1

Reliability and Availability Analysis of IEC 61850 Based Substation Communication Architectures
Mitalkumar G. Kanabar, Student Member, IEEE, Tarlochan S. Sidhu, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract-- To achieve interoperability among multi-vendor substation automation devices, international electro-technical commission (IEC) has published IEC 61850 standard for communication networks within power substations. This standard specifies the communication systems based on Ethernet networks for the substation automation systems (SAS). Ethernet provides flexibility in terms of configuring various architectures with the help of Ethernet switches. However, the reliability and availability of the applicable Ethernet architectures need to be analyzed before they are implemented for critical applications in substations. This paper presents the reliability and availability evaluation of the practical Ethernet switch architectures using reliability block diagram (RBD) approach. The reliability block diagrams have been built for the intra-bay and inter-bay communications considering a typical transmission substation. Further, the reliability and availability of the practical Ethernet architectures have been compared and some suggestions have been made using the final results. Index Termsavailability, IEC 61850, intelligent electronic device (IED), reliability, substation automation systems (SAS).

I. NOMENCLATURE R i (t ) reliability of ith component failure rate of ith component mean time to failure of ith component mean time to repair of ith component availability of ith component

i
MTTFi MTTR i Ai

ACRONYMS ESW IRIG-B LAN MTTF MTTR MU OSI RBD RSTP SAS SNTP TS Ethernet switch inter-range instrumentation group-B combination local area network mean time to failure mean time to repair merging unit open systems interconnection reliability block diagram rapid spanning tree protocol substation automation systems simple network time protocol time synchronization source

M.G. Kanabar and T. S. Sidhu are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, the University of Western Ontario, London, ON, N6A 5B9, Canada, (e-mail: mkanaba@uwo.ca; sidhu@eng.uwo.ca).

HE major challenge faced by substation automation design engineer is to provide interoperability among the protection, control, and monitoring devices from the various manufacturers. Up until recently, all the manufacturers are/were using their own proprietary communication protocols. Huge investment is needed to develop costly and complicated protocol converters [1]. To address this issue, IEC working group TC57 has published IEC 61850 named as Communication Networks and Systems in Substation in 2003 [2]. IEC 61850 standard provides the interoperability by defining the communication protocol, data format and the configuration language [3]. Further, this standard specifies OSI-7 layer based Ethernet communication systems [4]. IEC 61850 part-8 and part-9 proposes Ethernet at station level and process level respectively. Ethernet provides high flexibility regarding communication architectures as well as incorporation of fast growing communication technology [5]. The high-speed properties of current Ethernet technology (up to 10Gbps), together with its dominant position in the LAN field, makes Ethernet an interesting communication technology for substation automation usage [6]. However, IEC 61850 proposed Ethernet communications for critical substation automation applications has to fulfill reliability, performance and cost criteria for the successful implementation [7]. According to IEC 61850 reliability requirements, there should be no single point of failure that will cause the substation to be inoperable. However, IEC 61850 does not demand for redundancy even for critical applications, and it is left to substation design engineer. Therefore, SAS reliability and availability improvements will be one of the most challenging issues to the IEC 61850 based substation design engineer. Several literatures have been reported to address this issue. Reference [7] provides method to calculate reliability and availability of IEC 61850 based process bus for different architectures. References [8-11] have shown reliability of the different communication configurations. These literatures highlight the significance of reliability and availability analysis of the Ethernet communication networks. In addition to this, it is important to carry out reliability and availability analysis of practical Ethernet communication architectures by considering a specific substation layout. With this motivation, this paper discusses the reliability and availability analysis of practical Ethernet communication architectures for IEC 61850 based SAS using reliability block

II. INTRODUCTION

978-1-4244-4241-6/09/$25.00 2009 IEEE

diagram method keeping aside communication network performance issues. It is important to note that, this paper evaluates the reliability and availability of the Ethernet communication networks, not the substation protection functions. Detailed reliability block diagrams for the intra-bay and inter-bay communication are derived for a typical small transmission substation. All practical communication architectures are compared from reliability and availability results. Section-III describes the different IEC 61850 based SAS communication architectures using Ethernet switch. Section-IV shows the reliability and availability analysis for intra-bay and inter-bay communication. This section also compares the different Ethernet communication architectures from reliability of the SAS perspective. Section-V concludes the work. Section-VI (Appendix) discusses the concepts of reliability and availability calculations using RBD technique. III. COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURES FOR IEC 61850 BASED SUBSTATION AUTOMATION A. Function Hierarchy of IEC 61850 The three levels in the functional hierarchy proposed by IEC 61850 are shown in Fig.1.

cascaded, star, and ring. The practical architectures for SAS may be hybrids of these three basic combinations. In this paper, following Ethernet communication architectures are considered from the IEEE PSRC report [5]. Cascaded architecture: A typical cascading architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2. All Ethernet switches are cascaded without having any loop.

Fig. 2 Cascaded architecture.

This architecture is simple and less expensive. However, the time delay (latency) of this configuration would be higher comparatively. Ring architecture: As shown in Fig. 3, ring architecture is very similar to the cascaded architecture except that the loop is closed from last switch to first switch. Ethernet Switches dont support loops. Therefore, it is required to employ managed switches (i.e. those with a management processor inside) with the rapid spanning tree protocol (RSTP) (IEEE 802.1w). This protocol allows switches to detect loops and internally block messages from circulating in the loop and also allows reconfiguration of the network during communication network fault within subsecond. This architecture has potential to offers the better reliability because it facilitates n-1 redundancy i.e. IEDs can still communicate even if any one of the ring connections and/or ESW fails. However, this architecture is costly and complex, and does not improve any network latency.

Fig. 1 Functional hierarchy of IEC 61850 based SAS.

Process level: This level includes switchyard equipments such as CTs / VTs, Remote I/O, actuators, etc. Bay level: Bay level includes protection and control IEDs of different bays. Station level: The functions requiring data from more than one bay are implemented at this level. Process bus: This facilitates the time critical communication between protection and control IED to the process (the primary equipment in the substation), such as sampled values, binary status signals or binary control signals. Station bus: It facilitates communication between station level and bay level. It also allows communication among different bays. B. Practical Ethernet Communications Architectures The basic Ethernet switched architectures include

Fig. 3 Ring architecture.

Star-ring architecture: In star-ring LAN architecture as shown in Fig. 4, each bay level Ethernet switch is connected directly to two redundant

main Ethernet switches. Both these main Ethernet switches are connected in ring. This provides higher redundancy as well as low latency; however, this requires two additional switches to arrange the network in star-ring configuration.

IV. RELIABILITY AND AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS OF IEC 61850 COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURES The method to calculate reliability and availability of substation communication architectures has been carried out considering a typical transmission substation in this paper. However, this method is general and can be applied to any power substation. A. Typical Substation under Study Fig. 6 shows IEC 61850 classified T1-1 substation layout [2]. This is 220/132 kV small substation with single bus.

Fig. 4 Star-ring architecture.

Redundant-ring architecture: Fig. 5 shows the redundant-ring architecture, which provides two completely redundant rings. Further, both these rings are connected again in ring of four main Ethernet switches. This kind of architecture provides complete redundant ring network with medium latency. However, this architecture requires many managed Ethernet switches with rapid spanning tree protocol (IEEE 802.1w). Moreover, all the IEDs have to have two Ethernet ports which will again increase the cost. Hence, this network provides highest reliability, on the other hand, suffers from high cost and complexity.

Fig. 6 T1-1 small transmission substation layout

Fig. 5 Redundant-ring architecture.

All these practical architectures have been considered for the reliability and availability analysis in this paper. C. Time Synchronization Architecture IEC 61850-9 proposes digitization of current and voltage transformers (CTs/VTs) output at the switchyard (into the MUs) and communicating these sampled values to bay level IEDs through process bus. This stream of sampled values should be synchronized so that the protection function can utilize many such signal streams from independent MUs from various manufacturers. IEC 61850 proposes the implementation of time synchronization on LAN using simple network time protocol (SNTP). However, SNTP is able to provide an accuracy of about 1 ms, which is not sufficient for raw data sampled values. One of the solutions is to use IRIGB synchronization signal in compliance with IEEE 1588 [12]. Next revision of IEC 61850 standard may include IEEE 1588 based time synchronization in order to achieve accuracy in the range of 1 s. Hence, external time synchronization source connected to MUs is considered for reliability calculations in all the architectures.

The IED configuration for T1-1 substation is tabulated in Table-I. There are total 5 bays, three line bay, one for transformer and one for bus. It has been considered that each bay has redundant (main-1 and main-2) protection IEDs, whereas, according to current practice bay control IED is nonredundant. Due to the function allocation flexibility proposed by IEC 61850, control IED may be required even for bus bay control functions related to any breaker. The numbers of MU are determined based on CTs/VTs, and remote I/O connections. Two MUs are considered for the bus and transformer bays, as both the bays require AC signals from 2 to 3 sets of CTs/VTs. Whereas, feeder bay will require only one MU.
TABLE I IED CONFIGURATION FOR T1-1 SUBSTATION

Bay Name Line-1 XFMR-1 Bus-1 Line-2 Line-3

Prot. IED 2 2 2 2 2

Cnt. IED 1 1 1 1 1

MU 1 2 2 1 1

B. Reliability and Availability Calculations The reliability and availability calculations using reliability block diagram (RBD) method have been explained in Appendix. Although, reliability analysis using other methods such as fault tree, cut set and path set, etc. have different formal presentations, they all may give the same results as RBD [13]. For qualitative and quantitative analyses, RBD is more preferable and easy to understand, and hence it is used for this paper. For simplicity, reliability has been represented as MTTF in this paper. The MTTF values for reliability calculations are considered from references [4, 7] and are tabulated in Table-II. The basic assumption is that the failure modes are independent from each other. Generally, the MTTF value of the communication links is comparatively higher enough, and hence it is not considered for the calculation [8, 9, 10, 11]. The MTTF of Further, using MTTR of 8 hours from the reference [7], availability of individual components has been calculated as shown in Table-II.
TABLE II MTTF CONSIDERED FOR EACH SAS COMPONENTS

Reliability block diagram for the star topology of the line bays is shown in Fig. 8. As stated earlier, all the bays have redundant protections, hence, both the protection IEDs are shown in parallel. Further, in addition to protection IEDs, all other bay components such as time synchronization, merging unit, control IED, and Ethernet switch must work successfully. Therefore, all these components are connected in series with parallel protection IEDs.

Fig. 8 RBD for the line bays.

The MTTF and availability values for the RBD in Fig. 8 can be calculated using series-parallel combination of the components (as explained in Appendix).
MTTF ' prot = 225 years

A' prot = 0.9999999 With these values, MTTF and availability of line bays can be calculated as follows:
MTTFline = 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + MTTFTS MTTFMU MTTFCnt MTTFESW MTTF ' prot

MTTF Availability (in years) Prot. IED 150 0.999993912 Cnt. IED 150 0.999993912 MU 150 0.999993912 Ethernet Switch 50 0.999981735 TS 150 0.999993912 Using these tabulated individual component values, MTTF and availability has been calculated for intra-bay and inter-bay architectures in following subsections. C. MTTF and Availability for Intra-Bay Communication It is considered that each bay has a single Ethernet switch, and all bay IEDs are connected to the corresponding bay Ethernet switch. The significance of reliability and availability calculations for intra-bay communication is to find the availability of the communication components for a particular bay communication. Line bays Calculations: As all line bays have identical count of IEDs, the reliability and availability of all the line bays would be same. Hence, the common architecture for line bay is shown in Fig. 7. It can be seen that all the IEDs are connected to Ethernet switch with individual communication cable. This kind of configuration is referred to as star topology.

SAS component

MTTFline = 22.5 years

Aline = ATS AMU ACnt AESW A' prot

Aline = 0.9999634
XFMR-1 and Bus-1 bays calculations: Transformer-1 and bus-1 bays have two merging units which can have two separate time synchronization sources (as show in Fig. 9(a)) or both the merging units can be connected to single time synchronization source (as shown in Fig. 9(b)).

Fig. 9 Star architecture for XFMR-1 and Bus-1 bays

Reliability block diagram for Fig. 9 (a) would be same as for line bays, except there are two time synchronization sources and MUs in series as depicted in Fig. 10. Reliability block diagram for Fig. 9 (b) would be very similar to Fig. 10 except in the first block, there would be only one TS instead of two in series. Results for Fig. 9 (b) configuration are directly shown in summary Table-III.

Fig. 7 Star topology for the line bays.

Fig. 10 RBD for XFMR-1 and Bus-1 bays

Cascaded architecture: In cascaded architectures, all six Ethernet switches are connected in chain with open loop configuration as shown in Fig.11.

MTTF and availability for two series time synchronization sources and MUs are calculated using series combination of the components (as explained in Appendix).
MTTF 'TS = MTTF'MU = 75 years
A'TS = A'MU = 0.9999878
MTTFXFMR = 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + MTTF 'TS MTTF ' MU MTTFCnt MTTFESW MTTF ' prot
Fig. 11 Cascaded architecture.

MTTF XFMR = 19.57 years AXFMR = A'TS A' MU ACnt AESW A' prot

AXFMR = 0.9999513

Table-III summarizes the MTTF and availability for intrabay communication. It can be observed that transformer-1 and bus-1 bays have lower MTTF and availability as compare to line bays due to additional MU. However, reliability and availability improves if only one TS is used to synchronize both the MUs in a bay (as explained in Fig.9 (b)). To calculate reliability index for the worst condition, separate TS has been considered for the further analysis.
TABLE III MTTF AND AVAILABILITY OF INTRA-BAY COMMUNICATION

Reliability block diagram for cascaded architecture is shown in Fig. 12. It shows the reliability of the communication link between two extreme end (considering worst case scenario) protection or control IEDs. This diagram shows all the components are connected in series because in this architecture all the Ethernet network switches need to be working. In addition to that both protection IEDs with corresponding Ethernet switches will be connected in series.

Fig. 12 RBD for cascaded architecture.

Bay Name Line-1 Line-2 Line-3 XFMR-1 (separate TS) Bus-1 (separate TS) XFMR-1 (single TS) Bus-1 (single TS)

MTTF (years) 22.5

Availability 0.9999634

MTTF and availability can be obtained as follows:

MTTFcascaded = 8.82 years

Acascaded = 0.9999330
Ring architecture: In ring architecture, all six managed Ethernet switches are connected in a single loop as shown in Fig. 13.

17.307

0.9999513

19.57

0.9999573

D. MTTF and Availability for Inter-Bay Communication As explained in section-III, there are total four practical SAS communication architectures considered for the reliability and availability calculations of inter-bay communication. It is important to note that this section calculates the reliability and availability of any inter-bay communication link between any two IEDs. The significance of this analysis is to obtain the reliability and availability of the communication components for the inter-bay communication between any two bays. All the reliability block diagrams have been built considering one protection IED of one bay to the control IED of another bay. However, any two IEDs of different bay can also be considered for the calculation, and this would give the same results.

Fig. 13 Ring architecture.

The RBD of ring communication network would be different than cascaded architecture. As depicted in Fig. 14, instead of all four Ethernet switches in series, now only 3 out of 4 Ethernet switches are required for inter-bay communication. This n-1 redundancy is achieved with the implementation of RSTP into the managed Ethernet switches, which can reconfigure the communication network in case of any one switch and/or any one communication cable connection failure.

Fig. 14 RBD for ring architecture.

MTTF and availability of the ring architecture can be obtained as follows:

MTTFring = 12.17 years

Aring = 0.9999513
Star-ring architecture: As shown in Fig. 15, star-ring architecture requires two additional redundant Ethernet switches connected in ring. Both these Ethernet switches will be connected to the rest of the six switches in star configuration.

Fig. 15 Star-ring architecture.

Fig. 17 Redundant-ring architecture.

Fig. 16 shows the reliability diagram for star-ring architecture. As figure suggests, all bays Ethernet switches are connected directly to both main and redundant Ethernet switches. Hence, both Ethernet switches should be connected in parallel.

Reliability block diagram for redundant-ring architecture is shown in Fig. 18. It can be observed from the figure that all the IEDs are connected to two redundant Ethernet switches, hence, ESW components would be in parallel for both protection IEDs. Further, it can be observed that each IED is connected to two redundant ring configurations, and hence, both the ring configuration should be connected in parallel.

Fig. 16 RBD for star-ring architecture. Fig. 18 RBD for redundant-ring architecture.

Using calculations of the series-parallel combinations from the Appendix, MTTF and availability of star-ring architecture can be obtained as follows:
MTTFstar ring = 15 years

Astarring = 0.9999513
It can be observed from above values that star-ring architecture has improved MTTF but not availability with respect to ring architecture. This is due to the fact that the availability of 3-out-of-4 Ethernet switches and two parallel Ethernet switches are similar. Redundant-ring architecture: As shown in Fig. 17, all the SAS IEDs are connected to both redundant ring configurations. Further, these redundant rings are connected through four Ethernet switches connected again in ring architecture.

Calculating the series-parallel combinations from the Appendix, MTTF and availability of redundant ring architecture can be obtained as follows: MTTFredundant ring = 16.89 years

Aredundant ring = 0.9999878

Table-IV summarizes the MTTF and availability calculated values for all four practical architectures.
TABLE IV MTTF AND AVAILABILITY OF INTER-BAY COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURES

Communication Architecture Cascaded Ring Star-ring Redundant-ring

MTTF (years) 8.82 12.17 15 16.89

Availability 0.9999330 0.9999513 0.9999513 0.9999878

It can be observed from the Table-IV that cascaded architecture provides least MTTF (8.82 years) and availability (0.9999330), on the other hand, this configuration is least expensive and simple. Ring architecture improves the MTTF (12.17 years) and availability (0.9999513). However, ring architecture requires managed Ethernet switch with RSTP. Further, star-ring architecture provides higher MTTF (15 years) which is achieved by using two additional Ethernet switches. Finally, redundant-ring architecture has shown improvements in MTTF (16.89 years) and availability (0.9999878), but this architecture requires 8 additional switches for T1-1 small transmission substation, which may increase with size of the substation. It can be observed that the MTTF of ring architecture in reference [10] is 12.9 years which is comparable to the 12.17 years in this paper. However, the literature does not provide reliability and availability analysis for the more complex practical Ethernet architectures, such as star-ring and redundant ring proposed in reference [5]. V. CONCLUSION Several practical Ethernet architectures have been discussed for IEC 61850 based SAS from the reliability point of view. With the help of reliability block diagram techniques, MTTFs and availability has been calculated for intra-bay communications for T1-1 transmission substation. It has been found that the addition of merging unit with time synchronization source affects the MTTF and availability of the bay. Further, the reliability block diagrams has been demonstrated for practical Ethernet switch architectures, such as cascading, ring, star-ring, and redundant ring. The comparison among these architectures has been presented using MTTF, availability and additional component requirements. It has been found that star-ring and redundantring provide high reliability and availability as compare to cascaded and ring architecture. However, these architectures are costly and complex due to the fact that it requires additional Ethernet switches. In addition to the reliability, availability, it is recommended to consider network performance parameters, such as latency and throughput and cost for the selection of fit-to-purpose architecture. This paper addresses reliability and availability of the communication networks based on component failure modes. This work can be extended further by evaluating reliability of protection functions as well as considering catastrophic events which can affect large portion or the entire communication network. VI. APPENDIX Concepts of Reliability and Availability A. Reliability Functions One of the most extensively used reliability functions is failure rate function (t ) . Failure rate is the measure of the rate at which failure occurs. Fig. 19 shows the typical failure

rate function of electronic components, which is also referred to as bathtub curve [13].

Fig. 19 Typical failure rate function of SAS components

It can be observed from the Fig. 19 that during normal operation or useful life (region-II), the failure rate function remains constant. During region-I and III, failure rate is higher comparatively due to manufacturing errors and fatigue because of ageing respectively. This is true for most of the advanced power system protection devices which are based on electronic components. Hence, Poisson or exponential distribution is valid for the reliability and availability analysis of SAS components, as the failure rate remains constant during normal operating period (region-II) [7,13]. For exponential distribution, reliability function R(t) will be, Ri (t ) = e it (1)

Mean value for exponential distribution is designated as MTTF,

MTTFi = Ri (t )dt =
0

(2)

Availability of a component for a given MTTRi,

Ai = MTTFi MTTFi + MTTRi

(3)

B. MTTF and Availability using Reliability Block Diagram Reliability block diagram (RBD) shows the logical connections of functioning components needed to fulfill a specific system function. As shown in Fig. 20, for simple systems RBD is consists of components with series-parallel combinations.

Fig. 20 Reliability block diagram of a simple system

MTTF and availability calculations for series components: From the reliability point of view, the components are connected in series if they all must work for the successful functioning of the system or only one need to fail for the system failure as shown in Fig. 21.

[4] [5] [6] [7]

Fig. 21 Series system with two components

Reliability function of the series system, ( + ) t t t Rs (t ) = R1 (t ) R2 (t ) = e 1 e 2 = e 1 2 Hence, MTTF of the series system,
MTTFs = Rs (t )dt =
0

[8]

(4) (5)

[9] [10] [11] [12] [13]

1 + 2

MTTF1 MTTF2 MTTF1 + MTTF2

Availability of the series system, As = A1 A2

(6)

MTTF and availability calculations for parallel components: In contrast, the components are connected in parallel from the reliability point of view (as shown in Fig. 22), if only once needs to be working for successful functioning of the system or all must fail for the system failure,

K. P. Brand, V. Lohmann, W. Wimmer, Substation Automation Handbook, Utility Automation Consulting, 2003. IEEE PSRC Tech. Rep., Application consideration of IEC 61850/UCA2 for substation ethernet local area network communication for protection and control, July 2005 T. Skeie, S. Johannessen, and C. Brunner, Ethernet in Substation Automation, IEEE Control System Magazine, pp. 43-51, June 2002. B. Kasztenny, J. Whatley, E. A. Udren, J. Burger, D. Finney and M. Adamiak, Unanswered Questions about IEC 61850 - What Needs to Happen to Realize the Vision?, in Proc. 32nd Annual Western Protective Relay Conf., 2005. G.W. Scheer, and D. Dolezilek, Comparing the reliability of ethernet network topologies in substation control and monitoring netwrok, [Online]. Available: http://www.selgs.com/techpprs V.Skendzic, I. Ender, and G. Zweigle, IEC 61850-9-2 process bus and its impact on power system protection and control reliability, [Online]. Available: http://www.selinc.com/techpprs L.Andersson, K.P. Brand, C. Brunner, and W. Wimmer, Reliability investigations for SA communication architectures based on IEC 61850, in Proc. IEEE Power Tech., Aug. 2005. P. Zhang, L. Portillo, and M. Kezunovic, " Reliability and Component Importance Analysis of All-Digital Protection Systems, in Proc. IEEE Power System Conf. and Expo., pp. 1380-1387, 2006. IEEE Standard for Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems, IEEE -1588, 2003. R. O. Billinton, and R. N. Allan, Reliability Evaluations of Engineering Systems, 2nd ed., New York: Plenum Press, 1992.

VIII. BIOGRAPHIES
Mitalkumar G. Kanabar (S05) is currently pursuing his Ph.D. degree at Electrical and Computer Engineering Department at the University of Western Ontario, Canada. He received his B.E. degree from Birla Vishwakarma Mahaviddhyalaya, Gujarat, India, in 2003. He worked on design of large turn-key power plant projects at Larsen and Toubro Ltd., India from 2003-2004. He received his M.Tech from Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Bombay, India in 2007. His research area includes Power system Protection, Control, and Automation; Implementation of IEC 61850 based Substation Automation; Control and Automation for Distributed Generation, and MicroGrid. Tarlochan S. Sidhu (M90SM94F04) received the B.E. (Hons.) degree from the Punjabi University, Patiala, India, in 1979 and the M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada, in 1985 and 1989, respectively. He was with the Regional Computer Center, Chandigarh, India, Punjab State Electricity Board, India, and Bell-Northern Research Ltd., Ottawa, ON, Canada. From 1990 to 2002, he was with the Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Saskatchewan, where he was Professor and Graduate Chairman of the Department. Currently, he is Professor and Chair of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department at the University of Western Ontario, London. He is also the Hydro one Chair in Power Systems Engineering. His areas of research interest are power system protection, monitoring, control, and automation. Dr. Sidhu is a Fellow of the IEEE, a Fellow of the Institution of Engineers (India) and a Fellow of the Institution of Electrical Engineer (U.K.). He is also a Registered Professional Engineer in the Province of Ontario and a Chartered Engineer in the U.K.

Fig. 22 Parallel system with two components

For parallel systems with two components, R p (t ) = R1 (t ) + R2 (t ) R1 (t ) R2 (t )

( + ) t t t = e 1 +e 2 e 1 2 MTTF of the parallel system,
MTTF p = R p (t )dt =
0

(7)

1 + 2

(8)

= MTTF1 + MTTF2

MTTF1 MTTF2 MTTF1 + MTTF2

Availability of the parallel system,

A p = A1 + A2 A1 A2
VII. REFERENCES
[1] [2] [3]

(9)

T. S. Sidhu, P. K. Gangadharan, Control and Automation of Power System Substation using IEC 61850 Communication, in Proc. IEEE Control and Applications, pp.1331-1336, Aug. 2005. IEC Standard for Communication network and systems in substations, IEC 61850, 2003. L. Hossenlopp, Engineering perspective on IEC 61850, IEEE Power and Energy Mag., vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 45-50, Jun. 2007.