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No.

381 September 11, 2000

India as a World Power


Changing Washington’s Myopic Policy
by Victor M. Gobarev

Executive Summary

American interest in and concerns about India human rights record in Kashmir, or set other pre-
rose sharply after that country carried out under- conditions, for the U.S.-Indian relationship.
ground nuclear tests in May 1998. Clinton admin- Pursuing the current course may well extend the
istration officials belatedly acknowledged that impasse in relations to the point of irrevocably
developing a good working relationship with India “losing” India.
should be one of America’s top foreign policy pri- Mistakes in U.S. policy have contributed to
orities. President Clinton’s visit to South Asia in India’s drifting toward a Russia-India-China
March 2000 was an important symbolic step. nexus aimed at preventing U.S. global domina-
That initiative, however, does not constitute a tion. The likelihood of India’s participation in an
major breakthrough in relations between India anti-U.S. alliance will depend on what New Delhi
and the United States. Paying greater attention to thinks about American geopolitical designs
India, although long overdue, cannot by itself dra- toward India and its national security interests.
matically improve uneasy U.S.-Indian relations A long-range strategy needs to be based on
and turn India into a de facto strategic partner. Washington’s willingness to accept India’s world
The fundamental mistake made by U.S. leaders power status. That means accepting India into the
has been to underestimate India and its economic club of nuclear weapons states and enthusiastically
and military potential. How India uses its grow- endorsing New Delhi’s bid for permanent member-
ing power can either enhance or seriously under- ship in the UN Security Council. The main benefit
mine U.S. interests. Continued insistence by the to the United States of such a breakthrough in
United States that India liquidate its nuclear U.S.-Indian relations would be to prevent a dra-
arsenal will only cause major problems in rela- matic adverse change in the current global geopo-
tions between Washington and New Delhi. litical situation, which currently favors the United
Washington’s overemphasis on the prolifera- States. An assertive India could help stabilize the
tion issue illustrates the tendency of U.S. policy- Persian Gulf and Central Asian regions. Even more
makers to treat India as a potential adversary important, India could become a strategic coun-
rather than a potential friend. U.S. leaders should terweight to China and a crucial part of a stable
not insist on improvement in New Delhi’s balance of power in both East Asia and South Asia.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Victor M. Gobarev is an independent security policy analyst based in Washington, D.C. Previously, he was a schol-
ar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and George Washington University.
During the Bush gy from India and Pakistan to third
administration Introduction countries;
• to assist in resolving Indian-Pakistani
and the first President Clinton’s visit to India in late disputes that might provoke a regional
Clinton adminis- March 2000, the first visit by a U.S. president war;
tration, relations in 22 years, was long overdue. As Clinton • to preclude the nuclear capabilities of
himself admitted, India, the second most either India or Pakistan from falling
with India were populous country in the world, has never into the hands of anarchists and ideo-
largely ignored. been a major focus of U.S. foreign policy.1 logical extremists; and
Conventional wisdom attributes Washing- • to expand political, economic, and mil-
ton’s dismissive attitude to the fact that India itary ties with India and Pakistan in the
was seen as belonging to the opposing camp post–Cold War era.
during the Cold War. That explanation
seems insufficient. The United States always A series of steps toward rapprochement with
paid utmost attention to its relations with India followed. In addition, American inter-
the Soviet Union, the leader of that camp. est in India grew after it carried out under-
The main reason for the difference was that, ground nuclear tests in May 1998.
unlike India, the Soviet Union was consid-
ered dangerous. Such inattention to the
home of one-sixth of the planet’s population The Clinton Visit:
may be explained (but not justified) by the A Modest First Step
ferocity of the West-East confrontation that
consumed nearly all of America’s significant The visit of President Clinton was an
national security and foreign policy interests. important move in implementing the admin-
However, it is much more difficult to istration’s more engaged policy toward India.
explain why the end of the Cold War did not The Clinton administration acknowledged
produce much change in U.S. policy toward that a good working relationship, perhaps
India. During the Bush administration and even a strategic partnership, with India should
the first Clinton administration, relations be a U.S. priority. President Clinton proceeded
with India were largely ignored. (President cautiously and diplomatically during the visit,
Clinton took months even to name an carefully choosing his words in a country wary
ambassador to New Delhi.) India was not of lectures. Those Americans who argued that
considered a potential threat (or even a seri- he should have been blunt, for example on
ous geopolitical player) as opposed, for exam- human rights violations by the Indian army
ple, to neighboring China. Thus, China was and security forces in Kashmir, were wrong.3
engaged, whereas India was almost forgotten. Such an approach would have worsened U.S.-
The situation finally began to change dur- Indian relations and not helped the human
ing the second Clinton administration. For rights situation in Kashmir.
the first time, a comprehensive U.S. strategy During his visit, Clinton also reaffirmed
toward the South Asian giant, although still U.S. support of democracy in South Asia, and
lacking some essential features, was formu- his remarks clearly favored India over
lated. The strategy was based on “A New U.S. Washington’s long-time ally Pakistan. As the
Policy toward India and Pakistan,” a report Washington Post put it, “The Cold War strategic
prepared by a group of independent ana- alliance with the United States is over, and
lysts.2 U.S. strategic goals in the region were Pakistan must move to restore democracy and
determined to be the following: control terrorism in Kashmir or fend for itself
in its mounting confrontation with India.”4
• to deter a regional nuclear arms race; Although there were important discus-
• to restrict exports of nuclear technolo- sions on nuclear nonproliferation, the main

2
result of President Clinton’s visit was most able indeed.”9 That wishful thinking has not
evident in another field. He and Indian prime materialized: India refused even to discuss
minister A. B. Vajpayee agreed to start an the Kashmir matter, not to mention to
“institutional dialogue” between their coun- reduce its forces there.
tries, including “regular” summit meetings.5
Such a dialogue, if taken seriously, could
begin much-needed changes in U.S. policy The Need for Bolder Steps
toward India.
In general, Clinton’s visit to India was a Both critics and supporters of President
step toward a closer relationship between the Clinton’s performance in India have failed to
two countries. However, the visit was not a see the main point: even paying greater atten-
major breakthrough. Notably, the principal tion to India cannot dramatically improve
U.S. goal of the visit—getting concessions uneasy U.S.-Indian relations and turn India
from New Delhi on the issue of nuclear prolif- into a de facto strategic partner. The princi-
eration—was not achieved. The vast differ- pal reason is that American policy is still
ences on the issue were clearly reflected in the based on fundamentally wrong assessments
“vision statement,” the main document of India and its place in the world and of
signed during the visit: “The United States what India can contribute to stabilizing
American policy
believes India should forgo nuclear weapons. Asia’s security environment. U.S. leaders nei- is based on
India believes that it needs to maintain a cred- ther appreciate the importance of the inter- fundamentally
ible minimum nuclear deterrent in keeping ests at stake in relations with India nor
with its own assessment of its security needs.”6 understand how to set priorities for U.S. wrong assess-
The failure to persuade India to abolish its interests and goals. The United States still ments of India’s
nuclear weapons program drew attention sees India as a Third World, poverty-stricken
and some criticism from Congress, including giant that would profit from closer coopera-
place in the world
the Senate Republican leadership, and from tion with America but would be unlikely to and of what India
such politically diverse newspapers as the give something valuable in return. More per- can contribute
Washington Times and the Washington Post. The ceptive policy experts understand that India
Times stated that “Mr. Clinton failed to is already a heavyweight in South Asia and to stabilizing
achieve the major goal of his trip to India— can help guarantee stability and prosperity in Asia’s security
convincing the world’s most populous Asia as a whole. But even most of those environment.
democracy to forgo nuclear weapons. . . . The experts fail to see that India is an emerging
president fell short on each of the specific world power with an influence felt far from
objectives he laid out—persuading India to Asian shores.
ban the production of fissile materials, tight- Current American national security inter-
en export control, and embrace the ests with India, such as deterring a nuclear
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.”7 arms race in South Asia and restricting
The Post was less critical, while noting that exports of nuclear technology, are no doubt
Clinton had moderated his plea on the noble. But is it productive to treat the deci-
nuclear arms issue with praise for India. The sion by the world’s largest democracy to
Post admitted that Prime Minister Vajpayee develop nuclear weapons the same way we
“was unmoved” by Clinton’s call for nuclear treat pariah states’ nuclear ambitions? Is
arms cutbacks.8 The New York Times tended pressuring India to forgo nuclear weapons
to see only positive results of the visit, stating, our best option?
“If Mr. Clinton can coax India and Pakistan The United States considers India neither
to consider reciprocal steps to ease tensions— a serious adversary (despite its nuclear
a reduction in Indian forces in Kashmir in weapons) nor a serious ally. The mounting
return for a cutoff of Pakistani aid to the evidence of India’s rapid growth in virtually
rebels—the visit this week will have been valu- every major field has not yet been properly

3
assessed. We fail to see India’s enormous 1998, where Qian Qichen, China’s vice pre-
potential and its growing ability to affect, mier, told India’s foreign secretary that
either positively or negatively, U.S. foreign “China and India can make important con-
policy and national security interests. As a tributions in giving shape to a multi-polar
result, U.S. policy goals are not always wisely system.”1 1 India’s foreign minister Jaswant
determined. If we want India as an informal Singh and commerce minister Murasoli
strategic partner in the 21st century, the over- Maran visited China in June 1999 and
all approach of U.S. strategy toward India February 2000; however, the breakthrough in
needs to be changed. Only a real policy revo- the strategic convergence of India and China
lution—a genuine recognition of India’s seems to have occurred during a weeklong
world power status and corresponding for- visit to Beijing by India’s president Kocheril
eign policy moves on Washington’s part—will Raman Narayanan (who publicly made high-
bring success. ly critical remarks to President Clinton dur-
ing his visit to India) in June 2000. Warmly
received, Narayanan repeatedly discussed
Worrisome Signs of a with his Chinese counterpart, Jiang Zemin,
Russia-India-China Axis one of the main problems both countries
appeared to be facing: the ongoing creation
A more nuanced and realistic policy of a U.S.-dominated unipolar world. As Jiang
toward India will not be sufficient; it is too noted during the talks, “Taking into account
late for that. Other nations are likely to be the problems of the highest strategic level, we
one step ahead in developing their relations by all means must continue to build the con-
with India. Signs of an emerging Russia- structive partnership in the 21st century.”1 2
India-China strategic alliance with an unmis- Since Russian president Vladimir Putin is
takably anti-U.S. bias are causing growing scheduled to visit both India and China later
concerns in U.S. policy circles. The proposal this year, some Indian media note that,
to form that triangular alliance was formally “despite initial caution concerning the
put forward for the first time by Russian prospects on successful cooperation between
prime minister Yevgeny Primakov during his Russia, India, and China (the creation of the
visit to India in December 1998. Two pillars ‘triangle,’ in the words of the former Premier
of such a triangle already existed by that time: Evgeny Primakov), the activities in this direc-
If we want India the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership tion are being developed with increased
and the Russian-Indian strategic coopera- intensity.”1 3 The backbone of this three-
as an informal tion. The historically uneasy Chinese-Indian country cooperation is its military-technical
strategic partner relationship began to change in the second collaboration. India and China, the two
half of 1998 and throughout 1999, when biggest buyers of Russian military hardware,
in the 21st centu- both countries (as well as Russia) saw an account for 60 percent of current Russian
ry, the overall increasing threat coming from the perceived weapons exports. Indian defense minister
approach of U.S. U.S. bid for global hegemony. The U.S.-led air George Fernandes returned from Russia at
campaign against Yugoslavia and the U.S.- the end of June after completing prepara-
strategy toward British air attacks on Iraq were crucial cat- tions for signing a $400 million deal to sup-
India needs to be alytic events. As Jasjit Singh, a leading Indian ply India with 100 of the most advanced T-90
analyst, wrote, “Ironically, it may finally be main battle tanks and the license for produc-
changed. the NATO policies that may help create a ing another 200 tanks in India. Fernandes
more cooperative relationship between also said that the decision on acquiring the
China and India.”1 0 Kiev-class aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov
The past two years have witnessed dra- for the Indian navy would be made soon,
matic improvement in Sino-Indian relations. probably during Putin’s visit. Fernandes also
Joint working groups met in Beijing in April reviewed progress on constructing Krivak-

4
class modern frigates and submarines for the war), several steps behind Washington’s Would it not be
Indian navy at St. Petersburg shipyards.1 4 Western allies, and many steps behind easier for the
The Indian government and independent Russia. Therefore, if expansion of U.S. politi-
analysts also took notice of the new Russian cal, economic, and military ties with India United States to
national security doctrine adopted in April continues at its current slow pace, there is lit- deflect democrat-
2000 that mandates closer strategic ties with tle chance of developing close ties with that
India and China. As the Hindustan Times put country. For radical change to occur in U.S.
ic India rather
it, some “sections of the document say that policy, policymakers and academics need to than authoritari-
Moscow will take steps to increase strategic discuss not only America’s behavior toward an China from
cooperation with Asian countries, namely India but also America’s overall behavior in
India and China, to counter the growing ten- the international arena. Those discussions a prospective
dency toward a ‘monopolar’ world led by the could increase the number of options for anti-American
United States.”15 U.S. foreign policy toward India.
alliance?
Concerns that a Russia-India-China
alliance would have negative consequences
for the United States can be heard in India’s Rise as a
Congress, the administration, and the for- World Power
eign policy community. It is not coincidental
that some senators ask questions about the Making U.S. relations with India truly ben-
likelihood of India’s cooperating strategically eficial to America will require political wis-
with Russia and China in ways that could be dom, courage, and vision. Wisdom is needed
detrimental to U.S. interests. For example, because for many in the American foreign pol-
Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.), chairman of icy community it is hard to comprehend that
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s building good relations with India, often an
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South uncomfortable partner because of its non-
Asian Affairs, wondered whether the Indians Western culture, is more important for
would “engage more with Russia for strategic America over the long term than are relations
weapons technology.”1 6 At the same hearing, with many of Washington’s current allies.
Stephen P. Cohen of the Brookings Institution Courage is needed because Washington
acknowledged, “In fact, some Indians are should abandon numerous stereotypes and
contemplating an alliance with China to shibboleths—for example, the long-standing
keep the superpower hegemon out of Asia.”1 7 U.S. opposition to any expansion of the
In part because of worries about the evolving nuclear club. Vision is needed because the U.S.
triangular alliance, U.S. officials engage political establishment must look beyond
China and work hard to make sure America’s immediate and near-term concerns
Washington’s relations with Russia remain to consider its long-term foreign policy and
at least manageable. Why do we not engage national security strategy for India—and how
India with the same vigor? Would it not be that component fits into America’s overall
easier for the United States to deflect demo- security strategy.
cratic India rather than authoritarian China
from a prospective anti-American alliance? The Need for a Long-Term Perspective
Many of Washington’s allies have developed It is impossible to achieve a dramatic break-
diversified, profitable relations with India. through in relations with India if the adminis-
Israel, an especially close U.S. ally, has long tration and Congress continue to pay most of
cooperated with India against threats posed their attention to what can be accomplished
by Islamic countries. only in the short term. Kosovo and Bosnia
Indeed, in relations with India the United may look like pressing issues at the moment,
States is a step behind China (despite past but they are hardly the places where impor-
Indo-Chinese confrontations, including tant U.S. national interests reside. By contrast,

5
India does not seem to be a top priority for in 1998.1 9 India is still a poor country, espe-
U.S. foreign policymakers, even after recent cially as measured on the basis of per capita
nuclear tests and Clinton’s visit. GDP, but is clearly becoming a significant
With one of the largest economies on the economic player. That reflects strong moves
planet, one-fifth of the world’s population, since 1991 toward economic liberalization.2 0
booming high-tech sectors, a credible nuclear
arsenal, long-range strategic missiles, a India’s Potential Wide-Ranging
sophisticated space program, and a high-tech Contribution
conventional military, India will be a major Key U.S. foreign policy goals include eco-
factor in global affairs in 10 or 20 years. If nomic globalization, advancing liberal and
India is neglected (or antagonized) by democratic values, and maximizing the num-
America, will it join an anti-American ber of friendly countries. There will be a sig-
alliance with an assertive, expansionist China nificant gap in economic globalization and
and, possibly, an unpredictable Russia? (If political cooperation if India does not parti-
that turned out to be the case, part of the cipate. Also, depending on the status of U.S.-
blame would rest on current U.S. political Indian relations, India can be either an influ-
leaders who have failed to see the importance ential proponent or a formidable opponent
By 2025 India’s of India’s becoming a major world player and of U.S.-led globalization efforts. The health
GDP is expected the necessity for the United States to treat of the American economy in an era of global-
to pass those of India as such.) Having India, a global power ization will increasingly depend on trade and
with democratic values and institutions, as a financial relations with overseas markets.
Germany and U.S. de facto strategic partner is in America’s India’s market, potentially the second largest
France, making best interests. In fact, it should be one of in the world, presents American companies
America’s main national interests, although with invaluable opportunities. India has a
India the most U.S. policymakers have not grasped vast reservoir of cheap labor, numerous min-
fourth-largest that yet. Such disinterest is puzzling, since eral resources, and a growing commitment to
economic power. International Monetary Fund data are a free-market economy. If overall U.S.-Indian
already telling astonishing things about economic relations were improved (which
India. In 1999 India had a per capita gross would mean decreased Indian tariffs), all of
domestic product of only $1,720—substan- those factors would lead to a manifold
tially behind even China, at $3,600. But given increase in American investments in and
India’s enormous population, IMF calcula- exports to India.
tions indicate that by 2006 the country will At present, U.S. companies are happy with
likely have a larger GDP than will either Italy their mushrooming economic stakes in
or Britain. If recent growth rates persist, by China. But if the United States and China
2025 India’s GDP is expected to pass those of reach a point of confrontation (which cannot
Germany and France.18 That would make be ruled out), reliance on such ties with
India the fourth-largest economic power, China could backfire. American firms might
behind only the United States, Japan, and be wise to consider investing more in India,
China. which has many of the same favorable busi-
But one need not wait 10 or 20 years to ness conditions that China has (including a
realize how important it is for the United large, inexpensive workforce) but offers a
States to steer its India policy in the direction safer political environment for doing busi-
of closer cooperation. India’s economy, ness and making investments. Indian busi-
although still relatively modest in size, has ness leaders are ready to expand their ties
made noticeable progress since the early with American partners and seem a little puz-
1990s. Moreover, the rate of growth has been zled at “the slowness here of usually quick
accelerating, from a rather anemic 1.3 percent Americans.”2 1Already an emerging high-tech
in 1991 to 4.8 percent in 1994 to 6.7 percent economic power, India has the potential to

6
become within a decade a world leader in Moscow that occurred in the 1990s and draw
many fields of computer and information the country into the Western camp. But
technology. The U.S. government should do India, with its rapidly developing nuclear and
nothing that interferes with the ability of missile programs, has the potential to coun-
American businesses to forge strong eco- terbalance possible Chinese aggressive moves
nomic links with such a country. in Asia. India’s cooperation with Japan,
With regard to liberal and democratic val- whose political, economic, and military rela-
ues, America can be proud of its role in the tions (including combined naval exercises)
fall of communism in the Soviet Union and with India are already well developed, would
Eastern Europe. Making India, a country be possible. Even possessing strong conven-
three times as populous as all the countries tional capabilities, Japan is unlikely on its
that emerged from the Soviet empire taken own to be able to deter China in the region.
together, a friend of the United States would Moreover, the U.S.-Japanese military alliance
be another significant achievement. Turning (directed largely against China) requires far
this nuclear-armed giant into an adversary of too heavy U.S. involvement and creates direct
the United States would severely weaken risk exposure for the United States. There
American positions not only in Asia but also should be better solutions. Encouraging
in the rest of the world. Conversely, making India to play a more active security role could
India an informal strategic partner would be the best solution.
enormously strengthen them. India’s growing naval power and the
India bears directly on several important sharply increased activities of the Indian navy
U.S. national security interests. For example, in the South China Sea this year are strong
India’s joining ranks with China and possibly indicators that the country is determined to
Russia in an anti-U.S. alliance would be a dis- assert itself as an Asian power and a serious
aster for America’s global position, since over player in Asian geopolitics. As Fernandes put
time U.S. and NATO military dominance will it in April 2000: “The Indian Navy has a
erode. No one can predict how a confronta- responsibility that goes beyond protecting
tion between the U.S.-led West and nations our borders. . . . The Indian Navy’s interests
accounting for half of the planet’s popula- lie from north of the Arabian Sea to the
India’s growing
tion would end. But the dangers flowing South China Sea.” He added that Japan and naval power and
from such bipolar rivalry would be consider- Vietnam are emerging as India’s strategic the increased
able, and in contrast with the Cold War, this partners for countering piracy from the
time the Western powers might not prevail— Indian waters to the South China Sea.2 2 activities of the
much less prevail without a catastrophic war. China, which claims large portions of the Indian navy in
South China Sea and sees it as vital to its
India and Regional Security national security interests, has been nervous
the South China
Even within the Asian region, it is getting about another geopolitical player arriving Sea are strong
hard for the United States to keep in check there. In response to the joint exercises of the indicators that
China’s aspirations, which often conflict Indian and the Vietnamese navies in the
with American interests. What country has South China Sea, a spokesman for the the country is
the potential to be a strategic counterweight Chinese embassy in Washington admonished determined to
if China turns aggressively expansionist? that any naval exercise “must not violate the assert itself in
Taiwan is a local player that may survive with sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
increased U.S. arms sales, but Taiwan would countries in the region.”23 The fact that the Asian geopolitics.
not be all that militarily relevant in a major Indian navy is cooperating more closely with
U.S.-Chinese confrontation. Russia would be Vietnam—the country that repelled the
still too weak to confront China in the fore- Chinese cross-border invasion in February
seeable future even if America managed to 1979 and clashed with China over the disput-
repair the damage to its own relations with ed Spratly islands in the South China Sea—

7
It is often difficult and collaborating with Japan, which is con- every member of the Indian elite, as well as
for the West to sidered a potential adversary by Beijing, are the rest of the population, it seems natural
developments that cause Beijing concern. that India be among the great powers.
comprehend the More important for the long term, India In a little more than 50 years since inde-
depth of India’s is successfully creating a blue-water navy that pendence, India has moved from a colony
would be able to project power far from with more than a thousand ethnic, religious,
determination to Indian shores. Ambitious projects include and linguistic groups to a viable, democratic
“restore” its getting from Russia at least one aircraft carri- country whose economy is now among the
status as a er, nuclear submarines with ballistic missile top 10 in the world. Its political and cultural
capabilities, and other warships with long- influence is felt throughout Asia and
premier power. range capabilities. China, which still possess- beyond. Its military arsenal includes numer-
es only a green-water, or coastal, navy but is ous conventional forces with modern arms,
working on getting deep-ocean operational medium-range missiles, satellites in orbit,
capabilities, is afraid of lagging behind India, and nuclear weapons.
which did not remove all ships from the
South China Sea after having completed the Regaining Great Power Status
anti-piracy exercise with Vietnam. With the For many people in India, including those
formally declared goal of patrolling its waters in the current government, India’s becoming
in search of pirates, India left four surface a great power is not only a widespread
warships, a submarine, and an air-reconnais- national desire and goal—it is a sacred mis-
sance aircraft in the area on a semipermanent sion. However, the desire to be a great power
basis.24 In fact, India could help counterbal- is not the type of obsessive mission that has
ance Chinese forces in the region if a strategic produced mass suffering in totalitarian
understanding between Washington and countries. Indians believe that their economy
New Delhi is reached and American encour- and their people should benefit from, not be
agement is provided. Indeed, depending on sacrificed to, India’s world power status.
the nature of U.S.-Indian relations, India Military clout means less to Indians than do
could be a geopolitical and military force for other indications of great power status;
America itself to reckon with in Central and Indians are not dreaming of conquering for-
South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Thus, it is eign territories. What they want is to guaran-
in America’s interests to keep India from tee by sufficient means, including nuclear
becoming a potential adversary, thereby weapons and ballistic missiles, that their
reducing the danger of a military confronta- unique civilization will make it to the sixth
tion. U.S. policy should aim to have India be millennium of its existence.2 5
the primary power in a region where so many Reestablishing and maintaining world
anti-American forces are concentrated. power status are long-term and unifying
goals for India. The disintegration of the
Soviet Union, where people spoke approxi-
India’s Global Aspirations mately 120 languages, was a disturbing
example to Indians, since theirs is a country
It is often difficult for the West to com- in which 40 major and about 600 minor lan-
prehend the depth of India’s determination guages are spoken. There is widespread senti-
to “restore” its status as a premier power. ment that everybody in India must cooperate
Indian civilization is some 5,000 years old, for the unity of the country.2 6
and, for most of that time, India was a great India has always approached the subject
power. For Indians, 200 years of colonial of security in its larger framework, beyond
dependency seem a minor episode, a brief, that implicit in defense strategy and military
albeit humbling, interruption in their overall forces. The concept of security has involved
move toward greater eminence. For virtually the presentation and the perpetuation of the

8
core values of the Indian nation state: democ- Those challenges appear to have been bet-
racy, a secular society, a federal polity, moral ter met by the Bharatiya Janata Party, which
and ethical principles, equal rights, and, last has presented the second alternative course
but not least, national strength and power.2 7 to great power status. After a series of parlia-
Those core values are enshrined in the Indian mentary and electoral struggles, Indian vot-
constitution (if not always practiced ers brought that nationalist party to power in
throughout the country). The strength of 1998. What does the emergence of this polit-
those values has provided the political ical force and its different strategy to restore
resilience and stability that many outside the India’s greatness mean for India and the rest
country find amazing in such a multination- of the world, including America?
al, multilingual, and multicultural entity. First, it means that Washington’s habit of
Every major political force in the country neglecting India is no longer a viable option.
supports India’s global aspirations, but We are witnessing the birth of a new Indian
Indians have been divided on how to restore national security and foreign policy. India
their country’s greatness. There have been two will demand respect for and an understand-
alternative courses taken in India to regain its ing of its legitimate security concerns—as it
world power status. The first course was taken sees them—and will be prepared to aggres-
by the Indian National Congress, led by the sively defend those national security inter- India will
Gandhis, the most powerful family in South ests. New Delhi is highly unlikely to bow demand respect
Asia. With the exception of minor intervals, under foreign pressure, no matter how for and an under-
the Gandhis ruled India from independence severe. Although India remains a secular
until the mid-1990s. country, Hinduism, the religion of a signifi- standing of its
Under the Gandhis India achieved some cant majority of Indians, will play an increas- legitimate securi-
successes in restoring its former eminence. ingly greater role under a BJP regime.
Yet a set of complex geopolitical, economic, Policymakers in other countries who might
ty concerns—as it
and social challenges emerged to which the prefer to deal with the more pliable Gandhi sees them—and
Gandhi family and their supporters failed to government must now learn how to deal will be prepared
respond in a timely manner and to the satis- with the new nationalist government with its
faction of the nation’s elites. India’s modest more assertive posture in foreign policy. The to aggressively
economic achievements and peaceful policy BJP’s policy corresponds to the wishes of defend those
of nonalignment during the Cold War did hundreds of millions of Indians, many of
not transform the country into a world
interests.
whom value the opportunity for their coun-
power. Its most powerful ally, the Soviet try to become a major world power more
Union, collapsed, and the United States and highly than material achievements in their
other Western nations continued to see India personal lives. The Hindu religion, with
as, at best, a Third World giant and an emerg- which the BJP has been strongly associated,
ing regional power. As one prominent Indian helps them believe so.
scholar bitterly wrote: “Unfortunately, the The first major step taken by the new gov-
West tends to see national power through the ernment proved that India is serious about
distorted prism emphasizing the primacy of joining the ranks of world powers. Newsweek
military force—as in the antiquated ‘war as an noted just after the series of nuclear tests in
instrument of policy’ syndrome. There is thus 1998 that, “when Indian Prime Minister Atal
an excessive emphasis on military power; and Bihari Vajpayee said last week that his coun-
seen in the subcontinental framework alone, try’s bomb was no more than ‘the right of one
a completely distorted perspective emerges.”2 8 sixth of mankind,’ he plainly spoke for most
On the domestic front, economic gains and of his people.”2 9The Indian nation responded
breakthroughs in high technology did not to the nuclear tests with an outpouring of
result in improved living standards for the national pride. For a majority of Indians the
vast majority of the population. tests meant that the BJP government was

9
moving quickly toward a long-overdue tinues, coupled with the growing Indian
restoration of the country’s eminence. Indian economy and high-tech sector, India may
voters rewarded the BJP by handing the party have the following conventional military
a victory in the 1999 parliamentary elections. capabilities by approximately 2005–06:

Dramatic Surge in the Military Budget • Indian strategic power could be pro-
The BJP government also secured a 27 per- jected throughout the Indian Ocean
cent increase in India’s latest military budget. and neighboring waters of the Pacific
In terms of New Delhi’s intentions and future Ocean, such as the South China Sea, by
conventional military capabilities, the deploying several Russian-built advanced
increased spending has several implications: nuclear submarines with missile-
launching capabilities, two or even
• More aggressive defense of national three more aircraft carriers with
interests: India’s national security policy advanced Russian-made combat planes
is being shifted toward more aggressive on board, and other modern combat
defense of national interests, territorial ships.
integrity, and sovereignty independent • Ballistic missile capabilities (with con-
of what specific adversary the nation ventional warheads) may encompass
might have to confront. India would be the whole territory of Pakistan and
significantly less accommodating when Afghanistan, vital regions of China,
another power threatens its national Southeast Asia, the Middle East (to
security. Strategic defense will remain Turkey), former Soviet Central Asia,
India’s preference, but the focus may be and most of the Indian Ocean. The
shifted from “defensive defense” to operational tasks for those Indian bal-
“offensive defense”—meaning that pre- listic missile forces could be threefold:
ventive strikes against a perceived or real (1) to hit any important target in
aggressor could be launched before the Pakistan and most of China; (2) to hit
forces of that country would be able to any anti-Indian terrorist bases in the
invade Indian territory. Middle East, Central Asia, or Burma;
• Enhanced conventional military capa- and (3) to inflict impermissible losses
bilities: New Delhi wants its armed on the naval and the land forces of
forces to have the capability to repulse “outside powers” operating in the
by conventional means any attack by Middle East, Persian Gulf, Indian
The Indian not only an equal or inferior potential Ocean, South China Sea, Southeast
aggressor, such as Pakistan or interna- Asia, and other regions surrounding
nation responded tional Muslim radicals, but also a supe- India—in case of their attack on India.
to its nuclear tests rior force, such as China or even the • India’s military would secure even
with an outpour- United States. more superiority over Pakistan and a
• A larger military role in Asia: India is guaranteed victory in possible conflicts
ing of national actively asserting a larger military role with Pakistan or Pakistani-backed
pride. in Asia aimed at gradually squeezing Muslim guerrillas and make it impossi-
the forces of outside powers (the ble for China to achieve any meaning-
United States, China, Britain, Australia, ful success if it decided to invade India.
etc.) out of South Asia and the broad Such dominance could be achieved
oceanic areas surrounding India and its through acquisition and deployment
islands that are considered to be of vital of the following: advanced tank forces;
importance to its national security. modern artillery and tactical rockets;
sophisticated command and control
If the trend of larger military budgets con- systems as well as communications

10
and intelligence-gathering systems and by any means necessary. India’s national
with space-based components; new • Acquiring sufficient military and non- goals are
and upgraded aircraft; and a renewed military means to repel any aggressor.
arsenal of small arms, ammunition, In pursuit of that goal, India will main- extremely ambi-
and other military equipment. Many of tain strategic superiority over Pakistan, tious, but a
the required arms could come from gradually reach strategic parity with
Russia and to a lesser extent from China, and eventually achieve the
majority of them
France, Israel, and possibly Britain and means of inflicting impermissible loss- are likely to be
the United States. Many weapons sys- es on the United States should it attack achieved.
tems will be produced in India, either India.
by indigenous companies or under • Maintaining a minimal nuclear deter-
license agreements. rent despite any U.S. or international
pressure until the official members of
the nuclear weapons club agree to
India’s National Goals and National destroy their own nuclear weapons.
Security Interests
The BJP leadership is likely to pursue six Indians see the beginning of the 21st cen-
goals: tury as a breakthrough for their country.
India’s national goals are extremely ambi-
• Making India in this decade one of the tious, but a majority of them are likely to be
four world powers, with the United achieved.
States, China, and the European
Union. Specifically, the government How High Technology Serves National
will use India’s rising political, diplo- Security in India
matic, economic, military, and moral The favorable conditions under which
authority to achieve that goal and to India is striving for world power status are
get formal recognition of world power well described by the monthly intelligence
status, which would include India’s reports submitted to the Joint Intelligence
becoming a permanent member of the Committee of India. Those reports empha-
UN Security Council. size that India has the best scientific and tech-
• Asserting India’s independence while nical capability in the Third World, ranks
striving to build equal and mutually third in Asia in nuclear power, and seventh in
beneficial relations with the United the world in space technology. The reports
States. If Washington applies pressure also note that India plans to build a space-
on the country, New Delhi will try to craft that could be used about 100 times and
minimize the confrontation; if the launch a manned space mission early in this
United States continues to apply pres- century.30 India will not resume nuclear tests,
sure, Indian leaders are prepared to at least for a while. But the tests conducted in
strengthen strategic and defensive 1998 have given enough scientific informa-
cooperation with traditional allies tion for Indian specialists to improve the
(Russia) and possibly with new allies country’s nuclear weapons. India will contin-
(e.g., China). ue building an Inter-continental ballistic
• Maintaining the territorial integrity missile (ICBM) with a range of over 8,000
and unity of the country under any cir- kilometers and will likely achieve that goal
cumstances, which means few, if any, within a few years.31 Development of the
concessions on the Kashmir issue. polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) will be
• Preserving and defending the unique- accelerated and integrated with the reentry
ness of India’s civilization and culture technology already developed in India’s inter-
under any geopolitical circumstances mediate range ballistic missile, the Agni.

11
India is also working out new information planning to build and deploy a multiple
and communications policies. Representa- dual-use aerospace system (similar to the U.S.
tives from the armed forces must now be space shuttle) and is also interested in work-
included in any Indian delegation on infor- ing with the Russians on that project. The
mation and communications issues.3 2 A Defense Research and Development
thriving democracy with top-notch high-tech Laboratory is to work on the aerospace sys-
talent, minimum censorship of information tem between now and 2019.3 6 In addition,
technology, and widespread use of the India is working on and plans to launch its
English language, India is well placed to be a first manned spaceship in a few years, most
first-rate economic power in the 21st century. likely between 2006 and 2012.3 7
Also, India interacts with the Indian diaspora The most extensive military dual-use pro-
in the West to find solutions for integrating gram will develop, produce, and deploy new
information and related technologies into the generations of satellites. The first in the new
mainstream of life in India.3 3 series of earth-imaging satellites with
However, India’s most ambitious pro- advanced equipment Cartosat-1 will be
gram is space exploration. The country is launched in 2000.3 8 The satellite will give
poised to become the fourth space power of more information to the military than is
Indian booster the world after America, Russia, and China. available from Indian Remote Sensing
rockets are con- But with the deterioration of Russia’s space Satellites (IRS). IRS-6, a satellite similar to
siderably cheaper program and possible (albeit, mostly uncon- Cartosat-1, will be launched in 2002.3 9
firmed) Chinese failures in space, India could Nevertheless, both of these highly sophisti-
than U.S. launch- become, within this decade, the number-two cated satellites will not be used solely for mil-
ers. The service space power, behind only the United States. itary purposes. The Indian National Security
India plans to compete for foreign commer- Advisory Board calls for creation of space-
time of an average cial clients and has some advantages in that based high-resolution satellites to provide
Indian satellite is competition. For instance, Indian booster early warning so that the survivability of the
twice as long as rockets are considerably cheaper than U.S. nuclear arsenal and effective command, con-
launchers. The service time of an average trol communications, computing, and intel-
that of its Russian Indian satellite is twice as long as that of its ligence and information (C412) systems is
counterpart. Russian counterpart. Cooperation in space ensured.40 New space launching sites and
research, both commercial and academic, will other ground facilities will be created during
be expanded to France, the European Space the next two decades. The launching station
Agency, Russia, and other countries.3 4 The on Shriharikota Island (between Lake Pilicat
military component in India’s space efforts and the Bay of Bengal, 68 miles north of
will be increased, although not dramatically, Madras) recently got one more launching
and the Indian Space Research Organization pad and follow-up reconstruction is under
will pursue closer cooperation with the way. There are calls in India to prepare an
Indian armed forces and the Defense affordable long-term plan to build space-
Research and Development Organization. based surveillance assets, theater surveillance
The major goal in providing the military with unmanned air vehicles, stand-off plat-
with various satellite services for 2000–05 forms, stealth capacities, precision guidance
will be launching and maintaining more systems, and anti-missile defenses.41
advanced early warning and surveillance
satellites in order to prevent a repetition of
what happened during the intrusion of pro- India Will Not Give Up Its
Pakistan Islamic militants through the Line Nuclear Weapons Program
of Control in Jammu and Kashmir in 1999.
On that occasion, guerrillas penetrated For India, the nuclear arsenal is an integral
Indian-held territory unnoticed.35 India is part of world power status. Fortunately for

12
the rest of the world, India’s nuclear weapons sible hostile moves by the United States
program seems defensive. In his comments at toward India can be clearly discerned. To give
signing the vision statement, Prime Minister a recent example, President Narayanan visit-
Vajpayee confirmed that he had repeated in ed France in late April 2000. He and French
his private meeting with President Clinton prime minister Lionel Jospin agreed (in a
India’s commitment not to conduct further none-too-subtle reference to the United
nuclear explosive tests and not to be the first States) that a single superpower should not
to use nuclear weapons.4 2 He also added that dominate the world.
India’s nuclear program “has always been The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, con-
defensive in nature” and would remain so, but tinuing U.S. missile attacks on Iraq, and mis-
that the program is necessary.4 3 sile strikes on targets in Sudan and
American experts assume that India is Afghanistan have all served to reinforce
developing its nuclear program to check hos- India’s fears. It should be noticed that India
tile Pakistani (and possibly Chinese) ambi- considers not one but three foreign countries
tions. But there is much more to it than that. (Pakistan, China, and the United States) as
India is developing its “minimal” nuclear potential adversaries. The United States, the
deterrence for purposes that for the most most powerful and dangerous from India’s
part have little to do with Pakistan. India can perspective, has moved to the head of the list
successfully deter Pakistan, which is no of “priority” threats because of the U.S.-led
match for India’s military, by using its supe- military coercion of Serbia over Kosovo.4 5
riority in conventional forces. Thus, at its core, India’s determination to
New Delhi’s real goal is to have a suffi- keep its nuclear weapons until universal
cient arsenal to deter any aggressor, even the nuclear disarmament has little to do with
most powerful country in the world. The Pakistan, much to do with China, and every-
Indians do worry about a nuclear-armed thing to do with America. This Indian view
China. During President Clinton’s visit, may seem entirely unreasonable to most
Prime Minster Vajpayee said it was not “real- Americans. But if the United States wants to
istic” for India to give up its nuclear weapons dramatically improve relations with India, it
in the face of Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation cannot build them on false assumptions. The
and China’s nuclear might.4 4 But it is the United States must recognize that Indian
United States, with its global reach and supe- leaders (and much of the population) consid-
rior power, that India wants to deter. New er America the most serious potential foreign
Delhi is apprehensive about possible U.S. threat and that Washington cannot dismiss
plans to attack India. Primarily because of such Indian security concerns and conduct a The NATO
that uneasiness India will not give up its successful policy in South Asia. Many discus-
nuclear weapons program. That decision is sions held by the author throughout India bombing of
an unspoken truth that Indian officials never with various representatives of India’s politi- Yugoslavia, con-
publicly acknowledge in their talks with cal and military elites during the 1990s have tinuing U.S. mis-
American officials for two reasons: first, one thing in common: Indians still distrust
because of cultural habits Indians are not the United States and fear that one day they sile attacks on
accustomed to telling a foreigner something may be subject to an American attack. Iraq, and missile
that might be seen as an offense; and second, An examination of what Indian strategists
Indians do not want a public statement and the military think about U.S. global
strikes on targets
about a U.S. “threat” to ruin chances of plans, especially those regarding India, con- in Sudan and
improving U.S.-Indian relations. firms that point. According to India’s Afghanistan
Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies,
Fear of U.S. Power and Intentions the flagship of Indian national security have all served to
If one reads between the lines of Indian research, the United States is becoming reinforce India’s
public statements, apprehension about pos- increasingly bent on “coercive diplomacy”
fears.

13
Indians suspect and interventionism while shifting its main direct military ties with Pakistan, the United
that, despite sus- focus from Russia and Europe (since the fall States still has extensive security links with
of the Soviet Union) to a few key Third World that country, in particular in the area of spe-
pension of direct countries, including India. Indian national cial services cooperation. Singh noted that
military ties with security specialists interviewed by the author
in 1999–2000 have especially underlined that even professional serious studies pre-
Pakistan, the their predictions about such a trend in U.S. pared for the U.S. Congress fail to
United States still policy made just after the end of the Cold notice the existence of China [in
has extensive War are coming true. As far back as 1990, regard to India] or Indian security
Jasjit Singh wrote: concerns other than those related to
security links with Pakistan. Such distortions are even
that country. Two important factors will need to be welcomed by India’s smaller neigh-
borne in mind. Firstly, Western doc- bors who then claim sympathy and
trines are intended for application in even linkages of advantage with the
the Third World, where they expect a great powers for legitimate security
“broader range of challenges.” needs against the big “regional”
Secondly, Western strategies rely power. . . . In India, of course, people
heavily on “coercive diplomacy” and have found it difficult to understand
interventionism where technologies why other countries with core values
would offer greater opportunities similar to ours have preferred to sup-
with long-range “surgical strikes.” port those with contradictory value
U.S. strategists are worried that “a systems, at times with detrimental
Third World with three or four major and deleterious effect on our security
global military powers would con- environment. A very large number of
front American strategic planners examples could be cited.49
with a far more complicated environ-
ment.” And India in their calcula- India is organizing rather extensive,
tions, is one of those three or four.4 6 sophisticated intelligence operations for
gathering as much information as possible
Ten years later, those concerns have not dis- on U.S. military plans, actions, and pro-
appeared. To the contrary, they have grams. The Indians are well aware of the
increased since the BJP government has come achievements, scope, and sophistication of
to power.47 U.S. military programs. For example, the
Indian military planners on a strategic, extensive and mostly successful use of space
and often on an operational, level pay their in the U.S.-led interventions against
main attention not to Pakistani and Chinese Yugoslavia and Iraq has shown India that
strategies but to U.S. national security and satellites can secure domination of an attack-
military strategies, such as the “Airland ing side over a defending one.5 0
Battle 2000” and “Discriminate Deterrence.” Since the Kosovo conflict, Indian policy-
As Singh put it, “The realities of such doc- makers have come to believe that U.S. mis-
trines (besides reliance on nuclear weapons) siles and bombers, navigated from orbit by
and the technologies supporting them have satellites, may well threaten India. In India
to be taken note of not only because of the there are several “Kosovo-style” regions with
potential threat of great power intervention long-existing separatist movements: Jammu
(which has taken place in the past against and Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Mezoram,
India) but also its influence and impact on Tripur, and Tamilnad. So India’s ultimate
other countries, like Pakistan, with close mil- national security goal is to be ready for a U.S.
itary and strategic links with the USA.”4 8 attack with missile and bombing strikes;
Indians suspect that, despite suspension of however, India currently is not ready to

14
repulse even a mid-scale aerospace attack main problem in U.S.-Indian relations; more
conducted by a developed nation. Thus, for specifically, how can the United States con-
Indians the crucial matter is whether they vince Indians that it will never attack their
will they be able to prepare their air defense, country. Some Americans might say that it is
missile defense, and space component before absurd even to imagine a U.S. missile attack
a hostile power attacks them from the skies.5 1 against India. However, such a flat dismissal
The Indian military elite believes that with would be unwise. To Americans the notion of
no credible air defense against that threat the such an attack is absurd, but for India, it is a
only viable option for India is to develop a serious fear. If the United States is to dramat-
strategic deterrent capability of its own. ically improve relations with India, work
However, India may be willing to give up this must begin on alleviating India’s fears. It
program if ballistic missiles and nuclear could be done directly, at confidential talks
weapons can be eliminated universally.5 2 that would reassure Indians that they need
India’s military, including strategic analysis not fear the United States and that would
institutions and space-missile weapons devel- result in confidence-building measures. For
opers, has subjected NATO’s use of space in example, the following ideas for confidence-
Yugoslavia to scrupulous analysis. The prelim- building measures in the military could be
inary results: the U.S. military space system, considered: If the United
including point navigation, command and States is to
control, surveillance-intelligence, and com- • Implementation of regular U.S.-Indian dramatically
munications, is impressive but not infallible. consultations dealing with the military
Indians believe they are learning from the and security situation in the region. improve relations
actions of both sides in Yugoslavia, in particu- The goal would be to offer the respec- with India, work
lar how defenders can deceive an attacker’s tive governments suggestions on how
satellites and aircraft. Even guided missiles can to reduce troop levels and naval forces
must begin on
lock onto a false target.5 3 as well as tensions due to mispercep- alleviating India’s
Like the Chinese, the Indians are proac- tions on both sides. fears.
tive, continuing their priority missile and • Mutual advance warning for launching
space programs adopted before the ballistic missiles over the Indian
Yugoslavia conflict. However, there appear to Ocean.
have been two changes: first, demand is • Mutual advance information on large-
increasing for quality of resolution and other and mid-scale naval, air, and land exer-
characteristics of the new-generation Indian cises in South Asia, the Middle East,
satellites; second, since Kosovo the project and Southeast Asia.
for creating the Indian multiple aerospace • Mutual timely information on troops,
system seems to be receiving a boost.5 4 aircraft, and ship movement within
India is also concerned about U.S. plans and out of the “region of mutual con-
to develop a national missile defense (NMD). cern” (South Asia and surrounding
Indian military calculations show that nei- areas of the Middle East and East-
ther rogue countries nor India, even after Southeast Asia that are agreed to be
deploying an ICBM with a more than 8,000- included in the region of mutual con-
km range, would be able to seriously threaten cern).
U.S. territory for at least 30 years. The Indian
conclusion is that NMD is part of a U.S. Other countries of the region and world
strategy to escape retaliation after a first powers active in the region could be persuad-
strike. (India has also noted that the United ed to participate in the above-described mea-
States and NATO have not repudiated the sures, thereby further decreasing regional
concept of a first nuclear strike.)5 5 tensions. Moreover, improving relations
That pervasive fear and mistrust is the could be done indirectly, through U.S. for-

15
eign policy initiatives proposed below. The Pakistan or its proxies that have unleashed
more a sense of partnership can develop, the hostilities, in both numerous border skir-
more an atmosphere of trust will grow. mishes and the large-scale wars fought
between India and Pakistan.
Kashmir as a “Hot-Button” Issue Also not appreciated in the West is the
India especially worries that the United cautious nature of India’s military strategy
States might use its vast military power to and tactics, as reflected in India’s campaigns
impose a solution to the Kashmir dispute. against Muslim guerrillas in Kashmir. When
Why are Indians so sensitive to the Kashmir the latter have made their incursions, such as
issue that they will not agree to either U.S. or the last big incursion in the Kargil area in
international mediation? Because multina- 1999, Indian forces have confined land bat-
tional India is afraid that it might follow the tles to the Indian-controlled part of the
fate of the multinational Soviet Union and region. Even the Indian air force’s operations
fall apart. Indian elites consider Jammu and outside of India’s air space have been rare and
Kashmir, the only Indian state where the limited to bombing Pakistani-backed guerril-
majority of the population is Muslim, to be las’ rear positions and reinforcements no
the weakest link in a Hindu-majority coun- more than a few miles inside Pakistan or
try. They fear, and with some reason, that Pakistani-controlled Kashmir territory.
should India be weakened, Kashmir would Indian air force officers bitterly told the
be the first territory lost. author that their combat aircraft would have
U.S. policymakers tend to forget that been able to prevent or eliminate at the out-
India was already humiliated over Kashmir in set many incursions by Muslim rebels had
1947; Pakistani troops pushed Indians off a the air force used “Israeli tactics” (i.e.,
large part of this restive region and ceded destroying guerrillas wherever they could be
some of the conquered territory to China. found, as exemplified by Israeli military oper-
Consequently, India now holds only 45 per- ations in Lebanon).
cent of Kashmiri territory, while China occu- Furthermore, although they were
pies 15 percent and Pakistan controls the reproached by Western media for repressive
rest. With their commitment to peace and measures in Kashmir and the resulting flow of
self-restraint, Indians got over that bitter Muslim refugees, Indians were surprised to
experience. India has not put forward any find almost no sympathy in the West for the
demands for Pakistan (or China) to return plight of Hindu and other non-Muslim popu-
the occupied territories. Even the current lations of Kashmir. Few people in America are
India worries that nationalistic BJP government does not claim aware that most of the Hindu population of
those lands. But it seems that the West, Jammu and Kashmir has been forced into
the United States including America, has not given New Delhi exile by a terror campaign conducted by
might use its vast much credit for such restraint. Pakistani and Pakistani-backed Muslim guerrillas who sys-
military power to international Muslim media have been very tematically kill non-Muslims for the purposes
adept at drawing the world’s attention to of “cleaning Kashmir from infidels.”5 6 In
impose a solution Indian repression of Muslim guerrilla sup- another part of the world, such tactics are
to the Kashmir porters, while Pakistan’s role in the conflict called “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing.”
goes largely unremarked. India, which had all All the above factors, especially the forced
dispute. of Kashmir at the time of the declaration of emigration of non-Muslims from Kashmir,
independence but now has only 45 percent, have made this region a “hot-button” issue
stubbornly resists outside pressure to vacate for India. It should be added that Kashmir is
the rest of the territory. also extremely important to India in geopoli-
It should be remembered that India has tics and geostrategy. First, possession of
never instigated incidents to disrupt the sta- Kashmir secures India’s stake in geopolitical-
tus quo in Kashmir. It has been either ly important Central Asia, where the former

16
Soviet Central Asia, western China, Pakistan, degree to which India’s political, economic, Washington’s
and Afghanistan—in addition to Kashmir— and military potential can either enhance or willingness to
are also located. Second, preserving control seriously undermine U.S. position in the
of Kashmir enables India to mount a reliable world. Because of that underestimation, no tread carefully
defense of its extensive northern border. solid, long-term strategy seems to have been around the
Third, Kashmir is even more strategically worked out for developing U.S. relations with
crucial in case of foreign invasion: should the India. The Clinton foreign policy team’s
Kashmir issue
region be lost, its mountainous areas located strategy toward India is too modest in its is extremely
far above New Delhi and other important ambitions, too narrowly focused in its scope, important for
population centers would provide excellent and too limited in its goals.
locations for adversaries to place missile- Treating India on an equal basis with improving the
launching positions and air bases.5 7 Fourth, Pakistan and looking at India only through U.S.-Indian
Kashmir has enormous mineral resources the prism of the Indian-Pakistani relationship
relationship.
that are yet to be determined and explored. are unrealistic. Washington cannot befriend
Fifth, the region is a hub of strategically and both archrivals; it must choose—and better
economically important transit routes going sooner than later. (President Clinton’s criti-
in both east-west and north-south directions. cism of the Pakistani military regime in his
India would strongly benefit from control- speech to India’s parliament was a step in the
ling that nexus—especially if the situation in right direction.) For the sake of preserving
the region were to become peaceful. good relations with Pakistan, some U.S. poli-
The United States should trust India’s cymakers pretend not to, or really do not,
commitment to democratic norms. However understand that Pakistan has been behind the
gradually and painfully for itself, India will Islamic rebels in Kashmir not only politically
likely resolve the Kashmir problem on its and ideologically but also militarily. Beyond
own. Washington’s willingness to tread care- that consideration, Pakistan is a midsize
fully around the Kashmir issue is extremely power with an authoritarian track record.
important for improving the U.S.-Indian India is a democratic, rapidly emerging great
relationship. Washington needs to make it power. Relations with India should clearly
clear to India that the United States will not take precedence over those with Pakistan.
look at the India-Kashmir problem as it has America’s opinion makers neglect India
looked at the Serbia-Kosovo conflict. most of the time. Just a month after
Otherwise, America and India will never President Clinton’s visit to that country,
improve their relationship. American newspapers recall India only on
occasion, such as when tensions flare up over
Kashmir. Indeed, the president’s visit itself
An Impasse in might not have taken place had it not been
U.S.-Indian Relations for India’s becoming a nuclear power.
Except for diplomatic niceties expressed
The United States has been “losing” India during official visits, the United States does
since that country became independent. not really accept India’s world power status
Despite President Clinton’s visit in March 2000, and New Delhi’s insistence on a voice in glob-
that trend is likely to continue if not corrected al affairs. Instead, U.S. officials treat India as
by strong foreign policy moves. If the trend is a regional power only.
not reversed in the near future, Americans may Insisting that India dismantle its nuclear
soon be asking who lost India. weapons program is a critical mistake of U.S.
policy. That goal is “mission impossible” for
Mistakes Have Been Made this or any future U.S. administration.
The fundamental mistake made by Because of myriad factors vitally important
Washington has been to underestimate the to India and its national security, that coun-

17
try will never give up its nuclear weapons nuclear deterrent, not simply an air
unless all nuclear powers, including America, deliverable and a missile deliverable
agree on a complete ban of nuclear weapons. capability but to build submarines
Demanding that India liquidate its nuclear and put missiles on the submarines,
arsenal unilaterally will merely cause further which has grave implications for
problems in the U.S.-Indian relationship. America, because a submarine possi-
bly could reach the United States. In
fact, a few Indian strategists have
Bankrupt Competing argued that they should be able to
Policy Options attack the United States just in a way
of demonstrating to the U.S. that we
It is apparent why the administration’s cannot intervene in their region any
policy has led to an impasse in U.S.-Indian more. . . . Some Indians have thought
relations. But alternative options that have it necessary to acquire a capability of
been put forward by some U.S. political keeping the U.S. . . . out of South
forces on the right and the left would pro- Asia.59
duce no better results. Some conservatives
Complaints about still cannot forgive India for perceived Cold Yet India’s nuclear program seems more
human rights War–era sins. The worst of those sins was defensive than aggressive. (A former Indian
abuses committed India’s friendship with the Soviets. (Even minister of defense termed India’s national
that belief is not entirely fair. Washington’s security strategy a “defensive defense.”)6 0India’s
by the Indian mil- shortsighted alliance with Pakistan gave desire to prepare an asymmetric answer to a
itary have some India little choice but to counter that move perceived American threat cannot really be con-
by tilting toward Moscow.) sidered a threat to America. Doing so would
justification, but Americans who still harbor a grudge equate India with rogue countries, and that
the question is against New Delhi embrace a policy that would be both unfair and a serious blunder.
whether U.S. would maintain a tough line toward India Treating India as a potential enemy would risk
and treat it as a potential adversary. Concerns creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.
punitive measures about the Indian missile programs have been Another policy option toward India is
would really regularly raised at congressional hearings. advanced especially by some in the
The hearing before the Subcommittee on Democratic Party. Their main point is that
make India more
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the the United States should insist on higher lib-
receptive to Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May eral and democratic standards for India as a
American goals. 1999 illustrates such concerns. In his testi- precondition for improving U.S.-Indian rela-
mony, Karl Inderfurth, assistant secretary of tions. Calls for more Indian openness to
state for South Asia, reported that the United globalization, in particular to American
States “regretted the decision last month exports, and for respecting human rights in
[April 1999] by India to test an extended Kashmir are often heard.6 1 Complaints
range version of the Agni ballistic missile. about human rights abuses committed by
While we have a much better understanding the Indian military certainly have some justi-
after eight rounds of dialog of what moti- fication, but the question is whether U.S.
vates India’s strategic thinking, our concern punitive measures would really make India
about further missile tests by India . . . more receptive to American goals. Such mea-
remains.”58 Answering senators’ questions sures are unlikely to do so. That does not
about India’s missile program at the same mean Americans should always placate India;
hearing, Cohen told about however, Americans should ask what the
United States’ overriding goal toward India
those [in the Indian government] who should be. If it is to make a strategic break-
would like to go to the sea for a Triad through in U.S.-Indian relations and turn

18
India into a strategic partner, then some security and defense strategies, the likelihood
accommodation is required. Besides, current of New Delhi’s participation in an anti-U.S.
U.S. policy options toward India, including alliance will depend almost entirely on how
the one pursued by the administration, are the Indian government assesses Washington’s
counterproductive. geopolitical designs toward India. Accordingly,
the less the United States engages India in dia-
A Russia-India-China Strategic Triangle logue and cooperation, the less New Delhi will
The mistakes of U.S. policy toward India trust U.S. policy toward India.
have contributed to India’s drifting toward Unfortunately, much U.S. policy toward
forming a Russia-India-China axis, which India—especially that portion mandated by
would be implicitly aimed at checking U.S. Congress—is dominated by the language of
power. The idea of a counterhegemonic sanctions. Some of the measures, including
quadrangle—Russia-India-China-Iran—is the ban on U.S. military aid and the develop-
also floated. Discussion about the latter idea, ment of U.S.-Indian military ties, have been
put forward by members of the Russian elite imposed since India’s nuclear tests in May
(including Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov, director 1998 and have yet to be canceled. Sanctions
of the International Military Cooperation might work with a small, weak country such
Directorate, Russian Ministry of Defense), is as Iraq (although the record is murky even in
still in an embryonic stage.6 2 But the propos- that case), but they will never work with a
al has already been well received by some gov- great nation such as India. What is worse,
ernment circles in India, China, and Iran, congressionally mandated sanctions will
because the creation of such a strategic quad- deteriorate U.S.-Indian relations and push
rangle would fit well with the goal of curbing India toward strategic alliances with anti-
U.S. hegemony embraced by all four pro- American goals. Advocates of sanctions
posed participants of a multipolar world. should remember that most target nations
In India, the related proposal of reformist have other options. For example, when
Iranian president Mohammad Khatami for Congress bars the U.S. military’s contacts
“the dialogue of civilizations” received an with its Indian colleagues, the latter
especially warm welcome.6 3 India, enjoying strengthens ties with the Russian and the
long-term cooperation with Russia and cur- Chinese militaries.
rently improving its relations with China, is America has long worked to undermine
starting to build ties with Iran too. The the Indian ballistic missile program as if it
Indians did not proceed with that initiative were as threatening to U.S. security as the
until the reformer Khatami came to power. North Korean program. That inflexible Much U.S. policy
There is a strong connection between the approach has resulted in three important
success of democratic change in Iran and consequences. First, India’s suspicions about toward India—
India’s attitude toward that nation. U.S. plans regarding India have increased. especially that
Yet, there is still no firm anti-American Indians see Washington’s opposition to their portion mandat-
alliance involving the four “quadrangle” coun- country’s missile program as an American
tries. Iran remains wary of the United States, attempt to leave India disarmed in the face of ed by Congress—
and China harbors fairly substantial anti- a possible U.S. missile attack.6 5 Second, U.S. is dominated by
American sentiment. For example, the mili- resistance to the Indian ballistic program’s
tary attaché office of the People’s Republic of development has inevitably drawn India clos-
the language of
China Embassy in Moscow stated that er to Russia and even China. Beijing has begun sanctions.
“America remains the main adversary of all to view the Indian program more as an anti-
peace-loving nations.”6 4 Postcommunist U.S. rather than an anti-China deterrent.6 6
Russia is still choosing its geopolitical stance. Third, with their considerable high-tech tal-
India is also considering various options. ents and resources, Indians are building ballis-
Given the defensive nature of India’s national tic missiles—including long-range missiles.

19
The most radical Washington’s policy has not only annoyed the India’s joining the nuclear club and ask all
move the United Indians; it has also been futile. other members of the club to do the same.
Despite long-standing U.S. resistance, The U.S. official statement on the matter
States could make India has acquired sophisticated Russian should be explicit. The statement should
for dramatic cryogenic engines for the first rocket stage. emphasize the defensive nature of India’s
At the insistence of the United States, Russia nuclear weapons program and the lack of any
improvement in stopped transferring the technology in May Indian offensive threat to other countries. An
its relations with 1992. The Russians may well have suc- explicit dividing line should be drawn
India would be to cumbed to Washington’s pressure, but that between democratic India and rogue coun-
did not stop the Indians. On receiving the tries whose weapons of mass destruction
unconditionally first-stage cryogenic engine in a complete (WMD) threaten the world. Moreover, it
accept India’s form, Indian scientists have been able to cre- should be specified that America’s formal
ate second- and third-stage cryogenic recognition of India’s nuclear status is an
nuclear status.
engines. 67 Those engines were successfully exception to Washington’s general opposi-
tested in March and April 2000, and Indians tion to proliferation.
believe that accomplishment should not be The justification for making an exception
lost on the United States if it possibly believes in India’s case should not be based on the
it can checkmate India’s space program by fact that India already has nuclear weapons,
persuading Russia not to transfer cryogenic since that justification could be used as an
technology. Turning out a final product is excuse by some so-called nuclear threshold
hardly beyond the ingenuity of the scientists rogue countries to justify their nuclear
of India’s Satellite Research Organization. weapons programs. Instead, the reasoning
should be based on the undeniable fact that
India is a stable democracy with a solid
The Winning Way: record of aversion to the use of military
Accept India’s power for aggression. The statement should
also emphasize that this well-deserved inter-
World Power Status national reputation, and the moral authority
A reactive policy toward India (e.g., New it garners, puts India beyond any reasonable
Delhi tests a nuclear bomb, Washington suspicion that it would use nuclear weapons
imposes sanctions) is easy to conduct but for purposes other than retaliation against a
regrettably shortsighted. A proactive policy— nuclear attack.
building a long-term strategic relationship The concerns that such a move would
with India—is hard to pursue but the only invite increased nuclear proliferation do not
approach likely to succeed. There is no quick seem justified. Rogue countries currently
solution for improving U.S.-Indian relations. working on acquiring nuclear weapons will
The only feasible way for improvement is for continue to do so independently of U.S.
America to accept India’s world power status. recognition of India’s nuclear status.
That, in turn, will require daring foreign pol- Moreover, many states, especially in the
icy moves designed to bring India closer to Third World, would welcome a conciliatory
the United States and its national interests. move as evidence that the United States wish-
es to pursue an equitable foreign and inter-
Rogue Countries, India, and Nuclear national security policy for all nations, not
Weapons merely for developed countries. Britain,
The most radical move the United States France, Russia, and China, the members of
could make for dramatic improvement in its the nuclear club, are likely to follow the U.S.
relations with India would be to uncondi- move. Russia and China would be outma-
tionally accept India’s nuclear status. The neuvered, since a crucial foreign policy and
United States should formally recognize international security initiative dealing with

20
India would have passed from them to U.S. policy goals in South Asia. We would bet-
America. That move would also deal a heavy ter serve our global interests if our policy took
blow to those in China, Russia, and India India out of the subcontinent context and if
itself who dream of building the tripartite Washington conducted relations with New
strategic alliance to oppose the United States. Delhi in the same way it conducts relations
U.S. recognition of India as a nuclear with China, Japan, Russia, and other world
power would remove the main obstacle to powers. In this light, Clinton should have
making America and India friends and de confined his South Asia trip to a visit to India
facto strategic partners. Such an initiative by only. The administration should quickly set
Washington would likely mean India’s accep- up regular meetings between the U.S. presi-
tance of U.S. proposals on nonproliferation dent and the Indian prime minister, as well as
of WMD technology and fissile materials. between the U.S. secretary of state and the
India would join international talks on end- Indian foreign minister and the U.S. secretary
ing the production of fissile materials for of defense and the Indian defense minister.
nuclear weapons and would install effective Perhaps most important, all remaining
controls for nuclear-related materials. Those sanctions against India should be canceled.
measures would reduce the threat of prolifer- Abolishing sanctions would allow the
ation from India and begin U.S.-Indian co- resumption of U.S.-Indian military ties, an The United States
operation on counterproliferation. important step for promoting regional and should propose,
global stability. and wholeheart-
UN Security Council Membership The Kashmir issue should be left to India.
At the same time that America admits America should back democratic India, not edly support,
India to the nuclear club, Washington dictatorial Pakistan. With the Cold War over, India’s candidacy
should formally recognize India’s world America gains nothing by supporting
power status. In a major foreign policy state- Pakistan. President Clinton noted during his
for a permanent
ment Washington should formally recognize visit to India, “I believe that there are ele- seat in the UN
India’s world status and global interests. ments within the Pakistani government that Security Council.
Further, the United States should propose, have supported those who engaged in vio-
and wholeheartedly support, India’s candi- lence in Kashmir.”6 8 Human rights issues in
dacy for a permanent seat in the UN Security Kashmir—even when the Indian military
Council. Such actions would cause positive might be culpable—should not overshadow
reactions around the world, since India is India’s astonishing achievement: securing
regarded as a leader of developing nations. democracy and human rights for more than
Not only would U.S. international prestige one-sixth of the world’s population.
increase, but countries such as Russia, China, Moreover, the biggest perpetrators of human
and France would lose the initiative in the rights abuses in Kashmir are the Pakistani-
diplomatic struggle for India’s favor. backed insurgents.
America should also advise the G-7 indus- The United States should seek greater
trialized nations to invite India to become a cooperation with India in combating interna-
member of that elite international group. tional terrorism, including threats by WMD.
India could become a member of the political As the Hindustan Times recently noted, there
side of G-7 (as Russia is). The other G-7 mem- are many virulently anti-American terrorist
bers would certainly accept this move, since it groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in
would correspond to economic reality: as addition to Kashmiri militant factions based
shown above, India may overtake Britain, in Pakistan, that may be interested in acquir-
Canada, and Italy—all G-7 members—in size ing a radiation weapon.6 9 Those in the region
of GDP by 2006. working against America and India often have
The United States should immediately the same sponsors as well as the same funding
stop dealing with India only in the context of sources and weapons. Osama Bin Laden, the

21
international terrorist at the top of the U.S.
most-wanted list, finances and trains both The Winning U.S. Policy
anti-American and anti-Indian Muslim on India
extremist groups. Moreover, some of those
groups work on two fronts, against both What would such a policy win for the
America and India. United States? America would get a strategic
India and the United States should realize partner of the highest caliber. Most impor-
that they have a common geopolitical enemy, tant, such a policy would dramatically shift
international terrorists, who will not disap- the global, geopolitical, and geostrategic bal-
pear and whose defeat will require significant ance in favor of the United States.
coordination between special forces and other The geopolitical balance in Asia would be
agencies of America and India. The United especially tilted in America’s favor. India
States should not take offense at India’s could help the United States contain expan-
refusal to let a CIA technical intelligence- sionist threats from China to maintain order
gathering center be opened in India; it takes and stability in East and Southeast Asia. In
time for both sides to become less suspicious. addition, America would move further from
It would also be wise for the United States to the brink of nuclear confrontation with
carefully consider whether establishing such a China over the Taiwan issue and other poten-
center in neighboring Bangladesh would be tial sources of friction. China would be less
worth possible worsening relations with New able to contemplate a confrontation with
Delhi, which is likely to misinterpret the either its neighbors in East Asia or with the
move as directed against India. United States if Beijing had to worry about
We need to further open the U.S. market India’s response.
to Indian goods—especially steel and textile Benefits to U.S. national security interests
imports. In addition, U.S. immigration laws would occur on a global scale if the United
should be changed so that more Indians with States and India became strategic partners.
computer skills can be invited to the United Most notably, there would be no chance for an
States. Such a move would alleviate the anti-U.S. Russia-India-China alliance. Prevent-
shortage of information technology special- ing that outcome alone would be a huge
ists in the U.S. labor market. Unlike the geopolitical success for the United States.
Chinese, Indians have greater practical and Further, effectiveness of U.S. intelligence and
experimental knowledge in information special operations against major international
technology, primarily because Indian scien- terrorist groups located in Afghanistan and
U.S. immigration tists and engineers are better trained and Pakistan would significantly increase thanks
hence more capable. It is not by chance that to direct U.S.-Indian cooperation.
laws should be scientists and programmers of Indian (and In response to eliminating sanctions and
changed so that Russian) origin far surpass in number all further opening our market to Indian goods,
more Indians with other foreign colleagues at U.S. laboratories India would likely decrease import tariffs,
and research centers. securing easier access for American goods there.
computer skills Radically reforming U.S. policy toward The American economy would benefit from
can be invited to India will not be easy. We must accept the enhanced trade and investment with India.
modest goal of gradual improvement of U.S.- A foreign policy and national security
the United States. Indian relations. Real friends cannot be made strategy based on Washington’s willingness
overnight, especially when decades of to accept India’s world power status, includ-
ingrained suspicions on both sides must be ing accepting New Delhi in the nuclear club,
overcome. Although India will likely never is the only realistic way for a breakthrough in
become America’s closest ally, it may well U.S.-Indian ties. The current bankrupt U.S.
become a reliable de facto strategic partner in policy will merely extend stagnation in rela-
resolving many global problems. tions to the point of irrevocably losing India.

22
The potential benefits of a more enlightened 16. Sam Brownback, “Political/Military Developments
in India,” Testimony at hearing before the
policy are enormous. The potential perils of Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Washington’s current shortsighted policy are Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign
equally enormous. Relations, 106th Cong., 1st sess., May 25, 1999, p. 32.

17. Stephen P. Cohen, “Political/Military


Developments in India,” Testimony at hearing
Notes before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
1. Charles Babington and Pamela Constable, South Asian Affairs of the Senate Committee on
“Clinton’s Mission to India Overshadowed by Foreign Relations, 106th Cong., 1st sess., May 25,
Massacre,” Washington Post, March 22, 2000, 1999, p. 26.
p. A28.
18. International Monetary Fund, Nations’ GDP
2. Council on Foreign Relations, “A New U.S. Projections (Washington: IMF, 1995), p. 112.
Policy toward India and Pakistan,” 1998, http://
19. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
www.cfr.org/public/pubs/india_126.html.
Military Balance, 1993–1994 (London: Brasseys,
3. Pankaj Mishra, “Pride and Blood in Kashmir,” 1993), p. 138; International Institute for Strategic
New York Times, March 22, 2000, p. A27. Studies, The Military Balance, 1996–1997 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 159; and
4. Pamela Constable, “On South Asia Trip, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Clinton Makes Clear Cold War Is Over,” Military Balance, 1999–2000 (London: Oxford
Washington Post, March 27, 2000, p. A19. University Press, 1999), p. 161. See also
International Monetary Fund, International
5. Jane Perlez, “U.S. and India Set Out to Mend a Financial Statistics Yearbook (Washington: IMF, 1999),
Long-Neglected Link,” New York Times, March 22, pp. 512–13.
2000, p. A18.
20. James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, Economic
6. Quoted in ibid. Freedom of the World: 2000 Annual Report
(Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute, 2000), p. 52.
7. Bill Sammon, “Indian President Rebukes
Clinton,” Washington Times, March 22, 2000. 21. Author’s discussions with S. K. Mukherjee,
Vice president, Corporate Business Development,
8. Charles Babington, “Clinton Moderates Plea J. K. Industries (the second-largest producer of
on Nuclear Arms Issue with Praise for India,” chemicals, textiles, and tires in India), and other
Washington Post, March 23, 2000. Indian business leaders in New Delhi and State of
Rajhastan, India, September 1996.
9. “Blunt Talk in India” (editorial), New York
Times, March 23, 2000, p. A26. 22. “Ambitious Plans of India Navy,” Hindustan
Times, April 24, 2000.
10. Jasjit Singh, “India’s Nuclear Policy: The Year
After,” Strategic Analysis 23, no. 4 (July 1999): 8. 23. Quoted in Ben Barber, “Indian Navy Exercises
Seen Apt to Irk Beijing,” Washington Times, May 8,
11. Quoted in “K. Reghunat in China,” Times of 2000, p. A12.
India, April 28, 1999.
24. “India Projects Naval Power to the South
12. Quoted in Alexei Tamilin, “Jaswant Singh v China Sea,” stratfor.com, May 7, 2000.
Moskve: Phon Etogo Visita—Poteplenie mezhdu
Indiei i Kitaem” (Jaswant Singh in Moscow: 25. Author’s discussion with Ravinder Kumar,
Background for This Visit Is Warming between Director, J. Neru Memorial Museum and Library,
India and China) (in Russian), Dipkurjer NG, June New Delhi, India, July 1999.
22, 2000.
26. Author’s discussion with Raminder Singh Jassal,
13. Quoted in ibid. Former counselor, Embassy of India (Moscow),
Department of Foreign Affairs, New Delhi, India,
14. “T-90s Tank Deal with Russian This Week,” August 1993.
Hindustan Times, June 3, 2000.
27. Jasjit Singh, “India’s Strategic and Security
15. “Russia’s Doctrine Stresses Ties with India,” Perspectives,” Paper presented at “Force
Hindustan Times, April 24, 2000. Modernization 1990–2000: The Asia-Pacific

23
Security Conference,” Singapore, February 12–13, 47. Discussion with Col. Onkar Yadav.
1990.
48. Singh, “Technological/Operational Environment
28. Ibid., p. 3. at the Turn of the Century.”

29. Michael Elliott, “Out of Pandora’s Box,” 49. Singh, “India’s Strategic and Security
Newsweek, June 8, 1998, p. 21. Perspectives,” p. 2.

30. “Chinese Keen to See BJP Ousted,” The Pioneer 50. Discussion with Col. Onkar Yadav.
(India), April 14, 1999.
51. Discussion with Vice Marshal Samir K. Sen.
31. “Building India’s ICBM,” Deccan Chronicle
(India), February 8, 1999. 52. Author’s discussions with senior officers, New
Delhi, India, July 1999.
32. Author’s discussion with Col. Onkar Yadav,
Department of Defense, New Delhi, India, July 53. Ibid.
1999.
54. Ibid.
33. Akshay Joshi, “Information Technology and
Security: An Update,” Strategic Analysis (India), 55. Discussion with Vice Marshal Samir K. Sen.
May 1999.
56. “Pakistan-Sponsored Terror in the Indian
34. Discussion with Ravinder Kumar. State of Jammu and Kashmir,” Report by the
Indian Embassy to Russia, New Delhi–Moscow,
35. Author’s discussion with Vice Marshal 1999, pp. 2, 4, 5, 9, 12.
Samir K. Sen, Air Force, New Delhi, India,
October 1999. 57. Deploying missile-launching sites and air-
fields at altitudes much higher than where targets
36. “Defence Research and Development are located would give multiple advantages to the
Laboratory Results,” Times of India, July 19, 1999. attackers.

37. Discussion with Vice Marshal Samir K. Sen. 58.Karl Inderfurth, “Political/Military Developments
in India,” Testimony at hearing before the
38. “Cartosat-1 to Help Defense Forces,” Hindustan Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Times, August 2, 1999. Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 106th Cong., 1st sess., May 25, 1999,
39. “IRS-6 Satellite to Be Launched in 2002,” p. 5.
Asian Age, August 25, 1999.
59. Cohen, p. 31.
40. “India Spells Out Draft N-Doctrine,”
Hindustan Times, August 18, 1999. 60. Singh, “Technological/Operational Environment
at the Turn of the Century.”
41. V. Malik, “Army in 21st Century,” The Pioneer
(India), February 13, 1999. 61. Mishra, p. A27.

42. Perlez, “U.S. and India Set Out to Mend a 62. “General Ivashov Edet v Iran” (General Ivashov
Long-Neglected Link,” p. 18. Goes to Iran) (in Russian), Smi.ru, June 26, 2000.

43. Quoted in BBC Online, March 22, 2000. 63. Author’s discussion with Krishna Rao, Senior
adviser, Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, New Delhi,
44. Bill Sammon, “Clinton Blisters Pakistan, Calls India, August 1999.
India Great,” Washington Times, March 23, 2000,
p. A14. 64. Office of the Chinese Military Attaché,
“Toward Multipolarity,” Embassy of the People’s
45. Author’s discussions with senior officers, New Republic of China to the Russian Federation,
Delhi, India, August 1999. Moscow, 1999, p. 1.

46. Jasjit Singh, “Technological/Operational 65. Discussions with senior officers, August 1999.
Environment at the Turn of the Century,” Paper
presented at “Defense Strategy Seminar,” 66. Author’s discussions with Chinese military
Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, New officers and members of the Chinese military del-
Delhi, India, January 6–8, 1990. egations, Moscow, January 1995 and May 1996.

24
These discussions occurred at the time when India 68. Quoted in Sammon, “Indian President
was stepping up its ballistic missile activities. Rebukes Clinton,” p. A6.

67. G. Vachnadze, Voennye Mafii Kremlia (Military 69. “N-Material Seizure from Uzbekistan
Mafia of the Kremlin) (in Russian) (Moscow: Alarms West, India,” Hindustan Times, April 24,
Kniga, 1998), p. 91. 2000.

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