Sport Superstition as a Function of Skill Level and Task Difficulty

Perry B. Wright and Kristi J. Erdal Colorado College

Gmelch 's (1974) claim that professional athletes were more superstitious during difftcult tasks than easy tasks was tested in a golf putting experiment. Forty college students. 26 male and 14 female, of varying golfing abilities, were tested in 20 easy putts from 3 feet, and 20 difftcult putts from 9 feet. Using four colored balls, superstitious behavior was defined as selecting the same colored ball after a made putt, consistent with the methodology of Van Raalte, Brewer, Nemeroff, and Under (1991). Skill level was assessed by a median split of total putts made. There was a signiftcant interaction between level ofputt difficulty and skill level on superstitious behavior. Low skill participants were more superstitious in the easy putting task than the difficult putting task, and high skill participants were more superstitious in the difficult putting task than the easy putting task. Gmelch's claims were .supported by the high skill participants' behavior and may be explained by the uncertainty hypothesis. The tow skill participants' behavior did not support Gmelch's claims, and may be better explained by the reciprocal nature of learned helplessness and superstitious behavior.

Address Correspondence To: Kristi J. Erdal, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Colorado College, 14 East Cache La Poudre Street, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 80903, Phone: 719-3896598, E-mail: kerdal@ColoradoCollege.edu. 187

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Superstition appears to arise from situations of uncertainty (Burger & Lynn, 2005; Feison & Gmelch, 1979; Vyse, 1997). Skinner (1948) was one of the first to document 'superstition' as a way of describing the behaviors pigeons showed when reinforced with food on a fixed time interval. The pigeons were presented with a situation in which it was unclear why and when food reinforcement was to be given. The pigeons repeated specific behaviors that appeared to result in positive reinforcement. Skinner suggested that these behaviors were a result of the pigeons' chance actions being paired unintentionally with the reinforcement, which seemed to give the pigeon an illusion of control over the food presentation. Superstition is wholly about the illusion of control. Humans demonstrate much of the same behavior as Skinner's (1948) pigeons (Ciborowski, 1997). When put in situations of uncertainty, individuals may try to achieve control by investing in irrelevant objects or actions, believing there to be a causal link between these objects or actions and particular results. Jahoda (1969) reported a distinction between 'causal' superstition and 'coincidental' superstition. A causal superstition was suggested to be part of a conscious belief; while a coincidental superstition was more ambiguous about what behaviors individuals believed caused a particular outcome. Ciborowski and Jahoda both suggested that superstition was an accumulation of conditioned responses which provided a foundation for a conscious belief about causality. It may also provide a foundation for the illusion of control. It is often difficult to draw a distinction between rituals, pre-performance routines, and superstition in sport. Ritual is typically defined as a conscious activity that focuses on coping with a high-stress situation, such as taking a deep breath before shooting a free throw in basketball. Similar to rituals, pre-performance routines are specific actions and movements, such as taking practice swings before hitting a golf ball, which have been shown to effectively improve performance (Burke, Czech, & Ploszay, 2004; Cohn, 1990). Vyse (1997) made the distinction that a routine became superstition when an action gained special magical significance, such as carrying a rabbit's foot to bring good luck. Rudski (2004) defined superstition as a person's false belief that s/he can influence an outcome in a situation when realistically s/he has no control. What is paradoxical is that performing an action or carrying a lucky object as a way of controlling external factors may actually provide physical or mental relief to the point that it directly affects performance. Indeed, superstition may be seen as a psychological placebo (Neil, 1980). Ciborowski (1997) argued that if an individual believed that a particular behavior could improve performance, that behavior should not be considered superstitious. One condition that appears to be common for all superstitious behavior is situations of uncertainty, termed the "uncertainty hypothesis" (Burger & Lynn, 2005). Vyse (1997) suggested that the basic human desire to gain control in ambiguous situations was a significant motivating factor in superstitious behavior display. Superstitious behavior may be generated

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by needs to establish control as well as to enhance self-efficacy. That is, attributing outcomes to controllable factors has been consistently associated with high self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997; Haney & Long, 1995), while attributing outcomes to uncontrollable factors has been consistently associated with low self-efficacy and learned helplessness (Bandura. 1997; Seligman, 1975). In situations of uncertainty, the attempt to gain control through superstitious behavior may have a positive affect on self-efTlcacy. In contrast, no attempt to gain control and engage in superstitious behavior may indicate very low self-efficacy and even learned helplessness. / Rudski, Lischner, and Albert (1999) conducted an experiment in which participants were put in situations of uncertainty. Participants completed a 100 trial computer task which involved choosing between two letters. Before testing began, participants were assigned to groups in which points were either randomly awarded or subtracted with different probabilities. With the aim of achieving the most points, participants were put in a situation in which if was unclear how points could be gained or how to prevent points from being taken. Because of the ambiguous nature of point distribution, participants began to generate superstitious rules for point acquisition. Participants tended to show a 'Win-Sfay, Lose-Shift strategy' (Ono, 1987), indicating that people often repeated responses that resulted in positive outcomes and changed responses after receiving a negative outcome. Superstitious rule generation and having confidence in these rules increased as the probability of receiving positive reinforcements increased. The study suggested that the development of superstitious behavior was a function of different reinforcement schedules, and that people create superstitions based on their apparent success or failure in a task. Researchers have found that sport has an inherent quality of creating situations of uncertainty, which predict display of superstitious behavior. In one of the only experimental designs to elicit superstitious behavior in sport. Van Raalte, Brewer, Nemeroff, and Linder (1991) had participants hit 50 total putts on a putting green from a distance of 3.5 meters. After each putt, the participants were given the opportunity to choose from four different colored balls. Using the 'Win-Stay, Lose-Shift strategy' (Ono, 1987), selecting the same colored ball after a made putt was operationally defined as superstitious behavior. As expected, there was a negative correlation between chance orientation and the number of times the participants selected the same colored ball after a made putt. The present study was modeled after the Van Raalte et al. experiment but utilized a different method of ego-involvement, included participants without restriction due to skill levels, and assessed the impact of task difficulty on superstitious behavior. The Van Raalte et al. (1991) study offered a way in which superstitious behavior could be quantified and experimentally assessed in sport while most other research on sport superstition has been qualitative and/or correlational (Anderson, Neil, & Sheppard,

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1981; Brown & Todd, 2003; Buhrman, Brown, & Zaugg, 1982; Burger & Lynn, 2005; Ciborowski, 1997;Gmelcb, 1974). Bubrmann et al. (1982) tested the differences in superstition rituals between male and female basketball players. Contrary to historical research (e.g., Conklin, 1919), they did not find that females demonstrated more superstitious bebavior; however, tbe type of rituals performed between genders was significantly different. Females were more concerned with appearance rituals; whereas, male superstition was related to equipment use and repetitive actions. Anderson et al. (1981) studied male and female hockey players and found minimal differences between the genders; rather, tbey established that superstitions were more a function ofthe level of athletic involvement. Brown and Todd (2003) assessed differences in superstitious behavior between NCAA Division 1 and Division 111 track and field athletes. Tbe results illustrated tbat athletic identity and external locus of control had a positive relationship with superstitious behavior. Division 1 track and field athletes showed significantly more superstitious behavior and athletic identity than tbe Division MI track and field athletes. Because a greater level of athletic identity is indicative of greater ego-involvement (Brewer, Linder, & Van Raalte, 1993), these findings supported Anderson et al.'s (1981) researcb tbat ego-involvement was a key element in the development of sport superstitions. Burger and Lynn (2005) successfully found cross-cultural differences in superstitious practices between Japanese and American professional baseball players. Japanese players took more responsibility for poor performance than American players, consistent with Anderson's (1999) findings tbat individuals from collectivist societies were more likely to take responsibility for failure than individuals from individualistic societies. Japanese players were more likely to believe that their performance was a reflectioii of their effort, not luck, indicating that attributing failure to one's lack of effort rather than to some external source of luck is a culturally derived concept. As predicted, tbe Japanese baseball players were less likely to behave superstitiously than the American baseball players. Baseball itself has been anecdotally described to be a sport that yields the most superstitious behaviors (Ciborowski, 1997). Ciborowski researched a collegiate baseball team over three years by video recording the players during their games. The batters were scored on 33 preset superstitious movements, such as touching a particular body part, gripping the bat in different ways, or stepping in and out ofthe batter's box. During interviews, uniformly, the athletes were surprised at the number of extra movements they made while batting, and tbey denied that there was a causal connection between those superstitious movements and a foreseeable outcome. Ciborowski observed that the amount of extra superstitious movements increased wben the team was losing or the outcome was uncertain, compared to when the team

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was comfortably winning. Being comfortably in the lead seemed to provide a greater sense of control and a lack of need to appeal to luck for success. Consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis, and Ciborowski's (1997) observations that more superstitious behavior arose in situations of greater risk and more uncertainty, Gmelch (1974) had stated that baseball players were more likely to behave superstitiously while batting rather than fielding. He explained that fielding is an activity that typically yields a high rate of success, whereas an exceptional batter only gets a hit 1/3 of the time he or she steps up to the plate. Because batting yields such a low rate of success compared to fielding, Gmelch hypothesized that the amount of superstitious behavior was a function of the level of difficulty and uncertainty of the task. Gmeich never tested this hypothesis. The purpose of this study was to test the ideas Gmelch (1974) developed through observation in baseball, with the experimenlal method developed by Van Raalte et al. (1991). Consistent with Gmelch's hypothesis about situalional difficulty increasing superstitious behavior, it was hypothesized that participants would show more superstitious behavior (choosing the same color ball after a made putt) when completing a difficult golf-putting task as compared to an easier putting task. Method Participants Participants were 26 male and 14 female undergraduate students. Golfing skill was not a prerequisite for participation. All participants were given $5 compensation and the incentive to win $50 for making the most putts. Materials The golf-putting apparatus was a 4'X 16'board elevated T from the floor on lOcinder blocks. Three pieces of 2" x 4" wood were nailed to the edges of the board to provide bumpers, and green felt turf was nailed to the top of the board. A standard golf hole was cut in the wood. An 8' PVC pipe was propped at an anglefromthe back of a chair near the experimenter to a small bucket in the seat of another chair by the participant in order to return the ball to the participant. As in Van Raalte et al.'s (1991) experiment, four colored balls were used (royal blue, pink, red, and chartreuse). A blackboard was used to record names and rankings. The easy condition was a three-foot putt, and the difficult condition was a nine-foot putt, established after 11 pilot participants averaged 3/10 made putts on the difficult condition and 9/10 on the easy condition. These success ratios paralleled Gmelch's (1974) observations.

192 /Journal of sport Behavior. Vol. 31, No. 2 Procedure Upon arriving at the lab, the following rules of the competition were explained to the participants. The participants were eligible to win $50 if they made the most points. Each participant received one point for every made putt from the easy condition and two points for every made putt from the difficult condition. The participants took 20 shots from the difficult

condition and 20 from the easy condition. A coin was flipped to determine which condition the
participant would do first. All participants were led to believe that their names and rankings would be posted on the blackboard, in order to increase ego-involvement. They were told that the study assessed how one's attitude positively or negatively affected their putting ability. The participants signed an informed consent form after which they filled out a filler "attitudes" questionnaire. The participants removed their shoes to prevent tear in the green. They were asked to step up on the putting green, pick one ball at a time out of the bucket, and take three practice putts from a distance of 3.5 feet, at which time they were told that the procedure must remain the same for each participant in order to reduce "extraneous variables." The experimenter explained that after each shot the participant must stay still until the experimenter finished recording data and observations. Once the experimenter looked up at the participant, s/he could then prepare for the next shot. This was actually to allow time for the ball that was just used to get back to the bucket so that the participants could choose from all four balls on each trial. The experimenter recorded if the participants made the shot, and what color ball they used. After completing the putting, participants were debriefed about the deception. They were told that the attitude questionnaire was a filler, and that their names and rankings would not stay up on the blackboard. They were then given their compensation. Results '^

The primary independent variable of the experiment was the putting distances between the easy and difficult conditions. The dependent measure was superstitious behavior, determined by the number of times a made putt was coupled with staying with the same colored ball, consistent with Van Raalte et al. (1991). A paired Mest revealed no significant difference between the number of superstitious behaviors in the easy condition (A/ ^ 8.9, SD ^ 5.31) and the difficult condition (M - 9.88, SD = 5.41), /(39) = -.62, p = .54. A median split was performed in order to assess the impact of skill level on superstitious behavior. Participants who made 20 or fewer total putts were considered of low skill ( = 20; 10 females and 10 males), and those who made more than 20 putts were considered of high skill (

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= 20; 4 females and 16 males). All participants taken together made 78% of the putts in the easy condition and 21 % of the putts in the difficult condition. High skill participants made 88% of the putts in tbe easy condition and 29% of the putts in the difficult condition. Low skill participants made 68% of the putts in the easy condition and 14% of the putts in the difficult condition. T-tests revealed no significant difference between males and females on superstitious behavior in either the easy or difficult conditions, p > .05. A repeated measures analysis of variance revealed an interaction between skill level and task difficulty on superstitious behavior, F (1,38) = 8.24, p = .007, ti = .42. The low skill participants demonstrated greater superstitious behavior in the easy condition than in the difficult condition; whereas, the high skill participants demonstrated greater superstitious behavior in the difficuU condition than in the easy condition. (See Figure 1).

Figure 1\ Superstitious behavior as a function of skill level and task difficulty

14 ,

Low Skill High Skill!

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Difficult

Task Difficulty

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The results of the four conditions were subjected to four chi-square analyses in order to determine which conditions differed from chance and in which direction. That is, on any given made putt, by chance there was a .25 probability that the participant would stay with the same colored ball and a .75 probability that the participant would change balls. Chi-square analyses determined that neither low skill participants putting in the difficult condition nor high skill participants putting in the easy condition were choosing colored bails significantly different from chance, p > .05. The low skill participants putting in the easy condition chose to stay with the same colored ball after a made putt significantly more often than one would expect by chance, x- (1, n = 20) = 9.92, p < .01. The high skill participants putting in the difficult condition chose to stay with the same colored ball after a made putt significantly more often than one wouldexpect by chance, x^(l,fl = 20)= 12.5l,p<.0L Discussion The aim of the current study was to parallel Gmelch's (1974) observations that baseball fielders, who were successful 9 out of 10 times, showed less superstitious behavior than batters, who got a hit 3 out of 10 times. Contrary to prediction, there was no significant difference between superstitious behaviors in the easy vs. difTicult conditions for all participants combined; however, after a median split was conducted to account for skill level, a significant interaction was found between skill level and task difficulty on superstitious behaviors. It was further determined that the low skill participants putting in the easy condition and the high skill participants putting in the difficult condition showed superstitious behavior above what one would expect by chance. The percentages of made putts for the high skill participants reflected Gmelch's (1974) baseball observations. Consistent with the hypothesis, the high skill participants showed no superstitious behavior in the easy condition compared to the difficult condition. The high skill participants were likely more confident in their ability to make the putt from the short distance and did not need to reiy on luck, chance, or ball color. Also consistent with the original hypothesis, high skill participants struggled more with the 9' putt, ostensibly causing them to rely more heavily on external variables, which would account for the greater superstitious practices in this condition. These findings appeared to reflect the role of the uncertainty hypothesis (Burger & Lynn, 2005). Superstitious behavior increased as the outcome of the situation became less certain. Because professional baseball players would presumably be labeled high skill athletes, these findings support Gmelch's (1974) observations that professional baseball players show more superstitious behavior during more difficult activities.

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The percentages of made putts for the low skill participants did not reflect the ratio Gmelch (1974) described with professional baseball players, indicating that the putting tasks were more challenging for these participants than for the high skill participants. Consequently, participants who were considered of low skill showed a very difTerent effect from the high skill participants. They established superstitious behavior in the easy condition and not in the difficult condition since the 3' putt was not as easy for the low skill participants as it was for the high skill participants. Perhaps the low skill participants did not have the same confidence in their ability to make the short putt, so they felt the need to rely on external sources such as ball color. The feeling of uncertainty that the high skill participants may have had in the difficult condition were likely similar to the feelings of uncertainty the low skill participants felt in the easy condition. The lack of superstitious behavior in the difficult condition for the low skill participants suggests that the putting task may have been too difficult for them. Skinner (1953) might have argued that the inter-reinforcement interval was too great, that the low skill putters could not develop a ball color superstition because they did not have enough reinforcements to make an (illusory) correlation between ball color and made putt. Given that our participants, unlike Skinner's pigeons, brought with them variable skill levels of which they were cognizant, and a comprehension of how reinforcement could occur, however, we suggest a slightly more cognitive explanation. Rather than looking for some kind of external assistance, such as luck in a particular color of ball, the low skill participants may have demonstrated a form of learned helplessness (Matute, 1994; Rudski, 2004; Rudski e t a l , 1999). In this instance, the low skill participants likely had little to no confidence in their ability to make the 9' putt, so they essentially 'gave up.' Learned helplessness, in which repeated exposure to aversive events cause a person to realize that their actions have no effect on the outcome of an event, produces a sense of futility for the individual to respond. Rudski et al. (1999) suggested that there was a reciprocal relationship between superstition and learned helplessness. In Rudski et al.'s experiment of random reinforcement scheduling for both point losing and gaining, learned helplessness was apparent, in that participants who were in the point losing condition recognized the fiitility of responding. While points were not taken from participants in the current study, a form of learned helplessness may have been evident with the low skill participants. Low skill participants were consistently missing the difficult putts, meaning that these aversive events could have contributed to a feeling of fiJtility in performing well. It appears that in some situations of uncertainty, learned helplessness and superstition are opponent processes. Some individuals develop superstitions as a way of trying to control the uncontrollable; while individuals experiencing learned helplessness do not believe their actions have an effect on an outcome, and they 'give up.'

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This study adds insight into the complex nature of superstition in sport. Consistent with Anderson et al. (1981) and Buhrmann et al. (1982), no gender differences were found on superstitious behavior. But unlike gender, skill level appeared to play a role in superstitious behavior. That is, consistent with Brown and Todd's (2003) research on Division I and Division 111 track athletes, the current study found that high skill athletes demonstrated greater superstitious behavior in difficult situations. Although researchers have speculated that superstitious behavior is a function of the level of task difficulty (Gmelch, 1974), none had examined this experimentally. The Van Raalte et al. (1991) experimental model provided the basic methodology for the present study, which quantified superstition in terms of the interaction between task difficulty and skill level. This present study, in turn, was able to provide some empirical support for theorists like Gmelch. This being said, it is possible that the results of the current study could have refiected methodological inadequacies. Reproducing superstitious behavior in a laboratory setting is challenging because certain qualities of sport in practice cannot be fully replicated. Proper incentive to succeed may have been insufficient in the current study. A $50 prize ostensibly could have attracted or deterred participants; however, the participants were drawn from a relatively financially homogeneous pool, suggesting that the incentive did not yield a nonrepresentative sample. A public display of names and rankings could have provided different levels of ego-involvement based on each individual's predisposition to that incentive, with more self-conscious participants feeling potentially more pressure to perform. Similarly, while a priori divisions of high and low skill participants are typically considered optimal, priming participants about golf skill prior to the experiment may have put unequal pressure on participants. That is to say, participants providing skill information, particularly information suggesting high skill, before the putting task might have felt more pressure to perform, as opposed to those who rated themselves as low skilled. Conversely, participants providing skill information after the putting task might have been motivated to lie about their skill level based on their performance during the experiment. For this reason, we chose to assess skill level based on performance. Regarding the measure of superstitious behavior, although a survey by Van Raalte et al. (1991) revealed that royal blue, red, hot pink, and chartreuse were favorite colors among college students, using these colors did not necessarily rule out the color preference variable. Seven participants used the same color ball throughout the entire experiment. Four of these participants were from the low skill group, and three were from the high skill group indicating that this type of superstitious behavior was not contingent upon skill level. Lastly, the number of participants ( = 40) was relatively low and representative only of college students, barring global generalization from these data. However, the moderate - strong effect size indicated

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that the interaction between skill level and task difficulty is potentially quite important in understanding superstitious behavior in sport. With these limitations in mind, this experiment revealed important infonnation about what type of people, and under what situations, superstitious behavior may be seen. According to this study, athletes of higher skill were more likely to demonstrate superstitious behavior in difficult tasks than in easy tasks, supporting the uncertainty hypothesis and Gmelch's (1974) ideas. Low skill participants appeared to show a reverse effect, in that more superstitious behavior was performed in the easy task than the difficult task. This indicated that a form of learned helplessness may have come about in response to the difficulty of the 9' putt. Future research should delve more deeply into the relationship between superstition and learned helplessness, perhaps revealing what circumstances cause the shift from superstitious practices to learned helplessness. Development of learned helplessness in a sporting situation is likely the worst possible scenario for an athlete. Sport, by nature, requires a sense of belief and self-efficacy that one can perform well and accomplish tasks. The feelings of futility inherent in learned helplessness essentially restrict hope of performing welt. It is the aim of sport psychologists to rid athletes of feelings of futility and instead give athletes confidence in their ability to be successftil. In this respect, the development of sport superstitions may be an indicator of hope. However, too many superstitious practices may also inhibit performance because the athlete will not be focusing on physical and mental skill development, suggesting a complex relationship between superstitious behavior and psychologically healthy practices. It may be possible that sport psychologists will be able to determine what amount of superstitious behavior may optimize an individual athlete's performance. References Anderson, B., Neil, G. I., & Sheppard, W. (1981). Superstitions among male and female athletesof various levels of involvement. Journal of Sport Behavior. 4, 137-148. Anderson, C. A. (1999). Attributional style, depression, and loneliness: A cross-cultural comparison of American and Chinese students. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25,482-499. Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York: W.H. Freeman. Brewer, B. W., Van Raalte, J. L., & Linder, D. E. (1993). Athletic identity: Hercules'muscles or Achilles heel? International Journal of Sport Psychology, 24, 237-254.

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Brown, C , & Todd, M. (2003). Characteristics associated with superstitious behavior in track and field athletes; Are there NCAA divisional level differences? Journal of Sport Behavior, 26, 168-187. Buhrmann, H., Brown, B., &Zaugg, M. (1982). Superstitious beliefs and behavior: A comparison of male and female basketball players. Journal ofSport Behavior. 5, 175185. Burger, J.M.,& Lynn, A. L.(2005). Superstitious behavior amongAmerican and Japanese professional baseball players. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 27, 71-76. Burke, K. L., Czech, D. R., & Ploszay, A. J. (2004). An examination of the maintenance of pre shot routines in basketball free throw shooting. Journal of Sport Behavior, 27, 323329. Ciborowski, T. (1997). "Superstition" in the collegiate baseball player. The Sport Psychologist. //, 305-317. Conklin, E. S. (1919). Superstitious beliefand practice among college students. The American Journal of Psychology, 30, 83-102. Felson, R. B.,&GmeIch, 0.(1979). Uncertainty and the use of magic. Current Anthropology. 20,587-589. Gmelch, G. (1974). Baseball magic. In J.Spradley &D. McCurdy (Eds.), Conformity and conflict {pp. 346-352). Boston: Little, Brown. Haney, C. and Long, B. (1995). Coping effectiveness: A path analysis of self-efficacy, control, coping, and performance in sport competitions. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 25. 1726-1746. Jahoda, G. (1969). The psychology of superstition. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press. Matute, H. (1994). Learned helplessness and superstitious behavior as opposite effects of uncontrollable reinforcement in humans. Learning and Motivation, 25, 216-232. Neil, G. (1980). The place of superstition in sport: The self-ftjifilling prophesy. Coaching Review, 3,40-42. Ono, K. (1987). Superstitious behavior in humans. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 47,2^\-21 \. Rudski, J. (2004). The illusion of control, superstitious belief, and optimism. Current Psychology: Developmental. Learning, Personality. Social, 22, 306-315. Rudski, J., Lischner, M. I., &Albert, L. (1999). Superstitious rule generation is affected by probability and type of outcome. Psychological Record, -/P, 245-260. Seligman, M. (1975). Helplessness: On depression, development and death. San Francisco:
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