Gavin On Selective Hegemony

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Selective Hegemony and Beyond-Populations with No Productive Function: A Framework for Enquiry
Gavin A. Smith
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Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada Available online: 01 Sep 2011
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Selective Hegemony and Beyond-Populations with No Productive Function1 : A Framework for Enquiry
Gavin A. Smith
Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
A signicant shift in the form of the political economy since the 1980s is frequently described as a shift from the welfare state to neoliberalism, the latter either referring to new principles of rule or more broadly to include the nature of the economy. The paper argues that it is more fruitful to explore how these changes reected a shift in the dominance of forms of capitalprincipally from production to nance. The dominant class blocs in the former period pursued hegemonic projects described here as expansive; in the latter period such projects became selective. Insofar as nance capital seeks security through diversication (benetting from difference) and is not itself productive of value, so it relies on and [re-]producesrespectively, a) selected populations invested in distinctions, and b) an absolute residual population. The politics of the former is one of negotiation, of the latter counter-politics beyond negotiation. Exploration of this difference becomes a crucial task for social analysis. Key Words: nance capital, production capital, class, Keynesianism, neoliberalism, hegemony, political economy, governmentality, surplus population, Marx, Gramsci
When a country that calls itself a democracy openly declares war within its borders, what does that war look like? Does the resistance stand a chance? Arundhati Roy, Ghandi but with guns The Guardian 27 March 2010: 34. Consensus. . . means the attempt to get rid of politics by ousting the surplus subjects and replacing them with real partners, social groups, identity groups, and so on. Jacques Ranciere, Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man? South Atlantic Quarterly 2004: 306.
Introduction
Recently, there has been a urry of literature on that part of the population, which the Victorians used to call the residuum.2 Despite the urgent sense of this literature, it is best seen as coming in the
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Select Hegemony and Beyond-Populations with No Productive Function
wake of a much larger and more long-standing discussion in which the challenge of understanding the population has increasingly been the problem of heterogeneity: the fact that the analyst must nd conceptual tools for understanding the multiple ways in which people are embedded in the social world. This is often addressed in terms of juridical and ethical dilemmas, multiple forms of citizenship, complexities over human rights, and so on. Once all this work is done, inevitably we are left with what Ranciere (1999) refers to as the part of those with no partthe bits and pieces that are part of none of the categories that operate in this heterogeneous world. This article is both a contribution to the growing literature and a response to it. Although much that is useful in current work has resulted from what Butler calls norms of recognisability (2009: 7), these discussions have tended to be removed from the specicity of the crisis of reproduction facing current capitalist formations and their attendant political regimes. The problem is that we conne ourselves to the critical analysis of discursive chains and political programmes that classify people in this way. As a result, classications and categories appear to occur in a realm beyond the tensions in social reproduction that face the capitalist political economy from one conjuncture to anotherand the successive historically distinct attempts to resolve those tensions. To propose that we need to break out of this connement is not just a question of insisting on one theoretical approach over another: for the importance of a critique of political economy for our understanding of the world we live in, over say discourse theory or governmentality approaches. Rather, it is a question of how intellectuals assess the conditions of possibility that might contribute to the success of what I call revindicative politics. For example, as I note below, Marx embarked on his critical analysis of capital for just such a purpose. And as his analyses of conditions changed so too did his political interventions. So it does matter what frame is used for confronting the present. Even so, this essay seeks only to suggest such a frame; no ethnographic evidence is drawn on the canvass. I begin by noting that in the Global North the past two centuries can be seen in terms of a tension between demands that the body politic (represented by the state) be the expression of popular sovereignty versus demands that it be shaped to enhance productivity. Social democracy was not just the expression of attempts to mediate this tension; as Lefebvre noted, it enveloped the population into the productivity project: The socialdemocratic model. . . [w]as a variant and possibly an improvement of le mode de production tatique (Lefebvre 2001: 775). Despite persistent real heterogeneity among people in terms of ethnicity, gender,
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regional identity, etc., in liberal states through much of the twentieth century, there was a drive toward uniformity both in terms of citizenship and in terms of mass production. This culminated after World War II in the Keynesian National Welfare State [KNWS] (Jessop 2006). What emerged I refer to as expansive hegemony. But in the past thirty years, for a number of reasons (discussed below) the hegemonic projects of various dominant blocs began to be directed at selected groups of people. Selectivity, in turn, meant that both in the realm of population and in the realm of productivity (broadly conceived) the drive toward uniformity had to be replaced by criteria of difference. As a result, the tension between people and productivity was reformulated in what I call selective hegemony. I describe these two settings and then discuss two important interventions that provide us with lenses for characterizing heterogeneous membership in late-modern society. These authors help us to produce a tentative framework, but I then try to advance on that framework by means of a critique of political economy rather than the emphasis on governance, which they use. This leads to an initial way of understanding capitalist production and the characterization of the population in productivist terms. To get at this I refer to a tension between what I call tecnos and demos. I suggest that dominant blocs resolved these tensions through a variety of hegemonic projects, which were generally expansive. But to apply the principles of this argument to more recent forms of capitalism I need to introduce a second couplet: freedom and enclosure, and I suggest that, taken together, these lenses help us to understand current forms of capital and the congurations of the population. I then suggest that expansive hegemony no longer serves the purposes of dominant blocs, resulting in a shift toward selective hegemony. This exercise is undertaken to help us identify the conditions of possibility for revindicative politics.3 Taking his inspiration from Marxs exhaustive analyses of mid-nineteenth century society, Gramsci insisted that the success of revindicative politics would depend on what he called organic ideologya counterforce that arose out of, and in response to, the specic features of the current conditions of possibility.4 Along with a number of more recent authors who have made a similar kind of argument, suggesting that just as mid-nineteenth century capitalism called forth a certain kind of counterforce, so analysis of current neoliberal conditions suggests different appropriate politics, I seek to follow Gramscis agenda (Martin 2000; Feher 2009; see also Silver 2003). But I think that insofar as these conditions invoke the features of selective hegemony, which restricts the eld of negotiable politics to selected participants, so there is a sphere
of action beyond such politics where no such negotiation is possible, invoking the kinds of questions Arundhati Roy asks above.5
Changing conjunctures
The end of World War II in 1945 is often marked as a key moment in the relationship between the economy and society, both nationally and internationally. The quarter century that followed witnessed quite comprehensive state planned interventions in the form of the welfare state and, post-Bretton Woods, international interventions termed development. While in both cases these interventions were meant to produce better conditions for economic development, they were also supposed to offset tendencies understood to be inherent in capitalist reproduction. Within the so-called developed countries, they were supposed to address questions of generalized redistribution as against capitalist polarization (social and spatial). Regulatory programmes were to provide social security for that part of the demos who were not the beneciaries of the industrial capitalist economy. EspingAnderson (1990) speaks of this in terms of preserving or providing spaces of decommodication against the predations of entirely commodied relations (health care, pensions, public schooling, etc.), and Jessop speaks of this as the era of the Keynesian National Welfare State [KNWS] (Jessop 2006). In the so-called developing world, programmes were likewise aimed at the population as a whole, but largely in reverse terms. The absence of commodied relations and a thoroughgoing market in the traditional sector were seen to be an impediment to the development of a properly capitalist economy. For this, programmes were introduced for the purposes of various kinds of goals: most obviously to ease the transition from the so-called traditional sector into the modern sector; but where this seemed an excessively long-term or even insuperable goal, to enact a kind of trusteeship of that population (Li 2009); spaces too could be protected in which populations could be reproduced to provide cheap labour for the so-called modern sector (Wolpe 1980; Meillasoux 1980). Although 1945 is frequently used as the watershed moment for the enactment of these two variations on the theme of planning directed at a coherent population within a bounded polity, Cowen and Shenton (1996) show that we need to return to the nineteenth century to discover their origins. The term development, they suggest, is inherently problematic because it means two different things: immanent change (which we frequently refer to as development) and the intent to develop. The latter consists of the ordering or management (they call it
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trusteeship) of the chaos and disorder resulting from the former (Cowen and Shenton 1996: 438). As the logic of capitalist reproduction became more intensive in the core and more extensive beyond, so the compensatory need for the state or international bodies to handle its fallout grew. From the end of the 1970s onward, economic conditions and the regimes for their regulation shifted away from this formula. In the last twenty years of the twentieth century these changes came to be known as neoliberalism. The dominant economic and political classes reversed their understanding of the relationship between the economy and the state. Those actions of the state that were once taken to offset the tendencies of the economy were now seen as a handicap to the free development of the economy. The function of the state (and institutions functioning to the same ends internationally) was therefore reversed; it was now to cultivate the ground of optimum capitalist activity. Speaking of the earlier era and its antecedents, Cowen and Shenton (1996:438) explain the internal contradiction in the idea of development:
While an immanent process of development encompasses the dimension of destruction, it is difcult to imagine why and how the intent to destroy should be made in the name of development.
Yet this became precisely the goal of what Peck and Tickell (2002) call roll back neoliberalism (see also Klein 2008). State and international development interventions should be designed so as to enhance quite specic, selected targets to optimize their comparative advantage, rather than resolving broader issues of (spatial and social) inequalities. There were then two distinct features of this new regulatory regime: rst, its rollback function and, second, its departure from planning as a broad process attending to the interlinkage between elements of a coherent, bounded polity. This affected development itself as a planning exercise. As policies were aimed at enhancing the advantages of specic sub-national regions, populations, or sectors, planning itself as a coordinated intervention aimed at anticipating the effects of the dynamics of one part on that of anotherbecame problematic.6 So the shift away from social and national criteria for planning to programmes based on business models and so-called economic measures was not just a shift in the criteria by which development targets were measured; it was also a shift in the scale at which it was proposed plans could be made to modify reality. How might we understand the heterogeneity that arises from selective regulatory regimes of this kind and the kinds of politics that
might emerge therefrom? Two recent interventions have addressed precisely these questions, and in so doing they link distinctions among the populace to the question of surplus populations.
Chatterjee and Ong on the current conjuncture

Chatterjee (2008)7 begins his argument, following Sanyals (2007) Rethinking Capitalist Development, by noting the importance for the ongoing development of capitalism of the separation of peasants and artisans from their means of subsistence through political interventions of one kind or another. In the past he suggests this has produced a variety of what he calls narratives of social transition (2008: 5455). Today, however, although capitalist growth in a postcolonial society such as India is inevitably accompanied by the primitive accumulation of capital, the social changes that are brought about cannot be understood as a transition (ibid: 55; emphasis added). The reason Chatterjee gives for this leaves the impression that, in India at least, the old notions of trusteeship and welfare are far from dead.8
There is a growing sense now that certain basic conditions of life must be provided to people everywhere and that if the national or local governments do not provide them someone else must, whether it is other states, or intentional agencies of non-governmental organizations . . . It is considered unacceptable that those who are dispossessed of their means of labour because of the primitive accumulation of capital should have no means of subsistence. (ibid 55)
Yet, using the idiom of governmentality, Chatterjee presents us with a sectoral image of Indian society that requires political programmes to be selective rather than the earlier universalist programmes I described above.
. . . [T]he activities of governmentality require multiple, cross-cutting and shifting classications of the population as the targets of multiple policies, producing a necessarily heterogeneous construction of the social (2004: 36).
The major distinction that Chatterjee identies is a split in the eld of the political between a domain of properly constituted civil society and a more ill-dened and contingently activated domain of political society (ibid: 40). Civil society includes the middle class and seeks to be congruent with the normative models of bourgeois capitalist hegemony (2008: 57), while large sections of the rural population and the urban
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poor relate to society through making demands on the state and its appendages who respond in terms of political expediency (rather than an expansion of political participation). This latter Chatterjee refers to as political society. In civil society the hegemony of capitalism (including presumably its neoliberal, class concentrating accent) goes uncontestedthe requirements of corporate capital [are] given priority (ibid: 57) and indeed a signicant feature in recent years has been the withdrawal of the urban middle classes from political activities altogether (ibid: 62). As the name implies, this is far from the case for political society, the space of management of non-corporate forms of capital, (ibid) made up of units with low composition of capital where prots are subordinated to livelihood needs. People here are not regarded by the state as proper citizens possessing rights and belonging to the properly constituted civil society (ibid 63: 1). Evidently weak qua multitude or mass, these people engineer political negotiation (in which the threat of violence is not entirely absent) through various temporary or more long-standing associations. These associations are in part an effect of particular government programmes that target certain groups, as Chatterjees governmentality imagery would imply. Moreover, the political arena is far from the one E.P. Thompson (1968) proposed for the English working class; quite the contrary, here political struggles do not accumulate to produce an emergent culture; rather, peoples victories are always recorded as exceptions beyond the law, temporary, contextual and unstable (ibid: 57). As we might expect from the governmentality point-of-view (despite the name), these are not politics in the historical sense, but rather the effect of forms of governance.9 Even so, a careful reading of Chatterjee reveals that associations do have a life beyond their form as Platonic shadows cast by government programmes. It is through these institutions of collective membership that political society negotiates with state agencies, rather than as individual citizens. So, though limited from reshaping structural power through their designation as exceptions politics acquires what little leverage it has from institutions of collective membership. Chatterjees framework does then provide us with one form of selective hegemony: a small eld of generalized hegemony (civil society), and a vast and more amorphous social space where hegemony is selective. Neither is an attempt made by the dominant bloc to broaden participation into this arena and thereby extend civil society. Nor do people in this arena partake in the hegemonic values of civil society.10 But Chatterjee argues that there is a politics of negotiation for these peopleone in which the dominant bloc seeks to cast each success as an exception to hegemonic norms.
Though the vast majority of Chatterjees article and, indeed, his Politics of the Governed (2004) is taken up with this civil and political society, the nal section of his article is headed Marginal Groups. Here we nd the underside of political society. Neither political society [n]or electoral democracy have. . . given these groups the means to make effective claims on governmentality. In this sense, these marginalized groups represent an outside beyond the boundaries of political society (ibid: 61). So Chatterjee does suggest a eld of politics and something beyond, but what happens in this latter sphere is not taken up.11 Aiwa Ong (2006), on the other hand, deals with heterogeneity specifically in terms of exceptional groups. She does so, moreover, by setting her argument within a space wider then any one national polity. [G]raduated sovereignty is an effect of states moving from being administrators of a watertight national entity to regulators of diverse spaces and populations that link with global markets (ibid: 78). Like Chatterjees analysis, Ongs analysis places administrative expertise at centre stage. For her, placement within or without is the result of the interplay between politics [again, politics without politics (ibid: 3); see endnote 8] and ethicsethnographic milieus where the interplay between exceptions, politics and ethics constitute a eld of vibrating relationships (ibid: 4). Also like Chatterjee, she sees neoliberalism (which she connes entirely to a form of governing) as blurring the purchase of citizenship as an effective social category. But her conclusion is more radical. Using the notion of graduated sovereignty, she argues that citizenship is no longer the sole or primary mediator between people and the state: . . . legal citizenship is merely one of multiple schemes for (re)ordering and (re)evaluating humanity (ibid: 24). By limiting neoliberalism to a particular kind of relationship between the authorities and the people, Ong invokes a heterogeneous social eld along different criteria to Chatterjees. She suggests that it is a mistake to see Southeast Asia as uniformly under the sway of neoliberal governance in which the individual is formed through principles of self-responsibility and the population is seen as a resource, the better to be managed. Rather, spaces of neoliberal purview are to be found alongside spaces in which claims on and by the state can be made in terms of established norms that are specic to the history of that state, or claims can invoke transnational institutions. The result is a heterogeneous social space: a constellation of mutually constitutive relationships that are not reducible the one to the other (ibid: 9; emphasis added). Often, to service global clients, a state may apply neoliberalism in one sphere while using precisely its instrumental understanding of
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social membership12 to exclude populations and places from neoliberal calculations (ibid: 4) elsewhere. Moreover, since inclusion in the neoliberal project is not an unalloyed advantage so exclusion from it can be favourable or not, protecting some of the population with existing social safety nets or stripping away all forms of political protection by excluding migrant workers from the living standards [sic] created by market-driven policies (ibid). What are these mutually constituting relationships then? They are [privileged?] spaces where liberal reason ideally prevails, though in its local variant. In this sense it is resonant with Chatterjees civil society. Thus, speaking of the Malaysian middle classes, Ong writes: . . . they have a weak and ambivalent role in relation to state power. There are also a variety of mutually constituting relationships that are exceptions to neoliberalism. First, there are those that are framed in terms of traditional political culture in which the state protects the population from the predations of hard-nosed neoliberal calculation (e.g., individual competition and the absence of social security) by invoking the specicities of national or sub-national histories. Then there are the Special Economic Zones or less administratively formal spheres that are nonetheless analogous. And crosscutting all these are complex claims that can be made by those without territorialized citizenshipon non-state institutions like the UN, religious organizations, and NGOs. Ong speaks too of claims made directly on drug companies on behalf of the diseased and starving. Thus, in moving away from [neoliberal] civil society Ong shifts away from normative citizenship claims, as does Chatterjee by use of his notion of political society; in Ongs case, however, these constellations appear more complex because they invoke claims in terms well beyond those of citizenship. Moreover, Ong sees the politics here quite differently from Chatterjee. Political leverage in this case is not to be found through institutions of collective representation that arise like Chatterjees associations. Rather, intermediaries negotiate on behalf of the politically excluded (ibid: 9; emphasis added).
In short, bare life does not dwell in a zone of indistinction, but it becomes, through the interventions of local communities, NGOs, and even corporations, shifted and reorganized as various categories of morally deserving humanity. (ibid: 24; emphasis added)
Here then is a second instance of selective hegemony, and Ong initially appears to propose that even the excluded are embraced through those who negotiate on their behalf. Though we do learn that there are others who may more specically fall within Chatterjees marginalized
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groups: - Illegals who slip into the country have no legal or social rights (ibid: 83), while Southeast Asia is riddled with internal colonies of poverty and neglect (ibid: 84) and where aboriginal peoples are the victims of accumulation by dispossession. In both cases then the social itself is rendered as a heterogeneous eld both in terms of people and spaces and then a further population whose politics is not a logical extension of the others is alluded to, though no link is made between the existence of this kind of population and the distinctions made across the social tapestry through the selectivity of regimes of rule. While broadly informed by the perceptions of Marx, their approaches evade the Marx who felt it necessary to conduct his critical analysis of contemporary society through a thorough study of Capital. They are, in this sense, not so much postMarxist as tangential to Marxism; their analyses (like Foucaults) are inconceivable without their Marxist antecedents, yet are made tidy by being cleansednot of capitalism itself, which can be understood as simply a presencebut rather of the frenetic imperatives inherent in the production of capital.
Demos and tecnos : freedom and enclosure

Chatterjee does refer to the idea of states as the institutional expression of popular sovereignty, but he consigns this to a moment of the past. Ong does entertain the possibility that certain kinds of capitalists, mostly global capitalists, have an impact on the form of the state. But the xation on states and techniques of governance seems convincingly tidy at the expense of two interconnected forces, which surely cannot have recently simply ed the stage of history. The direction in which the social world goes is crucially a function of what is required for the reproduction of capital, and the direction it should go is the outcome of power struggles that are emergent from and about the relations of capital; in a word, class. It may indeed be the case that current imbalances of power give undue leverage to power blocs rather than popular classes, but to address the issue of current social forms as though the imbrications of power blocs and forms of capital were of peripheral concern seems problematic. One way in which we see this is that Foucaults important observation that modern power intervened to enhance productivity and national well-being (Rose 2000: 7), far from expanding our eld of enquiry, is used to limit it to matters of governance. Tasteless jokes about shepherds aside, we need to remember that the pastoral care they devote to their sheep is not for love of them nor to provide for their well-being sui generis. It is to enhance their value. If too much
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government destroys the dynamism and creative potential of the life processes on which freedom depends (Dufeld 2007: 6), it is not freedom per se that is the issue, but the creative potential it can unleash. It is a mistake to propose that the real application of liberalism is simply about freedom entirely detached from capitalismas an individual and from governmentand therefore must induce a selfregulated subject. We can agree that the problem to which modern forms of power were a response was a problem of productivity in its broadest sense. Initially, the sphere to which modern power was directed was containable and could be imagined as coherent, be it the space of production narrowly conceived (workshop, factory, or the hierarchically organized rm) or the national space in which productivity took on a broader meaning. But the neoliberal variant was a response to a slightly different set of issues, namely, the problem of harnessing the ow of value under new conditions of social space. As these spheres changed so too did the way power related to productivity. So, while there is no dispute with the productive nature of modern power, we need to explore a wider set of interconnected forces and conditions. Invoking as his model France, rather than Chatterjees India, Lefebvre (1977), for example, suggests a different understanding of a politics of popular sovereignty and governance as expertise. There is a tension between the building of a late-modern state on the basis of the national-popular, in which the state becomes the condensation of popular sovereignty and the expanding interconnections of scale in the realm of production that relies increasingly on coordination at the level of the state. Les gens de lEtat invent new instruments, for example, a space which is at one and the same time quantied, homogenized and controlled (Lefebvre 2001: 774775). Less a teleology in which peoples politics are succeeded by the rule of experts, in this reading the modern state is inherently an internally contradictory institution that condenses popular sovereignty and national productivity. I will call these, respectively, the impetus toward demos and the impetus toward tecnos. So, while it is true that from 1789 to the Paris Commune of 1870 there were a series of attempts to insist that the state should be a condensation of the community, the people (Sayer 1987), this was not just subsequently replaced by a concern with national productivity. Well before that the absolute monarchy had been interested in its enhancement in a line from Colbert that crosses 1789 to Napoleon.13 What followed the Revolution was a perpetual tension between concern with securitizing the economyexpressed, for example, in the legalization of joint stock companies (which increased security by spreading investor risk through shares or securities)and popular demandsfor the right
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to property, the right to representation and subsequently the right to security of society (i.e., social security)14 (Marshall 1963). The point, then, is not to focus exclusively on governance and invoke a line from participation to expertise nor to resort to a cynical argument for some kind of functional link between expansions of liberal democracy solely for the purposes of enhancing national productivity (which, during the period we are speaking of, was effectively the enhancement of national capitalisms). Rather, we need to note the tensions that arise as the power of these two forces play off one another at the level of society as a whole, resulting in different state forms. Directing attention to governance and governmentality naturally leads to an interest in what their effects are on society [understood as population]; society becomes an effect of the state. But the reverse is also true. For Marx the tension between the demos and tecnos arose in a wider arena than just the state. For him a key moment in this regard had to do with the passing of the factory acts of the 1840s and the response of industrialists. He argued that the acts were a [state] intervention to limit child labour and increases in the length of the working day since they were a danger to the reproduction of the working class. The effect was to reduce concrete labours contribution to production to which factory owners responded by increasing productivity through techne (efciency of instruments, rationalizing the labour process, etc.) so as to produce relative surplus value (Marx 1973). So we need to counter the fashionable xation on state effects with a broader picture that would allow for a dialectical interplay between people and production in terms of an ongoing struggle emanating from a contradiction that becomes a perpetual preoccupation for the state, not just in terms of struggles among experts, but in terms of power blocs and popular masses. We can take tecnos to refer to a set of strategies to increase productivity broadly conceivedbringing human energy to bear on ever more efcient instruments, enhancing skills, and increasing the speed and quality of information ow, and such like. But under capitalism the impetus to increase productivity generates a tension having to do with the enhancement of the creative potential of people and its harnessing within an enclosure that captures the value that results and directs it back toward capital. People acting freely (albeit selfregulating) are inclined to be more fruitful than people locked in chains (Bourdieu 2000: 20320415 ). But the fruits of that labour are of no use to either governor or capitalist unless their ow can be channelled. It is a principle of capitalism (much respected by Marx) that enclosure of the ow of value so that it can be used to enhance the productivity of capital authorizes this capture. But for our concerns here,
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it is the tension/balance between freedom/enclosure that we need to keep in mind, for this will allow us to see what happens when enclosure becomes a more vital concern than productivity. The effect of enhancing productivity through capitalist relations is that certain populations are rendered surplus. The surplus nature of these populations may be relative: temporarily because they may subsequently be reabsorbed or spatially in the sense that, not needed in one sphere, they are absorbed into another (though market segregation may limit the latter). But capitalist production may require less human input permanently. This may be the case in a general sense, or it may result from the fact that, made surplus in one sphere, they are not absorbed into another. The populations that result are absolute surplus populations economically speaking (i.e., in terms of production in the narrow sense). This is one way in which capitalist reproduction congures populations, and it is the one that mostly concerned Marx. But a second effect of capitalist social reproduction can result from prioritizing enclosure over productivity. Controlling the ow and direction of capitalenclosure16 can also effectively result in people becoming surplus or in excess, but the existence of such populations does not perform a latent function vis-a-vis the reproduction of capital under these conditions. In both cases we may understand capitalism as an inherently polarizing (i.e., class concentrating) socio-political system (Harvey 2005). But the mechanisms that make this happen are not the same in each case and the politics, both of dominant blocs and of subaltern people, must differ as a result. So, in the next sections, I reect on this issue by reference to two kinds of hegemonic project: the one expansive, and the other selective.
Surplus populations
As I have noted, authors who have sought to address the issue of surplus population in the current period have tended to do so in terms of juridical or ethical concerns. But these approaches do not seek to understand the way in which such populations are generated by the kind of social arrangements we live with today. Where there has been some attempt to do so, the decisive moment is said to be a political onea contemporary form of primitive accumulation. Primitive or primary accumulation is here used to refer to a form of coercion that is the inevitable barbarous side of the modernist coin. It allows those concerned with governance, but not especially with capitalism, to propose that it is politics, not the economy, that makes people surplus. Indeed, via a disingenuous reading of David Harvey, these authors
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propose that Marx got it wrong: capitalism did not need coercion only for its primary moment, but perpetually needs it. From here, it is easy to conclude that it is only this political moment of capitalism to which we owe the evils of dispossessed and, hence, surplus people. Neither Marx nor Harvey would suggest that capitalism ticks along nicely innocent of police or protest. Marx was perfectly aware of the persistent role of forceful political intervention for the stable reproduction of established capitalism.17 If current resort to the term, hijacking Harveys accumulation by dispossession along the way, is used precisely to avoid the dynamic features inherent to capitalist reproduction that drive it toward expanded reproduction, then we let capitalism and capitalists off the hook and attend instead to the state and its experts.18 Broadly speaking, for Marx, at certain moments capitalism produced people surplus to the needs of capitalists. Various extraeconomic interventions would be needed, therefore, to address the subsistence needs of this population so that it was available for capitalists in a new round, when they would again be needed. The problem of surplus population arises because such a circuit can only be completed ideallyfor various reasons. We need to rehearse this argument before we can move on.
1. Capital as tecnos and expansive hegemony

Marx notes how capitalists pursuit of prot through ever increasing productivity generates problems beyond the narrow connes of the labour process. On one side, there is a perpetual emergence of a relative surplus of populationwhat Marx referred to as a law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of production (1973: 630); on the other side, there is a relative scarcity of resources. As for the rst of these, Marx based his argument on three propositions. (1) Because in a capitalist society labour capacity can attain its value only when its surplus labour adds value to capital, when it is not adding value to capital it appears as a surplus. So the term surplus in the expression surplus population here refers exclusively to marketable labour capacities. Put another way, it is only when a population is valued just for its marketable labour capacities that it will appear to be surplus when it cannot realize those capacities.19 (2) The accumulation of this population is inherent to the moment when capital uses instruments (machines) to increase the surplus it extracts from labour.20 (3) The maintenance of these populations (either in their temporary down time or over a longer term) must either accrue to society in whole (or to some element of its parts), or become an
16
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insoluble problem or threat to that society.21 This threat can be merely an economic one. What capitalists produce is worthless until its value is realised, which only happens when it is sold to a consumer. So the economic threat has simply to do with the fact that there is a segment of the population who is contributing neither to production nor to the realization of value because they are unable to consume. This then is the relative surplus population. So on one side of the reproduction problem is the population; on the other are the resources. Cumulatively higher levels of productivity are inclined to require more resources for processing into the end product: oil, tin, wood, and so on. Within a bounded territory these can be bought from those who have rights over them, specically the right to sell them. There may then be need for some political and legal interventions to make such resources into property. In any event, the result will be to make a distinction between those who hitherto used themusufructand those who claim rights of sale. The latter may benet from capitals need for scarce resources; the former may become what we could call the absolute surplus populationin the sense that they are not relatively so in terms of cycles in capitalist demand. Rather, they are absolutely surplus in that particular space at any rate.22 (As we will see, there are other ways in which populations may be rendered surplus directly through rigours of the capitalist economy.) Although this looks quite similar, it does not in fact replicate the primary accumulation to which Marx referred. Dispossession is certainly involved but it results not from accumulation by dispossession, but dispossession as a result of accumulation. Where in the one the politics precedes the economics, in the other the economics is well in place before the politics becomes necessary. So we can see here that it was the gargantuan demands of production capital that produced both forms of excess, yet the mechanism in each case was slightly different. Just as the effect of the dominance (though not pervasiveness) of the wage relationship was to make all of labour that was necessary commodiable labour (the remainder being surplus), so the drive for resources was to commodify the commons (understood here, quite broadly as general rights of usufruct). The welfare state was a hegemonic project of post-war class blocs to decommodify crucial spheres of society in order to compensate for these destructive moments of capitalist reproduction. Beyond the core states, it did not, however, resolve either the problem of realization resulting from the one kind of surplus population it had produced or the problem of scarcity in resources that resulted from the demands of productivity. The result was what Harvey (1982) termed the spatial x (see also Smith 1984; Cowen and Shenton
17
1996). This, in turn, generated people who appeared as surpluses, most notably as a result of the second of the issues I have addressed here: one in which places (or resources) are useful but the people are not . . . (Li 2009: 1211),23 producing an absolute surplus population.24 When we speak of the emerging productivist state, it is this to which we refer. But there is nothing determinist or teleological that results from this understanding of capitalist reproduction. What Marx is talking about here is a certain kind of iron logic, one that inclines production capital toward expanded reproduction. It doesnt happen all the time; it is not something spread uniformly throughout social formations in which capitalist social relations are dominant; and, as we would expect, resolutions to this problem do occurlargely in the realm of political society. This points us toward Gramsci who addressed the issue of power and production through the two notions of hegemony and Fordism. His concern was precisely to use the notion of hegemony to explore the political implications of the tension between the dual drive for control over popular will and the pursuit of prot through the harnessing of labour. Or, better put: the growing realization that increases in productivity could be made by expanding the arena of inuence over popular will: an intensication of exploitation achieved through new forms of management and corporatist strategies, and expansion of state intervention in the economy and society (Forgacs 2000: 223). Here, Gramsci is clearly referring to hegemony as the project of a dominant bloc to secure the future. He is talking about how the state and the enterprise deploy power plus persuasion to penetrate civil society and thereby reshape it. While Gramsci was writing about interwar Italy, his observations are helpful when we turn to the post-1945 world. Following the Bretton Woods agreement, the core states pursued a broadly corporatist agenda, seeking to enhance productivity and reduce conict through making alliances with the leaders of key stake holders. These regimes functioned through hegemonic expansion so that initial pacts among the leaders of capital and labour were expanded to include regional and ethnic political classes, and so on. The best resolution of the tension between demos and tecnos was some distribution of the social good to the population. And the best vehicle for this project was the bounded national state within which claims and rights were made in the language of citizenship. The universality of citizenship on which the authority of expansive hegemony relied required that the medium for claims on the statecitizenshiprecognize only a homogeneous, uniform population. It is not that differences of culture, sexuality, and gender were not socially recognized; it was that the principles of
18
G. A. Smith
welfare-state citizenship were embedded in a kind of liberal republicanism (in the French sense) that was largely incompatible with them. The ignorance of the KNWS lay elsewhere: not in respect to the variations among the population, but in respect to the complexity of the sources of national productivity. It was supposed that insofar as people not immediately functional for the motor that made society productivethe mass production economy systemically producing relative surplus valueso they were the surplus who were the responsibility of the state. Yet even in the core countries the stable worker of the salaried society (Nun 1969) never constituted the majority of the work force. Put another way, the reality of society that the post-war state sought to manage was never neatly divided between wage labour in mass production, on the one hand, and unemployment and nonproduction, on the other. Rather, the commodied economy was made up of a vast array of forms of enterprise, all of which depended for their reproduction on an extensive arena of non-commodied practices generating less a binary world composed of spheres of moneyed and non-moneyed relations and practices, but rather an overall world of intricate commodied relations Yet, caught between the tensions of demos and tecnos, the juridical apparatus of the KNWS had to remain coy about its antisocial child, as though the so-called productive economy were not itself producing the excesses now appearing as a cost of the state. Expansive hegemony needs to be understood in this light: its overt containing of citizenship against recognition of difference, and its covert obscuring of the role in national vitality of spheres of either intricate commodied relations or non-commodied relations and practices. As the declining productivity of industrial capital set in by the 1970s so greater prots from capital shifted toward nance. This, in turn, rendered permeable the boundaries of the manageable state. The longstanding covert operations of the KNWS began to surface: state costs were increasingly (and explicitly) going to capital, not supposedly unemployed labour; and the vitality of the hitherto illegalized sphere of intricate commodied relations (informal economy, black economy, getting by, etc.) began to emerge, not only as the place of last resort for personal welfare but also as the source of national productivity it had been for some time.25 This, in turn, recongured the way in which tensions between demos and tecnos were to be worked out, as we shall see in the next section. One nal point before moving to that section. Was expansive hegemony extended to the Global South? This is not, in fact, quite the question that follows from the logic of my argument, since I have been suggesting that the modern pursuit of a productivist capitalist state generated specic tensions between demos and tecnos to which
19
expansive hegemony was an attempt at resolution. So, the rst question is the one Tania Li raises: Whether or not the pauperized population of the global South fulls the same function in relation to capital as the paupers of industrializing England described by Marx (2009: 1210). I hope it is clear that I have addressed this question above. To the crises of surplus population experienced in the Global South as a result of the way industrial capitalism generates surpluses of population and scarcities of resources on its edges, would need to be added a vast array of contingent historical realities arising from the varieties of colonial and postcolonial experience. Nonetheless, without pursuing these in this article, it is part of my argument that, insofar as postwar development programmes were the product of debates mostly within a Keynesian frame of reference, they were an extension of what I have been saying. As Greg Grandin notes of United States programmes in Latin America, In the early 1960s the goal was to set up functioning welfare states . . . The buzz was techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuelas (2009: 33). I have not, however, been arguing for an historical moment of the welfare state per se. Instead, a state increasingly concerned with coordinating productivity reected the political agenda of industrial capitalist power blocs who responded to the demands for demos at home with expansive hegemony. Such hegemony was best achieved in a political eld (or elds) contained within the bounded national state, which was imagined to be sufciently coherent to make macro-planning feasible and, thereby, bring the optimum number of the demos into the hegemonic project. A truly vast array of postwar development schemes were designed to prepare the way, if not actually produce, such a eld of operation. But it would be wrong to downplay the dispossession dimension of international geopolitics during this era as a result of the ravages of extractive industries, the imbalance in capital ows from South to North on which at least some of core welfare relied, and contests over political inuence up to 1989. Yet it is clear that as the modern state became increasingly biased toward its productivist functions, far from resolving the Malthusian problem of surplus population, it actually generated its own versions thereof. In brief, the problems arising from expanded reproduction could be resolved temporarily and spatially through expansive hegemony, but never nally solved.
2. Capital as enclosure and selective hegemony

Three features distinguish the current conjuncture from the one just discussed. The rst of these has a material and an ideological
20
G. A. Smith
dimension: the extremes of social polarization that result from the current forms of capitalism and the endorsement by both conservative and social democratic political elites of class concentration. The second is the dominance of nance capital. And the third is what Foucault calls the pervasive social ethic of the enterprisefrom the economic to the social sphere, the cultural, artistic, and so on, such that all the basic units would have the form of the enterprise (2008: 148). This is not an exhaustive list; it is simply a selective description of discrete features. This package (and much besides) has come to acquire a generic name: neoliberalism. While this term has been used to refer to a particular form of capitalism and its relation to the state (e.g., Peck and Tickell 2002; Harvey 2005; Smith 2005; Jessop 2006), as we have seen in the case of Ong an especially pervasive use of the term restricts it to a kind of government (Dean 1999; Rose 2000; Foucault 2008). In this narrative, neoliberalism emerges from the effectiveness of the intelligentsia themselves in conguring the nature of truthrst the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries political economists (e.g., Smith and Ricardo) whose principles authorized the self-limiting of modern government and then Freiberg liberals seeking to break with the Marxism of the Frankfurt School (Foucault 2008). It is as though the resolution of the demos/tecnos tension in the tripartite pact called the welfare regime happened because Keynes said it should be so, and now we have a different regime because Milton Friedman said it should be so. Foucaults disclaimers notwithstanding, this does seem to be an especially idealist understanding of causality. Here I try to understand the package of features just described by use of Marxs principles of the critique of the original political economists (i.e., the frame I have just used for discussing the KNWS). I began that argument by suggesting that we are helped in understanding modern productivist society in terms of a tension between demos and tecnos. What emerged from these tensions were various forms of welfare state (see Smith 1999: 195227) as increases in relative surplus value at home and expansions through markets and predation abroad made possible resolutions through actual or promised redistributions. But I also suggested that there is a second way of thinking about a similar tension inherent to capitalism, which I glossed as freedom versus enclosurefreedom of movement and mind versus control over ows and fancies. This second framing allows us to explore how the class projects of certain kinds of capitalists get translated into projects for hegemony, which do not have as their ideal goal universal expansiveness but rather particularistic selectionwith the obvious corollary of an excess beyond those selected.
21
What was actually happening in the crepuscolo of Keynesiansism was a series of initially piecemeal shifts in the vectors of capitalist protfrom productivity to nancethat gradually became dominant: nancial capital asserted its logic over that of industrial capital and the institutions into which it had become embedded.26 Thus, Robert Wade (2009: 159) writes,
The process of nancial dominancewhat I call nancialization of the economy (FOE) is measured quantitatively by ratios such as the total credit outstanding as a percentage of GDP in the USA which doubled from 170 [percent] in 1981 to more than 350 [percent] in 2007. FOE is also measured institutionally in the way that other nancial institutions, including corporations, households and pension funds have been reorganized in support of the capital market as the economys pivotal institution. (Dore, 2000)
The problem to which neoliberal forms of governance were a response remained those of productivity (in its broadest sense) and the ow of its end products, but the tension between the freedom (of movement) and its enclosure so that value ows toward capital now became acute. Perhaps we can best understand this if we imagine that we are a nance capitalist looking upon the North Atlantic region in terms of the potentials of a rm, and use Peck and Tickells list of the conditions that gave rise to neoliberalism as our prospectus: . . . competition from Newly Industrializing Economies, a slowdown in productivity growth and prots in the Atlantic Fordist zone, the oil shocks, the internationalization of capital ows, rising ination and unemployment, and growing labour-militancy (2002:386). Financial capitalists use a variety of instruments to securitize the future. Faced with all but one of the conditions described here, one response might be to sell short on this future (of the Atlantic Fordist zone). Another would be to take advantage of that one exceptional conditionthe internationalization of capital owsto disperse investment to benet from alternate futures to be found elsewhere. We can formulate this in terms of a series of hegemonic projects each with a horizon beyond the other. To make such movements possible, an initial component of the hegemonic project was to secure the ideological and juridical conditions to free up movement. Especially in the United States and the UK, neoliberalism was an expression of the way nance capital used the state to secure two crucial conditions to enhance the eld of its operation. The rst was to provide a rationale for a shift in the notion of good value from the use of capital for deriving prots from productivity to a use of capital to capture prots
22
G. A. Smith
through movement and enclosure.27 The second was to enact a package of programmes that facilitated international capital ows. This in turn produced conditions across a second, broader horizon that generated a shift in a relationship within capitalbetween nance, commerce, and industry. Finally, a further horizon affected relations between capital (dominated by nance) and ordinary people. Distinct from earlier resolutions of problems of capital reproduction,28 these latter kinds of capitalist socialization found expression in hegemonic projects directed toward selected people rather than the population at large, leaving a residue of people surplus to these projects. Two resulting features are especially distinctive from the KNWS. One has to do with the specic problems that arise from attempts to regulate the recongured space on which nance capital depends. The instruments used to do this at a global level have a knock-on effect at more reduced scales. The other has to do with the way in which nancial securitization relies rst on the distinctions among social phenomena and then on the means for establishing equivalents among them. These two featuresdispersal and compartmentalizationare connected in multiple ways. And it is these interconnections that modify the capitalist socialization process from its earlier form under KNWS.29 As the ability to make prots from capital mobility increased through the 1970s and 1980snot just through the speed and ease of ow (freedom), but through interrupting and redirecting ows (enclosure)so it created its own opportunities and its own problems.30 A global problem had to do with money itself. A major service provided by the state in the early days of merchant capitalism had been the provision of a uniform currency across the kingdom and, ideally, its relative stability over time. With the new order, changes in the exchange rate between, say, Japanese and German currency could spell doom for an international contract. Arbitraging across spreads of this kind had long been both the solution to the problem and the source of wealth for those so engaged, but as the sheer number and speed of such transactions increased, problems of ow arose. Moreover, the problem was not just nding equivalents across spatial variability. With ever-greater movements of capital to secure the future of rainfall in a wheat belt, on the one hand, and the cost of raw iron, on the other, there was a need for instruments that could assess equivalents across phenomena with qualitatively different kinds of value. A variety of nancial instruments arose to address these issues.31 Finance capital then, which relies on movement that allows it to oat like a buttery and sting like a bee, had rst to break down barriers that restricted movement and then produce monetary instruments
23
to resolve issues that arose from the more ephemeral kinds of spaces that resulted. Financial instruments can be seen as attempts at regulation in response to these conditions. And then, under the rubric of securitization, similar instruments were applied to more localized spheres. This, in turn, changed the balance in the way expropriation took placebetween the capital-labour relationship of production capital, on the one hand, and expropriation through various forms of enclosure on the part of nance capital, on the other. There is nothing new in making prots by taking rents from working people and selling them access to credit. Indeed, this is and long has been a means for extracting surpluses from non-capitalist relations. Nor is there anything new in the way these kinds of extraction have a polarizing effect, impoverishing some households (or specic members thereof) while pushing others toward the extension of their working day or working life. (For a detailed case, see Sider 2003.) But the integration of these with nancial services means that the rationality of nancial instruments orient domestic life (Martin 2000: 43).
In the last twenty years or so we have seen labour being treated like capital, the household being treated like a small business. . . . taking positions about an unknowable future. It comes back to the issue of the state withdrawing from guaranteeing the future. And its not just decisions about interest payments. Its about deciding whether or not and how to invest in a range of things. Education . . . my telephone and electricity. . . . Which superannuation fund or pension fund? . . . The list is long, and you dont really have the choice of not playing. So being working class now means engaging in competitively driven risk calculation and management. (Bryan 2008: 7)
In the North after 1980, the state intervened to enlarge credit demands and then mobilize the national population around the intrinsic worth of debt management and reduction (Martin 2000: 44). Meanwhile, in the South sundry NGOs engineered the same drive through such schemes as micro-credit while the World Bank adopted a global pension scheme, which would impose pension funds that, unlike pay-as-you-go schemes, link pension payments to funds investment performances (Wade 2009: 146). As Randy Martin puts it: The new international division of debt culled labour from populations around the world and fed it into a spiders web of nancial exchanges that spread from New York, London, and Frankfurt, to Tokyo, Singapore and Johannesburg (2007: 31). This is, of course, taking back the commons (a form of accumulation by dispossession),
24
G. A. Smith
but it has an additional socialization effect, which is fundamental to the way nancial securitization is achieved through dispersal. In nancial terms security is what you need in return for advancing a loan to somebody to offset the risk you take in making the loan. It is an asset (usually physical), which that party (a person, a company, a municipality and so on) owns that can be possessed if they default. What is put up in this way is referred to as collateral. This is one way of acquiring some assurance that you will not lose what you have advanced. But your assurance is tied to the exchange value of that one asset. You can acquire further security however by dispersing these kinds of obligations, so that if one of them loses its asset value, another may gain. Again, sticking just to nancial terms, securitization refers to the bundling together of multiple credit and debt contractsfrom home mortgages, and student loans, to corporate and government bonds. It is true then at an initial take that securitization depends on a primary stepto induce rents or interest in credits (usually through extra-economic means), but it is a mistake to get stuck at this level. Securitization detaches the rent that can be derived from specic ownershipof a house, or a factoryor the interest that can be derived from making advances that allow people specic ownershipof their health care or their carand thereby attains a new market value from the synthetic package that results. This synthetic package is traded and takes on a value of its own. Securitization draws household economies as directly into capitalist accumulation as companies or the economies of national governments. So we should not be misled into isolating domestic debt and life-course risk management from the entire reach of nancial securitization which, taken as a whole, has the effect of redrawing the mechanisms for the real subsumption of labour to capital (Bryan and Rafferty 2010).32 Dispersal thenand the freedom of movement that makes that possibleis fundamental to securitization. But we need to be cautious about the spatial metaphor (Smith and Katz 1993). Dispersal can of course refer to physical geography, but it can also refer to taking different degrees and kinds of risks and beneting from their dispersal. If these differences are only apparent, then nothing is gained from this spread, so dispersal only works if the differences are real from a nancial point of view. It is not then just that the pervasive conguration of social reality in terms of risk benets nance capital insofar as security can they be given a price. It is also that real distinctions in the degree of risk and the kind of risk are essential for the principles of securitization. This means the carving up of values within unitsthe household, the rm, the environment, and so onand the insistence on the reality of the differences between
25
them. Securitization through dispersal depends, in the language of nance, on diversicationin the language of society, on diversity. Earlier I was critical of suggestions that neoliberal theoreticians produced a body of theory that was so powerful that it conditioned the world we live in. Here I am not simply reversing the idealist bias with a materialist one. Rather, I am suggesting that the conditions of capitalist socialization produce a complex of relationships. Neoliberal rationales are cognate with many of those relations and practices.33
Counter-movement and revindicative politics

As I said at the outset, it is not the task of this article to rehearse in detail the kind of revindicative politics that might arise from the conditions I have described here. Yet this intervention is motivated by a conviction that we need to think quite carefully about what these conditions mean for such politics. I believe that the politics of negotiation revolves around various claims on social membership understood in terms of diversity rather than universalityreal partners, social groups, identity groups, and so on, in Rancires wordsand I will discuss these kinds of politics rst. But I think current forms of capitalism, within the core spheres of nance in the North and beyondthrough imperialist impositions of the terms of so-called freetrade, plus military incursionsinvolve the ousting [of] the surplus subjects (again in Rancires words), which give rise to an entirely different kind of counter-movement lying beyond the various elds of selective hegemony. As a result, the politics of such people cannot be some kind of albeit modied extension of the politics of negotiationbe it New Social Movements or various proposals for local alternatives to the capitalist economy and the like. I will broach this issue second. The interpretations of Chatterjee and Ong, which stress [neoliberal] governmentality, are undoubtedly insightful, but the notion hegemony embraces a wider arena of the social world: rst, because it embeds politics within features of the political economy and, second, because it understands the social in terms of force and counterforce. And yet, as Roseberry (1994) noted some years ago, a characteristic of such politics is to frame the language of dispute within the terms of the prevailing hegemonic elds. The politics of negotiation under conditions of selective hegemony thus induces claimants to collude in the constitution of social elds of exclusivity made up of concentrations and enclosures. One dimension of this kind of hegemonic collusion has to do with different forms of capitalist socialization (i.e., the way people become embedded in society through the form capitalist relations take at a given time and place). A politics of negotiation is possible in this
26
G. A. Smith
realm working across the tensions of interdependency and conict that are as inherent to nance capital as they are to production capital (as we have seen). Thus, exibilization in the spheres of production, services, and trade creates insecurity and precariousness, which themselves increase the contingencies of the future. Peoples concern to securitize their future then becomes a means for channelling surpluses toward capital via nancial instruments. But we then encounter another kind of security there, which relies, in part, on a kind of dispersal that is based on diversity. Achieving this kind of spread means differentiating not just among households (geographically, economically, culturally, ethnically, occupationally, etc.) but also differentiating within households, breaking down each component that embeds a persons life into the future: schooling, health, old age, etc. But this realm of a politics of negotiation is not identical to the politics of citizenship and rightshowever cultural we want to make that citizenship or however complex those rights. Obviously, this is not to conclude that we should compartmentalize the two, but it does seem important to make a distinction between the inherently tension-loaded discourse of negotiation through which the capitalist subject is socialized and the juridical (and possibly ideological) discourses around citizenship that also invoke social subjects. There may be a politics of citizenship that has to do, for example, with recognition of rights in the public sphere in terms of the autochtoons versus the allochtoons in the Netherlands, or indigenas versus mestizos in parts of South America, and so on.34 And these may be conducted in terms of a discourse of negotiation. Yet although these are the most striking instances of selective hegemony, they may simultaneously reect and obscure the differentiations that arise out of specic forms of capitalist exploitation.35 These processes are almost innitely complex and, therefore, from the perspective of ethnographic enquiry, deeply forbidding. Even so, despite the importance of their specicities, the fact is that both these vectors of socialization perpetually produce and reproduce difference and fragmentation. The degree to which the two are entwined or not clearly will vary, but along either plane there is room for the politics of negotiation. No doubt aspects of the current conjuncture throw up challenges for the conceptual and methodological tools we have at our disposal, but I believe that, working from the kind of frame I have provided here, we can at least begin this task. For both Marx and Gramsci it was the conditions by which capitalism socialized the world that gave clues to effective counter-politics. Such an agenda remains fundamental today for a politics suited to negotiation within the eld of hegemony, a hegemony that is hard to see as anything but selective.
27
But the characteristics of current forms of capitalism combine with congurations of the social in terms of selectivity and spheres of exclusivity to suggest that an entirely different kind of politics must be thought for those who are effectively excess to society rendered in this way. As we have seen, there are a number of quite distinct ways in which the reproduction of capitalism can produce absolute surplus populations.36 This was certainly the case prior to the current conjuncture. Despite such principles of expansive hegemony as republican universalism and the states responsibility for offsetting capitalist polarization, neither the KNWS in the North nor development projects in the Global South addressed these issues. There were always those beyond or outside expansive hegemonyin short: lumpen. Even so, the authority rulers derived from appealing to such principles, and the fact that counter-movements acquired leverage by being framed in those terms, effectively congured the relationship between revindicative politics and surplus populations was distinct from the current conjuncture. Neoliberal states today do not see their role as one of counteracting the inequities of capitalism but rather enhancing its eld of operation. And as dominant blocs increasingly represent nance so the role of social democracy in enhancing the state-productive project is redrawn. Finance capital may rely on growth but it does not itself produce it; rather, its purposeand its effectivenessis in seeking out the most microscopic element of surplus and channelling it back toward capital, for the next round of pursuit. As David Harvey (1982) and Neil Smith (1984) nearly thirty years ago showed, capital continually requires difference, produces difference, and having exploited it must seek out a new coefcient of difference. But insofar as expropriation of surplus preeminently through movement and enclosure does not in itself enrich the overall economy, it does not produce wealth. A series of concentric circles of wealth concentration become ever more intense at the centre while, taken together as overall wealth, the circles do not expand but contract, leaving surplus population to a kind of politics that has to be distinct from those within the hegemonic eld, or even those with the potential of entering it. Hegemonic projects are directed toward selected groups. And the recipients of such projects collude in the distinctions that allow their claims to be made in terms of selective hegemony. This, in turn, provides the templates that then authorize the distinctions that these people make vis-a-vis populations beyond that eld. There arises a distinction between this kind of politics and another kind. The ways in which regimes of regulation deal with the residuum produced by the specic forms of current capitalism suggest that a politics
28
G. A. Smith
of revindication for such people will require features for which the concepts of social science seem severely limited. I confess to nding it hard to move into this terrain. One way to go, however, is to work quite carefully with the principles that drove Gramscis enquiries in the twenties and thirties. As we have seen, for a long time populations were assessed on the valuation of labour in terms of its contribution to the production of surplus value through the labour process. Marxs point was that, in a typical reversal, this meant that, however much one may labour for ones own survival, or perhaps even communally for the common good, to the extent that such labour did not produce surplus value for capital it was surplus, and people who performed only such labour were effectively surplus people (at least until they were needed again). I have argued that Gramsci framed his argument in similar terms. Yet, I have spent the latter part of this article seeking to show that the forms of capitalist socialization now dominant do not result in a form of hegemony which, in principle,37 might extend to the whole of society. Before bringing coercion and persuasion together under the rubric hegemony, Gramsci separates the two with numerical points:
The functions in question are [those of] . . . social hegemony and political government. These comprise: 1. The spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group . . . 2. The apparatus of state coercive power which legally enforces discipline on those groups who do not consent either actively or passively. (1971: 1213)
Here, Gramsci is talking of two processes directed at two distinct groups: those who consent and those who do not consent to the project of the dominant bloc. The form of hegemony that provided the principles of the welfare pact is contained in the sentence that follows these numerical points. This apparatus [hegemony] is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed (ibid: 13). Here, persuasion and coercion are linked through time because hegemonic projects extend to the whole of society in a context of cycles of capitalist expansion and contraction (just as had Marxs understanding of the function of the relative surplus population). So what allows this apparatus of hegemony to be expansive to the whole of society is its sequential link.
29
Yet when the temporal and spatial connections Gramsci (and Marx) envisaged are fractured, we are no longer talking of moments when spontaneous consent fail nor of expansive hegemonic projects potentially embracing the whole of society, but rather projects directed toward selective groups. The idea of the state as the condensation of universal popular sovereignty promised by expansive hegemony and sustained by the tecnos of increases in productivity cannot be sustained. Extractions of surplus value through various forms of enclosure rely on ows that concentrate value already produced. Projects must, therefore, be directed at selective groups. Hegemonic projects of this kind then, work by being exclusive and thereby render obsolete the ideological power of universal popular sovereignty. Moreover, because selective hegemony reects a form of capitalist socialization based on surplus extraction through nance capital (as described here; see also Smith, forthcoming), populations on the threshold of the hegemonic eld do not perform the relative function of resolving the cycles in production capital (described above) in which their value is measured in terms of their potential for surplus extraction directly through the labour process. Not having such a latent value, for these people coercion is not held off stage as a threat for the future thereby giving power to persuasion; coercion is exercised in the present, unconnected to persuasion. The result is the substitution for a temporal distinction between now and then, with a metaphorically spatial distinction in the present: one space in which some are selected to be within hegemonic strategies and another occupied by an absolute surplus population subjected simply to coercion. For these people a counter-politics directed uniquely at neoliberal kinds of governmentality and the juridical features of citizenship will, in Gramscis terms, be more wilful than organic. Another way of putting this is to note that, as we have seen, the role of the KNWS in using social citizenship to compensate for the distributional and polarizing shortcomings of capitalist socialization have now been supplanted by forms of state intervention that do not perform this role. So claims to various rights in terms of citizenship may effectively advance the conditions through which one is selected in civil society, but they cannot be expected to ameliorate, still less resolve, those conditions of life that are made impossible by capitalist relations themselves. Again, I need to stress that this is not to argue for some kind of compartmentalization of the two realms, but rather to argue for assessing political conditions and possibilities in terms of their articulation. Clearly, issues of environmental destruction as well as the conditions faced by so-called immigrants, legal or otherwise, are profoundly tied to nationally specic forms of
30
G. A. Smith
capitalist socialization. But this may mean that it is the latter that should become the central focus of struggle, rather than claims on rights in terms of citizenshiphowever enlightened and encultured that might be. If we think in these terms, then it is surely clear that for some people, just as it would be nave to demand a more enlightened kind of citizenship which in practice will not be applied to them, so too it would be nave to accept the principles of capitalist socialization and demand simply that they be redrawn. While both of these strategies seem to me to embrace most of what left politics is about today, it is very clear that there are increasing numbers of people who accept neither the principles of a liberal citizenship that is always grafted on to capitalism nor a kind of capitalist system that is no longer able to compensate for their exploitation through growth.38 We might identify four criteria along which we could assess the distinction between counter-movement politics that I am suggesting here: 1. Continuity/disjuncture: the degree to which participants see that their demands can be met within existing social, political, and economic forms versus the degree to which only threats to those forms would establish the rst step toward their goals. 2. Organization/participation: the ways in which political engagement is organized and the forms of recruitment. To some extent I see this as the popular participation feature. Yet evidence of strong popular participation plays especially to the notion that the result will be to convince key players (including the players themselves, but also imagined spectators, and those in power) insofar as, once they see the value of this specic action, they will be persuaded. To this kind of leverage there is an important addition. . . . 3. Disruption/production: the forms of leverage they have at their disposal. One key element here would seem to be leverage that comes from the potential toward enhancing productivity broadly conceived that participants can offer, versus the degree to which their leverage derives from the pressure they can bring on key points that would produce signicant disruption. Where those in power minimize the productive potential of participants, the latter strategy offers the only kind of leverage. 4. Subject/agent formation: clearly different kinds of political intervention affect the subject-formation of participants. To some extent I see negotiated politics versus radical revindicative politics much in the way I see the distinction between the respective emphases in
31
this regard of Foucault, on the one hand, and say E. P. Thompson, on the other. The one stresses the way in which govermentality shapes subjectivity, and this is likely to be more the case for politics that involves participants in dialogue with those in power toward the reaching of consensus. The other stresses the role of force and counterforce in the emergence of the subject. Subject formation here is closely associated with the agency of the subject, collective and individual. Any incident of political engagement would express different mixes of these features and they are, of course, deeply interconnected. The challenge for the left therefore is to explore the means by which these myriad forms of revindicative politics can be combined as a counterforce out of which capitalist social relations will be superseded. Gramsci, of course, spoke of a war of position and a war of manoeuvre in the context of mass mobilizations extending out from the industrial setting. The balance between effective mass popular force and the technology of oppression was beginning to shift even in his time and has certainly redrawn the role of mass mobilization today. But what does remain is the need to identify points where intervention would have a geometric effect on altering the balance of forces in the interlocking chain of capitalist production and circulation. And as these become increasingly securitized through military means both domestic and imperial, it seems likely that the effectiveness of counterforces will require addressing this coefcient in its own terms. Perhaps we should take sustenance from James Baldwin who once remarked: It is ultimately fatal to create too many victims. The victor can do nothing with these victims, for they do not belong to him but to the victims (1972: 89).
Notes
Received 2 April 2010; accepted 15 July 2010. This article has benetted from the insights of so many friends and colleagues in workshops, over coffee, in seminars, and across dinner tables that, but for its limitations, it should really be seen as cooperatively authored. Thanks to Malcolm Blincow, Victor Breton, Michelle Buckley, Deb Cowen, Jaume Franquesa, Kanishka Goonawadena, Ken Kawashima, Kundun Kumar, Winnie Lem, Tania Li, Susana Narotzky, Jennifer Ridgley, Neil Smith, David Sworn, and Judy Whitehead. Address correspondence to Gavin A. Smith, Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 2S2. E-mail: gavin.gav@gmail.com
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1. The Turks have conquered Germany exactly how the Kosovars conquered Kosovo: with a high birth rate . . . a large number of Arabs and Turks [in Berlin] have no productive function with the exception of selling fruit and vegetables [italics added]. Thilo Sarrazin, administrator of the Bundesbank and once Berlin minister of nance in the Social Democratic Party Le Monde [Online] 12.10.09. 2. See, for example, Giorgio Agambens bare life (1998), Zygmunt Baumans Wasted Lives: Modernity and its outcasts (2004), Mike Daviss Planet of slums (2006), Mark Dufelds (2007) Foucauldian reading of development as the liberal enlightened form of eugenics, or Judith Butlers (2009) lives whose ending is ungrieved. 3. I realize that revindicative is not to be found in the English dictionary, but I use the term here because it captures an element of the dialectics of politics that I cannot nd in another word in English. I take it from the Spanish reivindicarto take back. 4. He contrasted this to willfulness. See Smith (2004, 2006) references. 5. For a response to Roy by Jairus Banaji, go to http://kala.org/2010/03/22/responseto-arundhati-roy-jairus-banaji/ (Accessed 16 April 2010). 6. This was the substance of Gunnar Myrdals Asian Drama (1968) in which he referred to the problem of cumulative disadvantage in which the success of growth poles undermines the economic possibilities of less endowed regions. 7. While my discussion of Chatterjee here refers mostly to his article in Economic and Political Weekly of 2008, which is conned to India, it is consistent with his book (2004) (especially chapter 2) whose subtitle is Reections on popular politics in most of the world. 8. Given his past among the historians of subaltern studies it is surprising to nd Chatterjee reproducing here a picture remarkably similar to that of W. A. Lewis (1954) and his followers in the 1950s, one in which value ows from the modern or formal sector to the traditional or informal sector, this time through government benecence. 9. . . . the contemporary redenition of politics as the art of expert administration, as politics without politics (Zizek 2006: 38). 10. The allusion here is to the two elements of hegemony, its production and its reception, that I discuss at length in Smith (1999; 2004; 2006). See also Narotzky and Smith (2006). 11. Ironically Banaji (see Footnote 6) accuses Roy of precisely the reverse omissionof leaving out of her discussion what we have here seen as civil and political society. 12. For neoliberalism itself is an extraordinary departure in policy that can be deployed to include as well as to exclude (ibid: 5). 13. The shift in measuring the worth of the nation in terms of the wealth of the citizens toward measuring it in terms of their contribution to overall productivity was a slow and uneven emergence from mercantilism. Gregory King, who conducted the rst sociological style survey of England, in his General Account of the 1690s, divided the population into 500,586 nobles, merchants, lawyers, etc., who increased Englands wealth, and 849,000 labouring people, seamen, servants, etc., who decreased it (cited in Mount 2004: 119120). 14. Security is a keyword (in Williamss sense), indicating juridical treaties that reect the conjunctural moment in class and imperial wars. From social security, to the securities and exchange commission, to national security, neighbourhood security to the securitizing of supply chains. 15. Bourdieu captures the overall ethos that results from the relation of freedom to the reigning in of value back to capital: Workers may contribute to their own exploitation through the very effort they make to appropriate their work, which binds
33
16.
17.
18.
19. 20.
21. 22.
23. 24.
them to it through the freedomsoften minute and almost always functional that are left to them . . . This is especially true when the dispositions that Marx calls vocational prejudices. . . . nd the conditions for their actualization in certain characteristics of the work itself, such as competition in the occupational space for example . . . It follows that, in many work situations the margin of freedom left to the worker . . . is a central stake; it introduces the risk of non-work or even sabotage, going slow, etc.; but it opens the possibility of investment in work or self-exploitation. . . . It is on this principle that modern management theory, while taking care to keep control of the instruments of prot, leaves workers the freedom to organize their own work, thus helping to increase their well-being but also to displace their interest from the external prot of labour (the wage) to instrinic prot. (Bourdieu, 2000) 203204 [italics in original]). By enclosure I wish to stress not just the image of the enclosed eld, to which the small rm might be analogous but also the image of enclosing water through channels and tubes, to direct ows. For example: Between equal rights, force decides. Hence, in the history of capitalist production, the establishment of a norm . . . presents itself as . . . a struggle between collective capital, ie. the class of capitalists, and collective labour, ie. the working class (Marx 1976: 342344 [italics added]). Those who debated the masa marginalista in the late sixties by contrast were concerned precisely with the connection between forms of capitalism and the juridical and normative elements that made it possible to designate a population surplus. They began with an understanding of capitalist society as a dynamic tension-lled process and asked how such a society produces surplus populations, and they then tried to show how these surpluses affect the further reproduction of that society: The rst element of research . . . the mould . . . of a social formation dialectically inter-relates three instances: the economic, the jurido-political, and the ideological. Emergent at the level of the economy, the relative surplus population necessarily involves the other two (Nun 1969: 225226 [translation mine]). See Smith, forthcoming. necessary labour appears as superuous, because the superuous is . . . necessary only to the extent that it is the condition for the realization of capital (1973: 609). If a denite amount of labour capacity is given, the relation of necessary labour needed by capital must necessarily continuously decline, ie: part of these capacities must become superuous, since a portion of them sufces to perform the quantity of surplus labour for which the whole amount was required previously (1973: 609). Marx explicitly notes that this abstract division of labour into its necessary and its surplus components could actually become a distinction among people, making some necessary and others surplus. society in its fractional parts undertakes for Mr Capitalist the business of keeping his virtual instrument of labour . . . intact as reserve for later use (1973: 609610). One way to address this issue is to re-congure such people as in some way different (e.g., indigenous, or tribal) and then tie them to a place like a reserve (Li 2009). Another is to propose that migration eg to urban centres will resolve the issue (Breman 2009). The social and political implications of these kinds of surplus populations are dealt with acutely by Li (2009). But we should not overstress North/South distinctions; regional or urban sectoral concentrations in the global south can themselves produce their own relative surplus populations as well as demands for land and resources.
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25. It is important to assert that this is not the de Soto (1986) argument. Rather, I am simply drawing attention to the obviousthe extent to which monopoly and competitive industrial capitalism depended on the non-commodied sphere for what is usually (misleadingly in my opinion) called social reproduction and on the intricately commodied sphere for a vast array of supplies and services. Hobsbawm (1984) notes that the huge expansion of factories in mid-nineteenth century England was accompanied by a multiplication of such operations. 26. It is hard to overemphasise the degree to which nancialization occurred in the United States and Britain. Arrighi (2007: 140 [italics in original]) notes that by the 1990s in the United States not only had nance, insurance, and real estate surpassed the share accounted for by manufacturing prots, non-nancial rms themselves sharply increased their investment in nancial assets relative to that in plant and equipment, and became increasingly dependent on nancial sources of revenue and prot relative to that earned from productive activities . . . manufacturing not only dominates but leads this trend towards the nancialization of the non-nancial economy. 27. Buying a property and waiting for its price to inate was deemed as productive as investing in new means of production (Michael Hudson 2008). 28. The capital-labour relationship expressed in the wage, the tripartite pact of the political representatives of capital and labour mediated by the state, etc. 29. The limitations of what Glick Schiller calls methodological nationalism become especially apparent under these conditions. Problems of exposition are made still more challenging when we recognize that we are trying to grapple with economic, juridical, social, and cultural features that are reciprocally connected in a kind of moebius strip (see also W. R. Scott 2004) The abbreviated discussion here is given more extensive treatment in Smith, forthcoming. 30. Production capital remains the baseline upon which value (through labour) is generated. It follows then that nance capital cannot be pervasive and old-fashioned labour has not disappeared (though it may have moved). Rather, nance capital is dominant in the sense that its principles condition the priorities of production capital and, as we will see, the priorities of some kinds of labour. 31. Earlier in this article I used the term instruments when referring to capital tools, rather than the more frequently used machines. The expression nancial instruments is in common parlance. Here I use it to refer to a vast array of things from derivatives like credit default swaps (CDS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDO) to models like the Gaussian Cupola, as well as the software programmes required to generate them. Use of the word across these instances is intentional. 32. the effect of securitization was to aggregate a vast number of otherwise discrete mortgage transactions . . . into a single mass of exposures; generating a socialized working class expression in nancial markets (Bryan and Rafferty 2010: 4). 33. As Michel Feher notes for the notion human capital: It is precisely as a consequence of [the] desire to overcome the divide between the intimate man and the entrepreneur that one should understand the promotion of human capitalthat is, the presentation of the individual as investor in him or herself (Feher 2009: 33). The analogy with the rm is brought out further by Feher (ibid: 34), who notes that, while labour power is the property of the free labourer, neoliberal subjects do not exactly own their human capital; they invest in it. The parallel with shares in a joint stock company is patent and, lest we still resist the association with nance capital Feher continues, the relationship between the neoliberal subject and his or her human capital should be called speculative, in every sense of the word (ibid
35
34.
35.
36.
37. 38.
[italics his]). I am grateful to Drew Gilbert and Andrea Muehlbach for pointing me to Fehers reections. The appearance of selective hegemony is especially obvious in development projects in the Global South, where particular groups whose names acquire extraordinary symbolic capital, become the selected targets of multiple agencies pursuing often uncoordinated programmes: creditworthy single mothers, indigenous peasants, pandas . . . and so on, whereas inevitably othersnon-creditworthy mothers, non-indigenous peasants, non-panda consumers of bamboodo not. And any urban or regional renewal project will reveal the same kind of phenomena. Evidence for the shift from expansive to selective hegemony in Latin America is provided in Roberts and Petras who remark: [Urban policies] mark a shift from the old urban political economy of the highly centralized states of the Import Substitution Industrialization period to a new one. . . . An important part of this shift . . . is a decreasing emphasis on the universalistic social policies of the past and an increasing emphasis on policies targeted to specic groups and individuals in need (2006: 58). I need to add an important caveat here. It seems to me that the role of surplus populations has become crucial to a revindicative politics in the future. And I feel that this is so in a way that was not the case at the height of the KNWS. I have therefore talked of the distinctions between these two situations. Yet it would be absurd to imply that this situation is unique. Through history societies have produced people who appear as surplus to that society. Indeed, it has been argued that for Marx and Engels there was a ragbag of people who were also surplus to revolutionary politics (Stallybrass 1990). The question I pose, therefore, is whether this remains the case (if it were ever the case in the rst place). In principle only of course. The whole of society is understood in terms of force and counterforce so that hegemony has to do with alliances under conditions of conict. This raises the question as to whether countries like China where production capital is quite prevalent can indeed address pressures through growth and increased productivity. Only empirical investigation can offer the beginnings of an answer. Factors to consider though are the fact that China has tended to increase the distinctions among the populations in the shift toward capitalism; nancialization is a major source of wealth and hence capital ow; and this in turn has inuenced Chinas national and international investment decisions.
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Martin, Randy 2000. Reading Capital for the socializing politics of globalization. Environment & Planning D: Society and Space 18: 3751. Martin, Randy 2007. An Empire of Indifference: American War and the Financial Logic of Risk Management. Durham: Duke University Press. Marx, Karl 1973. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft). Martin Nicolaus, trans. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Marx, Karl 1976. Capital, vol I. Ben Fowkes, trans. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Meillassoux, Claude 1980. From Reproduction to Production: A Marxist Approach to Economic Anthropology. In The Articulation of Modes of Production. Wolpe, ed. London: Routledge & Kegen Paul. Le Monde [Online] 12.10.09. http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2009/10/12/allemagnepolemique-apres-les-propos-xenophobes-d-un-dirigeant-de-la-bundesbank_1252687_ 3214.html#ens_id=1207057 (Accessed 12 October 2009). Mount, Ferdinand 2004. Mind the Gap: The New Class Divided in Britain. London: Short Books. Myrdal, Gunnar 1968. Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: Pantheon. Narotzky, Susana and Gavin Smith 2006. Immediate Struggles: People, Power and Place in Rural Spain. Berkeley: University of California Press. Nun, Jos 1969. Superpoblacin relativa, ejrcito industrial de reserve y masa marginal. Revista Latinoamericana de Sociologa 5(2): 178235. Ong, Aiwa 2006. Neoliberalism As Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham: Duke University Press. Peck, Jamie and Adam Tickell 2002. Neoliberalizing space. Antipode 34(3): 380404. Ranciere, Jacques 1999. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Julie Rose, trans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Ranciere, Jacques 2004. Who is the subject of the Rights of Man? South Atlantic Quarterly 103(2/3): 297310. Roberts, Bryan and Alejendro Portes 2006. Coping with the free market city: Collective action in six Latin American cities at the end of the twentieth century. Latin American Research Review 41(2): 5783. Rose, Nikolas 2000. Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roseberry, William 1994. Hegemony and the Language of Contention. In Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico. G. M. Joseph and D. Nugent, eds. Durham: Duke University Press. Pp. 272298. Roy, Arundhati 2010. Ghandi but with guns. The Guardian 27 (March): 34. Sanyal, Kalyan 2007. Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, Governmentality and Post-Colonial Capitalism. New Delhi: Routledge. Sayer, Derek 1987. The Violence of Abstraction: The Analytic Foundations of Historical Materialism. Oxford: Blackwell. Scott, W. R. 2004. Reections on a half-century of organizational sociology. Annual Review of Sociology 30: 121. Sider, Gerald 2003. Between History and Tomorrow: Making and Breaking Everyday Life in Rural Newfoundland. Peterborough: Broadview Press (revised edition of Sider 1986). Silver, Beverly J. 2003. Forces of Labor: Workers Movements and Globalization Since 1870. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Gavin 1989. Livelihood and Resistance: Peasants and the Politics of Land in Peru. Berkeley: University of California Press. Smith, Gavin 1999. Confronting the Present: Towards a Politically Engaged Anthropology. Oxford: Berg.
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Gavin On Selective Hegemony

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Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

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Chatterjee and Ong on the current conjuncture

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Demos and tecnos : freedom and enclosure

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1. Capital as tecnos and expansive hegemony

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2. Capital as enclosure and selective hegemony

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Counter-movement and revindicative politics

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