Documentos de Académico
Documentos de Profesional
Documentos de Cultura
SHELF
TREATISE
O N T H E
PRINCIPLES
of
POLITIC LAW.
By
J. J.
ROUSSEAU,
Gen
eva.
Citizen of
Fcede
is
aquas
Dicamus
leges,
w^Eneid, xi.
LONDON:
Printed for
T.
Becket
and P. A.
in ihe Strand.
M DCC LXi V,
De Hondt,
ADVERTISEMENT.
little
treatife
is
taken
In
THIS
from
which
I
much
larger
work,
my
to
abilities.
it
have,
long
fince
laid
afidej
con-
ceiving
extra(fl
it
proper
offer
the following
as the lead
eX'
CONTENTS.
BOOK
Jn which the
,
I.
trdnjition
from a
is
ft ate of nainveftigated^
ture
to
that
of focieiy^
with the
compact.
effential
conditions of
the foetal
Introduction^
CONTENTS.
CHAP.
Cnfavery^
IV.
"^
C H A
On
the
vecejjity
P.
V.
to
of recurring always
ile
1
primitive convention,
CHAP.
On
VI.
ig
CHAP.
Of
the fovereign,
VII.
23
VIII.
CHAP.
Of civilfociety in general^
27
IX.
CHAP.
Off real ^mefne$y
2g
BOOK
CONTENTS.
BOOK
C H A
That
IL
P.
I.
3^
C H A
That
P.
II.
3S
CHAP.
Whether the general will can
III.
be in the
wrong, 42
CHAP.
C H A
On
IV.
44
V.
5i
capital puniJhmentSy
CHAP.
On
the laiv^
VI.
55
CHAP.
CONTENTS.
CHAP.
Of
the genius
VII. 61
and charaSJer of a
VIII.
legljlatory
CHAP.
Of
the people^
^p
IX.
.
CHAP.
The fuhje^l continued^
*j%
CHAP.
The
fuhje5l
continued^
X.
^8
C H A
P.
XL
legijlature^
Of
of
83
CHAP.
On
the divfions
XII.
cf the laws^
III,
S7
BOOK
CHAP.
On
government
Government,
I.
ID
general,
>5l
CHAP.
CONTENTS.
CHAP.
On
the pr'inctpk
ir.
which conJiituUi
the differed
forms of government,
loi
CHAP.
Of
the aSiual dtftlnSlions
III.
'i
of government
I Ya
s^
ii6
C H A
Of
a Democracy:^
P.
to^
P.
C H A
0/
V,
IiJ
VI.
Arijlocraq^
CHAP.
On
monarchy i
Ii^
C H A P
Of
mixed Governments y
VII.
128
CHAP.
proper
VIII.
not equally
is
fr every
countryy
130
C H A
F.
CONTENTS.
C H A
Of th
P.
IX.
141
CHAP.
Of
the abufe
to
X.
its
of government'^ and
ten*
dsncy
degenerate^
^44
XE.
1
CHAP.
Of
the dijfolutlon
of
51
CHAP.
By what means
maintained^
XIT.
authority
is
the fovereign
'53
XIJI.
CHAP.
^he fuhjcH antinuedy
15^
CHAP.
ThefuhjeSi continued.,
XIV.
^
^i9
CHAP.
Of deputies
XV.
i^^
or nprefeniaiiveSf
CHAP.
CONTENTS.
CHAP.
Tto
the injihutlon
XVL
is
of government
-
not
a
i^S
company
CHAP.
Of
the injiitution
XVII.
171
of government,
CHAP.
Of
the
XVIII.
means
tions
of government,
173
BOOK
In which the fuhje5f of
tinued^
IV.
political
laws
is
con-
conftitution
CHAP.
That
I.
79
CHAP.
On
VoteSi
IL
183
CHAP.
CONTENTS.
CHAP.
On
Ekiiionsy
III.
1^3 g
CHAP.
Of
the
IV.
Roman
Comifia,
I94
CHAP.
On the
Tribunate,
V.
214
VI.
218
CHAP.
Of
the D'i^aiure^
CHAP.
Of
the Cenforjhip,
VII.
224
CHAP.
Of political
Religion^
VIIL
227
C H A
Conclufton,
P.
IX.
24^
TREATISE
O N T H
SOCIAL COMPACT,
&c.
BOOK
"
I.
INTRODUCTION.
Y
defign,
in the
inquire,
Whether
admits of any fixed and equitable rules of government, fuppofing mankind to be fuch as they
and their laws fuch as they might be made. In this invelliigation I (liall endeavour conllantly to join the confiderations of natural right and
are,
and
utility
may
1 ftiall enter
its
on
my
fubIf.
it
importance.
^
it
TREATISE
I
on
the
be afked, Whether
am
upon me
j
anfwer,
for
legifla-
tor I
in pointinf^
niyfelf
put
As
fl:ate,
and a member
of the fupreme pov/er, by birth, however weak may be the influence of my fmgle vote in public
affairs,
to impofe
the right of giving that vote is fufticient on me the duty of making thofe affiiirs
my
ftudy, thinking myfelf happy in difcuffing the various forms of government, to find every day
my own
coun-
try*
CHAP.
The
I.
T^ .^
AN
is
born
enflaved.
vidual frequently conceives himfelf to be the lord and mafter over others, though only more emi-
nently deprived
of liberty.
lawful
?
Whence
can
this
change
it
arife
may be rendered
* Geneva.
The
former quef-
tion
SOCIAL COMPACT.
tion I cannot anfw-er,
though
latter.
imagine myfelf
and
eiFeffs of power, I fhould fliy, So long as a people are compelled to obey, they do well to be obedient but, as fooa as they are in a capa;
do better
to
For, in recovering their liyoke of reftraint on the fame berty plea by which they lofl it, either they have a jufl right to realTume it, or thofe
who deprived them of it. But an inviolable there is right founded on the very nature of fociety, which ferves as the bafis of all
otiiers.
Man
this
right,
how-
ever, immediately from nature; it is founded on We mufl proceed, then, to mutual convention.
inquire,
convention
mufl
have been.
point,
I
But, before
we come
I
vanced.
C H A
On
P.
IL
only natural one, is that of a family. And even in this, children are no longer connecTted with their father, than while they ftand
in
TH
mofl ancient of
all focieties,
and the
need of his
afTi
fiance.
When
,
this
becomes
needlefs.
TREATISE
the natural
tie
is
on
the
needlefs,
of coiirfe difTolved,
the children are exempted from the obedience they owe their father, and the father is equally (o from thefoliciiade due from him to his children ;
both ailume a
each other.
frate
of independence refpefling
continue, indeed, to live
They may
together afterwards ; but their connection, in fuch a cafe, is no longer natural, but voluntary; and even the family union is then maintained by
mutual convention.
This
kind,
is
i
libert}^
which
is
common
to all
man-
nature
the neceflary confequence of our very whofe firfl law being that of felf-pre-
which
doth
no fooner,
therefore,
snan arrive at years of difcretion, than he becomes the only proper judge of the means of that
prefervation,
and of courfe
his
own
mailer.
In a family, then,
we 'may
:
model
of political
focieties
their chief
reprefented
and the people by his children, them of while being free, and equal by birth, alienate their libert}^ but for their cannot they common interefl. All the difference between a fa-
by the
father,
all
mily and a
children
is
That,
a compenfation for his folicitude conin the latter, it is the pleafure cerning them \ andj
of
S
of
A L C O
MPA
C T.
command
a chief
which
Grotius
denies
government
is
invefted
with power folely for the benefit of thofe who are governed, and cites the cafe of (laves as an
example.
fafl *.
It is,
pradlice,
on the matter of
a
more con-
clufive
then
doubtful,
according to Grotius,
except about an hundred individuals, belong to thofe individuals, or whether the latter belong to the
race of mankind,
and
he
appears,
mer
opinion.
Hobbes. Thus they divide the human fpecies into herds of cattle, each of which hath its keeper,
who
make
*
prote(fls
it
a property of
himfelf.
learned refearches into the laws of nature and naiions are often nothing more than the hiftory of ancient abufes ; fo that it is a ridiculous infatuation
to be too fond of
tife
" The
Manufcript Treaftudying them." en the Intenjis of France, the by Marquis d' A, This was exadly the cafe with Grotius.
B 3
As
A TRE
As
a fhepberd
fo
ATI S
E ON THE
is of a fuperior nature to his the herd-keepers of men, or their chiefs, are of a fuperior nature to the herd, over
flock,
which they
prefide.
Emperor Caligula, according who concluded logically enough from this analogy, that either kings were gods, or their fubjed-s
to
Philo, of the
This argument of Caligula bears much refemArifblance to thofe of Hobbes and Grotius.
totle
had
faid,
that
men were
not naturally
to
ii
equal
aver y,
but that
and others
Ariftotle
was right
as to the fa6l,
but miftook
is
the
eifecfl
Nothing
more
cer-
tain, than that every man born in flavery is born to be a flave. In fuch a fiate, men lofe even
the defire of freedom, and prefer fubjeftion, as the companions of UiylTes did their brutality *.
If there are
it is
any
flaves,
therefore,
by nature,
becaufe they are flaves contrary to nature. Power firil made flaves, and cowardice hath perpetuated them.
* See a
little
tionality of brutes,
have
so CI A L
I
COMPACT.
have
faid
emperor Noah, father of three monarchs, who, like the children of Saturn, as feme have imagined ihem to be, divided the world them. I hope my moderation alfo in
among
this re-
{pcS: will be efteemed fome merit; for, as I am defcended in a right line from one of thefe
and probably from the eldeft branch of the family, hov/ do I know, that, by a regular deduction of my defcent^ I might not find myprinces,
felf
the legitimate
this,
heir to univerfai
it
monarchy
Be
hov/ever, as
as
may,
a
it
cannot be denied,
to the fovereignty
that
Adam had
good
title
of the world, when he was the only perfon in it, as Robinfon Crufoc had to that of his ifland under the fame circnmflances. A very great conveniency alfo attended their government, in that
the monarch migin relt fecurely on his throne^ without fear of v/ars, confpiracies, or rebellion.
CHAP.
On
the right
III.
cf the Strongeft,
flrongefl: is not (Irong enough tocontinue always mafter, unlefs he transforms his power into a right of command, and obe-
ry^HE
dience into a duty. Hence is deduced the right of. the flronged ; a right taken ironically in ap13
.
4.
pearance,
A
in
TREATISE
down
But
?
on the
as
will
rightly explained
is
a phyfical
can refult
force
is
power nor can I fee what morality from its efFe^Sls. To yield to fuperior
moll
it is
an a6l of neceility, not of the will ; at but an a(5l of prudence. And in what
be called a duty
Let us fuppofe, however, for a moment, this pretended right eftablifhed, and we fhall fee it attended with inexplicable abfurdities ; for, if it
be admitted, that power conflitutes right, the efFefl changes with the caufe, and every fucceeding power, if greater than the former, fucceeds alfo to the right ; fo that men may lawfully difobey, as foon as they can do it, with impunity ;
and, as right is always on the ftrongeft fide, they have nothing more to do, than to acquire
fuperior force.
that be,
Now
what kind of
right can
which vanifhes with the power of enIf obedience be only exadled by comit ? forcing is no need to make fuch obedience there puifion,
a duty, as
uhen we
It apare no longer obliged to it. obey, adds noword the that right pe. rs, therefore, of in that this ca{q to in faift, force, and, thing
is
we
a term of
no fjgnlhcation.
Be
SOCIAL COMPACT.
Be
obedient
to
9
by
this
the
higher powers.
If
precept is meant, JubjeSl to a fuperior force^ the advice is good, though fuperfluous ; I will an-
fwer for
it,
I
power,
own,
derived from
is
in
If a
am
in
give him my
it
am
alfo
obliged point of confcience, though I might poflibly conceal it from him ? This will hardly be averred ; and yet the piflol he holds to
my
breail,
is,
in ^^td:,
a fuperior force.
On the whole, we mufl conclude, then, that mere power doth not conflitutc right, and that
men
are obliged only to
authority.
Thus we
my
iirfl:
queflion.
CHAP.
On
IV.
JIavery.
S no man hath any natural authority over the reft of his fpecies, and as power docii not confer right, the ba/is of all lawful authority
js
laid in
mutual convention.
If
10
If
TREATISE
on tpie
an individual, fays Grotius, can alienate his Hberty, and become the flave of a mafter, why
may
and become fubjel to a king ? This propofition, however, contains fome equivocal terms, which require explanation, but I Ihall confine myfelf to that of alienate. Whatever is alienated mufl be
Now a man difpofed of, either by gift or fale. who becomes the flave of another doth not give himfelf away, but fells himfelf, at leaft for his
whole people fell a king from furnifhing his fubjefls fubfiflence, that they maintain him ;
fubfiftence
;
but
why
far
fliould a
themfelves
So
is
fubjefls be fuppofed to give away their liberty, on condition that the receiver fhall take their property along with it ? After
a
little.
on
Can
this,
really
left.
It
may be
Be it fo I his fubjeifts the public tranquillity. would be glad to know, of what they are gainers,
if
the wars in
which
his
ambition engages
them, if his infatiable avarice, or theoppreflions of his minifiers, are more defl:ru6live than civil Of what are they gainers, if even diffenfions?
this
tranquillity
prifoner
;
may
live tranquil
geon
but will
?
this
be
fufFicient
to
make him
were
ftiut
contented there
When
the Greeks
up
SOCIAL COMPAC
up
in the cave of the Cyclops,
T.
ii
there
they lived
To
muft
fay,
that a
to talk unintelligibly
necefTarily
give himfelf away, is and abfurdly fuch an a(ft be illegal and void, were it for
;
man can
no other reafon, than that it argues infanity of mind in the agent. To fay the fame thing of a whole people therefore, is to fuppofe a whole nation can be at once out of their fenfes
it
;
but were
fo,
Were
pofTible alfo
for
in the
man
to alienate
dif-
fame manner,
human
beings, are
born
free
their
freedom
is
their
body hath any right to dlfpofe of it but themfeives. Before they arrive at years of difcretion,
indeed, their father may, for their fecurity, and in their name, flipulate the conditions of their
prefervation, but he cannot unconditionally and irrevocably difpofe of their perfons, fuch a gift being contrary to the intention of nature, and
It exceeding the bounds of paternal authority. requifite, therefore, in order to render an ar-
is
bitrary
government lawful, that every new generation fliculd be at liberty to admit or reje(fk
authority, in
its
which
cafe
it
would be no longer
an arbitrary government.
B 6
To
12
A
To
TREATISE
iiatural'
on the
liberty,
is
renounce one':
to
re-
nounce one's very being as a man ; it is to re-^ nounce not only the rights, but even the duties
of humanity. And what pofTible indemnification can be made the man who thus gives up his all ?
a renunciation is incompatible with our nature for to deprive us of the liberty of ; very the will, is to take away all morality from our In a word, a convention, which ftipujKHiions.
iates
Such
in
itfelf,
fu-
we
and contradi6lory. Is it not evident, that can lie under no reciprocal obligation what-
ever to a perfon, of
whom we have a right to demand every thing; and doth not this circumjflance,
againfl
my
all
flave
that belongs to him, himfelf, are mine ? His claims are of courfe my own, and
to fay thofe can be fet
when he
and
up againfl me,
is
to talk
abfurdly.
Again, Grotius and others have deduced the origin of this pretended right from the fuperiority
The conqueror, fay they, having a right to put the vanquifhed to death, the latter may equitably purchafe his life at the expence of his liberty j fuch an agreement being the 9
obtained in war.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
the
13
more
lawful, as
it
vanquiQied is not, in any fhape, the natural reThis is plain, were it for fuit of a ftate of war.
of mankind, while living together in their primitive independence, were not fufficiently durable, to conflitute a flate, either
of peace or
war
fo that
men cannot be
naturally enemies.
not between men, that gives rife to war ; which ariling thus, not from perfonal, but real, relations,
cannot fubfift between
either
in
every thing
is
The quarrels, encounters and duels of individuals are not fufficient toconflitute fucha flate
of war
;
and,
combats authorifed by the inflitutions of Lewis XI. King of France ; they were only fome of
the abufes
fyf-
of
natural juflice, as of
good
policy.
War
14
A
War
is
TREATISE
not,
ON the
which individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, or even as citizens, but as
in
v
foldiers
not as
members of
as
its
its
their
particular
community, but
frate
rot
men
as
between things
there can bs no
common
relation.
eftablilhed
This principle is, indeed, conformable to the maxims of all ages, and the conftant
of every civilized people;
Declarations
made
lefs to
than to
theii fubjcdts.
The
vidual,
foreigner,
whether a fovereign, an
indi-
or a people, who plunders, kills, or takes prifoner a fubjeft, without declaring war is not an enemy, but a robber. againft his prince, Even in a time of v/ar, a jufl prince may make
himfelf mafter, in an enemy's country, of whatever belongs to the public, but he will refpcvfl the perfons and private properties of individuals; he will refpel thofe rights on which his own are
founfled.
The
wc have
right to kill
j
but
as, in
laying
down
or
SOCIAL COMPACT.
murder them.
15
or inftruments of hoftility, they become, in that cafe, mere men, and we have not the leaft right
to
It is
of its members
or privilege, which
its
are they founded OQ principles of Grotius, nor the authority of the poets i but they are fuch a3 are deduced from the nature of things, ana are
founded on reafon.
With regard
it
has
no other foundation than that of force, the law of the ftrongeft. But, if war doth not give the
Victor a right to mafllicre the vanquifhed,
this
pretended right, which docs not exift, cannot be the foundation of a right to enflave them. If
we
to
have no right to kill an cnem-y, unlefs we cannot by force reduce him to (lavery, our right
make him
to
therefore, an iniquitous
bargain,
make him purchafe, at the expence a life, which we ha 'e .^o right to
In eAablifhing
thus a right of
life
and death over others, on thai of enflavin^ : o ibem y on the other a of and, hand, right enfl..ving
them on that of life an.l death, we certainly into the abfurdity of reafoning in a circle.
rail
Let
i6
TREATISE
ON the
Let us fuppofe, however, that this fhocklng right of general maflacre exifted, I flill affirm* that a flave, made fo by the fortune of war, or
a conquered people, fo reduced to flavery, lie under no other obligations to their mafler, than to obey him fo long as he hath the power to
compel them
favour
to
it.
inflead
of killing
them
ufclefsly,
he
hath only varied the mode of their deflruc^tion to his own advantage. So far, therefore, from
his
having acquired over them any additional authority, the ftate of war fubfifls between them
;
as before
is
the evi-
dent efFefl of
and
of war
is
fucceeded.
Will
it
it
be
:
faid,
they have
made a
a
convention; be
truce, and
flate of
is
fo
This convention
is
mere
fo far
to the
war, that
it
con-
tinuation.
Thus,
in
whatever light
we
making men
it is
null
and
unjufl:,
but becaufe
tetmsjiavery
abfurdand
infignificant.
The
and
SOCIAL COMPACT.
pofal
17
would be
equally
ridiculous,
whether
made by one
vate
individual to another, or
a
by
a pri-
man
to
whole
people.
enter into
an
and
folely
for my
profit,
iihich
will
to
ohferve as
ohferve afo,
long as 1 1 leafe^
CHAP.
On
V.
ON
be true what
^he advocate for defpotifm would, however, There will be always a great profit but little.
difference
between
governing
a fociety.
and
feverally
in that
;
flaves
they
are
an
Aggregate
alTociation
form an
neither
there fubfiAs among them commonwealth nor body politic. Such a fuperior, though he fhould become the mafler of half the world, would be flill a private perfon, and his intereft,
would be
28
TR E ATIS E
When
ON the
private interefl.
he prefided
is
diffolved,
component parts remain totally uncon-, nefled, jufj: as an oak falls into a heap of adies, wken it is confumed by the lire;
its
and
A
tius,
may
voluntarily bc-
According to Gro-
are a people before they thus give themfelves up to regal authority. Even this gift, however, is an acl of fociety, and
a people
prefuppofes a public deliberation on the matter. Hence, before we examine into the acl, by which a people make choice of a king, it is proper to examine into that by which a people became a
people, for, on this, which is ncceflarily prior to the other, reds the true foundation of fociety.
For,
tion,
if,
in
fafb,
arifes
there be no
(unlefs
prior conven-
whence
was unanimous) the obligation of the fmaller number to fubmit to the choice of the greater ? and v.'hence comes it, that an hundred perfons,
forinftance,
who might
?
defire to
have a mafter,
had
who might
de-
ilre to
have none
in itfelf
votes
is
The
for
CHAP.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
19
CHAP.
On
the foetal
VI.
or covenant.
pa^
prefervation
in
Bate of nature, prevail over the endeavours of a individuals, to maintain themfeives in fuch
ftate.
At fuch
fore could
rnuft
their
no longer
have perifhed,
manner of
as
living.
Now
only
ift,
men cannot
create
new
pov/ers, but
really
compound and
direft
thofe which
ex-
they have no other means of prefervation, than that of forming, by their union, an accu-
mulation of forces, fufficient to oppofe the obftacies to their fecurity, and of putting thefe in
aftion by a
firft
arife
This general accumulation of power cannot but from the concurrence of many particubut the force and liberty of each inbeing the principal inftruments of his
;
lar forces
dividual
own
the
is he to engage them in without intereft, hurting his own, and negledting the obligations he lies under to
prefervation,
how
common
himfelf
^o
A TRE
This
:
x^
E ON the
himfelf ?
difficulty,
prefent fubjefl,
may
ing terms
" To
find that
form of
aflbciation
which
fhall
community, theperfon and property of each individual, and in which each perfon, by uniting himfelf to the reil, fhall neverthelefs be obedient only to himfelf, and remain as fully at liber-Such is the fundamental proty as before."
focial
The claufes of this compaft are fo precifely^ determined by the nature of the a6l, that the
leafl:
them void
and of noefFeft;
they
may
much, that, although perhaps never have been formally prothey are yet
univerfally
fo
mulgated,
received.
the
fame,
When
by lofmg that conventional liberty for the fake of which they had renounced them.
Again
his rights
and
privi-
leges.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
leges, to the
2t
whole community. For, in the firfl one gives himfelf up entirely and without referve, all are in the fame ciicumflances,
place, as every
fo that
in
making
their
common
is
made without
re-
union
is
as perfedl
as pofTible, nor
hath
claim
whereas,
if
no common um-
between them and the public, own judge in fome cafes, would,
and their affociation would
would
ftill
fubfift,
necelTarily
become
tyrannical or void.
by giving himfelf up
gives himfelf to none ; and, as he acquires the fame right over every other perfon in
the community, as he gives them over himfelf, he gains an equivalent for what he bellows, and ftill a greater power to preferve what he retains.
If,
therefore,
we
is
nor effential to
it,
:
we
"
fhall
We,
the contraifting parties, do jointly and feverally fubmit our perfons and abilities, to the fupreme
direftion of the
general will of
all,
and, in a
collcflive
22
A T RE AT
as
E ON the
col!e(fbive
body,
body, receive each member into that an indivifible part of the whole."
accordingly
converts
This
the
a6l of afTocIatioii
feveral individual
many
which receives alfo from the fame a6l its unity and exiftence. This public perfonage, which is thus formed by the union of all its members, ufed
as there are votes in the afTembly,
members
formerly to be denominated a
City
*,
and, at
prefent,
The
for
true fenfe
of
this
word
;
is
almoft
entirely
perverted
among
a
city,
the
moderns
town
Such are ignorant, however, that, though houfea**, may form a town, it is the citizens only chat conftiThis fame errour formerly coft the Car* tute a city. I do not remember, in -the thaginians very dear.
courfe of my reading, to have ever found the title of Chves given to the fubjedls of a prince, not even formerly to the Macedonians, nor, in our times, to the
Englifh, though
liberty
The French
on
who
familiarly take
citi'^ens,
meanwere
ic
may be
for,
fon in ailuming
it.
This term
is
citizens
SOCIAL COMPACT.
prefent, takes the
litic.
a.
23
name of
called,
a rcpuhlic, or
its
kdy po-
It
Is
alfo
it is
by
feveral
members,
it
JIatey
when
with
pafTive;
is
active; and
fimply a
power ^ when
when it is com-
pared
other
With regard
to the afTociate?
name of
the people^
vereiga authority, and fuhjeSiS, as fubje6led to Thefe terms, indeed, are the laws of the ftate.
'
frequently confounded, and mlAakcn one for the it is fufficient, however, to be able to other when are be to ufed with diflinguifh them, they
;
:precifion.
CHAP.
Of
is
VII.
the
fcvereign,
iT act of
neva,
plain
afTociation
lie committed a wretched blunder, in midaking oneTor the other, Mr, d'Alembert indeed has avoided this miflake in the Encyclopcedia, where he has
even
five,
in our city,
public
reckoning mere ftrangers) that are found and of which two Oi.ly compcfe the re~ No other French author that I know of hath
c.'ti^en.
and
24
TREATISE
In
ON the
contra(5ling, if I
may
engagement, ty toward particular perfons, and as a member That toward the fovereign. of the ftate
fo fay, "with himfelf, is laid under a twofold viz, as a member of the fovcreign-
maxim
of the
civil
law, however,
is
inapplicable
here, which
fays, that
no one
is
bound by the
engagements he enters into with himfelf j for there is a wide difference between entering into
a perfonal obligation with one's
felf,
and with a
is
determination, which
jefl,
with regard to the fovereign, on account of the twofold relation by which each flands contrailed,
is
and
confequently inconfiftent with the nature of the body pplitic, that fuch fupreme Ihould impofe a law, which it cannot
is
power
break.
For, as the fovereign ftands only in a fm^le relation, it is in the fame cafe as that of an individual contra6ling with himfelf; whence it
is
plain,
is,
fundamental
being fuch.
compaft itfelf not however, it is not meant, that fuch a body cannot enter into engagements with others, in matters that 6.0 not derogate from
fecial
By
this,
SOCIAL COMPACT.
from
this contiafl
it is
;
2$
for,
objedls,
a fimple
But, as the body politic, or the fovereign, derives its very exigence from this inviolable contra6l, it can enter into no lawful engagement,
even with any fimilar body, derogatory from the tenour of this primitive adl ; fuch as that of
of itfelf, or of fubmitting italienating any part violate felf intirely to a foreign fovereign.
To
it
exifts
would be
arife
to annihilate
nothing.
No
al
becomes impofTible to
ofFenfively againft any of the members, without attacking the whole, and Aill lefs to offend
the whole body, without injuring the members. Hence both duty and interefl equally oblige the
two contrafling
parties to
affift
the fame perfons ought to endeavour to include, within this twofold relation, all the advantages
which depend on
it.
Now
the fovereign,
com-
pofed, can have no interefl contrary to theirs ; of courfe the fupreme power ftands in no need of any guarantee toward the fubje(5ls, becaufe it is
impofTible,
2S
TREATISE
it
ON
the
hurtmg
after,
all its
that
in
them
particular.
Hence
necefTarily,
exifts,
always fuch ^s
-
ought
to be.
The
;
cafe
is
different,
however, as to the
re-
lation in
which the
reign
reft,
as,
notwithflanding their
common
inte-
means be found
In
facl,
to
engage their
fidelity.
His
private
interefl:
may
influence him, in a
manner
of
as
common
intereft
the fociety.
fitive
po
and naturally independent, he may conceive what he owes to the common caufe, to be a free
garding the moral perfon of the flate as an imaginary being, becaufe it is not a man, he may
be defirous of enjoying
citizen, without
all
the
his
privileges
of a
fulfilling
engagement as a fubjed J
SOCIAL COMPACT.
s;
fubje^l J an injuftice, that, in its progrefs, mull necelTarily be the ruin of the body politic.
To
comtacitly
it
includes this engagement, which only can enforce the reft, viz. that vvhofoever refufes to pay
will,
fhall
be
liable to
be compelled to
by the force of the whole boAnd this is in effecTt nothing more, than dy. that they may be compelled to be free j for fuch
it
Is
the
the condition which, in uniting every citizen to ftate, fecured him from all perfonal dependJ
which forms the whole artifice machine it is this alone that renders all focial engagements juft and equitable which, without it, would be abfurd, tyranence
a condition,
political
nical,
CHAP.
'
viir.
in general.
0/
civil
focieiy
produflive of a very remarkable change in his being, by fubflituting juftice inflead of inftiniff, as the rule of
is
THE
tranfitlon of
man from
a ftate of na-
his condu(St,
a6lions, of
is
deftitute. It
in
immediate confequence of C 2
change,
when
the
2S
TREATISE
own
on
the
the voice of duty fucceeds to phyfical impulfe and the law of appetite, that man, who hitherto
obliged to adl on other principles, and to confult his reafon, before he follows the di<5lates of
his paflions.
of fociety, he
tages
Although, by entering into a (late is deprived alfo of many advanthat of nature, he gains
faculties
which depend on
others
by
it
exert and expand themfelves, his ideas are enlarged, his fentiments ennobled, and his whole
foul
is
if
the
low the former, he ought incefTantly to blefs that happy moment in which he was refcued from it,
into an intelligent
and converted from a flupid and ignorant animal and wife Being.
To
ed by
flate the
balance of what
is
lofl
it
and gainto
this
change,
we
fhall
reduce
rative terms.
By
compacom-
pa^l, man gives up his natural liberty, or unlirnited right to every thing v/hich he is defirous of,
and can
cial
attain.
In return for
this,
he gains fo-
liberty, and an exclufive property in all thofe things of which he is pofTefled. To avoid in the nature of thefe however, miftake, any
compenfations,
tin<5tion
it is
neceflliry to
make
juA
dif-
is
limited
by
SOCIAL COMPACT.
^29
by nothing but the Inabilities of the individual, and fecial liberty, which is limited by the general will of the community ; and alfo, betweea
that poiTe/Iion, or follows the
which
right
is
that property,
live title.
which
is
To
may h^ added,
as
the
only renders a man truly mafter of himfelf: for to be under the direcfiion of appetite alone Is to
be
in a flate of flavery, while to pay obedience only to thofe laws which we prefcribe to But I have faid too mucli ourfelves, is liberty.
already on this fubjecl, the philofophical meaning of the word Liberty being, in this place, out
of the queflion.
CHAP.
Of
member of
IX.
real demefnes*
devotes himlelf to
in
is,
power and
of which
abili-
make
part.
Not
that in
confequence of
property
3Q
A TREAT
E on the
;
property In thofe
of the fovereignty
but
as the
than that of an individual, the public pofTeflion more fixed and irrevocable, without
reigners.
being more lawful, at leaft with regard to foFor every Aate is, with refpeifl to its
all their poflTellions,
members, mafter of
by
vir-
tue of the fecial compaift, which, ferves as the bafis of all other rights
in a flate,
;
but, with
flates,
it
is
mafter of
them
which
only, by it derives
from individuals.
The
more
of the ftrongeft, becomes not an equitable right, till after the eftablifhment of property. Every man hath naturally a right to
real than that
every thing which is neceflary for his fubfiftence j but the pofitive a(ft by which he is made the
proprietor of a certain pofTeflion
excludes
him
from the property of any other. His portion being afligned him, he ought to confine himfelf to that, and hath no longer any right to a community of porfeiTion, Hence it is that the right
of prior occupancy, though but of little force in a Hate of nature, Is fo refpeflable in that of
fociety.
The
point to
which we
of this right,
ra-
ther
SOCIAL COMPACT.
ther what belongs to another, not belong to us.
31
To
neral terms,
ditions.
define the right of prior occupancy In geit is founded on the following conIt is requifite,
in
the
firfl
place, that
the lands in queflion fhould be unoccnpled ; fecondly, that no greater quantity of it fhould be
occupied than
the occupiers
feilion
;
is
necelfary for the fubfiflence of and, in the third place, that pofit,
(hould be taken of
mony, but by
mark
titles,
territory as
iirfl occupier a right to as much he may cultivate, and is neceffary to his fubfiflence, is certainly carrying the matter as far as is reafonable. Otherwife we know not
To
allow the
how
for a
to fet
bounds
to this right.
Is
it
fuificient
man
to fet foot
on an uninhabited
territory,
to pretend immediately an exclufive right to it ? Is it fufficient for him to have power enough at
them
to
it
?
can a man, or even a whole people, themfelves of an immenfe territory, and poflefs exclude from it the refl of mankind, without
How
being
32
A T
Pv
E A
E ON the
fince, by mankind of an
;
being guilty of an
illegal
ufurpation
means of
fnbfiflence,
which
nature hath given in common to them all ? Whea Nunez Balbao flood on the fea-Ihore, and, in
the name of the crown of Caftile, took pofTeffion of the Pacific Ocean, and of all South-
America, was this fufficient to difpoflefs all the inhabitants of thatvaft country, and exclude all the other fovereigns in the world ? On fuch a
fuppofition, the like idle ceremonie? might have
been ridiculouily multiplied, and his Catholic Majefly would have had no more to do, than to have taken
tries in
coun-
the world, and to have afterwards only dedu(fted from his empire fuch as were before
pofTefTed
by other
princes.
It
is
eafy
to conceive,
how
become the tercontiguous manner the of the and in what ritory public, itfelf from the of fovereiguty, cAiending right
eftates of individuals
once both
fubj<^3 to the lands they occupy, becomes at real and perfonal; a circumftance
which
lays the
pofleflbrs
under a
flate
of the
their
own
is
This
an
advantage
SOCIAL COMPACT.
advantage which does not appear
duly attended
cients,
to,
33
been
to have
who, by
men, rather than as matters of a country. Modern princes more artfully flile themfelves the
kings of England, France, Spain, ^i-. and thus, by claiming the territory itfelf, are fecure of the
inhabitants.
What is very lingular in this alienation is, that the community, in accepting the poflellions of individuals, is fo far from defpoiling them thereof,
that,
on the contrary,
in fuch poireffions,
into an
a(fl:ual
only confirms them by converting an ufurpatioa right, and a bare pofleflion into a
it
real property.
The
may
thing
fo
by
ft ill
public, and
they ceded by
proprietor
S4
TREATISE
on
the
kta
It
may
;
alfo
felves into
feffions
a fociety, before they have any pofand that, acquiring a territory fufficient
may pofTefs it in common, or diamong them, either equally, or in fuch different proportions as may be determined by the fovereign. Now, in whatfoever manner fuch acquiHtion may be made, the right which each individual has to his own eftate, muft be alall,
it
for
they
vide
ways fubordinate
to the right
munity hath over the pofTeilions of all ; for, "without this, there would be nothing binding
in the focial tie, nor
cife
I ihall ccid
this
ought
that
focial
fyftem : and this is, that, inftead of annHiilating the natural equality among mankind, the funda-
mental
compal
fublVitutes,
on the contrary, a
moral and legal equality, to make up for that natural and phyfical difference which prevails
among
individuals,
in per-
fonal
SOCIAL COMPACT.
fonal flrength and mental abilities,
all
35
become thus
This equality, indeed, is under fome govern* ments merely apparent and delufive, ferving only ta keep the poor Hill in mifery, and favour the oppreffion of the rich.
And,
always
and hurtful
to thofe
who
are
ciety
deftitute
is
whence
it
when
advantageous to mankind in general, only they all pofTefs fomething, and none f ihcnv
The End
of the First
Book,
BOOK
3^
TREATISE
B O O K
C
on the
II.
H A P.
I.
Thai
the Sovereignty
is
unaTtenahle.
eftablifhad,
principles already that the general w/7/only can dire6l the forces of the flate agreeable to the end
is,
THE
of
its
j
firil:
to be
original inflitution,
which
is
the
common
good
terefts
neceffary,
might make the eftablilhment of focieties it muil have been through the coalifuch eftablifhment
became
poffible.
The
common
to
no
point
ciled,
no
it is
Now
ment of
I fay,
fociety
fhouldbe founded.
therefore, that
only the exertion of the general will, cannot be alienated, and that the fovereign, which is only
SOCIAL COMPACT.
itfelf
:
fj
the power of a people may be tranfmitted or delegated, but not their will.
It
may not be
fome par-
with the general will of a whole it is, however, impoffible, that fuch ; people be conftant and durable, for (hould agreement
the will of particulars always tends to make diftinctions of preference, and the general will to It is further flill more ima perfe(fl: equality.
poffible,
fubfif!:,
as
it
any fecurity that it would do {o^ could never be the effecSt of art, but of
chance.
The
fovereign
may fay. My
will is
now
agreeable to the will of fuch an individual, or at leaft to what he pretends to be his will ; but it
cannot pretend to fay, I agree to whatever may be the will of fuch individual to-morrow ; as it
is
itfelf
ftraint regarding the future, and as it is impoffible for the will to confent to any thing contrary
it
is.
and be virtually
there
difTolved
by
that very
acft.
The moment
exifts a rhafter,
reign, the
body
would
38
I
TREATISE
ON
to
the
orders of a chief
of the general In contradil> does not oppofe it. fuch a cafe, it is to be prelumed* from the uniat liberty to
may not pafs for the dilates will, when the fovereign, though
confent.
This
end.
CHAP.
^at
the fovereignty
is
II.
indtviftble,
F OR
will
is
unalienable,
the fame reafon that the fovereignty is it is alfo indivifible ; for the
it
general *, or
is
not
it is
that of the
body of the people, or only that of a part. In the firft cafe, this will, when declared, is an a<f^ in the feof fovereignty, and becomes- a law
:
cond, only a particular will, or an afl of the and is at mofl a decree. magiflracy,
it is
But our
politicians, incapable
of dividing th
it
in
its
however,
;
fhould
be
objc^ 5
SOCIAL COMPACT.
obje<fl:
; they diftinguifh it into into a legiflative and executive
39
of executing juftice, prerogatives of taxation, into departments of doand of making war Sometimes meftic and foreign adminiftration.
;
they blend all thefe confufedly together, and, at others, confider them as diftin<fl: and feparate,,
making out the fovereign to be a fantaftic compound, jufl as if they (hould compofe a man out of feveral bodies, of which one fhould have onanother arms, a third feet, and nothing of the jugglers in Japan, that more. and cut it into pieces in a take will child, they the of the prefence fpeflators, then, throwing its difmembered limbs one after another into
ly eyes,
It is faid
up
they are united, and the child defcends The legerdemain of alive, and well as before. refembles this trick modern our politicians greatly
the
air,
of the Japonefe; for they, after having difmem' bered the body politic with equal dexterity,
bring
all its parts
it
and reprefent
This error
arifes
ed precife ideas of the fovereign authority, and from their miftaking the fimple emanations of
this authority, for parts of
its effence. Thus, als of declaring war and ma of foveufually regarded as als
reignty.
40
A TREAT
E ON the
relgnty, which they are not ; for neither of thefe afls are laws, but confifl: only of the application
of the law.
Each
is
a particular
a<5l,
determi-
nate only of the meaning of the law in fuch cafe, as will be feen more clearly, when the idea
attached
fettled.
to
the
word law
fhall
be'precifely
By
fions,
tracing, in like
divi-
we
;
(hall find,
that
we
taken, whenever
we
think
vided
pofed to be parts of the fovereignty, are all fubordinate to it, and always fuppofc the predeter-
mination of a fuperior will, which thofe preroferve to put in execution. gatives only
It is impoflible to fay, in
how much
obfcurity
want of precifion hnth involved the reafonings c^ authors, on the fubjefl of political law, when they came to examine into the refpe(fiive rights of kings and people, on the principles
this
By turning to the third they had eftablifhed. of the firft book of Grotius,^. fourth and chapters
the reader
his
may
fee,
how
and
tranflator,
own
or
much
purpofe,
which
SOCIAL COMPACT.
which
being
it
41
was
difllitisfied
with his
own countrymen, a
"ffuiJUM^
refugee in France, and willing to pay his court to Lewis XIII. to whom his book is dedicated,
and
^
licliOBif^,
gative.
Barbeyrac
wrote with
fimilar
view, dedicating his tranflation to George I. of But, unluckily, the expulfion of England.
II. which he calls an abdication, obliged him to be much on the referve, to turn and wind about, as he faw occafion, in order not to
James
make William
culties
III.
an ufurper.
vaniflied,
Had
all
thefe
two
writers adopted
true principles,
thefe diffi-
would have
have written confiftently 5 in fuch a cafe, however, they could only, in fober fadnefs, have told
the truth, and
to the people. Now, to tell the truth, is not the way to make a fortune ; nor are ambafTadors
CHAP.
42
TREATISE
CHAP.
ON the
III.
^
'Y
T T follows,
"*'
faid, that
the
general Will is always in the right, and conftantly tends to the public good ; it does not fol-
low,
however,
that the
deliberations of
the
people will always be attended with the fame recare ever defirous of our own good, titude.
We
but
fifts.
we do
A whole
fndii ?W*f
^^^^
jflaJcy*^
^^
^^^y "^^y be often miflaken, and it is in fuch ^^^y appear to feek their own
'6i*f^^^
difadvantage.
There
tween the
ral will
is
only the
common
the aggrebut,
if
>rA>
1/ y,
*.
j^fn
S^^^^ ^^^
.take
f ^^^^'^
this
particular wills;
we
JticsJ^ *AC^
thofe contradicftory wills that mutually deftroy each other*, the fum of tlie
from
fum
**7/
remaining differences
is
different
trinciphs..
A coalition betaven
tnay
He
might
SOCIAL COMPACT.
If a people, fuffidently
43
ture of the
fubje<5i:
under
confideration,
fliould deliberate,
cation with each other, the general will would always refult from the greater number of their
little
differences,
as
it
and
their
deliberation
would
be fuch
into cabals,
to be.
expence of the general one, the will of each of thefe affociations becomes general, v/ith regard
to the particular
felf,
in it-
particular, with
to the flate.
la
may
be faid, there is
no longer
ly as
as
many
many
The
differences then become lefs numerous, and give a lefs general refult. Again, fhould one of thefe
fo great, as to influence all partial affociations be the refl, the refult would no longer be the fum
of many little differences, but that of one great one; in which cafe, a general will^would^ ^^^.jh^ no longer fubfifl.
n^ t^ ^
of all is formed inight have added, that a coalition Were there oiu of oppofuion to the intereft of each.
different and clafhing intertfh, th .t of the whole would be hardly dilVmguifhable, as it would meet All things would go regularly on with no obftacle. of their own accord, and civil policy would ceafe to
DO
be an
art.
It
44
TREATISE
may be
dliflated
ON the
order that each re-
It is requl/ite, therefore, in
by the general will, no fuch partial foci eties fhould be formed in a for fi^tH^ <i^i% flate, and that each citizen (liould think yAU/,*<^f**^himfeIf *. Such was the fublime inftitution of
folution that
^^^Uilli'f^.
the
great
cieties
But,
exifl,
if
it
then expedient
Servius,
was done by Solon, Numa, and Thefe are the only falutary precautions
may be
properly informed, and the people not be miftaken as to their true intereft.
CHAP.
Of
F
the
the limits
flate,
IV.
or the city, be a mere moral whofe life depends on the union of perfon, its members, and. if the moft important of its concerns be that of its own prefervation, it
* Vera cofa
e,
oni nuocono alle republiche, e alcune giovano : quelle nuocono che fono dalle fetre e da partigiani accom-
pagnate
giani
fi
quelle giovano che fenza fette, fenzapartimanrengono, Non potendo adunque provedere un fondatored*una republica che non fiano nimicizle in quella, ha da proveder almeao che non vifia:
no
fette,
Hiil. Fiorent,
1.
vii.
fhould
SOCIAL COMPACT.
in
45
/hould certainly be poflelTed of an unlverfal compulfive force,, to move and difpofe each part
fuch a manner as
all.
is
mod
conducive to the
good of
As nature hath given every man an abfolute power over his limbs, to move and dire6l them at pleafure, fo the focial compact
gives to the
all its
body politic an abfolute power Qver members, and it is this power which, direfled by the general will, bears the name, as I have already obferved, of the fovereignty.
But, befides
this public perfon,
we are
to
conit
which
is
life
and
independent of
it.
We
come
nov/, there-
fore, to
a proper diftin<Slion between the and the foverefpecSiive privileges of the citizens the well as as between the *, obligations reign
make
former
lie
under
as
fubje(fts,
whofe
ufe
is
of importance to
the
community j
accufe
* Be not
in hafle,
attentive reader, to
I
me
cannct avoid the feeming contradi(5lion in terms, from the native poverty of the
here of contradilion.
Imguage.
But have a
little
patience.
but
46
but
is
it
TREATISE
alfo,
on the
that the fovefeigui
mufl be confefTed
to perform all the fervices of to a flate, whenever the be poflibly demands them but the fovereign, on ; fovereign
citizen
Is
bound
he can
his part,
jefl that
is
even be defirous of fo doing ; for, under the laws of reafon, nothing can be produced without a caufe, any more than under the law of na
ture.
engagements, in which we are bound to the body of fociety, are obligatory, only becaufe
The
and
their nature
is
fuch
that
we
cannot, in difcharging them, labour for the good of others, without, at the fame time, la-
Wherefore, in-
that the general will is always in the right, and that all conflantly defire the good of each, unlefs it be, becaufe there is no one that
and who does not think of his own intereil, in voting for that of all ? This ferves to prove alfo, that an equality of privilege, and the notion of
juftice
it produces, are derived from that preference which each naturally gives himfelf, and of
courfe from
I
man
that the
general
SOCIAL COMPACT.
general will, to be fo in its
that
it
47
in
ought to flow from all, in order to be applicable to all ; and that it mull: lofe its natural
redlitude,
when
it
and
determinate obje(5^ ; becaufe judging, in fuch a cafe, of what is foreign to ourfelves, we have
Eo
real principle
In
fa(l:,
particular
facSl
has not been fettled by a general and prior conIt is vention, than the affair becomes litigious.
a procefs, in which the particulars interefted are
one party, and the public the other but in which I fee no law to decide, nor judge to de;
It would be abfurd, termine. therefore, in fuch a cafe, to think of referring it to any exprefs decifion of the general will, which could be no
other than the deciiion of one of the very parties ; and therefore muft be, with regard to the
other,
foreign and partial, leaning to injuftice, In the fame manner, alfo, andfubje6l to error. that a partial and particular will cannot reprefent the general will, fo the latter, in its turn,
changes
its
nature,
when employed on
a parti-
cular objel,
and cannot,
pronounce concerning any particular man or fa6l. Thus, when the people of Athens, for inftance,
took
48
TREATISE
on the
to decree
took upon them to appoint or cafhier their chiefs, honours to one, and infliil pains and
exercifed indifcriminately
all
the
ads
of government, they had then, properly fpeakno general will at all: the Athenian ing,
people, in this cafe, did not
a(5l
in the capacity
of fovereign, but
in that
of magiftrate.
This
notions
may
common
We
may
learn
hence,
number of
than in
for,
the.
common
them
in this
inftitution, every
to thofe conditions
hence the admirable conformity between interefl and juftice, which ilamps on public declarations
that characteriftic of equity, which we fee va^ nilh in the difcuiTion of particular fubjefls, for
want of that common intereft which unites and. makes the criterion of the judge the fame with
that of the party.
we
recur to the
fir ft
at the
fame conclueftablifhes
compafl
themfelves
SOCIAL COMPACT.
49
'themfelves under the fame obligations, and ought all to Thus, from enjoy the fame privileges.
the very nature of this compa6l, every a6t of fovereignty, that is to fay, every authentic a (51 of
is equally obligatory on, or fathe to, citizens, without diftlncftion ; in fo much that the fovereign knows only the whole
vourable
body of the
individuals
then is pronot an agreement made between a fuperior and an inferior, but a convention between a whole body with each of
it.
?
who compofe
What
perly an
a<ft
of fovereignty
It is
its
becaufe founded
equitable, becaufe
ful,
it is
common
to all;
it is
ufe-
becaufe
it
can have no other object than the and it is foHd and durable, be-
preme power.
is owing only they pay in fa6b obedience to none but their own will, and to afk hov/ far
When
to fuch conventions,
the refpecSlive privileges of the fovereign and citizens extend, is to afk merely how far the latter
may
enter into engagements with themfelves, vix^ each individual with all collecflively, and allcollediively
Hence
so
TREATISE
fee,
on'
the
Hence we
folute,
inviolable,
and
flicred
as
it
is,
neither
does nor can furpafs the bounds of fuch genera^ conventions, and that every man hath a riaht to
he pleafes, of that liberty and property which the terms oi fuch conventions have
dirpofe,
as
-left
to his
own
difpoCd
fo
that the
fovereign
hath not any right to Liy a greater burthen on one fubje61: than on another, becaufe, in fuch a
in
which the
Thefe
difllnfiions
it
i'S
any
real re-
nunciation on
the
part of individuals,
when
they enter into the fecial compaf^, that their firaation becomes, by means of that very compa6l,
much
any
as,
inflead of
making
alienation,
advantageotis
pendence, for
focial liberty,
the
power of
inju-
of fecuring themfelves from ring others for that their own natural flrength, which and injury; mif^ht be overcom.e by that of others, for a civil
power v;hich the focial union renders invincible. Their very lives, which they have by thefe -means
de~
SOCIAL COMPACT.
d-cvcted to the flate,
5^
;
'
bb%ed'
to expofe
them-
death, in
defence,
what do they
more than render back to foclcty what they have before received of it ? What do ihey more,
iriYifquii-fg
their
lives for
their
to
country, than
do more
frein
when,
ge^, they
to defend their
?
means of
That everyone
ing in
he
is
from the
neceffity
of
And
are not
men
who!-?,
for
their
common
were they
C
On
HA
P.
V.
capital puyiifi/nents.
how
individuals, having
lives,
can
diffi-
The
from
i;.
52
A TREAT
E ON
th-e
its being badly exprefTed. Every man hath an undoubted right to hazard his Hfe for its prefervation. Was a man ever charged with fuicide, for throwing himfelf from the top of an houfe in flames, in
it
ever im-
away
at fea,
that
The
end of the
of
the
focial compa<5l,
is
the pre-
fervation
contrafling
parties.
Such,
'therefore, as
mufl afTent from fome dangers and lofTes. He that w^ould preferve his life at the expence of others, ought
to rifk
it
would reap the benefit of the end, to the means, which are infeparable
for
their
is
fafety
when
it is
necefTary.
Now,
ger to
but when the prince declares that the good of the (late requires his life, he ought to refign it ; fmce it is only on thofe conditions he hath hitherto lived in fecurity, and his life is not folely the gift of nature, but a conditional gift of the flate.
punifhment of death infli6>ed on malefaftors may be confidered alfo in the fame point it is to of view prevent our falling by the
:
The
hands
SOCIAL
hrtnds of an aflafnn,
C
tbcU
M
we
P A C T.
53
confent to die, on
are io
treaty,
:
becoming fuch
enter into
to be
it
oiiifelves.
lives,
Wc
this
far
from
by
th.at
is
we
net
.as't
prefumed that any one of the contra^ling parties formed therein a premeditated deiign to
Add
and
to this,
traitor; ceafing,
be
.a
member
war
two
the flate
of the community,
it.
againft
is
muA
incompatible with his; one of the and thus when a criminal is perifh
:
executed, he doth not fuiier in the quality of a His trial nnc? citizen, but in that of an enemy.
fentence are the evidence and declaration of his
having broken the focial compa(5f, and that, q confequence, he is no longer a member of the
flate.
Now,
by
as
at
leafl:
his refidence,
befep.irated from the ftate, either by banilliment as a violator of the focial compact, or by death as
a
public
enemy
for fuch
is
an
enemy
is
not
i^
moral perfonage, he
this cafe
mere man, and it is In only that the right of war takes place of
a
killing
an enemy.
But,
54
Cut,
,
rA
it
Pv
E A
on the
may be
it
fald,
cihTiinal
is
a particular
ac^.
that reafo'n
it
is
an
aci:,
for doing
cannot ex-
fuch authority itfelf. My ideas on thisare confiftcnt, though' I cannot explain fubje6l
them
all at
once.
It is to
fre-
qnency of ex'ecntions
is
always a
not be
Hgn
of the
no
malefa(5lor
:
who might
-fo-r
ic^mething
Nor
way of example,
the communit}\
With regard
their country,
-to
the prerogative
of granting
pardons to crimimVls,
belongs only to that power which is fuperior 'both to the judges and the laws, viz. the fove-
Not that it is very clear that reign authority. even the fupreme power is veiled with fuch a it right, or that the circumftances in which
might be exerted are frequent or determinate. In a well-governed fiate there are but few execulionsj
SOCIAL COMPACT.
lions
;
55
muliipiicity
of
the attempted' to grant pardons ; even did never this, although they fori^times people The frequency recalled their ov/a fentence.
of pardons indicates that in a fiiort time crimes will not ftand in need of them, and every one may
fee the
But
my
let
us leave the
juH:
difculTion
of
thefe
queftions to the
cii.ninal,
man
u ho
liath never
been
CHAP.
On
vr.
the law,
AVING
body
mven
it
exifience and
life to
the
politic,
by
a focial
compact,
we'
come now
tuie.
is
to give
For the
primitive a^i,
by which fuch
formed, determines nothing as yet with body refpecl to the means of its prefervaiicn.
js
Whatever is ricrhl and conformable to order, fuch from the nature of things, independent
Q^
j6
of
all
A TREAT
human
E ON the
All juAIce
it
;
conventions.
is
comes
from God,
who
the fountain of
but could
There
is
take place
among mankind,
juflice
it
fhould be
reciprocal.
To
we
to
find
the
maxims of
among mankind,
a natural
be vain and
fruitlefs, for
want of
fupportj they tend only to the advantage of the wicked, and the difadvantage of the juil:, while
the latter obferves them in his behavour to others* but no body regards them in their condufl to him. Laws and conventions, therefore, arc
neceflary in order to unite duties with privileges, and confine juftice to its proper obje(51:s. In a
of nature, where every thing is common, to thofe I have promifed nothing; I acknowlege nothing to be the property of anfiate
owe nothing
In a f^ate other, but Vv'hat is ufelcfs to myfelf. of fociety the cafe is different, where the
rights
We
what
is
come
law.
at
length,
as
therefore, to conllder
So long
we
content ouifelves
with the metaphyfical idea annexed to this term, we mufl talk unintelligibly and though we
;.
fhould
SOCIAL COMPACT.
fliould
57
come
I
we
fhould not
law.
will
know thence any thing more of political have already faid there can be no general In faft relative to a particular objeft.
every particular object muft be within or withIf without, a will that is foreign, out the (late.
and if the cannot with regard to it be general the within be it a part muft make flate, objecfl: in which cafe there arifes between the of it
;
:
is
the part,
and the whole wanting fuch part, is the other. But the whole wanting fuch part, is not the
whole, and fo long as that relation fabhfls, there is no whole, but only two unequal parts whence the will of the one is no longer it follows that
:
But when
a whole people, they confider only their whole body; and, if it then forms any relation, it muft be between the entire object conlidered in
point of view, without any divifion of the whole. In this cafe, the matter
of the decree
is
Sue It is the
a^fl
whichi
law.
I> 5
When
.58
,
A
V/hen
I
TREATISE.
I
ON the
is
al-
ways general,
.
mean
that -the
body, and their actions but never concerns itfelf with inabllracflediy, dividual perfons, nor particular actions. Thus
fubje61s in a colle6live
the Law
may decree
certain
privileges,
but
:
it
cannot befiow them on particular perfons the law may conftitute feveral claiTes of citizens,
and
.
which may
;
entitle
them
rank in thefe
clafies
but
to
it
cannot noadmitted
be
It
may
eflabliili
legal
fucceffion, but
government, it can-
not
make choice of
in a
family
; word, every function that relates to an individual object, doth not belong to the le-
giflative
power.
things in this light,
it is
Taking
feen
to
it is
immediately
it is
how
;
abfurd
?
to afk in
whofe power
make laws
is
will
as he
it is
but a
member
of the
fl:ate.
Hence
alfo,
can be unjuft
free,
what
it
is
to be
and
at
as
the
own
It
will.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
It is
59
objeft
may
:
decree of
own
head, cannot be
law
indeed, whatever
the fupreme
power
itfelf
is
ordain concerning a particular obje<5l not a law, but a fimple decree ; it is not an
may
a(5l
I call every flate, therefore, which is governed by laws, a Republic, whatever be the form of its adminlftration ; for in fuch a cafe only,
it is
and what-
ever
public
is is
fomething.
republican
*.
Thus
I
every lawful
explain
government
hereafter
fiiall
what
mean by
a government.
The
laws are,
flri(flly
The
people
who
fub-
an ariftocracy or democracy
vernment influenced by the general will of the people, which is the law. To make a government legal, it is not necefTary that it fhould be confounded with the
fovereign,
but that
it
fhould
be
is
the
minifter
fo
monarchy
a republic*
This
more
fully explained in
mit
6o
TREATISE
it
on
tke
them
as
parties, to
fettle
they
they to
confent
or by a fudden infpi ration ? hath the body politic an organ by which to make known its will i
it with the necefTary prefcience determinations, and to- publifn them before-hand, or how fhall it divulge them in the
who
to
{hall furnifh
its
form
time of need
who
how fliall an ignorant multitude^ know not what they chufe, becaufe feldom know what is for their good, exe?
often
(o great
and
fo
difficult as
it
The
always
it
in
the
right,
is
but the
judgment by which
fufficiently
is
directed
is
not always
it
informed.
It
necellary
fliould
as they
ought to appear
it
it
fecured from
the
fhould have an infight into the circumftances of time and place ; and fhould be enabled to
fet
and perceptible advantages of the diilant and concealed evil things, againil
the prefent
that
SOCIAL COMPACT.
that
65
(cq
may
good
attend them.
Vv'hich
Individuals often
;
the
they rejecl
it is
the public
is
de..
Both incapable to fee. the former f\and equally, in need of a guide fhould be compelled to conform their defires ta
firous of that
:
which
reafon,
and the
latter
It is thus uom the difcovery of what it defires. of the that there reinformation public, proper
fults
in the body
concurrence of
greated: force
parts,
and
in
the end
arifcs
the
of the whole.
Hence
the
aecelTrcy of a legiflator.
CHAP.
Of
r*!^
the genius
VII.
legiJJator,
invefligate
conditions of
fociety
which may beft anfwer the purpofes of JL Bations, would require the abilities of fome fuperior intelligence,
who
the palTions
of men, but
fhould
be
fubjedi:
itfelf
to
none;
who
it
have no
conne(?iion
with
human
know-
fliort, whofe happilege being, nefs fhould be independent of us, and who
of
in
would
62
A
is
TREATISE
ON the
ours *.
itfelf .-feoiit
It
the province of
Gods indeed
to
make laws
for
men.
fame argument which Caligula made ufe
of fa6t, Plato himfelf employs, in when he goes about to de-
The
of,
in point
civil or royal perfonage, in treating of But if it be certain that a great prince a king. is a perfonage rarely to be met with, what is
right,
The
thing more
to
do than
to follow
model de-
The one is the mechanical figned by the latter. the machine, the other only genius who invents the workman who puis it into execution. In
the
commencement of
it
focieties,
fiys
Montef-
the principal perfons in republics quieu, which form their inftitution ; and afterwards it
is is
the iniVitution
chiefs of re-
publics.
He who
litic,
human
nature
of tranffolitary
as their
legiHature
declines.
The
inftitution
and
SOCIAL
iM
A C
T.
63
and independent being, into a part of whole, from which fuch individual is
in one fenfe his
life
a greater to receive
and exigence
he muft be
of the man, capable or altering the conflitution in order to flrengthen it ; and to fubfiitute a
partial
in
the
room of
that
exiftence which we phyfical and independent In a word, of Nature. hands the receive from
he muft be able
tural
abilities,
to deprive
man
of his
nafo-
in
order
to
invefl
him with
which he cannot makeufe of withreign powers The more fnch out the affiftance of others.
natural
force
is
annihilated
and
extin(n:,
the
and more durable are thofe which are greater the more perfefl and folid is the acquired, and
focial inflitutlon.
So that
if
each citizen be
effedl nothing but by the exnothing, and can igence and afliftance of all the refl:, and that the force acquired by the whole body be equal, or
fuperior, to the
its
fum of the
natural forces of
all
have reached
it is
capable 10 attain.
The
edly
{o
fo,
legiflator
is
in
he be undoubthe
is
on account of
his fun<5iion.
his genius,
not
lefs
from
Yet
this is
ma-
64
TREATISE
the
on the
maglfiratc or
which
into
conftitutes
its
conllitution.
on the contrary,
that hath
:
employment
common with human government nothing for if he who hath the command over the citizens, fliould not be entrufled with the command over the laws, he who hath the power over the laws,
ought
tizens
:
as little to
for
ci-
otherwife, his laws, being made inilrument;il to his pafHons, would often ferve to
it
were
perpetuate his injuftice, and he could never prevent pa-iticular views from altering his fyflem.
When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he It was the began by abdicating the throne. cuflom of molt of the Grecian cities to entrult
their
eflablifhment
that hath
been
republics of Italy
that of
in
and found
* Thofe
its
account
*.
In
the mod:
theoloein:
who
little
The comprehenfive genius. digefl of cur laws, in which he had a confderable (hare, do him as much honour as his religious ilcm and what revolution foever time may sf:cCt f)
knew
but
of
his
in
our public vvorihip, tlie memory of this greu man wil! continue to be revered To long as patiiotifm and a fenfe of liberty furvive among us.
flo.urifii
SOCIAL COMPACT.
llourlfhing age of
6?
:?
Rome,
that
city fuffered
unitfelf
der flagitious
a<51s
on the brink of ruin, for having entruHed the Sovereign power and the legiflative authority ia
the fame hands.
^^durt'dl
^
Even the decemviri themfelves, however, never afllimed the right of pafling any law merely
on
their
own
authority.
NAh'ing that
we
pro-
pofe,
faid they to the people, can pafs into a law wiih-Ait your Be yourfelues, ye Romans^ confent. the authors laws en which
of
thcfe
your happ'mefs
depends.
The leglQator, therefore, who digefls the laws, fliould have no right to make them pafs
for fuch
;
inclined to
nor indeed can the people, though do it, deprive themfelves of that in:
communicable right
becaufe, according to the. fundamental compaif^, it is the general will only that is obllgatojy on individuals, and it is im-
poflible to be afTured that any particular will is conformable to the general, till it be fubmitted to on the free fufFrage of the people. I have faid
this before,
Jicpeated
it.
Thu-3
66
A T REA T
Thus
la the bufinefs
on the
of a legifiaturc,
we
Find
things apparently incompatible ; fuperior to human abilities, carried into execution by an. authority
two
a dtfign
which
is-
nothing.
attention
Another
difficulty
which merits
is,
in talking their
is
impofTible
Views
beyond
reiifning
which
with
is
private intereft,
fee
is
difficulty
which are
checks he
to
thofe advantages
may
In
order to give the found maxims of policy, and induce them to follow the fundamental rules of fociety, it
Is
neceflary
that
manner which
efte(fi:
prefide
form that
and that
men
as
(liould
the laws
make them.
For
argument, he
SOCIAL COM? A
he
is:
C T.
67
of an higher order, which may compel without violence, and pcrfuade without convicftion. Hence it is that the founders of narity
fA
tions
have
to the
been
recur
in
all
to
own
tins themfelves
fame manner
leging the
city
as
as to thofe of nature,
and acknow-
fvtrac
power
in
more
the formation of man, might bend freely, and bear more traflably the yoke
in
felicity.
Now
fon,
which
which the
legiflator puts
mouths of
his
immortal perfonages,
however, to make the gods his oracles, nor even to be believed when he pretends lobe their
interpreter.
The
leghlator, is: the miracle that proves the truth of his. miflion. Any man -may engrave tables of
Ifone, hire
68
A TREAT
in his
E ON the
teach
a
bird
to
whifper
ear, or hit
to impofe on
a people.
other devices^
thing more, though he may be lucky enough to get together an aflembly of fools and madmen,
will never
lay
and often burying him in its tranfitory union may be formed from
connections
;
ruins.
flight
A
and
futile
nothinfr but
the didfates of
wifdom, hov/ever, can render it durable. The Jewilh law, ilill fubfifting, and that of the fon of
Ifmael,
hath governed world, are (landing proofs of the fuperior genius of thofe great m.en by whom they were dicftated and though the vanity of phifor ten centuries
which
half the
iofophy, and
nothing O
in
fpeflive
inflitutions,
that
fagacious
and
com-
prehen.five power of mind which muft ever lay the lalling foundation of human eflablidiments.
muftnct, from all this, be concluded, however, that religion and government have, in our times, as Warburton alleges, one common obIt
je(5f
but. only jhat in the firfl eftabliiliment of focietiesj the one was made inftrumental to the
;
ether.
C H A
P-
SOCIAL COMPACT.
69
CHAP.
Of
VIII.
the people,
\
*^^
S the archlte^l, before he begins to raifc an edifice, examines into the ground
he
is
%vhere
to
lay
the foundation,
that he
may be
weight
able to judge whether it will bear the of the fuperflrufture \ fo the prudent
legiflator
falutary
does not begin by making a digell of laws, but examines firfl whether the
people for whom fuch laws are deilgned, arc It was for this capable of fupporting them. reafon Plato refufed to give laws to the Arcadians
and Cyrenians, knowing they were rich and luxurious, and could not admit of the inIt was for trodu(5lion of equality among them.
this reafon that
Crete, though
it
boafted
;
good Minos
Various have been the nadepraved by vice. tions that have made a dillinguiflied figure in
have not been capable of being governed by good laws ; and even thofe who were capable of being fo governed, continued fo but a
fliort time.
Nations,
as well as
:
they
be.
70
TREATISE
o?i
the
become
have
cuftoms are
rous and
taken root
is
a dange-
fruitlefs
form them.
their vvounds
but refemble thofe weak and cowardly fhudder at the Tight of their phypatients fician. Not, but that fomctimcs, as there are
cured
who
diftempers which affe6l the brain of individuals and deprive them of the capacity of remembering what is pad", there happen in ftates fuch revolutions as province the fame effefl on a peowhen the horror of the paft fupplies the ple,
place of oblivion,
and the
v/ars,
flate,
rifes
inflamed and
if
I
exhaufied
by
civil
again,
may
re-
its
own
aHies,
and
afTumes
the vigour of youth in forfaking the This was the cafe with Sparta arms of death.
in the
time of Lycurgus, and of Rome after the Tarquins-; and fuch hath been the cafe in mov/iih
dern times
But thefe events the expulfion of their tyrants. are fuch are rare ; and exceptions as have their
caufe in the particular conflitution of the flate They cannot even take place twice excepted. among the fame people: for though they may
SOCIAL COMPACT.
uncivilized
;
71
yet,
when
are exhauiled, In that they cannot be renewed. faction revolutions canbut cafe, may deftroy,
j they require for ever afcer a mafter, and .not a deliverer. Every
free
remember
this
maxim,
abfolutely irrecoverable.
There
is
in
they (liould be
permitted to arrive before they are fubjc(fl:ed to laws. This term, however, is not always eafy
to
be
known
and yet
if it
be anticipated
it
may be of dangerous confequence. Again, one people may be formed to difcipline in their infancy.; while
fiibjeflion
till
another
after
ripened for
The
Ruf-
be truly polidied
Peter
had only an imitative turn he had nothing of that true genius, whofe creative power forms
Some of his meafures, things out of nothing. indeed, were proper enough, but moft of them were ill-timed or ill-placed. He faw that his
fubjcds were mere barbarians, but he did not
fee
72
fee
lite.
A TR E
that they
x^
E ON the
made pofliould
were not
He wanted
to civilize
them, when he
He wanted
make them,
whereas
at once,
men,
vented
he ought to
firfl
making them
otherwife
Ruffians
his fubje6ts
fuading them
not.
It is
might have been, by perthey were fuch as they were thus a French tutor forms his pupil
they
for
and
to
Empire
of Ruffia, while
is
Europe
itfelf.
its
fubje6lion,
be
fubjefted
neighbours, the Tartars, will in time This event both its mafters and ours. become ^^^i*^i<^
ffY
yCitu/'
'
feerns
to
me
inevitable;
acSl,
all
the monarchs
in
Europe
feeming to
in concert,
to accelerate
fuch a revolution.
C H A
P.
IX.
hath limited
dimenfions
of
well-
formed human
body, beyond which flie produces only giants or dwarfs, fo in the body poUtic there are
limits^
SOCIAL COMPACT.
Um'its,
73
a (late
to be confined or
extended
to the
may not be
little to
is
maintain
own
independency.
a
in
every
it
body
politic
which
often
The more
more lax
is it
grows
and
in
general, a
little
ft
ate
always,
A
of
this
thoiifand reafons might be given in fupport maxim. In the fir^ place, the admini-
Aration of government
difficult as the
difiance from
as
in-
creafes,
even
at the
body
has
the
greatefl:
end of the longeO: \&\ev. It be* comes alfo m.ore burthenfome in proportion as it is divided into parts ; for every town hath
weight
firfl;
its
own
of each
ple
;
diflri'fl
province, then
that
of
all
particular governments with their viceroys, of whom are to be paid as they rife in
dignity,
and always
people
J
at
whom,
iifelf
niftration
the expence of the unhappv laft of all, the fuprcme adsnicru(hes with the whole wcirrht
It
is
of
its
oppreHion.
impoilible
{o
many
need^
74
TREATISE
charges (hould
the people
on
tend
the
eontinually
(o
far
needlefs
to
not
;
impoverifh
who,
from
^MU ^^ ^*^7
\.^^
y
being
^'^
better governed
by
ihefe
different ranks
^^^*
'J
fo, than if they ^^ ^^^^^' of governors in the flate. And yet with this multiplicity of rulers, they are far from being furniihed with proper re-
fnperiors, are
much worfe
^^^ ^"^
fources
for extraordinary
occafions
but,
oa
the contrary,
to
occafion to recur
them, the
rum
Nor
is
this all
Jfd^
comes
laws
Itfs
vigorous and
in
putting the
removing private opprcfTion, correcting abufes, or preventing the fediiious enterprifes of rebellion in diflant provinces j
in execution,
whom
for
but the people have lefs affecfion for their chiefs, they never have an opportunity to fee ;
their
is
like
the
whole world
which the greater part are utter Grangers. The fame laws cannot be convenient for fo many various people of dilferent manners, and climates,
and
who
cannot be fuppofed to
live
ment.
And
mufl occafion
much
SOCIAL COMPACT.
much
who,
trouble
75
and living under the fame adminiftration, a on intercourfe, frequently perpetual carrying
change
their habitations, inter-
other, and, being educated under different cuftoms, hardly ever know when their property
is
fecure.
lives
obfcured, and vice prevails with impunity, amidfl; that multitude of Grangers, which dock i:ogether round
the
chief
feat
of
adminiftraiion.
7'he principals, overwhelmed with a multiplicity of bufinefs, can look into nothing themfelves ; the government of the Aate being left
to their
meafures to
In a word, the deputies and clerks. -be taken, in order to maintain the
general authority, on which fo many diftant olHcers are ever ready to encroach or impofe
engrofs
ii
the
public attention
there
is
none of
employed about {he happinefs o^ the people, and indeed hardly any for their dethus it is, that a body too fence in cafe of need
left to
be
unwieldy for
its
its
conftitution
grows
debilitated
own
weight.
On
on fome
to refifl
the other hand, a (late ought to be fixed bafis, to fecure its folidiiy, to be able
thofe fiiocks
which
2
it
v/ill
not
fail
to
it
encounter,
and
to
make
thofe efforts
which
will
7.6
TREATISE
all
on tke
will find
Nniions have
independence. of centrifugal force by u'hich they a6f continually againil each other,
a kind
like the vortices of Defcartes,
and tend,
bours.
toagsran-
prefently fwallowed up by the ftrong ; nor is there any fecurity for them, but by keeping themrclves in^quilibrio \\iLh the reA, and makon.every fide equal. iitg the compreiiion
Hence we
extend, and ftate ; nor is
lity to
fee
it
is
prudent
in
fome
cafes
to
one of the
po-
diflinguifh
fix
iind
to
on that advantageous
the
prefervation
proportion of the
It may be obferved in general, that the reafons for extending dominion, relating to ob-
je6\s external
and
relative,
ought
it,
to be fubor-<
whofe objefls
and vigorous
confidered,
A found
is
the
firfl
thing to be
to be
and
much
greater reliance
made on
good government, than on the refources which .are to be drswn from an extenfive territory.
Not
SOCIAL COMPACT.
Not but
il:ates (o
77
of
that
there
have been
inftanccs
conftitiUed,
been
eiTential
to
their
It is pofilble alfo they might very conftitution. felicitare themfelves on that happy neceflity,
which pointed out, nevertheJefs, with the lummit of their grandeur, the inevitable moment of their fail.
C H A
The
fuIjeSf
P.
X.
continued,
HE
territory,
taken
body
politic
may be
;
viz.
by the extent of
the
people which form the flate, and the territory which aiiords fubfiflence to tiie people this
;
relation,
fufficient
therefore,
exill-s
when
the
tenitory
i^
numerous
as the ter-
the
maximum of
;
of people
iVQ,
for
if
the
defence of
infufficient,
cultivation
fluous
78
fluous
j
TREATISE
under the
its
on the
'
war.
hence the proximate caufes of defenfive If, on the other hand, the territory be too
is
necciTity of to
its
being
neigh-
fubfiflence
bours
H'ar.
Every people who, by their fituaiion, have no other ahernaiive than commerce or
Wiiv,
luuCi
pend on
their
They muft conquer others, and thereby change their fituation, or be conquered therafelves, and thence be reduced to nothing.
its
certain exigence.
impoffible fuch a ftate can preferve independency but by its infignificancy or its
It is
grcatnefs.
not eafy to calculate the determinate relation between the extent of territory and numIt is
other
rot only on account of the difference in the qualities of the foil, in its degrees of fertility, in
its productions, and in the influence of climate, but alfo on account of the re-
the nature of
markable difference
little in a fertile
in the
on a barren
foil.
Regard mufl
be had to
the
SOCIAL COMPACT.
the
79
population, and
legiflator
to
the
which the
may hope
other countries by the advantages attending his fcheme of government ; fo that he ought not to
found
but
after
his
on
;
exifts
here-
not on the prefent iiate of population, In but on that which will naturally fucceed.
fine,
which
local
poJfTcfs
Thus pear aiflually neceflary for prefent ufe. a people may fpread themfelves over a large fpot
in
a mountainous country, whofe natural pro* duce, of wood or pafture, requires lefs labour of cultivation ; where experience teaches us that
women
tries
;
are
and
in
flat
coun-
fuperficies
a fmail horizontal bafe, by which only gives but the land mull be eflimated in the affair of ve-
getation.
habit a
lefs
mong
the
barren fands
v/ith
becaufe
them
fuflenance,
;
of the earth
they can
difbunhen
their
community by fending
out
E 4
&o
TREATISE
of
Its
ON the
;
out colonies
fnperniimerary inhabitants
necefTary for
and
Jafily,
becaufe
it is
them
in
fuch
a cafe to live near to each other, in order lorepel the invafions of pyrates.
We
.JfoL
may add
rcfpecUng the
all
formation of
this
is,
a Aate
in
which which
foldiers are
ment
in
ance, and the moft eafily defeated. They would even make a greater refiRance when put into
their
firli:
fermentation,
when each
is
taken up more about his ov, n particular janlv than the common danger. Should a war, a famine,
or a rebellion, break out at fuch a
crifis,
the flate
would be
infallibly fubverted.
in
times
of
diforder
fion
in
thofe
vernments
fubverted
rife
the
to,
flate.
or
der
SOCIAL COMPACT.
der to
8i
procure fuch cleflru6>ive laws, which the people never could have been prevailed oa
to pafs
at a
more difpadionate
feafon.
The
choice of the proper lime for the laws, is one of themoft certain tokens by which
inAitalion of
we may
diflinguifh the
a tyrant.
defign of a
IcgiQator
from that of
be adzed then, what people are in a fituation to receive a fyflem of laws ? I anfwer,
If
it
thofe
compaft,
are
not
ihofe whofs yet truly fuhje61ed to regular lav/s ; cuAoms and prejudices are not deeply rooted ;
thofe
who
a
up by
are under no fear of being fwallowed fudden invafion, and who, without
engage
the quarrels of their neighbours, are able to encounter feparatcly uith each, or to the affiftance of one to repel the other ;
entering, into
whofe individuals may be known to >ach other, and among whom it is not necefa people
fary to
charge a
is
man with
for
greater burthen
than
a people poffible can fubfifl without others, and without whom all others m/ight fubfjfl: * 5 a people neiit
him
to bear;
who
ther
* If two neighbouring people were fo fituated tha^ fubfiil without the other, the circum-
llaaces
82
TREATISE
;
OM the
people,
in
fhort,
once the confiflency of an anpofTefs and cient nation, the docility of a nev/ly-created
at
who
one.
The
knowing what ought to be eAabliflied and what than what ought to be eradicated
fifts lefs in
;
the impoilibiof nature in the lity of finding the fimplicity wants of fociety. It is true that all thel'e cir-
renders
it
fo
feldom fuccefsful,
is
cumflances are very rarely united ; and it is for this reafon that fo few ftates have much to
boaft of, in their conftitution.
There
is
flill
cj
receiving
The
va-
lour and conHancy, with which thofe brave people recovered, and have defended their liber-
ftances of the
flrft
latter
very dangerou?.
fuch a cafe,
would
extricate itfelf as
a Hate of dependence
rather to be without
receive
it
fait
than
or even
prudent Thlafcalans faw through the fnare of fuch hlerality. 1 hus they preferved their liberty ; this petty ftate,
gratis
of
the
Mexicans.
The
ruin.
ty,
SOCIAL COMPACT.
ty,
83
might defervedly excite fome wife man to teach them how to preferve it. I cannot he\p
furmifing, that this
little
Jt
UtJS 'b-/ux,
^
iflaad will,
one day ox
C H A
P.
XI.
of
legtjlature,
Of
we were
IFcifely the
to enquire, in
what
confifls pre-
greateft good, or
what ought
to
be the end of every fyftem of legiflature ; we fhould find it reducible to two principal obje(5ls, liberty and equality:, liberty, becaufe all
partial
the ft ate of fo much ftrength ; equality, becaufe liberty cannot fubfid without it.
have already explained the nature of fecial liberty j and with regard to equality, we are_ not to underftand by that term, that individuals
I
fhould
all
abfolutely
Jo
the latter,
it
fame degree of but only that, with refpe(5t ftiould never be exercifed con*
pofTefs the
trary to
good order and the laws ; and with no one citizen fhould
to
be
ri^ch
enough
that
fell
none
him-
ftiould
be fo poor
as to
Mi.
84
h^ (aM '^rU/'n gY
r
TREATISE
ON the
v^fU/1
C^
This fuppofes a moderation of pofrefTions credit on the fide of the great, and the moe y r^"^^ dui/fiuU deration of defires and covetoufnefs on the part
^^^^^ '
yfiaitialM ut/Y
ee^^.
!
of the
little.
^ W^^iulcU,
fmu^i; r^^f^^
This equality, th^y tell us, is a mere fpecuUiive chim.era, which cannot exift in pratfiice :
it
is
^t^^/ ^UikA,
but though abnfes are inevitable, does tollow they are not to be corrected ? It
this equality,
thence
for the
^ery reafon that things always tend to deflroy that the laws ftiould be calculated
it.
to preferve
legiflature,
how-
countries, agreeable to local fituaiion, the chara<5i;er of the inhabitants, and thofe other cir-
cumflances
which require
particular
In itfelf,
(hould have a
that
^Uf/'
^*
(yct^^^ ^
j^^^,^^i^
^i^hrf
y
.
Would you give a Hate conil'lency and llrength, as much as poffible ; let prevent the two extremes Thefe two ff .CiA\\^^^ he no rich perfons nor bee^ars.
/coudjtions, naturally inleparable, are equally deiiruccommonwealth: the one furnifhes tyrants,
t, is
*H/T J^JI^
.
*fL
l^h
/J/
*^^***^tive to the
v^
/ y'
y4W^^^^*'*^
jj
r^
^^ ^^^ other the fupporters of of pubhc liberty fUiA^^^^^ the trafTiC the other felling it. one / buying,
ranny.
carried
It is
by
the
on
/;.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
that ftate for
85
for ex-
which
it IS
calculated.
If,
ample, the
foil
may be exchanged
Vv^hich duflry and the arts, the produ(Elions of for the commodities required.
On
fertile hills
a rich
felves
if your country abounds in and plenteous vales if you live on foil in want of inhabitants; apply yourto agriculture, which affords the means
;
of population
and
banifli
by gathering the few inhabitants of ic. together in one particular fpot or two, to the depopulation of all Do you occupy an extenfive and the refl: *.
fituation by the fea fide ? Cover the with ocean your fliips, cultivate the arts of you will by thefe navigation and commerce
:
which
ferve
commodious
means enjoy
ftrenglh
On
their
the contrary,
Rq* againil: your inacceffibie rocks main barbarous and illiterate you will live out
;
the
*
more
at
eafe,
af- /hm-
Zaj^
-}
The advantage cf foreign commerce, fiys the Marquis d'A. is produdlive only of a delulive util.ty
to the
'/
VlV^
.
/
^
kingdom
in
general.
It
may
enrich a few
in-^^
iy^f^j^
dividuals, and perhaps fomc cities; but the whole nation gains nothing by it, nor are the people the
better for
it.
/^rw.^^
fure^dly
86
A T REAT
to all
E ON the
'
In a word,
naiions,
befides the
maxims common
them
in
particular
manner,
aid
renders their
for themfeives.
own fydem
of laws
proper only
among
It is thus thac in. ancient times, the Hebrews, and in modcin. times, a-
mong
ce
,
^ J'ci
'
cipal
the .'rablans, religion was made the prinobjeft of national concern; among the
this object
it
Athenians
was
literature;
at
was commerce.,
v/ar,
at CarRhodes it
at Spai ta
and
at
Rome
The
a
hath (liewn, by
manner the
agreeable to
legiflator
A nAi
^'^^'^'^
''^^^^
durable,
is
therein
between
natural
and
focial
relations,
as
it
of the former.
in his objeft,
But
if
the
deceived
one
to
one
SOCIAL COMPACT.
one
to peace
Sy
the other to
would infenfibly lofe their force, the conflitution would alter, and the ftate continue
the laws
to be
agitated
till
it
or
deftroyed,
and
refumed
its
empire.
CHAP.
On
xir.
whole, or give the beft polTible form to the conflitutlon, various circumftances are to be
taken into confideration.
IN the
of
Of
thefe
the
firft is
that
is
the relation
whole, or of the fovereign to the flate, which relation is compofed of thofe between the intermediate terms
^
as will
be feen hereafter.
The
name of
laws which govern this relation bear the fa^u^<^'^^^, fundacalled and alfo are laws, politic
For if there be only one are wifely ordained. good method of government in a (fate, the people,
who
hit
on that
method, ought
by
it
but, wherefore
fhould
A
^yy
'
TREATISEoN
Iav,'s
the
fliould a
people, whofe
^"C^^ ^^^^2
is
f
to'^'^^
- ^^^'^'
^^^^"^
r>-uy^
a.
^^M^^^Mides,
a nation
in
any cafe
Jiberty to chanfye
pleafes
:
laws,
mi'^^d
when
for
if
777ic/fi^iti^t49^^'9^^^^^'^^^
injury,
who
i(
'^^'^^
fecond
circumflance
is
the
relations
'
which the members or the community bear to each other and to the whole body, the firft of which fliould be as little, and the laA as r^reat,
:
fo that every citizen (hould live in a ^^^ ad^rrv/tt^^ pofTible /f/ ^ / Aate of perfect independence on all the reft,
'
''
-^^ ^^
A /7\
:
'/
\/
^^^
h.x^lufi^%j^^^^
'
^ greateit dependence on tlie^ Both thefe are ever effeaed by the fame
:
means
for
It
is
the
power of the
flate
only
J/ 7.FA^
^^^ liberty of its members. Oa /^^^^^^'^^'^'^^^^^^ cub^^fu^r j|,jg fecond kind of relation is laid the imm.ediate
civil
laws.
p)
f a.aS
b^ proper to confider alfo a third relation of between the individual and fpecies
^t
^''^y
the law
life to lefs
penal
a di-
Aatutes
fancllcn
of
all
To
SOCIAL COMPACT,
ro
thefe three kinds of laws,
a fourth,
89
may be added
the reil
;
all
and
;
brafs or marble
;
forminj^
ihe
the
conflitution
of the
flare,
'rhefc are
laws which acquire daily frefli influence, and when otheis grow old and obfolcte, invigorate
which keep
fibly
the
The
laws
lierc
all
and above
difiegarded
fpeak of, are manners, cu[\om?., J^i ^Z?^yU^, all unknow^n or public opinion
;
which depends the fuccefs of all the are the objefls on which the real
Thefe
legiflator is
employed
confine
in
fecret,
himfelf to thofe
which compofe only the preparatory centre of the vault, of which manners, more flow in
their progrefs,
form
in the
arch.
Of
which
relative
conftitute the
only to
my
prefent fubjeft.
The End
of the
Second Book.
BOOK
f/Q
A TREAT
E ON the
BOOK
EFORE
we
III.
feveral forms of government, it will not be improper to afcertain the precife meaning of hat term ; which as jet hath not been well ex-
plained.
CHAP.
X.
very deliberately, as
myfelf clearly
is
intelligible
Every
cur to
two
caufes,
which con-
viz. produdlion, the one moral, the will which determines the aft j the other
elFecft
it
in
exe-
cution.
When
for indance,
toward
firfl: necefTary that I any particular object, fliould will to go; and fecondly that my feet
fhould bear
me
forward.
paralytic
may
will
to run, and an
be unwilling ; the want of power in the one hath the fame effeft
a6live racer
as
SOCIAL COMPACT.
as the
91
want of
will
in
the other
politic
both remahi
in their place.
The body
;
principles
alfo In
of motion
which
are
the
the fame manner by power and will latter under the name of the leg'^Jlat'tve
power, and the former under that oi \\\z executive power. Nothing is or ought to be done without the concurrence of both.
We
power
belong
it is
that
the
leglHative
and can
none
elfe.
On
the
other
hand,
conclude, from the principles already eftablifhed, that the executive power caneafy
to
not appertain
or fovereign
;
to
the
generality,
as legiflator
becaufe this power is exerted only in particular a6ls which are not the province of the law, nor of courfe that of the fovereign,
whofe
a(5ls
To the public force, therefore, /hould be annexed a proper agent, which may re-unite and put it in acflion, agreeable to the directions
tion
of the general will ; ferving as a communicabetween the flate and the fovereign, and
eiFe<5ling the
as the
is
fame purpofe in the body politic, union of the foul and body in man. Such
founded
fp.
TREATISE
on the
v.lTich
It is
only
What
diate
then
is
jToverntrient
It is
an internnefubjeci:
body
tfl.ibliihed
between the
and
the fovereign, for their mutual conefpondence ; charoed with the execution of the laws, and with
the maintenance of
civil
and
political liberty.
The members
of which this
body
is
comcof-
eJ, are called magidrates or ^igs, that is to bears the fay, gove^ncrSi and the whole body
Thofe, therefore, who prince*. the al, by which a people profefs fubmifiion to their chiefs or governors, is not a
name of
affirm
\.h.Q
that
contra<fV,
are certainly right ; it being in fadl a fimple comnothing more than the conferring xniHion on the faid chiefs ; an employ, in the
xJifcharge of
which they a^l as mere officers of the fovereign, exercifing in its name the power
which
it
it
may
hath placed in their hands, and which limit, modify or refume whenever it
alienation
pleafes; the
of
its
right
fo
to do.,
fera'.ors
is
called
is
when
the
doge
not
I call
SO<:iAL COMPACT.
'I
93
call therefore,
and the individual or body, charged with that adminiftraiion, the prince or the
;
maniftrate.
termediate forces, whofe relations compofe that of the whole to the whole, or of the fovereign
to the
ftate.
This
lafi
relation
may be
repre-
fcntcd
a conftnnt
proportion, the mean proportional of which is The government receives from the government. the fovereign thofe orders, which it gives to the people ; io that, in order to keep the flate in
fidered,
due equiiibrio, there ihould, every thing cor. be the fame equality between the mo-
mentum
it-felf,
or
force
and the
momentum
zens,
]y
who
on one
feverally
on the
other.
It is,
befides,
"three terms,
portions. to govern, or
impofTible to vary any of thefe without inflanily deAroying the proIf the fovereign fhould be defirous
the magiflrate
to
to give
laws, or
obey
94
TREATISE
on
tfie
mediately take
power
thus no longer ailing in concert, the flate would be difTolved, and fall into defpotifm or anarchy.
Add
to this,
mean
proportional
between each
relation,
there can
be but one good government for a Aate. But as a thoufand events may change the relations
fubfifting
among
people
different
govern-
ments may not only be good for different people, but even for the fame people at different
periods of time.
may
exifl
by way of example, make ufe of the number of people, as a relation the mofl
extremes,
I
fhall,
eafily exprelfed.
We
IS
will
flatc
The compofed of ten thoufand citizens. as be confidered muft only colledively fovereign and in a body but every particular in quality
:
of fubje^l
is
ihc fovereign
is to fay, every member thoufandih part the ten only of the fovereign authority, whiie at the fame
of the
time he
is
fubjeifled
to
it
in
his
whole perfon.
to
SOCIAL COMPACT.
to an
>
hundred
fubjefls
would
receive
no
alteration
each of
them being
and vote
tenth
totally
his
fhare In
the
fovereignty,
in the enaflion
be reduced
leis
to the
than before.
Thus
maining always a fingle integer, the proportion between him and the fovereign increafes as the number of citizens is augmented whence it
:
follows,
that as a
ftate
of the
fubje(5l diminiilies.
When
that
lity.
it
I fay the proportion Increafes, I mean recedes farther from the point of equaThus the greater the proportion, in the
it
is
reckoned
:
according to
common
and according
of
tion.
of quantity, is eftimated by its extent ; to the latter, confidered in point it is eflimated identity, by Its proxima-
voices bear
proportion which particular the general, that is to fay, the manners to the laws, the more ought the genelefs
Now,
the
to
be augmented.
Thus
the
government
iliould
more numerous.
Oa
pd
A TRE
On
AT
IS
on the
of a
lic
ftate affording
the other hand, the increafing greatnefs the guardians of the pub-
authority greater temptations and means to abufe their power, the more force a govern-
turn to retrain
the government.
am
not
of abfolute power, but of the fpeaking relative forces of the component parts of the
here
flate.
It
follows, from
that
the conftant
proportion between the fovereign, the people, is not a mere arand the prince,
a ncceffary confequence of the bitrary idea, but of the body politic. It follows very exiftence
alfo, that,
as fubjefls, being
one of the extremes, viz. the people a fixed term reprefented by two- fold ratio is increafed the wherever unity, or dlmlnifhed, that the fimple ratio mull increafe or diminifbin like manner,
and of courfe
the
mean term
is
will
be changed.
Hence
it
ap-
pears there
no one
fettled conflitution of
go-
there are
ftatesdiifering in magnitude.
If
SOCIAL COMPACT.
If any
97
one fliould
afFe(ft to
turn
my
fyflem into,
ridicule,
and fay that, in order to find this mean proportional, and form thegovernment as it ought to be> we have no more to do than to find the
root of
I
fquare
the
anfwer that
here
the people;
the
number of
way of example;
I
by the number of individuals, only but in general by the momentum or quantity of action, which arifes from a combination of various caufes ; and though, in order to exprefs
inyfelf concifely, I
metry,
cifion
I
is
am
mo'
ral quantities.
The government
body
moral
politic
is
in
it,
containing
at large,
ft is
perfon endued with certain faculties* a(flive as the fovereign, pallive as the Rate, and capable of being refolved into other fenfible
relations,
fcale of
this,
arifes
new
according
till
another
within
juOice,
that
is
we
fay,
to
the
fole
giflratCj
of
98
of
this
TREATISE
as
ON
the
between the
progrefTion,
an
unity
ferles of fra'flions,
But, without embarraffing the reader with a mul'Liplicity of terms, we fliall content ourfelves
with confideiing the government as a new body in the ftate, diflin<5l from the fubje<fls and the
fovereign,
There is this elTential difference, however, between the government and the ftate, that the latter exifts of itfeif, and the former only by means of the fovereign. Thus as the ruling
will of the prince
is,
general
prince
will, or
is
the
only
that
him
fo that
himfelf any abfolute and independent aft, the combination of the whole is affefled. And if,
at length, the prince
will of his
(liould
own, more
fliould
active
fovereign, and
make
as
power
in his
hands
to enforce
obedience to fuch
it
were, two foparticular will, forming, vereigns, the one of right and the other of fa6l, the fecial union immediately vanidies, and
the body politic
is
dillolved.
In
SOCIAL COMPACT.
thelefs,
99
In order that the body of government, nevermay have an exigence, a real life to diAin-
guifhitfromthatof the ftate, and that its members may ad^ in concert to anfvver the end for which
It
is
inftituted,
it Is
necefTary that
it
Aioiild
be
pofTcfled
of a particular
of its prefervation.
Such
a particular exigence necefTarily fuppofes that of affemblies and councils ; of a power to deliberate
and refolve
of the eights,
titles
and
l^elong exclufively to the privileges fituation of a magiftrate the and render prince,
which
the
more
honour^ible
in
proportion
lies in
as
it
is
more
laborious.
The
all
difficuky
the
me,
thod of difpofing
the inferior
\yhile
it it is
parts of the
whole body
its
fo
that,
Arengthening
own
conflitution,
may
the
ftate.
At the fame
its
always
defiined
diftinguifli
to
own
force
in a
fice
word,
fliould
'
To
tificial
this
add, that, although the arof body government be the work of anF z other
we may
100
other
TREATISE
body, nnd
is
ON the
artificial
pofTefled only of a
;
this
doth
not prevent it from acfling with different degrees of vigour and celerity, or from enjoying, if I
may
fo
exprefs
myfelf,
a greater
or
lefs
fharc
of health and ftrength. In fhort, it may, without running diametrically oppofite to the purpofes of
its infiitution,
deviate
or
lefs,
according
to
the
mode
which
it is
conflituted.
m
It is
from
all
vernment ought
to bear
toward the
flate,
ac-
cording to thefe accidental and particular reFor the lations in which the ftate is modified.
beft
government
if
in itfelf
may
its
often
become the
worfl:,
the
relation
of
component parts
body
politic to
which
it
belongs.
CHAP.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
loi
CHAP.
On
the prindple
II.
whi.h
conjiitutes
of government,
the general cauTj of thefe difit is
TO
explain
ferences,
between the prince and the government, in the fame manner as I have already done between
the fovereign and the flate.
The body
of the
magiflracy may be compofed of a greater or a lefs number of members. It hath been obfcrv-
ed
alfo
that
bears to
ber of people
we may
proportion to the numby an evident analogy, the of the relation betweea fame fay
;
thus,
the tofal force of the government, being always equal to that of the ftate, fufRrs no alteration ; whence it follows that the more fuch
Now
force
is
fpent by
the diflribution
of
the
it
among
lefs
the
re-
mains to be excited
people.
That
IC2
TREATISE
therefore,
on the
which
is
That government,
mull:.
tal
in
the
magidrates
As
this is a
fundamento illuf-
maxim, we
it.
take
fome pains
trate
In the perfon of the magiftrate may be diAinIn the gulfhed three wills eiTentially different. lirfl: will of the the individual, place particular
fe-
which
is
common
to
him
as
the advantage of the prince j being general with refpedl to the government, and particular with regard to the
a magiflrate, tending folely to
flate,
and
of which the government is only a part > the will of the people or the fovereign will, which is general as well
in the third place,
with regard to the flate confidered as a whole, as with regard to the government confidered
as a part of that whole.
ticular will
amount
government
courfe the general or fovereign will the ruling and fole dire61or of all the others.
Ao
SOCIAL COMPACT.
According
to the order of nature,
wills are
103
however,
contrary
they are
thefe different
ranged
in
a
as
manner
will
active
concentrated in themrclves.
is
Thus
the
general
always
of the individual
fo that each
member
firft
of the
to
be confidered
of
all
as an individual, fecs^idly as
a magiflrate,
and
op-
laiHy as
pofite
quires.
to
citizen:
gradation
dire^lly
that
fociety re-
This point being fettled, let us fuppofe the adminiflration of government committed to the
hands of one man.
In this cafe the will of the
individual, and that of the body of the magiflracy are perfectly united, and of confequence the latter pofTeffes the greateft degree of intenfity.
Now,
as
it
is
will
that the exertion of force depends, and as the abfolute force of the povernment never variety
it
follows
that
all
a J mini-
flrations
On
tion
the contrary,
if
we
F
4,
unlic the
if
adminiflrathe prince
wc make
the
I04
TREATISE
on
the
t^e foyereign, and the ciiizcns all (o many main this the wiU'of the cafe, gilrrates: govern-
ment, confounded with the general will, would P'jilek no greater fhare of afiivity, but would
kavt the particular will of individuals to exert its whole force. 7"hus the government, having always the fame degree of abfolute force, Avoald be at its minim::m of relative force or
atfiivify,
7
is
and may be
It
farther
confirmed
by other
confi)i;erations.
evident, for example, that the magiftrate^ is more aftive in that capacity than the citizen in
bis,
will of the
ftiare
indivi-
of in-
in
the adminiftration
of
government,
th^n in
almoft
fovereign
government, whereas no
as
ci-
an individual,
difcharges
any
fun(fl:ion of the fovereignty. Befide this, the real force of a flate increafes, as the Hate
increafes in magnitude,
it
is
in
vain to increafe
the
number of
maglftrates, as the
government
becaufe
SOCIAL COMPACT.
becaufe
Aate,
is its
105
the
force,
being always
equal.
that of
conft.intly
And
thus
is
the rcLi-
of government
diminifh-
ed, without
its
real
augmented.
It is
tranfacfed
to
more or
of
lefs
expeditiouily accordinfr
the
number
;
difpatch
prudence, too
the
lofl,
trufled
is
to fortune;
thac
opportunity
of
fuccefs
thus frequently
This may
reins
as
of
the
government are
relaxed
in proportion
magiflrates are multiplied ; and I have before deraonflrated that the more numerous the
ple are, the
peo-
more fhould
the
:
retraining
power
of government be increafed
that the proportion
giflrates (hould
be
in the
j
inverfe ratio
fovereign
the
that
to fay, the
flate more contrafled fhould be the government, the number of chiefs diminiihing as that of the people increafes.
5.
fpeak.
io6
I
TREATISE
ON
the
fpeak here only of the relative force of the government, and not of the re<fl:itude or proP^or, otherwife, itjs certain that priety of it.
the more numerous the magiftracy
is,
the nearer
to
doth the
will
of that
body approach
the
general will of the whole people ; whereas under a fole chief, the will of the magifiracy is, as I
that of an indiviin
Thus what
j
is
gained
one
refpecSl,
is
on the other
and the
which the
and the
which
is
moft advantageous
to the Hate.
CHAP.
Of
the aulual dijlln^lons
III.
cf governments,
"^T T E
in the preceding chapof the reafons for diftinguifhing the fevcral f]:>ecie and fornis of government, by the
have treated
VV
ter
number of
the
it
how
The
so CI A L CO
The
fovereign
iMP
AC
T.
in
[07
authority may,
the
firft
place, commit the charge of the government to the whole people or to the greater part of them ;
the number of maglllrates in fuch cafe exceedThis form of going that of private citizens. vernment is difiinguiflied by the name of a de-='
mocracy.
may com-
name of an
ariftocracy.
laftly, the government may be entrufied one magidrate only, who delegates his power This third form is the mofk to all the reft.
Or
to
common, and
government.
is
called
monarchy or
a regal
It
is
to
be obferved that
all
thefe forms,
and
two former, are fufceptible of particularly the different degrees of perfecflion, and admit indeed of confiderable latitude
tion
:
in their modifica-
for
\^-'hole
people, or be limited
the
half.
An
from
ariftocracy alfo
quantity
ic8
TREATISE
the
ON the
to
people
the
fmallt-ft
iifelf is
number
indefinitely.
Nay
monarchy
fufceptible
of fome diftribution.
Sparta, for
inOance, had confritutionally two kings at a time; and the Romans had even eight emperors
at once,
tually
been acis
divided.
Thus, we
fee,
there
cer-
tain point, at
is
which each form of government confounded with that to which it is neareA re;
laied
nominations only, government is really fufceptible of as many different forms, as there are
citizens in the fiate.
To
go
jQill
farther
as
government
tion
is
capable, in
many
refpe6ls, of
being
may
refpeflively
differ,
there
may refuk
thefe forms a
may
Politicians
have in
all
ages
difputed
much
of
government,
without
confidering that each different form may poffibly be the beft in fome cafes, and the worfl in
others.
^
If
O C
A L
COMP
A C T.
109
If in different
ftates the
number of fuprcme
in the inverfe ratio to that magiftrates fhould be of the citizens, it follows that -the democratical
government
to fmall
ftates,
is
ftates,
the ariftocratical
to
middling
and
his
rule
is
,
our prin-
ciples
multiplicity of circumftances
exceptions againft
it.
CHAP.
Of
IV.
a Demccracy,
TH
it
E inftitutor of a law (hould certainly know better than any other perfon, how
fliould
ought to be underftood and executed.. It feem therefore that the beft conftitution,
in
muft be that
tive
is
which the
legiflative
and execuIt
in the
fame hands.
fuch a
government imperfeft;
exift
doth not
which
ought to be made in its parts ; while the prince and the fovereign, being one and the fame
perfon, only form, if I may fo exprefs myfelf, a government without a government.
It
no
It is
TREATISE
on
the
not proper that the power which makes laws fhouid execute them, or that the atthe
tention of the
Nothing
of
fluence
private intereft in
the abufe of the laws by the government, being a lefs evil than the corruption of the legidature;
which
is
infallibly the
confequence of
its
being
For
all
in that cafe,
reformation
becomes impofTible.
abufe the
more
not people of would be no government, power to abufe their independence and propenfe
;
who would
a people
who
To
its ftrifteft
fenfe,
there
mocracy
in the
world.
contrary to
the
be the governors, and the minopeople ihould the governed. It is not to be conceived rity
a whole people fhouid remain perfonally afTembled to manage the affairs of the pubhc ; and it is evident, that no fooner are deputies or
that
form of the
It
changed.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
It
iii
may be laid down indeed as a maxim, that when the fun6lions of government are divided among
feveral
courts, that
will,
;
which
is
compofed.
it
though
were for
it
facility
with which
alfo,
number of circumflances
firft
In the
place,
it
is
rcquiiite
of fmall extent,
aflembled and
might be
eafily
perfonally
fi
known
to each other.
Secondly,
the
as to prevent a
and per-
plexity in
difcufling
them
And
thirdly, there
without
exift
them
in
or no luxury
for
effect
;
of wealth, or
mull:
make
it
neceffary
it
corrupts at once
both rich and poor ; the one by means of the poffeffion of wealth, and the other by means of
the
want of
it.
Luxury makes
a facrifice
of
pa-
112
TREATISE
to
ON
the
;
patrlotifm
llate of
its
Indolence and
vanity
it
robs
to
a;
citizens
by fu'^e^ling them
all
each
to
the influence of
public prejudice.
It is
author hath
down
the
:
firft
prin-
for all thefe ciple of a republican government circuraHances cannot concur without the exi-
flence
of public virtue.
of making proper diAinfiions, this great genius hath been led into frequent miftakes, as well not having'obferved that, as want of precifion
;
in
though
it
is
true in
every a
government.
To
is
this
it
may be added,
that no
government
[o fubjefl to civil
wars and
intefline
commo.
popular
tions
as
;
that
of the democratical or
becaufe no other tends fo flrongly and fo conftantly to alter, nor requires fo much vi-
form
gilance
tion.
it
from altera-
ticularly that
ed
SOCIAL COMPACT.
113
ed with force and coiiAancy, and fhould repeat every day, in the fincerlty of his heart, the
faying of the virtuous palatine
cuifa?n litertalem
*.
Malo
pcri^
quam
qu'ietum f.rvitium,
Did there exift a nation of Gods, their government would doubtkfs be democratical ; it
is
CHAP.
Of
V.
an Arlfoira-y,
exifl
this
form of government
two moral
viz.
the ad-
which of couifc
two general
wills,
:
citl/cns univcrfally
of the adminiflraiion.
police
of
pleafes,
it
ple but in the name of the fovereign, that is to fay, the people themfelves ; which is a circum-
The
primitive
fo-
of mankind
The Pahuine
Duke
Poland,
or Lorra"n.
cally.
114
cally.
A
The
TREATISE
ON the
among
young
the
Hence
Senat.^,
the
&c.
The
favagcs of North
to .this
America are o governed in the fame manner and are extremely well governed. day,
But, in proportion as the inequality arifing from fecial inQitutions prevailed over natural
were preferred to inequality, riches and power At elective. and became the ariflocracy age*,
length power, tranfmitted with property
father to fon,
froixi
making whole
families patrician,
Ariftocracy therefore
ral,
ele<51:ive
is
of three kinds
natu-
and hereditary.
the
The
of
firfl, is
ap-
while the
laft
is
word
is
all- .kinds
;
of gois
vernment.
is
The
fecond
the beft
and
what
Befidc
SOCIAL COMPACT.
irs
Eefide the advantage of the abovemeniloned dlHindion, this form hath alfo that of the
choice of
its
members
in
popular govern-
the citizens are born magiflrates ; but in this the number of the latter are very limited, and they become fuch only by ele61:ion * ; a method by which ;hc?ir probity, their talents,
all
ment
their
experience,
and
all
thofe
other
reafons
for preference in
ditional
fecurity
governed.
Again, their public afTemblles are attended with more decorum ; affairs of ftate are more
regularly difculTed, and bufinefs executed with
greater order and expedition ; while the credit of the flate is better fupported, In the eyes of
foreigners,
by a
by
felefl:
number
of
venerable
fenatorsj than
a promifcuous or contemptible
mob.
*
h is
method of chufing
to the prince,
it
for, in
leaving this
is
an
to the republics
of Venice and Berne. Hence the firft has been lonofmce difTolved, but the fecond hath been fupported by the great prudence of tiie Senate. This is an exception, however, as dangerous as iionourable,
IQ
ii6
TREATISE
and- moH:
on the
would be undoubtednatural,
the befl
according to
wliich the wife and experienced few dlre(fl the multitude, were it certain that the few would
in
government confult the intereft of the It is abmajority governed, and not their own. furd to multiply the fprings of a(fl:ion to no purtheir
pofe,
or to
that,
doing
With regard
requifite to
this
to
form of government ; the flate Hiould not be fo fmall, nor the manners of the
people (o fimple or fo virtuous as that the execution of the laws fliould coincide with the
public Will, as in a well founded democracy. On the other hand alfo, the (late Hiould not be
fo exienfive that
and down
its
themfelves,
each
his
feparate
d-epartment,
But
than
a
if
an
there are yet fome popular government which are peculiar to it fuch as moderation in
;
an exaift equality
SOCIAL COMPACT.
lity
117
of condition
would
:
in fuch a
it
government
be quite improper
Sparta.
nor was
obferved even at
If a certain degree however, of inequality in the fortunes of the people, be proper in fuch a government ; the reafon of it is, that in general the adminiflration of public aflairs, ought
to be put
perfons
;
who
not,
ought always
to
be preferred
On the contrary, it is very necelTary that an oppofite choice fhould fometimes teach
wealth.
ference
the people that there exift other motives of premuch more important than riches.
CHAP.
On
VI.
monarchy.
we have
confidered
HITHERTO prince
as
the
moral and
collecSlive pcrfo-
nage, formed by the force of the laws, and as the depofitory of the executive power of the ftate.
At
our bufmefs to confider this hands of a phyfical perlodged power, real man or 5 fonage pofTefTed of the right of exprefent,
as
it
is
in the
iiS
TREATISE
ON the
Such a per* exerting it agreeable to the laws. fon is denominated a monarch or king.
In other adminiftrations
collective
it is
common
for a
;
body
in
whereas
trary,
this
an individual
is,
on the con-
body
fo
unity which
conftitutes
the
prince,
which
in
all
fame time a phylical unity, in the faculties which the law combines
at the
the
latter.
the will of the people and that of the the prince, together with the public force of flate, and the particular force of the govern-
Thus
ment,
all
all depend on the fame principle of adlion the fprings of the machine are in the fame hand, are exerted to the fame end ; there are no
:
oppofite
motions
each other; nor is it poiTible to conceive any fpecies of government in which the leaft effbrt
is
\
Archimedes, fitting at his eafe on the fl:jore, and moving about a large veflel on the ocean
at pleafure,
reprefents to
in
my imagination
an able
monarch
fitting
his
cabinet, and
governing
in
motion.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
motion,
But,
fo
if
119
while
he himfelf
fcems
immoveable.
no other kind of government hath much aftivity, there is none in which the
is
nant,
predomitrue, proceeds toward Every thing, the fame end ; but this end is not th^it of public happinefs ; and hence the force of the admiit is
(o
the
ftate.
way to become (o^ is make themfelves beloved by the people. This maxim is doubtlefs a very fine one, and even in
times told that their beft
to
fome refpe6ls
at
in
true.
But unhappily
is
it is
courts.
arifes
laughed from
the
greateft
but
fo precarious'
and conditional,
faiisfied
that
with
it.
Even the
beft kings are defirous of having it in their power to do ill when they pleafe, without
It
is
to
no purpofe
that r?i4eclaiming politician tells them that the Arength of the people being theirs, it is their
greatefl intereft to have
numerous and
is
refpecftable
they
know
that this
interefl:
is,
not true.
120
is,
TREATISE
as to
on the
fo
be incapable of makI
to government.
confefs
indeed that, fuppofing the people to be held in perfect rubje(flion, it would be to the intereft
of the
prince
powerful,
his,
and
alfo
ferves to
make him
this
refpecftable to his
is
neigh-
bours; but as
intereft
only fecondary
incompatible, it is natural for princes to give the preference always to that maxim which is
the
moft immediately
ufeful.
This
is
what
Samuel hath reprefented very forcibly to the Hebrews and Machiavel hath made evident to a
;
demonftration.
We
we
fliall
convinced of
it,
on
a further examination.
The
more numerous the members of the public adminiftration, the more is the relation beween
the prince and the fubje(n:s diminifhed, and the nearer
SOCIAL COMPACT.
nearer
it
lit
equah'ty which
democracy.
This
government
contra^ed
and arrives
is
at its
max'unum
when
the adminiftration
perfon.
a didance
in the
hands of a Tingle
there
is
In
this
cafe,
then,
too great
the Aate
place,
is
To
to
therefore, recourfe
had
mediate ranks
orders
is
of
people.
Hence the
of nobility.
fuitable to a
If the
ter
good government of
a flate
be
mat
mode of admlnidrathe
tion,
more
perfon
a fingle
confequences when
Again, there
defedt,
is
one
effential
which
vernment
inferior to a republic
and
unworthy perfons
ftration
;
to
high pofts
in the
admini-
men of knowfundions
who
i22
TREATISE
then-
on
the
who
ge-
make
way
to
fuch
polls
under a
men
of little minds
and rnean
talents,
who owe
their preferment to
themeritricioiis arts of flattery and intrigue. The public are lefs apt to be deceived in their choice
than the prince; and a man of real merit is as rarely to be found in the miniflry of a king, as a block-
head
at
Thus, when
accident, a genius born for government, takes the lead in a monarchy, brought
by any fortunate
to the verge
world
is
amazed
and
his
To
it is
have a monarchical
its
flate well
governed,
requifite that
It is
be proponioned to the abilities of the regent. more eafy U> conquer than to govern. By
means of
fibJe
a lever
fufFiciently
long,
to
it
wiih a
fingle finger
it
move
but to fupport
Hercules.
requires the
a
fhoulders of an
When
Hate
the prince is alpriety be denominated great, And when, en the conmofl: always too little.
trary, it hnppenf,
which however
is
very feldom,
that
SOCIAL COMPACT.
that the ftate
is
123
too
little
;
for
its
becaufe
a^Liatcd by the greatnefs of his own ideas, is apt to forget the intereft of his people, and
makes them no
unhappy from the abufe of his fnperfluous talents, than would another of a more liaiited capacity, for want of thofe talents
lefs
which fhould be
iite, that a
necefiary.
It
is
thence requi-
kingdom
dilate
rhonl(]> if I
itfelf,
may
fo
fay,
contral and
on every
fuccefiicn,
according to the capacity of the reigning pi-ince : whereas the abilities of a fenate being more fixt,
the fiate, under a republican government,
may
be confined or extended to any determinate limits, and the adminiilration be equaily good.
The mod
palpable
inconvenience in
is
the*
go-
vernment of a
fole magiflrate,
the default of
which, in the
two
When
;
to
have another
fuch e]e<ftions form very turbulent and dangerous intervals ; and unlefs the citizens are pof-
feded of a difintercftedncfs and integrity, incompatible with this mode of government, venality
v/ill
necefTarily
ir,
have an
It
?.
124
to
A T REAT
the Rate
is
E ON the
fell it
whom
fold,
does not
again
in his
turn, and
make
the
extorted from him by the firong. Every one becomes, fooner or lafer, venal and corrupt, under fuch an adminifiration ; while even the
money
tranquillity,
which
is
is
To
made
been
remedy
thefe
evils,
crowns have
been
efiablidied, which prevents any difputes on the death of kings that is to fay, by fub:
that
of
ele<flions,
an apparent tranquillity
;
is
preferred
to a wife adminiflration
ter to run
and
it
is
thought bet-
plied
to have any
kings.
llate
by children, monflers, and ideots, thf,n difpute about the choice of good
It is
not conf'iered,
to the rifk
is
every chaace
again II
Almofl everything confpires to deprive ayouth, educated to the command over others, of the
principles of reafon and judice.
faid, are taken
Great pains,
it is
to teach
art
of
125
they profit be better to legln by teaching them fubjevStion; The greateil monarchs that have been celebrated in hillory, are
thofe
much by
who were
not edu-
cated to govern. This is a fciecce of which thofe Icnow the lead who hnve been taught the
moft, and
is
better
dicnce than
brev'ijjwius
command.
.Nam
utillijjinius
idem ac
prlricipe aut
VQ"
lucrU,
A
i$
confequence of
this
Js
fometimes purfued on
who
of
is
governs, or
who hold
;
reins
fo
that
its
condu<5l
objeflof
It is this inconflancy which purfuit is wavering. keeps the Aate ever fludliwilng from maxim to
project to project
an uncer-
which
always the
Thus we
fee,
in general,
that if there
is
be more cunning
in a coutt,
there
more true
wifdom
126
TREATISE
;
on the
^vifdom in a fenate
plifh their
ends, by
:
better purfued while on the contrary, 'every levolutlon in the miniftry of a court, produces
it
maxim
to
engage
meafures
direiTily
of their imnaediate predecellcrs. Again, it is from this very incoherence that \V may detiuce
the folution of a fcphifm very common wiih regal politicians j and this is not only the practice of comparing the civil government of fociety to the domeflic
government of
father
family,
to the
of
it,
(an error
already expofed) but alfo that of Hberally beftowing on the reigning magiQrate all the virtues
need of, and of fuppofing the as he ought to be. fuch With prince ahvays the help of this fuppofition, indeed^ the regal
he llands
in
government
becaufe
it is
is
evidently preferable to
all
;
others,
and no-
thing more is required to make it alfo the beft, than that the will of the prince fhould be con:
But
ture
is
if,
according to Plato, the king by nafo very rare a perfonage, how feldom
nature
?
may we fuppofe
concurred
to
and
fortune
hath
crown him
If a regal educatioo
alfo
SOCIAL COMPACT.
alfo
I27
receive
it,
necelTarily
corrupts
thofe
who
of
men
It is
error, therefore,
in
confound
a regal
government
general with
But, to fee
itfelf, it
muft
dire<rtion of
weak and
wicked princes
they come make them.
when
Thefe
difficulties
been
much
embarralfed by them.
is
The
obey without murmurremedy, fay they, us bad things in his wrath, and fends God ing.
to
we oueht
to
as
chaflifemcnts
is
from on high.
very edifying
v^ith greater
;
This way of
but
I
talk
it
certainly
conceive
would come
pulpit,
propriety from
a
politician.
the
than
What
fhoukl
we
fay of a phyfician
who
up patience and
enough
refignation
is
preaching obvious
bad governis
the queflion
to find a
good
one.
CHAP.
S23
TREATISE
C
on the
H A
P.
VII.
Of
mixed Gcvernments,
is
THERE
ing,
lole chief
as
a fiinple
Even a
and a
in the diis al-
mull have
inferior magiftrates,
Thus
power
there
number to the ways a gradation from the greater with tliis difference that fometimes the iefs, number depends on the Iefs, and at
greater others the
Iefs
on the greater.
is
when
on each other,
;
Englifli
governpart
is
ment
of each
as in Poland. independent, though imperfe<fl, This laft form is a bad one, becaufe there is no
union in fuch a government, and the feveral of the ftate want a due connedlion.
parts
It is a queftion
Which
is
beft,
The
as
SOCIAL COMPACT.
as I have before
129
made to the like queftion conof government hi general. forms the cerning
A /imple government is the befl in itfelf, though for no other reafon than that it Is fimple. But when the executive power is not fufficiently dependent on the legiflative, that is to fay, when there is a greater difproportion between the
prince and the fovereign, than between the people and the prince, this defecfl muft be remedied by dividing the government ; in which cafe all
its
parts
would have no
and yet
their
lefs
lefs
fubjeft,
divifion
would render
them
colleflively
fovereign.
The
fame inconvenience
is
prevented alfo by
magiftrates,
cfl:abli(hing a
number of
inferior
which tend
to preferve a ballance
between the
refpcfftive
to maintain
this
cafe,
their
In
The
medy
like
means may
alfo
be employed
to re-
an oppofite inconvenience, as
is
wben
a go-
vernnneQt
too feeble,
by ere<^ing of propel
trlbunais
130
A
is
TREATISE
concentrate
its
on the
This meIn the
firft
tribunals to
force.
thod
cafe, the
adminiflration
is
divided in order to
it
:
weaken
it,
and
in the
fecond to enforce
For
is
weaknefs,
common
to
mean propor-
CHAP.
^hat every form
VIIL
is
of government
not
equally
^
AS
liberty
it
is
all all
climates,
people.,
fo
is
The more
blifhed by
one
on
this
principle, eila-
become of
the more
The more
it
is
c'cinteftedj
we
find
it
perfonage,
the public,
Whence
?
then
doth
it
confumed
the labour of
its
members.
It
that the neceiTities of perfiuity of individuals are Hence it follows the public provided.
ihat
SOCIAL COMPACT.
/131
that a focial Aate cannot fubfifl longer than the induflry of its members conthiues to produce
fuch fuperfluity.
is
The quantity of this fuperfluity, however, It is in many not the fame in all countries.
proportion mate, the fpecies of labour required in the cultivation of the foil, the nature of its produce,
the ftrengih of
its
very confiderable, in feme but moderate, ia The others null, and again in others negative. of the the clion fertility depends
On
fc)unded on
tributions
are
removed from
not by the
that we are to efliquau'iity of the impoiition but of the burthen mate it, by the time or fpace
its
it
retuinrng back
exa(flcd.
to
the hands
this
is
When
return
quick and eafy, it matters little whether fuch irDpofitioa be fmall or great ; tke people are
al.
132
TREATISE
ON the
always rich, and the finances in good condition. Ou the contrary, however low a people be taxed,
if
the
money never
to
fure
;
by
be foon exhaufted
be rich,
fnch
follows hence that the farther the people are removed from the feat of government, the
It
inore
thus in a
:
democracy
weight
is
leaft
;
felt
in
an
ariftocracy they
fall
more heavy
is
and
in a
mo-
Monarchy, therefore,
;
opulent nations
ariftocracy for
middling
flates
and
poor.
In fa<^, the
fiance, the
more we
plainly
refle(5l
on
this
circum-
more
we
rence in this
refpe(?t
a free Hate,
In the latter,
;
force
is
ex-
public intereft of the flate and the private intereft of the prince are reciprocally
oppofed
of
the
decreafie
the other.
In
SOCIAL COMPACT.
.
133
In a word, inftead of governing fubje6^s in fuch a manner as to make them happy, defpoiifm makes them miferable, in order to be able to
govern them
at
all.
Thus may we
tural caufes,
which point out that particular form of government which is bcA adapted to
it,
as well
it. barren and ungrateful whofe produce will not pay for the labour of cultivation, would remain uncultivated and uninhabited, or, at befl, would be peoThofe countries from pled only with favages. which the inhabitants mi^ht draw the neo cefTaries of life, and no more, would be peo-
foils,
pled by barbarians,
among whom
would be
ihe eftabiifh-
ment of
civil polity
places as might
derate fuperfluity, would be befl adapted to a free people ; while the country where ferule
plains
and plenteous
vaies
mere
bounteoufly
culiivator,
would
form of government,
:
that
confume the
is
the
much
better that
fliould
be
am
ceptions
134
ceptions
TREATISE
to
ON the
is
might be made
what
here ad-
vanced
however, ferve
that they are
produiflive of revotheir
natural
order.
fhould always make a diAin<fiion between general laws, and thofe particular caufes which
We
may
diverfify
their
efFe(5is.
For,
though the
fouthern
climates fhould be adlually filled with and the northern with republics, defpotic monarchies, it would be neverthelefs true in
theory,
is
concerned, def-
potifm agrees hot, barbarifm with a cold, and good polity with a temperate reI am aware farrher that, even granting gion.
the piinciple, the application of
it
befl w^ith an
may be
dif-
puted.
tries are
It
may be
faid,
that
very
fertile,
while others
more warm
and fouthern are very barren. This objef^ion, however, hath weight only with fuch as do not examine the matter in every point of view. It
is requifiie
confumption, with
every oiher
drcumAaoce
Let
SOCIAL COMPACT.
135-
proportion of whofe producfl: fhould be as five to It is plain that, if the inhabitants of the firll
confume four, and of tb.e latiernine, the fuperiiuity of the one would be -, and that of the
Their different fuperfluities being alfo y. an inverfe ratio to that of their produce, the territory whofe produce Oiould amount only to
other
in
five,
fuperfluity of
that
But the argument does not refl upon a double produce nay I doubt whether any perfon will
;
fertility
bare equality
climates.
We
will fuppofe
them, however, to
;
be
in this
fcttiog
Sicily,
England,
for inflance,
on a balance with
Still
and Po-
we
But
to
what
!
of
cultivation
to
In
they have
nothing
:
more
in
the earth
England agriculture
.
extremely toilfome
a greater
and
laborious,
Now, where
aumber of
hands
126
hands
is
TREATISE
to raife
on the
required
number of people
temperate, if they would preferve their health. Of this the Europeans are made fenfible, by feeing thofe
living in
who do
not
alter
their
manner of
off
hot countries,
daily
carried
by
Chardin reprefents us, as beafls of prey, as mere wolves in comand thinks thofe parifon of the Afiatics ; have attributed the writers miftaken, who
temperance of the Perfians, to the uncultivated His opinion is that flate of their country.
their country wns fo little cultivated, becaufe the inhabitants required fo little for their fub-
If
their
frugality
ferves,
it
fort of
them
general.
lefs
more or
si-s
Hty
is
He
tells
ws,
SOeiAL COMPACT.
us, alfo, that
137
their
the Perfians
;
boad much of
of
manner of
only to
living
pretending their
complexions
its
be a
fufficient indication,
being
the
preferable to that
of the Chriftians.
At
fame time, he admits that their complexions are very line and fmooth ; that their (kin is of
a
foft
texture,
while, on the
who
live
after
The
ple.
nearer
certain, the
They
rice
and maize
There
are millions of
amount
people in the Indies, whofe fubfiftence does not to the value of a penny a day.
Wc
fee even in
in this refpeft,
Europe, between
Spaniard will
fubfift
eat
up
confumption.
itfelf in
Thus
folid
138
pafl
A
h
TREATISE
out
ON the
fweetmeats
furnifhed
with
and
lloweis.
The
fimllar
alfo,
with
In
climates,
where the
change of the weather is fudden and violent, the people wear better and plainer clothes 3
while
in thofe
drefs only
ufe
of
luxury.
Naples, you will daily fee gentlemen walking about in laced clothes without Aockings, It is the fame with regard to
at
Thus
buildings
is
to
At
Paris and
London people
are
defirous of warm and commodious apartments. At Madrid, they have fuperb faloons, but no
falhes nor cafements
;
and
open
The
aliment
is
alfo
more
fubflantial
and nou-
than in cold ; this is a third rifliingin hot countries difference that cannot fail to have an influence
is it
Becaufe they
In France,
where
SOCIAL COMPACT.
139
where they are themfelves nourifhed chiefly by water, they are lefs nutritive, and are held of
little
as
confequence. They occupy never thelcfs much ground, and coft as much pains to
^ijltivate
them.
It
hath
been experimentally
other re-
proved
of France, gives a greater quantity of meal, and that the French corn yields
Aill
more than
that of the
North.
Hence
is
it
may
be inferred that a
fmiilar gradation
car-
ried on in
the pole.
Now
?
is
it
quan-
of aliment
To
all
thefe
different -confideratlons, I
arifes
may
fewer inhabitants than the cold, and yet afford fubfiftence for more ; a circum fiance that caufes
two-fold fuperfiuity, always to the The m.ore the fame tage of defpotifm.
a
advan-
number
of people are diHributedover the face of a large territory, the more difficult becomes a revolt ;
as
they
cretly,
and
it is
and/uin
their proje(^s.
140
je6ls.
roirs
A
On
TREATISE
the other hand, the
on the
more
the
a
numecan
the
lefs
;
may
as
deliberate
as fecurely
at their meetings, as
therefore, to
Increafing with the dlQance like that of a lever*, by the afhflance of a proper center. That of
concentrated
dilated, even
only by being evaporates and lofcs itfclf when as gunpowder fcattered on the
a(fi:s
it
ground, takes fire, particle by particle, and is Countries thinly inproductive of no Gf^G6i,
* This doth not contradict what
is
advanced
In,
the inconvenience of Chap. ix. Book II. concerning in matter queilion there being the great ftates ; the and of the authority government over its members,
here of
its
Its
members,
ferve as points
of fupport
ple
;
to enable
it
it
to act at a diftance
on the peoaftion
but
affil its
on
its
members
Thus
in
its
and
habited
SOCIAL COMPACT.
wild beads reiga only ia defarts.
141
j
CHAP.
Of
the
IX.
WHEN
vernment
?
terms, what
the queflion
:
as Indeterminate
as
unanfwerable
or rather
may
be reafonably
anfwered as many different ways as there are pofTible combinations of the abfolute and relative circumllances of a people.
But
if it
it
may be
This
is
to berefolved.
Is
doing
it
after
own manner.
The
the one prefers the fecurlty of property, the other that of his perfon ; the one maintains the bed government to be the
mod
is
fevere,
the
mod
agreeable 3
142
able
;
A
the
TREATISE
latter
is
:
ON the
crimes,
for punlfhing
the
former for preventing them the one thinks it a fine thing to be dreaded by his neighbours;
the other
thinks
it
is
better
fatisfied
to be
if
unknown
to
them
; money does but circulate, the other requires the people fhould have bread. Were they even agreed alfo on
the one
Moral
quantities are deficient in point of precifion ; fo that, were men agreed on the fign, they
would
fill]
differ
about
its
eflimation.
For
my
part,
am
be
fo
ftiould
What
the
is
doubt-
lefs
prcfervation
and
is
meml^ers.
And what
?
or proof of thefe
Certainly
their
number
and
plain,
that government
muA
be the
befi:,
under which
other circumfiances
equal,
and no
foreigners
to
naturalized or colonies
increafe
:
introduced,
caufe fucii
and
that,
on the
contrary
SOCIAL COMPACT,
contrary,
that
143
under
people
which,
fliould
par^but^
the
number of
dimH>ifti.
give
it
up
to the arithmeticians.
CHAP.
*
It is
to
judge
mankind.
thofe, in
being difLiriguiihed for the prof^erity of We have in general too much adi^ured
literature
which
and the
fine arts
have flou-
fecret caiife
tlieir
of
confidering
fatal -df*
pars
/cr-x'itiiti!
hum nltas --j-jcahatur^ cum we never be able to fee down in books, the inter
No,
all
let
writers fay
what they
will,
it
try decreafe,
things
go
well,
whatever be
i^s
external profperity
year, does
make
the age
he
lives in
the bell of
others.
We
ihould not fo
much
re-
gard
tions,
quillity
the apparent repofe of the w rid, and the tranof its chiefs, as the well being of whole na-
and
p:.nicularly
of the
mod
populous
ftates^
ftorm of hail
it
may
lay
but
144
A TREAT
E on
the
CHAP.
Of
the ahufi of government^
X.
and
Its
tendency
to
degenerate,
A
XJL
S the particular
people, the governnaent necefliirily makes a continual effort againfl: the fovereignty. 7 he greater this effort is, the more is the conflitution altered
flinift
;
and
as in
no other
di-
librio,
Will to keep that of the prince in equiit muft fooner or later infallibly happen
that
civil wars may give rniich diflurbance to rulers but they do not conltitute the real misfortunes of a peoeven enjoy feme refpite, while they ple> who may are difputing who Ihall play the tyrant over them.
;
It
is
profperity
iituaticn
arife
:
that
their real
all
when
fubmit
;
yoke, then
chiefs,.
it is
periihing
ceRroying them
at their eafe,
When
the in-
trio-uesof the nobility agitated ihe kingdom of France, and the coa ijutor of Paris carried a poignnrd in his
all this did not hinder the bulk pocket to parliament of the French nation from growing numerous and en*
;
SOCIAL COMPACT.
145
that the prince will opprefs the fovereign, and This is an inherent break the focial compaifl.
and unavoidable
birth of the
defe6>,
very-
body, inceffantly tends to old age and death tend as even its diflblution, the natural of to the diflblution body.
political
There
which
a
contrails
itfelf,
or
when
the flate
itfelf,
is
dlfTohed,
The
its memgovernment a from to a few i bers are reduced great number that is to fay, from a democracy to an ariflo-
contrafls
when
cracy, and
from an arillocracy
to
a royalty.
Ancient enjoying themfelves in happinefs and eafe. Greece flourifhcd in the midft of the moil cruel wars :
fpilt in torrents,
It
chiavel, that, in the midil of murders, profcriptions and civil wars, our republic became only the more
powerful,
their independence
it,
than
all its
diifenticns
agitadon gives vigour to the mind, and liberty, not peace, is the real fource of the prcfperity of our
ipecies.
This
146
A TREAT
E ON
the
This is Its natural tendency *. Should it make a retrogrelTive change, by having the number
of
* The
lic
of Venice, prefent a notable example of this fucceffion ; and it is very furprifing that in the fpace of zoo years the Venetians fhould be got no farther
I
than
to the
1198.
With regard
fecond term, which began in the year to the ancient dukes, Vi'ith
is
reproached,
fay,
it is
certain,
that they
were not
The Roman
progrefs
made an
its
objelion, as having
from monarchy to
this
and from
far
ariflocracy to democracy.
am, however,
from
thinking
was the
real cafe.
The firfl eftablifhment of Romulus was a mixt government, which degenerated prefently into deCpotifm.
From
its
ed before
very particular caufes the flate perifhtime, as a new born infant, before it
The expulfion of the attained the age of manhood. was the true era of the rife of that repubTarquins,
lic
;
although it did not aiTumc at firft a determinate form ; becaufe the work was but half done, in not
order of patricians. For hence, having abolifhed the adminiof all the vvorH aa hereditary arilloc.riiCy,
ftrations.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
of
its
147
fald
members
Increafed,
itfelf
;
it
might be
to
relax or dilate
is
but
this
inverfe progrefs
impoillble.
except
In fadl, a government never changes its form, its fpring of adlion be too much worn to
its
fupport
own.
Now,
its
if it
relaxes
ftill
more,
by being extended,
i^rations,
ai:ing oppof.ticn to the democracy, the of government remained indeterminate ; not being fixed, as Machiavel obfervcs, till the eRablifliment of the tribunes ; when, and not before, it was
in
form
a real government under the form of a true democraIn faft, the people were then not cy. only
foverei^n,
but alfo magiflrate and judge; the fenate being a tribunal of an inferior order, formed to temper and
collccl the
fclves
government
in
although
patrician-j,
magiftratcs,
and
as
ge-
nerals abfolute
Rome
they were
From
lowed
its
this
time
it
is
natural byafs,
ariilocracy.
felf,
The
members
Venice and Genoa, but in the body of the fenate compofed of Patricians and Plebeians, and even in the body of tribunes when they
of that body,
began
A
nothing, and
itfelf.
TREATISE
is
on
the
Aill lefs
capable of fupporting
It
is
necellary therefore to
in
wind up and
way
The
not
diflblulion
of
FirA,
the
Hate indeed
may
when
to
according
gates the fovereign power to himfelf: in which cafe he eifefls a remarkable change, whereby
flate itfelf is
is,
con-
What
mean
to fay
other within
thence diflblved, and that he forms anitj compofed only of the members
of the government, who are only the mailers and tyrants over the reft of the people. So
began to ufurp an aftive power. For words make no alteration in things. When the people have chiefs
who govern
given to
Sriflocracy.
in their flead,
whatever denomination be
government
of
the
is
always an
From
the
abufe
arillocratical
form, arofe the civil wars and the triumvirate. Sylla, Csefar and Auguftus indeed became real moJulius
the
flate
was
finally dilTolved.
The Roman
doth not tend to di/prove hiftory, therefore, to confirm it, but ciple,
my
prin-
that
SOCIAL COMPACT.
that
ty,
149
when
compact
is
broken^
who were
citizens before*
the rights
of natural
liberty,
and
are
compelled,
not legally
obliged,
to
obedience.
It is
when
the
members of
power they which
an infringement of the laws, and is For, produ<flive of flill worfe confequenccs. in this cafe, there may be faid to be as many
no
Jefs
princes as magiflrates
while the
is
ftate
no
lefs
totally difTolved
When
the
flate Is
difTolved,
the
it
nbufe
be,
of
takes
To
diQinguifU
more
nicely, dcmosracy
;
is
faid to
degenerate into
;
ochlocracy
ariftocracy
into
ol'garchy
:
and
this
Into
tyranny
but
lafl:
equivocal, and requires fome explanaIn the vulgar fenfe of the w^ord, a tyrant
a king
who
more preindi-
and determinate
fenfe,
it
means any
vidual
350
vidual
TREATISE
on the
who
ailumes ihe royal authority, withIn this latter fenfe the it.
;
and give
bad princes indifcriminately both to good and whofe authority was not legal *. Thus, iyrant and are two words perfectly {^vjurper
aonlmous.
I
to diffegive dilTcrent names, however, of rent things, I call the ufurpation regal au-
To
thority, tyranny^
defpotifm.
takes is he, who tyrant to to law, govern acupon himfelf, contrary the and to law defpotic chief, one ; cording
The
who places himfelf above the laws themfelves. Thus a tyrant cannot be defpotic, though a
defpotic prince
muH
et
always be a tyrant.
et
* Omnes enim
hahentur
ufaeji.
that Ariflctle
and king, in that the one governs for his own good, and the other for the good of his fubjeas: but, befides
Greek
word tyrant
by the
Ariftotle's
\n a different
fenfe, as appears
particularly
Hiercn of Zenophon, it would follow from diftinaion that no king ever exifted on the face of
the earth.
^ CHAP.
.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
G H A
P.
151
XL
Of
UCH
is
dency of even the beft conlHtutcd governwhat If Rome and Sparta perifhed, ments. ftate can hope to laA for ever ? In our endea
vours to form a durable eilabllfhrnent,
to
make
it
eternal.
we mufl If we
would hope
impOiTibiiities,
to
fucceed,
ilatter
we muft
not attempfi-
nor
permanency
to
human
inftituiions,
which
is
in-
The body
begins to die
caufes of
polTefs
its
politic,
as
well
as
at its birth,
and bears
deflru^llon.
Both, howevci
lefs
may
and
conftitution
more or
robuft,
adapted
of the
The
^lOt
conftitution of
flate,
is
man
the
is
work of
doth
depend en men to prolong theiii lives, >'ic it depends on them to prolong that :^ 'he fu'ce
as much as pofTiblc, by giving the beft adapted to longevity.
it
a contiiruticii'
The
moil
c c;
fcl
conititution,
it
is
true, will
have an end
H' 4,
ituv
J52
but
flill
A
fo
TREATISE
much
later
ON the
forefecn
folutlon.
accident
The
principle of political
life,
lies
in
the
is
is
7 he
;
legillativc
power
the
brain,
part in motion.
The
brain
may be rendered
ufelefs
by the
live
palfy,
furvive.
A man may
:
be*
come an
is
infenfible
driveller
and yet
bat
dead.
The
flate
doth not
fubfif^
by virtue of the
The HalawS; but by the legiflative power. tutes of yefterday are not in themfelves neeffarily
binding to day, but the tacit confirmation of them is prefumed from the filence of the
inlegiflaturej the fovereign being fuppofed renot laws confirm the actually cefTantly to
Whatever is once declared to be the pealed. will of the fovereign, continues always fo, unlefs it
be abrogated.
Wherefore, then,
is
there fo
much
rcfpe(5>
It paid to ancient laws ? Even for this reafon. the that is rational to fuppofe, nothing but
ex."
SOCIAL COMPACT.
excellence of the ancient laws,
15 j
could preferv&
long in being ; for that, if the fovereign had not found them always falutary and Vifefulj they would have been repealed.
fo
them
Hence we
their
of lofing;
acquire additional authority by time, in every well formed flate ; the prepoffeflion of their antiquity renders them every day
force,
more venerable whereas, in every country where the laws grow obfolete and lofe their force as they grow old, this alone is a proof that the legiQative power iifclf is decayed, and
;
CHAP.
By what tmam
iained,.
XIT,
authority
the foverclgn
main"
THE
mera
?
fovereign, having no other force than the leglflative power, a(5ls only by the laws ; while the laws being only the authentic a6ts of the general will, the fo7ereign cannot a<St unlefs the people are aflembled. The
people afTemble
It
it
you
not
will fay.
What
at
fo
a chi-
is
indeed
chimerical
prefentj
though
was
reckoned
two thoufand
ij'4
TREATISE
on
the
Are mankind changed in their fand years ago. nature fince that time ?
The bounds
lefs
of pofTibility in moral
affairs are
:
confined than
foibles,
we
It is
our
Mean fouls give no credit to the fentiments of heroic minds ; while flaves alfet:
tract them.
hath been done, however, we may of what may be done again. I (hall not: judge fpeak of the petty republics of ancient Greece; but the Roman republic was, undoubtedly, a
By what
great ftate, and the city of Rome a great city. By the lafl: regifler of the citizens of Rome,
their
number amounted
to four
hundred
thvju-
fand perfons capable of bearing arms j and the lafl regifler of the Empire amounted to more
women,
children or flaves.
How very difficult, you will fay, muft It have been, to affemble frequently the people of that capital and its environs ? And yet hardly a week
which the Roman people were not nflembkd, and on fome occasions feveral times
pafTed
in
a week,
J
SOCIAL COMPACT.
a
1^5
week.
This
fome
only
exercifed
alfo
the
fovereigntyj
but
in
cafes
of government..
the whole
They fometimes
at
magiflrates as
ci-^
By recurring
tions,
to the
primitive
ftate
of na-ancient*
we
fliall
find
that moft of
the
governments,
affemblies.
fa(ft
popular
Be
this,
however,
as
may, the
all
for, to
deduce the
poiTibility of:
w?il
H^
CHAR.
156
A TREAT
E om the
C H A
P.
XIII.
*rhe JuhjcSi
continued,
TT
not enough, however, that the people once aflfembled fliould fix the conftitution
Is
of the
rtate,
by giving
code or
fyfl:em
of Jaws
it
is
they Jfhould eflablilh a perpetual govemment, or provide once for all by the cic'<5tion of magiftrates.
which
riodical
iinforefeen
may
require,
it
is
meetings, which nothing might abolifh or prorogue fo that the people (hould, on a
:
fummoned by
law, with-
formal convocation.
ar
But, excepting thefe regular alTemblies, rendered legal by the date, all others, unlefs con-
voked by the proper magilhate previoufly appointed to that end, agreeable to prefcribed formsj fhould be held illegal, and all their determinations
becaufe
of
the
people's
afTembling
As
C
the
A L CO
M P A C T.
157
it
As
that
rules
to
depends on
it
is
many
It
different
to
confiderations,.
impoffible
lay
down any
precife
in
on
this
head.
ge-
the
itfelf.
All this,
fingle
it
may be
city
;
faid,
is
a;
town or
but what
mud
?
be done ia
cities
Mufl the
fovereign authority be diflributed, or ought it to centre in one, to the total fubje(flion of the
reft
>
the other.
is
In
the
and uniform,
out deftroying it. In the next place, one city cannot be legally fubjedl to another, any more
than one nation to another
;
of the body
politic
eonfifts
in
the
union of
anfwer
1:58
I
TREATISE
that
it
on
the
anfwer farther,
Is
fundamentally
wrong, to unite feveral towns to form one city ; and that fuch union being made, the natural inconveniences of it muft enfue. The abufes
peculiar to great flates muft not be made objections to the fyiiem of one, who maintains
the
exclufive
it
propriety of
faid,
little
ones.
But
how,
will be
can
little
flates
be made
powerful enough ta relift the great ? Even as the cities of ancient Greece Were able to refift
the arms of a powerful monarch; and, as
in
times, Switzerland and Holland, have refiAed the power of the houfe of Auftria.
more modern
rcfource
duced within proper bounds, there remains one and this is by not permitting the ex;
iftence of a capital, but removing the feat of government from one town to another, and affemb-
in
every part
dlf^
out
and the
flate
flrongeft
and the
beft governed.
Remember
cities
are
of the
villages,
SOCIAL COMPACT.
In
159
town
G H A
P.
XIV.
Subjc^ continued,
NO
in a fovereign
fooner are the people legally afiembled^. body, than the jurifdi(ftion'
of government ceafes, the executive power of the (late is fufpended, and the perfon of the
meaneil: citizen
becomes
as facred
;
and inviolable
becaufe
it is
when
the
to
or
negleft the confuls were only prefidents of the afTembly of the people, the tribunes merely orators*,
of this rule.
Thefe
intervals
of
fufpenfron,
when
the
prince acknowleges,
or at
leafl:
ought
to ac-
Nearly
in
thofe
who
the
fpeak^
on any queftion
of England.
fet
The
their
refemhlance of their
employments
confuls
knowlegg
i6o
A TREAT
E ON the
formidable
aflemblies,
of government, have been held in honour by fo that they never have been fparlng the chiefs
:
raifing obje^lions and difficulties, or of making fair promifes in order to difguft the citizens with fach meetings. When the
of pains,
in.
latter,
therefore,
mean,
or cowardly, preferring their cafe to liberty, they have nox been able to withQand long the repeated efforts of government.: and thus it is
that, this
aug-
menting,
tinft,
and
timely end.
is
introduced be-
tween fovereign authority and arbitrary government, a mean term of power, of which it
is
necelTary to treat.
eHA
P.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
C
i6i
H A
P.
XV.
Of
to
deputies or rtprefentaiives*
t
ne public ceafes
ci-
by
al-
is
toward ruin. When they fhould march out to fight, they pay troops to
and
flay at
home.
When
they
go they fend deputies, and jQay at home. Thus, in confequence of their indolence and wealth, they in the end employ
to council,
foldiers to en (lave their country, tatives to betray it.
and reprefen-
It is
it is
the buflle of
arts
the fordid love of gain, of luxury and eafe, that thus convert perfonal into pecuniary fervices.
A'len readily
to
profit,
increafe
fupply
an
adminiftration
with money,
and
The
in
very term
a free city.
of taxes
is
flavifh,
and unknown
difcharge
their
own
i62
x\
TR
z^
TI
E ON the
own
So far from hands, and not by money. paying for being exempted from fuch duty, they would pay to be permitted to difcharge it
ihemfelves.
I
am
by
force
a lefs infringement
taj^es.
The
better the
conftitntion
of a ftate, the
greater influence have public affairs over private, in the minds of the cilizeuo They will have,
:
alfo,
much fewer
;
private
affitlrs
to
concern
them
common
the
lefs
happinefs, furnifhing a
tion to each individual,
private concernSo In a city well governed, every one is ready to bad governfly to its public afFfmblies ; under a ment they are cure lefs about going thither at
fi
om
his
own
all
is
becaufe no
-,
une
interefts
hlmfelf in
what
will
5t known that the general is doing there does not inrluence them,, and hence at
all their atlength domefiiC concerns engage Good lav/s tend to the making better, tention.
while bad ones are introdutftory of Worfe. No fooner doth a citizen fay, what ctre ftate-affalrs
to
me
than the
ftate
may be
given
up
for
It
SOCIAL COMPACT.
It Is this
103
want of public
interefl:,
fpirit,
the influence
of private
the
given
ple
V
quers and abufes in government, that have rife to the method of afiembling the peoby deputies and
reprefentatives.
The
af-
fembly of thefe reprefentauves is called in fome countries, the third eftate of the nation ; fo
that the particular interefts of the two orders arc placed in the firft and fecond rank, and the public interefl only in the third.
The
fented,
be repreit
and that
for
the fame
It
reafon that
eflentially
cannot be alienated.
the general will, and
cenfifts
of
sented
it is
fome
other
there can be no
mean term
in the cafe.
The
deputies of the people, therefore, neither are nor can be their reprefentatives ; they are
only mere commiffioners, and can conclude definitively on nothing. Every law that is not
void
confirmed by the people in perfon is null and it is not in facSl a law. The Engliih
;,
they
are
members of parliament. Whea flaves become they again ; and indeed they make fo bad a ufe of the few
of
thefe
are
chofcn,
traa-
i64
TREATISE
mcments of
it.
on the
that they richly
tranfitory
liberty,
deferve to lofe
of reprefentatives is modem ; defccnding to us from the feudal fyftem tnar mofk iniquitous and abfurd form of government, by
The notion
fliamefuV.y degraded.
In the ancient republics, and even monarchies, the people had no reprefentatives i they were it is even very fingular /^rangers to the term,
that,
at
Rome, where
revered,
it
the
Tribunes were fo
much
was never imagln<'d they and as could ufurp the funlions of the people
;
One ftrange that they never once attempted it. embarraflinent the of may judge, however,
fometimes caufed
by the multitude,
by what
happened
in
the
when
houfe-tops.
Where men
ties are
Among
a to
this wife
people things
;
were held
mitted
proper eftlmation
they
per-
the Li6^ors
do
what
j
they
woufd
SOCIAL COMPACT.
afraid the
Ll<5lors
165
repre-
fenting them.
To
thefe
it
explain,
neverthelefs,
in
what manner
will
conceive
how
ment
only
The
governlaw being
it is
clear
but they may, and ought to be, in the executive ; which is only the application of
power
power
jf
to law.
And
this
makes
it
evident that,
things to the bottom, we fhall find very few nations that have any laws. But,
we examine
this
be
as
it
may,
it
is
certain
that the
Tri-
bunes, having no part of the executive power, could not reprefent the Roman people, by virtue of their office, but only in ufurping thofe of the fenate.
Among
had
per-
in
perfon
they were
They
inhabited
climate,
were
their
free
managed
domeflic
liberty.
and
was
As you do not
can you expert
how
i66
TREATISE
ON the
?
Your
cli-
mate being more fevere, creates more wants * ; for fix months in the year your public fquares
are too wet or cold to be frequented ; your hoarfe tongues cannot make themfelves heard in the open air ; you apply yourfelves more to gain than to liberty, and are lefs afraid of flavery
than poverty.
On
me,
this
occafion,
if liberty
affiftance of flavery ? Perhaps not. At leaft the 'two extremes approach very near. What-ever does not exift in nature, mult have its
conveniences, and
civil
fociety
flill
more than
any thing
their
elfe.
There
are
fome circumftances
(o critically
unhappy
that
men cannot
preferve
liberty but at the expence of the liof others and in which a citizen cannot berty be perfedly free without aggravating the fub;
own
jelion of his
of Sparta.
flaves.
fituaiion
no
flaves,
As
To adopt in cold countries the luxury and effeminacy of the Eaft, is to appear defirous of flavery, without having the fame excufe for fubipitting
to
it.
their
SOCIAL COMPACT.
their liberty
boafl:
167
if
by your own.
You may
you
of this preference ; for my part> pleafe I find more meannefs in it than humanity.
this to inculcate
it is
that
we
equit-
able to reduce
to a ftate of flavery ; havI am here ing already proved the contrary. the reafons certain namodern only giving why
tions
men
who
let
imagine themfelves
prefentatives,
But
this
free, employ reand why the ancients did not. be as it will, I affirm that when
do not
fee a
of the fovereign maintaining its rights, and the exercife of its prerogatives, for the
future
fmall.
among
But
to
it
it
not
I
be
will
liable
lofe its
No.
make
manner may be
little
ODe.
CH A
i6B
TUEATISE
CHAP.
on the
XVI.
is
not a
compa^,
well
^T^HE
-*
leglflative
power
being
to
once
eftabllflied,
we proceed
fettle
:
the exe-
cutive
latter
for the power in the fame manner which operates only by particular a(n:s,
effentially different
it.
being
from turally divided for the fovereign, confidered as fuch, to pofTefs the executive pov/er, the matter of right and
faft
{o confounded, that we fhould to diflinguifh what is law and able be no longer the what is not ; body politic alfo being thus
would be
become
a prey
which
it
was
originally infli-
tuted to correi^n:.
The
all
citizens
all
compadl,
being, by virtue of the focial equal, that which all may perfornij
may
prefcribe,
Now
motion,
it is
to fibly necefTary
litic in
in-
vefts
SOCIAL COMPACT.
vei^s the prince in
169
the
inflitution
of govern-
ment.
It
at
they
forming
the
was
contrad between
of
the
chiefs
in
which
contract
conditions on
which the
one obliged themfelves to command, and the I am perfuaded every one will other to obey.
agree with me that this was a very ftrange mode But let us fee whether this opiof contraft.
nion
is
in itfelf well
founded.
In the
no more
alienate
place the fupreme authority can modify or alter its form than it can
firfl:
itfelf;
it.
to limit or reftrain,
It
is
would be
to oblige
its
own
itfelf to
is
to
difTolve
its
members
trail
Again, it is plain that fach a fuppofed conbetween the people in general and certain
particular perfons
would be
it
particular
a
aft
whence
it
follows that
would not be
f law
nor
70
A T
-a(5t
Pv
E A
o^r
the
nor an
would be
illegal.
It
is
farther
evident,
that
the
contra<filng
parti-es
of nature, without any fecurit}^ for the performance of their reciprocal engagements, a circumftance totally repugnant
i:o
a {\^tQ of
civil fociety.
The
party only
who
might have the power, could enforce the execufo that we might as well give tion of the terms the name of a contract, to the a(5t of a maa
;
*who fliould fiiy to another, " I give you whole property, on condition that you will
ilore
my
re-
me
juft as
much
of
it
as
you pleafe."
flate,
There
is
is
and that
is
which alone
as
it
ex-
is
impo/Tible to
contrad): which,
CHAP.
SOCIAL COMPACT,
CHAP.
Of
notion,
171
XVII.
WHAT
inftituted
firil
?
of the a6l,
then,
In anfwer
that
this
to
this queftion,
is
fliall
remark
ad
compofed of two
others, viz
rfl',
fiiall
it
be eftablifhed
is
and
this
it is
a law.
By
who
are
the fecond, the people name the chiefs to be charged with the adminiftratioa
Now
this
a fefirfl:,
nomination, being a particular ac^l, is not cond law, but only a confcquence of the
and
in reality
an
ad
of governaient.
The difFiculty lies in being able to comprehend how an ad of government can take place
before the government
I
exifled,,and
2
how
the
people,
172
people,
A'
Pv.
E A
E on
the
who
mnfl:
fubjec^s,
become prince or
tain circumftances.
We
difcovery of one of
body
politic,
by which
fected
it
reconciles
operations
;
apparently
this a6\
being
ef-
fudden converfion of the fovereignty fo that, without into a democracy any fenfible
by
to
all,
pafs
and
to the execution of
them.
pbce very frequently in the parliament of England, where among the commons, the whole houfe is formed on certain occafions, into
it
takes
a committee, for the better enquiry into, and the members difcufTion of the matter in hand
;
become mere
court
they
to
commifTioners of
a
the fovereign
before.
conftituted but
moment
Agreeable
they
of'
make
a report to themfelves, as
Commons,
com-
SOCIAL COMPACT.
committee,
173
the
and
deliberate
anew under
former
title
under the
latter.
Such, indeed,
is
is
eftablidied
general will.
After which, this provifional government continues, if fuch be the intended form ; or eflablidies, in
the
name of
according
a
to
order.
in
im-
pofTible' to inflitute
legal
any other
before eflablidied.
CHAP.
Of
the
XVIIL
the ufurpations
means of preveyiting
gGvernmcnt*
of
FROM
XVIth
tutes
confirmaiion of
chapter,
what
is
alTerted
in
the
viz. that
is
the
a6l
which
inAi-?
;
government
executive
power
are
not
174
A TREAT
E ON tre
not the mafters, but the fervants of the people that the people may appoint or remove them
at pleafnre
;-
no pretence
to a con-
tra6l
with the people, but are bound to obey them ; and that in accepting the offices the
ftate
impofes
as
on
them,
their duty
citizens,
"When
people
it
fo
eflablifh
whether
monarchical,
and confined
to
one
pardcular family, or ariftocratical, and divided among a certain order of citizens, they do not enter thereby into any formal engagement they
;.
which remains
change
it.
legal
till
they
think proper to
It
is
certain that
fuch changes
a
are
always
eilait
government once
be found incompatible
witfi
is
the public
good
but
this
maxim of
policy,
The
flate,
how-
no more bound
thorhy
SOCIAL COMPACT.
rhorlty
chiefs,
17S
into
the
bands of
its
of
its
generals.
It Is
certain, alfo,
all
be
taken to obferve
fiich a cafe,
and
legal
to
diftinguirn
cafe,
no
farther*
countenance, than
juftice
in the
utmoft
flri(flnefs
of
they
may
deferve.
Of
this obligation,
power
the
in fpite of the
rilk
people,
without
running
it.
of
being
For
in
appearing
make
he may
public
peace,
may prevent
thofe
10 re-eftablifh the
fo that
he might profit
thofe
ir-
regu-
ijo
TREATISE
;
cn the
which he himfclf might canfc to be committed pleading in his favour the taregularities
cit
jfiient
and
punifhing
It
thofe
who
are
bold
enough
at
iirfl:
to fpeak.
ele^led
for OEe
wards continued
for another, attempted to pertheir power, by prefrom affembling as ufual ; cafy means that all the go-
venting the
Ccfj'iii'a
and
it is
by
fr.ch
vernments
in
the world,
when once
inveflied
with power,
authority.
Thofe
periodical
affemblles,
of which
when
then
convocation
-y
for
The
focial
be made by
two
SOCIAL COMPACT.
two
propofitions,
177
be fup-
which
can never
First
Whether
It
be the determination
Second
Whether
it
be the determinatioa
of the people to continue the adminiilration in the hands of thofe, who are at
prefent charged with
it.
It is
to
granted,
what
in
demonflrated,
tal
that
there
is
no fundamenflate
law
any
fiate,
which fuch
cannot
repeal, not excepting even the fecial compatTl : for, fhould all the citizens aiTemble w'ith one
accord to break
this
compact,
it
would un-
Grotlus doubtedly be very legally dillolved. an that individual thinks even may renounce
the Hate of which he
is
member, and
re-
fume
his
natural
independence and
property
by
Now
it
would be
very
*
fiy,
With
this
to elude his
I 5
178
TREATISE
on the
very abfurd to fuppofe that the whole body of citizens united, could not do that in concert,
fepa-
rately.
try
his fervice
is
required.
would not be a
retreat
but defertion.
The End
of the
Third Book.
BOOK
SOCIAL eOMPACT.
B O O
179
IV.
CHAP.
That
I.
ann.hilated%
C
*^
long
number of
individuals
remain
one body, they can have but one will; which relates to their common prefervation and welfare.
political
maxims
clear
and obvious
oppofite
it
comprehends no
but
that
all,
intricate
and
'
interefts;
of the
public
is
demonflrably evident to
the
gift
of
common
fenfe
underfland
it.
Peace, concord, and equality are enemies to political refinements. "When men are hcneH:, and
fimple, their very fimplicity prevents
their de-
ception
they
are
not 10
be impofed on by
When
people
it is
in the
dential ceconomy,
pofTible
to forbear
de-
ipifini 'S
i8o
fpifing
A
the
fo
TREATISE
much
artifice
ON
the
nations,
to
refinements of other
who
employ
and myitery
?
render
but few
thus fimply governed hath need of while in proportion as it becomes to neceflary promulgate new ones, that neceflity
flate
]av/s,
is
univerfally apparent.
The
firfl
perfon
who
himfelf to
fpeak only
;
and nei-
ther eloquence nor intrigue is requifite to make that pafs into a law, which every one had already refolved to do, as foon as he fhould be
alTured others
That
fubje6l,
v/hlch
is,
deceives
our reafoners on
this
that, feeing
were badly conftituted at their beginning, they are Aruck with the impoffibility of maintaining
/
fuch a police in them. They fmile to think of the abfurdities, into which a defigning knave
or infinuating orator might lead the people of Paris and London. They are not apprized that
a Cromwell, and a Beaufort,
treated as
incendiaries at Berne
difcipline
But
SOCIAL COMPACT.
and the
that
i8i
But when the bonds of fociety begin to relax, flate to grow weak ; when the private
of individuals begin to appear, and of parties to influence the flate, the objects of public good meet with oppofition ; uninterells
animity no longer prefides in the afTemblies of the people j the general will is no longer the will of all ; contradi(flions and debates arife,
falutary
counfel
is
not adopted
wjthout dlfpute.
flate
is
bordering on ruin,
focial
and
lie
exifts only
in
no longer
the
conne<fl:s
when
bafefl:
alTume the facred name of the public good ; then is the general will altogether filent ; individuals, actuated
than
if
the
had never
pafs,
mock
legif-
under the name of laws, thofe inidecrees which have no other end than quitous
lature
private intereflr
Doth
No.
it
however, that
corrupted
?
annihilated or
invariable,
and
i82
and pure
A
;
TRE ATI S E
though
it is
ON the
of party.
fee,
fubjecfted to that
There
is
not an individual
who
doth not
own
interell
from that
entirely
but
in
his
ihare in
the
to
common
the
feems nothing
companion
which he propof^s
felf.
to lecure exclufively to
good him-
Setting
and
is as ready of the pubgood hat even tor his own fake as any one.
this
motive afide
he
Nay. even
all fenfe
in
ftllin^ hi-
he only eludes
in
it.
changing the f^ate of i.he queOion, and making an anfwer to what is not af^ed him ; fo that, inllead of adis
The
fiult
be
guilty of,
lies
it
is
to
the
imerejt of
he
fays,
//
/j
to the
in'ereft
this
of Juch an
or that iaiv
Jhould
ptifs
Thus
the order
not be calculated fo
interrogated, and
much
make
it
to
to be
always
anfwer.
I might here make a variety of refle<5fions on the fimp 'e right of voting in every adf of the fovereignty ; a right which the citizens
cannot be deprived of
as alfo
on the rights of
think-
SOCIAL COMPACT.
thinking,
183
public
is
propofing and
debating on
matters
ever
memitfelf
;
bers.
is
of importance
whole
treatife
of
me
C H A
On
is
P.
II.
Votes,
evident,
faid
in
IT the preceding
which public
concord there
animity in
lent
is
affairs are
may
afford
a fure indicaaon of the actual f>ate of manners, and the health of the body politic. The more
is
in public aflcmllies,
that
is
to
the
members approach to untheir votes, the more prevagiving will among them but long general
:
and commotions, evince debates, the afcendency of particular intereiis and the dediffentions
cline of
the ftate.
This appears lefs evident, Indeed, when two or more orders of men, enter into the ronflitution
;
as at
Rome, where
Pa-
iS4
TREATISE
ON the
and Plebeians occafioned frequent diflurbances in the Comitia^ even in the moft flouPatricians
republic.
This exception
real
:
however,
is
as in that
body
is
politic,
one
not true of both together, may neverthelefs be true of each apart. It is alfo true in fat
that, even during
the mofl
turbulent times of
the republic, the decrees of the Plebeians, when he Senate did not intermeddle, were pafTed
with
lity
great tranquillity agreeable to the pluraThe citizens having but o^Je of voices.
intereft, the
common
will.
at
this
tizens,
nor will.
reduced to flavery, have neither liberty In fuch a fituation, fear and flattery
no pervert their votes into acclamations ; they but either themfelves ; longer deliberate among
adore
or curfe their
tyrants.
debafed principles of the Senate under the Roman emperors. Under thefe circumffances alfo,
the
fentiments
of the
the
public were
frequently
cxprefTed,
tion
J
with
moil ridiculous
SOCIAL COMPACT,
185
Senators, while they loaded Vitellius with execrations, they aHecfted at the fame time to
make
to
a confufed
his
and clamorous
noife, in
order
prevent
their mafter,
fliould
he become
faid.
From
thefe
confiderations
may be deduced
the maxims, on which the manner of counting votes, and comparing diiferent fafFrages, (hould
or
or
be regulated, according as the general will is more lefs eafy to be difcovered, and the ftate more
lefs
advanced towards
its
decline.
There
is
but one law, which in its own nature, requires unanimous confent and this is the fecial com :
pact.
tary
free,
For
in
civil
aflbciation
:
is
al
the world
every
and mafter of himfelf, no one can lay him under reftraint, on any pretence whatever,
without his
own
is
confent.
fon of a Have
born a Have,
to affirm
he
is
If there
pofe this
contrail
their
;
oppofition
does
k
;
only
hinders
comprehended
in the
therein
main
aliens
midfl of citizens.
When
a flate
i86
a ftate
A
is
TREATISE
formed, a confent to
ON
its
the
inftltutlon
:
is
inferred
to fub-its
mrt to refidence
fovereignly
*.
any country
is
to
fubmit to
If we except this primitive eontra^ft, the determination of the majority is- always obligathis is a neceHary confequence tory on the refl
:
of the
contra(5l itfelf.
how
can a
man be
free,
conform to the
will of others.
How
can the
members of an oppofition be
called free-men,
who
are compelled to fubmit to laws which have not confented to ? I anfwer that this they is not The citizen queftion properly jfirated.
confents to
all
Ibme of them
by which he
is
punifhable for
* This mull always be underdood, however, of a free flate, from which people have the liberty to deFor in others the part with their eifetls at pleafure. confideration of their family, their property, the
want of an afylum,
tain an
neceffity
or
violence,
may
de-
inhabitant in a country contrary to his will ;. In which cafe, his fimple refidence neither implies
bis confent to the con trad, nor his violation of
it.
any
SOCIAL COMPACT.
any one.
this alone
187
The
that
conftant will of
is
all
the
;
memit is
bers of a Aare,
the general
will
and
freemen*.
feverally
approve or
the propofition ; but whether it be conformable or not to the general will, which is theirs as a colletfiive body ; each perfon, therefore,
this
in
claration of the
inferred frorii
pafles contrary
the majority.
to
When
it
law thus
my
I
that
proves
it
really
was
not.
So
my
ed,
it
to
my
will,
we fee the word Lihertas infcribed on the chains of the galley flaves, and on the doors of the prifoners the application of which device is
:
* At Genoa
it is
in
of
all ftates
adually
chained
the oar,
jierfed: liberty.
which
l88
A
as a
TREATISE
ON^
the
which
and
citizen is the fame as the general, that in cafe I fhould not have been free.
all
the
the plurality
to
of votes: and
take
when
this
ceafes
be the
is
cafe,
will, there
an end of
liberty.
In having (hewn
parties
is
how
and
in public
out the practicable means of preventing fuch abufes ; of this, however, I fliall fpeak further hereafter.
With regard
to the proportional
number of
it
down
the principles on
which
may be determined.
The
difference of a
ilngle voice
is enough to break the unanimity ; but between unanimity and an equality there is a variety of proportions ; to each of which the
number
in
queflion
may be
applied, according
There
are
SOCIAL COMPACT.
:
189
the nearer ought the determination to approach to unanimity .the other is, that the more exthe lefs fliould unpedition the affair requires,, In on. dehberations where infifted be iinimity the matter
iliould
be immediately determined,
the majority of a fingle vote fliould be fufficicnt. The firfl of thefe maxims feems mofl applicable
to permanent laws, and
the fecond
as
it
to matters
It is
of bufinefs.
But be
this
may,
from
tions
lity
fifl
propormuft be deduced, concerning that plurain whofe votes fliould be fuppofed to coav/ill.
the general
CHAP.
Of
III.
Ekclions,
ITH
cbfervcd
is
complicated
;
a<5l;
there
are
two
methods of proceeding
lot.
viz.
by choice and by
In dif-
They have
;
ferent republics
and we
fee in
our
own
times,
Jh
igo
T'he
TREATISE
on the
ts
the fiaiure
Montefquleu,
of
This
The
admit, but
choice
;
not for
fays he,
the
is
reafons given.
by
Ict^
hy per--
This, however,
is
If
we
fundion
of government and not of the fovcreignty, we iliall fee the reafon why this method is of the
nature of a democracy, in
flration
is
^o
much
the better, as
acls
are
fewer.
In
the office of
ma-
is not advantageous but expenfive and burthenfome, io that it were unjufl: to impofe it on one perfon rather than another. The
giftrate
whofe
lot
it falls.
For
in this cafe,
all
ffandin!^
an equal chance, the choice doth not depend on human will, nor can any particular application change the univerfality of the law.
the prince
SOCIAL COMPACT.
itfelf,
i^i
properly applicable. apparent exception, in the election of the doge of Venice, confirms this diIs
here
it
that
votes
are
The
it
fuch a mixt
form
as
is
is
adapted to
a mixt government.
For
it
is
a miflake to fup-
pofe the government of Venice a true arilloIf the lower order of people, indeed, cracy.
have no
fliare in
in
What
into
number
there
of nobles,
the
who
ma-
getting
giftracy, and reap no other advantage from their rank than the empty title of Excellency,
Coun-
This great council being as numerous as our general council at Geneva, its illullrious members have no greater privileges tl^erefore
It is certain, that than our ordinary citizens. extreme the afide difparity of the two refettlng
of Venice
the
fojomners
frma belonging
to that
ftate.
In a word, con-
what
light
you
wili.
192
will,
A TR EAT
abftra6led
is
S.E
ON the
from
its
no more
ariflocratlcal
is
we
have no
choice by lot, is attended with very inconvenience in a real democracy, when all
to
The
little
men
manners
and
abilities,
as
to
fentiment^
and fortune, the matter of choice is indifferent. But I have already obferved a true democracy is
only imaginary.
When
the
eledlion
is
of a mixt form,
viz.
by vote and by lot, the firfl ought to provide for thofe ofHcers which require proper talents, as in military affairs ; the other being bell: adapted
which require only common fenfe, honefly and integrity j fuch as the offices of
to thofe
in a
well-formed
ffate,
thofe
ia
by
all
the
citizens
common.
No eleflion either by vote or lot, hath place under a monarchical government the monarch himfelf being the only rightful prince and legal
;
,
magiflrate,
is
veiled
in
SOCIAL COMPACT.
in
193
him
alone.
When
to
the
Abbe de
St. Pierre,
increafe the
number of
ele(5l
their
members by
It
remains
to fpeak
in
but,
Roman
it
po-
explain
better
than
blifh.
all
the
It is
maxims
particularly
affairs,
to the
man-
both general
and
particular,
a council of two
hundred
thoufand perfons.
CHAP.
194
TREATISE
C H A
Of
the
on
the
P.
IV.
Comitia,
Roman
earliefl
Rome
there
is
even
great reafon
told
us
of
the moft interefting and inftruflive part of the annals of nations in general, which is that of
their eflablifliment,
is
Ex-
teaches us
but as
we
fee
formation of
ftates,
we
The
cuftoms
we
find
a(n:::ally
eftablifhed,
however, fufficiently atteft, there muA have been Thofe traditions, an origin of thofe cufloms.
*
it is
pretended was
taken
the
name of
Numa
is
is
What
this
probability
two
firft
kings of
preflive
of
their future
anions
alfo.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
a!fo, relating to fuch
19^
origin, which appear the moft rational, and of the befl authority ought
Thefe are the to pafs for the mofl: certain. maxims I have adopted in tracing the manner in which the moft powerful and free people ia
the univerfe, exercifed the fovereign authority.
Rome,
to fay, the
Sabines and foreigners, compofed was divided into three clafTes ; which, from that
of Albans,
divifion, took
the
name of
tribes.
thefe tribes
was fubdivided
Each of and
were
fele(fled
from
each
called
to the
good
order of a
city,
were
at
only
military.
But
it
feems
greatnefs, induced
the
little
town of Rome to
adopt
at firfl a
From
ig6
TREATISE
ar>
on the
however, there
From
that the
fpeedily refulted
inconvenience.
This was
while that of
the flrangers Vv^as perpetually encreafing by the concourfe of foreigners, the latter foon furpafTed The remedy the number of the two former.
corre<fl: this
divifion
room of
diftinflion of race,
which
he aboliflied, another taken from the parts of Inflead of the town occupied by each tribe.
three tribes, he conflituted four
;
each of which
hills
of
removing
it
inequality
he prevented
alfo for
the fu-
ture
and
in
only be local but perfonal, he prohibited the inhabitants of one quarter of the city, from removing to the other, and thereby prevented the
mixture of families.
He doubled
of
cavalry,
alfo
centuries
denomina-
tion; a fimple and judicious method, by which he compleatly diilinguifhed the body of knights
from
SOCIAL COMPACT.
murmurs of
the latter.
197
added Again, to thefefour city tribes, Servius becaufe fifteen others, called rurlic tribes, they
were formed of the inhabitants of the country, diIn the fequel were vided into as many cantons.
made an
tlie
equal
number of new
the
divifions,
and
Roman
thirty-five
number
till
at
which
theif
divifions
remained fixed,
the
final dilTolu-
From
the diflln<fllon
between the
tribes
of
city and country, refulted an efFeft worthy of becaufe we have no other example obfervation
;
of
to
it,
it
and becaufe
Rome was
of
It
its
at
once indebted
increafe of
empire.
the city
tribes
felves, the power and honours of the ftate, and treat the ruftics with contempt. The efFe(ft'^
neverthelefs,
was
dire(Elly
contrary.
The
life is
tafte
of the ancient
Romans
for a country
this tafle
well
known,
inftitutor,
l^hey derived
who
and configned, as
it
ipS
it
TREATISE
city,
on the
were, to the
Thus
in the
of agriculture, it was among thefe only the Romans looked for the defenders of their republic. This ftation, being that of
bufinefs
verfal efteem
the moft worthy patricians, was held in unithe fimple and laborious life of
:
the villager was preferred to the mean and lazy life of the citizen ; and a perfon who, having been a labourer in the country, became a refpelable houfe-keeper in town,
in
con-
tempt.
It is
with reafon,
fi^ys
magnanimous
men,
in
who
defended them
in
rifiied
them
in
peace.
ex-
becaufe of the perfons of which they were compofed ; whereas fuch of their individuals as
were
ed into the
bine,
of the city.
When
to fettle in
Rome,
he was loaded with honours, and regiftered in one of the ruAic tribes, which afterwards took
the
SOCIAL COMPACT.
the
199
name of
all
;
his
family.
were
rural
nor
the exiftence
of the
cy, although
become
a citizen.
ried fofar,
This was an excellent maxim, but was carthat it effe<5fed an alteration, and unftate.
Cenfors, after having long arrogated the right of arbitrarily removing the citizens from one tribe to another, perfirft
In the
place, the
mitted
in
whatever
they
pleafed
permilTiori
methods of cenfure.
Befides, as
powerful thus got themfelves regiflered in the rural tribes; and the freedmen, with the populace, only filled up thofc of the city; the
tribes in
^ion
but were
together,
the
word
tribe,
was
20
TREATISE
ON the
-rather
happened
alfo that
made
them.
a property
of the flate,
who
to purchafe
With
inflituted in
regard to the Curia, ten having been each tribe, the whole Roman peothe walls,
made up
thirty
Curia, each of which had their peculiar temples, their gods, officers
and
feafts called
Cm-
pitaiia, rcfembling the poganala, afterwards iniiituted among the ruflic tribes.
At the new
divifion
made by
Servius,
the
number
among
mode
of diftribution
dependent of the
tribes,
Ko
notice,
however,
the ruftic
;
among
becaufe
the tribes
mere
civil
SOCIAL COMPACT.
raifing
20f
of
military diftiiKftions
as
fuperfluous.
regirtered
in
Thus,,
citizen
was
fome
iii
yet
many
any
curia.
Servius
made
flili
a third divifion,
which had no
relation
to the
became
of
all.
in
its
He
into fix
clafll^s,
which he
diftinguifiied, neither
by
perfons
Of
by the rich^ the lower by the poor, and the middle clafTes by thofe of middling fortunes. Thefe fix clafTes
thefe the higher claffes
filled
were
again fo
that the
firft
clafs
alone
and the
laft clafs
In this
method
the feweft perfons, had the greater number a centuries ; and the lafl clafs was in numbe?
it
contained mor^-
Rome.
into the
tion,
In order that the people fliould penetrate lefe defign of this latter form of diflribuServius afFe^fted to give
it
the air of a
ml*
lltarf
202
TREATISE
of
ON the
litary one.
two
clafs,
centuries of armourers,
inftruments
war
to the fourth.
except the laft, he diAinguifhed alfo between the young and the old, that is to fay,
who were obliged to bear arms, from thofe were exempted from it on account of their age a diftin(ftion which gave more frequent rife to the repetition of the cenfus or enumerathofe
who
ty
laftly,
on the Campus A^crtius^ where all thofe who were of age for the fcrvicewere to appear under
arms.
why he did not purfue the fame of age in the lafl clafs, was, that the populace, of which it was compofed, were not permitted to have the honour of bearing arms
reafon,
dlflin<5^ion
The
There
is
not one
perhaps, of
all
thofe innumer-
the armies of
for
want of property,
Roman
when
fol-
liberty.
In
SOCIAL COMPACT.
In the
61:ion
laft clafs,
203
diAiii-
proktarii
and
The
former,
not quite reduced to nothing, fupplied the fiate at leaft with citizens, and fometimes on preiFing
occafions with foldiers.
totally
As
to thofe,
who were
deftitute
of
fubftance,
and could be
they were difrefirft
numbered only by
garded
deigned
as nothing to enroll
;
capitation,
who
to decide,
whe-
good or
nothing
their
lefs
than
of manners,
which prevailed
ture, their
among
the
t-heir
ancient
tafie
Romans^
agricul-
difintereftednefs,
for
contempt
for trade
it
practicable.
in
Where
the nation
among
the m.oderns,
which vofluctuation
racious avarice, a
fpirit
turbulence of difpofition, a
of artifice,
of property, would permit ment to continue for twenty years without overmufl be well obiervcd turning the flate ? Nay it that the purity of the Roman manners, and the
force of a cenfure
an eAablifli-
more
204
TREATISE
a rich
clafs
on the
of
at
man was
often re-
an
improper parade of
comprehend from this, why mention is hardly ever made of more than five clafTes, though there were in reality fix. The fixth,
It IS eafy to
furniQiing neither the army with foldiers, nor the Campus Martins * with voters, and being
of hardly any ufe in the republic, was hardly in'^er accounted any thing.
Ro-
man
people.
We
7
the de-
producftive, in their
legally
hefe afTemblies,
con-
voked, were denominated Comitia, and were held in the Campus Martins and other parts of Rom.e; being diAinguidied into tw/W^, centuriata^ and
tributa, according
to
the
fay
the
it
was there
jhe Cornitia afiembled by centuries ; in the two other forms, they affembled in iht forum and other places,
where the
portance
as the
al citizens.
of
SOCIAL COMPACT.
of the people into Curia, Centuries,
205
and Tribes^
The
C'^ni.ia curiata
were
inftitnted
by Romulus,
the Centuriata by Servius, and ihe Tributa by the tribunes of the people. Nothing could pafs
into a law, nor could any magiftrate be choferi
follows
his
that
no
;
citizen
fo
giving
vote
that
Roman
and
people
were
in right
fa6t.
To make
and give
it
iheir determinations
In the
firft
with
proper authority for fo doing : Secondly, that the afiembly ftiould occur on the days permitted
fliouid
be
The
thus
it
reafon
:
of the
firft
is
condition needs no
explanation
The
fecond
an
affair
of police
was not permitted the Cornitia to afTemble on market days, when the country people, coming to Rome on bufmefs, would be prevented from tranfacSting it. By the third, the Senate kept a fierce and turbulent multitude
under
2o6
A TREAT
reflraint,
E ON the
under fome
the latter,
But the laws and the elef^Ion of the chiefs were not the only matters fubmitted to the dethe Roman people having ufiirped the moft important fun<5lions of government, the fate of Europe might be faid
to
depend on
their afTemblies.
before them,
alterations in
To judge
of thefe diverfities,
it
is
fufficlent
The defign of Roto compare them together. the mulus in inAituting Curiee, was to reftrain the Senate by means of the people, and the
people by the Senate, while he himfelf maintained his influence equally over both.
By
all
this
the
number to counterballance that of and riches, which he left in the hands power
But, agreeable to the
fpirit
of the Patricians,
of monarchy, he gave more advantage to the Patricians, by the influence of their clients to obtain
SOCIAL COMPACT.
tain the majority of votes.
207
flitution of patrons
and
clients,
was
a mafter-
piece of politics and humanity, without which the order of Patricians, fo contrary to the fpirit
of the republic, could not have fubfifted. Rome alone hath the honour of giving to the world this fine example, of which no abufe is known
to have
fubfifted
under
the kings till the time of Servius, and the rejgn of the laft Tarqutn being accounted illegal, the
regal
guifhed by the
name of
leges curiata.
Under the republic, the Curia^ always confined to the four city tribes, and comprehending only the populace of Rome, could not arrive either at the honour of fitting in the Senate, which was at the head of the Patricians,
Aanding they were Plebeians, were yet at the head of the citizens in eafy circumftances. They fell, therefore, into difcredit, and were reduced to
fo
contemptible a
to
flate
Lidlors afTembled
the Comitia cur lata.
The
2c8
TREATISE
by
centuries^
on the
fo favourable
The
divifion
was
to ariliocracy, that it is not at firft eafy to comprehend why the Senate did not always carry their point in the Ccmitia ccniuriaia^ by which
ninety three
centuries, forming
of the whole
taining
Roman
the
convotes
and
the
being reckoned only centuiies, this firll clafs alone had more votes than all the others. When
the centuries of this clafs, therefore, were found
to be unanimous, they
proceeded no farther in
counting votes ; whatever might be determined by the minority being confidered as the opinion
of the mob.
So
that
it
might be juflly
faid,
money,
But two
this
firft place, the TribuneSg and always a confiderable generally fpeaking, number of wealthy citizens, being in this clafs of the rich, they counterpoized the credit of
caufes.
the Patricians
in
The
fecond
SOCIAL COMPACT.
to order, beginning with the
lots
firfl
209
in rank, cafl:
And
to the elecflion.
lot
it
was, pro-
the other centuries being called upon another day to give their votes accord* ing to their rank, when they repeated the fame
eledlion,
ceeded * alone
the former.
By
this
in
rank was
fet afide,
according
There
this
is
;
another advantage
refulting
from
cuftom
which
is
in the country
tions to
candidates thus
by
to of
a-
which means they might be better enabled But under the pretence give their vote. expediting aifaixs, this cuftom- was in time
bolilhed,
fame day.
7 he century thus preferred by lot was called frof bccaufe it was the iirft whofe fuitrage was demanded j and hence is derived the v/ord prerogarogari-za
;
ti-ve.
The
210
TREATISE
ON the
C'imltia hy Tribes, were properly fpeakthe ing great council of the Roman people. T'hefe were convoked only by the Tribunes ;
The
by
The
in
of rank
thefe affemblies
the right to be
to pay
prefent at
obedience to laws
This
in-
jufiice,
underflood, and
to
was
in
alone fufficient
invalidate the
decrees
all
of a body, whofe members were not admitted to vote. Had all the Patricians
as
they had
right>
in
quality of citizens, they could have had no undue influence where every man's vote was
It
is
evident,
therefore,
that,
exclufive
of
the good order that refulted from thefe feveral divifions, in colle(5ling the votes of fo nume-
rous a people, the form and method of thefe divifions were not indifferent in themfelves ;
each
being produ6\ive of
effecls,
adapted to
certaia
SOCIAL COMPACT.
certain views
in
2ii
regard to which
it
was prefer-
more circumftan-
account of thefe matters, it is plain from what hath been advanced, that the Comltia iri-
mod favourable to a popular the Comiia ccninrlata to an and government, With refpetfl to the Comitia curia a aiiilocracy.
hunaia were the
of which the populace formed the majority, as they were good for nothing but to favour tyrannical defigns,
ible
flate,
into
employ means,
which muft
have expofcd
It is very certain that too openly their defigns. all the Roman of the people was difmajedy
played only in the Comltia centuriata^ which only were compleat; the f^/r/tf/a wanting the ruHic
Tribes, and
tricians.
the tribunaia
With
votes,
it was, among the primitive Romans, fimple as their manners, though flill lefs fnnple than that of Sparta. Every one gave his vote
aloud, which the regifter took down in writing ; the plurality of votes in each tribe, determined the
212
TREATISE
cn the
tribes determined the fuffrage of the people. In the fame mianner alfo they proceeded with reThis gard to the Curies and the centuries.
cufiom was
grity
a very
good one,
fo long as inte-
prevailed
among
perfon or caufe.
people grew corrupt and fold their votes, it became neceffary to make them 'give their votes
more
privately,
in
order
to
re drain
the pur-
I know that Cicero cenfures this alteration, and attributes to it in a great degree the ruin of the republic. But, though I am fenfible of
all
cannot be of his opinion. I conceive, on the contrary, that the ruin of the ftate would have
been accelerated,
negledlcd
making
this
alteration.
As
the
regimen of
people in health, is not proper for the fick, {o of governing a corrupt it is abfurd to think
people by the fame laws as were expedient for them before they were corrupted. There cannot be a flronger proof of this maxim, than the duration of the republic of Venice, the fliadov/ of which ftill exifrs, folely becaufe its laws are
Oa
SOCIAL COMPACT.
On
blets
213
this change in the manner of voting, tawere diflributed among the citizens, by means of which they could give their fuffrage
without its being known On this occafioa other methods were of courfe made ufe of in
coUefling votes, fuch as counting the number of voices, comparing it with that of the tablets,
Sec.
Not
that
thefe
methods were
fo
returning officers from being often fufpe^led of partiality and it is plain in the fequel, by the multiplicity of
:
laws
in
made
to
eleC:tions,
that they
point.
Toward
was had
make up
digies
Pro-
but
this
were fometimes played off with fuccefs ; fcheme, though it impofed on the muldid not impofe on thofe
titude,
who
influenced
them.
called fud-
denly, and ifi great halte, that the candidates might not have time to create an undue interefl : others again the whole feffions was fpent in declamation, when it was feen that the people
at
were
214
were and
fo
TREATISE
wrong
all
on
fide.
the
At length,
biafTed to take a
thefe precautions,
is
many
people
flill
con-
tinued,
by
to judge caufes, both and and to expedite public private aifairs, with as much facility as could have been done in the Senate
itfelf.
CHAP.
On
V.
a Trihur;atf
exafl proportion between the component parts of a fiate, or that inevitable caufes
perpetually operate
to
WHEN
it is
impracticable to
eflabliili
an
change
is
their
relations,
a particular magiftracy incorporating with the reft, replaces every term in its true relation, and conftitutes in itfelf a
due medium
either
the prince and the fovereign, people, between of cafes or, in neceflity, at once between both.
I fhall
call a Tribt4nate^
is
legiflative
jpower.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
power.
It ferves
215
fometimes to prote6l the fothe government, as the tribunes vereign againft of the people did at Rome ; fometimes to prote<5t
the government againft the people, as at the ten do at Venice ; and prefent the council of
as did the
Ephori
The
of the
Tribunate
city,
is
not a conftitutional
part
any (liare in the legiOative or executive power even in this however, its own is much greater
for being able to
do nothing itfelf, it may prevent any thing from being done by others. It is more facred and revered, as defender of the
laws, than the prince
who
executes
them, or
the fovereign
evident at
who
who
always
the
people colledlively,
to their
common
didlion.
ofHcers, without
command
or
jurif-
The
is
good
conftitution
but
have ever fo
little
afcendency of power,
it
2i6
it
TREATISE
thing.
ON the.
to Its
fubverts every
it is
With regard
it it
;
weaknefs
it
not natural to
all,
too
power.
ufurps only the would interpret the
it
when
is
it
and when
it
it
The
enor-
mous power of the Ephori, which was exercifed without danger, while Sparta retained its puferved only to increafe the when once begun. The them of corruption blood of Agis fpilt by thofe tyrants was revenged by his fucceflbr the crime and the punifliment
rity
:
of manners,
of the Ephori accelerated equally the ruin of that republic ; for after the time of Cleomenes
Sparta was nothing.
The
deflru(51:ion
of the
Roman
ner
:
republic was
efFe<5>ed in
the fame
man-
power which the Tribunes by degrees ufurped, ferved at length, with the
the exceffive
made
the
in
defence of
liberty,
As
it is
a
to
fangulnary the Patricians and the people, and which is fo far from openly protecting the laws, that it now
ferves but fccretly to efFedl the breach of them.
mofl:
tribunal, equally
horrible
The
SOCIAL COMPACT.
The Tribunate
is
217
government, by increafing the number of its members. When the Roman Tribunes, at firfl
two, and afterwards
Vheir
five,
had
mind
not
to
double
oppofe it; being well afTared they fhould be able to make one a curb to another which was actually the cafe.
;
Thebefl way to prevent the ufurpations of fo formidable a body, a way that no government hath hitherto adopted, would be to render fuch
a
body not permanent, but to regulate the intervals during which it fhould remain dilTolved.
Thefe
intervals
fo great
manner
that
in cafe of n-e-
by extraordinary commifTion.
This method appears to me, to be attended with no inconvenience; becaufe, as I have already obferved, the Tribunate making no effential
part
of the conftitution,
injury
:
may be
newly
fup'
prelfed without
efiecftual,
and
it
appears to
mc
becaufe a
ma.giilrate
re-el\a-
blifhed doth
not
pa him.
CHAP.
ziS
TREATISE
CHAP.
Of
ON
the
vr.
the D'lSfaiure,
^^ HAT inflexibility of
in
may
fome
cafes render
critical juncflure
order and prolixity of forms, take up a length of time, of which the occafion will not al-
The
ways admit. A thoufand accidents may happen for which the legiflature hath not provided
;
and
it is
that
We
efFe(n:s.
fhould not be
defirous,
therefore,
of
eftablifliing the
Even Sparta
lie
foraetimes permitted
the laws to
dormant.
government
is
concerned.
In fuch
manifefl:,
uncommon
the pubbe provided for by a particular afl, ^vhich commits the charge of it to thofe who
when
the
danger
is
are
SOCIAL COMPACT.
are moO: worthy.
in
219
pafs,
Such
commliTion
may
two
the nature
of the danger.
If the cafe require only a greater activity in the government, it fliould be confined to one or two members ; in which cafe it would not be
the authority of the laws, but the form of the adminiftration only that would be changed^
But
if
the
that
a re-
would prevent
who
medy, then a fupreme chief might be nominated fliould filence the laws, and fufpend for a
the
moment
the
fovereign
authority.
In fuch a
cafe, general Will cannot be doubted, it being evident that the principal intention of the
people mufl: be to fave the (late from perdition, By this mode of temporary fufpenfion the legidative authority
girtrate
is
not abolilhed
it,
the
it
ma-
who
filences
cannot make
fpeak,
;
and though he over-rules cannot reprefent it he may do every thing indeed but make laws.
The
Senate,
firfl
method was taken by the Romaa when it charged the confuls, in a fafor the
fafety of the
com-
220
A T REAT
The
E ON the
when
common- wealth.
one of the confuls nominated adiflator*; a cuftom which Rome adopted from the example
of Alba.
In the early times of the republic, the Ro-
to the diiSatorfhip,
fufficient ftabilicy
to fupport itfelf
The
was no
would abufe
be tempted
the term.
(o '^reat a
his authority, or
that
he would
to
keep
it
in his
it
hands, beyond
On
the contrary,
appeared that
power was burthenfome to the perfon invefted with it, (b enger were they to refi<^n it; as if it were a difncnlt and dangerous
pcfi;,
to
be fuperior
to the laws.
was not the danger of the abufe, but of the debafement of this fupreme magiftracy,
Thus
it
* This nomination wasfecredy made in the night, as if they were afhamed of the adlion of placing ary man
fo
much above
the laws.
that
SOCIAL COMPACT.
of
it,
221
to proflitute
in
the
affiiir
ther matters of
to
mere formality,
was veryjuflly
be apprehended that it would become kfs refpetSlable on prefiing occafions ; and that the
people would be apt to look rspon an office as
merely
titular,
which was
infliiuted to afnfl at
empty ceremonies.
Toward
republic, the
Rc^
mans, becoming more circumfpect, were as fparing of the di<5lature, as they had before been prodigal of it. Ir was eafy to fee, however, that their fears
internal
magifirates
might
li-
fome
berty, without ever making encroachments on it; and that the Roman chains were not forged
in
Rome
itfelf,
but
in its
armies abroad.
The
and
litde
cjo
weak
made
to Sylla
Pompey
C^far,
fhewed
plainly
city
how
the authority
againfl the
could
L3
T'--
222
A TREAT
]^d
E ON the
commit great blun-
This error
ders.
them
to
Such
for inftance,
was
ilieir
neglecting
of Catalineor at moft a
For, as
it
city,
on him, might
fpiracy,
a'
eafily
llances
to expe<5l.
tented
itfelf
with committing
;
power
into
whence
in a capital
condu(51:,
he was very
juftly
he
had
fpilt
a reproach they
But the
before
his
it ;
eloquence
of the conful
carried
a
all
and preferring,
glory to
his
though
Roman,
own
of the
country, he
thought
lefs
mofl
flate,
legal,
and certain method of faving the than the means of fecuring all the honour
of
SOCIAL COMPACT.
'of fuch a
tranfacflion to
223
himfelf *.
Thus was
of
honoured
as the deliverer
Rome,
it
was
his
repeal,
was
After
all,
in
whatever manner
conferred,
this
it is
commiliion
may be
important of confe-
quence to limit its duration to a fhort term ; which fhould on no occaiion be prolonged. In
thofe conjiinflures,
when
it is
necelTary to ap-
is
prefently faved or
deflroyed, which caufcs t>eing over, the didature becomes ufclcfs and tyrannical.
At Rome,
for
fix
the
ditflators
;
held their
office
only
and the greater part refigned before Had the time appointed that term expired.
months
been longer, it is to be apprehended they would have been tempted to make it longer flill ; as
did the decemvir whofe office lafled a
year.
whole
The
did^ator had
for
him than was necelTary to difpatch the bufmefs which he was appointed fo that he had
;
* This
CHAP,
224
A TR
E A
E ON the
C H A
P.
VII.
Of
the
Cinforjkip,
AS
by the laws,
is
public judgment
made by
a
their cenfure.
The
the law, public opinion Cenfor puts in execution, in particular cafej, after the example of the prince.'
is
kind of
which
far,
therefore, ^s
the cenforial
tribunal
from being the arbiter of popular opinions, it: and, whenever it departs only declares them
;
from them,
fe61ua}.
its
decifions
are
vain
and
inef-
It
is
ufelcfs to difiinguirti
the manners of a
nation
by the objedls of
its
efteem
for
thefe
arc neceUaall
people
opinion,
world,
it
is
their pleafures.
Correal the prejudices and opinions of men, and We altheir manners will corre6l themfelves.
is
beautiful, or
what appears
SOCIAL COMPACT.
lb
it
;
225,
but
is
it is
this
manners, takes upon himto judge of honour; and whoever judges of honour, decides from opinion.
of
Whoever judges
The opinions of a people depend on the condo not govern Aitution ; though the laws
manners, it is the legiflature that gives rife to them. As the legidature grows feeble, manner's
degenerate, but the judgment of the cenfors will not then effel what the power of the. laws-:,
efFe(fled*
It follows,
office
of a cenfor
.
may
but never to
cenfors
this
is
Eftablifh.
during the vigour of the laws ; whens pad, all is over ; no legal meansi can be
effecSlual
when
The
cenfor
is
prefervative
of manners, by
propriety by judici--
them when
in a flu<5luating
fituation.
The
ure..
L.5_,
oJ
226
TREATISE
ON the
of feconds in duels, though carried to the greateft excefs in France, was abolifhed by the following words inferted in one of the kings edifts ; As to who have the covjardice to call thofe
ihemfelves feconds*
to that cuftom
at
fame,
edifls pronounced
though
trary
it
is
cowardice to fight a duel ; certainly true, yet as ic was conthe public laughfo
ed at a determination
the
public
no
it
conftraint, there
in
fhould
be no appearance of
to
the tribunal
eftabliflied
reprefent
it.
Romans, and
ftill
more
efFedlually
by the Lacedemonians.
A
*
man
made an exthe
cellent
propofal in
do but
(lightly
have
treated
bert,
more
at large
my
letter to
M.
d'Alem*.
Ephori,
SOCIAL COMPACT.
227
notice of it, caufed Ephori, without taking any the fame propofal to be made by a citizen of
charadler
and
virtue.
How
honourable was
this proceeding to the one, and how difgracefa^ to the other j and that without dire6lly praifmg
or blaming
either
of the
public edicl,
flaves.
fo fevere as fuch
impunity
their
tans
Greece,
CHAP.
Of poUtkal
the
VIII.
ReUgion
firft
INother kings
ages of the world, men had nothan gods, nor any other
go-
theocratical.
It
required a great alteration in their fentiments and ideas, before they could prevail on themfelves,
fter,
to look
and think
a ma^*
Hence^
228
TREATISE
on the
Hence, a deity being conftantly placed at the head of every polhical fociety, it followed that
Two
as many different gods as people. communities, perfonally ftrangers to each other, imd almofl always at variance, could not
;
there was
nor could
other
in
againft
each
chief.
Thus
civil
Polytheifm
became
and theo-
which
r.re
/hewn
hereafter.
The
trace
their
notion of the Greeks, in pretending to own gods among thofe of the Barits rife
people.
we
which
different
nations,
and according
to
which
it is
Moloch, fuppofed were one and the fame god and that the Baal of the Phenicians, the Zeus of the Greeks, and
;
that
Saturn and
Chronos
common
be*
SOCIAL COMPACT.
between
chimerical
229
diiFereiit
beings
bearing
names
If
it
be
aflced
why
there
were no
religions
wars among the Pagans, when every flate had thus its peculiar deity and worfhip ? I anfwer,,
was
plainly
its
for
this
having government, no diftindlion was made between the obedience paid to their gods, and that due
to their laws.
ftate
own
Thus
their political
were
at the
fame time theological wars; and the departments of their deities were prefcribed by the limits of ihdr refpe(5live nations.. The god of one peo*
pie
nor
were
Pagan
but
deities jealous
of their pre'
rogatives
kind
amicably
between them.
manEven Mofes
himfelf fometimes fpcaks in the fame manner of the god of Ifrael. It is true the Hebrews de-
gods of the Canaanites, a people profcribed and devoted to deflrucfion, whofe poffeflions were given them for an inheritance
fpifed the
:
of
whom
mi
they
poJJ'efs
were forbidden
ihaty fays
thou
.4
230
TREATISE
on the
mtes, whiJ} Chetnoth thy God glveth thee to pof? So whomfoever the Lcrd our God fhall drive fefs
out from before us^ them will ive poffep.
There
i&
in this pafTage, I
of the
^
But when the Jews, being fubje(fled to the afterwards to ihofe of kings of Babylon, and
Syria,
god
an
to acknowlege any perfifled in refufing refufal was efteemed this but their own,
of rebellion againft their conquerer, and drew upon them thofe perfecutions we read of
al
in their hiftory,
is
*
flianlty
The
clufively
only method of converting nations was to fubdue them ; warriors were the only miflionaries ;
and the obligation of changing their religion being a law to the vanquifhed, they were firfl to be conquered before they were folicited on
*
It is
an holy war was not a religious war. to facrilege, and not to fubdue
punilh
objed was
infidels.
this
SOCIAL COMPACT.
this head.
231
So
far
Ho-
mer,
in
behalf
of
mankind.
its
Each
it
refpedlive
deity,
and exprelTed
of
by
beits
the erection
fore
new
it
The Romans
fummoned
It
gods to abandon
left
the
people of
and though
upon
thofe gods as fubje(fled and obliged to do homage to their own They left the vanquifhed
:
they fometimes
Romans having extended their with their religion empire, and fometimes even
length, the
At
adopted the deities of the vanquifhed, the people of this vafl empire found themfelves iri
pofTefTion of a
multiplicity
of gods
and
reli-
from each other, Paganifm became infenfibly one and the fame religion throughout the world.
gions
;
which not
difTering efTentially
Things were
efliablifh his
in this flate,
when
Jefus
came
5
to
fpiritual
kingdom on earth
a de-
fign
232
TREATISE
gave
ON the
theological
to thofe in-
^gn which,
from the
political fyflem,
teftine divifions
fince continued
Nov/
this new idea of a kingdom in the other worlds having never entered into the head of the Pathe ChriHians as a5!ual gans, they regarded
rebels,,
who,
pretended to
refpe(n:
and
this
was undoubtedly
fe.cuted.
What
did, in
come
to pafs.
Things put on
flians,
new
face,
as their number increafed, changed their their invifible kingdom of the other while tone, world, became, under a vifible head, the moOt
As
vil
in all countries,
cl^
governors, and laws, there reiulted from this two-fold power a perpetual ftruggle for a perfedl fyAem of juiifdidtion, which renders
SOCIAL COMPACT.
;
233
domeftic policy almoft impoflible in Chriflian and prevents us from ever coming to a ilates
determination, whether
prieil
it
we
are
bound
to obey.
Some
in
Europe or
its
Beighbourhood,
fuccefs
or rc-eftablilh the
;
fally prevailed.
remained, or again become independent of the fovereign, and without any neceffary conneclion
with
the body of
the
Aate.
Mahomet had
his
fyftem, and fo
fubfifted
long as
modes of
under the caliphs and their government fucceffors, that government remained perfe<f^Iy
uniform, and fo far good.
becoming wealthy, learned, polite, indolent and cowardly, were fubdued by the Barbarians then the divifion between the two powers re:
commenced
and
though
to
it
be
lefs
apparent
among
it
the
Chriflians,
is
neverthelefs
as in
Perfia,
where
divifion
is
con-
llantly perceptible.
Among;
.234
A TREAT
E ON the
us, the kings of England are placed head of the church, as are alfo the Czars inRuflia but by this title they are not fo pro-
Among
:
at the
countries
to
perly mailers as miniflers of the religion of thofe they are not pofTefTed of the power
:
change
it,
its
prefent
Wherever the Clergy conftitute a colledive body *, they will be both matters and There are therelegiflators in their own caufe. fore two in fovereigns England and RufTia, as
form.
well as elfewhere.
Of
all
Chriftian
authors,
who faw
it
is
not fo
much
the
formal afTemblies of the clergy, fuch as are held in France, which unite ihera together in a body, as
the
communion of
their churches.
excommunication form
clergy
;
the
focial
the
al-
a compa6l by
their
ways maintain
people.
are fellow-citizens, though they fiiould be perfonally as diftant, as the extremities of the world. This in-
vention
priefts
is
a mafter-piece in
it;
any
clerical
SOCIAL COMPACT.
that political
235
without which
no
ftate
But he or government can be well conftituted. the prevailing fpirit of ought to have feen that
was incompatible with his fyftem, and that the intereil of the Church would be It was not always too powerful for the flate.
Chriftianity
fo
much
that
which was
really falfe
and fhock-
of this philofopher, as what was really jull and true, that rendered him odious *.
florical
conceive that, by a proper difplay of hifacSls, in this point of view, it would be eafy to refute the oppofite fentiments both
I
-,
pretends that no religion whatever can be of fervice to the body politic, and the latter that
Chriftianity
is
its
beft
It
that every
nth
* In a letter of Grotius to his brother, dated the of April, 1643, may be feen what that great
blamed
in his
book
de ci-vC'
Grotius, being indulgent, feems inclined to forgive the author, the faults of his book, for the
its
fake of
were not
fo candid,.
flate-
236
flate
TREATISE
;
on the
the world
bafis of religion
and againft the fecond, that the precepts of Chriftianity are at the bottom
more
of the
make myfelf fully underdood, need only give a little more precifion to the
In
order
to
political
Religion, confidered as
it
relates
to fociety,
which
general or particular, may be diftinguiflied into two kinds, viz. the religion of the man and that of the citizen. The firft,
is
either
or
rites,
confined
is
;
genuine theifm,
divinity.
The
gods
felf,
other, adopted only in one country, whofe and tutelary faints are hence peculiar to itis
external
all
counted
Infidels^
this
kind
SOCIAL COMPACT.
kind of religion extends the duties and leges of men no farther than to its own
237
privialtars.
Such were
to
civil
all
which may be
Uw
or pofitive divinity.
There
is
Aill
more
extraordinary, which dividing fociety into two legiflatures, two chiefs, and two parties, fubjecfts
mankind to contradicSlory obligations, and prevents them from being at once devotees and citizens. Such is the religion of the Lamas,
of the Japanefe, and of the Roman Catholics ; which may be denominated the religion of the priefls, and is productive of a fort of mixed
If
we examine
in a political
light,
they
have
all
their faults.
it
The
third
is
would
of time, to point them out. Whatbe mere ever contributes to dilTolve the focial union is
lofs
good
for
in
nothing
all
inflitutions
which
fet
man
ufe.
coiitradi<Stion
no
The
238
TREATISE
is
on
the
as
it
The
fecond
fo far
commendable
unites
divine worfhip with a refpefl for the laws, and that, making the country the objedl of the people's adoration, the citizen
is
the flate
is
is
to ferve
its
tutelary divinity.
This
fliould
a fpecies of theocracy, in
which there
To
;
die, in
fuch
;
to fufFer
martyrdom
impiety
and to doom a
to
is
devote him
It is blameable, however, in that, being founded on falfehood and deceit, it leads man-
fubftitutes
inis
exclufive
and tyrannical,
perfecuting;
fo
it
that a
fometimes
breathe nothing but murd.er and maffacre, and think, at the fame time, they are doing an holy
a(ftion in cutting the throats
ftilp
of thofe
who wor-
feives.
This circumllance
SOCIAL COMPACT.
in a natural flate
is
239
which
of war with
all
others,
fafety.
own
rational
and
religion
of
in
Chriftianity
not however,
it is
profefTed
modern
this
times, but as
is
which
quite another
According to
the children
which
unites
them
dif -
But
tion to the
felTion
having no particular relabody politic, leaves the laws in pofonly of their own force, without adding
,this religion,
any thing to it ; by which means the firmeft bonds of fuch particular fociety are of no effect.
Add
to
this, that
Chriftianity
is
fo
far
from attaching the hearts of the citizens to the ilate, that it detaches them from it, as well as
from
than which worldly objefls in general to the fpirit of more be can contrary nothing
all
:
fociety.
It
is
faid
that a nation
of true Chriftians
To
240
A
this
TREATISE
aflertion,
;
on the
is
To
however, there
that
a
one great
objediion
and
this is,
fociety of true
Chriflians
I will
would not be
to
its
a fociety
of men.
this
Nay,
afHrm,
that
fuppofed
perfection,
would neither
be of the greatefl flrength nor duration. la confequence of its being perfe(Sl:, it would want
the (Irongeft
ties
of connexion
and thus
it.
this
do their duty, the people to the laws, the chiefs obedient be might might
Individuals might
be
jufl:,
might look upon death with contempt, and there might prevail neither vanity nor luxury, in fuch
a ftate.
So
far all
would go well
but
let
us
look farther.
Chrlftianity
is
fplritual
:
religion, relative
ritance,
He
performs his
profound
good
It
or
ill
deavours.
Provided
here be-
low
SOCIAL COMPACT.
low.
If the ftatc be in
241
a flomifhing fjtiiation,
kit he fhould be puffed up with the incountry's glory ; if the blefTes the hand of God that
he
humbles
It
Is
farther neceiTary to
mony
of fociety, that
all
be without exception equally good Chriflians ; for, if unhappily there fhould be one of them
ambitious or
hypocritical, if
there ihould be
found among them a Cataline or a Cromwell, it is certain he would make an eafy prey of his Chriftian charity doth not pious countrymen.
eafily
evil
of one's neigh-
bour.
the
art
No
Chriftians mufl
obey the fuperior powers. Does the depofiiary of power abufe it ? he becomes the rod by
which
it
pleafes
God
And
24^
A TREAT
E ON the
them to
And, would
drive
mud be broken,
ceed
;
out the ufurper, the public tranquillity and violence and blood-fhed fucall this
agrees but
J
ill
of true Chriftians
and, after
what
is it
to
them, whether they are freemen or Haves in this vale of mifery ? Their efiential concern is
to
work out
their falvation,
nefs in another
world
is
to efFeft
refignation in this,
but
they
Of what confequence
vantages
to
?
them, whether
an
impetuous
of
their
and
might
take
ftoicifm
draw
enemy them
out againft a brave and generous people, arlove of glory and their dently infpired with the
inftance, your truly country; fuppofe, for Chriftian republic againfl that of Sparta or of
Rome
Your
de-
SOCIAL COMPACT.
243
depend-
ing on the contempt which their enemy might It was, in my opinion, a entertain for them. fine oath that was taken by the foldiers of Fabius.
They
,
did not
make
vow
cither to die
or conquer
querors, and
pundlually performed
their oath.
made
fuch a
vow,
ths
afraid of templing
But
am
all this
in fpeaking of a Chriftian republic ; one of thefe terms neceflarily excluding the other. Chii-
ftianity
inculcates
fervitude
and dependence
the
fpirit
of
it
is
flians are
them not fometimes to profit by it. True Chriformed for fiaves they know it, and
;
this
tranfitory life
is
of too
little
Will
foldiers
it
?
be
I
faid,
it.
deny
fiiaa
244
A TREAT
For my
oNT
the
of no true
ilian troops,
part, I
know
Chriiiian foldiers.
Do
you name
thofe of the
Crufades
the
far
citizens:
the
of the priefl,
fpirimai country,
had converted
int-o^-
To
fet
this
was
as i.hc gofpt-l
ligion,
on by true Chrifllans,
Under
diers
the Pagan emperors, the Chriflian folwere brave ; of this all the Chiiflian wrius,
ters afFure
tive
and
believe
them
the
mo-
fpirit
of honour or
emulation, excited
when
tive
the
Crofs
Eagle to
flight,
Roman
valour difappeared.
But, laying a/ide political confiderations, let us return to the matter of and afcertain
right,
if
SOCIAL COMPACT.
its
245
true principles with regard to this important The right which the focial compafl conpoint.
fers
nions he
may
Now,
it
is
of great
importance to a flate, be of a religion that may infpire him with a regard for his duty; but the tenets of that religion are
no farther interefilng
to the
commuto the
morals, and
the
pro-
citizens.
If
ws
is
ferfeSlly at
becaufe no one
may
injure another.
This
is it
the invariable limit of republican liberty, nor to (late the cafe more precifely. J canpoffible
is
not
deny
fometimes quotinpr
this manafcript,
order to
who
preferved
ttie
inte-
in the
the
mod
ment of
tl 3
except
^j^6
TREATISE
on the
except thefe, the individual may profefs what others he pleales, without the fovereign's baring any right to interfere ; for, having no jurifdiclion in the other world, it is nothing to
the fovereign what becomes of the citizens in a future life, provided they difcharge the duties
incumbent on &nm.
in the prefent.
There
is
a
;
profefTion
of Faith,
therefore,
it
purely* political
is
in^
the province of the fovereign to afcertain, not precifely as articles of religion, but as the fentiments due to &ciety,
poffible to
without which
it is
im-
Without compelling any one to adopt thefe fentiments, the fovereign may alfo equitably baniih him the fociety not indeed as impious, but as
;
endeavoured to
edablifh the do6\rine of the Pv^ortal'ty of the Soul : Cato and Cicero, in anfwer to him, did not enter in o
a philofophical difcufiion of tlie argumeni, but contentedticmfebes with fhevving that Csfar had fpoken
like a
bad
citiz^^n,
to the ftate.
And
this
and advanced a dogma pernicious was in fact the Doint only that
come
in theology.
gard
SOCIAL
gard to
quired,
after
juftlce,
M PACT.
147
and of
duty.
a
to his
having made
fentiments, betray
his difbelief of
them by
his
may equitably be punifhed with death ; having committed the greateft of all crimes, that of belying his heart in the face of
mifcondu<fl, he
the laws.
The
fevi?
and fimple
precifion,
down
alfo
wit
The
fiate
and without explication or comment. exiftence of a powerful, intelligent, beneprefcient and provident Deity ; a future' the reward of the virtuous and the pu;
ficent,
;
contraift,
its
and of
laws
thefe
be
txveen civil
nffe^l to
make
a diflincftion
be-
religious
It
is
toleration, are, in
my
opinion miftaken.
dially in
impofTible to
live cor-
lieve
whom we
:
firmly be-
to love
them would
it
be
to
Is
therefore
us
either to
per-
5148
TR
EA
TI
E ON the
Wherever the
of religious perfecution fubfifls, it is impofTible it fhould not have fome efFeft on the
civil police,
in
which
cafe,
the fovereign
is
no
longer fovereign even in a fecular view ; the priefts become the real maflers, and kings only their
officers.
requifite to
fpirit
of toleration toward others, provided their tenets are notcontradiftory to the duty of a good
citizen.
to fay,
n^re
ought
is
no fahation out of the pale of our churchy to be banifhed the flate ;. unlefs indeed
the Aate be an ecclefiaftical one, and the prince Such a dogma is of ufe only in a a
pontiiF.
it is
de-
The
reafon
which
it is
faid
Henry
ligion,
it,
IV. gave, for embracing the Roman Catholic reought to have made an honeft man reje<5^
C H A
F.
SOCIAL COMPACT.
e H A
P.
249
IX.
The Conclufwn,
thus flated the true principles
to
HAVING
the ftate on
in
its
fix
proper
it is
bafis,
it
remains to fhevv
what manner
lations.
head would be comprehended, the laws of nations and commerce, the laws of
Under
this
war and conqueft, leagues, negotiations, treaBut thefe prefent a new profpeft, ties, &c.
too
vafl:
as
mine ;.
diflant
which
fliould be confined to
objeds
lefs
my
limited capacity.
FINIS.
in
the Prefs,
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