itsMembers.-Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.In fact, on the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process of law? It rendersthe decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already committed to the other party - GMA - with a judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone thecharade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president,can they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act? Issue: WON Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Held: -Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can enlighten the court andcontribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.) However, Attorney Paguiahas not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within the judicial forum. Indeed, he hasrepeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. By his

acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice. -It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context, relates to actsdesigned to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filedcertificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any incomingPresident of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of theHighest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be nodifferent from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the NationAddress by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.-The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow theerosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it topractice law in the Philippines.-Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe andmaintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct byothers. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, andauthority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct andpervert the dispensation of justice.-The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of hisgrave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at alltake heed.-WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effectiveupon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

CASE DIGEST ON ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN [369 SCRA 394 (2001)] November 10, 2010

Issues: 1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. 2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.

Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime chargedthe element of the offense. Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two -pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder We do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy. What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733 Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being. There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. After Atty. Raul Gonzales was stripped of his power of investigation as Tanodbayan pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, he hurled several attacks at the Supreme Court through the media. He was suspended on the basis of the same.

Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all, the Supreme Court. What he seemed unaware of is that freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no animosity between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter puts it; x x x A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other, both are indispensable to a free speech. (Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan and Raul Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 74690-707 and 80578, Feb. 1, 1989).

Atty. Gonzales cannot invoke his right to expression as a lawyer. A lawyers right to free expression may have been more limited than that of a layman. A lawyer, acting in a professional capacity, may have fewer rights of free speech than would a private citizen. Neither the right of free speech nor the right to engage in political activities be construed or extended as to permit any such liberties to a member of the Bar. A layman may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free speech or

political activities until he runs a foul of the penalties of libel or slander, or into some infraction of the statutory law. A member of the bar can, and will, be stopped at the point where he infringes the Canons of Ethics, and if he wishes to remain a member of the bar, he will conduct himself in accordance therewith. (Zaldivar vs. SB, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, Oct. 7, 1988).

Suspension for subjecting the Supreme Court justice to threats. In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316, Atty. Gonzales was suspended because of charges that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision, necessarily implying that the Justices betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon him. This was considered as constituting the grossest kind of disrespect for the court. Such statements debase and degrade the Supreme Court and the entire system of administration of justice. In the case of In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987), a lawyer was suspended indefinitely. A letter individually addressed to some justices of the Supreme Court is not covered by the constitutional right to privacy of communication when the same pertain to their exercise of judicial functions.

To subject the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful. (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).

To allow litigants to go beyond the Courts resolution and claim that the members acted with deliberate bad faith and rendered an unjust resolution in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes. In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562

19 JUL FACTS:

Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a Petition to Surrender the Lawyers Certificate of Title to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice. He also expressed strong words as against the judiciary like justice is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb. . The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice system.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

HELD:

YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.

RATIO:

It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty. Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are so noble, in speaking of the truth and alleged injustices,so as not to condemn the sinners but the sin, it has already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this particular case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and local jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as benchmarks and references. Between disbarment and suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension may only be lifted until

further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to prove that he is again fit to resume the practice of law. IN RE: ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562 2/18/70)

FACTS: Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title, filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is a great injustice committed against his client by Supreme Court. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribual peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. His clients he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Courts unjust judgment, has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He ridicules the members of the Court, saying that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only bline, but also deaf and dumb. He then vows to argue the cause of his client in the peoples forum, so that people may know of the silent injustices committed by this court and that whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated. He ends his petition with a prayer that: a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession. The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment agains his client. On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision. Twenty days later on he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the time and plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For lack of proof of service, the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.

HELD: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

The doctrine of fair comment. In Borjal vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999; 301 SCRA 1, it was said that fair commentaries on matter of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judiciary proved, and every false imputation is directed against a public reason in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. being in a law school. "Dura Lex Sed Lex" - The law may be harsh but it is the law; the prolific group of students from CPC College of Law :-)

Borjal v Court of Appeals 301 SCRA 1 January 14, 1999 Facts: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and Soliven for writing and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be launch concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of the articles nor was the conference he was organizing. The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was filed before the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the subject of the published articles.

Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.

Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. These requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. The element of identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he was the organizer of said conference and had he not done so the public would not have known.

The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that privileged communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair

comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.

The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared objective of the conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a public issue. The court held that freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the reminder among media members to practice highest ethical standards in the exercise thereof. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------A privileged communication may be either:

1. Absolutely privileged communication those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.

2. Qualifiedly privileged communications those containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks."