Univan ship management ltd, Security notice 04/2012

SECURITY NOTICE No 04/2012

CONTENTS: DATED: REFERENCES:

Prevention of Stowaways 24-May-2012 Industry Sources

This Circular is to be read in conjunction with our earlier Security Notices 03/2010 and 05/2011.

Copyrights: Univan Ship Management Limited, Hong Kong. All rights reserved Any unauthorized reproduction of this manual, in any form is prohibited

Univan ship management ltd, Security notice 04/2012 Prevention of Stowaways

1.0 Stowaway Awareness

Regular and thorough Stowaway Searches and the implementation Strict Security Measures including Strict Access Control are essential in reducing the risk of the boarding of stowaways. Gangway and anchor watches should be maintained at all times and the watch keepers must be vigilant and diligent in their duties. Watch keepers must be made aware that stowaways have been known to board by posing as stevedores or visitors. Regular searches of the vessel must always be carried out whilst in port and a carefully executed search of the entire vessel must be conducted immediately prior to sailing. Routine ship-board searches are probably the most effective way of detecting stowaways and they should be carried out daily at Stowaway Risk Ports. There is an even greater stowaway risk if the port in question has unfenced areas with poor security. The risk becomes higher still if the vessel's next destination is a country known to be favored by stowaways, such as Europe, Canada or the USA. Furthermore, the safe operation of a vessel may be indirectly affected because stowaways require extra effort from crew members to keep them under custody and observation after their discovery in addition to the massive paperwork for making Stowaway Declaration Formalities at every port until the repatriation is successful. In some cases the vessel will lose time due to deviation and/or delays to her Port of Call. As the vessel has little or no influence on port security, thus the shipboard team has to undertake measures in preventing stowaways from gaining access to the ship. Stowaways are typically able to gain access to the ship due to inadequate security measures ashore and / or onboard. The core strategy is to ensure that no unauthorized personnel are able to gain access to the ship and that all those who have been authorized to board disembark before sailing. 2.0 Instructions 2.1 Master and SSO to educate and raise the Crews awareness related to problems associated with Stowaways, identifying Stowaway Risk Ports and Security Measures as may be required. 2.2 Inspect Rudder Trunk for the possible access by Stowaway by measuring the clearance of the Rudder Stock under the safe condition to access into the Rudder Trunk above waterline with safe entry through the void space. Ship is required to report to the Company the outcome of check with supportive photographs and advice if crew can install Steel Grid to reduce the gap.

Copyrights: Univan Ship Management Limited, Hong Kong. All rights reserved Any unauthorized reproduction of this manual, in any form is prohibited

Univan ship management ltd, Security notice 04/2012

2.3 Fabricate & install Gratings to the Accommodation Stairway in way and leading to the Boat Deck whereby the Locking Device in use must allow the unlocking without a Key or Tool from Top-side and at the same time preventing unlocking at underside, this in order to accommodate emergency escape from above. Master is required to report to the Company the completion of the fabricated Gratings with supportive Photographs. 2.4 Ships calling berthing at Terminals of South African Ports (except for STS & Bunkering) are requested to inform the Company in a timely, in order to seek permission in engaging Stowaway Search Services through the Local Agent. 3.0 Stowaway Search prior departure Ports in general Stowaway Search is to be conducted prior departure Ports even if having low risk of Stowaways.

4.0 Stowaway Measures & Search at Stowaway High Risk Ports Ships calling at Stowaway High Risk Ports shall as far as possible report to the CSO of intention to establish preventive measures as below. 4.1 Crew briefing session to be held so as to clarify specific tasks and role of each crew member. 4.2 Ensure that all officers and crew understand their part in security / anti-stowaway measures including any special or additional security measures taken. 4.3 Ensure that Security Watches are maintained while at anchor and in port to detect Stowaways boarding via Anchor Chain or Moorings, as early detection is the best deterrence. 4.4 Ensure that all Restricted Areas are kept locked during the port stay and areas that are not possible to be locked are regularly monitored through Safety & Security Patrols. 4.5 In addition, Dry Cargo Hatches when not in operation or on completion of Stowaway Search are to be locked or Tag Sealed with Security Cable Tie. 4.6 Areas that are having conflict with Safety in locking for example the Lifeboat Access Door(s) are to be tagged and during Security Patrol or Stowaway Search are to be checked for any breach. 4.7 Maintenance hatch for Satellite Dome if having a butterfly nut arrangement must be replaced by general nut securing arrangement to prevent Stowaways easy removal for access. 4.8 Spurling Pipe to be covered and tagged in order to avoid access by Stowaway in hiding inside the Chain Lockers, while when anchored the Hawser Pipe Cover must be secured in place. 4.9 As far as possible, additional lighting to be installed so as to light up dark areas; especially those lower parts of the vessel near the waterline. 4.10 Access into the Accommodation & Engine Room must be restricted to one access point only. Copyrights: Univan Ship Management Limited, Hong Kong. All rights reserved Any unauthorized reproduction of this manual, in any form is prohibited

Univan ship management ltd, Security notice 04/2012

4.11 Proper headcount of all people to be taken and Visitor Log to be properly maintained. 4.12 Visitors onboard must be checked thoroughly with their proper Identification and purpose of Boarding. 4.13 All visitors and / or Authorities must be accompanied onboard, while Stevedores must be monitored at the Work areas. 4.14 Watch keepers are to inform SSO immediately, if any difficulties are encountered in headcount, verification or identification of all people boarding the ship or when identifying Visitors with no purpose to board. 4.15 Watch keepers must tally the number of Visitors and Stevedores that are onboard. 5.0 Possible Unauthorized Accesses. 5.1 Pilot Ladders & Gangway when not attended to by Crew must be picked up or secured / stowed. Each and every individual arriving at the gangway should be questioned to verify his right to board the ship. Good communication should be maintained between all personnel on duty; if you always give the impression of an efficient and high profile regime, this will deter most opportunist stowaways and thieves. Be aware that persons ashore may attempt to distract watch keepers in order to assist stowaways boarding a vessel alongside. 5.2 An efficient Gangway Watch with Access Control should be maintained at all times. NO Visitor allowed to board if they cannot provide proper Identification & explain their purposes for boarding. 5.3 Inform CSO & Terminal Representatives immediately for any case of denial of access. 5.4 Subject to available resources and facilities, additional Shore Watchmen and canine search teams can be engaged through the Agents after confirming with the office. Do not be over dependent on the Shore Watchmen due to the possibility of poor level of Port/Terminal Security. 6.0 Roaming Security Patrol must be maintained to the requirement of the SSP or have its frequency increased accordingly. In case of any abnormality while in port and in the anchorage, please do not hesitate to contact the CSO for prompt follow up and action. Security Gratings on accommodation stairways (leading to Boat deck) must be secured and as far as possible fences have been rigged on Boat Deck as an additional deterrent measure for unauthorized Access though climbing. Daily Stowaway Search to be conducted in order to reduce the risk of Stowaway. Final Stowaway Search 9.1 This to be conducted when all shore personnel have officially disembarked and include inspection of all security seals for any breaches.

7.0

8.0 9.0

Copyrights: Univan Ship Management Limited, Hong Kong. All rights reserved Any unauthorized reproduction of this manual, in any form is prohibited

Univan ship management ltd, Security notice 04/2012

9.2 In cases where conducting Final Stowaway Search at the berth is not possible due to terminal or other restrictions, then the search should commence immediately after leaving the berth and be completed before commencing the next sea passage. 9.3 STOWAWAYS MAY ATTEMPT TO BOARD FROM PILOT BOATS. IN STOWAWAY HIGH RISK PORTS CONDUCT AN ADDITIONAL SEARCH AFTER THE PILOT HAS DISEMBARKED AND BEFORE COMMENCING SEA PASSAGE. AT THIS TIME A FINAL CHECK OF THE RUDDER TRUNK MUST BE MADE. 10.0 Stowaway High Risk Areas The below countries have been identified by the Company as Stowaway High Risk Areas. Algeria Benin Cameroon Cape Verde Colombia Congo, Dem. Rep. Cte d'Ivoire Djibouti Dominican Republic Egypt Ghana Guinea Kenya Lebanon Libya Morocco Nigeria Senegal Slovenia South Africa Tanzania Togo Tunisia

This Circular is to be read in conjunction with our earlier Security Notices 03/2010 and 05/2011.

Copyrights: Univan Ship Management Limited, Hong Kong. All rights reserved Any unauthorized reproduction of this manual, in any form is prohibited