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Parayno G.R. No. 148408 Subject: Doctrine: Police power vs Jovellanos closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner. A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution. Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either. Moreover, petitioners business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location. On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note: Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander.. recommended to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185. It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is in the heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao. Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location. G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994 MARTIN CENTENO, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALONPORNILLOS 236 SCRA 197 Facts: The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno,

Public

Corporation

Facts: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of existing law. According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the latters police powers HELD: The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44. The Counsel in fact admitted that : That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code; The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them. hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline service station under Section 44 necessarily included gasoline filling station under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace those in a gas filling station. As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the

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the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As a consequence, an information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. Issue: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose? Ruling: No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly. Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted. People v. Manantan GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684) En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendants plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General. Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term judge includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term judge, including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace. The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the merits.

KING vs HERNAEZ MACARIO KING, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondentsappellants.

FACTS Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizen Import Meat and Produce" Philippine Cold Stores, Inc permission from the President of the Philippines(Secretary of Commerce and Industry) DENIED petition for declaratory relief, injunction and mandamus(Court of First Instance of Manila) writ of preliminary

appeal

3 __ (RETAIL TRADE LAW)Section 1, Republic Act No. 1180 No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines, and no association, partnership, or corporation the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, shall engage directly or indirectly in the retail business: . ." mphasis supplied) (x) merely to ban them from its ownership and not from its management control or operation. sphere is merely limited to the citizens to the exclusion of those of other nationalities. falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. This preliminary injunction issued by the trial court on December 6, 1958 is hereby lifted. The petition for mandamus is dismissed, with costs against appellees.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS vs. HON. TORRES (1994)

(Anti-Dummy Law )Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134) which seeks "to punish acts of evasion of the laws of nationalization of certain rights, franchises or privileges." Read in connection with the Retail Trade Law, the Anti-Dummy Law would punish acts intended to circumvent the provisions of the former law which nationalize the retail business. Itchong Case ISSUE Is the employment of aliens in non-control position in a retail establishment or trade prohibited by the AntiDummy Law? RULING Yes, it is prohibited. Against retail trade law and Anti-dummy law (X)unconsti-right of employer to choose The nationalization of an economic measure when founded on grounds of public policy cannot be branded as unjust, arbitrary or oppressive or contrary to the Constitution because its aim is merely to further the material progress and welfare of the citizens of a country. Indeed, in nationalizing employment in retail trade the right of choice of an employer is not impaired but its

FACTS: Petitioner NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of respondents bank employees occupying supervisory positions. The Bank moved to dismiss on the ground that said supervisory employees were actually managerial/confidential employees, thus, they are ineligible to join, assist or form a union. The MedArbiter granted the petition and directed the holding of the certification election. The Bank appealed to the Secretary of Labor. Said court partially granted the appeal ruling that the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers are declared managerial employees and cannot join the union of the supervisors. Issue: Whether

Held: Petitioner concludes that subject employees are not managerial employees but supervisors. Even assuming that they are confidential employees, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees who are not performing managerial functions to form and join a union. A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified.

G.R. No. 140092

September 8, 2006

UNITED BF HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE BARANGAY CHAIRMAN and THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BF HOMES PARAAQUE, respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: At bar is an appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61, in Civil Case No. 94-077,1 raising pure questions of law on the contending rights of petitioner and respondents over the administration of BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision's multi-purpose hall. In 1991, then Paraaque Congressman Freddie Webb caused the construction of a multi-purpose hall on an old basketball court in BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision. The old basketball court was one of the original facilities built by the developer, BF Homes Inc. (BFHI). The funds for the construction of the building were taken from Congressman Webb's Countrywide Development Fund. The controversy arose when both petitioner and respondents claimed authority over the administration of the hall. Due to the parties' conflicting claims, petitioner protested when respondents installed a fence around the edifice. Petitioner also censured the latter for refusing to seek its prior endorsement before issuing barangay clearances to operate or conduct businesses inside the subdivision. According to petitioner, since the hall was erected on an "open space" in the subdivision (which had not been turned over to the local government), it remained the private property of the subdivision's developer. As BFHI's representative,2 it was charged with the administration of the property. It also pointed out that, under Municipal Resolution No. 88-123 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-084 passed by the Municipal (now City) Council of Paraaque, its endorsement was necessary before barangay clearances could be given to applicants for business licenses within the subdivision.

Respondents, on the other hand, invoked RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 as the source of their authority to administer the hall and to issue barangay clearances even without petitioner's prior endorsement. When efforts to settle the dispute proved futile, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for injunction against then Barangay Chair Helen Moreno, Kagawad Frederick Alegre, Ederlina Wenceslao and Dolores Escobar, and Sanggunian Kabataan Chair Rachel Rosel to enjoin them from administering the hall. This case was originally filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 64, but it was later re-raffled to Branch 61.5 Before the trial court, the parties stipulated on the following issues for resolution, namely: (1) who, between petitioner (as plaintiff there) and respondents (as defendants), had the right to administer the multi-purpose hall and (2) whether petitioner's endorsement was necessary before respondents could issue barangay clearances to applicants for business permits inside the subdivision. In a decision dated April 11, 1996, the trial court denied the petition and upheld respondents' right under RA 7160.6 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (MR). While the MR was pending resolution, a new set of barangay officials was elected in 1994, hence, petitioner filed a new motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to restrain them from further carrying out the policy of their predecessors. When the new officials manifested to the court that they were adopting the position of their predecessors on the above-mentioned issues, the petition was amended to implead them.7 A similar amendment was made after the 1997 barangay elections.8 On June 5, 1998, the trial court recalled its April 11, 1996 decision and declared respondents in default for failing to file responsive pleadings. It also allowed petitioner to present its evidence ex parte. On September 17, 1998, the trial court found no legal basis to enjoin the barangay officials from performing acts of administration over the disputed

hall and accordingly dismissed the amended petition: The prevailing law in the instant case is [RA 7160], Section 391, paragraph [a] (7), quoted as follows: (7) regulate the use of the multi-purpose halls, multi-purpose pavements, grain or copra dryers, patios and other post harvest facilities, barangay waterworks, barangay markets, parking area or other similar facilities constructed with government funds within the jurisdiction of the barangay and charge reasonable fees for the use thereof. The homeowners recognize the authority of the municipal government of Paraaque and its power to regulate the issuance of license and as a government authority and therefore it cannot refuse to recognize the authority of the Barangay which is now the authority within the Barangay.9 Petitioner moved for reconsideration in vain.10 Petitioner went to this Court directly raising the following legal issues: (1) whether PD 957,11 as amended by PD 1216,12 had been repealed by RA 7160; (2) whether petitioner had the exclusive right to administer the subject multi-purpose hall and (3) whether petitioner's (prior) endorsement was necessary before a barangay business clearance could be issued by respondents.13 Before anything else, lest the Court be accused of giving its imprimatur to an illegal act, it should be pointed out that the construction of the hall in the "open space" was prohibited by law. The second paragraph of Section 31 of PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, categorically provides: Section 31. Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks and Open Spaces. x x x [Open spaces] shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable. x x x (emphasis supplied) Thus, no structure or edifice should have been built on the old basketball court as it was an area declared and reserved by law as an "open space" in BF Homes Subdivision.

However, since both parties did not question the legality of the construction and continued presence of the hall in the "open space" and, considering the impracticality of ordering at this point its demolition or removal, the parties are pro hac vice deemed estopped from impugning it. We now address the issues raised by petitioner. The first issue was not raised in the proceedings in the lower court. As a rule, an issue raised for the very first time on appeal should not be allowed.14 Petitioner, however, contends that the resolution of the first issue is necessary to resolve the case. We do not see the point of petitioner. Except for providing the definition of "open space,"15 petitioner fails to cite any clear-cut basis why the Court should disregard the above rule. Neither does it provide a cogent explanation why this Court should rule that RA 7160 supposedly repealed PD 957, as amended by PD 1216. At any rate, no irreconcilable inconsistency appears in both laws that will force us to uphold one and strike down the other. To our mind, the critical point in this case is who, between petitioner and respondents, has the authority to administer the hall built with government funds on an "open space" owned by a private entity. Petitioner anchors its right to administer the hall on the fact that the land on which it stands belongs to BFHI. In other words, petitioner invokes in its favor the civil law principle that the accessory follows the principal. No doubt, BFHI is the owner of the "open space."16 However, it does not necessarily follow that petitioner should be charged with the administration of the hall. Acts of administration, as opposed to acts of ownership,17 pertain solely to management or superintendence. They do not necessarily pivot on ownership. Be that as it may, petitioner's right as owner's representative to use and enjoy the "open space" is not absolute but may be subjected to reasonable

regulation by the government. In this regard, RA 7160, Section 391(a)(7) is pertinent: SECTION 391. Functions. Powers, Duties, and

construction that where the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts distinguish ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemus.20 A close reading of Section 391(a)(7) shows that the legislature did not intend to make such a distinction. Therefore, we cannot make any valid inference therefrom that the hall is different from the other multi-purpose halls referred to in the provision. The Court cannot read into the law something which was not intended by the legislature lest it be accused of encroaching on the latter's law-making power.21 Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, this Court wishes to emphasize that the authority of respondents over the hall is purely administrative in nature. They cannot exercise any act of ownership over it, especially its surrounding areas. Thus, respondents erred in constructing a fence on the areas adjoining the hall as these are already part of the "open space" (required by law) and which are therefore no longer under their jurisdiction or authority. Moreover, since respondents have shown no proof that the fence serves any purpose ancillary to their right to regulate the hall, we are constrained to strike down respondents' act as ultra vires or in excess of their mandated authority under RA 7160. On the issue of whether petitioner's endorsement is necessary before the issuance of a barangay clearance, we rule in favor of petitioner. Under the local legislations passed by the then Municipal Council of Paraaque, Municipal (City) Resolution No. 88-1222 and Municipal (City) Ordinance No. 97-08,23 respondents must first obtain petitioner's prior endorsement. These issuances are in effect to this date. Respondents themselves did not present any evidence to the contrary, hence, their acquiescence thereto may be safely implied. Furthermore, the required endorsement of petitioner cannot be negated by respondents' argument that RA 7160, Section 152(c)24 vests on them the exclusive right to issue said clearances. Respondents' authority to issue barangay clearances under Section 152(c) is clear. But that is not the point.

(a) The sangguniang barangay, as the legislative body of the barangay, shall: xxx xxx xxx (7) regulate the use of the multi-purpose halls, multi-purpose pavements, grain or copra dryers, patios and other post harvest facilities, barangay waterworks, barangay markets, parking area or other similar facilities constructed with government funds within the jurisdiction of the barangay and charge reasonable fees for the use thereof. (emphases ours) Based on the foregoing, it is respondents, not petitioner, who enjoy the authority to administer the hall. Although the building was erected on an "open space" owned by BFHI, there is no doubt that the cost of its construction was sourced from government funds. Thus, the hall falls within the ambit of respondents' jurisdiction. The law is clear and unambiguous, hence, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed.18 Furthermore, while it may be gainsaid that PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, is the relevant law governing subdivisions and that, under said law, the maintenance of the "open space" pertains to the residents thereof,19 the Court nevertheless still cannot award the administration of the hall to petitioner. As the records indicate, the case does not involve merely the maintenance of the "open space" but of the hall itself that was built with government funds. We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's stand that RA 7160, Section 391 (a)(7) applies only to multipurpose halls accessible to the public in general and not to those which cater to an exclusive segment such as the homeowners or residents of a subdivision. Well-recognized is the rule in statutory

What concerns us here is the question of whether petitioner's prior endorsement is necessary before a barangay business clearance is issued, not who has the power to ultimately issue such clearance. Lastly, we find no inconsistency between Section 152(c) of RA 7160 and the local legislations passed by the then Municipal Council of Paraaque. In fact, they only made more evident the authority split between petitioner and respondents to, on one hand, endorse applications for and, on the other, issue barangay clearances within the subdivision. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. Respondents are hereby directed to (1) seek petitioner's endorsement before issuing barangay clearances to applicants of business permits and (2) desist from acts of ownership over the "open space" on which the multi-purpose hall stands. No costs. SO ORDERED. Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J., concur.

Latin phrases in statutory construction

Posted on March 23, 2009 by danabatnag He says: You are the one I love the most among the women in my life, and that includes my mother, my sister and my grandmother. You ask him, Is that ejusdem generis or expressio unius? And he answers, Ejusdem generis. Should you slap him or kiss him? Heres a short reviewer on some Latin phrases in Legal Method. The phrases are followed by a very short description of cases that illustrate the Latin rule. The definitions are taken from Agpalos book on Statutory Construction. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS Words must be construed in conjunction with the other words and phrases used in the text. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. Where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated. Aisporna vs. CA: wife of insurance agent prosecuted for having sold an insurance without registering as an agent. Using this doctrine, the Court ruled that an insurance agent is one who sells insurance in return for compensation, and it was not proved that Aisporna received compensation for the insurance she was alleged to have sold. (Her defense was that as her husbands clerk, she only renewed the insurance because her husband was out at the time). Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. v. Villarama : DaiChi filed a complaint against Villarama for violating an agreement that he would not join the companys competitor within two years after leaving Dai-Chi. Dai-Chi filed a complaint against Villarama at the RTC, which dismissed it on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, for it should have been filed before a labor arbiter. Using the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the court ruled that while the Labor Code says that all money claims of workers were under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, it did not mean to encompass the entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers. Paragraph 3 should not be read in isolation, but rather in conjunction with paragraphs 1 to 5, which all refer to money claims of workers arising from violations of or in connection with an employee-employer relationship. DaiChis complaint was anchored on a violation of contract, since Villarama was no longer an employee. The court ruled that the RTC was the proper venue for filing of the case. EJUSDEM GENERIS Where a statute describes things of particular class or kind

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accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a kindred nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statute to repel such influence. Ejusdem generis could be expansive, however, because the list is not exclusive; it may be expanded if a juridical tie could be found with another item. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp: Because gambling was with the phrase and other prohibited games of chance it was construed to refer only to illegal gambling. PBA v CA: Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS The express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Variation: Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. Canon of restrictive interpretation. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Malinias v Comelec: An attempt to use an administrative charge for a criminal complaint against police officers accused of violating the election code. The court ruled that not all violations of the election code provided for criminal penalties and in this case, the violated provisions only warrant the imposition of administrative, not criminal, penalties. Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos: A group of old men charged with violating the solicitation permit law was acquitted because the term religious purpose was not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, and what the law does not include, it excludes. The law referred only to charitable purposes, which phrase cannot be construed so as to include a religious purpose. DISSIMILUM DISSIMILIS EST RATIO The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification. Garvida v. Sales: Sales sought to have Garvida disqualified from the SK post because of age. The court ruled that while the Local Govt Code provided that SK members should be 21 years old, it added a qualification that should officials should be 21 years old on the date of election. Garvida was disqualified because she was more than 21 years old, although she was less than 22 years old. CASUS OMISSUS Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This needs two laws. In expressio unius, its just the enumeration you are looking at, not another law. COA of the Province of Cebu v Province of Cebu : This case is about the effects of a new law on an old law. The Special Education Fund (SEF) allowed the use of part of the realty and cigarette taxes for extension programs and scholarships. When the Cebu provincial office used it to pay for salaries of teachers and scholars, COA said those were not chargeable to the SEF since RA 5447, which created the SEF, was deemed repealed by the Local Govt Code. Because the two retained sections in the LGC omitted the scholarship grants, the court ruled that what was omitted must have been omitted intentionally, and so may not be included. UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMOS Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ramirez v CA: The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. Cebu Institute of Medicine v Cebu Institute of Medicine Employees Union-National Federation of Labor: Other benefits may refer to SSS, Medicare, Pagibig and may be taken from the 70% tuition increase since the law only says that money from this may be given to employees in the form of salaries and other benefits. Since the law did not distinguish between other benefits and SSS, etc, these may be deducted from the 70% increase in tuition charged by the school. REDEENDO SINGULAR SINGULIS Referring each to each; let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively. Amadora v CA: Teachers should apply to pupils and students; and heads of establishment of arts and trades to apprentices. The teacher in charge must answer for a students tort, but in this case none of those charged were either the teacher in charge or the dean of boys. People vs Tamani: Promulgation should refer to judgment and notice should refer to order. The computation of the filing of the petition was wrong. (This was an obiter because the filing was late either way it is computed, and the court decided on the case anyway).