Is India Becoming More Democratic? Author(s): Ashutosh Varshney Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.

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Is India Becoming More Democratic?

ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY

(A) long tradition ofideologicalsubjectionhas made (the lowercastes)stagnate.... Centurieshave instilledinto them a meek acceptanceof the existing(order).... This can change.In fact, thismustchange.The revolt againstcasteis theresurrection ofIndia or,shallwe say,thebringing intobeingofa uniquelyand hitherto unrealized occasion,whenIndia shall be truly and fully alive. Is such a revolt possible? Rammanohar Lohia, TheCasteSystem A great deal of confusion exists on how to discuss, and theoreticallycharacterize, political developments in India during the last decade and a half. There is, of course, a consensus that the Congress party,a towering political colossus between 1920 and 1989, has unambiguously declined. While there are legitimate doubts about whether the decline of the Congress partywill continue to be irreversible, it is clear that much of the political space already vacated by the Congress has so far been filled by three different sets of political forces. The firstforce, Hindu nationalism, has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention (Basu 1997; Hansen and Jaffrelot1998; Jaffrelot 1993; Varshney 1993). The second force,regionalism, has also spawned considerable researchof late (Baruah 1999; Singh forthcoming;Subramanian 1999). A third force, not so extensivelyanalyzed, covers an arrayof political parties and organizations that encompass groups normally classified under the umbrella category of "lower castes": the so-called scheduled castes, the scheduled tribes, and the "other backward classes" (OBCs). How should we understand the politics of parties representingthese groups? How far will they go? What are the implications of their forwardmarch, if it does take place, forIndian democracy? In an attempt to answer these questions, this essay compares political developments in Northern and Southern India. My principal claim is that our North Indian politics will be wrong ifwe do not place judgments about contemporary South India at the center of our analytic attention. In this century, the South has experienced caste-based politics much more intenselythan the other regions of India. If the Hindu-Muslim cleavage has been a "master narrative"of politics in North India formuch of the twentiethcentury,caste divisions have had the same status in Southern Ashutosh is an AssociateProfessor of Government and International Studiesat Varshney the University of Notre Dame. For comments, the writer is grateful to Hasan Askari-Rizvi, JagdishBhagwati,Kanchan Chandra,Robert Hardgrave,Pratap Mehta, Philip Oldenburg, Vibha Pingle, Sanjay Reddy,AlfredStepan,the late MyronWeiner,Yogendra Yadav, and reviewers of thisjournal. two anonymous The Journal ofAsian Studies 59, no. 1 (February 2000):3-25. forAsian Studies,Inc. C) 2000 by the Association
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Partlybecause electoralpolitics was India (Dirks 1997; Varshneyforthcoming).' axis,lower organized aroundcastelinesin theSouthand notarounda Hindu-Muslim states all southern majority, cameto powerin virtually castes, constituting an electoral by the 1960s. Our analysisof recentNorth Indian politics will be deeper if we oflowercastestookplace in theSouth.An exclusive appreciate howtheempowerment attentionaway fromwhat is clearlya focus on Hindu-Muslim divisionsdeflects in the North. caste-based churning significant but counterintuitive The majorSouthIndian conclusion about casteis culturally castehas alwayssymbolized hierarchy politically easilygrasped.Sociallyand ritually, castecan democracy, when joined with universal-franchise and inequality; however, and dignity (Beteille1996; Dirks 1997; ofequalization paradoxically be an instrument Kothari1970; Rudolphand Rudolph 1987 and 1967; Weiner1997). Weigheddown by tradition,lower castes do not give up their caste identities; rather,they availableand and "reinvent" castehistory, deployin politicsa readily "deconstruct" numbers to electoral advantage, ("low caste"),use their easilymobilizedsocialcategory It is the uppercastes,beneficiaries of politically. and fight prejudiceand domination that typically wish caste did not existwhen a lower the caste system forcenturies, castechallengeappearsfrom below. North India today,and in future, may not followin South India's footsteps politics in the North alreadybears striking entirely, but the rise of lower-caste similarities. Even Hindu nationalism, opposedto lower-caste thoughfundamentally in theNorth,has not been able to and quite formidable politicsin ideologicalterms as well as intention, dictateterms to northern lower-caste By implication politicians. Lower-caste standsforHindu unity,not forcaste consciousness. Hindu nationalism partiesare againstHindu unity.ArguingthatHindu uppercasteshave long denied and even dignityto the lowercastes,theyare advocatesof castepower,privilege, of power. Such has been the based social justice and a caste-basedrestructuration Hindu nationalists to politicsin recent yearsthatit has forced powerof lower-caste Forthe distasteful makeideologically but pragmatically necessary politicalcoalitions. and for the thirteenth sake of power, the Hindu nationalists-afterthe twelfth nationalelectionsheld in 1998 and 1999, respectively-hadto team up with other several ofwhomwerebased amongthe lowercastes.The latter, amongother parties, things,ensuredthat the ideologicallypure demands of Hindu nationalism-the based building of a temple in Ayodhya;a common civil code and no religiously abolitionof the special statusofJammuand Kashmir, personallaws forminorities; of the Minorities the only Muslim majority state of Indian federation; elimination moreacceptable to thelower-caste Commission-weredroppedand a program parties was formulated. have been ideologically Thus, in theirmomentof glory,the Hindu nationalists deceived. As they have ended theirlong isolation in Indian politics and formed to make in Delhi, theyhave also been forced by lower-caste politicians governments While Hindu nationalists haveindeedcometo powerin programmatic compromises. as an ideologyhas not. Delhi, Hindu nationalism the lower-caste mobilizationin the Can Hindu nationalismfinally overpower are lower-caste North? Alternatively, politiciansstrongenough to defeatHindu
princelystate of Hyderabad(Varshney 'With the prominentexceptionof the former ofSouth Indian 1997). As to how Britishrule mayhave turnedcaste into a masternarrative in NorthIndia, see Dirks (1987). In strictly politics,parallelingthe Hindu-Muslimnarrative as "theMuslimsofSouthIndia" Dirks says,Hindu Brahmins can be described politicalterms, (Dirks 1997, 279).

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as it tries thecharacter ofHindu nationalism nationalists, or,less radically, transform of India's somehow to accommodatea lower-castesurge? Our understanding in the comingyears. democracy will be shapedby how thesequestionsare answered in impulse.In its ideologicalpurity, it is deeply is majoritarian Hindu nationalism who constituteabout 18 percent of the threatening to non-Hindu minorities, but,much Lower-caste to be majoritarian country's population. politicsalso endeavors as working-class Western Europe, its politics was in late nineteenth-century ideological aim is to put togethera plebeian, not a religious,majority.It is and inclinedtowardsthe socioeconomically nonthreatening to religiousminorities disadvantaged. and More thaneverbefore, we need to pay greater attention to thedeterminants of India's plebeianpolitics.As is becomingincreasingly clear,lower-caste dynamics partiesmay not be able to come to poweron theirown, but it is unlikelythatany in Delhi in the foreseeable future can be formed withoutthem.Even if government will either thatsucha return theCongress party returns to power,it is almostcertain thelower-caste or havemanylowercastepoliticians incorporate partiesin a coalition, in the Congress as visiblepower-centers partyhierarchy.

The LargerPicture: From a North-SouthDivide to an Emerging of North India Southernization

of the castecomposition ofIndian politics Let us begin witha brief comparison In the 1950s, India's national today with the situationsoon afterindependence. urbanpoliticianstrainedin law. Most politicswas dominatedby English-speaking, theuppercastes,and manyleadersweretrained came from abroad.Lower politicians an agrarian and "vernacular" elite dominated local and down thepoliticalhierarchy, tendedto statepolitics(Weiner 1962), but even the lower-level politicalleadership the uppercastesin NorthIndia. come from Southern but, South India was different. politicianswere not only "vernacular" from as the 1950s evolved,theywere also increasingly the lowercastes(Hardgrave 1965; Subramanian 1999). By the 1960s, much of South India had gone thougha theDravidaMunetra lowercasterevolution: Kazgham(DMK) came relatively peaceful in the 1960s, and theCommunist party to powerin Tamil Nadu as an anti-Brahmin in powerin Keralain 1957, was primarily first basedin theEzhavacommunity, party, a low casteoftraditional ofindigenous liquor engagedin theproduction toddy-tappers (Nossiter1982).2 The social indignities inflicted on the Nadars of Tamil Nadu, anothertoddySouthIndia, areall too well known(Hardgrave1969). To tappingcasteoftraditional to get how much the stateof Kerala has changed,it would be instructive appreciate the Ezhavas routinely a sense of the humiliation suffered until the earlydecades of thiscentury: to walkon publicroads.... Theywere Hindus,butthey Theywerenotallowed thepremises of couldnotenter Whiletheir couldfrequent pigsandcattle temples.
2in the two otherSouth Indian states,Karnakataand AndhraPradesh,the lowercaste ForKarnataka, see Manor(1990); thrust ofpolitics,thoughpresent, has been less pronounced. forAndhra,Ram Reddy(1990).

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the temple,theywere not allowed to go even there.Ezhavas could not use public wells or public places.... ... An Ezhava should keep himself,at least thirtysix feet away froma Namboodiriand twelvefeetaway from a Nair. ... He mustaddressa casteHindu man,as Thampuran(My Lord) and womanas Thampurati (My Lady).... He must stand before a caste Hindu in awe and reverence, assuminga humble posture.He should neverdress himselfup like a caste Hindu; neverconstruct a house on the uppercastemodel.... The womenfolkofthecommunity ... wererequired, young and old, to appear before caste Hindus, alwaystopless.About the ornaments also, therewere restrictions. There were certainprescribed ornaments only which they (could) wear. (Rajendran1974, 23-24) By the 1960s, in much of the public sphere in Southern India, not simply in Kerala, such egregious debasement and quotidian outrage had been radicallycurtailed, if not entirely eliminated. A democratic empowerment of the lower castes was the catalytic agent forthe social transformation. The lower castes were always numerically larger than the Brahmins, but were unable to use their numbers before the rise of universal franchise. A classic distinction between horizontal and vertical political mobilization proposed by Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph (1967) captured the essence of North-South at the time. In South India, lower castes had already developed political differences their own leaders and parties by the 1950s and 1960s, whereas in North India the model of mobilization was top-down, with lower castes dependent on the upper castes in a clientelistic relationship. At the national level, the Congress party aggregated horizontally,as it brought together different linguistic and religious groups, but at the local level, it was a typical clientelisticparty,building a pyramid of caste coalitions under the existing social elite (Weiner 1967). In the 1980s and 1990s, a southern-style plebeian politics has rocked North India. The names of Mulayam Singh Yadav, Laloo Yadav, Kanshi Ram, and Mayawati-all "vernacular" politicians who have risen frombelow-repeatedly make headlines. They are not united. Indeed, substantial obstacles to unity, both vertical and horizontal, remain. Vertically, though all lower castes are below the upper castes/varnas (Brahmins, Kshtariyas, and Vaishyas), there are serious internal differentiations and hierarchieswithin the lower-castecategory.And, horizontally,even though caste system is present all over India, eachcaste has only local or regional meaning, making it hard to build extralocal or extraregional alliances. Thus, horizontal mobilization tends to be primarilyregional or state-specific,not nationwide. Nonetheless, these and other lower caste leaders have often made or broken coalitions in power. Their total vote share continues to be lower than that for the Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) respectively,but it is enough to force concessions fromthe two largest parties. In the three national elections held between 1996 and 1999, the various parties explicitly representing lower castes, in the aggregate, received between 18 to 20 percent of the national vote, as against 20 to 25 percent forthe BJP, and 23 to 29 percent forthe Congress Party.3Disunity at the 3Basedon the ElectionCommission1996, 40-51, and ElectionCommission1998, 4956. The 1999 data areprovisional. The explicitly lower-caste parties are:JD (various versions), RJD, SP, BSP, JP, ADMK, DMK, MDMK, PMK, BJD, and RPI.

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level ofpolitical parties notwithstanding, lower-caste politics has come to stay.4 It has pressedthepolityin newpolicydirections, a newcoloring and introduced ofphrases, in politics. diction,and styles The powerof the new plebeianpoliticalelite is no longerconfined to the state level, thoughthat is whereit is most prominent. The centerhas also been socially reconfigured. Delhi has twicehad primarily lower-caste coalitions in power-between 1989 and 1991 and between1996 and 1998. In K. R. Narayanan, India todayhas its first ex-Untouchable President. In a parliamentary system, ofcourse, thePresident is onlya head ofstate,nota head ofgovernment. What lendsNarayanan's electiona of a special politicalmeaningis thatno politicalpartyin India, with the exception regional party (the Shiv Sena), had thecourageto opposehis nomination. Narayanan was electedPresident by a near-consensus vote in 1997, a featnot easilyachievable in India's adversarial polity. havealso acquireda new thrust. An enlarged Government policiesand programs affirmative actionprogram and a restructuring ofthepowerstructure on thegroundstreet-level and police stations-have been the battle cryof the new bureaucracies plebeianelite. By far,theirmoststriking nationalsuccessis the additionof an extra 27 percent reservation for thelowercastesto central government jobs and educational seats.In the 1950s, only22.5 percent ofsuchjobs werereserved, and morethanthreewereopenlycompetitive. are49.5 and 50.5 percent, fourths Today,theseproportions respectively. At the statelevel,the reserved quota has been higherfora long timein muchof southern India. Indianpoliticsthushas a new lower-caste now prevalent bothin muchof thrust, the Northas well as the South. Democracyhas been substantially indigenized, and the shadow of Oxbridge has left India's political center-stage. Does the rising mean that India's democracy is becomingmoreparticipatory vernacularization and mere inclusive,or simply more chaotic and unruly?Or, are such developments cosmetic changes on the surface,a political veneer concealing an unchanging socioeconomic structure ofpowerand privilege? whatthe riseof lowercastescan do to politics,stateinstitutions, To understand and policy, we needto understand thetwentieth-century history ofSouthIndia,where thelowercasteshaveexercised remarkable powersincethelate 1950s and early1960s. in termsof caste,not Plebeian politicsin South India was primarily conceptualized class. Even the ideologically in the stateof Kerala foundit class-based Communists necessary to plug into a discourseof caste-based injusticein the 1930s and 1940s, and they relied heavilyon the traditionally depressedEzhava caste for theirrise (Nossiter1982). caste rather than class has been the primary Indeed, with isolated exceptions, in India. The risingmiddle class of a low caste has mode of subaltern experience had to fightsocial discrimination and disadvantage.For contesting customarily theemerging and domination, eliteoflowercasteshasevery reason hierarchy therefore, in politics.Whetherthisstrategy meansthatin the long run to use caste identities caste itselfwill disappear,as some lower-caste intellectuals and leadershave long wished (Ambedkar 1990), remainsunclear. What is clear is that, relyingon a a large proportion of the lower castes would ratherfight horizontal mobilization, the long-run prejudicehereand now,whatever consequences.
4In the 1999 elections,it was widelypredictedthat the electorate would deal a serious theirshare blow to lower-caste partiesin the North.In UttarPradesh,SP and BSP increased ofseats,evenas theirvotesmarginally declined;in Bihar,RJD kept its voteshareintact, but lost seatsdue to the BJP's superior coalition-making strategy.

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The Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, and the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in North India
The papersin thissymposium theaggregate go beyond profile summarized above, and addressin detail the recentpoliticalfortunes of threedifferent and historically underprivileged social groupsin NorthIndia:5theex-Untouchables, officially named scheduledcastesby India's constitution, and often also called the Dalits; the tribals, called scheduledtribessince 1950;6 and the otherbackwardclasses(OBCs) among the Hindus. Technically,the termOBC incorporates two different disadvantaged communities-Hindu and non-Hindu.Of these,Hindu OBCs are the low castes socialand ritual scheduled whosetraditional statushas beenabovetheex-Untouchable castes,but below the uppercastes(figure 1). Hindu OBCs overlapmostlywith the a category Sudra varnaof traditional hierarchy, consisting mainlyof peasantsand artisans. to the 1991 census, thescheduled castesconstituted According about 16.5 percent ofIndia'spopulation, and thescheduled tribes 8.1 percent. Becauseno fullcastecensus has beentakenin India since 1931, statistical exactitude on theOBCs, Hindu or nonHindu, is not possible. We do have approximatefigures, however.The Mandal theonlynationwide thatHindu sourceavailableon theOBCs, suggests Commission, about 43.7 percent of the totalpopulation(OBCs hereafter, unless OBCs constitute a distinction is necessary between Hindu and non-HinduOBCs).7 These three groups a majority of India's populationand electorate.8 constitute Since independence, the scheduledcasteshaveprimarily theCongress supported came fromthe partyin India. Though the leadersof the Congresspartytypically wereable to get scheduled castesupport becausetheCongress uppercastes, they partly architect of the affirmative action program, and partlybecause partywas the first in villageswereon thewholealive and robust. traditional patron-client relationships In 1984, a new political partyof the scheduledcastes-the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)-was launched.Receiving 4.0, 4.7, and 4.3 percent ofIndia's votein the 1996, 1998, and 1999 nationalelections, respectively (up from1.6 percentin 1991), the in nationalparliament. BSP may not yetbe a powerful force However,on the basis
5Strictly speaking,the arguments in thisessayapplyonlyto Northand SouthIndia but statesof Gujarat and Maharashtra theycan, in a modified form, be extendedto the western too. Lower-caste partiesmay not have played a similarrole in the West, but a lower caste churning from belowhas affected politicsseriously (Wood 1996; Omvedt1993). It is,however, not clearhow farthesearguments will apply to stateseast of Bihar. therehas 6Thoughtechnically scheduledtribesare not part of the Hindu caste system, in politicalcirclesthatalong withthescheduledcastes,they werehistorically been a consensus theterm "tribal" themostdeprived groupin India. It shouldalso be notedthatin somecircles, substitute. For want of a is viewed as pejorative. However,we don't yethave an appropriate I will use the term"tribal"in thisessay,withoutimplying anything pejorative. betterterm, 7Non-HinduOBCs are about 8.40 percentof India's population.Thus, in all, theOBCs of the country constitute 1980, 1:56). 52 percent (Mandal Commission, the Mandal Commissionoverestimated the size of 8Thereis some dispute overwhether thatthese consensus theOBCs, but thenature ofthatdisputedoes notchangetheprofessional growth three groupstogether constitute a majority ofIndia's population.Since thepopulation are typically rates,accordingto demographers, higherat lowerends of economicscale,it also means thatthe OBC proportion of the electorate is likelyto be higherthantheirpercentage in the population.

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6% Dominant Castes

Sudras 43%

Hindu OBCs (mostly)

Scheduled Castes16.5% and Scheduled Tribes 8.1% Figure 1. All-IndiaHindu Ritual Hierarchy. Note: (1) The nonScheduledCastesand Tribesfigures are bestguesses.Beyondthe ScheduledCastesand Tribes,castecensushas not been takensince are widelyviewedas statistically 1931. These bestguesses,however, if not statistically exact.(2) Since a fraction of Scheduled reasonable, Tribesare Christians, the numbers above add up to morethan82%. Source:(1) For ScheduledCastesand Tribes,Government of India, Census of India, Report ofIndia, 1991; (2) forothercastes,Government of theBackward Classes Commission (Mandal Commission Report), FirstPart,Vol. 1 (1980). of the shareof nationalvote,it has alreadybecomethe fourth largest partyin India, the Congress, the BJP,and the Communist following PartyMarxist(CPM).9 the BSP has developed a substantialpolitical presencein More importantly, almostall NorthIndian states,especially UttarPradesh(UP), Punjab, Haryana, and has been twicein power, MadhyaPradesh(MP). In UP, India's largest state,theparty and withthesupport ofother thougheach timebriefly parties. By 1996, theBSP had a whopping20 percentof UP's vote, cripplingthe once-mighty startedreceiving in itscitadelofgreathistoric In the 1996, 1998, and 1999 national Congress strength. the Congressparty'svote in UP was considerably below thatof the BSP. elections, Well until the mid-1980s, such scenariosforthe Congressin UP were altogether inconceivable. '?
9At 5 to 5.5 percent, the CPM's shareof the nationalvote has been onlyslightly higher thanthatof the BSP in 1996, 1998, and 1999. But the CPM has each timewon manymore seatsthantheBSP, fortheBSP's voteis notas geographically concentrated as thatoftheCPM. 'Oltis arguablethatif Mrs. Gandhi had not been assassinated barely3-4 monthsbefore the 1984 nationalelections,the lowercaste upsurgewould have shakennationalpoliticsin 1984 itself, insteadof waitingtill 1989. Her assassination changedthe issuesentirely in the 1984 elections.

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How did theBSP breakthedependence ofthescheduledcasteson theCongress? Kanchan Chandra,in her paper forthe symposium, providesan answerby taking research down to the constituency level. The resultsfromHoshiarpur, Punjab, are reported here, supplemented also withresearch doneat theconstituency levelin Uttar Pradesh. Chandraarguesthat the BSP's successin replacingCongressis built upon two factors. First,affirmative actionforthe scheduledcasteshas led to the emergence of a middle class among them. The new middle class is made almost entirelyof officers government and clerks.Despite experiencing theseofficers upwardmobility, have continued to face social discrimination.Endured silently earlier, such has bynowled to a firm discrimination resolve to fight for and dignity. respect Second, the scheduled castes within the Congress experiencedwhat Chandra calls a "representational blockage." Most districtcommittees of the Congresshave been dominatedby upper-caste politicians.Scheduledcaste leadersweremeretokensand Since the early 1990s, such meager rewardsof symbolsin the party structure. clientelism have been considered largelyinsufficient by the newlymobile scheduled castes. The new middle class eventually took overas local BSP leaders.Their strategy was to arguethathumiliation, rather thaneconomic was themainproblem deprivation, of the scheduledcastes,and thatgreater insteadof material politicalrepresentation, was the principalsolution.The scheduledcasteshad to be horizontally advantage, oftheirown,and had to win assembly seats.Financed mobilized,had to havea party by the new middle class,the BSP took offin much of NorthIndia and developeda largegroupof cadres. as the BSP has progressed newpoliticalrealities havedawned. However, further, In no Indianstatedo thescheduled castesconstitute even30 percent ofthepopulation, norare theygeographically concentrated, norforthatmatter do all scheduledcastes vote forthe BSP, thougha large proportion does (Chandra,in this volume). As a the BSP cannotcapturepowerat the statelevel,unlessit incorporates consequence, othergroupsor developsallianceswith otherparties.The need foralliancemaking in BSP's rhetoric. has led to a moderation is different from Still, such moderation fortheBSP now captures between7 and 20 beinga clientin theCongress hierarchy, ofthevotein Haryana, percent Punjab,MP, and UP (ElectionCommission 1996 and the 1998) and thus,in a fragmented politicalspace dominatedby no single party, BSP has the politicalmuscleto strikebargainsoverlegislative seats,appointments, werenotbargained but handed policies,and material goods. In thepast,benefits for, and assumedto be sufficient. top-down by the Congress party aregeographically Unlike thescheduled thescheduled tribes concentrated. castes, in For example,in the stateof Bihar,the site of StuartCorbridge's research reported this symposium, fieldwork theylive mostlyin the South. Since 1981, Corbridge's takenhim from someofthe state'surbancenters, amongBihartribalshas repeatedly wheremostofthetribalgovernment and publicsector to three tribal employees work, and statistical observation villages,fromwheretheycome. Combiningparticipant to compare the situationof tribals in research, Corbridgeis able systematically He arguesthatbothaffirmative ruralbackgrounds. action government jobs withtheir haveoffered and democracy newopportunities to thetribes. Theyhavemadepossible material advancement and led to a new awareness formany, ofpoliticsand powerfor thewholegroup. One consequenceof affirmative action is that the tiny middle class of the scheduledtribeshas becomeconsiderably larger.And a resultof democratic politics

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is thata tribal-based politicalparty has been headinga movement fora separate state in theIndianfederation, wherethetribalpopulationwould be in a majority. Though several prejudicesand exclusionsremain,Corbridgeargues that the benefits of democracy and affirmative actionhavebeen quite considerable, and mayevenexpand if a new statewith a scheduled-tribe further majority is born in the comingyears. The latter possibility can no longerbe ruledout. The OBCs, covered Jaffrelot in thissymposium, aredifferent by Christophe from theothertwo groups.As already noted,compared to the scheduledcastesand tribes, the OBCs commandmuch largernumbers:accordingto the Mandal Commission, Hindu OBCs constitute about 43.7 percent ofIndia's totalpopulation.Being mostly Sudras,the OBCs have facedmanysocial and economicdisadvantages, but the fit betweenthe two categories-OBC and Sudra-is not perfect. If one goes by the all-India classification of castes,a national-level abstraction, the picture that emerges is unable to capture the many regional variationsin dominance and power.Sociologists and socialanthropologists theterm construe Sudra to include,but the category ofOBC on the wholeexcludes,theso-called"dominant castes": the Jats, Reddys, Kammas, Patels, Marathas,and others.The notion of "dominant castes"was coinedbyM. N. Srinivas (1966) to specify thosegroupswhich, in a ritualistic or formal senseoftheall-Indiacastelvarna havebeentermed hierarchy, Sudras,but the ritualistic usage of the termis vacuous because thesegroups have in theirlocal or regional been substantial and rather historically landowners powerful In any realistic settings. sense,the termSudra can not be applied to them,nor are includedamongthe OBCs. theytypically Jaffrelot to nationalpowerin 1977 was a arguesthatthe riseoftheJanataparty in North turning pointfortheOBCs. Since then,theshareofupper-caste legislators Indian assemblies and nationalparliament and that has,by and large,been declining In the first of the OBCs going up, the stateof Rajasthanbeing the onlyexception. Lok Sabha (1952-57), Jaffrelot calculates,64 percentof North Indian Membersof from the OBCs; Parliament (MPs) werefromthe uppercastesand only4.5 percent had declinedto 30.5 percent and the latterrisento by 1996, the former proportion 24.8 percent. Sudra category Jaffrelot withinthe sprawling also showshow the contradictions have producedtwo different kindsof plebeianpoliticsin NorthIndia. For political an urbanversusruralideology Charan mobilization, was proposedby theredoubtable Singh,and an upperversuslowercasteconstruction by Ram ManoharLohia. Charan It subsumedthe lowercastesin a largerpolitical worldview. Singh'swas a sectoral in whichthelowercasteswerea clearmajority. oftheruralsector, His main category demands wereeconomic: andgreater higher cropand lowerinputpricesin agriculture, in thecountryside.11 In contrast, sincebothcitiesand villageshave public investment the urban-rural lowercastes,Lohia's ideologycut through sectorsas well as Hindu Affirmative thelowercasteswas Lohia'sprincipal thrust and a social actionfor society. state the and of restructuring institutions-especially bureaucracy police-his primary objective(Lohia 1964). of sectoralpoliticshave been After severalups and downs,the biggestvotaries defeatedin electoralpolitics. Nonpartypolitics is now their principal arena of and castehas trumped sectorin plebeianpolitics.If demandsforhigher functioning, do are agricultural prices expressed today,it is the lower-caste partiesthatprimarily rural so, not parties. 11For further details, seeVarshney (1995).

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thefurther riseofOBCs, however, aretwocountervailing Checking forces: Hindu nationalism and the disunity withinthe OBCs. With an ideologicalstress on Hindu thancaste distinctions, unityrather the Hindu nationalists seek to co-optOBCs in the larger"Hindu family";and new distinctions are also gettinginstitutionalized betweenthe upper OBCs, such as the Yadavas, and the lower OBCs, such as the Telis and Lodhas.These differences havealready undermined theOBC cohesionevident at the timeof the Mandal agitationof the early1990s. It is notyetclear,saysJaffrelot, whether thelowerOBCs will risefurther, oronly the upperOBCs will. But, at any rate,a reestablishment of uppercastedominance, he suggests, in NorthIndianpolitics.Politicalpowerin North is now rather unlikely India has moved downward.Even Hindu nationalists, the biggest proponents of areincreasingly Hindu unity, caughtbetween givinga greater shareofinternal power to the OBCs and emphasizingHindu unityover caste considerations. The latter tendency,traditionallyunquestioned in Hindu nationalist politics, is being it is a newideological challenged. Fighting posture- "socialengineering" -proposed by someparty who would rather in ideologues, give OBCs morepowerand visibility the BJP. "Social engineering"is not anotherexpressionof vertical clientelism organizedunderupper caste leadership, but an attemptto build Hindu unityby lowercastesmoreequally. incorporating

The New Plebeian Upsurge and Democracy

Has the rise of lower castes in the North, now added to their southern The collective empowerment, changedIndiandemocracy? judgment above,as well as the view of severalothers, is thatIndia's democracy has becomemoreinclusiveand participatory (Sheth1996; Nandy 1996; Varshney 1998; Weiner 1997; Yadav 1996a and b, 1999). A relative professionalconsensus is building around Yadav's thatIndia is going thougha "seconddemocratic characterization upsurge."The first of the end of Congressdominancein the midupsurge,forhim,was the beginning fair it is perhaps 1960s. In a century-long to saythatthisis the perspective, however, fourth democratic upsurgein India. The rise of mass politics in the 1920s under Gandhi's leadership was the first,and the universalization of franchiseafter the second. independence havenotremained Such judgments, ofcourse, Even thosewho agree uncontested. thatpowerhas decisively moveddown the caste hierarchy are unsureabout what it meansfor thecountry's healthor longevity. India's English-language democratic press has, on the whole,bemoanedthe riseof the new plebeianpoliticians, holdingthem often forthedeclineofpoliticalstandards. The anxiouschorus ofeveryday responsible howthelanguageofpoliticshas becomemore criticism has acquiredstandard refrains: coarseand thestylemorerough,compared to thesophistication ofpoliticaldialogue and conductunderNear; how menof "dubiousprovenance" havetakenoverelectoral ofa previous erahasgivenwayto unstable politics;and howthegovernmental stability and unrulycoalitions,in which mutual differences quickly turn into unseemly and intemperate outbursts. bickering Though rarely openlystated,the subtextof English-language commentary appearsto be that a democracy movingdownwards maywell be a poorerand shakier democracy. Such anxiety is genuinely felt and shouldnotbe lightly dismissed. It is notsimply a swan song of an anglicized,globally linked, upper-caste elite, dominatingthe

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powerful English-language pressbut finding its politicaldeclinefrustrating. We do, in perspective. however, need to put the anxiety A large number of political theorists today, not simply the so-called lamentthe declineof moralvalues,or "civic virtue,"in all liberal communitarians, democracies.No currently functioning democracyin the world seems to have institutions or mechanisms in place to ensurea durablemoralor civic enhancement ofthepoliticallife.Democratic politicians, saythesetheorists, areincreasingly turning politics into a marketplace, paying attentionmerelyto the utilitarian calculus of routinepolitics: winning electionsregardless of what it takes to do so; making promises to citizens thatcannotbe fulfilled; "misbehaving" whilein office butseeking coverof legal principles and technical If the qualityof goals pursuedin formalities. these political theorists politics becomes immaterial, contend,even procedurally correct democratic politics can only weaken the moral and civic fiberof nations. Democracies todayare ceasingto be "civicrepublics"; theyarebecoming"procedural republics" (Sandel 1996; Taylor1998). Lest it shouldbe believedthatsuchlamentis confined onlyto theinsulated ivory towers of universities, some of the populardiscourse, in the press. consider reflected "How low can theygo?," moanedNorthAmerica'sleadingbusinessnewspaper in its editorial, reporting on campaignsin the U.S. forthe November1998 electionsand thecorrupt electoral stillfollowed in somepartsofthecountry: highlighting practices fraud is slowly thelegitimacy andmore (V)oter undermining ofmore elections.... all states Sincealmost don'trequire a photo ID, it is fairly easytovotein thename ofdeadpeople, voteifyouarean illegal an absentee ballot orvotemore alien, falsify than once. ... Twoyears ago,groups federal funds hundreds ofnon-citizens using registered in Orange California. . . . cameup with The HouseOversight Committee County, thename be removed from therolls, of1499voters whoshould butelection officials them theLosAngeles claimit is toolateto purge for election. Thismonth, today's identified submitted Country registrar 16,000phony registrations by twogroups with theDemocratic aligned Party. (The Wall StreetJournal, 3 November 1998) A decline in other to Indiandemocracy. Unvirtuous is notspecific politics, words, in morality and a debasement ofpoliticalpractices and languageareindeedsignificant problemsfor any society,as they have been for India. But unless they entirely invalidatecitizen preferences, they do not amount to a negation of democracy. the latteris not the conclusion ofIndia's English-language Fortunately, press.It is a whichwe mayall share,not an argument thatdemocracy in India call forcorrection, has becomemeaningless.

Democratic Authoritarianism?
A second challenge to the view that India's democracyis becoming more is rather moreradicalin conception and thrust. participatory Simplyput,itsprincipal claim is thatIndia's democracy is a sham.In Jalal(1995), we have themostdetailed statement of this view, thoughsofter can also be foundin Bonner(1994), versions Brass(1990), Lele (1990), Shah (1990), and Vanaik (1990). According to thisview,changesat the level ofelections and electedinstitutions are oflittleconsequence so long as thesocialand economic inequalities ofcivilsociety

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remainunaltered, and the non-elected state institutions, especiallythe bureaucracy and police,continue to act in an authoritarian manner vis-a-vis thecitizens, muchas theyused to whenthe Britishruled.For democracy to function in a real,notformal, sense,therehas to be greater priorequalityamong its citizens.A deeply unequal society cannotchecktheauthoritarian functioning ofthestatestructures and therefore cannothavea politythatis "really"democratic. "Democraticauthoritarianism," Jalal argues,is the best way to describeIndia's polity, and there are no fundamental between India, Pakistan, and differences Bangladesh, except at the level of political superstructure. All have profound socioeconomic and all haveinherited inequalities insensitive, colonialstatestructures in whichthe nonelected institutions easilytrumpthe electedpowers-that-be: Thesimple dichotomy between democracy in Indiaandmilitary authoritarianism in Pakistan andBangladesh collapses as soonas onedelves below thesurface phenomena ofpolitical . . . (P)ost-colonial processes. IndiaandPakistan exhibit alternate forms ofauthoritarianism. Thenurturing oftheparliamentary form ofgovernment through themeticulous observance oftheritual ofelections in Indiaenabled a partnership between the political leadership andthenon-elected institutions ofthe state topreside over a democratic authoritarianism. (Jalal 1995,249-50) Thus,evenwhenmeticulously a "ritual."At best, observed, elections arebasically theycombine"formal and covertauthoritarianism" democracy (99). If societiesare unequal,thepoorwill inevitably be manipulated by thepoliticalelite: Unless capable of extending theirvotingrightsbeyondthe confines of the institutionalized electoral arenas toan effective social struggle against andeconomic are morelikely to be handmaids exploitation, legalcitizens ofpowerful political thanautonomous manipulators agents deriving concrete rewards from democratic processes. (48) In its theoretical we should note,this kind of reasoning anchorage, is not new. Commonly associatedwith Marx,Lenin,Gramsci,Mosca, and Pareto,it has a long lineage lastingovera century. The arguments of Gramsciand Mosca are the most elaborate.12 Gramsci(1971) reasonedthatso long as the economically had powerful control overthe cultural meansofa society-its newspapers, its education, its artstheycould establisha hegemony overthe subaltern classesand essentially obfuscate thesubaltern abouttheir owninterests. And Mosca (1939) arguedthatin democracies, giventheirmanyinequalities, domination of a small elite was inevitable. For our discussion about casteand democracy, thereare two levelsat whichthe claim about the emptiness of Indian democracy theoretical and compelsattention: The keytheoretical empirical. issue is: Should we consider socioeconomic equalitya for And sincea changein thesocialbaseofparties-to reflect precondition democracy? a closer correspondence betweenpartypolitics and India's caste structure-and a of stateinstitutions changein the composition action-to make thoughaffirmative the staterespondbetter to the needsof the deprived-are the two principalaims of lowercastepoliticians, thekeyempirical are:Is theriseoflower-caste questions parties not real?And is affirmative actionillusory? onlyformal,
'2Fora detailedtreatment, see Dahl 1989, ch. 19

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Is SocioeconomicEquality a Precondition forDemocracy?

A theoretically defensiblenotion of democracyis not possible based on the exampleofSouthAsia, a regionin whichonlytwo countries-India and SriLankahave had the institutions of democracy, formal or real,in place forany substantial lengthof time. Any reasonablesense of theory means that we should cast our net wider, especiallyif the larger universeis where most of the actually existing democracies havehistorically can be interpreted existed.EitherSouthAsian materials in theframework ofa larger, morehistorically embedded, democratic theory, or their empirical specificities can be used to modify thebroader ofdemocratic insights theory (Varshney 1998). In and of themselves, South Asian instances of democracy cannot make democratic theory. In the leading textsof democratic theory (Dahl 1998, 1989, 1981, 1971), the two basic criteria of democracy have been: contestation and participation. The first in effect, principle, asks how freely does the politicaloppositioncontestthe rulers, and the secondinquireshow manygroupsparticipate in politicsand determine who the rulersshould be. The first the second about principleis about liberalization; inclusiveness (Dahl 1971, ch. 1). Contestation and participation do not requiresocioeconomic equality;theymay affect, or be affected by, inequality.Democratictheorists expectthat if sociallyor constitute economically unequal citizensare politically equalized and ifthedeprived a majority of the electorate, theirpolitical preferences would, sooneror later,be reflected in who therulers areand whatpublicpoliciesthey adopt.By givingeveryone of priorresource-endowments, universal franchise createsthe equal vote irrespective In Europe,laborparties forundermining vertical potentialmechanisms dependence. in politics,oncefranchise was extended to the workers' interests pushingfor emerged class. working Another well-known theoretical point is germaneto a discussionof inequalities If inequality, and democracy. comesin the way of a institutions, despitedemocratic free expression ofpoliticalpreferences, makesa politylessdemocratic, suchinequality but it does not make it undemocratic. and participation are So long as contestation is a continuous variable (expressedas "more or less"), not a available, democracy dichotomous in degreeand dichotomies variable(expressed as "yes or no"). Variations shouldbe clearly In the of classicformulation RobertDahl, theUnited distinguished. a States was less of "polyarchy" term for an actually existing (Dahl's preferred thecivilrights before revolution democracy) ofthemid-1 960s, thoughit can in future be evenmoredemocratic ifinequalities at thelevelofcivilsociety comedownfurther but restricting (Dahl 1971, 29). Similarly, by allowinga greatdeal of contestation participation accordingto genderand class,England in the nineteenth was century less democraticthan it is today,but it was democraticnonetheless, certainly by and participation, standards.Given contestation nineteenth-century greater equality makes a polity more but inand ofitself, does not constitute certainly democratic, greater equality, Thereis no democracy withoutelections. democracy. The claims above are empirical,not normative. They are not a defenseof thanhaving nordo theyimplythathavinguniversal franchise is better inequalities, equality.Relativeeconomicequality,forexample,maywell be a value itself, and we may wish to defendit as such. But we should note thateconomicequalityand

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aredistinct democracy categories. Societies withhighlevelsofeconomic equalitymay well be quite authoritarian: South Korea and Taiwan until the late 1980s, China under Mao, and Singaporetoday come to mind. And societieswith considerable economic inequalitymay have vibrantdemocracies:India and the U.S. are both believed to have a Gini Coefficient of 0.4-0.45, as opposed to a more equal Gini of 0.2-0.25 forthe pre-1985, authoritarian Coefficient South Korea and Taiwan."3 Preciselybecause economicequalityand democracy are analytically distinct, some in economicequality; people mayquite legitimately be democrats but not believers othersmay believein democracy as well as economicequality;and still othersmay A similar be democrats but indifferent to thequestionofeconomic equality. argument can also be made about social inequalities. In lightof the theoretical discussion above,let us now turnto India. Has Indian democracybecome more inclusiveor not? And hasn't greaterinclusion reduced In case inequalities have come down as a consequence socioeconomic of inequalities? thepoliticalprocess, it will, in thetheoretical terms proposed above,makeIndia more eventhough an inability democratic, to reduceinequalities morewill notmakeIndia's polityundemocratic.

Are the OBCs an Elite Category?

If "the so-calledotherbackward castes(OBCs) are in manyregions thebetter off who benefitedfrom the Zamindari (absentee farmersand peasant proprietors (Jalal 1995, 205), theirrisewould indeed not landlordism) abolitionin the fifties" a significant of "social and economicexploitation." constitute changein thepatterns An old set of "exploiters" would simplybe replacedby a class onlyslightly less rich and privileged. Are the OBCs an elite groupin the lattersenseof the term? and peasant proprietors" To call the OBCs "better offfarmers is a serious and empiricalerror, forit conflates OBCs with "dominant castes."Most conceptual those OBCs are notdominantcastes.The latterterm,as alreadystated,represents abstraction have been groupswhich in the national-level of a varnalcaste hierarchy termed of regionalor local reasons, this termmakes Sudras,but fora whole variety that the term no senseforthem.Their powerand statushas farexceededanything irrelevant Sudraimplies(Srinivas for was simply 1966). The all-Indiahierarchy groups of substantiallandowners such as the Jats, Patels, Kammas, Reddys, Nairs, and and rich,evenifthey arenotBrahmins, Marathas. Theyhavebeenmuchtoo powerful orVaishyas, thecustomary Hindu varnas/castes. Kshatriyas, upperthree Manyofthese if the Zamindari castesdid indeed benefit fromthe abolitionof Zamindari, system prevailedin theirareas.14 The dominantcastes and OBCs have some intersections-for example, the in Karnataka countas both-but thetwoarenotoverlapping Okkaligasand Lingayats Sudras minus the dominant sets(Figure2). By and large, the category ofOBCs is equaltothe 0 and in a society, income theGiniCoefficient between distribution 13Measuring ranges a country it is,and thecloser to 0, themore 1. The closer is to 1, themore unequal equal. Givensimilar GiniCoefficients, withhigher countries percapitaincomes (USA) wouldhave than far those with incomes lesspoverty lower percapita (India). 14This, however, wouldnotbe true oftheRyotwari areas, where theMarathas, Reddys, Kammas, andPatels havebeendominant for a very longtime.

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Castes\ about

6.3%

Okkaligas, Lingayats

e.g.

Hindu OBCs

43.7%/o

Figure2.

OBCs and DominantCastes.

The dominantcastesin northern castes. and western India-the Jatsand Patels,for example-have in factopposedthe extension of reservations to the OBCs. to Can the argument about therelative elitismoftheOBC category be extended anyOBCs at all? The upperOBCs, suchas theYadavas,areindeedpeasantproprietors and also beneficiaries of Zamindari abolition.Much like the Patels in Gujaratat the the Yadavas have achievedsufficient beginningof the twentieth century, upward and have used theirnumbersto considerable mobilitysince the green revolution, in a democracy. One can indeed say that theyare fastbecominga dominant effect be viewedas such in the comingdecades. But the caste,and will in all probability are not as privileged. lower OBCs, such as the Lodha, Pal, Mali, Teli and Maurya, This bifurcation of the OBC categoryraises an importantquestion: what of the OBCs can be called economically proportion deprived? Though landholding data for for estimates cannot casteshas notbeencollected decadesand therefore precise theseparate casteand landholding be given,simplecalculations-combining statistics in an empirically defensible of the lowerOBCs are way-can show that a majority mostlikelyto be marginal farmers (owninglessthan2.5 acresofland)orsmallfarmers (less than5 acres). line (Ravallionand In 1993-94, about 36 percent ofIndia was belowthepoverty Datt 1996; The World Bank 1997). Therewould virtually be no OBCs in thisgroup if we assumed that (a) all scheduledcastes (16 percentof India's population),all scheduledtribes(8 percent), and all Muslims (12 percent)were below the poverty we line; and that (b) all upper caste householdswere above it. Both assumptions, boththe as Chandraand Corbridge showin thissymposium, know,are wrong.First, thereis a substantial scheduledcastesand tribesnow have a middleclass. Moreover, and western India from where Muslim middle class in India: especiallyin southern India wherea Muslim to Pakistanwas minuscule,but also in northern migration the late 1960s. middleclass has reappeared after thatof the 36 percent Let us supposeforthe sake ofargument populationbelow the poverty line, nearly30 percent(of the total) comes fromthe scheduledcastes,

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tribes,Muslims and a tiny numberalso fromthe upper castes. With this more reasonable supposition, about 5-6 percent ofthepopulation falling belowthepoverty line would consistof the OBCs. Sincethepoverty line is primarily nutritional in thedeveloping world-meaning thatbelow the line one could not even buy enoughfoodto get a basic minimumof calories (The World Bank 1997, 3)-another 15-20 percent of the country's population, widelybelievedto be onlyslightly above thepoverty line,would also be at least20-25 percent quite poor.The OBCs thuswould constitute ofthepopulation thatis below,or just above, the poverty line. That, in turn,would make up 50-55 percent of Hindu OBCs (constituting, as theydo, 43 percent of Indian population). We also knowthatmarginal farmers, havingless than2.5 acresofland,constitute in India (Visariaand Sanyal1977).15 Thus, about 50 percent ofall landedhouseholds we can safely infer that marginal puttingthe caste and landholdingdata together, farmers constitute an overwhelming proportion of OBC households.Even after the in Indian agriculture the level ofproductivity has not reached greenrevolution, such a level thatwe can justifiably call theselatterclasses"peasantproprietors or better 16 In agrarianpolitical economy, the terms"peasantproprietors" offfarmers." and "betterofffarmers" do not indicatedebilitating economicdisadvantage, but rather thatcannotbe appliedto marginal considerable These are terms and small advantage. farmers. In short,to say that peasant proprietors or better-off farmers benefited from Zamindari abolitionis correct; but to concludethatpeasantproprietors and better-off are by and largethe OBCs is a nonsequitur. farmers Most lowerOBCs are not only in both respects but also economically better sociallysubaltern so, and onlyslightly a keyquestionincreasingly thanthescheduled castes.That is why,as Jaffrelot argues, with the scheduledcastes in a BSP-led is: can the lower OBCs be incorporated as opposedto partiesled by the upperOBCs? coalition,

Is Affirmative Action Illusory?

action leads to the coTheoretically speaking,it is possible that affirmative optationof a tinylower caste and scheduledcaste elite into the existingvertical without their for castes.After structure, anywidelydispersed welfare-gains all, India's affirmative In 1992, of actionconcerns onlygovernment jobs, not theprivatesector. the nearly 300 millionpeople in the work-force, only20 millionwerein the public will directly sector.One can therefore actionin thepublic sector say thataffirmative and one can, in principle, benefit of the deprived, only a small proportion suggest that "access to education,government and state patronagebased on employment rather thanstrengthened theautonomy ofthe reservations mayin facthavehampered (Jalal1995, moreprivileged and talented members ofthescheduled castesand tribes" 209-10; also Gokhale 1990, and Sachchidananda 1990). This Is thereevidence that this theoretical possibilityholds up empirically? actionforthe questioncan, in turn,be brokendown into two parts:(a) affirmative in thelasttwodecades-atanyrate, "5These havenotsignificantly proportions changed iftrue, theconclusions nottowards wouldhavechanged ofthis larger holdings which, paragraph. '6Only in Punjabis it possible to generate a surplus on a 2-3 acrefarm today (Chaddha 1986).

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OBCs (in additionto the scheduledcastes),which has takenthe formof quotas in muchofSouthIndia sincethe 1920s; and (b) affirmative actionforthescheduled castes, all overIndia since 1950, to whichthe OBCs have been added outside implemented the South only after1990. Clearly,it is far too early to evaluate the impact of India. For the scheduledcastes, affirmative action forthe OBCs beyondsouthern however, our empirical judgments can be nationalin scope. In southern over the scheduled caste Indianstates, and above quota, closeto 50 percent the have for in the of stategovernment jobs been reserved OBCs stateof Karnataka to begin with,and since the 1960s; in Tamil Nadu, the OBC quota was 25 percent was increased to over50 percent later;in Kerala,theOBC quota has been40 percent; and in AndhraPradesh,25 percent.What has been the impactof such large-scale reservations? Have the nonelected stateinstitutions changed? of statebureaucracies, to caste,is availablefor No detailedbreakdown according It is widelyknownthat South India, but thereis no mystery leftabout the results. many Brahminssimply migratedout of South India as the OBC quotas were instituted.Once access to governmentjobs, their traditionalstronghold,was substantially reduced, some Brahmins went into the private sector, becoming businessmen to Delhi, Bombay,the forthe first time,but a largenumbermigrated and so capable UnitedKingdom,and theUnitedStates.Indeed,so largewas theflight that theirmigration were the Brahminsof gettingjobs anywhere to, and rise in, in the late 1960s and early1970s Bombayled to a seriousanti-southern movement havebecomeremarkably, (Katzenstein 1979). By now,bureaucracies ofsouthern states thoughnot entirely, non-Brahmin.17Moreover, thoughsystematic empirical studies have not been undertaken, it is also widelyrecognized that the South is governed affirmative actionin betterthanNorthIndian stateslike Bihar and UP. Large-scale in the does not appear to have undermined bureaucratic recruitment governance South. Let us now turnto the impactof reservations forthe scheduledcastes.Kanshi Ram, the leading scheduledcaste politicianof India todayand the leader of BSP, actionhas "nowdone enoughforthescheduled arguesthataffirmative castes,"noting thatin thestateofUP, of the 500 officers in theeliteIndianAdministrative Service, the scheduledcastes(Mendelsohn and Vicziany1998, 224). However, 137 are from affirmative action,Kanshi Ram adds, is "usefulfora cripplebut a positivehandicap forsomeonewho wantsto runon his own two feet";instead,he says,the scheduled castesshouldfocuson winningpowerthrough for"the captureofpolitical elections, the composition of the bureaucratic elite" (224). transform powerwill automatically action leading to coCompared to the theoretical possibilityof affirmative the claim of India's leadingscheduledcastepolitician noticehow different optation, is. Affirmative action,in his judgment, is alreadyquite considerable, thoughit is at the same time an inadequate tool for empowerment. In a new sign of political affirmative confidence, action,he says,is forthe disabled,whereasit is time now to play the game of democratic politicsmoreequally. Finally,his politicsare premised upon the assumption that nonelected institutionsdo not trump the elected will transform thebureaucracy electedinstitutions and institutions; rather, capturing It is the electedinstitutions of India thatset the police much morefundamentally. thefaculties ofScience andEngineering in many American universities, as wellas 17And American software companies, havea lotofSouth Indian Brahmins!

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toneforthenonelected stateinstitutions ofbureaucracy and police,nottheother way 18 round. After all is said and done,the mosttellingevidenceof the impactofaffirmative actionon the scheduledcastesmaywell be indirect, not direct.Affirmative action,as Chandraand Corbridgeargue,has produceda new counterelite, which has started leading political mobilization.Chandra shows that scheduled caste government officers, beneficiaries ofaffirmative action,financed theBSP and wereitsearly leaders. Rather than leading to a verticalco-optation, affirmative action, by producinga scheduledcasteelite,appearsindirectly to havefacilitated horizontal A mobilization. hampering of autonomy followsdirectly from verticalclient-patron links,not from horizontal mobilization.

Deeper,but Unfinished'9
to mean thatIndia can not be made still None of the above shouldbe construed moredemocratic. Thereis no doubt thatmanybattlesforsocial dignity and equality forthe lower castes still lie ahead, even in South India (Bouton 1985); and so do The continuinghostility strugglesforwomen and minorities. betweenthe upper OBCs and scheduled castesin several partsofIndia is another exampleofan unfinished social transformation. However,the papers here,as well as earlierstudies(Frankel 1990; Omvedt 1993), show that democracy has alreadyenergizedIndia's plebeian orders. the traditional Theyhavechallenged forms ofclientelistic politicsand started fighting forgreater power. or noteconomic Whether inequalities havegone down,socialinequalities certainly have,evenforthescheduled castes(Mendelsohn and Vicziany1998). This is a serious If in South India it was not possible forEzhavas to walk on public achievement. ifit was impossible forNadar womento covertheirbreasts whenwalkingin streets, frontof higher caste Hindus, if scheduled castes in much of India could not and public wells, then the have access to schools,public transport, traditionally ofthenotionofbasicdignity thelowercastesin thepublic emergence among,and for, mustbe takenextremely eventhough economic sphere seriously, inequalities maynot have lessenedto the same degree.Thereis no uniquelyacceptablereasonto suppose thateconomicinequalities mustbe givenprimacy oversocial inequalities. The battle forsocial dignity is being increasingly won in the public sphere. By all accounts,India's democracy has made such social victories possible. In in theworld, is higher India,unlikemanyother democracies the incidence ofvoting among the than the less the the educated than in the poor among rich, among among graduates, villages thanin the faith cities seem to havegreater (Yadav 1996a and b, 1999). The deprived in India's electionsthan the advantaged.Unless we assume short-sightedness, the subaltern seem to thinkthatthe electoralmechanisms of democracy can be used to socioeconomic fight disadvantages.
l8Jalal (1995) arguestheopposite.During thecolonialperiod,thenonelected institutions wereindeedmorepowerful thantheinstitutions The reason based on limitedelections. simply was thatthe former institutions wereBritish-dominated, the latter saw manyelected whereas Indiansat thetop.Universal-franchise democracy hasreversed thecolonialrelationship between the electedand the nonelected in India. institutions 19This sectionhas been inspiredby discussions of Americandemocracy and its achievements.Indeed,it comesveryclose to the last paragraph ofa greatbook on American politics: "Criticssay thatAmericais a lie becauseits reality fallsso shortofits ideals.Theyarewrong. Americais nota lie; it is a disappointment. But it can be a disappointment onlybecauseit is also a hope" (Huntington1981, 262).

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It should also be noted that many scholarswho accept these claims have nonetheless of some otheraspectsof Indianpolity.But we should been quite critical how theircriticisms are different the claim thatIndia's democracy from is a specify are: sham.The threemostcommoncriticisms (1) That a seriouscrisisof ungovernability has arisendue to increasing political participation and theinability ofthestateto respond adequately to therising groups and demands(Kohli 1991). (2) That India's politicalelite has focusedfartoo much on narrow identities on theone handand purely economic goalson theother, but far too littleon usingpublic forthe deprived(Dreze and Sen 1995). (By policy to expand social opportunities "social," I might add, Dreze and Sen primarily mean educationand health,not and ritualstatus,the sensein whichthe termhas been used in this everyday dignity is undoubtedly ofIndiandemocracy essay.Though thesocialperformance poorat the level of educationand health,its social performance at the level of everyday dignity and respect, as arguedhere,has been rather substantial.) (3) That there is nothing unnatural aboutthepoliticians makinguse ofidentities in democratic politics,but that does not explainwhy India's politicianshave paid such inadequate attentionto issues of public policy in general,bothconcerning educationand healthon the one hand and incomeson the other(Bhagwati 1993; Weiner1991, 1986). Nothingin India's democracy precluded a switch from dirigisme to a market-orientation, as was demonstrated in 1991, nordoes democracy ruleout a at universal effort education and public health, as SriLankaand some greater primary Indian statesshow. Failuresof public policyhave less to do with democracy per se, and mind-setof India's political and bureaucratic more with the ideology elite (Bhagwati 1993; Sachs,Varshney and Bajpai 1999; Weiner 1986). Quite different ideologieshave been,and can be, pursuedin a democracy. Moreover, sensiblewelfare-enhancing public policiesdo not alwayshave to wait forpopularpressures to build up; theycan emergewithan ideologicalchangefrom the electoral have not so farpressed above.20 Though the subaltern, through process, India's decision-makers forbetterincomes,educationand health,only foreveryday and respect, on the former such a lack of pressure dignity objectivesdid not dictate relative or lack of boldness, on thepartof the government. inaction, India's greatest and awareness failure is one ofimagination on thepartofthepoliticaland bureaucratic elite. ofthethirdcritique.It acceptsthatelections havea real, Notice theimplications not simplyformal and ritualistic, value and yetit claimsthatifpopular were demands orifthe state the results ofIndia's democracy would be so much responses were, different more impressive. The admittedly unremarkable of the Indian state in functioning and healthopportunities forits massesis viewed enhancing economic,educational, not as a negation of democracy, but a problem analytically separable and one attributable to eliteideologies.Fora balancedrecord, suchfailures mustbe contrasted with the success of India's democracy,reflectedin rising participationand at the level of social dignity on the one hand and victories and respect inclusiveness on the other.By privileging numbersand giving freedom to organize,democracy inIndia's inthemid-1960s 20The shift is anexample agricultural policy (Varshney 1995); so isaffirmative action enshrined inIndia's constitution. Both came into force without a popular movement in favor ofeither.

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has become the biggestenemyof the hierarchies and degradations of India's caste system.

Conclusion
Insteadof arguingthatonlyrelative equalitycan producea democracy, a much more empiricallygrounded claim would be that democracycan help reduce at least social if not economic.Understanding inequalities, how this happenedin a necessityfor a deeper South India in the 1950s and 1960s is increasingly of contemporary understanding NorthIndia. Not onlyhave socialhumiliations gone in the South,but thereis a consensus thatSouth India is on the down significantly wholeless unequal todaythantheHindi-speaking North(as well as better governed). It is clearthattheriseoflowercastesto powerbetweenthe 1950s and 1960s has had a greatdeal to do with the transformation of South India since then.Whether the North will replicatethe South is still an open question;the proportion of the uppercastes,forone, has alwaysbeen substantially higherin the North,and lower in the South, foranother, caste movements did not have to contendwith Hindu nationalism.However,should the northern outcomeseven approximate southern outcomesin the comingyears, as would seem likely,both votaries of the liberating and thoseof reducinginequalitieswill have much to cheer potentialof democracy about. India is, indeed, still far frombecoming a democracyfrombelow, but democratic poweris increasingly movingdownward. Democracyis no longera gift from above.

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