Armstrong (1978a, 41): The problem of universals is the problem of how numerically distinct particulars can nevertheless be identical

in nature, all be of the same type. 1. Does being of the same type mean something is identical in nature? What is it to be of the same type? A. It could mean sharing an essential property or properties of a type. B. It could mean sharing a specific history essential for being of a type. Armstrong, in trying to pin down the philosophical question of properties, puts the question as such: The problem of universals is the problem of how numerically distinct particulars can nevertheless be identical in nature, all be of the same type (1978a, 41). I'd suggest that framing the question in this way is already loadedfirst, there is an assumption that particulars can be identical in nature, whatever that might be, and that being identical in nature entails or is equivalent to being of the same type. It is the question of being of the same type that concerns me here. This essay will exam two ways we commonly think of things as being types and will show that there are at least two ways of thinking about things as being of the same type: resemblance and origin. We often think of types in the manner suggested in Armstrong's framing of the question of universals: being identical in nature. We do not have to accept the thesis that there is anything identical with anything else except for itself. We could reject the identity predicate all together and I do not think it would affect what I have to say herein. It is rather we think of particulars bearing a strong enough resemblance to one another to count as members of a typethat is, tokens of a particular type. Furthermore, based on degrees of resemblance, these types may be nested in other types. Biology perhaps provided the most accessible example. While the concept of species may still be problematic, I'll take for granted we more or less have a grasp of what it means to be a member of the same species. Hence, two house mice are identified as the same species because of resembling structural features features that allow them to successfully breed and produce offspring. Now, clearly in a male and female house mouse there are structural differences as welltheir sexual organs, for example. However, they share a critical mass of similarity that causes us to classify them as examples of a single speciesthat is, tokens of a type, the type being the species field mouse. They are also examples of another typethe mammals. And again, they are classified with other mammals on the basis of similaritiesbeing able to generate body heat from consumables and producing milk among them. Hence an example of nesting. Mammals are a type nested within the family cordata, those organisms having a spine, and so forth. The entire biological field of taxonomy is largely built in identifying and classifying based on these resemblances. There is another manner in which we talk about types, though, that has no relation to such structural properties but instead point to common origins. For example, there are German-Americans. They do not differ structurally from other Americans (as German-Americans, like Americans, does not imply a common ethnicity). They are classified as German-Americans simply because one of their ancestors once had German nationality.