Graduate School of Development Studies

Impact of Ethnic Federalism in Building Developmental State of Ethiopia

A Research Paper presented by:

Samuel Kenha Bonda

(Ethiopia)
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of MASTERS OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES Specialization: Governance and Democracy (G&D) Members of the examining committee: Dr Freek Schiphorst (Supervisor) Dr Sylvia I. Bergh (Reader)

The Hague, The Netherlands December, 2011

Disclaimer:
This document represents part of the authors study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

Inquiries:
Postal address: Institute of Social Studies P.O. Box 29776 2502 LT The Hague The Netherlands Kortenaerkade 12 2518 AX The Hague The Netherlands +31 70 426 0460 +31 70 426 0799

Location: Telephone: Fax:

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Contents
List of Acronyms .............................................................................................................. v Abstract .......................................................................................................................... vi Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Background 1.2 Framing Research issue and problems 1.3 Relevance and Justification 1.4 Objective of the study 1.5 The Research Question Sub-Questions: 1.6 Methodology Method of data collection 1.7 Organization of the paper Chapter 2 Conceptual frame work: Ethnicity, Federalism and Ethnic Federalism 2.1 Ethnicity 2.2 Federalism 2.3 Ethnic Federalism 2.4 Ethnic Federalism in the Ethiopian context 2.4.1 The politics of self-determination 2.4.2 Ethnic Federalism and Conflicts Chapter 3 Theoretical Frame work and Literature Review: Conceptualization of developmental state 3.1 A Brief History of the debate in Developmental States 3.2 The developmental state 3.3 Features of Developmental State 3.4 Southeast Asian Experiences 3.5 Failed attempts at state-led development in Africa Chapter 4 Developmental State of Ethiopia 4.1 The making of developmental state in Ethiopia 4.2 Elite Commitment 4.2.1 Human resources in the bureaucracy: Case of BeninshangulGumuz regional state 4.3 Insulated Bureaucracy 4.4 Embedded Autonomy 4.5 Ideological Underpinning is Developmental 1 1 3 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 8 8 9 10 12 13 14 16 16 17 19 20 22 24 24 26 27 29 30 32

Chapter 5 Conclusion 34 References.......................................................................................................................... 1 iii

Acknowledgements
I am greatly indebted to my supervisor Freek Schiphorst whose great patience, understanding and constructive advices, have really made this paper is reality. Importantly, I owe a great deal to him not only for his intellectual guidance but also for his understanding my problem which at one point nearly i stopped this research paper. He was so patient with me at all the time that i was not able to match any deadlines. Let him stay blessed.

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List of Acronyms
BoFED ENA EPRDF FDRE GDP GTP IMF MDGs ML MoFED NIE OLF PASDEP PDRE SNNP TGE TPLF UNCTAD UNDP UNECA WB Woreda Bureau of Finance and Economic Development Ethiopian News Agency Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Growth Domestic Product Growth and Transformation Plan International Monetary Fund Millennium Development Goals Marxism-Leninism Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Newly Industrialized economies Oromo Liberation Front Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Transitional Government of Ethiopia Tigray Peoples Liberation Front United Nations Conference on Trade & Development United Nations Development Programme United Nations Economic Commission for Africa World Bank District administration

Abstract
This paper examines the impact of ethnic federalism in building successful developmental state of Ethiopia. The developmental state has two components: one ideological and one structural. It is this ideology- structure nexus that distinguishes developmental states from other forms of state. In terms of ideology, a developmental state is essentially one whose ideological underpinning is developmentalist in that it conceives its mission as that of ensuring economic development. The main force behind the developmentalist ideology has usually been nationalism. On the other hand, the state-structure side of developmental state emphasis the capacity to implement economic policy sagaciously and effectively. The central to the activities of such developmental state is a highly competent and autonomous national bureaucracy. However, as indicated in the finding the ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has negatively impact in establishing highly competent bureaucracy due to the ethno-language criteria for recruitment and appointment of bureaucrat and their patron client arrangement. In addition, the creation of country wide citizenship has declined due to ethnic federal structure of the country.

Keywords

Developmental state, Bureaucracy, nationalism, ethnic, Federalism, Ethnic Federalism.

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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Ethiopia contains about 85 million peoples and approximately about 80 ethnic and linguistic groups, and stands as the second populous country in subSaharan Africa. The main- stay of the economy is subsistent peasant agriculture which accounts for about 42.9 percent of the GDP. Agriculture provides the largest proportion of foreign earnings and employs more than 85 percent of the population (African Economic outlook, 2011). The country is confronted with complex poverty, which is broad, deep and structural. The country has one of the lowest per capita incomes- about 1000 USD and is categorized as one of the poorest countries in the world (ibid.). Federal forms of government in any country result from unique political and historical processes. In the Ethiopian case, the federal structure of the country relates to the problem of a failed nation-building project through assimilation and centralization. Thus, the ethnic-federal experiment of devolving public power to ethnic groups goes against the centralized nationbuilding project of the previous regimes. The previous regimes gave much emphasis to Ethiopian nationalism as a unifying concept and promoted centralization rather than regional or ethnic autonomy (Asnake, 2006). During the rule of the emperor Haile Selassie (1931-1974), which was based on absolutism and concentration of power on the king himself through a patrimonial network of power, resource and privilege accumulation and distribution system that benefits the rulers and their few collaborators at local, regional and central levels with very little ethnic references. The major orientation of the state was to use the state power for voracious appropriation of resources mainly from the peasantry in order to reward the few ruling nobilities and their clienteles that maintain the survival of the highly centralised state (Messay, 1995). Though the predatory state had showed inconsequential favouritism based on ethnicity, it promoted state nationalism and national integration of course, with the perception of national identity as the mirrorimage of the shoan ruling elites ethnic and cultural manifestations such as Amharic language and orthodox Christianity. The project of building a highly centralised state was intensified during the reign of Emperor through his twin policies of centralisation and modernisation (Clapham, 1969). This project, however, faced several challenges from different corners of the country increasingly radicalised students who rallied behind land to the tiller, the nationalities question and armed insurgency in Eritrea. The abrogation of the Ethio-Eritrea federation in 1962 led to a civil war. In 1974, revolutionary upheavals rocked the country. The imperial regime, whose structures failed to handle the increasing demands for change coming from the various corners of the country, was overthrown by a popular revolution in September 1974 (Clapham, 1988:32) 1

After 1974, the military regime, repeatedly stressed that it preferred a socialist solution to the nationalities question but promoted militaristic nationalism by means of an authoritarian and strongly centralized political system. It initiated, however, few measures like broadcasting radio programmes in Afar, Somalia, Oromiffa and Tigrigna language and drawing a new internal boundary based on ethno-territorial bases. Nevertheless, it did not make any attempt to link ethnic rights with politics or governance issues. Rather without any regional or ethnic prejudices, it imposed its greatest centralisation and brutal governance system, controlled at the core by junior military officers regardless of their ethnic affiliation or orientations. Militaristic state nationalism blended with socialism was promoted by hoping to obliterate regional and ethnic movements; however, excessive centralization backed by ruthless coercion did not abate regional and ethnic movements. Rather, it exacerbated internal turmoil and massive resentment of the population, which provided a good opportunity for the expansion of ethno- nationalist movements. The ethno-nationalist movements that took centre stage of opposition after the 1974 revolution were vocal about their unqualified right to exercise self-determination up to and including secession. The Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), for example, in its formative years claimed that it was fighting for self-determination... which could result in anything from autonomy, federation, confederation, up to and including independence (Markakis, 1987:254). The Eritrean separatist movements considered Eritrea as an Ethiopian colony and sought its independence. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which emerged in 1974, also aimed at the creation of an independent state for the Oromo. The situation led to decades of devastating civil wars. The military regimes attempt to reorganize the countrys internal administration after its establishment of Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) in 1987 failed to create a new social and political basis for the country (Clapham, 1994:34). The incumbent party and government, Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), came to power by overthrowing the military regime in May 1991. The new ruling group in power, who had started their movement for the liberation of their ethnic region (TPLF) from the central Ethiopia administration, has advocated ethnic-federalism by stressing that it could empower and equalize the diverse ethnic communities and reduce conflict. As a result, the overall centralized structure of the previous regime has been replaced by a federal state. The July 1991 Peace and Democracy conference that led to the establishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) adopted a Transitional charter that recognised Eritreas secession. According to the preamble of the Transitional charter, self-determination of all the peoples shall be the governing principles of political, economic and social life. It affirmed the right of ethnic groups to self-determination up to and including secession (Article 2). Based on the charter, the countrys internal administration was structured in 14 regions along ethno-linguistic lines in 1992 (TGE, 1992). The transitional government established a constitutional commission to draft a constitution. The commission adopted the federal constitution which 2

was ratified by the constituent Assembly in December 1994 and, which came in to force in August 1995. Accordingly, the 1995 constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), Article 49, has created a federal government with nine ethnic- based regional states and two federally administered city-states (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa). The regional states were delimited on the basis of language, settlement pattern and identity. These include Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations, Nationalities and peoples (SNNPR), Gambella and Harari. Like the 1991 charter, the constitution affirmed the unrestricted corporate right of all ethnic groups: every nation, nationality and people shall have the unrestricted right to self-determination up to secession (Article 39). The act of secession requires a two-thirds vote in the legislature of the seceding ethnic group to be followed three years latter by a referendum in the seceding region. Obviously, the federal restructuring of the country brought several changes to ethnicity and governance. The party in power (the EPRDF) contends that ethnic federalism will be the basis for a reformed Ethiopian state structure and bring about a solution to ethno-nationalist conflict. Since the beginning of 2000s, the EPRDF began to portray poverty as an existential threat to the country. Presently, one of the development models which are being promoted as a panacea for Africa is the developmental state. In recent years, Ethiopian government had shown its disregards for the other theories, most importantly the neoliberal economic principles which faced its dead-end in bringing development and hence adheres to the current economic paradigm, i.e. the developmental state model. Regarding this, the countrys long serving prime Minister; Mr. Meles Zenawi advocates the use of this model not only in Ethiopia but also across Africa (EPRDF, 1995). With the agricultural sector at the forefront of the development agenda, the government continuously champions the idea of strong presence of the state in most parts of the economy. Meles Zenawi stressed that it had made a compelling case for a strong government presence in the economy to correct the pervasive market inefficiencies. He cited the experience of Asian countries like Taiwan and Korea with the same growth strategy that they implemented (ibid.). According to the governments Millennium Development Goal report, the double digit GDP growth rates which the country achieved since 2003/04 has boosted the confidence of the government in its developmental path (FDRE, 2010:5). Hence, the reconstitution of Ethiopia into an ethnic federalist state poses sets of opportunities and challenges. This paper examines the impact of ethnic federalism for building a successful developmental state of Ethiopia.

1.2 Framing Research issue and problems

In the literature, developmental state has two components: one ideological, one structural. It is this ideology-structure nexus that distinguishes developmental states from other forms of states. The state-structure side of the definition of the developmental state emphasises capacity to implement economic policies sagaciously and effectively. Such a capacity is determined by various factors- institutional, technical, administrative and political. (Mkandawire, 2001:290). In terms of structure, the essential features that characterized successful developmental states are a strong core of state 3

institutions with the capacity to promote economic growth without being captured by particular interests groups. This is what Peter Evans (1995) has called embedded autonomy. Thus, the developmental state establishes its autonomy through the creation of a rationalised (core) bureaucracy characterised by meritocracy and long-term career outlooks. The state-led model of development intends to bring about industrialisation and entrepreneurship through intensive and deliberate effort and state intervention. The problem associated with state interventions were rooted in state capture: influential interest groups used the state to foster their own interests and extract rents rather than to promote a developmental vision (Malloy, 1997). Very often, the perverse dynamics generated by large state involvement in the economy enabled politicians and bureaucrats to build a basis of political support by manipulating markets (Bates, 1981).According to Khan (2005), state capture implies not only that benefits from state interventionism are diverted to private pockets, but more importantly that the policies themselves no longer are driven by a logic to yield development but rather are intended to yield benefits for limited groups (Khan, 2005). The civil service structures and other benefits generated by state-led development were frequently manipulated by the government apparatus and ruling elites as a source of patronage. The state was captured by narrow interests more concerned with building clientelistic networks than with fostering a transformation of the countrys economy (Van de Wall, 2001; Bayart, 1993). Eventually, this lead to a predatory state. As Evans, the predatory state is the developmental state without bureaucratic competence. As developmental state, the predatory state also directs the trends of business and picks the winner. However, the criteria for the intervention are not technical competence based on assessment of expertise, but nepotism and corruption. Thus, government officials act as rent-seekers, giving government facilities and protection to business people and getting personal benefit in return. The result is the very antithesis of development. Ideologically, a developmental state is essentially one whose ideological underpinning is develop- mentalist in that it conceives its mission as that of ensuring economic development (Castells, 1992:55). At the ideational level, the elite must be able to establish an ideological hegemony, so that its developmental project becomes, in a Gramscian sense, a hegemonic project to which key actors in the nation adhere voluntarily (Mkandawire, 2001:290). In other words, the main force behind the develop mentalist ideology has usually been nationalism (ibid.). Similarly, the underlying requirements of the developmental state are thus the creation of a nation-wide public (Ghani et al., 2005). As such, a nation-wide public needs not be rooted in a unified sense of nation based on linguistic lines, but in the form of a more civic identity. The important issue is that all citizens see themselves as Ethiopians more than their ethnic line. However, the ethnic federal structure of Ethiopia is still remain a challenge to bring ethnic tension and conflicts that emerged at local and regional levels on a range of issues such as self-determination/secession, the politics of resource sharing, political power, representation, identity, ethnic and regional boundary and others(Asnake,2006). Hence it worsening ethnic relation 4

and divides rather than unites peoples by creating mutual suspicions. Hence, the ethnic based socio-political structure declines nationalism to subordinate the energy of the people behind a single national goal to the successful and sustainable developmental state of the country. Despite, the ethnic federalism is granted regional states to administer themselves and promote their language and culture (FDRE, 1995), the ethnicization and politicization of staffing the bureaucracy is still problematic. In other words, the recruitment and appointment of bureaucratic staff is mainly ethno-language criteria rather than competitive meritocracy. As a result, state capacity and effectiveness is still a key bottleneck to implement the policy. Moreover, the ethnicization and politicization of state bureaucrats in the country is critical challenge which capture by influential groups. This paper examines how the ethnic federal structure affects the recruitment of competent bureaucratic staff and also how it reduces nationalism by creating ethnic tension and conflict.

1.3 Relevance and Justification

The debate about the nature of development is still important for Africa where myriads of developmental models failed. One of the development models which are being promoted as a panacea for Africa is the developmental state. The Ethiopian government has explicitly committed it selves to build a developmental state. As a result, the country achieved consecutively doubledigit GDP growth. Despite the continued economic growth, there is growing discontent with the government ethnically defined state in fear of continued ethnic tension and conflict as a consequence of ethnic-based politics. Development is more of a political process; According to Leftwhich (1996), development in human societies always involves the organization, mobilization, combination, use and distribution of resources in new ways, where the resources take the form of capital, land, human beings or their combination. And because resource are to be used and distributed in new ways, there will inevitably be disputes among individuals and groups about how such resources are to be used as they calculate who will win and who will lose as a result of different configuration. As such, when the political system is based on ethnicity, partition and federalism forms a challenge for sustainable developmental state. Furthermore, the empirical findings of Evans (1995) and Leftwich (1996) about the common features of the developmental states in the history of many countries include: highly competent economic bureaucracy that is well insulated from patronage and rent seeking networks; highly competent bureaucracy that enjoys embodied autonomy in the surrounding social structure and developmental elites and nationalism. Thus, the lack of capacity and effectiveness of the bureaucracy is detrimental to implement the developmental policy. The establishment of such competent bureaucrat is badly affected by the ethnic federal policy. Hence, the relevance of this study lies in making a contribution to the understanding of ethnic federalism and developmental state in Ethiopia. 5

1.4 Objective of the study

The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of ethnic federalism in building a successful developmental state of Ethiopia. As such the main objectives are: To explore the possible linkages between ethnic federalism and state bureaucrat capacity and effectiveness in turn to assess its impact in building developmental state in the country. To investigate possible linkages between ethnic federalism and state nationalism.

1.5 The Research Question

To achieve this objective one main research question and three other related sub-questions were posed: 1. How does ethnic federalism affect the building of a successful developmental state in Ethiopia?

Sub-Questions:

To what extent do the state bureaucrats staffed in meritocratic principle? How is their political neutrality? How is their capacity and effectiveness to implement the policy? How does ethnic federalism accommodate state nationalism? What are the possible implications for the developmental state of Ethiopia?

1.6 Methodology
The research methodology largely employed qualitative approach by qualitatively examining and interpreting texts. It examines ethnic federalism debate on developmental state in the country, along categories such as state capacity and nationalism as its two key variables. The time frame for this research is limited to political development in the country since 1991.

Method of data collection

The research is conducted by studying a wide array of documentary sources using both published and unpublished materials. These include government and non-government report, books, journals, party documents (particularly the EPRDF), newspaper, magazine and internet sources are used. 6

1.7 Organization of the paper

This paper is organized into five chapters. The first chapter presents the problems that the paper aims to examine. In particular it provides an overview of the research topic, the research problem, the research objectives and questions. The second chapter is the examination of theoretical debates on ethnicity, federalism and ethnic federalism. It also presents the historical and ideological basis for ethnic federalism in Ethiopian context. Chapter three discusses the concept of developmental state and also outlines the feature and characteristics of developmental state. It also examines the experience of South East Asian Miracles. Chapter four aims at examining the construction of developmental state in Ethiopia and the impact of ethnic federal structure for a successful and sustainable development in the country. Hence, it discusses the impact of ethnic politics in recruiting and appointment of state bureaucrat by taking Benishangul-Gumuz region. It also discusses the debates on the impact of ethnic federalism on ethnic conflict which in turn affects the countrywide nationalism. The last chapter gives a conclusion.

Chapter 2 Conceptual frame work: Ethnicity, Federalism and Ethnic Federalism

Ethnicity and federalism have become the major factors in organizing the political and territorial space in Ethiopia. Hence, this chapter is aimed to explain the theories of ethnicity and federalism which help in setting up a framework for observation and examination of the actual working of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. It could help to clear up the ground for the study by indicating tensions in synchronising ethnicity and federalism at least in theoretical level.

2.1 Ethnicity
There is no generally agreed definition or theory of ethnicity; scholars define and describe the term in various ways, such as a modern cultural construct, a universal social phenomenon, a personal identity, a peculiar kind of informal political organization. According to Fukui and Mar- kakis, define ethnic identities on the basis of genealogical or cultural criteria by claiming that a complex pattern of fusion and fission among group is the reality. They argue that ethnic identities are to be understood as essentially political products of socially defined and historically determined specific situation (Fukui and Mar kakis, 1994:6). Likewise, for Thomas Eriksen (1993) ethnicity simply refers to relationships between groups whose members consider themselves distinctive and, these groups may be ranked hierarchically within a society. He therefore describes ethnicity in terms of the classification of people and group relationship that has a political, organizational aspects as well as a symbolic one (Eriksen, 1993:13). Nabudere (1999), writing in the African context, notes that there are two aspects to ethnicity: positive and negative. The positive side of ethnicity, which he calls post-traditionalism is a a form of ethnic identification that is forward looking in that it tries to cope with modernity whilst also at the same time defining ones identity for needs of stability and self-definition(1999:90). The negative aspect of ethnicity he describes as class manipulation and mobilization of the ethnic sentiments for purely narrow and self-serving interests of a small minority of elites who continuously struggle for positions in the state (ibid.). In the Ethiopian situation, ethnicity was associated with narrownationalism, tribalism or conspirators agenda by the previous regimes, where as the new ruling elites as the emancipator and valuable asset to be protected and promoted. As Markakis states that over-night, ethnicity became a legitimate and preferred principle of political organization, and provides the foundation for a reconstructed Ethiopian state (Markakis, 1994). The most relevant situation for Ethiopia is the position that takes it as an ideology of mobilized collectivises that may be used both as a weapon of resistance by the 8

marginalized ethnic groups and as a political instrument for elites (Merera, 2003:26).

2.2 Federalism
According to Elazar, one of the leading experts in field of federalism, federalism has to do with the need of the people and politics to unite for common purposes yet remain separate to preserve their integrity. Federalism is concerned simultaneously with the diffusion of political power in the name of liberty and its concentration on behalf of unity (Elazar, 1987:33). Here the basic federal principle is concerned with the combination of self-rule and shared-rule. It is the framework that involves the linkage of individuals, groups and polities in lasting but limited union in such a way as to provide for the pursuit of common ends while maintaining the respective integrities of all parties. Accordingly, federalism is considered as a comprehensive system of political relationships which emphasis the combination of self-rule and sharedrule within the matrix of constitutionally dispersed power (ibid.). According to Burgess (2000), federalism is an ideological, in the sense that it can take the form of an overtly perspective guide to action, and as philosophical, to the extent that it is a normative judgment up on the ideal organisation of human relations and conduct (2000:27). However he adds an operational dimension by considering that federalism can also as loaded up on as empirical fact in its recognition of diversitybroadly conceived in its social, economic, cultural and political contexts- as a living reality, something that exists independent of ideological and philosophical perceptions. This means that in practice, authority should be divided and power should be dispersed among and between groups in a society (ibid.). On the other hand, Graham Smith questions the notion of considering federalism as an ideology. Rather than considering federalism as an ideology that has developed and exists autonomously from the main tradition of political thought, he writes that federalism is best treated as traversing a broad range of what we can more usefully call programmatic orientation (Smith, 1995:4). In his opinion, the term federalism has been subjected to different meaning and applied to different situational contexts. He states that federalism as ideology is best considered as an amalgam of doctrines, beliefs and programmatic considerations reflect in the very paradoxes and tensions inherent in thinking about the politics of modernity(ibid.). In contrast, Riker understands federalism as a range of phenomena rather than a single constitutional things (Rikker, 1975:103). A federal arrangement does not always mean that the boundaries of power are clearly fixed on a permanent basis, but rather a continuous political bargain and process. It is not a static and fixed phenomenon (ibid.). Riker places federalism on a continuum scale with respect to centralisation and decentralisation. According to him, federalism is a political organization in which the activity of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activity on which it makes final decision(ibid.). As John Agnew put federalism is an evolutionary political 9

arrangement rather than a fixed formula for the territorial division of government powers. The balance of power between central and regional units could change over time (Agnew, 1995; 294).

2.3 Ethnic Federalism

Though it remains difficult and complex to establish a federal arrangement based on ethnicity, many scholars in the field argue that one of the characteristics of federalism is its aspiration and purpose to generate and maintain both unity and diversity simultaneously (Watts, 1999:6). As Elazar argues that federal systems operates best in society with sufficient homogeneity of fundamental interests, he thought of Switzerland as the first modern federation built on indigenous ethnic and linguistic differences that were considered permanent and worth accommodating. Political integration federal or otherwise is likely to be more difficult in places in which strongly rooted primordial groups continue to dominate political and social life (Elazar, 1987:191). Nevertheless, in his view, federalism might be the best political framework in the existence of essentially permanent religious, ethnic, cultural or social groups around which political life must be organized. Besides, he added territorial divisions of power can also be used to protect minorities and minority communities by allowing them greater autonomy within their own political jurisdictions (ibid.). Accordingly, with the aim of accommodating ethnic diversity, Elazar specified two forms of federal frameworks (1987:236). The first form is the structure of a polity cutting across ethnic cleavages and thereby diluting them through the creation of a cross cutting civic community and, the second form is structuring a comprehensive polity to give each people a primary means of expression through one or more of its constituent polities. Elazar, however, held the idea that federalism should transcend the recognition of differences eventually by structuring relationships that permit the groups bearing those differences to function together within the same political system. As a result, Elazar supposed that under certain circumstances, federalism offers the possibility of creating a civic community that transcends the divisions among ethnic collectivises and thereby makes possible the establishment of civil society and workable political order (Elazar, 1987:232). Federal arrangements could be structured on the basis of territorially segmented ethnic, linguistic or religious groups, but the trouble is associated with institutionalising primordial entities in political organization. As a result the ethnic nationalism is probably the strongest force against federalism, because ethnic ideology could undermine power sharing arrangements and consequently, ethnic federalism could degenerate in to civil war. Thus it is preferred to promote political order based on non-primordial or civic ties without disqualifying ethno-linguistic federal arrangements (Elazar, 1987:232). If ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, federalism could offer an excellent opportunity for group autonomy. Thus, by accepting the inevitability of drawing federal arrangements based on ethnic boundaries in case of geographically concentrated ethnic groups, the federal framework with relatively many and small constituent units could make the federal dividing 10

lines coincide as much as possible with the ethnic boundaries (Lijphart, 2002:51). However, if ethnic groups are geographically dispersed and synchronized, Lijphart (1997) recommends convocational democracy which includes four essential attributes: grand coalition, segmented autonomy, proportionality and minority veto. Grand coalition entails power sharing of all significant groups in political power, particularly in executive power. Segmented autonomy entails a delegation of decision making power to every significant group. Proportionality entails that political representation, civil service appointments and allocation of public funds, etc. should consider proportion of each significant group. Lastly, minority veto entails the power given for minority groups to veto any decision that can put their vital interest at sake due to majorities out votes. Empirically, Lijphart enumerates a variety of more or less functional power-sharing models in deeply divided societies. Some of the models were such as executive power sharing in a form of grand coalition cabinet of ethnic parties like in Malaysia and South Africa; equal representation of ethno linguistic or other groups in government like in the Belgian cabinets; and proportional shares of ministerial positions to the different linguistic groups, states and regions like in India (Lijphart, 2002:46). On the other hand, Donald Horowitz argues that federal management based on ethnic homogeneity is detrimental to the creation of inter-ethnic cooperation. Horowitz recognises the importance of power-sharing and territorial devolution, as he states that territorial compartmentalization with devolution of generous power can have tranquillising effects in countries with territorially separate groups, significant sub-ethnic divisions and serious conflict at the centre (Horowitz,1985:164). Moreover, Horowitz contends that a political framework that crystallizes and legitimises ethnic cleavages would be of limited utility to bring about compromised power-sharing arrangement in states with desperate ethnic groups, because elites of majority groups would not be so easily self-abnegating as to give some of their political power and privileges to the minority groups. He maintains that both ethnic majority rule and ethnic minority rule are very ineffective and destructive type of arrangement in ethnically divided societies. Majority rule permits perpetual domination of the majority group or the tyranny of the majority ethnic group (Horowitz, 1994:46). In severely divided societies, matters such as equal control of the state , the designation of official languages and educational issues, such as languages of instruction, the content of curricula are very divisive question on which groups are not very willing to concede; they are more worried about who gets what in a kind of zero-sum competition. As a result, approaches or models that could crystallize or encourage ethnic entitlement may not be a viable option to bring inter-ethnic compromise and cooperation, because of the fact that divisive issues are not easy to compromise and symbolic demands such as language seem to be less compromisable than claims that can be quantified (Horowitz, 1985:566). Related to federalism, Horowitz argues that in severely divided societies, such as in Nigeria, India and Malaysia, federalism has helped to reduce conflicts at the centre because many contested issues become state-level issues 11

within ethnic groups; it has dispersed the flow of conflict in linguistically homogeneous states in to sub-ethnic channels; it provides career opportunities for groups not well represented at the centre and it helps to restructure institutions so as to alter ethnic balances and alignment. He also observed that ethnic federalism has mitigated or exacerbated minorities exclusion: a group that is a minority at the centre may be a majority in one or more states and may be in a position to rule these states, at the same time it may also produce other minority groups that feel exclusion and domination at the local areas (Horowitz, 1994:613). Federal model or territorial autonomy could be worthwhile in maintaining unity while conceding claims of self-government by allowing ethnic or other groups claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them while allowing the larger entity to exercise those powers which cover common interests (Ghai, 2002:155). In ethnic federalism, the normal tensions of federalism like resource distribution and regional influence are likely to be aggravated by assuming ethnic dimensions. Interregional mobility is likely to be contentious and distinction between the private and public spheres may be less sharp than in other types of federalism (ibi d.). Furthermore, the federal arrangement need great administrative capacity, political skill, and abundant resources therefore narrow group or ethnic interests alone may not create a desirable arrangement. It could produce poorly equipped provinces struggling to carry out new responsibilities which they neither understood nor wanted or producing less efficient bureaucracies or with politicians not given to compromises (ibid.).

2.4 Ethnic Federalism in the Ethiopian context

Historically, the Russian revolutionaries who were forced to confront the plight of subordinate national groups and minorities in Tsarist Russia developed what came to be known a Stalinist theory on nationalities. Initially, Russian revolutionarily leaders like Lenin were dismissive of the role of nationalism in the Russian Empire (Hirsch; 2005:23). In 1905, Lenin even opposed the idea that was proposed by the social democrats to provide territorial and extra-territorial autonomy to the nationalities in a post-Tsarist Russia (ibid.). But when the revolutionary upheavals began to gain momentum, he reversed his earlier position and came to embrace the concept of national self-determination. This reversal of position was necessitated by the desire to gain the support of non-Russian ethnic groups in the struggle against the Tsarist regime and during the civil war that followed the 1917 revolution which brought the Bolsheviks to power. The principle of self-determination and federalism were also used to build the soviet state (Duchacek, 1970:137). The Soviet Nationalities policy which was on the main developed by Joseph Stalin incorporated Marxist Leninist ideas and sought to legitimize the vanguard role of the communist party (ibid.). This led to the creation of the Soviet Union as a multitier ethnic federation in which power was monopolized by the unitary communist party. And the right of self-determination up to and including secession was incorporated in the constitution (ibid.). Similarly, 12

almost all of the leftist political movements that emerged after the 1974 revolution in Ethiopia accepted the ML ideology and Stalins theory of nationalities (Young, 1997:154).Right after its assumption of state power in 1991, the EPRDF began its project of reconstituting the country in an ethnic federation. This process was highly influenced by Stalins principle of ethnic self-determination up to and including secession (ibid.). Consequently, the Ethiopian ethnic federal system is significant in that it provides for secession of any ethnic unit. Opponents of ethnic federalism fear that it invites ethnic conflict and risks state disintegration (Ottaway, 1995). The Ethiopian state, they worry, may face the same fate as the USSR and Yugoslavia (Solomon, 1993). Others, of an ethno-nationalist persuasion, doubt the governments real commitment of self-determination; they support the ethnic federal constitution per se, but claim that it has not been put in to practice (ibid.). Supporters of ethnic federalism point out that it has maintained the unity of the Ethiopian peoples and the territorial integrity of the state, while providing full recognition to the principle of ethnic equality. According to the 1995 FDRE constitution, the federal arrangement of Ethiopia had two levels of governments: The federal government at the centre and the regional governments at the regional level. The central government was responsible for foreign affairs, national defence, economic policy, monetary and fiscal policies, Building and administrating major development infrastructures and establishments. It was provided with a power for budgeting allocation to the regional governments. Likewise, the regional governments were provided broad powers on all matters with in their territorial jurisdiction except for those assigned to the federal government. Some of the major responsibilities provided to the regional governments were: Full power on matter related to language, culture and education policies; To establish a state administration that best advance self-government; To formulate and execute economic, social and development policies, strategies To enact and enforce laws on the state civil service (Article, 52).

2.4.1 The politics of self-determination

Ethnic-based federalism is the most controversial EPRDF policy. Celebrated by some as the panacea for holding multi-ethnic Ethiopia together. It is decried by others as a dangerous concept that will eventually dismember the country. For nationalists, the policy is a deliberate ploy to undermine national identity. They see the constitutional granting of self-determination to ethnic group as deliberate step backward from the nation building process. Many describe ethnic federalism as a malicious TPLF tactic to plant divisions among ethnic groups so as to facilitate rule by the Tigrayan minority. The allegation that the TPLF manipulates ethnic identities and conflicts to stay in power is made by most opposition supporters. Critics decry worsening ethnic relations as a result of ethnic based competition. In their view, the political system divides rather 13

than unites people, by creating mutual suspicion and rancour and instituting tribal dynamics that could easily spiral out of control. The constitutional clause that gives nationalities the right to seceded is touted as proof of the EPRDFs anti-Ethiopian stance. Eritreas independence, which turned Ethiopia in to a landlocked country, is viewed as evidence of a desire to dismember. A recurrent claim that the EPRDF has unduly privileged its Tigray base and regional state to the national detriment (Paulos, 2007:378-380). Proponents of ethnic federalism, however, acclaim the recognition of group rights, seeing creation of ethnic-based administrative entities as the only meaningful approach for defusing ethnic discontents. According to this viewactively propagated by the government- Ethiopians ethnic and minority groups have suffered centuries of domination by a central state that forced Amharic language and culture up on them. Granting nationalities their culture, ethnic, and political aspirations is necessary to redress historic injustice. Thus, it brought important recognition of their culture and language to many groups.

2.4.2 Ethnic Federalism and Conflicts

Though there is no necessary connection between ethnicity and conflict as Horowitz argues, the basic for confrontation may emerge due to the inclusion of two or more ethnic communities within a single or adjacent territory of a state characterized by discriminatory and uneven status and resource allocation (Horowitz, 1985:148). As Ted Gurr (1994) in his cross-national study of communal based conflicts, shows that in many instances ethnic tensions and conflicts are more likely when certain groups perceive discrimination or exploitation in the context of state formation. Ethnic conflicts are usually centred on three general issues: the desire for exit or independence from the state, the demand for greater autonomy within the state or the recognition and protection of minority interests within a plural society (Gurr, 1994:111). He also adds that ethnic identity and interests per se do not risk unforeseen ethnic wars rather; the danger is hegemonic elites who use the state to promote their own peoples interests at the expense of others (Gurr, 2000:64). In the Ethiopian case, the most noticeable change regarding ethnic conflicts after the formation of the ethnic federal structure has been the emergence of localised violent conflicts involving several of the ethnically constituted regions (Abbink, 2006). At the same time, there are secessionist movements engaged in low-level armed guerrilla warfare (ibid.). The EPRDFs conception of ethnicity did not always match the multi-ethnic makeup of many cities and areas. The southern region, Gambella, Benishangul- Gumuz and Harari are inhabited by multiple ethnic groups. Tigray, Amhara, Oromo and Somali states are dominated by one ethnic group but host others ( International Crisis Group, 2009). Granting self-administration to dominant ethnic groups thus created new minorities. In some case this minorities didnt speak the language of the new administration. The principle was interpreted by some groups as an opportunity to claim exclusion rights over land by evicting settlers and other newcomers. These tensions have often been nurtured by 14

politicians from local indigenous groups. Examples include the conflict between the Berta and Oromo settlers in Asosa zone the exploded during the 2000 federal elections. Sometimes the conflicts take on the character of ethnic cleansing; non-natives have been chased away in Arussi, Harar and Bale (Abbink, 2006:153). Beginning in the first half of the 1990s, a wave of local conflicts gripped the country as groups were incited by the transitional charter to settle old disputes or claim territory they felt was rightfully theirs. Some of the most severe were between Amhara settlers and Anuak in December 2003 in Gambella. In Somali after 2000, several hundreds were killed in repeated fighting between the sheikash, a small clan that sought to establish its own district, and Ogaden sub-clans. A border dispute between the Guji and Gedeo exploded in to large-scale fighting in 1998 over control of Hagere Mariam district. Land disputes triggered by administrative boundary changes incited a confrontation between the Guji and Borena in June 2006, causing at least 100 deaths and massive displacement. Some 70,000 fled the border area between Oromiya and Somali after conflict erupted. By a very conservative estimate, several thousand peoples were killed in inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia between 1991 and 2005 (Abbink, 2006:408).

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Chapter 3 Theoretical Frame work and Literature Review: Conceptualization of developmental state
3.1 A Brief History of the debate in Developmental States
The role of the state in promoting economic growth and social progress in the developing world has been a subject of contestation among international development experts and policy analysts for the past 50 years. After the end of World War ll, with the emergence of newly independent states in Africa and Asia, the international community embraced a state-led model of development intended to bring about industrialisation and entrepreneurship through intensive and deliberate effort and state intervention. By the late 1970s, however, the state-led model of development had come under strain in Africa, as well as in Eastern Europe and Latin America. State intervention in the economy in many of these countries was often wasteful (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007). Many of the problems associated with these failed state interventions were rooted in state capture: influential interest groups used the state to foster their own interests and extract rents rather than to promote a developmental vision. In Latin America, for example, state intervention nurtured- and became dependent on- a particular kind of populist politics (Malloy, 1997). Very often, the perverse dynamics generated by large state involvement in the economy enabled politicians and bureaucrats to build a basis of political support by manipulating markets (Bates, 1981). At the same time, protectionist policies deprived states of imports often without stimulating domestic production of sufficient quantity and quality (Lockwood, 2005). By the early 1980s, a growing coalition of reform-minded academics, policymakers and political elites was calling for the abandonment of the stateled model of development and a return to a market-based economy. The international assistance community, led by the IMF and the World Bank, embraced a set of neo-liberal economic policies that converged in what came to be known as the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990). At the core of this thinking was an insistence that aid-recipient countries adopt structural adjustment programmes designed to reduce the size and reach of the state. Instead, these countries should relay on the market as the most effective mechanism for allocating resources and promoting economic growth (ibid.). As put forth in 1991 by the World Bank in the World Development Report, government intervention should be used sparingly and only where most needed. Put simply, the report argues, governments need to do less in those areas where markets work, or can be made to work, reasonably well (1991:9). Since the mid-1990s, however, another shift in understanding the role of the state in development has become perceptible. This new thinking is based in large part of the recognition that there has been a very different experience of state-led development in a number of Asian countries, especially in East Asia (Deyo, 1987; Haggard, 1990; Johnson, 1982; and Wade, 1990). Over a period 16

of 30 years, the so-called Asian tigers, which include Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, underwent rapid economic growth and a radical socioeconomic transformation, moving from being poor agrarian societies or city states in the 1960s to producers of high technology, high value-added goods by the 1990s (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007). The 1997 World Development Report was thus dedicated to rethinking the state, and reaffirmed the position that the state is central to economic and social development. Since then, there has been a growing awareness among development practitioners as well as academics of what this means- namely; that the orientation and effectiveness of the state is the critical variable explaining why some countries succeed whereas others fail in meeting development goals. In 2005, the report of the Commission for Africa reflected this thinking, recognising state capacity and effectiveness as a key bottleneck in Africas ability to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007). Hence, Asias sudden emergence as an economic colossus stimulated scholars and policy makers alike to begin a grail-like quest for what Meredith Woo-Cummings has called the regional solipsism of an Asian developmental model (1991:5). One of the most powerful and persuasive attempts at a political explanation for East Asian success has been the concept of the developmental state (Johnson, 1982). The East Asian states, it is argued, have been successful because governments there have acquired control over a variety of things presumed critical to economic success. Initially and most forcefully articulated by Chalmers Johnson with specific reference to Japan (and subsequently to South Korea and Taiwan), the developmental state is seen as one of the three ideal types of states, all categorized by the states relationship to the domestic economy (ibid.).

3.2 The developmental state

The developmental state is back at the centre of the international policy debate. Policy thinking shows an increasing willingness to abandon value-laden prescriptions about governance and to adopt approaches rooted in comparative history and evidence based analytical theory. The concept of the developmental state serves as a marker of this trend. Although the language was hardly new even in the 1980s when the first flood of studies of East Asian industrialisation brought it into currency, the idea of the developmental state has enduring value as an anchor for discussions among researchers and policymakers on how to bring evidence from history to bear on todays policy challenges (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007:531). Drawing on the work of Johnson (1982), Deyo (1987) and Evans (1995) among others, we understand a developmental state to exist when the state possesses the vision, leadership and capacity to bring about positive transformation of society with a condensed period of time. The transformation can also take various forms. In the classical East Asian examples, it was aimed at speeding up growth, while at the same time enhancing opportunities to participate in the modern economy---most commonly through the expansion of public services such as education, health care and agricultural extension. The 17

state was associated with rapid processes of industrialization and/or the adoption of new technologies--- that is, moving in to higher value-added activities relative to the starting point. Typically, there was a shift from subsistence agriculture to more commercial, export- oriented farming, or to textile processing, or to tourism, or a mixture of these. Developmental states are marked by a combination of capacities, visions, norms and/or ideologies. They are not associated with specific policies; at different times and in different places, very different policies have ushered in social and economic transformation (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007:534). At most, as Woo-Cummings explains, the developmental state is neither socialist... nor free-market... but something different: the plan-rational capitalist developmental state... (Which links) interventionism with rapid economic growth (1999: 1-2). Similarly, according to Bollesta, developmental state position between free market capitalist economic system and centrally planned socialist economic system makes it neither capitalist nor socialist in texture (2007: 106). According to Castells, a state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy, its ability to promote and sustain development, understanding by development the combination of steady high rates of growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship to the international economy (Castells, 1992:55). As Chalmers Johnson contends that, developmental state was one that determined to influence the direction of and pace of economic development by directly intervening in the development process, rather than relying on the uncoordinated influence of market forces to allocate economic resources (Johnson, 1982). There is of course a major problem of defining states simply from its economic performance: not all countries with good growth rates are developmental state (Mbabazi and Taylor, 2005:45). According to Mkandawire, the definition of developmental state runs the risk of being tautological, since evidence that the state is developmental is often drawn deductively from the performance of the economy (Mkandawire, 2001:290). This arises because a state is defined developmental if the economy is developing, economic success is equated to state strength and the latter is measured by the presumed outcomes of policy (UNCTAD, 2009:28). It is possible to avoid this tautological view, in which outcomes are used as explanations of phenomenon in question, by recognizing that the governments in developmental states are certainly develop mentalists in their vision, their priorities and their ideology, but they may fail to achieve their objectives (ibid.). From this perspective, developmental state as a state in which the political elite aim at rapid economic development and give power and authority to the bureaucracy to plan and implement efficient policies. It aimed at rational and deliberate development and implement state driven industrialisation policies, with co-operation between the government and private (Abe, 2006:8-9). According to Mkandawire developmental state has two components: one ideological, one structural. It is this ideology-structure nexus that distinguish developmental state from other form of states. In terms of ideology, developmental state is essentially one whose ideological underpinning is 18

develop mentalist in that it conceives its mission as that of ensuring economic development (Mkandawire, 2001:290). At the ideational level, the elite must be able to establish an ideological hegemony, so that its developmental project becomes, in a Gramscian sense, a hegemonic project to which key actors in the nation adhere voluntarily (ibid.). The main force behind the develop mentalist ideology has usually been nationalism. The centrality of ideology also points to the naivet of the de-politicised quest for technocratic governance (Mkandawire, 2001:291). Supporting Mkandawire, Bagchi argues that:
Developmental state puts economic development as the top priority of governmental policy and is able to design effective instrument to promote such a goal. The instruments would include a forging of new formal networks of collaboration among the citizens and officials and the utilization of new opportunities for trade and profitable production (Bagchi, 2000:398).

Mkandawire defined the structural side of developmental state as the capacity to implement economic policy sagaciously and effectively. Such capacity is determined by various factorsinstitutional, technical, administrative and political. Undergirding all these is the autonomy of the state from social forces so that it can use these capacities to devise long-term economic policy unencumbered by the claims of myopic private interest (Mkandawire, 2001:290). Developmental state act as a facilitator by steering, assisting and inducing the private firms to attempt new production challenges in areas which are of high priority by allocating credit, limiting import competition, or even by providing subsidies(M. Cipher and L. Dietz, 2009:215). According to Pempel, developmental state defines their mission primarily in terms of long-term national economic enhancement. They actively and regularly intervene in economic activities with the goal of improving the international competitiveness of their domestic economies. Rather than accepting some predefined place in a world divided on the basis of comparative advantage, such states seek to create competitive advantages. I n this sense, the developmental state is a logical descendant of the German historical school with its emphasis on economic nationalism and neomercantilism. Central to the activities of such developmental states is a highly competent and autonomous national bureaucracy (Pempel, 1999:139).

3.3 Features of Developmental State

Recent writing on developmental states has emphasized the importance of both infrastructural powers and political commitment. According to Michael Manns, infrastructural powers defined as the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm. The extraction of resources (human or material) from society is a key element of such infrastructural power (Manns, 1993). Leftwich emphasises commitment; an ideal-type developmental state is one that demonstrates a determination and ability to stimulate, direct, shape and cooperate with the domestic private sector and arrange or supervise mutually acceptable deals with foreign interests (Leftwich, 2000:167-8). Similarly, a developmental state project must possess at least two essential attributes. First, the state must have the capacity to control a vast majority of its territory and 19

possess a set of core capacity that will enable it to design and deliver policies; secondly, the project must involve some degree of reach and inclusion (Ghani et al., 2005). Hence, a common factor among developmental states appears to be a committed leadership that is embedded in the right context of demands. The leadership should strongly commit to developmental goals, and which places national development ahead of personal enrichment and/or short-term political gains (Ghani et al., 2005; Leftwich, 2000). Another key characteristic of the developmental state is embedded autonomy. According to Evans, the developmental state is autonomous in so far as it has a rationalised bureaucracy characterized by meritocracy and longterm career prospects, traits that make civil servants more professional and detached from powerful rent-seeking groups (Evans, 1995:12). Embeddedness he defined as good communication and ties with the private sector. But this factor was bound up with autonomy which would simultaneously allow state officials to make policy professionally and independently of special private sector interests (Evans, 1995:45). An embedded state possesses a variety of institutionalized channels where in the state apparatus and the private sector continually interact in a constructive manner via Joint project of fostering economic development (Cypher and Dietz, 2004:213). Therefore, embeddedness is not enough, for there is always the danger that state apparatus can be captured by the very interests and sectors it seeks to guide promote and control. In order to guard against the risk of capture, the state apparatus must have integrity, loyalty and cohesiveness. In short, state must also exhibit the characteristics of autonomy (Cypher and Dietz, 2004:213). For embedded autonomy to work, Evans observed the state must create a meritocratic bureaucracy of highly skilled people who can freely combine their close contacts with the private sector with their independent understanding of the global market to help steer economic planning in directions good for the national economy as a whole (Evans, 1995). The interdependence of these factors was crucial, social embeddedness without political autonomy would leave state officials vulnerable to private pressure, leading to corruption and cronyism. Autonomy without embeddedness would leave state officials isolated from real events, prone to bad decision-making and, in the worst scenarios, ruinous miscalculations (Evans, 1995). Another of the underlying requirements of the developmental states is thus the creation of nation-wide public (Ghani et al., 2005). A nation-wide public need not be rooted in a unified sense of nation based on cultural and linguistic unity, but may well take the form of a more civic identity. The important issue is that all citizens see themselves as Nigerians or Tanzanians as much as or more than as Igbo or Nyamwezi.

3.4 Southeast Asian Experiences

The current thinking about the developmental state has been strongly shaped by research into the experience of the East Asian tigers. Although there is 20

some disagreement in the literature regarding the core set of policies that enabled the original Asian tigers (and now others) to achieve high levels of development and economic growth, there is a general consensus about the essential features that characterized these successful developmental states. Most of all, a strong core of state institutions with the capacity to promote economic growth without being captured by particularist interests is regarded as having been essential (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007;8). This is what Peter Evans (1995) has called embedded autonomy. Two factors are assumed to have enabled such a bureaucracy embodying embedded autonomy and the developmental orientation of the state to arise in the East Asian cases: a political leadership that was committed to development and, in most case, the uprooting of traditional elites. In Asia, political leadership committed to development was often motivated by regional competition, nationalism and the desire to catch up with the west. As a result, development was regarded as a national project of the first priority. Such determined political elites were either relatively uncorrupted or limited personal gains to non-predatory corruption which did not impede investments and the expansion of national productivity (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007:8-9). Subsequent analysis has shown that neoclassical reading of experiences of development in Asia had downplayed the role of the state in the success stories. Mounting evidence showed that the state had been the key agent behind the spectacular success of the East Asian Four Tigers. This has led not only to a re-reading of the role of the state in the development process, but it has also raised the question of the replicability of their policies and experience in other developing countries (Mkandawire, 2001:292). The market failure is so prominent in development economics is still a problem that warrants government intervention and that, since such failure differ in intensity, scope and location, a selective set of interventions is required. The most significant lesson has been the central role played by a developmental state in the process of development (ibid). The role of government in East Asia also went beyond the autonomous bureaucracy to one of close partnership between government and business: in the successful Southeast Asian developmental state, a positive relationship exists between the business community and the government. In these countries where the government may directly influence the conduct of private enterprise for the benefit of public good, and in turn, government is expected to assist and protect the private enterprise. The incentives and resources provided by government also included the creation of rent. That is, policies were devised to ensure that private companies would secure profit above normal market conditions. Such rents were particularly important for inducing new investments and innovative activity. The management of rent-seeking is thus an essential part of governance in successful developmental states. In this model, rent-seeking was not in itself bad. But the key governance issues was to ensure that rent were derived through activities that had social as well as private returns that the rent, when earned as profits, were raised in a way that supported national development(UNCTAD, 2009:34).

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3.5 Failed attempts at state-led development in Africa

Many African countries experienced some sort of big push for development during the early independence years. However, subsequently governance deteriorated due to clientelistc and/or neopatrimonial social structures strangled the potential of promising economic sectors and undermined attempts at state-led industrialisation. Efforts to spread education stalled, inter alia when increasingly authoritarian leaders found that those with some education, but lacking good employment opportunities (due to the clientelistic throttling of the economy), become politically dangerous. National armies discredited themselves through bloody coups and internal divisions along ethnic lines. The project of national integration failed (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007:535-536). In many African countries, benefits generated by state-led development were turned in to rents for small elites and clientelistic networks who captured the state- making investments successively less productive (Van de Walle, 2001; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bayart, 1993).Hence, the difference between successful and failed attempts at state-led development does not appear to be primarily attributable to corruption-which was generally present in both- but rather to the problem of state capture(Hellman et al., 2000; Khan,2005). A key ingredient in avoiding state capture and other forms of predatory behaviour is a competent, meritocratic and result-oriented core bureaucratic system. In a majority of African countries, a committed and competent civil service failed to emerge or was eroded (often despite repeated attempts to develop it) (Rocha Menocal, 2004). Civil service structures and other benefits generated by state-led development were frequently manipulated by the government apparatus and ruling elites as a source of patronage. The state was captured by narrow interests more concerned with building clientelistic networks than with fostering a transformation of the countrys economy (Van de Wall, 2001; Bayart, 1993). Political leadership is crucial because of the way it affect the quality and autonomy of the bureaucracy in developmental states. Importantly, political leadership in Africa has not been uniformly poor since independence. However, even development-oriented post-independence leaders failed to build a sustained embedded autonomy of the state (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007). The tendencies militating against successful state-led developmentleadership which lacks a motivation to prioritise development and the dearth of a competent and efficient civil service- are perhaps most evident and perverse in sub-Saharan African states. While unfavourable geographical and economic factors have certainly had a detrimental impact on development prospects (Sachs, 2005), the dynamics embedded in a political system rooted in neopatrimonialism have played a central role in engendering and reproducing underdevelopment. No African country- with South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius- has truly achieved an encompassing and sustained developmental orientation; the underlying reason increasingly identified by academic scholars and other observers is the neopatrimonial character of many African states (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Van de Walle, 2001).

22

One argument often advanced, sometimes by Africans themselves, relates to the lack of an ideology of development anchored in some form of nationalist projects. Fanons (1967) tirades against the ideological numbness of the emergent ruling classes in Africa remain among the most sustained statements of this position. Many other political leaders and analysts have elaborated on this lacuna. Onimode (1988) talks of the ideological vacuum that he attributes to petty bourgeois commitment to their class interests and their fear of revolutionary pressures. For some, the lack of ideology is inherent in personal rule under which loyalty is not to some overriding societal goals but to individuals, often holding highly idiosyncratic ideologies that they themselves flout with impunity and with no moral qualms (Sandbrook, 1986). Consequently, such leaders are said to have no moral basis on which they could demand enthusiastic and internalised compliance to whatever national project they launched. AS Mkandawire explained that, the quest for an ideology to guide the development process inspired African leaders to propound their own idiosyncratic and often incoherent ideologies to rally the masses for national unity and development. The centrality of development was such that it acquired the status of an ideology (developmentalism) that provided the ideological scaffolding of development plans (Mkandawire, 2001:295).

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Chapter 4 Developmental State of Ethiopia

4.1 The making of developmental state in Ethiopia
Ethiopia was a quasi-feudal, one-party socialists state with virtually no experience with representative democracy or capitalism. The coming to power of EPRDF, which is a coalition of different ethnic-based groups, witnessed a wide range of policy reforms in the social, economic and political spheres. The socialist-oriented command economy has given way to a market-based type of economic system, albeit under the ideological guise known as revolutionary democracy. Its preferred conception of democracy has not been the liberal bourgeoisie variety, based on individual participation, a diversity of interests and views, and plural representation. Rather the revolutionary democracy is based on communal collective participation, based on consensus forged through discussion led by the vanguard organisation (Vaughan and Trouville, 2003:15). Under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the country has become Africas donor darling: still one of the poorest countries in the world, it receives billions of dollars in aid annually. At least partially as a result, the government has embarked on gradual and limited liberalisation of the economy- it retains ownership of key sectors and all land, but an embryonic independent private sector has begun to emerge. This has been accompanied by high levels of economic growth and substantial advances in the human development of its largely rural population (UNDP, 2010:3).
The year 2001 saw a division within EPRDF members. Among others, a major one centred on ideological differences, and divergence of development strategies. After a complex debate that took the party close to disintegration, the party came up with a declaration that expressed its commitment to building a developmental state in the country (EPRDF, 2006). Since 2003/2004, the Ethiopian Economy achieved a double-digit growth (see table 1.1 below). However, the country has been struggling with the twin macroeconomic challenges of high inflation and very low international reserve since 2007/2008 (African Economic outlook, 2011). The government argues that its success is fundamentally related to its rejection of the neoliberal economic policy, following its own indigenous ideology of revolutionary democracy, and above all the government attributes this growth success to its embrace of the idea of a developmental state. Ethiopias growth and developmental trajectory that was adopted after the 2001 tehadso/ resuscitation movement is a very much contested issue. There is no consensus among different elites of the country as to whether the government is truly developmental or not, and the argument goes even to extent of questioning the growth success achieved.

The example of East Asia is inspiring Ethiopian governmental elites to place double-digit growth at the forefront of their national development strategy; this would certainly be consistent with much of the literature on the East Asian Model and Beijing consensus. The East Asian Model puts economic growth and the fulfilment of the material needs of majority at the heart of government policy (Gore, 2000:796), often becoming the main source 24

of governmental legitimacy (Peerenboom, 2002:245). In Suhartos Indonesia, for example, economic recovery and material expansion.... became an ideology in the strongest sense of the term, describing the purpose of political activity, the method used to achieve that goal, the attitudes which public figures should express, as well as serving as an effective ideological weapon against opponents of the regime or proponents of alternative visions (Chalmers, 1997:3). The emphasis is on productivity and competitiveness rather than on welfare, and other economies are used as reference points which bureaucrats can emulate and use to measure their progress (Johnson, 1982). The strong parallel between Ethiopia and East Asias drives for economic growth thus seem rooted, at least partially, in processes of emulation. The other and related lesson from East Asia is the strong role that the state is perceived to play in the economies.Ethiopian elites saw East Asia as an alternative to the neo-liberalism they so decried in the west and its conditionalities, Elsje Fourie (2011:14). State intervention in the economy is the other very visible role the government is still playing. The state needed to intervene because it has a firm belief that market failures would make the development of rural areas unprofitable and unfeasible for the countrys nascent, particularly in the sector of physical infrastructure (ibid:15). Thus, State intervention in the economy in Ethiopia is so pervasive to the extent that recently the government has fixed the price of certain commodities, devalued the value of the currency and manipulates exchange rate in response to the changes in the economy (EPRDF, 2006). According to the prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, one of the lessons that development draws from South Korea and Taiwan is their alleged ability to free rural communities from rent-seeking private landlords and to build developmental structures through selective government intervention(2006). This thinking has carried over into policy as well, primarily by preventing from liberalising the economy at the speed that donors would prefer. The government continues to practice import substitution, impose control on foreign exchange, and protect and promote key industries from outside competition. All land remains public, and key sectors such as banking and telecommunications are wholly government-owned. Regarding to this, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, which assigns countries a score from one to ten depending on the extent of market liberalisation, accords Ethiopia a score of 4.11( Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009:1). Although most countries in East Asia experienced a degree of state intervention during their periods of rapid growth, South Koreas government is often seen as having been most interventionist of the Asian Tigers (Lairran and Vergara, 1993:257): government banks fuelled the countrys large corporations, strict import controls and export quotas were in place. Ethiopias emulation from South Korea is significant. According to (MoFED, 2010a), import substitution policies, government directed private sector development programmes, institutions established by the ministry of industry to promote exports in certain key sectors--- all were expressly cited as being influenced by observation of East Asia. The Ethiopian government overwhelming emphasis on economic growth has manifested itself in official documents and in practice as well. The 25

governments highly ambitious five-year plans are the clearest example of this: in 2005, the plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development To End Poverty (PASDEP) made a massive push to accelerate growth the second of its central pillar, and aimed to achieve an annual average of 7-10% growth in real GDP for the five years to follow (MoFED, 2006:165).The lowest of this numbers is said to come directly from the best experience of Eastern and Southern Asia countries that have registered accelerated growth (ibid.). The even more optimistic Growth and Transformation plan (GTP) in 2010) aims to double the countrys GDP by 2015 and achieve middle-income status by 2025 (MoFED, 2010b).

4.2 Elite Commitment

In the literature, a developmental states leadership is strongly committed to developmental goals, and which places national development a head of personal enrichment and/or short-term political gains (Ghani et. al, 2005). EPRDF sources (EPRDF, 2011:39) stress on Taiwan and South Korea as being typical East Asian models that the government strives to emulate. These governments, it claims, were committed to developing their economies and took the issue as a matter of life and death. Similar to them as one feature of a developmental state, the government considers itself committed to transforming the country to a middle-income country within a short period of time. Not only this, the government also views ensuring development as an issue that determines regime-survival (EPRDF, 2011: 67). During the time of the resuscitation movement which was also the time the Eritrean government invaded Ethiopia, government sources further claimed, there had been conflict between the develop mentalist and rent-seeker leaders of the party which the former was able to win. Expressing it in other ways, it also rests its premises on the nature of the region (Horn of Africa) the country is placed in, saying, taking the question of development as a matter of life and death and achieving fast development and structural change does not require deep knowledge in a region where majority of nations are either failed or in a crisis (EPRDF, 2006:72). Political leaders in Ethiopia, Aaron Tesfaye (2010) claims, envision a break from the past leading to rapid economic growth while guaranteeing political autonomy to ethnic regions (Aaron, 2010). As it is the case to many issues in the country, however, there are different views reflected regarding the nature of the elite. Supporting the governments position, there are some who conceive of the leaders as truly committed to the process of re-building the country with the Prime Minster Meles Zenawi emerging as unchallenged intellectual and ideological guide of the party and government especially after the tehadso movement (Medhane and Young, 2003:401). Foune (2011) said, Elites [in Ethiopia] viewed economic growth as important for its impact inside a country, but also as crucial for achieving international independence and gaining the respect of others. While for others, elites in Ethiopia are regarded as dictators and tyrants owing to the politics of exclusion which the government purposefully uses (Merara, 2003:146). Thus, according to Evans (1995), the state must be embedded in society, that is connected to concrete set of social ties that bind the state to society. In 26

the case of south East Asian, political leadership was committed to development and in most case the uprooting of traditional elites. The political elites were either relatively uncorrupted or limited personal gains to nonpredatory corruption (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007). However, in Ethiopia scholars Mesay, echoed that the state are used to marginalized and exclude rival elites. The practice of exclusion instead of integration or coalition denotes the lack of development-oriented elites and the preponderance of rent-seeking and predatory elites (Mesay, 2010). On the other hand, the degree of political stability is a precondition sustainable development. For multi- ethnic societies, as argued by Lijphart(2002), a grand coalition of power sharing of all significant groups in political power is contributed to the stability of the country. For instance, as Sebudubudu (2009) argued that Botswana national elite to form a successful grand coalition which in turn contributed to political, social and economic stability (2009). Moreover he noted that one of the factors to Botswanas developmental state was the absence of a dominant ethnic group (ibid.). As a result, the elite in Botswana has forged a grand coalition since independence, and this inclusion of different groups in society, including the traditional chiefs, has granted a stake for all groups to take part in the politics of the new nation which in turn promoted the goals of a Developmental State to be achieved, granting legitimacy for state policies (ibid.). In Ethiopian case, as stated by Mesay, should not be cited as an example of grand coalition, given the hegemonic position of the TPLF (Mesay, 2010). This is the feature that lacked Ethiopia when the new state/TGE was formed, failure to have consensus and national reconciliation across elites that were struggling to bring the downfall of the military regime has been one factor inhibiting the success of government policies, until recently where we have different associations and leagues that carry the objective of participating different sections of the society (particularly the youth and women) in to government agendas. Thus,Mesay stressed that, the only way by which the present ruling elite can be begin its transformation is through the establishment of a grand coalition materialized a power sharing arrangement among various elite groups(ibid.). Therefore, this impacts on the subsequent political and economic developments in the country and puts its own limit on succeeding the goal of a developmental state.

4.2

Bureaucracy

4.2.1 Human resources in the bureaucracy: Case of BeninshangulGumuz regional state

In accordance to the 1995 constitution of Ethiopia article 49, Benishangul-Gumuz is acquired the status of the member states of Ethiopia. It has located in the western part of Ethiopia. It has a population of 939,000 and composed of different ethnic groups includes Benishangul, Gumuz, Amhara, Oromo and others of which Benishangul and Gumuz accounts the majority. According to BoFED, the main economic activity of the region is agriculture and cattle breeding which account 90% of the livelihood of

27

the population. The region has a huge fertile land with abundant water resource to develop advanced agricultural production. In addition, the region is rich in mining resource like gold, copper, zinc, base metal and marble resources (BoFED, 2003). Despite its potential, it lacks industrial activities.

Benishangul- Gumuz suffers from shortage of trained and educated manpower. In 1999, the regional state had about 9063 civil servants, of which only 167(2 percent) were professionals. Adult literacy rate was about 15 percent (BoFED, 2003). However, virtually all professionals and educated human resource were from non-indigenous groups. Despite resistance from the indigenous elite the regional state has employed professionals and trained individuals from across Ethiopia without ethnic preferences. For instance in 1997 alone, more than 225 non-indigenous professionals were recruited (Young, 1999:338). Since the regional state officially uses Amharic language in government structures and education, it has been easier for professionals across Ethiopia to work in the region. However, key political, bureaucratic and administration posts have remained in the hands of individuals from the indigenous ethnic communities in line with the right of the ethnic self-administration discourse in Ethiopias ethnic federal principles. This situation has created a type of dual responsibility and tension within bureaucratic structures in which the professionals are responsible for the technical inputs. However, the decision within these offices are controlled by indigenous individuals who have no relevant knowledge of the activities they are leading The ascriptive criterion of ethnic federalism has exacerbated the problem in the region. For instance, development projects like micro-dams, medium and small-scale irrigation projects and improved agricultural and veterinary services could not be executed or implemented because of lack of skilled human resources. Due to the ethnic federal principle which has drawn a dichotomy of insiders and outsiders; the insiders have no professional skills where as the outsiders are not happy and willing to work in the area which considers them outsiders. As Vaughan and Tronvoll state that there have been widespread complaints that the combined requirements to recruit personnel on the basis of ethnic quotas, and political affiliation or loyalty means that the most able and efficient functionaries are continually overlooked (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003:14). In addition, as Young observes, the internal party factions, inter-ethnic hostilities and the dichotomy of indigenous and non-indigenous categories have intensified a high degree of rent-seeking and favouritism in regional administration. He observed that the whole complex of partially completed government building can be seen in the region testimony to corrupt relations between politicians and contractors (Young, 1999:336). In its third regular conference in 25 October, 2002, the regional council urged to get rid of tribal, parochial and widespread corrupt practices in the regional government, and the same call was repeated in 2005 and the problem has continued to be the major problems in the region (Ethiopian News Agency, October 25, 2005). According to scholars,Mesay argued that ethnic federalism in Ethiopia discourages the free movement of labour and capital which has serious consequences for the countrys development (Mesay, 2010).Despite the 28

potential for investment, the Benishangul-Gumuz region could not attract significant amount of private capital. This is mainly due to the dichotomy between indigenous and non-indigenous, which has spread fear and suspicion among the peoples. Such environment would not encourage bringing much needed investors to the region from other parts of the country. Beside, this policy also harms the unity and national identity of the country. Thus, Young concludes that Benishangul-Gumuz region is not meeting its potential in either agricultural production or industrial development, and again political factors seemed to be the major obstacle (Young, 1999). The federal government pressured the regional state to use professionals from outside the region to head bureaus and other offices that need qualified and trained manpower. In 1998 approximately half of Benishanguls bureau heads were outsiders and 17 out of 225 appointed professional were indigenous (Young, 1999:338). As a result the federal government has played a vital role in Benishangul-Gumuz regional administrative functions due to lack of experience in administration by the indigenous elites. This situation has created an opportunity for the EPRDF to play a controversial role in shaping and affecting politics in the regional state. Furthermore, a civil service college was set up by the federal government to train regional officials and bureaucrats to produce professionals from the indigenous ethnic members.

4.3 Insulated Bureaucracy

The capacity of public institutions especially the bureaucracy is crucial to economic performance in a developmental state. The bureaucracy constitutes the soft underbelly of the state which advises the political executive and formulates and implements public policies professionalism. Discipline and technical skills are core issues in administrative, competence and capability (UNECA, 2005:138). Similarly, Mkandawire argued that one of the key features of developmental state is the capacity of the bureaucracy to implement the policy. Such capacity is determined by institutional, technical, administrative and political (Mkandwire, 2001). Evans also explained that the state must create a meritocratic bureaucracy of highly skilled people who can freely combine their close contacts with the private sector with their independent understanding of the global market to help steer economic planning in directions good for the national economy as a whole (Evans, 1995). For example, Johnson argues that developmental in Japan is a rational development-oriented strategy developed by the state. The goal of the political establishment is rapid economic development as a means of legitimizing itself. Thus it gives power and authority to the bureaucracy to plan, supervise, regulate, and implement efficient policies (Johnson, 1982). Furthermore, Abdi Samatar, in his most recent work An African Miracle (1999:6), argued that Botswanas status as a developmental state is located in a professional Weberian-style bureaucracy that has conducted and implemented policy efficiently. In this respect, Botswana has maintained a strong and relatively autonomous and effective bureaucracy by insulating the bureaucrats (Mbabazi and Taylor, 2005). Botswana then echoes the developmental state of Chalmers Johnson where the politician reign and the state bureaucrats rule 29

(Johnson, 1982:12).Thus, Botswana bureaucracy has contributed to its success story. Regarding to Ethiopian bureaucracy, Desta put is managed by civil servants that have clearly spelled-out functions. The government functionaries and technocrats are by and large recruited on meritocracy and are expected to serve competently. However, the institutions in which the functionaries operate are not autonomous. They are strongly influenced by the ruling elite. The higher positions in many governmental departments are assigned according to an ethnic-based quota system (Desta, 2011). Another scholar, Mesay, echoed that the cumbersome weight of political intervention does not allow the autonomy of the bureaucratic sphere. He further stressed that, far from allowing autonomy, the bureaucracy is using an extended organ of the political machinery, thereby undermining impartiality and professionalism, and distributing favourable treatment on the basis of political patronage and, ethnic affiliation. Thus, what must be emphasized here is that the ethnic basis of the country, as fashioned by EPRDF, is structurally adverse to the autonomy of the bureaucracy (Mesay, 2010). Notwithstanding this, though the bureaucracy might be recruited on the basis of meritocracy, due to the perception held by the public, willingly or unwillingly they are expected to operate in conformance with their ethnic affiliation rather than in pursuit of the goals of their organization. Because of this, instead of transparency, the desire to fulfil the wishes of the political agenda introduces the temptation for corruption that has become endemic in the functioning of the Ethiopian bureaucracy. Despite this, some of the government initiated development plans were very rational and if systematically implemented they could successfully achieve their intended goals. But, many fruitful projects were unduly delayed because the functionaries lacked the professionalism and commitment needed to mobilize the limited resources of the nation for development (Desta, 2010). Thus, according to Desta, if Ethiopia desires to use the state as an important vehicle to tackle its deeprooted developmental problems, it needs to improve the competence of its public bureaucracy and keep them politically neutral (Desta, 2010). Furthermore, as Mesay stressed, in order to build a competent and professional bureaucracy, recruitment and promotion must be based on merit rather than on ethnic affiliation and political patronage (Mesay, 2010).

4.4 Embedded Autonomy

According to Evans, one of the important characteristics of developmental state is embedded autonomy in which the state must be embedded in the society. In other words, the elite must create concrete social ties that connect the state and society in a mutually binding way (Evans, 1995). In addition, Evans defined embeddedness as the state must establish a good communication and ties with the private sector. For embedded autonomy, Evans argue that, the state must create a meritocratic bureaucracy of highly skilled people who can freely combine their close contact with the private sector with their independent understanding of the global market to help steer economic planning in directions good for the national economy (ibid.). 30

The government claims that it was able to preserve its autonomy from private interests based on two premises. The first reason it presents is that the party had a strong support base of the rural (beginning from its inception) as well as of the urban population that the political and economic influences of capitalists had less influence in affecting its autonomy. Second, its control over major institutions of the economy that were inherited from the military government granted it power to deal with capitalists (EPRDF, 2011). Even if the legitimacy of the government in Ethiopia is greatly contested especially following the formation of the new transitional government (TGE) which resulted ethnic- based federal system, and following the infamous 2005 election (Merara:2003), embeddedness is a factor stressed by promoting a developmental state in Ethiopia regarding pro-poor inclusion(Tesfaye, 2010). In fact, this feature of developmental state is perhaps the most visible in Ethiopia. EPRDFs perception its own role as well as that of society is central, whether government institutions have the required capacity or not. Regarding to this, Melaku Tegegn argues: the EPRDF assumes that it is not only omniscient but should also be omnipotent. It drives from this the notion that society should be led by the vanguard (the government in this case) in both development and democratization. Because of this, the relationship between government and society is not based on equality, mutual recognition of sovereignty and freedom(Tegegn, 2007:14). This shows that the elite fail to expound a vision that connect the state and society and provide institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of policies.. Elites in Ethiopia wish to emulate aspects of the East Asian developmental model and they attribute the growth record achieved for the last successive seven years to the developmental path the government is following. There is every reason to believe that growth becomes a main source of governmental legitimacy (Wade, 1990). In Ethiopia also this general rule seems to be working, especially owing to the successive growth record being informed by the government in its effort to make the developmental thinking a hegemony(EPRDF, 2010), which will serve as an input to facilitate growth through mobilizing the population at large. Even if the government praises of its achievements, there are critics against the whole project of building a developmental state in the country. If we are to label Ethiopia as a developmental state, it must be said it is at the very early stage and much remains to be done. According to Tesfaye, the government fails to develop institutions and policy instruments, to win the hearts and minds of the majority of the population round developmentalism, to secure resources, particularly foreign savings, to build an efficient, meritocratic public service, and to insulate the state from private poetical pressure enough to allow inclusion to be a positive form of embeddedness (Tesfaye, 2010).

31

4.5 Ideological Underpinning is Developmental

Ideological underpinnings are required in order to give the developmental project a hegemonic aspect to it, in the sense that the project gains consensus and attracts broad sections of the populace. As Woo-Cumming (1999), argued that nationalism and a national vision lie at the heart of a developmental state. It was argued that the success of the East Asian miracle is driven by nationalism. In addition, for example, the success of developmental states of Botswana the slogan: ditiro ts a ditlhabololo. (Work for development) underpinned the trajectory post-1966 under Khama with a strong sense of nationalism (Taylor, 2005). According to Ghani et al., (2005), one of the underlying requirements of the developmental state is the creation of nation-wide public. A nation-wide public need not be rooted in a unified sense of nation based on cultural and linguistic unity, but may well take the form of a more civic identity. The important issue is that all citizens see themselves as Ethiopian more than their ethnic line. According to Mkandawire (2001), the main force behind the developmental ideology has been nationalism which seeks to subordinate the energy of the people behind a single national goal. With this backdrop, this part of the paper presents finding of the impact Ethiopian ethnic federalism on conflicts at local and regional levels in turn it affect the project of an overarching countrywide civic citizenship. Thus, my argument here is that due to the ethnic federal structure of Ethiopia the sentiment of state nationalism is declining and ethno nationalism emerges which adversely affects the unity of the country. Since the project of ethnic federalism in 1991, Ethiopias ethnic groups the right to self-determination would lead to peace and provide a new basis for the unity of the country. However, decentralisation and proliferation of conflicts at local and regional levels accompanied the federal restructuring of the country (Asnake, 2006). In addition, according to the Crises Group report, ethnic conflicts have not disappeared but have been either transferred from the national to the regional and district levels. Relations between ethnic groups have become increasingly competitive as they vie for control of administrative boundaries, land and natural resources (2009). Hence, after the introduction of this policy ethnic conflicts happened in different parts of regions. Ethiopian ethnic federalism includes ethnically defined national citizenship, self-administration on an ethno-linguistic basis as enshrined in the constitution, ethnically defined political representation and decision making at all administrative levels (FDRE, 1995). In fact, the ethnic federalism is a clear break with the past, which allows people to be involved with and understand local government. However, with the exception of linguistic and cultural autonomy, so far the constituent members of the ethnic federation cannot exercise administrative and political autonomy (Asnake, 2006:243). Thus, it is possible to explain the wide gulf between the theory and practice of Ethiopian federalism in terms of political autonomy by the emergence of a dominant oneparty system under the EPRDF. Hence, state and society relationships in Ethiopia today, are mainly characterized by the hegemonic control of the masses (or the majority) by the few who maintain control over the state and its economic and military assets (Asnake, 2006:243). 32

One of the crucial impacts of ethnic federalism was the generation and transformation of intra-regional autonomy conflicts and inter-regional conflicts. Empirical evidence has showed that, in the Somali region, autonomy led to intra- and inter-clan divisions and conflicts. According to Asnake, the most important division affecting the Somali region and its relations with the political centre was the division that emerged between the Ogaden and the non-Ogaden clans. (Asnake, 2006:246). Moreover, the identity and autonomy question of the Bantu minorities and the Sheikash-Ogaden conflict over administrative structure (territory) demonstrated how federal restructuring affected inter-clan relations (ibid.). On the other hand, the ethnic politics created the organization of clan in political unit in the region. As a result, the politicisation of clan relation led to one of the worst localised conflicts in the region between the Ogaden and the Sheikash.This conflict led to the death of hundreds of people and the displacement of thousands(Asnake, 2006:246). Similarly, in Benishangul-Gumuz region show the impact of federalism on the generation and transformation of conflicts. According to Young, in the pre-1991 ethnic tensions in Benishangul-Gumuz areas were limited to conflict between adjacent communities for various reasons of livelihood challenges and social facets such as land grapping, cattle raiding and cultural clashes. Very low intensity sporadic clashes used to occur between Gumuz and Amhara and between Gumuz and Oromo in the south part of the region. However the post-1991 ethnic tensions are very new and induced in connection with the establishment of the regional state government. Competition for political leadership, position in the state bureaucracy, groups hegemonic ambitions and language issues (Young, 1999). Empirical evidences showed that there are two trends of autonomy conflicts in the region, conflicts between the titular ethnic groups and conflicts between the titular and non-titular groups. In the first case (Bertha-Gumuz dispute), it was happened that the availability of resources at local and regional levels like the office of the president, financial resources and other caused a dispute between the two dominant titular ethnic groups of the region (Asnake, 2006:246). Hence, in post-1991 the region has been practice the politics of inclusion and exclusion based on two categories of peoples, titular and non-titular. This generated violent conflicts in the region (ibid.).

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Chapter 5 Conclusion
This study has provided a glimpse to the link between ethnic federalism and the developmental state model in Ethiopia. It has employed whether the ethnic federal structure has accelerated or affected to the sustainable and successful state-led model of development. In general, Ethiopia has scored a GDP growth after the country has shifted to a developmental state model. However, the country is required a prerequisites in the developmental state theory which is a crucial to the continuity and the sustainability of development. Thus, it is still remain a challenge to established a highly competent bureaucracy and the creation of countrywide civic citizenship in other words to build nationalism. The finding indicates that due to ethnic federalism, ethnic entitlement produced a weak bureaucratic structure which is a key to developmental state. It was mainly due to the prioritization of ethno-language criteria rather than meritocratic which adversely affect to establish a highly competent bureaucratic staff. In addition, the political neutrality of the bureaucrat is still a challenge. On the other hand, the ethno-language criteria discourage the free movement of labour and capital which has its own limitation for the countrys development. The other finding shows that the project of ethnic federalism has further exacerbated the rise of ethnic classification as a consequence it divide rather than unite the people. Moreover, it generated more inter-ethnic and intraethnic conflicts which have a negative impact to the creation of civic countrywide citizenship for successful developmental state of Ethiopia.

34

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