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Mediterranean Politics
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On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing the Cases of Greece and Turkey
IOANNIS N. GRIGORIADIS
a a

University of Athens/ELIAMEP Published online: 07 Feb 2008.

To cite this article: IOANNIS N. GRIGORIADIS (2008): On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing the Cases of Greece and Turkey, Mediterranean Politics, 13:1, 23-41 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629390701862574

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Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2341, March 2008

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On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing the Cases of Greece and Turkey
IOANNIS N. GRIGORIADIS
University of Athens/ELIAMEP

ABSTRACT The transformation of the character of the European Union and the diffusion of European norms facilitated a drastic improvement of minority rights in Greece in the 1990s. Nonetheless, signicant problems have persisted, which have undermined the credibility of the role model that Greece wishes to comprise for neighbouring EU candidate states. The situation was different in the 1990s when Turkeys EU candidacy gained impetus. The promulgation of the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 meant that respect for minority rights became a condition for EU membership. It is argued in this study that minority rights protection in Greece and Turkey remains one of the elds where Europeanization has triggered considerable progress, but not fullled its full potential. The asymmetry between current and past EU membership criteria led Greece and Turkey to diverse experiences of Europeanization in the eld of minority rights.

Introduction This study aims to address the impact of Europeanization on minority1 rights protection in Greece and Turkey. If Europeanization is understood as the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance (Risse et al., 2001: 3), then we explore how Greece and Turkey responded to European pressures to reform their illiberal minority policies. Exerting adaptational pressures is necessary for the success of Europeanization, and their strength depends on how suitable pre-existing domestic structures are (goodness of t). The existence of incompatible domestic structures turns Europeanization into a non-linear process of domestic reform, which often faces serious reaction from domestic actors and whose success is not guaranteed. Europeanization is also understood as a diffusion of European norms and ideas, dened by the European liberal democratic paradigm. The advocacy and diffusion of these principles, their use in the redenition of concepts such as national interest and security and their prioritization against state
Correspondence Address: Ioannis N. Grogoriadis, ELIAMEP, Vas. Soas Ave. 49, Athens, GR-10676, Greece. Email: ing7@columbia.edu

1362-9395 Print/1743-9418 Online/08/010023-19 q 2008 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/13629390701862574

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sovereignty gives Europeanization a strong normative character, which aims to bring ideational change within the borders of member and candidate states. It is argued in this study that minority rights protection in Greece and Turkey remains one of the elds where Europeanization has triggered considerable progress, but not fullled its full potential. Both states have long hesitated to ratify international conventions for the protection of minority rights. The status of minority rights in both states has been repeatedly used for mutual accusations or as a pretext to invoke the principle of reciprocity. Greece, despite being a consolidated democracy, an EU member state since 1981 and an advocate of further European integration, often fell short of European standards regarding minority rights. On the other hand, protection of minority rights is one of the elds where Turkey needs to make decisive steps, before its EU membership. The asymmetry between current and past EU membership criteria led Greece and Turkey to diverse experiences of Europeanization in the eld of minority rights. In the case of Greece, Europeanization of minority rights protection began after Greeces EU membership and was rather based on a combination of rationalist and constructivist reasoning. In the case of Turkey, it began as a part of Turkeys quest to join the European Union and was primarily based on constructivist reasoning. The State of Minority Rights in Greece Greeces territorial expansion in the nineteenth and early twentieth century resulted in a rising diversication of the countrys ethnic, religious and linguistic fabric. Between 1912 and 1923, the Greek borders were redrawn several times, while ethnic cleansing and population exchanges voluntary or not changed the ethnoreligious map of the Balkans and Anatolia. The 1919 Voluntary Population Exchange Convention between Greece and Bulgaria and the 1923 Mandatory Population Exchange Convention between Greece and Turkey attempted to provide a nal resolution for the minority problems of the signing parties. Greeces military defeat in the Greco-Turkish War of 1919 1922 resulted in territorial contraction and a very disproportionate (against Greece) exchange rate. Approximately 1.2 million Greeks of Turkey were exchanged with 350,000 Turks of Greece (Hirschon, 2003: 14). This contributed to a dramatic rise of ethnic, religious and linguistic homogeneity among Greeces population. While several minority groups maintained a noticeable presence, the homogenization trend was further amplied with the dramatic events of the Second World War. Muslim Albanian Chams, the remaining Bulgarians and Slav Macedonians were expelled in the aftermath of German/Italian/Bulgarian occupation and the Greek civil war of 1946 1949, while Greeces Jews were nearly annihilated by German occupation forces. This left Greece in the aftermath of Second World War with one ofcially recognized religious minority in Western Thrace, several ofcially unrecognized ethnic (such as Slav Macedonians, Arvanites, Vlachs, Roma) and religious groups (such as Catholics, Protestants and Jews), whose rights were often violated.2 While national homogenization policies had started ever since the inter-war years, they gained strong impetus in the aftermath of the Second World War. Following the bitter

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experiences of occupation and civil war, Greece of the early Cold War era was a procedural democracy, in which human rights did not enjoy full protection. Under these circumstances, minorities were among the most sensitive population groups. The existence of minorities other than the Muslim minority of Western Thrace was denied, as well as any ethnic identication of that minority. Besides, policies aiming at the numerical contraction, social and economic marginalization of its members were implemented. Greek authorities never came to the point of orchestrating a pogrom like that of 6 7 September 1955 in Istanbul. Nonetheless, it was thought that minorities comprised a national security threat, whose presence was a necessary evil for Greece. It is no coincidence that the discriminatory Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code was introduced in 1955. The 1967 1974 military regime brought human and minority rights protection to the lowest point. In 1969, the junta withdrew the countrys membership of the Council of Europe shortly before its suspension, due to gross human rights violations, including torture. Similarly, relations between Greece and the European Economic Community were frozen. In 1974, Greece entered a successful democratic consolidation and economic development process, which became a condition for its readmission in the Council of Europe and the improvement of its relations with the European Economic Community.3 In the new 1975 Constitution, the number of human rights which enjoyed constitutional protection increased, while the protection of human rights included in previous constitutions was upgraded.4 Greeces successful transition was rewarded with its accession to the European Economic Community in 1981. Although minority legislation reform did not form part of Greeces EEC accession negotiations and no conditionality policies were attached, signicant improvements in the eld of minority rights took place. In 1995, restrictions to the freedom of movement in the mountainous minority zones of Western Thrace were lifted. Further improvement was achieved between 1996 and 2000, which included the abolition of Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code and the ratication of several international conventions protecting minority rights. However, signicant loopholes in minority rights protection have remained intact, despite the countrys membership of the European Union and increasing international interest in minorities. Legal Issues The Greek Nationality Code remained until 1998 one of the clearest manifestations of discrimination against minorities. Having its origins at a Presidential Decree of 1927, Article 19 of the Nationality Code, which was established by Legislative Decree 3370 in 1955, stated, A Greek citizen of non-Greek descent (allogenis 6) who left the Greek territory with no intent of return may be declared as allog1nh having lost his Greek citizenship. This provision explicitly discriminated against minority members compared to citizens of Greek descent whose citizenship could not be removed on that basis. Meanwhile, Greece avoided being committed to international treaties against statelessness, which could have limited its leverage to strip minority members of their nationality.5 Article 43 of the 1975 Constitution restricted withdrawal of Greek citizenship only in case of voluntary acquisition of

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another citizenship or of undertaking service contrary to national interests in a foreign country, under the conditions and procedures more specically provided by law.6 This would render the provision of Article 19 unconstitutional. However, Article 1116 of the Constitution stated that the provision of Article 19 of Legislative Decree 3370/1955 on sanctioning of the Code of Greek citizenship shall remain in force until repealed by law. It took 26 years after the promulgation of the 1975 Constitution before a law repealed Article 19. Meanwhile, it had served as the legal basis for the removal of Greek citizenship from approximately 60,000 citizens, the vast majority of whom were members of the Western Thrace minority (Sitaropoulos, 2004: 205 206). Many of those citizens who had not in the meantime acquired another nationality remained stateless. Greeces disinclination in the eld of minority rights protection was additionally highlighted by its delay or refusal to sign and ratify several international conventions, which included provisions aiming to improve the international protection of minority rights.7 Greece delayed for more than 30 years its signature and ratication of the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The reason for this delay was Article 27, which stated that In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. (United Nations, 1966) It was feared that this clause would not only increase the level of minority rights protection but also give them a collective character, due to the reference to the collective exercise of minority rights. Long-lasting state policies which violated minority rights persisted. Based on the use of the term Muslim minority in Article 2 of the 1923 Population Exchange Convention, Greek authorities continued to claim that there was only one minority in Greece, that in Western Thrace, and it was exclusively religious. This meant denial of rising claims for the recognition of a Turkish national minority in Western Thrace, as well as a Macedonian minority in north-western Greek Macedonia (Human Rights Watch, 1990, 1999; Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1994). The right of ethnic self-identication was denied, and its exercise was seen as contrary to public order and illegal, even when exercised individually. The situation reached a peak in the late 1980s when members of the Western Thrace minority participated for the rst time with independent tickets in parliamentary elections. The election of lu in June 1989 shook Greek independent MPs Sadk Ahmet and Ahmet Faikog politics and public opinion. Ahmet, who had repeatedly stressed in his election campaign that he was Turkish, faced criminal prosecution on the grounds of propaganda dissemination or disturbance of public order. Increasing tensions between local Greeks and minority members led to riots in Komotini in January 1990. This escalation forced the Greek government to look into the issue of minority rights reform with more resolve.

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Similarly, associations whose constitution or name implied the existence of minorities other than the Muslim minority faced similar judicial action. The Home of Macedonian Civilization was not allowed to register in 1990, while the Turkish Union of Xanthi was closed as contrary to public order and thus illegal in 2005, because their names implied the existence of a Macedonian and a Turkish minority go6) in Greece. The Hellenic Court of Cassations (Areios Pagos r1io6 Pa upheld the ban of both associations, underlining that there are no minorities in Greece other than the Muslim minority of Western Thrace recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne and that any other claim is contrary to public order and thus punishable. In the decision on the Turkish Union of Xanthi, it was argued that: The purpose of the association is illegal and against Greek public order on the grounds of its contradiction with the international conventions signed in Lausanne, as it clearly attempts to display the existence in Greece of a national Turkish minority, while according to these conventions only the existence of a religious Muslim minority is recognized in the Greek territory . . . The reference to Turkish identity is not meant to declare a distant Turkish descent, but a current identity as members of an existing in Greece Turkish minority, which furthers within the Greek territory the political aims of a foreign state, and more specically Turkey. The association harms Greek public order and national security by insisting on the use of the word Turkish in its name. This is contrary to the aforementioned conventions and not only does it not contribute to the peaceful coexistence of the citizens of the region, which is necessary for the good of both Greek communities, Muslim and Christian, but raises instead a non-existent Turkish minority question. (Hellenic Court of Cassation, 2005) The Home of Macedonian Civilization case nally reached the European Court of Human Rights, which held that Greece violated Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights protecting the freedom of association (ECHR, 1998). Other issues involved the election of the minority religious leadership and property questions. The appointment of the muftis of Western Thrace became an issue of considerable tension.8 According to the Treaty of Lausanne, the muftis performed not only religious, but also judicial and administrative functions related to the minority. Members of the minority disputed the right of Greek authorities to appoint the muftis and organized elections to ll the posts. The elected muftis were recognized by Ankara and challenged the legitimacy of state-appointed muftis. Eventually the brahim S elected Muftis of Xanthi Mehmet Emin Aga and Komotini I erif were brought to court, accused of pretension of religious authority and convicted. Both Aga and S erif appealed to the European Court of Human Rights which held that by punishing them for acts related to their claimed mufti ofce, Greece violated Article 9 of the Convention (ECHR, 2000, 2006). The mufti question brought to the fore the issue of religious freedom in Western Thrace, as well as the anachronistic character of some of the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne.9 Even though Greece had failed to ratify several international conventions related to minority rights, it was still bound by

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the European Convention of Human Rights, whose general provisions also applied to members of minority groups, although there was no specic protection of minority rights as such. Greece faced several convictions by the European Court of Human Rights for violating freedoms of religion, expression and association of citizens who were members of minority groups. The Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection in Greece The embryonic political nature of the European Economic Community in the 1970s, the lack of political criteria for EEC membership as well as of conditionality policies aiming to incite reform of minority rights resulted in Greeces EEC membership without a resolution of minority discrimination questions. Greeces long process of Europeanization resulted in considerable improvements in the status of minority rights, which could not however eliminate all shortcomings. Two waves of Europeanization can be traced regarding minority rights protection in Greece. The rst was linked to the Konstantinos Mitsotakis government, which ruled Greece from 1990 until 1993. Having a very thin parliamentary majority despite winning 46.9 per cent of the vote, it came to power under turbulent domestic political circumstances. Throughout his tenure, Mitsotakis claimed as his primary mission to re-establish Greeces strong links with Europe, which were weakened under the previous PASOK (Panellinion Sosialistikon Kinima Panhellenic Socialist Movement) administration. A new, more European-oriented foreign policy was launched, while measures aiming at economic and political liberalization were taken. Regarding minority rights, the election of independent minority Members of Parliament, the intensication of the campaign to recognize the Turkish identity of the minority and the riots of January 1990 underlined the urgency of a decision to reform government minority policies (Anagnostou, 2005: 339 340). This also coincided with the general political programme of his government, which furthered political and economic liberalization. Mitsotakis paid a historic visit to Western Thrace in May 1991, when he admitted that the Muslim minority had fallen victim to injustice by previous governments and stated that he sought to rectify past errors. While using the Lausanne Treaty term Muslim minority, he also recognized that the minority consisted of three sub-groups, ethnic Turks (tourkogeneistoy rkog1n1i6), Pomaks and Roma. The new policy would still be based on the Lausanne agreements but would also be informed by the principles of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the United Nations and the Council of Europe (Anagnostou, 2005: 344). Under the slogan legal equality equal citizenship (isonomia-isopoliteia isonomia-isopolit1ia), a new minority policy was launched, and several restrictive measures were removed.10 Besides, a set of policy measures aimed to promote the economic development of the region was introduced. This pointed out that the minority question of Western Thrace was also seen as a result of the regions relative underdevelopment.11 Nonetheless, the reform of minority policies did not include the abolition of Article 19 of the Nationality Code. Rising nationalist fervour in Greek public opinion, which eventually led to the fall of the Mitsotakis government in 1993, did

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not favour such a development. Facing increasing opposition from the nationalist ank of his own party led by Foreign Minister Antonios Samaras, the thin majority of the Mitsotakis government eventually collapsed, as he was accused of compromising Greek national interests on the Macedonian question. The new PASOK government, which came to power under Andreas Papandreou with the October 1993 elections, was much more populist, nationalist-prone and did little to further the reform agenda. The succession of Andreas Papandreou by Konstantinos Simitis due to the ailing health of the former in January 1996 became a turning point in the continuation of Europeanization reform in Greece. The reform of minority policies by the Simitis government was a part of a broader reform agenda. This included reshaping Greek identity and national interest perceptions by afrming Greeces commitment to be a member of the political core of the European Union and declaring its intention to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as soon as possible. It also recongured the strategic priorities of Greek foreign policy. Greece would abstain from becoming a party to existing Balkan conicts, but would instead undertake a Europeanizing mission for the whole region. Greeces leadership role would consist in becoming the transmission belt of European norms and principles, facilitating the Europeanization of Balkan states, as well as their eventual membership of the European Union. A new vision of a less nationalistic and more European strong Greece (ischyri Ella da) became the leitmotiv of the Simitis administration. As Ellada-isxy rh aptly put by Ioakimidis, Greece was a European country in the Balkans, not a Balkan country in Europe, a role model for its neighbours. Under these circumstances, it was imperative that Greece had to clear its own minority policy record and avoid accusations of double-standard policies. Minimizing the number of convictions at the European Court of Human Rights on cases related to minority rights was a rst step. Besides, the existence of Article 19 provided a clear contradiction between Greek rhetoric about respect for minority rights in the Balkans and its own policies. The situation became more serious for Greece in November 1997 when the Monitoring Committee of the Council of Europe decided to set a meeting for January 1998 to discuss the launch of a monitoring process against Greece on the grounds of Article 19. This possibility played a signicant role in triggering the decision to abolish Article 19. Although the government was aware of the problem which Article 19 posed, an additional instrumental justication to proceed with the abolition emerged. The abolition could be defended not only in principle, as abolishing a agrantly discriminatory legal provision, but also as serving Greek strategic priorities and interests in the Balkans.12 This combination of instrumental and normative reasoning facilitated support for abolition by the vast majority of the Parliament and prevented a possible political crisis. However, the price for this consensus was the removal of the abolitions retroactive effect. This meant that there would be no automatic restitution of Greek citizenship for the more than 60,000 persons who had been stripped of it on the grounds of Article 19. Interested persons were given the chance to apply for citizenship through the normal, long and unpredictable naturalization process.

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Besides the thorny issue of Article 19, the Simitis government also upgraded the legal status of minority rights protection in Greece by signing and ratifying relevant international conventions. In 1997, Greece ratied the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and signed the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the 1997 European Convention on Nationality of the Council of Europe. Additionally, measures of afrmative action in education, which used to benet the youth of Greek Diaspora and repatriates, were expanded to include the youth of the Muslim minority. The change of state was highlighted by an interview of Foreign Minister George Papandreou who on the question of the ethnic characterization of the minority of Western Thrace argued: No one doubts that there are many Muslims of Turkish origin. Of course, the Treaties [of Lausanne] mention only Muslims. If no one contests the present borders, I could not care less if one calls himself a Muslim or a Turk, a Bulgarian or a Pomak.13 Additional evidence of change was a discursive difference regarding the normative basis of minority rights protection. Respect for minority rights used to be seen not as an essential element of the democratic nature of the Hellenic Republic, but as a burden imposed by the Treaty of Lausanne, which was bound by the principle of reciprocity (also see Tsitselikis, 2006: 383 384). In other words, respect for the rights of the minority of Western Thrace was conditional upon Turkeys respect for the rights of its own Greek minority. It was to Turkey and not to its own citizens that Greece owed respect for minority rights. Thus if Turkey did not full its own obligations, namely respect for the rights of its own Greek minority, Greece was released from its obligation and could treat its own minority on a par with Turkey.14 The decimation of Turkeys Greek minority was used as irrefutable argument for the violation of the Treaty of Lausanne by Turkey, which allegedly relieved Greece from its own conventional duties and deprived Turkey of any right to complain about Greeces treatment of its own minority.15 Under the Simitis government, this argumentation was replaced by arguments that emphasized Greeces soft power as a force of democratization and Europeanization in the Balkans. This new role entailed respect for human rights not as a sovereignty concession but as an indispensable principle of Greeces liberal democratic regime, which was also a sine qua non for the fullment of Greek strategic objectives in the region. Besides, rising tension with Turkey between 1997 and 1999 also meant that Greece wanted to minimize the possibility of being accused of violations of minority rights. These signicant steps, however, did not mean the end of minority discrimination policies. Limitations to the right of ethnic self-identication, freedom of expression, association and religion and the problem of statelessness have remained and tarred Greeces improved record in minority rights protection (see e.g. Human Rights Watch, 1999; Kostopoulos, 2004). Full recognition of the right of ethnic selfidentication would imply lifting of the limitations to freedom of association and expression. Besides, a resolution of the mufti question in a way that would separate his religious from his administrative/judicial functions would secure the disengagement of the Greek state from the election process and respect for the right of Greeces Muslims to elect their religious leadership. Moreover, the ratication of the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the 1997 European

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Convention on Nationality and the signature and ratication of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which would signicantly upgrade the level of minority rights protection, is still pending. Despite considerable improvement, Greeces minority rights record has not been awless (ECRI, 2004: 18 24). Upcoming verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights on a number of cases related to minority rights may increase pressure for necessary reforms. The State of Minority Rights in Turkey The question of minorities has maintained its central signicance ever since the late Ottoman years. Protection of Ottoman religious minorities became one of the most heated political issues of the nineteenth century, which served as reason and often pretext for foreign intervention and precipitated the partition of the Empire along national lines. Although the demise of the Empire was marked by massive massacres and population movements, Turkeys population maintained a considerable degree of diversity. The republican regime, which emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, aimed to assimilate the various minorities, which remained in Turkish territory after 1923. Muslim ethnic or linguistic groups were invited and expected to voluntarily assimilate to Turkish national identity. If they refused to do so, state repression and assimilation policies ensued. This was particularly the case for the Kurds who repeatedly revolted against republican assimilation policies in the interwar years. Kurds, Alevis, Arabs, Laz, Circassians, Bosnians, Albanians, Roma and other Muslim minorities were denied any minority rights, as ofcial state policies refused the existence of minorities other than the non-Muslim minorities identied in the Treaty of Lausanne. Steps made towards democratization in the 1950s also meant that minority repression somewhat decreased. This trend was further strengthened under the provisions of the 1961 Constitution.16 Nonetheless, political radicalisation in the 1970s and the September 1980 coup left a heavy trace on minority policies. Abject denial of the existence of minorities other than Armenians, Greeks and Jews was revitalized and those especially Kurds who objected to their forced assimilation faced severe state repression. Speaking Kurdish in public became a criminal offence. These policies facilitated the rise of Kurdish armed insurgency by the Kurdish Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan PKK). The crisis escalated even further in the 1990s when PKK operations and terrorist attacks were intensied and Turkish security forces hardened their policies in eastern and south-eastern Turkey. The forced relocation of the inhabitants of more than 3,000 villages suspected of serving as logistics support bases for the PKK led to a major humanitarian crisis in south-eastern Turkey. Turkish military operations came to a peak in 1997 and culminated with the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah calan in February 1999. O Lausannes non-Muslim minorities, Turkeys Armenians, Greeks and Jews, were deemed inassimilable. Although the Lausanne Treaty guaranteed their basic minority rights, their economic and social marginalization and eventual coercion to emigrate became targets of long-term state policies. In the 1920s and 1930s, access of non-Muslims to a long list of professions was restricted, while non-Muslims

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residing outside Istanbul were forced to settle in that city and those holding double nationalities were forced to leave the country (Ic duygu and Soner, 2006: 458 460). In 1942 an arbitrary and inequitable Property Tax (Varlik Vergisi) was imposed to curb proteering, which had allegedly been taking place due to the continued war in Europe. Nonetheless, it soon became evident that the real target of the tax was the non-Muslim bourgeoisie of Istanbul, which was disproportionately and severely hit by the measure (Aktar, 2000: 140 141). After a relative easing of the situation with the advent of multiparty politics and the rise of the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti DP) into power in 1950, anti-minority policies reached the level of a fullyedged pogrom in 1955. Carefully leaked information about the situation in Cyprus and persecution of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots and an alleged Greek attempt rk in Thessaloniki led to the instigation of a to bomb the house of Kemal Atatu rampant Turkish mob, which on 6 7 September 1955 attacked and looted Greek and ven, other non-Muslim buildings and properties in Istanbul (for more on this, see Gu 2006). The catastrophic effect of these events was compounded by the 1964 mass deportations of thousands of Istanbul Greeks who held Greek nationality, again on the pretext of the Cyprus conict. These measures were largely through property conscations and targeted expropriations, which also affected the Greeks living on kc the two Turkish Aegean islands, Go eada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos). While these measures led to the numerical diminution of Istanbul Greeks and to a lesser extent Armenians and Jews, other measures aimed to deprive rich nonMuslim foundations of their assets. A series of legislative and administrative measures aimed to conscate the immoveable property of these foundations and thus even further weaken the position of non-Muslims. These policies led to the decimation of the non-Muslim minorities of Istanbul. In 2006 about 80,000 Armenians and 20,000 Jews remained in Istanbul. Yet the hardest hit minority was the Greek one. Out of a population of more than 120,000 in 1923, about 2,000 to 5,000 ethnic Greeks lived in Turkey in 2006 (Bas langc , 2005). Legal Issues As nation-building was one of the foremost priorities of republican state institutions, minority rights did not enjoy any legal protection.17 The Turkish state refused to recognize legally any minorities beyond the Armenians, Greeks and Jews who had been explicitly mentioned and protected by the Treaty of Lausanne. Consecutive court decisions declared that the minority listing of the Treaty was restrictive and that Turkey had no other minorities. Other sizeable Muslim minorities, such as the Kurds, the Alevis or non-Muslim ones, such as the Assyrians, the Protestants and the Catholics, faced severe state persecution, as the authorities denied their existence and raised obstacles against their institutional organization. Persistent court decisions banned associations whose names or activities implied minority afliations on the grounds of undermining national unity. Policies of denial reached their peak in the 1980s, when the existence of Kurds was ofcially denied, and the people of southeastern Turkey were described as Mountain Turks. It was only in the mid-1990s that public discussion started on the multiethnic, multicultural character of Turkey, which

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was aptly described as a mosaic. Nonetheless, despite the discursive change, state authorities remained adamant in defending the indivisible unity of the Turkish nation. The status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has been another major public manifestation of legal failures in the protection of minority rights in Turkey (on ktem, 2002). The Ecumenical Patriarchate, a religious freedom in Turkey, see O seventeen-centuries-old institution and cradle of Orthodox Christian religion and culture, maintained its position in Istanbul after the Treaty of Lausanne, even though the Treaty failed to make any reference to its status and protection. This gave authorities the pretext to launch policies of systematic harassment. The legal personality and the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate were denied. The Ecumenical Patriarch was not recognized as the spiritual leader of the Orthodox Christians but only as the religious leader of Turkeys Greek minority. Serious restrictions were imposed on the stafng and operations of the Patriarchate. The election of the Ecumenical Patriarch was conditional upon the approval of Turkish authorities, which also demanded that the incumbent be a Turkish citizen. Moreover, the Orthodox Religious Seminary of Heybeliada (Chalki), which since its foundation in 1844 had served as a major educational centre for Orthodox clergy and laity, was shut down in 1971. This deprived the Greek minority of Istanbul of its only religious education institution. The question of non-Muslim foundations has been one of the enduring issues of minority discrimination policies. As most of these foundations had their roots in Ottoman times, they lacked proper foundation constitutions, due to the peculiarity of the then applicable Islamic law, which did not recognize the concept of legal person. The Treaty of Lausanne guaranteed in Article 423 that All facilities and authorization will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities, which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924) In the early republican years the introduction of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926 paved the ground for the normalization of the status of minority foundations. A new Law on Foundations was promulgated in 1935, and in 1936 the foundations were asked to submit a list with their immovable assets (beyanname). In 1974, the Turkish Court of Cassation Yargtay declared that the lists submitted in 1936 had become the effective constitutions (vakfname) of the non-Muslim foundations. As a result of that, they could neither acquire nor sell property, because no such power was mentioned in their constitutions. In its decision, the Court equated non-Muslim foundations with foreign foundations arguing that they did not enjoy the protection of Turkish foundations. Consequently, all immoveable asset transactions that took place between 1936 and 1974 were annulled. These assets should have been returned to their former owners. However, since most of them were dead or absentee, they were swiftly acquired by the state. This policy threatened to impoverish the vast majority of non-Muslim foundations in Istanbul and put their very existence into question.

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All these amounted to a dire situation for minority rights in Turkey in the mid1990s. A vicious circle of minority repression and violent reaction represented by PKK operations severely undermined social cohesion in Turkey and allowed extremists to gain inuence and attack any possible steps towards liberalization. Recognition of minority rights was invariably seen as surrender to PKK agenda and as the rst step toward Turkeys partition. Minorities were often discredited as tools of foreign interests and unreliable, second-class citizens that did not deserve any special protection. As a result, Turkey was repeatedly found by the European Court of Human Rights to violate several articles of the European Convention of Human Rights, not least among which were those referring to freedom of expression, religion and association of minority group members. The Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection in Turkey The process of Europeanization of minority rights protection in Turkey is distinct from that of Greece, for apparent historical reasons. While until the mid-1970s the relations of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey were on a par with those with Greece, Turkey distanced itself from the Community at the very time Greece was intensifying efforts to join it. The 1980 military coup brought political relations to a minimum, and when Turkey re-expressed its interest in joining the Community, the latter had already become an institution very different from that of the 1970s. The end of the Cold War reshufed the political map of Europe, while the 1992 Treaty on the European Union signalled the decisive politicization of a formerly economy-heavy international organization. The promulgation of the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership in 1993 pointed out that full respect for minority rights became a clear condition for EU membership, although they had no retroactive effect regarding minority rights protection in existing member states. Turkeys minority rights record would become one of the most examined and debated topics in EUTurkey relations, and radical reform in this eld was seen as an indispensable step before any upgrade of EUTurkey relations was possible. Meanwhile, the Council of Europe also exerted pressure in the direction of minority rights protection and provided an alternative agent of socialization to European norms. Since Turkey recognized the right to individual petition and the binding judicial competence of the European Court of Human Rights, it has confronted an increasing number of convictions, many of which referred to violations of minority rights. Basic pieces of Turkish legislation were found to be contrary to the European Convention of Human Rights, and Turkey came under pressure to reform. This pressure became increasingly important as EUTurkey relations were improving, and Turkey was interested in the fullment of the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership. Similar pressures also originated from EU institutions. Successive EU Commission reports conrmed the existence of serious shortcomings in the protection of minority rights and urged Turkey to undertake substantial reforms to converge with European standards. However, it was the improvement of EU Turkey relations that allowed for improvements in the status of minority rights since 1999. As the prospect of Turkeys EU membership became increasingly realistic,

Minority Rights Protection: Greece and Turkey

35

EU conditionality policies gained effectiveness on the issue of minority rights reform. After the December 1999 Helsinki European Council decision, which gave Turkey the status of an EU candidate state, Turkeys need to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria triggered an unprecedented reform programme, which considerably improved minority rights. Several articles of the Constitution and laws were amended to meet the new requirements (Grigoriadis, 2007a: 424 426). The reform programme on minority rights signalled that the Europeanization of Turkish political norms and principles was in progress. As the reforms were implemented by two different governments, this pointed to the widespread social appeal of the reform programme.18 Turkeys Western vocation was one of the founding principles of the Republic of Turkey. However, in the minds of early republican leadership, Westernization and modernization were not necessarily identied with democratization. Although Turkey entered multiparty politics in the aftermath of the Second World War, it remained a procedural democracy, frequently hit by military coups attempting to restore the regime that had allegedly come under threat by democratic politics. However, in the aftermath of the Cold War, as liberal democracy became the undisputed system of political organization in Europe and the European Union adopted it as the core element of its identity and elevated it to a condition for EU membership, Turkey was forced to substitute Europeanization for Westernization in its strategic agenda. The democratic nature of the regime and respect for human rights including minority rights qualied Europeanization from earlier Westernization programmes. The diffusion of European norms was greatly facilitated by European conditionality policies. Knowing that to achieve the major strategic target of EU membership it had to fully respect human and minority rights, Turkey embarked on a redenition of its national interest and identity. A special position between Europe, the Middle East and Eurasia with special links with the United States and Israel was no longer sufcient for Turkish strategic interests. Turkey prioritized its full integration in the European Union and allowed for the diffusion of European norms among its elites and public opinion. Under these circumstances, notions of national interest and security came under reconsideration. The military and civil bureaucracy was caught in a conundrum. On the one hand, it could not dismiss Turkeys European vocation, as this was an indispensable component of Ataturks reformist vision. On the other hand, it became increasingly clear that Turkeys Europeanization would eventually deprive the military and civil bureaucracy of its privileges, which were established through post-coup constitutional and legal arrangements. The emergence of the post-Islamist AKP as a champion of Turkeys EU ambitions signalled a dramatic shift in Turkish politics. The transformation of Turkey became a combination of European conditionality and domestic agency (see also Ulusoy, 2007: 473 478). lent Ecevit and the AKP governments led Both the coalition government led by Bu an proceeded with unprecedented l and Recep Tayyip Erdog by Abdullah Gu constitutional and legal reforms. The Constitution was amended in the direction of expanding fundamental rights and freedoms including minority rights.19 Seven reform packages attempted to achieve Turkeys convergence with the Copenhagen Criteria. In 2001, the stipulation of Article 26 and Article 28 language prohibited by law

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which was used in the past to ban the use of Kurdish, was removed. In 2002 the right of non-Muslim foundations to own immovable properties and to dispose of them freely was recognized, and in 2003 the right of non-Muslim communities to build places of worship subject to the approval of the competent administrative authorities was recognized. Teaching as well as broadcasting of Kurdish and other minority languages zbudun and Yazc, 2004: 1819). There was also allowed. (Kurban, 2003: 1516; O was a parallel attempt to desecuritize minority rights issues, which would in turn decrease the role of the military. This also allowed for the rise of discussions that attempted to redene Turkish national identity on more inclusive lines, which would show respect for the ethnic and linguistic diversity of Turkeys people (see Grigoriadis, 2007a). For the rst time, Turkeys Muslim minorities participated, especially Alevis, whose associations claimed recognition of their distinct identity. Major improvements also took place regarding the international legal protection of minority rights in Turkey. In September 2002 Turkey ratied the 1965 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and in September 2003 the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, albeit expressing its reservation regarding Article 27, which protected minority rights. The verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights in which Turkey was found guilty of violating the Convention were recognized as a ground for a renewal of the trial in civil, criminal, and administrative courts. Moreover, in the 2004 constitutional amendment it was stated that in case of a conict between domestic laws and the ratied international conventions on human rights, the latter should take precedence. Previously, Article 90 of the Constitution had not stipulated the precedence of international over domestic law, and in case of a conict between the two, domestic law could prevail if it were more specic or more recent. This constitutional provision allowed for a more effective application of international conventions on zbudun and Yazc, 2004: 25 26). human rights by Turkish courts (O Despite the aforementioned major improvements, the status of minority rights protection in Turkey was still characterized by signicant shortcomings (ECRI, 2005: 2426). Turkey has not signed the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the 1997 European Convention on Nationality and the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages of the Council of Europe yet. The implementation of reform steps made has been problematic, as obstacles emanating from the bureaucracy abounded (Oran, 2004: 100110). The challenge of the status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has persisted, as well as the refusal to allow the reopening of the Heybeliada (Chalki) Orthodox Seminary. Despite successive laws, there has been no full restitution of non-Muslim foundations to their conscated properties. The status of non-Muslim minorities beyond those recognized in the Treaty of Lausanne has not signicantly improved. Problems arising from the illiberal Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which punishes denigrations against Turkishness, also affected Turkeys minorities. The murder of the Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, who had been convicted on the basis of Article 301 and tarred by nationalist circles as a traitor and enemy of Turkey, by a nationalist juvenile in January 2007 demonstrated that in the most tragic fashion (Grigoriadis, 2007b). Despite all the improvements, Turkeys record of minority rights protection has remained poor.

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Minority Rights Protection: Greece and Turkey Conclusions

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Although the violation of minority rights in Greece was less acute than in Turkey, it nonetheless posed a serious challenge to the prestige of the single until 2007 EU member state in South-eastern Europe. Greeces liberal democratic credentials were questioned, as constitutional rights were not fully enjoyed by a part of the countrys population. This showed that the effect of EU membership on legislation and norms of candidate member states has been diverse, depending on the time of accession. Second, it manifested that it might take a long period of interaction between European and domestic institutions before liberalizing reforms materialized. As Greeces EU membership was realized at a time when political criteria for EEC membership were less pronounced, issues of minority rights were not of immediate relevance in the course of Greeces EEC accession process. Greece was able to join the Community without having to address its serious shortcomings on minority rights protection. The transformation of the character of the European Union and the diffusion of European norms facilitated a drastic improvement of minority rights in Greece in the 1990s. Nonetheless, signicant problems have persisted, which have undermined the credibility of the role model that Greece wishes to comprise for its neighbouring states. The situation was different in the late 1990s when Turkeys EU candidacy gained impetus. The promulgation of the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 meant that respect for minority rights became a condition for EU membership. Consecutive European Commission reports addressed deciencies of Turkeys legislation and state practices, and recommended reforms. While some steps were indeed taken, many problems have remained to undermine the course of Turkeys EU accession negotiations and expose the incomplete nature of Turkeys Europeanization. Nationalism has maintained a signicant impact on law- and policy-making in both countries, as the aforementioned examples have highlighted. A redenition of national interest, so that it does not contravene liberal democratic principles, is still not unanimously accepted. Based on the Greek and Turkish experience, one can reach conclusions on the usefulness of rationalist and constructivist arguments of Europeanization. To investigate the reasons which prompted the change in the position of the Greek government, one can consider European pressure expressed in the form of shaming (Moravcsik, 1995: 161). Pressure emanating from the Council of Europe and human rights non-governmental organizations had a critical role in facilitating reform. The Simitis government internalized the need for a reconguration of Greek national interest, citizenship and identity on a constructivist basis and turned this into its main political agenda. When it came to the reform of minority rights legislation, it preferred to address the need for reform on a rationalist basis to maximize domestic support. Arguing that Greeces minority policy had failed and that the costs of minority repression for Greeces international image and strategic interests were disproportionately higher than any perceived benets, they managed to achieve a political consensus to promote Europeanization in the eld of minority rights. In the case of Turkey, constructivist arguments fare better to explain Europeanization reform in the eld of minority rights. Turkeys political elites understood that the countrys quest to join the European Union and be accepted as a

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member of the European family required a radical reconguration of political and social norms. This facilitated a process of social learning among Turkish political elites, which made the reform steps possible. Although traditional perceptions of national sovereignty, identity and human rights maintained a considerable appeal, they were challenged by novel perceptions of citizenship, national interest and identity (Checkel, 2001a: 182). The evident shortcomings in the reform process could be attributed not only to the limited nature of the diffusion of European norms but also on the basis of bureaucratic inertia and lack of cooperation with political elites, what is also called involuntary non-compliance (Checkel, 2001b: 575 576). EU conditionality policies matched with Turkeys rm commitment to become an EU member and comprised a catalyst and anchor of Europeanization in the eld of minority rights and a guarantor for the full accomplishment of the reform. Last but not least, it should be stressed that the power of EU institutions to instigate processes of social learning heavily depends on the degree of respect that the promoted norms enjoy among its current members. Until the early 1990s, membership of the European Economic Community did not entail the adoption of the norms which later comprised the political core of the Copenhagen Criteria. The European Union was often accused of applying a policy of double standards, as it demanded from candidate states reform measures which member states had not domestically implemented. To maintain a strong effect of conditionality, European institutions need to develop instruments to secure compliance with European norms throughout the European Union. Full respect for minority rights in Greece and the other EU member states would strengthen their consideration in Turkey and other candidate states as a natural consequence of the rule of law and an indispensable element of a consolidated democracy.

Acknowledgements
An earlier draft of this study was presented at Workshop 13 of the 8th Mediterranean Research Meeting, organized at the European University Institute in March 2007. The author wishes to thank all participants as well as two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.

Notes
1

3 4 5

There is no universally accepted denition of the term minority due to its complicated and politically sensitive nature. Capotorti dened a minority as a group, numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members- being nationals of the Statepossess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language (Capotorti, 1977). For more information on Greeces minorities, see Clogg (2002) and Koliopoulos and Veremis (2002). nu l (1999). For a historical Specically for Western Thraces minority, see Aarbakke (2000) and Akgo account of minority protection in Greece, see Tsitselikis and Christopoulos (2004). The case of Greece bore strong resemblances with Spain and Portugal in that respect. For a concise account of the rule of law and human rights in Greece, see Pollis (1987: 598 611). Greece ratied only in 1975 the 1954 UN Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. It has not signed or ratied the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. In 1997, it signed but did not ratify the European Convention on Nationality (Council of Europe, 1997). Despite that,

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6 7

8 9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

Article 19 violated Article 5 of the 1965 UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which Greece had ratied in 1970. For the complete text of the Constitution of Greece, see Hellenic Parliament (2001). For more information on the legal status of minority rights in Greece until the mid 1990s, see Stavros (1995, 1996). On the mufti ofce in Western Thrace, see Tsitselikis (2004: 412 415). Due to the often inextricable link between state and Islam, muftis in Muslim countries are appointed by the state. Allowing for the election of muftis of Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim countries while stripping them of their traditional judicial and administrative duties has thus become a major challenge for Western legal orders (on this, see Ktistakis, 2006). The lifting of Cold War-era travel restrictions within the mountainous border areas of Western Thrace in 1995, which were almost exclusively inhabited by the minority, was one of the most important measures in that respect. For an example, see the measures proposed by the Academy of Athens (1995). On this, illuminating was also the parliamentary debate on the ratication of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While initially the government had suggested that a reservation be made to Article 27, which guaranteed minority rights, this removal of the reservation unanimously approved on the grounds of removing pretexts for criticism against Greeces minority rights protection record (Anagnostou, 2005: 347). For more information on this, see Papanikolatos (1999). Although later Papandreou was forced to take a more circumspect position, this did not eliminate the signicance of his original statement. As evidence of this, one can observe that the number of citizenship removals on the basis of Article 19 was a function of Greek Turkish relations and the status of Turkeys Greek minority (Sitaropoulos, 2004: 216 217). In effect, this brought both minorities to a hostage status and an easy target of nationalist reprisal policies. On the application of this principle in minority education, see (Dragonas and Frangoudaki, 2006: 27). As the aim of the military government which took power after the 1960 coup was to preclude the resurgence of majoritarian politics, the 1961 Constitution included relative improvements in the protection of human and minority rights and allowed for a more tolerant public sphere. Regarding international protection of minority rights, Turkey avoided committing itself to international documents advancing minority rights. At the United Nations level, Turkey had neither signed nor ratied the 1954 UN Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the 1965 UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. At the European level, Turkey had not signed the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities and the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages of the Council of Europe. Wide segments of a growing civil society supported the new initiatives, while a considerable part of public opinion and bureaucratic elites met the new steps with suspicion, if not outright opposition. For the complete text of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, see Turkish Grand National Assembly (2001).

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