The Greeks On Pleasure PDF

The Greeks On Pleasure
J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor

Print publication date: 1982 Print ISBN-13: 9780198246664 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: Oct-11 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246664.001.0001
Pleasure: Formal or Final Cause

J. C. B. Gosling, C. C. W. Taylor
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246664.003.0014
Abstract and Keywords

Chapter 11 sketched the two passages on pleasure which suggested various points of divergence, while leaving some points of overlap. One attractive view is to hold that the points of overlap indicate the presence of a persistent opposition, and this enables us to explain at least some of the more interesting divergences in terms of developments in Aristotle's position. The last two chapters argued that the divergences between Books VII and X of the Nicomachean Ethics are greater than such a view would suggest. In so doing we hope to have done two things: first to have removed or at the very least weakened some of the grounds for supposing a change of view on the nature of pleasure, and in particular a growth in sophistication between Books VII and X; and second, to have shown to be baseless what might be called the after-glow theory, the view that Aristotle in Book X thought of pleasure as a supervenient je-ne-sais-quoi rounding off perfect actualization. It remains to be asked whether the books differ at all with respect to the view of pleasure presented. This chapter proceeds in two stages. First it considers the view that in Book X Aristotle considers pleasure to be the final cause of actualization, and argues for the more traditional view that he considers it the formal cause. We shall then be in a better position to ask what the difference amounts to. The second stage argues that the differences of terminology do not indicate a difference of view.
Keywords: Artisotle, pleasure, Nicomachean Ethics
13.0.1 It might help at this point to review the state of the argument. In Chapter 11 we gave a sketch of the two passages on pleasure which
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suggested various points of divergence, while leaving some points of overlap. One attractive view is to hold that the points of overlap indicate the presence of a persistent opposition, and this enables us to explain at least some of the more interesting divergences in terms of developments in Aristotles position. In the last two chapters we have been arguing that the divergences between the two books are greater than such a view would suggest In so doing we hope to have done two things: first to have removed or at the very least weakened some of the grounds for supposing a change of view on the nature of pleasure, and in particular a growth in sophistication between Books VII and X; and secondly (cf. Ch. 11, especially 11.3.1219), to have shown to be baseless what might be called the after-glow theory, the view that Aristotle in Book X thought of pleasure as a supervenient jene-sais-quoi rounding off perfect actualization. It remains to ask whether the books differ at all with respect to the view of pleasure presented. We shall proceed in two stages First we shall consider the view that in Book X Aristotle considers pleasure to be the final cause of actualization, and shall argue for the more traditional view that he considers it the formal cause. We shall then be in a better position to ask what the difference amounts to. Our second stage will consist in arguing that the differences of terminology do not indicate a difference of view. 13.0.2. We have already argued that Owens interpretation of Book X is unacceptable (cf. Ch. 1112) Traditionally the difference has been seen as finer. In Book VII Aristotle sees pleasure just as unimpeded actualization, in Book X as something extra. Here there have been three styles of view. First, that of the majority of commentators (for references see (p. 242 ) Gauthier and Jolif II (2), p. 839) holds that pleasure is the formal cause of actualization; secondly, not always distinguished from this or the following has been the view (cf. Gauthier and Jolif II (2), p 841) that pleasure is some subtle extra perfection added to the perfection of actualization; and thirdly, there is the view adopted by Gauthier and Jolif themselves, that pleasure is the final cause of (perfect) actualization. We have already argued against the second view in Chapter 11 where we wrote as if pleasure was a formal cause. It remains, therefore, to see whether Aristotle is treating pleasure as a formal or final cause,
1. The four causes

13.1.1. In order to get the nature of this dispute clear it will be necessary first to make a few remarks on the different kinds of cause and then see what would be needed to settle the issue This is no place for a full discussion of
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Aristotles doctrine of cause Briefly and dogmatically the essential features are as follows. Aristotle held that if you ask the question Why is X F? there are four families of answers available. Thus, suppose we are faced with a tall tree and ask Why is this tree growing so tall? We might be told (i) it is made of such and such tissue (material cause), (ii) it is a poplar (formal cause), (iii) the gardener has been feeding and watering it (efficient cause), or (iv) to reach the light and encourage root growth (the final cause). The first of these appeals to the material of which the tree is constructed and gives the material cause of growth, the second to the form of object and gives the formal cause, the third to the agency effecting the change and gives the efficient cause, the fourth to the purpose or function of such growth and gives the final cause. These are families of answer in the sense that not every explanation has to take one or other of these forms, but it does have to belong to a group structured round one or other of these forms. Thus we might explain a murderers killing a certain man by saying that he mistook him for the Prime Minister. This is not an explanation of any (p. 243 ) of the above forms, but is grouped under (iv) because it is a failure of purpose. The act in question had a point, though the point does not successfully explain what happened. The explanation given is explaining what went wrong with the pursuit of the given goal. Similarly a person may walk as he does because he is blind. This does not give the formal cause, because blindness is a deformity; but the explanation depends upon the formal type of explanation in that it explains by reference to that as a standard. 13.1.2. Aristotle often makes remarks suggesting that in some sense causes of types (ii)-(iv) can be identified (cf. Phys. 198a246) and at other times that (ii) and (iv) can (cf. Met. H 1044a35b1). For the present it is only important to see the plausibility of identifying (ii) and (iv) since this threatens to annul the present dispute. Suppose, then, we return to the example of the poplar. It seems plausible to suggest that if one had a full understanding of the nature of a poplar one would grasp its peculiar mode of growth and propagation with all its attendant needs. It would become clear what was good for a poplar, why it needed to grow high, and so on. In other words, one would have the final cause of the growth. Similarly, to know the final cause (cf. G A 731b23; Phys. 195a236) is to know why such growth is a good thing, and this involves knowing the nature of that for which it is good. In the case of a formal cause, the form of a poplar is what makes a perfect
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poplar. A form never explains bad functioning, but only good functioning. So if we can give a formal cause of the poplars growing tall this will be because the poplar is in good condition, manifesting the poplar form by this growth, i.e. it will be a good thing for a poplar to grow so tall. Similarly, a final cause always gives a good state towards which the object is tending. All things are tending towards death, but this is not their final cause (cf. 8.2.3). This is given only when we have the good state of that thing, towards which it is its nature to tend. 13.1.3. In this way formal and final causes, at least with living things, look like being much the same. Yet if there is to (p. 244 ) be a dispute about Aristotles view on pleasure they must be distinguishable, and the options exclusive. In other words, Aristotles remarks that they are identical must be interpreted in a way that allows them to be different. How this might be will emerge more clearly if we consider the arguments for saying that pleasure is a final cause.
2. Pleasure as final cause: arguments and objections

13.2.1. There seem to be two (cf. Gauthier and Jolif, II (2), p. 839). First it is claimed that although the example of health that is used by Aristotle as an analogue of pleasure could be an example of a formal cause, it is more likely to be an example of a final cause. Aristotle, does indeed, on occasion, use the way in which health makes something healthy to illustrate what he means by a formal cause (e.g. EN 1144a35; Met. A 1070a216, b28). Far more commonly, however, health is used as an example of a final cause (e.g. EN 1094a8, 1145a79; EE 1218b23, 1822, 1249b1113). Thus health explains the bodys recuperative activities as their goal, the perfection towards which they are aiming, and it is in this sort of context that Aristotle most commonly cites it. It is more probable therefore that pleasure is being looked upon as that towards which the organism tends as a goal. Just as health, as a goal, causes the perfection of the body, so pleasure perfects actualizations as the goal at which a sentient nature aims. 13.2.2. Secondly, this is reinforced by the fact that Aristotle actually calls pleasure a goal. He uses the word telos, one of his words for referring to the final cause, to refer to pleasure when at 1174b33 he describes it as supervenient perfection (telos). He would be guilty of gross incompetence if his example of health were of a formal cause. For he has set out to explain how pleasure perfects the actualization The claim would be that he reminds us how health perfects the body as formal cause and then declares pleasure
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to be a final cause. In other words his illustration signally fails to be an illustration of the relevant manner of perfecting. All is well, however, when we realize that the illustration is in fact intended to be of health as a final cause. Then the whole passage is consistent. 13.2.3. The first argument is not, of course, one that could bear the whole weight of the thesis by itself. Indeed this is putting matters too mildly. This argument cannot really bear any weight at all. It must be among the most futile arguments to be found in the literature on the subject. For of course health might figure equally well as either formal or final cause. If we have two people, one of whom, A, is constipated, the other, B, is without digestive troubles, and ask Why is A having such trouble while B has none? the answer may be not that B is being helped along by a mixture of medicaments, but that B is healthy. Here Bs health is the formal cause of his digestive peace. Now A may well go to a doctor and the doctor advise him, and As digestive organs undergo a reactive change as a result of treatment. All these occurrences may be geared to As health, so that As health may be cited to explain them all. But now it is being cited as final cause, as that to which they are all aiming. It is quite futile to ask But which is health really? Is it a formal or final cause? For it is not in itself really either, though it may well be either. In other words, As health may be a formal cause or a final cause, but it does not follow that these styles of explanation are identical. For saying on any given occasion that it is a formal cause is saying that health (in possession) is the form that in this case explains, while saying it is the final cause is saying that it is the goal towards whichThis does not entail that an explanation by reference to a form possessed is the same as one by reference to a goal. Typically they will differ. Thus typically a formal explanation explains why A is F by reference to the possession by A of the requisite form. But a final explanation typically supposes present lack of full possession. But of course, As health, which is the final cause of his own activities and his bodys reactions, will, once achieved, be the formal cause of a quiet life. Indeed, with living things the form is the formal cause of much activity just because it is what makes something act perfectly and its good state is what each thing aims at, and so the form is the final cause too of much activity.
(p. 245 )
13.2.4. Everything hangs, then, on the statement that pleasure is a telos, at least so far as evidence internal to (p. 246 ) Book X is concerned. Yet as it stands this looks very weak. To begin with, the word telos is not a decisively purpose word like the English goal. It means, equally, completion or perfection, and Aristotle commonly talks of the actualization of natural
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potentiality as telos (for examples of this use, e.g. GA 725b8, 736b4, 742b1; de An. 416h2S; Met. A 1021b25) A being is incomplete in so far as it is in potency, is perfect in so far as it actualizes its nature, and so its actualization is its perfection (telos). So the use of the word is not decisive. Aristotle could be thinking that pleasure is the perfection of an actualization or condition rather than its goal. 13.2.5. Three further points about the Book X passage might make one hesitate about the final cause thesis. First the section where pleasure is called a telos is the end of a passage where Aristotle has been arguing that it is not a movement because, like sight, it is something perfect (teleion) and does not, like movements, aim at a telos and so become perfect only in achieving it. The use of teleion of sight in this passage is very much that of perfection, perfect (complete) rather than goal. Secondly, the question that we are asking is not one of the form: For what does X ? The question is: What sort of thing is pleasure? That it should be a form seems quite intelligible. That it should be the nature of something to be a goal is hard to make much of. So, indeed, is the idea that it should be the goal of an actualization (though see Ch. 16). Actualizations are perfections at which potentialities may, at a stretch, be said to be aimed and at which beings of course may aim. They are themselves, however, complete. The only apparent exceptions are imperfect actualizations, mentioned at Phys. 201b27 ff., but in the Book X terminology these would presumably count as movements In general, then, only an imperfect actualization can be said to have a goal There will, however, be that which makes an actualization perfect by way of form. Vision, for instance, may be perfect because of the relevant form, this being, of course, the form of animal whose vision is in question, which is what makes this sort of vision good vision for this animal. So the form that makes a given sort of life a good canine life is that whose presence (p. 247 ) is the actualization of the canine potentialities, including canine vision. Thus actualizations are made perfect by forms, but do not have goals. So the form may feature in formal explanations of them, but not in final ones. They may, however, be the final causes of activities aimed at perfecting actualizations, but that is a different matter. Thirdly, in the health illustration, health is the cause of being healthy, and this must surely be a formal explanation (aitia esti tou hugiainein: 1174b26). 13.2.6. The situation so far, then, is as follows: with living things one and the same thing is both the formal and the final explanation of behaviour, viz. the relevant form; but this is not to say that formal and final explanations are explanations of the same sort. So Aristotles remarks identifying formal and
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final causes do not mean there is no dispute about pleasure. When it comes to the text of Book X one cannot argue from the frequency of Aristotles use of health as an example of formal or final cause, since it must be capable of being either, according to context, nor does the use of the word telos tell us anything, since that indifferently means perfection or goal and, once again, a things telos may explain formally or finally according to context. Finally, health, in the illustration, explains being healthy, which is not an explanation by reference to purpose, but is a formal explanation.
3. Gods pleasure a formal cause

13.3.1. It is important to realize that in his treatment of causes Aristotle is not simply concerned to analyse and categorize familiar ways of answering the question Why is X F? Doubtless reflection on standard ways of explaining influenced his account, but he also has a view, partly inherited from Plato, as to the form an adequate explanation should take. This in turn is bound up with his overall view of the universe The distinction of form and matter which underlies that between material and formal cause, is part of Aristotles general account of change. Any change is comingto-be something, and that implies that what changes is now potentially, but not yet actually, what it becomes (p. 248 ) (cf. e.g. GC 317b 17 ff.). In general, only what is composed of matter and form can change; for matter is the potentiality for some other characteristic, and without that change is impossible. So changeable things are always composite (cf. e.g. Met. 1050b15 ff., 1069b15 ff.; Phys. 190b1011) The heavenly bodies, which move eternally, have matter with regard to place (i.e. they are potentially at P1 or P2), but they are not, like normal natural objects, potentially in motion or at rest (Met. 1050b15 ff.). An ordinary material object has the capacity to receive opposed characteristics and so to become or cease to be something; indeed its material constitution consists in not just a capacity but a tendency to change (GC 1.3), while the form that constitutes its nature ensures a constant tendency towards the development in actuality of that form (Phys. II. 8). The unmoved mover is the perfection of being, that is he contains no potentiality to be anything else, but is the pure actualization of his nature (cf. Met. 1072b), with no possibility of change. The rest of nature aspires after this perfection, but cannot attain it. Some things are in constant motion, and the process of coming-to-be goes on forever. The whole structure is one of imitation of the unchanging pure actualization of the divine (cf. GC 336b25 ff; Met. A 7.) Perishable beings cannot achieve true being, but the drive of their nature is to some approximation to it. In animate
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beings this is shown by the urge to procreation, achieving in the species a quasi-eternity unachievable by the individual (de An. II. 4). 13.3.2. The consequence is that final explanations are of two sorts. Any poplar will be geared to the manifestation of poplarhood, and its operations explained in that way; but poplarhood itself is a good in being some approximation to the perfect actualization of God, who is in this way the final cause of everything. So each kind of composite being aims at its own good, and has a good condition to which it can (intermittently) attain or between aspects of which it will change (cf. EN 1154b2030); and there is one good, God, which all beings aim at; not that he can be attained, but he can be imitated, or be the point of their struggles. 13.3.3. Fairly clearly we have here an elaborate world view. God is at the peak, the perfection of actualization. The activity of the universe is motivated by love of him, and he is the basic final cause. Now plainly, if we are thinking of a final cause as explaining any change or motion, no final cause can apply to God. The description of him as pure actualization entails that he has no potentiality for change, and so there will be no change or motion to be explained. Yet God is stated by Aristotle to experience the highest pleasure in virtue of being the perfection of actualization (Met. 1072b 1330, and cf. EN 1154b248, 1178b728). It follows that in his case pleasure cannot be a final cause if a final cause is one that explains some change or movement. Yet any other version of a final cause makes it difficult to distinguish from a formal one. In short, it seems clear that God enjoys himself because pleasure is perfect actualization and God is the most perfect actualization. Since there is no sign of a different account of pleasure for God and humans it seems that Aristotles view of pleasure, in Book X at least, is that it is perfect actualization. It follows, of course, that with humans it will commonly be the final cause of action. But it is the final cause because it is the form.
(p. 249 )
13.3.4. If the above is correct, then Aristotle believes that the Veal pleasure of a thing of a given species consists in the perfection of actualization of the nature of the species, and that this in turn can be seen to be aspiring after that perfection of actualization which is the life of God. It is implicit in this that although, in a sense, every species has its own specific pleasures which it pursues, there is also a sense in which all species aspire after one and the same pleasure, in that they strive to approximate to the divine life This is precisely what is suggested at EN 1153b2532, where it is said that perhaps all living things pursue not the pleasure they think nor the one they
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would say they were pursuing, but the same one; for they all by nature have something divine in them. 13.3.5. When one says that pleasure is the formal cause of perfect actualization the question arises how one is thinking of forms. Is it the form of seeing that is the pleasure of (p. 250 ) seeing? After all, it is a form that is a formal cause, and it sounds a little odd either to call pleasure a form, or seeing. The earlier exposition of formal causes was in terms of speciesforms. It would, of course be possible to opt for agnosticism, but there seems no obvious reason why Aristotle should not have thought of the speciesform as the form in question. In Gods case, it is the divine (perfect) life that is the pleasure, and the form is not something added to life, but its perfect actualization With a being like man there will be no episode of complete actualization. Only over a life could a man manifest human nature; at any given time he will only actualize aspects of it. So the form of man is only partially manifested in particular actualizations. Still, in so far as these are actualizations of human nature they are manifestations of the form of man and it is their form that makes them perfect actualizations of human nature. So with human beings, the form in question that perfects activities is the form of man; and to talk of human pleasure and the form of man (i.e. form of human life) is to talk of one and the same thing. An account of the form of man is an account of the good life for man which is an account of the pleasant life for man.
4. The nature of pleasure in Books VII and X

13.4.1. We conclude, therefore, that in Nicomachean Ethics X Aristotle is considering pleasure as the form of the being in question, that is as the actualization of its nature. It is now time to ask whether there is any significant difference between Books VII and X in their views of pleasure. It has been acknowledged that, as Owen points out, there is a tendency in Book VII to talk of pleasure as what perfects activities and so makes them pleasant. The question then is, what sort of difference does this signify? This is of interest at least in part because it has been commonly thought that the Book X statement is slightly subtler, and so should be taken as a later refinement (cf. 13.0.2). It has also sometimes been thought that the opposite is true (cf. e.g. Webb). 13.4.2. Suppose we admit there is a terminological difference, and that whereas in Book X the interest is in what (p. 251 ) makes actualizations pleasant in Book VII it is in the pleasant actualizations. One obvious reason
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for this could be the current state of disputes. At the time of writing of Book X Eudoxus and Plato dominate the discussion, and that dispute was over what makes the good life good. Eudoxus was for saying that it was its pleasantness, Plato for claiming (a) that some pleasures are bad, (b) that there are activities that are good not because they are pleasant, and (c) that what makes a life good is not its pleasantness but its order. To turn the tables on this critique it will be necessary to portray pleasure as what makes Platos further activities good, as filling the role of order with respect to a life, and then to dismiss the bad pleasures. This will account for the criterion of reality for pleasures of Book X and also the interest in seeing them as what makes actualizations good. In Book VII the issues seem different. The point about different kinds of pleasure seems accepted on all sides. Consequently the issue is not whether pleasure is or is not the good but whether any pleasure is (the) good. The opposition may have a small selection of pleasures which it treats as the totality, but it is in no doubt about their plurality. The issue then is what should be allowed into the set of pleasures and whether any could be good. 13.4.3. Granting all this it is hard to see an incompatibility of substantial position between the two books This can be seen by posing to each the others question and seeing whether they would have to supply different answers. Suppose then that the Aristotle of Book X is asked: is any pleasant actualization a or the good? Clearly on the Book X view those actualizations will be pleasant which pleasure perfects or which are perfect. So the first question is: will the criteria for identifying pleasant actualizations differ from those of Book VII? We have already seen (cf. 11.3.1216) that perfect actualization involves perfection of faculty and perfection of object. The first requires that the subject be in good condition for its kind, or in other words that it show a developed nature. This corresponds to the Book VII point that a pleasure is an actualization of a natural disposition, which is contrasted with something defective (cf. 1153a1, (p. 252 ) 1154b1520). When it comes to perfection of object, this clearly entails a requirement for external goods. As has been pointed out perfect manifestation of perfect faculty is not sufficient for perfect actualization, and so a fine eye gazing at an ugly building is not a perfect actualization of vision. Pleasure requires the provision of an appropriate environment. Now this is precisely what Book VIIs lack of impediment requires (cf. 1153b 1619). Lack of impediment is required for perfect actualization which constitutes eudaimonia and external goods are required for lack of impediment. But lack of impediment entails pleasure, and so pleasure is required for eudaimonia. It also emerges from this passage that lack of impediment is needed for perfection of actualization, the other
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requirements being that one have a non-defective nature actualized. It seems, then, that the conditions that Book X would require for a perfect actualization are identical with those of Book VII, and if Aristotle had been asked whether any pleasant actualization was the good he would have had to say yes (cf. 1177a227, b1921), and for precisely the same reasons. 13.4.4. Suppose we reverse the procedure and ask the author of Book VII what makes an actualization into a pleasure in the formal way? Clearly he thinks the efficient cause of a pleasant actualization is perfection of natural disposition and perfection of object But those do not simply produce an actualization. They produce a perfect actualization, and what is needed to make an actualization a pleasant one is, of course, that it be perfect, the actualization of a good nature without impediment, i.e. on a perfect object. Consequently, even allowing for the terminological difference it seems that each book would be committed to giving to the others question an equivalent answer, and there seems no cause to suppose greater sophistication of position in the one than in the other.
5. The terminological differences

13.5.1. It should be noted, however, that the above suggests that the terminological difference implies a greater difference than in fact it does. The air of contrast comes from (p. 253 ) speaking of forms as what, when added to actualizations (or faculties and objects), perfect them. This suggests that a form is not an actualization but can be added to one to round it off and perfect it, like some tune-up additive to ones motor oil. But this is a quite un-Aristotelian way of thinking of forms. It is part of his reaction against the Platonic way of talking to reject this implication and insist that a form is an actualization (cf. Met. 1050a4b3, esp. a1516, b23). The form of dog is not added to something to actualize it; rather a dog is considered with respect to its form when its actualization is considered. But just as actualization is prior to potentiality, so perfection of actualization is prior to partial actualization. The operations of imperfect natures are only to be called actualizations by benefit of some relation to perfect actualizations. A mediocre dog is imperfect in form, but a perfect dog is in perfect form simply in virtue of actualizing perfectly. This means that speaking of actualization may not be enough for speaking of form, for we should add the qualification perfect. But this is an addition in definition. There is not an added, formal, element in reality that is stuck onto the actualization The form is the perfect actualization. Consequently, when Book X speaks of pleasure as perfection added to actualization this does not imply that it is something other than
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an actualization, but that it is not just an actualization but a perfect one. Consequently the contrast with Book VII evaporates.
6. The difference in context

13.6.1. It seems, then, that Book VII shows no contrast with the position of Book X. The changes are not in the position but in the opposition, and therefore in the way the issues are set up. 13.6.2. On any hypothesis about the relative dates for Books VII and X it would seem that there is a difference of atmosphere in their respective philosophical contexts. There are indeed in Book VII those who think some pleasures very desirable but not bodily ones or those with regard to which the intemperate man is intemperate (1154a821). (If these people objected to all bodily pleasures, as the discussion (p. 254 ) suggests, they cannot include Plato (cf. Phil. 51).) Predominantly, however, the arguments considered are to the effect that no pleasure is good six arguments are cited as against two for the view that not all pleasures are good and one for the view that pleasure is not the good. The arguments that no pleasure is good mostly seem to rely on taking pleasure to refer to bodily pleasures. The view that pleasure is a perceptible genesis does not have to be confined to bodily pleasures, but the Timaeus and Philebus suggest that that is where it got its origin. The argument that a temperate man avoids pleasure has any force only if pleasure is confined to the pleasures with which temperance is concerned. The position that the wise man pursues a painless life, not a pleasant one, is backed up by the point that pleasure disturbs thought, and cites the effects of love-making (cf. Phil. 65e66a) The objection that children and animals pursue pleasure again seems to have bodily pleasures in mind. Consequently the point has to be made that these objections cover bodily pleasures only (1153a2935), and the question is raised, that does not occur, naturally, in Book X, as to why bodily pleasures have so monopolized the name (1153b331154a1). Even those who think that some pleasures are very desirable are portrayed as very hostile to bodily pleasures, and seem to suppose that most people will think bodily pleasures more desirable, so that they need to be attacked. This is why, presumably, it is thought important (1154a22 ff.) to explain just why bodily pleasures are thought to be so much more desirable. Of this, again, there is no sign in Book X, but the context of Book VII is one where bodily pleasures have assumed considerable importance so that philosophers are either talking as though they were all the pleasures there are, or at least as though it has to be insisted that there
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are others and that though bodily ones form the majority, they are none of them desirable. The significance of these differences we shall discuss later.
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The Greeks On Pleasure

J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor

Pleasure: Formal or Final Cause

Abstract and Keywords

1. The four causes

2. Pleasure as final cause: arguments and objections

3. Gods pleasure a formal cause

Pleasure: Formal or Final Cause

4. The nature of pleasure in Books VII and X

5. The terminological differences

6. The difference in context

Pleasure: Formal or Final Cause

Pleasure: Formal or Final Cause

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